i 


MY   LIFE   AND   ACTS 


IN 


HUNGARY 


IN   THE    YEARS    1848    AND    1849 


vetvf 


BY    ARTHUR    GORGE!, 


NEW    YORK: 
HARPER    &    BROTHERS,    PUBLISHERS, 

359    &    331    PEARL    STREET, 
FRAXKLIN     SQUARE. 

18  52. 


r-^ 


■6^ 


^t^Sd 


PREFACE 


The  resistance  of  Hungary  to  Austria  and  Russia  was 
broken,  Kossuth  and  Szemere  and  their  partisans  saved 
themselves,  like  the  Poles,  on  a  neutral  territory.  I  re- 
jected flight ;  and  the  majority  of  the  unfortunate  com- 
batants for  Hungary  against  New  Austria  followed  my 
example. 

Hereupon  I  was  pardoned,  and  meanwhile  banished  to 
Carinthia.  The  decision  on  the  fate  of  my  companions, 
however,  was  left  to  the  Master  of  the  Ordnance,  Baron 
Haynau. 

The  striking  contradiction  between  my  pardon  and  the 
subsequent  executions  might  have  induced  the  relatives 
of  some  of  those  who  were  awaiting  the  decision  of  their 
case  to  suppose  that  it  would  be  possible  for  me,  by  some 
means,  to  save  these  unfortunate  men ;  for,  immediately 
after  the  first  executions  at  Arad  and  Pesth,  I  was  re- 
quested by  letters  from  various  quarters  to  exert  my  pre- 
sumed influence  with  the  government  of  Austria  in  favor 
of  one  or  other  of  the  politically  compromised  persons  who 
had  come  into  the  power  of  Baron  Haynau. 

The  failure  of  these  applications  needs  scarcely  to  be 
mentioned.  I  had  positively  no  influence  at  all  to  exert. 
I  had,  on  the  contrary,  to  perceive  that  it  was  my  duty 
to  suppress  even  the  anxious  cry  for  pardon,  so  long  as 
Baron  Haynau  remained  the  absolute  master  of  life  and 
death  to  my  companions  in  war.  My  intercession  could 
but  kindle  still  higher  the  pious  zeal  of  the  Baron. 


PHEFACE. 

Not  Tintil  there  was  a  pause  in  the  execution  of  the 
capital  sentences  pronounced  at  Arad  and  Pesth,  and  it 
seemed  to  be  indicated  by  this  circumstance  that  Baron 
Haynau  no  longer  ruled  with  unlimited  sway  in  my 
country,  could  T  venture  to  beg  attention  to  the  logical 
consequences  of  my  being  pardoned,  without  having  to 
fear  at  the  same  time  that  my  intercession  would  com- 
pletely endanger  the  lives  of  those  whose  deliverance  it 
implored. 

I  was  on  the  point  of  handing  my  petition,  addressed 
to  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  to  the  local  mili- 
tary authority  of  Klagenfurt  to  be  kindly  forwarded, 
when  the  rumor  that  the  Monarch  would  perhaps  visit 
Carinthia  also  on  his  state -progress  in  May,  1850,  roused 
in  me  the  desire,  as  will  easily  be  conceived,  to  make  my 
request  orally  to  his  Majesty. 

The  rumor,  indeed,  was  well  founded ;  but  an  audi- 
ence was  refused  me,  and  I  was  referred  with  my  petition 
to  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  Re-encouraged  in  some 
degree  by  the  assurances  with  which  Herr  von  Bach  dis- 
missed me,  I  thought  it  best  to  present  through  him  my 
petition  to  the  Monarch.    This  T  did  in  the  following  letter : 

To  his  Excellency  the  Minister  Alexander  von  Bach. 

"  Your  comrades  will  not  be  deceived,  if  they  expect  the  clemency  of  his 
Majesty" — were  the  last  consolatory  words  with  which  your  Excellency 
was  pleased  to  dismiss  me  yesterday. 

How  deeply  they  penetrated  into  my  afflicted  soul,  how  quickly  they 
revived  my  well-nigh  extinguished  belief  in  the  prevalence  of  forgiving 
sentiments  in  the  breast  of  the  offended  earthly  dignities,  let  the  inclosure 
declare  to  your  Excellency. 

^t  is  a  feeble  attempt  to  implore  the  pardon  of  his  Majesty  for  those  who 
are  not  in  the  fortunate  position  of  being  able  to  do  so  for  themselves. 

But  I  know  not  the  language  which  has  power  to  reach  the  heart  of  his 
Majesty;  your  Excellency,  on  the  contrary,  can  not  be  a  stranger  to  it. 

My  words  are  perhaps  too  bold ;  perhaps  the  use  I  make  in  the  inclosed 
document  of  the  reminiscences  of  a  mournful  past  is  calculated  to  thwart 
my  purpose. 

It  can  not  be  concealed  from  your  Excellency's  sound  judgment,  whether 
both  are  fitted  to  be  of  use  to  my  unfortunate  companions,  or  whether  the 


PREFACE.  iii 

mischief  of  a  contrary  effect  may  perhaps  threaten  them  from  my  ignorance 
of  the  bearing  of  this  step. 

And  thus  my  anxious  uncertainty  about  the  consequences  of  the  in- 
closed most  submissive  petition  will  excuse  me  for  daring  once  more  to 
approach  your  Excellency  with  the  respectful  prayer,  that  your  Excellency 
would  be  pleased  most  kindly  to  decide,  on  a  humane  consideration  of  that 
which  it  was  not  permitted  me  personally  to  lay  before  his  Majesty  whether 
the  petition  most  respectfully  inclosed  in  the  original  is  worthy  to  be  pre- 
sented to  his  Majesty  by  your  Excellency's  gracious  intermediation. 

Klvigenfurt,  21st  of  May,  1850. 

My  petition  to  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria, 
was  as  follows  : 

Your  Majesty  ! 

When,  on  the  13th  of  August  last  year,  I  laid  down  our  arms  before  the 
troops  of  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  1  begged  that  my  unfortunate 
companions  might  be  spared,  as  well  as  the  deeply  distressed  people  of 
Hungary,  freely  giving  up  myself  in  expiation  of  what  had  been  done.  I 
despised  flight,  and  purposely  avoided,  after  as  well  as  before  the  laying 
down  of  our  arms,  any  expression  or  action  tending  to  my  own  safety;  for 
I  wished  at  least  to  share  the  fate  of  my  companions,  if  my  prayer  should 
not  be  granted ;  since  my  companions  were  guilty  of  no  act  for  which  they 
deserved  a  more  rigorous  fate  than  myself. 

The  laying  down  of  our  arms  was  resolved  upon  in  a  military  council, 
at  which  I  was  not  even  present.  I  merely  undertook  to  execute  this  reso- 
lution :  and  nevertheless,  I  was  pardoned,  while  a  part  of  the  members  of 
this  military  council  lost  their  lives,  another  part  their  property  and  liberty. 

I  it  was  especially  whose  independent  acts,~  favored  by  the  fortune  of 
war,  so  long  hostilely  delayed  the  realization  of  your  Majesty's  great  idea 
of  a  united  free  Austria  :  and  notwithstandiij^g,  your  Majesty  was  pleased 
to  grant  pardon  to  me,  while  my  former  inferiors — the  tools  of  my  daring 
hand — ^were  given  up  to  the  inexorable  severity  of, the  courts-martial. 

In  vain  I  sought  for  a  point  of  view,  regarded  from  which  my  fate  and 
that  of  my  unfortunate  companions  might  be  made  to  agree.  I  found  none ; 
and  abandoned  myself  to  the  torturing  thought  that  the  act  of  Vilagos,  by 
its  consequences  speedily  and  bloodlessly  terminating  the  Hungarian  revo- 
lution, had  been  accounted  meritorious  in  me  exclusively,  and  had  been 
rewarded  with  my  pardon. 

Deeply  afflicting  as  this  supposition  is  to  me,  I  firmly  cling  to  it  because 
it  has  become  to  me  the  ground  of  hope,  that  those  of  my  former  companions 
who  are  still  alive  might  not  much  longer  be  deprived  of  your  Majesty's 
most  high  pardon,  if  my  ingenuous  words  were  permitted  to  re-echo  in  your 
Majesty's  soul. 

The  surrender  at  Vilagos,  with  all  its  consequences,  would  have  been 
impracticable  without  the  magnanimous  co-operation  of  all  those  on  whom 
your  Majesty's  courts-martial  have  since  either  inflicted  death,  or  the 
severest  imprisonment. 

TIk;  dead — they  rest  in  peace  ;  neither  affected  any  more  by  fear  or  hope. 


PllEFACE. 

ut  the  living — they  still  hope.  The  pardon  which  has  been  extended 
to/ne,  their  leader,  continually  encourages  them  to  hope. 

For  them  I  venture  my  prayer,  w^hose  boldness  the  sacred  interests  of 
umanity  may  justify,  the  oppressive  burden  of  my  grief  may  excuse. 

Mercy  for  them  implores  the  man  who  could  never  hope  or  pray  for 
mercy  for  himself,  although  sacred  duties  forbade  him  to  reject  it  when 
freely  offered. 

Mercy  for  those  whom  death  has  not  yet  removed  beyond  the  influence 
of  your  Majesty's  clemency. 

For  all,  who,  by  love  to  their  country,  in  the  midst  of  great  bewildering 
events,  enticed  from  the  path  of  duty,  partly  too  late  entered  on  the 
honorable  way  of  return,  partly  could  not  again  enter  on  it  through  insur- 
mountable obstacles ;  and  whose  faithful  love  to  their  fatherland  justifies 
the  sure  expectation,  that  they  would  repay  with  threefold  interest  their 
sacred  debt  to  the  great  common  fatherland  by  a  devoted  co-operation  in 
healing  the  wounds  they  had  once  helped  to  inflict. 

The  gloomy  prisons,  unbarred  at  your  Majesty's  gracious  nod ;  the 
purification-commissions  relieved  from  their  melancholy  duty  by  the  merci- 
ful words,  '•'forgiven  and  forgotten" — would  restore  to  thousands  their 
liberty,  their  home,  their  respectable  position  in  society — to  the  common 
fatherland  a  great  number  of  intelligent  faithful  citizens — to  the  state  many 
a  capable  tried  servant. 

The  .apprehension  of  a  shameful  abuse  of  your  Majesty's  pardon  is  con- 
tradicted by  every  trait  in  the  general  national  character  of  the  Magyars ; 
and  even  in  the  non-Magyars  among  my  unfortunate  companions,  this 
apprehension  vanishes  at  the  remembrance  of  their  voluntary  submission. 

A  single  stroke  of  the  pen  would  gain  for  your  Majesty  millions  of 
thankfully  devoted  hearts — a  secure  refuge  at  any  time — and  thousands  of 
millions  of  timorous,  though  voiceless,  complaints  would  become  most 
joyously-sounding  wishes  for  blessings  on  Francis  Josenh  the  magnani- 


Four  or  five  weeks  later,  several  of  my  companions  in 
arms  were  pardoned ;  those,  namely,  who,  like  myself, 
belonged  to  the  category  of  the  so-called  ''  quitted"  of- 
ficers, that  is,  those  who  had  quitted  the  rank  of  officers 
in  the  Austrian  army  before  the  breaking  out  of  the  war 
between  Hungary  and  Austria,  bat  on  their  departure 
had  given  a  written  promise  never  to  fight  against  the 
armies  of  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria. 

The  publication  of  this  act  of  mercy  induced  me  to 
address  the  following  letter  to  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  : 

To  his  Excellency  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Alexander  von  Bach. 

His  Majesty's  recent  act  of  mercy,  to  which  all  those  officers  owe  their 
deliverance  from  the  dungeons,  who  as  "quitted"  royal  imperial  officers 


PREFACE.  V 

had  taken  service  in  the  revolutionary  Hungarian  army,  and  were  for  this 
reason  condemned  by  the  courts-martial,  has  surprisingly  revealed  the 
beautiful  meaning  of  those  consolatory  words  with  which  your  Excellency 
dismissed  me.  The  hearts  of  those  who  have  now  been  given  back  to  their 
families  and  to  their  friends  overflow  with  loud  blessings  for  those  men 
who  put  tlfe  thought  of  mercy  into  the  Monarch's  heart,  and  made  it  there 
germinate  to  a  noble  action.  None  of  the  public  voices  announces  their 
names ;  but  nevertheless  I  am  constrained  firmly  to  believe  that  the  pardon 
of  a  considerable  number  of  my  companions  has  certainly  been  most  decid- 
edly promoted  by  your  Excellency ;  not,  perhaps,  in  consequence  of  the 
hopeless  steps  which  I  dared,  but  rather  in  spite  of  them ;  for  I  can  very 
well  conceive  that  all  I  urged  verbally  and  in  writing,  believing  it  to  be  in 
favor  of  my  companions,  was  more  fitted  to  incite  than  to  conciliate.  It 
came,  however,  from  me,  the  living  evidence,  the  irrefutable  reproach,  that 
punitive  justice  has  by  no  means  been  dealt  out  in  equal  measure  to  the 
participators  in  the  Hungarian  revolution. 

On  a  first  superficial  glance,  this  disproportion  seems  now  to  be  equalized 
— let  us  leave  the  dead  in  peace — for  I  also  belong  to  the  category  of  the 
quitted  royal  imperial  officers.  But  he  who,  on  the  one  hand,  does  not 
overlook  the  limited  political  horizon  of  the  soldier,  and,  on  the  other,  the 
events  of  the  summer  of  1848,  standing  somewhat  isolated  in  history,  can 
hardly  free  himself  from  the  apprehension,  that  the  reproach  of  inequality 
in  punishing  and  forgiving  has  gained  but  a  broader  basis  by  pardoning  all 
quitted  officers,  in  face  of  the  still  condemned  active  ones. 

The  Monarch,  whose  will  is  law  to  the  army,  was  represented  in  the 
summer  of  the  year  1848  by  two  executive  powers,  crippling -each  other, 
and  nevertheless  legitimate  ;  the  army  was  divided  between  both  by  distinct 
military  oaths.  Publicly  disavowed  by  both,  but  secretly  supported  by 
one  of  them,  a  third  national  military  power  arose,  and  with  fatal  haste 
first  hurled  the  fire-brand  of  civil  war  from  the  south  into  the  heart  of  the 
monarchy. 

In  the  midst  of  this  general  confusion,  only  a  few  succeeded  in  guessing 
for  which  of  the  two  legitimate  executive  powers  the  Monarch  would  de- 
clare himself,  simultaneously  disavowing  the  other  ;  for  the  proclamations 
— which  were  calculated  to  explahi  to  many  an  isolated  body  of  troops,  to 
which  they  came  direct,  the  true  will  of  the  Monarch — were  either  not 
communicated  to  the  others  at  all,  or  too  late,  and  moreover  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  weaken  their  effect.  The  first  steps  of  the  soldier  ordered  to 
Hungary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Hungarian  executive  power,  already 
nullified  in  Vienna,  were  made  consequently  under  the  moral  influence  of 
the  recent  military  oath,  out  of  obedience,  the  fundamental  principle  on 
which  the  existence  of  every  regular  armed  force  depends. 

The  quitted  officers  already  pardoned  were  not  subjected  to  this  influence. 
They  broke  their  promise,  given  in  the  reciprocal  bond  when  they  quitted — 
never  to  serve  with  arras  in  hand  against  the  troops  of  his  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  Austria — from  a  free,  independent  resolve. 

By  the  pardon  of  these  men,  the  execution  of  the  condemnations  of  the 
active  officers,  still  proceeding,  gains  an  expression  of  rigor,  which  causes 
it  not  only  easily  to  be  forgotten  that  these  also  have  already  been  mitigated 
in  the  way  of  mercy,  hut  which  moreover  might  even  raisse  the  natural 
compassion  of  the  masses  for  those  who  are  punished  to  a  kind  of  martyr- 


vi  PREFACE. 

worship,  with  all  its  traditional  consequences,  especially  to  be  regretted  by 
Austria. 

The  modest  expression  of  a  deeply  felt  thanks,  which  I  wished  to  give  to 
my  words,  has  by  degrees  been  changed,  from  continually  looking  at  so 
many  still- unbarred  prisons,  into  the  almost  avowed  one  of  a  substantiated 
intercession  ;  and  while  I  am  aware  of  this,  the  doubt  again  ari^fes,  whether 
I  do  not  thereby  perhaps  injure  where  1  wish  to  benefit.  This  doubt 
would  silence  me  forever  in  behalf  of  my  companions,  were  it  not  counter- 
acted by  the  conviction,  that  your  Excellency,  recognizing  in  all  its  great- 
ness the  irresistible  effect  of  clemency  ixpon  the  human  heart,  and  dis- 
regarding the  contradictory  views  of  parties,  will  successfully  conduct  to  its 
consummation  that  work  of  reconciliation  which  has  already  been  so  nobly 
begun. 
Klagenfurt,  30thofJune,  18.50. 

I  give  these  documents  in  the  Preface,  because  I  think 
their  contents  may  be  calculated  to  serve  as  a  pledge 
beforehand  to  the  reader  of  the  frankness  of  the  subsequent 
records  of  my  life  and  acts. 

Those  historical  documents  of  value  which  accidentally 
remained  in  my  possession  appear  in  their  proper  places, 
partly  given  i)P.rj^atim.  partly  faithfully  translated  from 
Hungarian  into  Grerman. 

The  surprisingly  small  number  of  documents  is  ex- 
plained by  the  circumstance,  that  I  never  expected  to 
survive  the  revolution. 

ARTHUR  GORGE  I. 

Klagenfurt,  15th  of  August,  1851. 


Note.— The  reader  is  requested  to  observe  that  wherever  miles  are  mentioned,  the 
German  long  niile  ( =  nearly  5^  English  miles)  is  meant.  In  some  instances  the  word 
'  (German)'  has  been  inserted  before  'miles,'  but  it  is  feared  not  uniformly.— TVansJ. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 
Enter  the  Honv^ds.    Occupations  out  of  Hungary.    Advanced  to  Honv6d  major. 

Szolnok;  the  Volunteer  Mobile  National-guards.    Political  confession  of  faith 13 

CHAPTER  II. 
Detached  to  the  island  of  Csepel.    Nominated  commander-in-chief  of  the  south- 
ern militia,  and  simultaneous  extension  of  my  military  mission.     Count  Eugene 

Zichy  arrested  ;  examined,  condemned,  and  executed  by  court-martial 17 

CHAPTER  HI. 
Three  days'  armistice  after  the  battle  at  Pakozd,  Velencze,  and  Sukoro.  Vasar- 
helyi.  Recommencement  of  hostilities.  Perczel  my  commander-in-chief.  The  mili- 
tia. Opening  of  the  expedition  against  Major-general  Roth.  Skirmish  at  Tacz. 
Disarming  of  a  Croat  column.  Philippovich  in  Perczel's  head-quarters.  Retreat  of 
Major-general  Roth.    Dispute  between  Perczel  and  myself.    Disarming  of  the  Roth 

corps  at  Ozora 35 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Advanced  to  Honved  colonel,  and  recalled  from  the  Perczel  corps.     Kalozd.    Take 
possession  of  some  jewels  belonging  to  the  late  Count  Zichy.    Vasarhelyi.    Pestli. 

Deliver  up  the  jewels  48 

CHAPTER  V. 
A  consultation  at  Kossuth's.     His  want  of  confidence  in  Moga.     Secret  object  of 

my  recall  from  the  Perczel  corps  and  mission  to  Parendorf 51 

CHAPTER  VI. 
The  command  of  the  van-guard  of  the  army  of  the  upper  Danube  transferred  to  me. 
Ladislaus  Csanyi.    Our  outposts  on  the  Lajtha.    First  crossing  of  the  frontier.     The 
head-quarters  at  Parendorf,  and  my  secret  mission.     The  troops  of  the  van-guard. 
Second  crossing  of  the  frontier 55 

CHAPTER  VII. 
First  proclamation  of  Prince  Windischgratz,  and  its  consequences.  A  deliberation 
beforehand  at  Moga's  about  the  impending  third  crossing  of  the  frontier.  Some  light 
on  the  first  two  crossings  of  the  frontier.  The  military  council  in  Nikelsdorf.  Kos- 
suth in  Parendorf.  His  ultimatum  to  Prince  Windischgratz.  The  agitations  in  the 
camp  for  the  offensive  A  Hungarian  tmmpet  made  prisoner  in  the  hostile  camp, 
and  its  consequences 60 

CHAPTER  VIH. 
Third  and  last  crossing  of  the  frontier.    The  battle  at  Schwechat.   Remarks  upon  it .     68 

CHAPTER  IX. 
A  conference  with  Kossuth.  His  experience  on  the  flight  from  Schwechat.  Count 
Guyon  named  colonel  of  the  national  guard  and  commander  of  the  expedition  against 
Field-marshal  Lieut.  Simunich.  The  chief  command  of  the  army  of  the  upper  Dan- 
ube transferred  to  me.  The  expedition  against  Simunich  fails.  The  two  meetings 
between  Bern  and  myself 79 

CHAPTER  X. 
Reasons  which  had  determined  me  to  accept  the  chief  command  of  the  army.  I 
demand  the  evacuation  of  the  frontier  ;  Kossuth  its  occupation.  Kossuth's  depend- 
ency. Nevertheless  I  desire  him  for  Dictator.  My  reasons.  My  letter  to  the  Com- 
mittee of  Defense  in  reference  thereto.  Controversies  between  Kossuth,  the  Com- 
mittee of  Defense,  and  Meszaros  on  the  one  part,  and  myself  on  the  other.  Proofs 
of  it 85 

CHAPTER  XI. 
Reasons  why  I  was  not  removed  from  the  chief  command  when  in  Presburg.  Why 
I  did  not,  of  my  own  accord,  resign.  Whether  I  did  or  did  not  aspire  to  the  dictator- 
ship and  why.  A  private  letter.  Establishment  of  defensive  works  at  Presburg, 
Wieselburg,  and  Raab.  The  state  of  Hungary  in  autumn,  1848,  and  the  regular 
troops 100 


viii  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Prince  Windischgratz  crosses  the  frontier.  It  is  evacuated.  Presburg  abandoned. 
Great  losses.  Beginning  of  the  retreat  toward  Raab.  Combat  at  Wieselbiirg.  Con- 
tinuation of  the  retreat  as  far  as  Raab.    Patriotic  devastations.    An  end  put  to  tliem. 

Troops  believed  to  be  lost  unexpectedly  saved 108 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Raab  evacuated  without  drawing  a  sword.    Combat  with  the  rear-guard  at  Babol- 
na.     Vertesi  Hegyelc.     Plan  of  defense.     Undeceivings.     General  Perczel  defeated 
at  Moor.    Offensive  disposition  against  Perczel's  conqueror.    Retreat  toward  Ofen.  112 
CHAPTER  XIV. 

Perczel's  views  about  his  defeat  at  Moor.  The  last  resolutions  of  the  Diet  at 
Pesth.  Kossuth  demands  a  decisive  battle  before  Ofen,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
army  to  be  saved  and  the  capitals  spared.  The  impracticability  of  this.  Kossuth  at 
Debreczin.  Military  council  in  Pesth.  Its  resolutions.  Battle  at  T6t6ny.  Evacua- 
tion of  the  capitals 118 

CHAPTER  XV. 

The  state  of  Hungary  and  the  regular  troops  after  the  evacuation  of  the  capitals. 
The  proclamation  of  Waizen.    The  regular  troops  get  out  of  the  rain  and  under  the 

spout 125 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

The  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube.  Offensive  against  Field-marshal  Lieut. 
Simunich.  Its  interruption  by  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Csorich.  Characteristics  of 
Colonel  Count  Guyon.  I  insist  on  prosecuting  the  offensive  against  Simunich.  The 
chief  of  the  general  staff  proposes  to  save  the  corps  of  the  upper  Danube  in  the  mount- 
ain-towns, and  prevails 132 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

The  district  of  the  mountain-towns.  Position  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper 
Danube  before  the  retreat  thither.  Position  of  the  hostile  corps.  The  plan  of  retreat. 
Its  execution.  Position  of  the  corps  d'arm6e  of  the  upper  Danube  in  the  mountain- 
towns  137 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

The  enemy  attacks  the  mountain-towns.    Zsarnocz.    Turning  column  of  Colonel 

CoUery.    Conflict  at  Hodrics  (22d  of  January) 141 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

The  defeat  of  the  Guyon  division  at  Windschacht  (21st  of  January),  and  its  retreat 
from  Schemnitz  as  far  as  Bucsa  (22d  of  January),  subsequently  becomes  known. 
Critical  situation  of  the  Aulich  division.  Saved  from  it.  Still  more  critical  situation 
of  the  Guyon  division  and  that  of  the  left  wing.  Final  junction  in  Neusohl  of  the 
corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube.  A  previous  order  to  retreat  by  the  war-minister 
is  afterward  taken  into  consideration.  Our  lines  of  retreat  from  Neusohl  toward  the 
upper  Theiss.  Plan  for  retreating  as  far  as  the  Zips.  A  train  of  heavy-loaded  wag- 
ons as  rear-guard.  The  retreat  commences.  A  tempter.  Disposition  of  the  popu- 
lation  ^ 150 

CHAPTER  XX. 

Arrival  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  in  the  Zips.  Sudden  attack  at 
Iglo  (between  the  2d  and  3d  of  February).  Dangerous  situation  of  the  corps  d'ar- 
mee of  the  upper  Danube.  A  possible  outlet.  Reasons  against  making  use  of  it,  and 
for  the  offensive  against  Field-mar.shal  Lieut.  Count  Schlick.  Offensive  begun.  Posi- 
tions of  the  corps  under  Klapka  and  Schlick.  The  combinations  deduced  from  it 
very  unfavorable  for  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube.  Importance  of  the  bat- 
tle at  the  Branyiszko.    A  reckoning  with  the  past 158 

CHAPTER  XXI. 
Report  on  Guyon's  victory  at  the  Branyiszko  (5th  of  February')-  Essentially 
changed  -situation  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube.  Count  Schlick  aban- 
dons the  basis  of  his  operations.  Conjectures  occasioned  thereby  as  to  his  next  in- 
tentions. Measures  against  them.  Surprising  defensive  measures  of  the  enemy. 
Direct  news  from  Colonel  Klapka.  Their  influence  on  our  dispositions  for  attack. 
The  enemy  evacuates  Kaschau  without  striking  a  blow.  Junction  of  the  corps  d'ar- 
mee of  the  upper  Danube  with  the  Hungarian  forces  on  the  Theiss.  Klapka's  last 
operations  against  Count  Schlick.  Offensive  concerted  between  Klapka  and  myself. 
The  Klapka  corps  undertakes  the  pursuit  of  the  Schlick  corps.  Lieut.-general  Dem- 
binski  orders  the  Klapka  corps  from  Kaschau  to  Miskolcz.  The  corps  d'armee  of 
the  upper  Danube  undertakes  the  pursuit.    Its  results 166 

CHAPTER  XXII, 
Dembinski  becomes  Hungarian  commander-in-chief.     New  classification  of  the 
Hungarian  forces.    The  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  receives  the  name,  Sev- 


CONTENTS.  ix 

enth  Army  Corps.    Antipathies  therein  against  Dembinski's  being  commander-in- 
chief.    Causes  and  consequences.    Measures  taken  against  the  consequences.    Dem- 

binski  recognized  as  commander-in-chief 173 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Dembinski  rejects  the  plan  of  operations  concerted  between  Colonel  Klapka  and 
myself.  The  seventh  army  corps  ordered  to  Miskolcz.  First  encounter  with  Dem- 
binski.   Dembinski's  first  acts  as  Hungarian  commander-in-chief 177 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

Dembinski's  dispositions  assume  an  offensive  character.  His  dissatisfaction  with 
Klapka  and  the  government.  His  dispositions  of  troops.  Encounter  with  Dembinski 
in  Erlau.    The  enemy  himself  assumes  the  offensive.    Dembinski's  characteristics .  183 

CHAPTER  XXV. 
Position  of  the  Hungarian  army  immediately  before  the  two  days'  battle  at  Kdpol- 
na.    Termination  of  the  first  day's  battle  (26th  of  February).    Dembinski's  disposi- 
tions for  the  second  day's  battle.    Circumstances  causing  delay  in  forwarding  them 

to  the  army  corps.    Guyon  arrives  too  late  at  Kapolna 189 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 
The  second  day's  battle  at  Kapolna  (27th  of  February).     The  Kmety  division 
arrives  too  late  at  Kerecsend.    Dembinski's  dispositions  of  troops  after  the  battle. . .  194 

CHAPTER   XXVH. 
Dembinski  after  the  battle  at  Kapolna  declines  any  ftirther  resistance.    I  disap- 
prove of  this  measure,  but  can  no  longer  prevent  it.    A  private  misimderstanding  be- 
tween Dembinski  and  myself.    The  support  of  the  army 206 

CHAPTER  XXVni. 
Retreat  to  Mezo-Kovesd.    The  camp  there.    Battle  at  Mezo-Kovesd  on  the  28th  of 

February.    Guyon's  characteristics 210 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 
Dembinski  intends  to  give  the  army  rest.    His  dispositions  to  that  effect.    The 
army  enters  the  cantonments.    Klapka  attacked  at  Eger-Farmos  (1st  of  March).    The 
army  quits  the  cantonments.    Dembinski's  theory  for  procuring  rest.    Character  of 

the  Windischgratz- Dembinski  campaign 214 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

The  Klapka  divisions  refuse  unconditional  obedience  to  Dembinski.    Dembinski 

decrees  the  retreat  beyond  the  Theiss.    Klapka  effects  it  with  his  divisions  (2d  of 

March).    I  delay  the  retreat  of  the  seventh  army  corps.    Reasons  for  it.    Dembinski 

countermands  the  retreat  of  the  seventh  army  corps.    Mv  written  declaration  against 

it.    I  effect  the  retreat  (3d  of  March) 219 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 
The  staff-ofiicers  of  the  army  demand  Dembinski's  removal  from  the  chief  command. 
The  government  commissary  Szemere  undertakes  to  execute  it.    Dembinski's  unsuc- 
cessful objections.    Kossuth's  arrival  at  the  army.    Interrogation  of  the  staff-ofllicers. 
Vetter  appointed  commander-in-chief 224 

CHAPTER   XXXH. 
Colonel  John  Damjanics  victorious  at  Szolnok.    Dembinski  allows  us  subsequently 

to  discover  his  plan  of  operations 230 

CHAPTER  XXXni. 
The  new  (Vetter-Dembinski)  plan  of  operations.    The  interregnum  in  the  army. 

My  acts  during  it 234 

CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

Kossuth  and  his  political  opponents 238 

CHAPTER   XXXV. 
My  journey  to  Debreczin.    Termination  of  the  interregnum.    Vetter  commander-in- 
chief  241 

CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

Independent  operations  of  the  seventh  army  corps.    The  Vetter-Dembinski  plan  of 

operations  abandoned.    Advance  of  the  united  army  as  far  as  Gyongyos  and  Hort. .  244 

CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

Vetter  falls  sick.    The  chief  command  provisionally  transferred  to  me.    Our  plan 

of  attack.    The  seventh  army  corps  conquers  at  Hatvan  (2d  of  April),  and  thereby 

renders  possible  the  execution  of  the  plan  of  attack 247 

CHAPTER  XXXVHI. 
The  first,  second,  and  third  army  corps  separate  from  the  seventh  corps,  and  be- 


X  CONTENTS. 

gin  to  turn  the  enemy.  One  half  of  the  third  army  corps  defeats  the  enemy  at  Tapi6- 
Uicslte,  after  the  latter  had  previously  defeated  the  whole  first  corps  (4th  of  April). 
Continuation  of  the  turning-mancEUvre 250 

CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

Battle  at  Isaszeg  (6th  of  April) 258 

CHAPTER  XL. 

On  the  state  of  affairs  in  Hungary 268 

CHAPTER  XLI, 
Delayed  advance  against  Godolo  after  the  battle  of  Isaszeg.    Retreat  of  Prince 
Windischgratz  toward  the  capital.    The  seventh  army  corps  before  and  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Isaszeg 271 

CHAPTER  XLH. 
Kossuth  in  Godollo 274 

CHAPTER   XLHI. 
The  new  plan  of  operations.    Its  execution,  by  storming  Waizen,  begun  on  the  10th 
of  April,  1849.    The  sudden  attack  on  Lossoncz  (end  of  March),  and  its  probable  con- 
sequences   , 279 

CHAPTER  XLIV. 

Details  of  the  battle  at  Waizen.    Continuation  of  operations  as  far  as  the  river  Gran 

at  L6vencz.    The  resolution  of  the  Diet  at  Debreczin,  14th  of  April,  1849 283 

CHAPTER  XLV. 
Crossing  the  Gran.    Damjanics  conquers  at  Nagy-Sarlo  on  the  19th  of  April.    My 
views  on  this  combat.    Continuation  of  the  operations.    The  battle  at  Kemend  on 
the  20th  of  April.    Relief  of  the  fortress  of  Komorn  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  on 
the  22d  of  April 288 

CHAPTER  XLVI. 
Preparation  for  the  relief  of  the  fortress  of  Komorn  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Dan- 
ube.   Sudden  attack  on  the  hostile  trench  in  the  night  between  the  25th  and  26th  of 
April.    The  relief  on  the  right  bank  also  effected  on  the  26th  of  April 294 

CHAPTER  XL VII. 
Retrospective  glance  at  my  helpless  situation  as  commander  of  the  army,  after  the 
first  news  of  the  declaration  of  independence.    How  events  assisted  me.    Situation 
at  that  moment,  and  my  proclamation  of  Komorn ^02 

CHAPTER  XL VIII. 
The  theatre  of  war  after  the  26th  of  April.    Instead  of  the  uninterrupted  prosecu- 
tion, as  at  first  intended,  of  our  offensive  operations  against  the  hostile  main  army, 
the  siege  of  the  fortress  of  Ofen  comes  into  the  fore-ground 311 

CHAPTER  XLIX. 
My  appointment  as  war-minister.    Damjanics  becomes  unfit  for  service.    Klapka 
leaves  the  main  army  in  order  to  act  as  my  substitute  in  the  war-ministry.    Changes 
in  the  army 320 

CHAPTER  L. 
Poltenberg  occupies  Raab.    The  main  body  of  the  army  invests  Ofen.    The  range 
of  the  investment.    The  fortress  of  Ofen.     The  disposition  of  our  batteries.    The 
over-hasty  attack.    Its  cessation.    My  letter  to  Major-general  Hentzi.    His  answer, 
A  letter  from  Klapka,  in  which  he  dissuades  from  the  operations  against  Ofen 322 

CHAPTER  LI. 

The  siege  of  Ofen 329 

CHAPTER  LH. 

Criticism  on  the  siege  and  defense  of  Ofen 342 

CHAPTER  LIII. 
The  events  of  the  war  on  the  upper  Waag.    Condition  of  affairs  in  the  district  of 
the  operations  of  the  main  army  at  the  time  of  the  taking  of  Ofen.    Klapka's  plan  of 
defensive  operations,  and  my  disposition  of  the  troops,  immediately  after  the  taking 

of  Ofen 345 

CHAPTER  LIV. 
A  meeting  between  General  Klapka  and  myself.    Its  consequences.    I  refuse  the 
distinctions  which  the  Diet  had  intended  for  me,  and  in  consequence  of  this  enter  into 
communication  with  the  parliamentary  opponents  of  the  declaration  of  independence .  349 


CONTENTS.  xi 

CHAPTER  LV. 
Account  of  the  circumstances  which,  on  the  one  hand,  bound  me  to  the  chief  com- 
mand of  the  army,  and  on  the  other  hand  determined  me  to  undertake  personally  the 
management  of  the  ministry  of  war.    Plan  for  the  offensive  against  the  Austrians. 
Origin  of  the  central  office  of  operations 355 

CHAPTER  LVI. 

My  meeting  with  members  of  the  peace-party  in  Debreczin 358 

CHAPTER  LVII. 
Kossuth  and  the  declaration  of  independence.    My  relation  to  Kossuth  after  the 
14th  of  April,  1849 364 

CHAPTER  LVni. 
The  seat  of  government,  notwithstanding  my  counter-representations,  transferred 
from  Debreczin  to  Pesth.    Commencement  of  my  activity  against  the  existence  of  the 
declaration  of  independence.    Two  captured  Honved  officers  executed  by  order  of  the 
new  commander-in-chief  of  the  Austrian  army,  Baron  Haynau 367 

CHAPTER  LIX. 
Significance  and  consequences  of  the  executions  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chap- 
ter.   Continuation  of  my  endeavors  hostile  to  the  existence  of  the  act  of  independence. 
The  final  aim  of  these  endeavors.    The  peculiarity  of  my  relation  to  the  peace-party, 
to  Szemere,  to  Kossuth.    Supplementary  facts  from  my  duties  as  war-minister 371 

y^  CHAPTER  LX. 
Events  on  the  theatre  of  war  of  the  Hungarian  main  army  from  the  taking  of  Ofen 
to  the  middle  of  June.  Reciprocal  position  of  the  Hungarian  and  Austrian  main 
armies  at  that  time.  My  suppositions  about  the  enemy's  plan  of  operations.  Uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  strength  and  the  serious  commencement  of  the  Russian  intervention. 
The  influence  of  this  uncertainty  on  my  resolves  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army. 
The  causes. >f  the  delay  of  our  offensive.  Dispositions  for  the  retreat  and  other 
preparations  in  the  event  of  a  serious  commencement  of  the  Russian  intervention 379 

CHAPTER  LXI. 
The  opening  of  our  offensive  against  the  Austrians  (on  the  16th  of  June)  miscarries. 
I  fix  the  20th  of  June  for  a  second  more  energetic  attempt  at  the  offensive.    General 
Klapka  dissuades  from  it,  and  proposes  again  instead  his  plan  of  defensive  operations, 
but  in  vain  387 

CHAPTER  LXIl. 

The  events  of  the  war  on  the  20th,  21st,  and  22d  of  June 392 

V  •  CHAPTER  LXHI.     ~ 
The  first  news  of  the  serious  commencement  of  the  Russian  intervention.    Their 
confirmation,  and  influence  on  my  resolutions.    The  ministerial  council  of  the  26th  of 

June.    Loss  of  Raab  (28th  June).    Retreat  into  the  fortified  camp  at  Komorn 414 

CHAPTER  LXIV. 

Differences  between  the  government  and  myself 424 

CHAPTER  LXV. 

The  2d  of  July 430 

CHAPTER  LXVI. 
The  last  days  at  Komorn 446 

CHAPTER  LXVH. 
A  part  of  the  main  army  leaves  Komorn.  Retreat  as  far  as  Waizen.  First  encounter 
with  outposts  of  the  Russian  main  army.  Battle  at  Waizen  (15th  of  July).  Not  able 
to  improve  the  advantages  gained  by  it,  and  informed  that  the  Russian  main  army  was 
immediately  opposite  us,  I  determine  on  turning  the  latter  by  Miskolcz.  Reasons  for 
this  choice.  Necessity  of  gaining  on  the  new  line  of  retreat  a  considerable  advance 
on  the  Russian  main  army.  The  only  means  of  attaining  it,  the  nightly  retreat  from 
the  position  before  Waizen,  is  ordered  for  the  night  between  the  16th  and  17th  of  July. 
Unexpected  interruption.  The  hostile  surprise  very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  17th 
of  July.  General  Leiningen  nevertheless  enables  the  army  to  depart.  Rear-guard 
combat  on  the  Waizen  mountain,  before  Retsag  and  at  this  place.  Continuation  of 
the  retreat  on  the  17th  of  July  as  far  as  Vadkert.  Commencement  of  the  further 
retreat  on  the  18th  toward  Balassa-Gyarmat  471 

CHAPTER  LXVIII. 
Events  of  the  war  from  the  1 8th  to  the  20th  of  July.    Our  conjectures  at  that  time 
about  the  plan  of  the  enemy's  operations.    Their  influence  on  the  employment  of  the 
divers  army  corps.    Dispositions  for  the  march  on  the  21st  of  July 489 


xii  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  LXIX. 

The  first  Russian  trumpets  in  tiie  camp  of  the  army  under  my  command.  Imme- 
diate consequences  of  this  event 494 

CHAPTER  LXX. 

Continuation  of  the  operation  of  breaking  through  toward  Miskolcz.  Drawing  up 
of  the  army  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Sajo.    Situation  of  the  army  at  that  time.    En- 

coimter  of  outposts  at  Harsany  on  the  23d  of  July.    Dispositions  for  the  24th 503 

CHAPTER  LXXI. 

A  letter  of  the  Russian  General  Count  Riidiger.    My  answer.    What  occurred  to 

it.    Exchange  of  arms  between  Lieut.-General  Sass  and  myself 509 

CHAPTER  LXXH. 

Combat  at  Goromboly  on  the  24th  of  July.  Battle  on  the  Sajo  on  the  25th.  Retreat 
from  the  Sajo  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Hernad.    My  determination  to  remain  on  the 

Hernad.    Motives  for  it 512 

CHAPTER  LXXHI. 

Kossuth  censures  my  answer  to  the  Russian  commander-in-chief.  Particular  mo- 
tives which  determined  me  to  receive  this  censure  in  silence.  The  real  object  of  a 
letter  to  General  Klapka.  Conditions  for  a  favorable  turn  of  affairs  in  the  south  of 
Hungary.  I  advise  Kossuth  to  remove  Dembinski  from  the  chief  command.  Kossuth 
assents,  and  intends  himself  to  take  the  chief  command.    A  projected  rendezvous  with 

Kossuth  does  not  take  place « 519 

CHAPTER  LXXIV.* 

The  Russians  cross  the  Theiss  at  Tiszafiired.  Our  strategic  situation  on  the 
Hernad.  A  new  Russian  corps  enters  on  tlie  scene  of  war.  Combat  at  Gesztely  on 
the  28th  of  July.  Commencement  of  the  retreat  from  the  Hernad  in  the  night  between 
the  28th  and  2gth.  News  about  the  movement  of  the  Russians  from  Tiszafiired. 
Division  of  the  army  into  two  columns  (at  Nyiregyhaza).  Dispositions  of  the  march 
for  the  combined  retreat.  Explanations  of  them ;  and  instructions  for  the  leader  of  the 
secondary  column.  Conflict  between  the  latter  and  the  Russians  at  Debreczin  on  the 
^d  of  August.  The  situation  of  the  principal  column  (the  main  body  of  the  army) 
during  this  conflict  and  immediately  after  it.  Retreat  as  far  as  Gross- Wardei'n. 
General  Nagy-Sandor's  culpability,  and  my  seeming  indulgence  toward  him.  The 
consequences  of  the  2d  of  August  at  Debreczin,  and  their  influence  on  the  further  dis- 
positions. Uninterrupted  continuation  of  the  retreat  from  Gross-Wardein  to  Arad. .  522 
CHAPTER  LXXV. 

Supplementary  account  of  divers  circumstances,  rumors,  and  events,  from  the  time 

of  the  retreat  from  the  Hernad  to  Arad 538 

CHAPTER  LXXVI. 

The  next  war  operations,  and  Lieut.-General  Dembinski's  retreat  from  Szoreg  to 
Temesvar.  General  Nagy-Sandor  on  his  march  from  Arad  to  Temesvar  attacked  and 
forced  back  to  Arad.    The  last  ministerial  council  of  the  10th  of  August,  1849 554 

CHAPTER  LXXVII. 

The  provisional  government  and  the  negotiations  with  Russia.    Tendency  of  my 

taking  part  in  the  latter 566 

CHAPTER  LXXVIII. 

My  last  meeting  with  Kossuth.  Count  Guyon  reports  that  Dembinski's  army  has 
been  scattered  at  Temesvar.  I  call  upon  Kossuth  to  resign.  He  nominates  me  com- 
mander-in-chief. Csanyi  induces  the  governor  to  resign.  Kossuth's  last  proclama- 
tion to  the  nation.  Answer  of  the  Russians  to  our  invitation  to  negotiate.  I  propose 
an  unconditional  surrender  before  the  Russians.  The  military  council  accepts  my 
proposal 569 

CHAPTER  LXXIX. 
March  from  Arad  to  Vilagos.    Events  there 594 

CHAPTER  LXXX. 
The  surrender  of  arms 605 

CHAPTER  LXXXI 
After  the  surrender  of  arms 608 


MY   LIFE   AND  ACTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 


The  summoning  cry  of  distress  of  the  first  independent  Hunga- 
rian ministry  of  war,  "  The  Country  is  in  danger !"  drew  me 
from  the  quiet  country-life  in  which  I  had  passed  the  spring  of 
1848,  on  the  estate  of  a  female  relative  in  the  north  of  Hungary, 
into  the  ranks  of  the  Honved  battalions,  which  had  just  been 
raised. 

Having  formerly  been  a  lieutenant  in  the  royal  imperial  Aus- 
trian army,  I  was  immediately  invested  with  the  rank  of  captain, 
and  attached  to  the  fifth  battalion  of  Honveds.  The  station  for 
its  formation  was  Raab  (Gyor). 

There  I  found  a  captain  my  senior  in  rank  already  occupied  in 
the  organization  of  his  company.  I  had  known  this  man  when 
I  served  in  the  royal  Hungarian  Noble  Life-guards,  and  knew 
also  that,  not  long  before,  he  had  been  pensioned  as  a  royal  im- 
perial lieutenant  on  account  of  his  mental  imbecility.  What 
services  could  the  country  expect  in  the  time  of  war  from  one 
whose  intellectual  faculties  had  not  sufficed  for  the  claims  of  the 
service  in  the  time  of  peace  ?  The  preferment  of  such  a  man  to 
the  rank  of  captain  made  me  fear  that  sufficient  strictness  had 
not  been  exercised  in  the  choice  of  the  Honved  officers.  Sadder 
were  the  experiences  in  this  respect  which  awaited  me.  This 
senior  comrade  of  mine  was  intellectually  unfit  for  his  post ;  the 
chief  of  the  battalion  was  also  morally  so.  He  was  generally 
recognized  as  a  usurer  well  known  in  Pesth. 

In  these  painful  circumstances,  I  joyfully  hailed  the  decree  of 
the  ministry,  which  suddenly  transferred  me  from  the  battalion 
to  a  more  independent  sphere  of  action ;  and  from  this  time  I 
saw  my  battalion  no  more 


14  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Ill  Pesth,  whither  this  decree  ordered  me,  I  received  a  com- 
mission to  purchase  for  Hungary  a  supply  of  flint-muskets,  they 
lying  in  Smyrna  and  Constantinople,  and  to  use  the  greatest 
possible  speed  in  transporting  them  to  Pesth.  This  project  failed 
as  the  person  who  offered  them  could  not  be  depended  upon  ;  and 
I  was  then  commanded  to  establish  a  manufactory  for  fusees  and 
percussion-caps ;  but  meanwhile  to  furnish  percussion-caps  during 
the  next  year,  by  obtaining  speedy  supplies  from  similar  manu- 
factories already  existing. 

The  fulfillment  of  this  task  led  me,  in  August  1848,  to  Prague 
and  Wiener-Neustadt.  I  visited  several  times  the  royal  imperial 
manufactory  for  fireworks  situated  near  the  last  mentioned  place, 
to  learn  the  process  of  manufacturing  fusees  adopted  there.  In- 
troduced by  the  then  ministry  of  war  at  "Vienna,  I  received  the 
necessary  information  from  the  directors  of  the  establishment  in 
the  most  obliging  manner. 

The  war  of  Hungary  with  the  southern  provinces  of  Sclavonia 
had  almost  exhausted  the  stock  of  fusees  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Hungarian  ministry  of  war.  I  was  therefore  ordered  at  the 
same  time  to  provide  Hungary  with  a  fresh  supply  direct  from 
the  royal  imperial  establishment  for  fireworks ;  and  assisted  by 
the  Vienna  ministry  of  war,  quickLy  executed  this  commission. 
On  my  return  to  Pesth,  I  submitted  to  the  ministerial  president 
a  proposal  for  the  establishment  of  a  manufactory  for  fusees  and 
percussion-caps.  But  there  were  always  more  important  things 
to  be  attended  to.  I  Avas  obliged  to  wait,  and  wait,  and  again 
wait,  till  at  last  I  lost  all  patience,  and  insisted  on  being  em- 
ployed in  the  war  against  the  Raizen.  My  request  was  acceded 
to.  I  had  to  join  the  suite  of  the  minister  of  war,  Avho  was 
about  to  proceed  to  the  Hungarian  camp,  and  superintend  the 
operations  against  the  revolted  Raizen  and  Serbians. 

I  had  already  waited  an  hour  for  our  departure  on  board  the 
steamer  appropriated  to  the  minister  of  war,  when  I  suddenly 
received  orders  to  remain  in  Pesth,  and  assist  in  the  formation 
of  a  plan  for  the  concentration  of  the  mobile  National-guard  from 
the  four  circles  of  Hungary,  regard  being  paid  to  the  strategic 
conditions  of  the  country.  I  had  immediately  to  take  the  com- 
mand in  one  of  the  circles,  and  was  appointed  to  that  on  this 
side  the  Theiss  ;  my  chief  station  being  Szolnok.  On  this  occa- 
sion I  was  advanced  to  the  rank  of  Honved  major. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  15 

In  Szolnok  I  obtained  my  first  insight  into  the  state  of  affairs 
in  Hungary,  and  was,  alas,  undeceived.  I  had  supposed  that  all 
my  countrymen  were  animated,  like  myself,  with  a  determination 
to  sacrifice  every  thing  for  the  salvation  of  the  fatherland.  I  con- 
fidently expected  that  the  whole  Mag5''ar  population  of  Hungary 
would  rise  as  one  man  in  defense  of  our  native  soil  and  all  that 
renders  it  dear  to  us.  But  the  formation  of  the  mobile  National- 
guard  was  already  rendered  necessary,  in  general,  by  a  moral 
defect  in  the  National-guard  itself,  of  which  the  tragi-comical 
influence  on  the  events  of  the  war  threatened  to  become  an  in- 
exhaustible source  of  numerous,  successful,  though  involuntary 
parodies  on  the  traditions  of  the  heroic  ages  of  Hungary. 

To  leave  their  own  hearths,  that  they  might  defend  those  of 
their  fellow-citizens,  which  were  nearer  the  danger,  seemed  to 
fathers  of  families  and  proprietors  among  the  National-guard  a 
matter  demanding  most  mature  deliberation.  With  a  most  af- 
fecting pathos  they  dwelt  on  the  far  more  sacred  duty  of  preserv- 
ing their  own  dear  selves,  and  obstinately  refused  to  march 
against  the  enemies  of  the  country ;  and  if  their  Jiobilisation 
was  nevertheless  sometimes  successful,  the  country  was  more 
injured  than  benefited  by  it,  because  the  expenses  of  such  an 
organization  were,  in  comparison  with  that  of  regular  troops, 
disproportionately  great,  while  their  services  were  just  as  dispro- 
portionately small,  nay,  were  scarcely  warth  mentioning. 

This  experience  had  suggested  to  the  ministry  the  idea  of 
making  the  personal  obligations  of  the  National-guards  partly 
transferable  to  others,  partly  profitable  to  the  state  in  money  or 
money's  worth.  It  was  granted  to  each  battalion  of  National- 
guards,  whose  duty  it  would  have  been,  for  instance,  to  serve 
with  its  whole  contingent  during  six  weeks  against  the  enemy, 
to  send  only  a  part  of  its  contingent  into  the  field,  but  for  a  pro- 
portionately longer  time.  These  partial  contingents  of  National- 
guard  battalions  were  consequently  composed  of  volunteers,  and 
were  thus  called  Volunteer  Mobile  National-guards.  The  name 
of  the  circle  by  which  they  were  sent  completed  their  designa- 
tion. 

By  the  collective  expression  "volunteers"  were  understood 
those  also  who  did  not  serve  freely,  that  is,  those  who,  belonging 
to  the  poorer  classes,  had  been  forcibly  levied  by  lot. 

Szolnok   is   situated    in  the  circle  on  this  side  the   Theiss. 


16  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  estimated  number  of  mobile  National-guards  to  be  furnished 
by  this  district  was  about  5000  men,  who,  as  it  was  said,  were 
already  eager  for  combat,  and  needed  only  to  be  put  into  ranks, 
to  be  a  little  drilled,  and  then  led  against  the  enemy.  But  of 
the  5000  men  thus  officially  calculated  upon,  in  the  course  of  a 
month  with  great  difficulty  I  got  together  scarcely  700,  and  of 
these  hardly  100  real  volunteers.  This,  thierefore,  was  my  con- 
tingent when,  in  the  end  of  September,  I  was  ordered  to  occupy 
Csepel,  an  island  on  the  Danube  below  Ofen-Pesth,  and  to  frus- 
trate at  any  cost  attempts  to  cross  the  Danube  by  Field-marshal 
Lieutenant  Ban  Jellachich,  or  his  auxiliaries  under  Generals 
Roth  and  Philippovich. 

Before  I  proceed  to  describe  my  acts,  which  only  now  begin 
to  be  of  some  importance,  I  think  it  necessary  to  explain  the 
relations  in  which  I  then  stood  to  the  political  questions  of  the 
day. 
^^  The  month  of  March  1848  brought  for  collective  Hungary  an 
independent  and  responsible  ministry  based  on  the  ancient  con- 
stitution. In  this  ministry  was  vested  the  executive  power  over 
Hungary  Proper,  as  well  as  over  all  the  provinces  united  under 
the  Hungarian  crown,  without  distinction  as  to  the  nationality 
of  the  inhabitants.  This  ministry  had  the  sanction  of  his  ma- 
jesty King  Ferdinand  V.  of  Hungary.  At  the  summons  of  that 
ministry  I  joined  the  ranks  of  the  newly-raised  Hungarian  troops. 
The  royal  imperial  troops,  of  whatever  nationality,  who  had  been 
removed  from  Austria  into  Hungary,  had  already  taken  oath  to 
the  constitution,  the  maintenance  of  which  was  the  first  duty  of 
that  ministry.  The  recently-formed  Hungarian  troops  also  took 
the  same  oath.  This  constitution,  so  far  as  I  could  judge  of  its 
influence  on  the  welfare  of  my  country,  met  with  my  approba- 
tion, and  it  was  the  most  natural  of  all  feelings  which  caused 
me  to  defend  it.  All  attempts  made  by  the  provinces  peopled 
by  non-Magyar  races  to  change  the  constitution  through  any 
other  than  the  lawful  parliamentary  means,  as  aiming  at  the 
overthrow  of  the  existing  form  of  government,  were  considered 
high  treason. 

Whether  the  Austrian  monarchy  could  preserve  its  former  im- 
portance as  a  great  European  power,  after  the  isolation  of  the 
Hungarian  ministries  (principally  of  war  and  finance)  from  the 
governing  power  constituted  in  Vienna  for  the  other  provinces  ; 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUT.  17 

and  whether  Hungary,  recognising  the  guarantees  of  Austrian 
influence  as  the  principal  condition  of  its  own  existence,  would 
not  have  to  sacrifice  to  the  consolidation  of  collective  Austria  a 
part  of  its  newly-acquired  advantages  ; — these  were  questions, 
the  answers  to  which  lay  beyond  my  sphere,  nay,  which,  can- 
didly speaking,  I  had  never  put  to  myself 

Such  were  my  personal  relations  to  the  political  questions  of 
that  day. 


CHAPTER  n. 

My  forces  on  the  island  of  Csepel  being  insufficient  to  oppose 
with  certainty,  over  an  extent  of  more  than  two  (German)  miles, 
any  attempt  (supposing  such  probable)  of  the  enemy  to  cross 
from  the  left  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  I  had  to  endeavor, 
if  possible,  to  increase  my  numbers  there,  and  also  to  obtain 
powers  which  might  enable  me  successfully  to  resist  far  more 
dangerous  enemies — the  indolence,  cowardice,  and  treason  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  district.  For  this  purpose  I  requested  from 
the  Prime-minister,  Count  Louis  Batthyanyi,  a  document  au- 
thorizing me  to  form  a  court-martial  to  adjudicate  upon  cases  of 
disobedience,  cowardice,  and  treason,  to  confirm  condemnations 
to  death,  and  order  their  execution.  Furnished  with  this  docu 
ment,  I  repaired  to  the  place  of  my  destination. 

At  the  commencement  of  my  new  duties,  the  Prime-minister 
entrusted  me  with  the  chief  command  of  a  division  of  mixed 
troops  stationed  at  Duna-Foldvar,  as  well  as  of  the  local  militia 
levied  from  the  lower  Danube.  The  original  object  of  my  mis- 
sion was  also  extended,  and  the  field  of  my  operations  widened ; 
I  had  to  prevent  the  junction  of  General  Roth's  corps  with  the 
troops  of  Ban  Jellachich. 

The  division  in  Duna-Foldvar  consisted  of  about  1200  infantry 
from  the  so-called  Hunyady-Schar,  and  some  cavalry.  There 
being  no  probability  that  General  Roth  would  dare,  single-hand- 
ed, to  cross  the  Danube,  through  a  country  where  he  could  not 
count  on  any  sympathy,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  he  would  try 


18  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

by  every  means  to  unite  as  soon  as  possible  with  Jellacliicli.  But 
the  latter  had  already  reached  Stuhlweissenburg  (Szekes-Feher- 
var),  while  Generals  E,oth  and  Philippovich  were  five  or  six  days' 
march  more  to  the  south. 

Not  strong  enough  to  engage  the  latter,  I  had,  on  the  contra- 
ry, to  fear  that  the  detached  division  in  Duna-Foldvar  would 
shortly  be  attacked  and  beaten  by  them,  perhaps  even  destroyed. 
I  therefore  drew  the  troops  from  Foldvar  to  Adony,  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Danube,  opposite  the  southern  part  of  Csepel,  and 
confined  myself  to  crossing  from  east  to  west  the  line  of  commu- 
nication between  Generals  Roth  and  Jellachich,  about  Soponya, 
by  two  parallel  chains  of  outposts,  one  facing  the  north  against 
the  camp  of  Ban  Jellachich  at  Stuhlweissenburg,  the  other 
southward  against  the  troops  of  Generals  Roth  and  Philippovich. 
Thus  I  should  render  impossible  all  communication  between  the 
two  hostile  corps  by  means  of  patrols,  couriers,  or  spies.  The 
local  militia,  which  had  been  speedily  levied  from  the  strip  of 
land  occupied  by.  the  outposts,  furnished  them  with  reinforce- 
ments. 

On  the  29th  of  September,  1848,  Counts  Eugene  and  Paul 
Zichy,  coming  from  Stuhlweissenburg,  were  stopped  at  the 
northern  outpost  line  :  on  suspicion  of  being  hostile,  they  were 
arrested,  and  escorted  on  the  following  day  to  my  head-quarters 
at  Adony. 

I  was  at  Csepel  when  the  news  reached  me.  To  convince 
myself  what  the  facts  were,  I  returned  without  delay  to  Adony. 
In  the  streets  1  met  crowds  of  the  inhabitants,  and  of  the  south- 
em  militia  concentrated  there,  evincing  the  most  hostile  excite- 
ment against  the  two  prisoners.  While  inquiring  what  had 
been  done  with  them,  I  met  by  chance  two  staff-officers  (a 
colonel  and  a  major)  of  the  Hunyady-Schar.  By  a  decree  of  the 
Prime-minister  both  were  under  my  command,  without  reference 
to  their  seniority  and  rank.  I  was  informed  by  them  that,  dur- 
ing my  absence,  they  had  already  given  orders  to  escort  the 
counts  to  Pesth.  I  asked  the  reason  of  these  orders.  The  col- 
onel assumed  a  mysterious  air,  and  invited  me  to  accompany 
him  to  his  lodgings.  When  there,  he  whispered  to  me,  with  evi- 
dent satisfaction,  that  he  had  taken  care  both  counts  should 
share  the  fate  of  Count  Lamberg.  "  The  major  here,"  he  conti- 
nued, pointing  to  him,  "will  take  upon  himself  the  conduct  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  19 

the  escort,  and  harangue  the  people  in  the  streets  of  Pestli 
against  the  counts  while  marched  through  the  town.  The  peo- 
ple is  certainly  still  disposed  to  execute  Lynch-law  on  account  of 
the  murder  of  Count  Lamberg  .  .  .  ."  I  could  hardly  believe 
my  senses.  This  plan  would  have  immolated  two  men  to  the 
blind  rage  of  the  populace,  merely  on  account  of  their  name  I 
After  having  in  vain  endeavored  to  convince  its  contrivers  of  the 
infamy  of  such  an  act,  I  was  obliged  to  make  use  of  my  author- 
ity over  them.  Reversing  their  arrangements,  I  ordered  that 
the  prisoners  should  not  be  escorted  to  Pesth,  but  that  they 
should  be  immediately  examined,  and  according  as  they  were 
found  guilty  or  innocent  of  high-treason,  should  either  be  tried 
by  a  court-martial  or  set  at  liberty.  Whereupon  I  received  for 
answer  :  "I  might  try  to  execute  this  myself,  and  at  all  events 
take  the  responsibility  of  what  I  intended  to  do." 

The  execution  of  my  order  was  indeed  most  hazardous.  In 
the  neighborhood  of  Adony,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  I 
had  not  a  single  man  at  my  disposal,  except  the  militia  and  the 
Hunyady-Schar.  The  militia  considered  as  their  first  duty  the 
destruction  of  all  whom  they  suspected,  or  who  were  represented 
as  being  so ;  and  both  counts  had  been  pointed  out  to  them  as 
traitors  to  the  country.  The  Hunyady-Schar,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  a  corps  of  little  discipline  ;  the  colonel  just  mentioned  com- 
manded them  in  person.  He  had  organized  them,  he  had  made 
all  the  appointments  ;  he  suffered  all  kinds  of  dissolute  conduct 
— to  him  they  were  devoted  :  while  they  hardly  knew  me  by 
name  ;  and,  besides,  the  relation  in  which  I  (a  major)  stood  as 
commander-in-chief  to  their  commander  (a  colonel)  had  in  it 
something  offensive  to  the  troop  itself  In  addition  to  this, 
the  Hunyady-Schar  also  had  already  been  incited  against  both 
counts  ;  and  from  among  the  whole  mass  of  armed  men  assem- 
bled there,  not  a  single  voice  was  raised  for  the  prisoners,  but 
every  one  declaimed  against  them. 

The  jeering  allusion  of  the  colonel  to  the  consequences  of  my 
intention  to  liberate  the  two  counts  in  case  they  should  not  be 
found  guilty,  acquired  through  these  circumstances  a  dangerous 
significance.  I  soon  saw  that  if  I  seriously  intended  to  have  my 
orders  executed,  I  must  act  decisively,  speedily,  and  in  person. 
First  of  all,  the  prisoners  had  to  be  conveyed  to  Csepel,  conse- 
quently across  the  Danube.     On  that  island  there  were  about 


20  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

400  men  of  the  battalion  I  had  myself  formed,  and  on  whose 
obedience  I  could  already  rely ;  and  there  were  there  at  that 
time  only  very  small  bands  of  lagging  militia  wandering  about, 
against  whose  hostile  intentions  they  could  be  sufficiently  pro- 
tected. There  was  but  little  means  of  communication,  over  the 
broad  arm  of  the  Danube,  between  the  island  and  Adony ;  so 
that  when  once  upon  the  island,  there  was  no  longer  much  to 
fear  from  the  militia,  and  the  Hunyady-Schar  on  the  Adony 
shore.  But  the  transport  of  the  counts  to  Csepel  was  just  the 
most  difficult  part  of  the  task  ;  and,  from  the  evidently  increas- 
ing excitement  of  the  masses,  threatened  to  be  soon  imprac- 
ticable.    The  greatest  speed,  therefore,  seemed  necessary. 

I  went  immediately  in  search  of  the  prisoners,  and  found  them 
at  dinner  in  a  house  close  to  my  own  quarters,  a  guard  being  in 
the  court-yard,  and  with  them  the  officer  who  had  escorted  them 
hither.  The  house  was  surrounded  by  such  dense  crowds  of 
people  that  it  was  only  with  great  difficulty  I  could  get  into  it. 
On  entering  the  room  of  the  prisoners,  they  were  presented  to 
me  by  the  officer  on  duty  ;  and  Count  Eugene  Zichy,  when  his 
name  was  mentioned,  added,  that  he  was  the  unfortunate  ad- 
ministrator of  this  comitate  (Stuhlweissenburg),  on  whom  had 
fallen  the  hatred  commonly  felt  against  those  who  hold  the 
office  of  administrator,  and  the  more  heavily  in  proportion  to  the 
strictness  of  his  former  administration.  "  I  have,  however," 
continued  the  count,  "  always  been  a  good  patriot,  and  formerly 
belonged  to  the  liberal  party."  His  remarks  were  interrupted 
by  his  companion  in  misfortune,  who  mentioned  as  a  decisive 
proof  of  his  patriotic  feelings,  that  he  had,  within  the  last  few 
days,  resigned  his  post  as  officer  in  a  R.  I.  cavalry  regiment,  that 
he  might  not  have  to  fight  against  his  native  country.  I  re- 
quested them  to  reserve  their  defense  till  the  time  of  judicial 
examination,  and  told  them  to  prepare  immediately  for  their 
transport  to  Csepel.  I  then  left  them,  and  went  to  arrange  their 
escort. 

As  the  object  of  this  escort  was  less  to  frustrate  any  appre- 
hended attempt  at  escape  on  the  part  of  the  prisoners,  than  to 
protect  them  from  violence  in  the  midst  of  the  dense  masses  of 
the  population  of  Adony  and  the  local  militia,  exasperated  espe- 
cially against  Count  Eugene  Zichy,  I  had  at  my  command  but 
a  small  number  of  individuals  fit  for  the  service.     However,  I 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  2J 

succeeded  in  finding  some  among  the  soldiers  of  the  Hunyady- 
Schar,  who  had  formerly  served,  and  were  fortunately  sober. 
Of  these  I  formed  the  escort,  and  remained  constantly  near  the 
prisoners  during  their  removal  from  the  place  of  custody  to  the 
bank  of  the  Danube,  because  I  apprehended  some  malicious  dis- 
turbance from  the  two  staffofEcers  already  mentioned,  and  did 
not  trust  even  the  escort.  Several  officers  of  the  National-guard, 
who  had  joined  me  of  their  own  accord  when  I  left  Pesth  for 
Csepel,  now  continued  by  my  side,  and  honorably  assisted  me  in 
protecting  the  prisoners  against  the  hostile  designs  of  the  mass. 

It  took  us  about  half  an  hour  to  reach  the  Danube.  Our  way 
thither  lay  through  the  midst  of  the  town,  and  then  close  past 
the  camp  of  the  militia. 

At  first,  and  so  long  as  the  crowd  consisted  of  those  whom 
just  before  our  setting  out  I  had  energetically  warned,  in  a  short 
address,  not  to  commit  any  violence  against  the  counts,  no  in- 
terruptions occurred.  These,  however,  were  soon  succeeded  by 
others,  who  repeatedly  attempted  to  break  through  the  escort, 
and,  with  the  most  horrid  imprecations,  to  seize  the  prisoners. 
It  was  now  important  to  repress  these  manifestations,  without 
having  recourse  to  extreme  measures  ;  because  on  the  great 
number  of  drunken  persons  in  the  crowd,  a  premature  use  of 
arms  might  have  produced  an  effect  directly  contrary  to  that 
intended.  The  attacks  even  of  the  most  furious  were  directed 
only  against  Count  Eugene  Zichy.  Several  crowded  close  on  the 
escort,  and  impetuously  demanded  to  be  shown  him,  that  they 
might  reckon  with  him ;  and  after  they  were  repulsed,  they  gave 
vent  to  their  rage,  generally  in  the  most  vociferous  accusations 
against  him.  These  had  mostly  reference  to  his  inhuman  treat- 
ment of  those  under  his  authority. 

Amid  many  and  various  scenes  such  as  these,  which  grew 
ever  more  menacing  and  more  intimidating  to  the  escort,  we  at 
last  reached  the  Danube.  I  had  previously  charged  some  officers 
to  have  in  readiness  the  means  necessary  for  crossing.  But  at 
the  mere  rumor,  that  I  intended  to  convey  the  counts  to  the 
island,  only  for  the  purpose  of  more  certainly  allowing  them  to 
escape,  all  boats  had  suddenly  disappeared.  The  officers  whom 
I  had  sent  vainly  endeavored  to  procure  some.  Every  moment 
of  delay  evidently  increased  the  danger  to  which  the  lives  of  the 
prisoners  were  exposed :  close  to  the  flat  shore  of  the  Danube, 


22  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

pressed  down  to  the  water's  edge  by  the  excited  peasants,  far 
from  any  place  of  protection  I 

Preservation  without  boats  was  impossible.  At  whatever  cost, 
they  must  be  obtained.  Finding  even  threats  unavailing,  the 
officers  had  seized  two  millers  of  the  place,  and  with  these  they 
forced  their  way  through  the  crowd.  I  threatened  them  with 
death  unless  they  immediately  enabled  us  to  cross.  This  succeed- 
ed.   In  a  few  minutes  two  millers'  boats  were  ready  to  receive  us. 

Meanwhile  the  rage  of  the  populace  had  reached  its  height. 
Close  to  the  place  where  we  were  awaiting  the  boats,  several 
hundred  scythes,  intended  for  the  militia,  were  piled  up.  A  party 
of  my  own  battalion  guarded  them.  The  escort  having  directed 
its  repulses  mainly  against  our  armed  assailants,  those  nearest 
us  now  were  almost  wholly  without  arms.  The  rising  bank  of 
the  river  enabled  the  masses  to  have  constantly  in  view  the 
objects  of  their  hostility.  This  circumstance  was  particularly 
favorable  to  the  instigators  against  the  counts.  As  often  as  they 
were  recommended  to  the  vengeance  of  the  crowd  by  any  agita- 
tor, he  could  at  the  same  time  distinctly  point  them  out.  This 
increased  the  effect.  Short  addresses,  to  the  purport  that  both 
of  them  would  long  ago  have  been  hung  on  the  nearest  tree, 
had  they  been  poor  peasants,  and  not  high  and  noble  counts  ; 
that  there  was  no  law  for  punishing  counts,  and  no  justice  for 
peasants,  &c.,  &c.,  were  continually  re-echoed  by  a  thousand 
voices. 

With  increasing  anxiety  I  counted  the  moments  till  the  arrival 
of  the  boats.  At  last  they  came.  But  scarcely  had  we  proceeded 
to  embark,  when  suddenly  one  of  the  mass  cried  out :  "Don't  let 
them  cross  ;  we  shall  be  deprived  of  our  just  vengeance  I"  and 
in  an  instant  a  dense  forest  of  weapons  of  every  kind  bristled 
over  the  heads  of  the  unarmed  crowd  in  front,  who  now  rushed 
toward  the  pile  of  scythes,  that  they  also  might  arm  themselves. 
The  party  on  guard  drew  back  terrified.  The  escort  also  began 
to  waver. 

Matters  had  now  come  to  extremities.  I  called  to  my  people 
to  take  courage,  and  commanded  them  to  shoot  dead,  without 
hesitation,  the  first  man  who  should  dare  to  advance  a  step. 

The  cocking  of  the  muskets  fortunately  checked  the  foremost 
of  the  assailing  peasants ;  they  hesitated,  and  before  the  rest 
could  encourage  them  to  renew  the  attack,  I  was  in  the  boats 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  23 

with  the  escort  and  the  prisoners,  and  already  some  strokes  from 
the  shore. 

Immediately  on  arriving  at  the  island,  I  called  together  the 
court-martial,  which  was  to  examine  and  pass  sentence  on  the 
counts.  I  had  succeeded  in  saving  them  from  the  fury  of  an 
enraged  mob,  but  could  not,  without  acting  contrary  to  my  con- 
victions, save  them  from  the  stringency  of  the  articles  of  war. 

The  examination  and  court-martial  were  held  in  conformity 
with  the  prescribed  regulations  of  the  royal  imperial  Austrian 
army ;  these,  as  well  as  the  articles  of  war  on  which  they  are 
based,  having  been  introduced  among  the  recently-formed  Hun- 
garian troops.  The  office  of  president  devolved  upon  me.  I  had 
at  my  disposal  only  the  two  staff-officers  of  the  Hunyady-Schar 
already  mentioned  ;  and  neither  of  these  could  I  conscientiously 
permit  to  decide  on  the  life  or  death  of  the  men  whose  destruc- 
tion they  had  already  resolved  upon. 

The  basis  of  the  proceedings  was  the  written  report  of  the 
commander  of  the  outposts  on  the  capture  of  the  counts,  which 
was  accompanied  by  the  documents  discovered  on  searching  the 
articles  of  wearing-apparel  and  carriage  of  the  Count  Eugene 
Zichy. 

Among  the  latter  were  numerous  copies,  still  wet  from  the 
press,  of  two  proclamations  ;  one  of  which  was  addressed  to  the 
Hungarian  nation,  the  other  to  the  troops  in  Hungary.  At  the 
bottom  of  both  had  been  printed  the  name  of  his  Majesty  King 
Ferdinand  V.  of  Hungary,  with  the  date  :  Schonbrunn,  22d  Sep- 
tember, 1 848.  The  legal  counter-signature  of  a  responsible  Hun- 
garian minister  was  wanting  to  both.  Their  contents  were  cal- 
culated to  encourage  the  South-Sclavonian  provinces  of  Hungary, 
which  had  revolted  against  the  lawful  executive  in  Pesth,  in 
their  attempt  to  overthrow  the  lawfully  existing  government, 
and  even  to  seduce  the  troops,  who  had  sworn  to  the  constitution 
of  the  country,  to  participate  in  this  revolt. 

Beside  these  proclamations,  an  open  letter  was  found  among 
the  papers,  in  the  following  words  : 

"  To    THE    EoYAL    IMPERIAL    BrIGADIER-GeNERAL    VoN    HoTH. 

"  General. — At  the  request  of  Count  Eugene  Zichy,  I  have  decided 
that  a  safe-guard  and  every  protection  be  given  to  the  Count. — Stuhl- 
weissenburg,  27th  September,  1848. 

"  Jellachich,  m.  p.  {mnnu  propria),  Field-Marshal  Lieutenant." 


24  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAE,Y. 

Count  Eugene  Zichy's  own  depositions  were  in  substance  as 
follows : 

When  the  Archduke  Stephen,  palatine  of  Hungary,  a  short  time 
since,  came  to  Stuhlweissenburg,  with  the  intention  of  remaining 
near  the  Hungarian  camp,  he  (Count  Zichy)  had  for  the  last 
time  left  his  usual  residence,  Kalozd,  and  repaired  to  Stuhlweiss- 
enburg. There  he  remained  even  after  the  departure  of  the 
archduke  palatine,  and  the  retreat  of  the  Hungarian  army. 
Soon  afterward,  the  Croat  army  under  the  personal  command 
of  Ban  Jellachich  had  reached  and  occupied  the  town.  All  the 
civil  officers  of  the  comitate  of  Stuhlweissenburg,  whom  the 
Croats  could  capture,  had  been  kept  prisoners  in  the  comitate- 
house.  This  caused  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  to  address 
themselves  to  him  (Count  Zichy),  whom  the  Croats  had  left  un- 
molested, with  the  request  that  he  would  induce  Ban  Jellachich 
to  prevent  his  Croats  from  plundering.  This  request  he  had 
made,  and  with  success. 

When  he  (Count  Zichy)  had  afterward  heard  that  General 
Uoth  was  approaching  Kalozd  with  a  Croat  corps  of  10,000 
men,  he  asked  from  Ban  Jellachich  a  safe-guard  (sauvegarde), 
that  he  might  protect  the  poor  inhabitants  of  the  place  against 
the  robberies  of  the  Croats ;  whereupon  Ban  Jellachich  had 
given  him  the  above-mentioned  letter  to  Roth. 

Armed  with  this  letter,  after  the  main  army  of  the  Croats 
had  taken  their  departure  for  Yelencze,  he  had  left  Stuhlweiss- 
enburg, accompanied  by  his  cousin,  now  his  fellow-prisoner,  for 
the  purpose  of  repairing  to  Kalozd,  there  to  await  the  arrival  of 
General  Roth,  and  obtain  from  him  protection  for  the  poor  in- 
habitants of  the  place  against  the  plundering  of  his  soldiers  ; 
but  immediately  after  to  return  to  Stuhlweissenburg,  and  from 
thence  start  for  Presburg.  His  stay  at  Kalozd  was  to  be  only 
for  a  few  hours. 

He  had  neither  disseminated  the  proclamations  found  in  his 
carriage,  nor  had  he  wished  to  do  so.  The  originals  had  been 
brought  by  Count  Mensdorf,  a  royal  courier,  from  Vienna,  and 
printed  in  Stuhlweissenburg  by  order  of  Ban  Jellachich.  The 
copies  which  lay  before  us  had  been  left  behind  by  two  officers 
of  the  Croat  army  quartered  in  his  house  at  Stuhlweissenburg, 
and  in  mistake  packed  up  with  his  things  by  his  valet. 

To  weaken  the  suspicion  that  he  had  intended  to  carry  these 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  25 

proclamations  to  General  K-oth's  camp,  Count  Zichy  constantly- 
renewed  the  protestations  of  his  patriotic  sentiments.  I  was 
thus  induced  to  ask  him  how  it  happened  then,  that,  being  so 
patriotic,  it  had  not  occurred  to  him  to  transmit  to  the  Hungar- 
ian camp  the  news  of  the  menacing  proximity  of  the  Croat  aux- 
iliary corps,  which  he  had  been  aware  of  two  days  before  his  ar- 
rest, as  was  plain  from  the  date  of  the  letter  of  protection,  which 
lay  before  us. 

The  justification  of  Count  Zichy  was  to  this  efiect :  He  had 
been  unable  to  leave  Stuhlweissenburg  before  the  29th,  because 
Ban  Jellachich  and  his  army  did  not  quit  the  town  sooner.  Un- 
til that  day  it  had  been  surrounded  by  Croats.  These  would 
have  stopped  and  plundered  him  (Count  Zichy),  had  he  at- 
tempted to  leave  Stuhlweissenburg  before  the  departure  of  the 
enemy,  his  letter  of  protection  being  in  force  only  for  General 
Roth's  camp.  "When  at  last,  on  the  29th,  he  had  left  Stuhl- 
weissenburg, he  believed  it  to  be  superfluous  to  transmit  intelli- 
gence to  the  Hungarian  camp  of  the  approach  of  the  Croat  aux- 
iliary corps,  supposing,  as  he  did,  that  it  was  already  generally 
known:  Beside,  he  had  immediately  announced  at  the  station 
(where  he  was  arrested),  that  General  Roth  was  advancing  with 
his  corps. 

The  charge  against  Count  Eugene  Zichy  consisted  : 

1 .  In  an  understanding  with  the  enemies  of  the  countr)^ 

2.  In  active  participation  in  the  open  revolt  of  the  South 
Sclaves  against  the  government  lawfully  existing  in  Hungary,  by 
propagating  proclamations  intended  to  abet  the  revolt. 

As  most  direct  evidence  of  the  first  crime  there  lay  before  us, 
the  letter  of  protection  ;  as  evidence  of  the  second,  the  proclama- 
tions. In  his  statement  Count  Zichy  had  endeavored  to  weaken 
both  these  proofs. 

He  called  the  letter  of  protection  (Schutzbrief)  an  ordinary 
letter  of  safe-guard  {Sauvegai'deschreibeii),  such  as  is  often 
given  during  war  by  the  commanders  of  troops  even  to  the  in- 
habitants of  an  enemy's  country,  from  innocent  and  humane 
considerations.  But  in  regard  to  the  proclamations,  he  affirmed 
that  they  had  been  packed  up  with  his  luggage  by  mistake  on 
the  part  of  his  valet. 

To  clear  himself  still  more  distinctly  from  the  suspicion  of 
both  the  crimes  contained  in  the  accusations,  he  repeatedly  en- 

B 


26  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

deavored  to  introduce  into  his  statements  protestations  of  his  pa- 
triotic sentiments  ;  and  excused  himself  for  having  neglected  to 
transmit  the  news  of  the  approach  of  the  hostile  auxiliary  corps 
of  Croats,  from  the  supposition  that  their  advance  was  already 
generally  known.  He  moreover  adduced,  in  proof  of  these  patri- 
otic sentiments,  the  circumstance  that,  when  he  found  Hungar- 
ian outposts  in  Soponya,  he  had,  in  evident  contradiction  to  that 
supposition,  immediately  communicated  to  them  the  news  of  the 
approach  of  the  hostile  auxiliary  corps. 

The  rules  of  the  court-martial  allow  of  no  defense.  The 
votum  informativum  of  the  auditor  or  law-officer,  customary 
in  the  ordinary  military  tribunals,  has  no  place  in  the  court-mar- 
tial. 

The  auditor,  or,  in  his  absence,  his  deputy,  at  the  conclusion 
of  the  examination,  has  to  communicate  to  the  president  of  the 
court-martial  only  and  secretly,  his  opinion  as  to  the  sentence 
Avhich  the  law  prescribes ;  and  he,  after  having  considered  the 
opinion  of  the  auditor,  decides  for  himself,  and  communicates  his 
decision  secretly  to  his  fellow-judges,  calling  upon  them  to  notify 
their  assent  by  drawing  their  side-arms,  or  their  dissent  by  omit- 
ting this  act :  all  the  members  of  the  court-martial  vote  at  the 
same  time. 

According  to  these  rules,  the  right  of  forming  a  positive  judg- 
ment in  a  court-martial  is  exclusively  reserved  to  the  president : 
all  the  other  members — not  excepting  even  the  auditor — are 
confined  within  the  narrow  bounds  of  rejecting  or  ratifying,  by 
swift  resolve,  the  proposed  judgment,  without  previous  consulta- 
tion, nay,  without  having  had  even  the  time  necessary  for  ma- 
ture deliberation.  Thus  the  law  claims  the  decision  on  the  life 
or  death  of  those  brought  before  a  court-martial  almost  entirely 
for  the  president  ;  and  it  is  therefore  his  duty,  in  the  secrecy  of 
his  own  conscience,  to  undertake  Jhe  defense  of  the  accused 
against  the  judicial  opinion  of  the  auditor. 

Viewed  in  this  light,  it  was  my  duty  to  consider  in  his  favor 
the  value  of  those  declarations  of  Count  Eugene  Zichy,  by  which 
he  had  endeavored  to  weaken  the  force  of  the  before-mentioned 
charges. 

The  most  serious  accusation  was  the  attempted  dissemination 
of  the  enemy's  proclamations.  Count  Zichy  having  asserted 
that  his  valet  had  by  mistake  packed  up  the  proclamations  with 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  27 

his  luggage,  I  had  to  endeavor  to  find  proofs  of  the  credibility  of 
this  assertion  in  the  coincident  circumstances.  But  in  vain  I 
For  the  proclamations  had  been  left  behind  them  by  the  officers 
of  the  enemy  quartered  in  the  house  of  Count  Zichy ;  and  it  ap- 
peared most  probable  that  Count  Zichy,  as  proprietor  of  a  house 
in  the  town  of  Stuhlweissenburg,  which  certainly  had  several 
rooms,  did  not,  considering  his  oft-protested  patriotic  sentiments, 
occupy  the  same  room  with  the  enemy's  officers,  nor  even  hold 
any  friendly  intercourse  with  them.  The  proclamations,  there- 
fore, could  only  have  been  left  in  one  of  the  rooms  occupied  by 
the  officers  while  quartered  in  the  house.  Further,  according  to 
his  own  declaration.  Count  Zichy  resolved,  immediately  after  the 
departure  of  the  officers,  to  go  to  Kalozd  for  a  few  hours  only, 
and  to  return  immediately  to  Stuhlweissenburg.  On  such  short 
excursions  much  luggage  is  not  commonly  taken,  but  generally 
only  such  articles  as  are  daily,  nay,  hourly  needed.  From  what 
has  been  already  said,  these  articles  could  scarcely  have  been 
left  lying  in  the  rooms  just  quitted  by  the  officers  of  the  enemy, 
consequently  not  near  the  proclamations,  by  possibility  forgotten 
in  these  rooms. 

In  the  face  of  these  probabilities  I,  alas,  could  not  comprehend 
how  it  could  have  happened,  that  while  the  valet  was  engaged 
— probably  in  the  sitting-room  of  his  master — in  arranging  the 
articles  necessary  for  a  journey  of  only  some  hours'  duration,  the 
proclamations  left  lying  in  another  room  had  so  fallen  into  his 
hands  as,  by  mistake,  to  have  been  packed  up  with  them.  The 
pretty  considerable  bulk  and  the  striking  shape  of  the  forty- 
three  pieces  (this  was  the  number  of  proclamations  found)  of 
coarse  printing-paper  in  half-sheets,  when  lying  among  the  other 
articles,  were  sufficient  to  contradict  the  assumption  of  such  a 
mistake. 

It  would  have  sounded  far  more  credible,  that  the  proclama- 
tions had  been  intentionally  packed  up  by  the  valet,  and  of 
course,  considering  the  patriotic  feelings  of  his  master,  without 
his  knowledge. 

But  Count  Zichy,  on  the  discovery  of  the  proclamations  in  his 
carriage,  might  have  immediately  perceived  the  danger  which 
threatened  the  life  of  his  valet  in  consequence  of  this  discovery, 
and,  secure  in  the  consciousness  of  his  own  innocence — in  spite  of 
the  indignation  which,  considering  his  oft-asserted  patriotic  senti- 


28  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

ments,  he  must  have  felt  at  the  intentional  act  of  his  valet — 
mij^ht  have  had  a  kind  of  generous  compassion  for  him,  and  have 
resolved  to  represent  the  evidence  of  his  crime  as  the  consequence 
of  a  mere  mistake. 

I  at  least  could  very  easily  conceive  the  possibility  of  such  a  fit 
of  generosity ;  and  had  hereby  to  be  only  still  more  incited  to 
weaken  the  dangerous  suspicion  of  traitorous  understanding  with 
the  enemies  of  the  country,  which  the  Count,  by  a  noble  emotion 
of  the  heart,  might  in  a  most  critical  w^ay  have  turned  off  from 
the  guilty  head  of  his  valet  on  to  his  own  innocent  one — ^by  de- 
veloping, where  possible,  the  positive  proofs  of  his  asserted  patriotic 
sentiments,  from  the  coincidence  of  his  own  declarations  with  the 
motives  for  the  facts  now  before  me,  these  motives  becoming  con- 
sistently discernible  by  means  of  the  accessory  circumstances. 

For  this  purpose  there  were,  however,  in  the  Count's  own 
declaration,  only  three  points,  in  some  degree  favorable,  to  be 
taken  into  consideration.     The  Count  had  declared  that : 

1 .  At  the  solicitation  of  the  inhabitants  of  Stuhlweissenburg, 
he  had  interceded  with  Ban  Jellachich  to  put  a  stop  to  the  rob- 
beries of  the  Croats. 

2.  He  had  requested  the  letter  of  protection  from  Ban  Jella- 
chich likewise,  only  with  the  intention  of  protecting  the  poor 
inhabitants  of  Kalozd  against  the  robberies  of  the  Croats  of  Gen- 
eral Roth.     Finally, 

3.  He  had  immediately  communicated  to  the  first  Hungarian 
soldiers  whom  he  unexpectedly  met  near  Soponya,  when  on  his 
journey  from  Stuhlweissenburg  to  Kalozd,  the  menacing  approach 
of  General  Roth  with  his  corps  of  10,000  Croats. 

But  however  favorable  the  light  thrown  on  these  points,  it 
could  not  be  overlooked  that  Count  Eugene  Zichy  possessed  a 
house  in  Stuhlweissenburg,  and  that  Kalozd  was  his  own  estate ; 
and  that  consequently  the  personal  interest  which  he  had  in 
seeing  Stuhlweissenburg  as  well  as  Kalozd  spared  from  the 
robberies  of  the  Croats,  was  quite  sufficient  to  impel  him  to  the 
acts  mentioned  under  (1.)  and  (2,),  even  in  a  total  absence  of 
patriotism. 

But  the  third  point  seemed,  from  the  coincidence  of  the  simul- 
taneous circumstances,  far  more  calculated  to  testify  against,  than 
for,  the  patriotism  of  the  Count.  For,  had  he  been  well  affected 
to  his  country  and  its  defenders,  the  unexpected  challenge  of  a 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  29 

Hungarian  outpost  must  either  have  joyfully  surprised  him,  or 
awakened  in  him  the  most  anxious  solicitude  for  the  safety  of  his 
country's  troops,  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  a  hostile  corps  of 
10,000  men.  Both  feelings  could  only  have  decided  him  to 
hasten  as  much  as  possible  the  communication  of  his  certain 
knowledge  of  the  threatened  danger.  Had  the  Count  been  well 
disposed  to  his  country  and  its  defenders,  the  thought  that,  forced  by 
circumstances,  he  had  been  obliged  to  apply  to  its  enemies  for  the 
necessary  protection  to  his  person  and  property,  would  have  been 
painful ;  the  challenge  of  the  Hungarian  outpost  must  have  filled 
him  with  the  joyful  hope  that  behind  this  outpost  there  stood  an 
army  of  his  countrymen  sufficiently  strong  to  deliver  him  at  once 
from  his  painful  position ;  he  must  have  longed  for  this  deliver- 
ance, and  made  haste  to  insure  it  by  a  behavior  fitted  to  awaken 
confidence.  Nay,  even  had  the  Count,  in  sight  of  the  hostile 
armies,  remained  entirely  neutral  in  his  feelings,  the  challenge  of 
the  Hungarian  outpost  must  have  decided  him,  if  conscious  of 
the  purity  of  the  object  of  his  journey,  on  the  score  of  prudence  at 
least,  instantly  and  freely  to  produce  the  letter  of  protection  from 
the  Croat  general,  for  the  very  purpose  of  proving  the  purity  of 
his  intention,  and  of  preventing  the  suspicion — equally  dangerous 
and  unworthy — ^that  he,  a  Hungarian  subject,  lived  in  treason- 
able communication  with  the  rebels  against  the  lawfully-existing 
order. 

But  Count  Zichy  had  to  be  forcibly  arrested  ;  and  only  after 
this  had  taken  place,  did  he  mention  the  menacing  proximity  of 
the  auxifiary  corps  of  Croats,  asking  his  captors  if  they  did  not 
know  that  General  Roth  was  approaching  with  10,000  men. 
But  the  Count  concealed  the  enemy's  letter  of  protection.  This 
was  discovered  only  in  consequence  of  the  forcible  search  among 
his  articles  of  dress. 

This  circurast^ce,  as  well  as  the  resistance  to  the  challenging 
outpost,  which  necessarily  preceded  the  forcible  arrest  of  the 
Count,  made  it  easier  to  recognize  the  meaning  of  a  menace  than 
of  a  friendly  communication  in  the  Count's  question,  whether 
they  did  not  know  that  General  Roth  was  approaching  with 
10,000  Croats  ;  and  testified  not  only  against  his  self  asserted 
patriotism,  but  much  more  to  the  existence  of  a  mode  of  thinking 
and  acting,  which  had  every  thing  in  common  with  that  of  the 
open  enemies  of  the  country — except  its  openness. 


30  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  reflections  to  which  another  point  in  the  Count's  state- 
ment gave  rise,  led  unfortunately  to  the  same  conclusion. 

When  the  proclamations  discovered  in  the  carriage  of  Count 
Zichy  were  laid  before  him  during  the  examination,  he  distinctly 
recognized  them  as  the  same  which  the  enemy's  officers,  who  had 
been  quartered  in  his  house  at  Stuhlweissenburg,  had  left  there. 
He  must  consequently  have  seen  these  proclamations  during  the 
time  that  elapsed  between  the  departure  of  the  officers  and  his 
own  setting  out  from  Stuhlweissenburg. 

Had  the  Count  been  a  true  patriot,  he  would  immediately  have 
destroyed  these  proclamations.  For  he  knew  every  detail  of  the 
manner  in  which  their  originals  had  reached  Stuhlweissenburg  ; 
and  could  not  have  been  ignorant  of  their  dangerous  tendency  as 
regarded  the  lawfully-existing  order  of  things  in  Hungary. 

The  speediest  destruction  of  those  copies  was,  moreover,  in  his 
power,  without  the  slightest  risk  ;  the  enemy's  officers,  who  had 
brought  them  into  the  house,  and  had  forgotten  them  there,  hav- 
ing marched  away  with  the  w^hole  of  their  array. 

But  Count  Zichy  had  neglected  to  do  this  ;  and  hence  it  ap- 
peared— as  has  already  been  pointed  out — that  the  existence  in 
his  breast  of  the  patriotic  sentiments,  asseverated  by  him  during 
the  examination,  was  wholly  untenable. 

His  statement,  that  these  proclamations  had  come  into  his  car- 
riage only  by  a  mistake  of  his  valet,  now  indeed  became  more 
credible,  because  very  probably  the  Count  had  himself  brought 
them  into  his  own  sitting-room,  and  consequently  near  to  the 
articles  which  were  to  be  taken  with  him  on  his  short  journey. 
But  through  the  barefaced  senselessness  with  which  Count  Zichy 
dared  to  affirm  during  the  examination,  notwithstanding  the 
letter  of  protection,  the  contents  of  which  expressed  an  almost 
unlimited  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  hostile  general  in  the 
friendly  disposition  of  his  protege,  that  he  had  neglected  to  trans- 
mit to  the  Hungarian  camp  the  news  of  the  approach  of  the  aux- 
iliary corps  of  Croats,  only  because  he  had  supposed  that  it  was 
already  generally  known  ;  through  the  same  barefaced  senseless- 
ness with  which  he  adduced,  as  a  proof  of  his  patriotic  sentiments, 
that  he  had  communicated  the  news  of  the  near  danger  from  the 
enemy  to  the  first  Hungarian  outpost  which  he  met  at  Soponya, — 
he  had  entirely  destroyed  the  credibility  of  all  his  other  state- 
ments during  the  examination  :  and  the  evidence  on  which  both 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  31 

the  points  of  accusation  against  Count  Zichy  were  founded, 
acquired  only  so  much  the  greater  weight  from  his  contradictory 
declarations. 

Upon  this  evidence,  the  officer  who  acted  as  auditor  of  the 
court-martial  had  delivered  his  judicial  opinion:  That  Count 
Eugene  Zichy,  for  being  in  an  understanding  with  the  enemies 
of  the  country,  and  for  active  participation  in  the  South-Sclavo- 
nian  rebellion  by  propagating  proclamations  drawn  up  in  its  favor, 
as  guilty  of  high  treason — (the  Hungarian  original  copy  of  the 
judgment  contains  the  expression,  "traitor  to  the  fatherland") — 
be  punished  with  death  by  hanging. 

Before  I,  as  president  of  the  court-martial,  adopted  this  opinion 
of  the  auditor  as  my  own  decision,  I  had  to  make  it  clear  to  my- 
self, whether,  and  how  far,  from  the  evidence  before  me  and  the 
coincidence  of  the  circumstances,  I  was  morally  convinced  that, 
contrary  to  the  declarations  of  Coimt  Zichy,  he  was  really  guilty 
of  both  the  crimes  with  which  he  was  charged. 

Although  my  deliberations  in  favor  of  the  Count  had  led  to 
the  unfavorable  result,  that  he  did  not  feel  the  slightest  sympathy 
for  the  legitimate  cause  of  his  country,  still  it  was  not  placed 
beyond  a  doubt  that  he  lived  in  actual  understanding  with  its 
enemies.  His  violent  behavior,  in  consequence  of  which  he  had 
to  be  forcibly  arrested  ;  his  question,  resembling  a  threat,  ad- 
dressed to  the  Hungarian  outposts,  whether  they  did  not  know 
that  a  Croat  auxiliary  corps  was  already  close  at  hand;  his 
secreting  the  enemy's  letter  of  protection  ; — all  this  might  just  as 
well  have  had  its  origin  in  the  Count's  intractable  nature,  and  in 
his  habit  of  never  treating  inferiors  otherwise  than  brutally,  as  in 
his  surprised  consciousness  of  guilt,  and  sudden  perception  that  an 
imposing  carriage  alone  could  rescue  him  from  the  danger  of 
being  rigorously  searched,  and,  after  the  discovery  of  the  letter  of 
protection  and  the  proclamations,  hung  on  the  nearest  tree  as  an 
enemy's  spy. 

The  contents  of  the  letter  of  protection  only  could  furnish  the 
principal  proof  of  the  Count's  real  understanding  with  the  en- 
emies of  the  country ;  and  this  letter  appeared,  at  first  sight, 
nothing  more  than  the  concession  of  a  so-called  safe-guard,  or 
protective  watch-post  {Schutzwache.) 

By  "safe-guard"  is  generally  understood  that  usage  in  war 
which  is  commonly  applied  in  those  cases  in  which  the  act  con- 


32  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

cems  the  interests  of  humanity  in  their  widest  sense,  for  the  pre- 
servation of  human  lives  or  things  which  either  could  never  have 
had,  or  have  already  ceased  to  have,  any  influence  on  the  oper- 
ations of  war. 

In  such  cases,  for  instance,  the  general  who  leaves  a  place 
appeals  to  the  humane  feelings  of  his  advancing  adversary,  when 
he  avails  himself  of  this  usage  of  war,  probably  introduced  into 
the  armies  of  all  civilized  states. 

In  the  Austrian  army  this  usage  of  war  consists  in  placing  the 
persons  or  things  in  question  under  the  care  of  a  special  protect- 
ive watch-post,  whose  duty  it  is  to  protect  what  has  been  con- 
fided to  it  from  every  kind  of  injury  until  an  opportunity  oflers 
of  consigning  to  an  officer  of  the  enemy — the  higher  in  rank  the 
better — the  written  request,  in  such  cases  always  indispensable, 
addressed  by  its  own  general  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  with  it, 
at  the  same  time,  what  had  been  placed  under  its  protection. 

Protective  watch-posts  of  this  kind  are  generally  not  made 
prisoners  by  the  enemy,  but  are  duly  escorted  either  to  their  own 
outposts,  or  at  least  far  beyond  the  chain  of  those  of  the  enemy. 
Hence  their  name  ''  safe-guard,"  which  passed  over  to  the  custom 
itself  This  is  undoubtedly  the  noblest  blossom  of  the  most  chi- 
valrous mode  of  carrying  on  war. 

The  chief  condition,  however,  for  the  performance  of  this  usage 
of  war  with  security  is,  that  its  application  neither  may  nor  can 
cause  any  advantage  whatever  to  the  general  as  such.  This  cir- 
cumstance must  be  so  plain  as  to  be  evident  to  the  enemy  also. 

To  travelers  capable  of  bearing  arms,  the  safe-guard  is  applica- 
ble only  in  very  rare  cases  :  in  particular  only  when  their  former 
as  well  as  their  present  sphere  of  action  is  evidently  remote  from 
the  cause  of  the  war,  as  also  from  the  war  itself 

But  a  letter  written  by  a  commander-in-chief  of  an  army,  and 
given  to  a  traveler  whose  relation  to  the  war  does  not  correspond 
to  these  conditions,  in  order  that  the  possessor  of  this  letter  may 
be  considered  as  a  friend  and  not  as  an  enemy  by  an  isolated 
corps  of  the  same  army,  within  the  circuit  of  whose  operations 
he  intends  to  move — such  letter  can  never  bear  any  analogy  to 
the  humane  war-usage  of  the  safe-guard. 

The  letter  in  question,  even  if  only  that  part  of  it  be  consider- 
ed in  which  a  safe-guard  is  assigned  to  Count  Zichy  in  General 
Roth's  camp,  was  consequently  nothing  else  than  an  especially 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY.  ^3 

favorable  passport  given  by  the  enemy ;  the  mere  granting  of 
which  forced  on  one  the  supposition  that  the  writer  of  the  pass- 
port— in  this  case  the  enemy's  commander-in-chief^ — had  akeady 
received  indubitable  proofs  of  Count  Zichy's  sympathy  with  the 
objects  of  the  war  in  which  he  was  engaged.  The  correctness 
of  this  supposition  appeared  to  be  still  more  confirmed  by  the  con- 
cluding formula  of  the  letter — namely  that  "  every  protection  be 
given  to  the  Count." 

Nevertheless  it  can  not  be  denied  that  a  letter  of  protection  of 
the  same  tenour,  miitath  mutandis,  granted  to  a  harmless  per- 
son— for  instance,  to  a  man  of  scientific  celebrity,  that  he  may 
not  be  interrupted  in  his  journey,  undertaken  to  make  researches 
in  the  natural  or  other  sciences — would  have  led  at  worst  to  the 
temporary  loss  of  the  bearer's  personal  liberty  ;  it  being  assumed 
as  a  matter  of  course,  that  his  conduct  toward  the  outpost  who 
stopped  him  had  not  been  so  suspicious  as  that  of  Count  Zichy. 
But  Count  Zichy  was,  as  is  generally  known,  neither  a  person 
of  scientific,  nor,  under  the  then  existing  circumstances,  of  an 
otherwise  Jiarmless  celebrity.  By  the  constitution  recently  sanc- 
tioned by  the  king,  he  had,  like  many  others  of  his  rank  and  po- 
litical creed,  been  deprived  of  an  influential  position  in  the  coun- 
try, of  many  of  his  privileges  of  nobility,  nay  even  of  a  consider- 
able part  of  his  revenues.  That  he  therefere  longed  again,  like 
many  others  of  his  rank  and  political  creed,  for  the  ante-March 
fleshpots  of  Egypt,  and  that  he  had  sympathies  for  the  overthrow 
of  the  recent  Hungarian  constitution,  and  especially  for  the  Croat 
invasion  on  account  of  its  feudal-reactionary  character — was 
more  than  probable.  Of  Magyar  origin,  he  had,  however,  by  ac- 
tions to  prove  this  sympathy  to  the  enemy's  general-in-chief, 
before  he  could  obtain  the  letter  of  protection  which  lay  before  us. 

Consequently  this  letter  of  protection,  in  accordance  with  the 
events  which  preceded  its  discovery,  made  it  in  fact  evident  that 
the  Hungarian,  subject.  Count  Zichy,  had  an  operative  under- 
standing with  the  enemies  of  his  country. 

Once  arrived  at  this  moral  conviction,  I  positively  could  no 
longer  adduce  any  argument  to  show  that  Count  Zichy,  had  not 
himself  taken  these  proclamations  with  him  from  Stuhlweissen- 
burg,to  Kalozd,  intending  to  hand  them  over  to  General  Roth 
that  he  might  disseminate  them.  Being  aware  of  the  proximity 
of  the  hostile  auxiliary  corps  to  Stuhlweissenburg,  and  comforted 


34  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

by  the  supposition  that  his  country  had  no  troops  between  that 
place  and  the  enemy's  main  army,  the  execution  of  such  a  design 
appeared  to  Count  Zichy  to  be  altogether  without  danger,  and 
the  opportunity  therefore  extremely  favorable  for  rendering  an  im- 
portant service  to  the  party  to  which  he  adhered,  without  any 
sacrifice  to  himself 

But  these  considerations  led  to  the  further  moral  conviction 
that  Count  Zichy  had  really  endeavored  to  disseminate  the  hos- 
tile proclamations,  and  that  he  was  engaged  in  the  execution  of 
this  design,  when  he  was  unexpectedly  stopped  and  arrested  by 
our  outposts. 

In  accordance  with  this  conviction,  the  motives  also  were  re- 
vealed which  had  induced  Count  Zichy  to  state,  that  the  procla- 
mations were  in  his  carriage  by  a  mere  mistake,  and  not  from  the 
criminal  intention  of  his  valet.  It  was  by  no  means  the  impulse 
of  a  generous  compassion  which  had  drawn  from  the  Count  this 
assertion  ;  but  the  fear  of  being  confronted  with  his  valet,  from 
whose  attachment  he  might  expect  that,  to  exonerate  his  master 
he  would  perhaps  take  upon  himself  a  mistake,  but  certainly  not 
the  criminal  intention,  the  avowal  of  which  might  be  followed  by 
the  punishment  of  death. 

After  all  this,  I  was  deprived,  on  the  one  hand,  of  any  valid 
reason  for  coming  to  a  conclusion  different  from  the  judicial  opin- 
ion of  the  auditor  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  great  danger  in 
which  the  country  was  at  that  time,  and  the  importance  of  a 
successful  accomplishment  of  my  mission  toward  averting  it — on 
which  account  I  had  been  invested  with  powers  so  unusually  am- 
ple— demanded  the  strictest  application  of  the  laws  of  war  against 
crimes  of  that  kind. 

I  therefore  passed  sentence  :  That  Count  Eugene  Zichy  had 
really  committed  the  crimes  of  which  he  was  accused,  had  there- 
by forfeited  his  life,  and  deserved  the  punishment  of  death  by  the 
halter. 

This  sentence  was  unanimously  adopted  by  the  whole  court- 
martial,  and  was  carried  into  effect  after  the  delinquent  had  re- 
ceived the  last  offices  of  religion. 

Count  Eugene  Zichy's  fellow-prisoner,  Count  Paul  Zichy — 
against  whom  the  proofs  requisite  for  the  proceedings  of  a  court- 
martial  did  not  exist — was  handed  over  for  trial  to  the  ordinary 
tribunals. 


CHAPTER  III. 

The  first  important  battle,  which  was  fought  on  the  29th 
September,  1848,  between  the  Hungarian  army  and  the  Croats, 
at  Pakozd,  Yelencze,  and  Sukoro,  led  to  a  three  days'  armistice. 
During  this  interval  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Hungarian 
army,  the  Austrian  General  Moga,  held  a  council  of  war  upon 
the  operations  to  be  next  undertaken.  Before  this  council  was 
summoned,  I  had  received  orders  from  the  commander-in-chief 
to  draw  back  my  outposts  from  Soponya,  and  to  proceed  with  a 
part  of  my  detachment,  on  the  1st  of  October,  to  Ercseny  (Ercsi) 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  above  Adony.  On  the  30th, 
immediately  after  the  termination  of  the  court-martial  against 
the  Counts  Zichy,  I  obeyed  these  orders. 

On  the  2d  of  October,  a  lieutenant  of  the  Hunyady-Schar, 
named  Vasarhelyi,  arrived  at  Sziget-Ujfalu,  on  the  island  of 
Csepel,  opposite  Ercsi,  with  a  report  that,  soon  after  the  Counts 
Zichy  had  been  conveyed  from  Soponya  to  Adony,  a  suspected 
individual  had  been  stopped  on  the  line  of  outposts  near  the 
former  place  ;  had  taken  to  flight  at  the  first  challenge  of  the 
vidette  ;  and  while  escaping  had  thrown  away  a  crumpled- 
up  note.  This  note  had  been  found  by  the  pursuing  patrol, 
and  handed  over  to  him  (Vasarhelyi.)  In  a  few  lines,  with- 
out legible  address  or  signature,  it  mentioned  a  hiding-place  in 
Count  Zichy's  castle  at  Kalozd,  "  where,"  thus  the  document 
ran,  "  may  be,  found  what  is  sought  for."  This  hint  had  de- 
termined himlyasarhelyi)  to  undertake  immediately  an  expedi- 
tion to  Kalozd,  hoping  to  find  there  a  large  supply  of  arms. 
"When  arrived  at  Kalozd,  he  got  hold  of  the  count's  intendant, 
and  forced  him  to  point  out  the  hiding-place  indicated  in  the 
note.  But,  instead  of  the  supposed  supply  of  arms,  only  two 
iron  chests,  securely  locked,  were  to  be  found  ;  and  these  he  had 
immediately  brought  away  to  save  them  from  the  Croats,  who 
were  just  approaching.  He  was  ignorant  of  the  contents  of  the 
chests,  as  they  remained  locked. 

I  asked  to  see  the  note  in  question ;  but  received  for  ansAver, 


36  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

that,  having  found  out  the  hiding-place,  the  identity  of  which 
with  that  indicated  by  the  note  was  undoubted,  he  had  taken 
no  further  heed  of  the  note,  which  had  been  lost  by  him  while 
engaged  in  searching  for  the  hiding-place.  Moreover,  he  thought 
the  chests  he  had  brought  with  him  would  be  sufficient  proof  of 
the  correctness  of  his  statements. 

I  found,  in  fact,  no  reason  to  doubt  them  ;  and  having  con- 
vinced myself  that  neither  of  the  chests  had  been  opened,  I 
ordered  Yasarhelyi  to  escort  them  without  delay  to  Pesth,  and 
deliver  them  to  the  government.  At  the  same  time  I  sent  by 
him  a  report  of  the  whole  affair,  in  which  I  recommended  him 
to  the  attention  of  his  superiors  for  promotion  out  of  his  turn. 

Meanwhile  the  armistice  had  been  made  use  of  by  Ban  Jel- 
lachich  for  such  a  speedy  flank-march  from  his  position,  after 
the  battle  on  the  29th  September,  toward  K.aab,  that  it  became 
impossible  for  General  E,oth  to  overtake  him  with  his  auxiliary 
corps,  which  was  consequently  exposed  to  the  danger  of  meet- 
ing with  total  discomfiture,  a  few  days  later,  by  being  separated 
from  the  Croat  main  army,  as  well  as  from  the  Croat-Sclavo- 
nian  frontier,  by  Hungarian  forces. 

On  the  4th  of  October  hostilities  recommenced  between  Grene- 
ral  Moga's  troops  and  those  of  Ban  Jellachich. 

I  was  incorporated  with  my  detachment  into  the  corps  of 
Moriz  Perczel,  who  was  then  colonel  and  commander  of  the  so- 
called  Zrinyi-Schar,  which  had  been  appointed  to  act  independ- 
ently against  General  Roth's  Croat  corps.  This  I  learned  only 
on  the  evening  of  the  3d  of  October  in  Adony,  whither  I  had 
returned  from  Ercsi  ;  and  as,  according  to  a  previous  decree  of 
the  Hungarian  commander-in-chief,  I  retained  my  independent 
position,  and  was  intrusted  with  the  same  mission,  I  had  already 
issued  my  arrangements  against  General  Roth  for  the  following 
day. 

Moriz  Perczel  thus  took,  on  the  evening  of  the  3d  of  October, 
the  principal  direction  of  the  expedition  against  General  Roth, 
and  assigned  to  m.e  the  command  of  the  vanguard.  He  made  no 
changes  in  my  previous  dispositions. 

Our  object  was,  in  the  first  instance,  to  get  between  General 
Roth  and  the  road  to  Stuhlweissenburg,  and  either  drive  him 
back  to  the  south,  or  at  least  detain  him  till  we  should  be  suffi- 
ciently reinforced  to  defeat  him.     In  the  latter  case,  the  militia, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  37 

organizing  m  the  south  of  Hungary,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Danube,  was  charged  to  render  his  retreat  into  Croatia  as  diffi- 
cult as  possible. 

The  brief  instructions  for  this  purpose,  which  I,  as  command- 
er-in-chief of  the  southern  militia,  gave  to  my  sub-commanders, 
were  nearly  these  : 

"  The  militia  is  not  to  be  employed  in  open  combat  against 
regular  troops,  especially  if  these  are  provided  with  artillery  : 
open  combat,  therefore,  is  to  be  avoided  as  far  as  possible.  It 
is  to  alarm  the  enemy  by  the  successive  display  of  constantly 
changing  and  augmenting  masses  beyond  the  reach  of  his  guns  ; 
to  obstruct  his  movements,  by  destroying  the  most  important 
means  of  communication  in  the  hostile  district  of  operations 
(defiles,  dams,  bridges,  &c.),  as  well  as  by  removing  the  faciHties 
for  transport  existing  in  the  neighborhood  ;  and  to  expose  him 
to  the  most  destructive  privations,  by  consuming  the  nearest 
provisions,  and  secreting  the  more  remote.  These  are  the  duties 
to  which  the  militia  has  to  confine  itself." 

That,  in  fact,  I  could  scarcely  expect  more  useful  services 
from  the  mihtia,  the  following  statements  will  show. 

As  commander-in-chief  of  the  southern  militia,  I  was  never  ig 
a  condition  to  know,  even  approximately,  what  numbers  I  should 
have  at  my  disposal  at  any  given  time,  or  in  any  appointed  place 
The  militia  came,  and  the  militia  went,  just  as  it  felt  inclined. 
Generally,  however,  it  came  when  the  enemy  was  far  off';  when 
the  enemy  approached,  the  militia  departed.  In  a  word,  it  liked 
to  avoid  seeing  the  enemy.  When  by  accident,  however,  and  in 
spite  of  every  precaution,  it  had  the  misfortune  to  come  so  near 
the  enemy  as  to  hear  his  shots,  it  shouted,  "  Treachery  I"  and 
ran  away  as  fast  as  it  could.  The  utmost  degree  of  physical 
weariness  was  on  such  occasions  the  only  means  of  bringing  the 
militia-men  to  a  stand,  that  is,  to  a  lying  down. 

These  good  people  were  mostly  armed  with  scythes,  and  a 
very  few  of  them  with  old  rusty  muskets,  to  which  "  going-off'" 
was  almost  as  rare  an  occurrence  as  it  was  to  their  scythes. 

The  militia-men  had  a  particular  predilection  ibr  cannons. 
These  they  drew  after  them  with  enthusiasm,  even  without 
orders.  Their  first  question  to  the  person  who  presented  himself 
as  their  leader,  always  was,  whether  he  had  cannons.  If  his 
answer  was  in  the  affirmative,  they  joyfully  prepared  to  march ; 


38  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

if  not,  he  could  scarcely  reckon  on  any  considerable  number  of 
adherents.  For  this  reason  their  leaders  very  often  made  use 
of  the  artifice  of  assuring  them  that  they  had  sent  their  guns 
already  in  advance  against  the  enemy.  Clumsy  as  this  trick 
vi^as,  it  was  sometimes  sufficient  to  keep  the  militia-men  on  their 
legs  for  some  days. 

The  attachment  of  the  militia  to  heavy  guns  (naturally  to 
friendly  ones)  was  severed  in  the  first  moment  of  danger  from 
the  enemy.  It  might  be  calculated  with  certainty,  in  ninety- 
nine  cases  out  of  every  hundred,  that  from  a  zealous  expedition 
of  militia  with  artillery,  in  a  very  short  time  all  the  men  would 
return,  somewhat  exhausted  indeed,  yet  otherwise  unhurt,  but 
without  the  cannons. 

The  resolute  leader  of  a  well-disciplined  corps  of  from  8000  to 
10,000  men  could  therefore  hardly  be  efiectually  misled,  in  his 
operations,  as  to  the  hostilities  practicable  with  such  a  militia. 
Yet  in  the  circumstances  of  the  auxiliary  corps  of  Croats  under 
the  command  of  Generals  Roth  and  Philippovich — abandoned 
by  Ban  Jellachich,  probably  from  higher  considerations — the 
hostilities  even  of  this  militia  sufficed  to  prepare  the  ruin  of  the 
Croat  corps,  nay,  finally  to  accomplish  it. 

Perczel's  whole  corps,  which,  besides  the  militia  just  de- 
scribed, was  employed  against  Roth,  consisted  of  scarcely  3000 
men,  with  200  horses  and  eight  pieces  of  artillery ;  all,  except 
the  cavalry,  being  freshly-organized  troops. 

The  main  body  of  this  army  left  Adony  on  the  4th  of  October, 
at  daybreak,  to  traverse,  in  the  shortest  time,  by  Seregelyes,  all 
roads  leading  from  the  south  to  Stuhlweissenburg,  and  ascertain 
first  of  all  how  far  General  Roth  had  already  advanced  toward 
that  place.  A  squadron  of  hussars,  a  company  of  the  Hunyady- 
Schar,  and  four  guns,  formed  the  vanguard. 

A  fl^nk-column,  consisting  of  a  part  of  the  militia  and  two 
companies  of  the  Hunyady-Schar,  had  been  sent  from  Adony,  by 
Sarosd  to  Aba,  to  endeavor  to  efiect  a  junction  with  the  militia 
— which  lay  still  more  to  the  south,  on  the  road  from  Aba  to 
Bogard — and,  by  a  change  of  direction  toward  the  east,  to  pre- 
vent the  escape  of  the  enemy  from  Kalozd — where  we  supposed 
he  was — into  the  less-protected  territory  lying  between  the  Da- 
nube and  the  channels  of  the  Sarviz,  by  which,  with  the  disposi- 
tions already  made — thanks  to  our  tactic  and   strategic  inex- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  39 

perience — the  possibility  of  righting  ourselves  would  have  become 
very  problematical. 

The  dispositions  for  this  day,  4th  October,  were  : 
Vanguard  :  Seregelyes. 
Southern  flank-column  :  Sarosd ;  its  advanced  posts  as  far 

as  Aba  and  Sarkeresztur. 
Main  body  :  Szolga  Egyhaza. 

Arrived  at  Seregelyes,  I  learned  from  a  scout,  that  in  the 
forenoon  the  enemy  had  been  seen  on  the  road  between  Soponya 
and  Tacz,  marching  toward  Stuhlweissenburg  ;  and  I  at  once 
resolved  to  advance  immediately,  on  my  own  responsibility,  with 
the  vanguard  to  Tacz,  and  attack  him.  I  took  my  way  thither 
by  P.  Barand  and  P.  Foveny,  of  which  I  informed  Colonel 
Perczel,  and  at  the  same  time  desired  him  to  follow  me  speedily, 
that  the  enemy  might  not  escape  us. 

Toward  evening — though  still  in  broad  daylight — I  stood 
before  Tacz. 

The  place  was  occupied  by  infantry,  and,  according  to  my 
information,  by  two  battalions.  Having  only  one  company  of 
infantry  at  my  disposal,  and  that  one  having  never  stood  fire,  I 
ordered  a  section  of  hussars  to  attack  the  village,  though  occu- 
pied by  infantry,  and  this  contrary  to  every  existing  rule  of 
tactics,  reckoning  on  the  Croat's  dread  of  the  hussars,  even  then 
well  known.  The  attack,  supported  by  some  discharges  of  can- 
non, was  made  by  the  hussars  with  their  accustotned  energy,  and 
after  a  few  minutes  the  enemy  was  in  wild  flight  toward  So- 
ponya, and  the  village  of  Tacz  in  the  possession  of  our  troops. 

During  the  night  we  bivouacked  at  P.  Foveny,  and  had  our 
outposts  in  Tacz. 

I  heard  nothing  from  Perczel  during  the  whole  night,  and  was 
therefore  obliged,  at  daybreak  on  the  5th  of  October,  to  retreat 
from  Foveny  to  Seregelyes,  lest  I  might  perchance  be  cut  ofl' 
from  our  main  body  by  a  hostile  column  advancing  on  the  road 
from  Aba  to  Stuhlweissenburg. 

Scarcely  had  I  left  P.  Foveny,  when  this  apprehension  ap- 
peared to  be  justified  by  the  report  of  a  patrol,  that  the  enemy 
was  already  marching  between  myself  and  Perczel  on  the  above- 
mentioned  road  to  Stuhlweissenburg. 

Now  the  enemy  was  already  nearer  to  this  town  than  myself; 
and  if  I  did  not  succeed  in  getting  the  start  of  him  on  the 


40  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

parallel  road  from  Tacz  to  Stuhlweissenburg,  General  Roth's 
junction  with  Ban  Jellachich,  in  my  opinion,  could  no  longer 
be  prevented  ;  for  I  had  even  then  no  idea  of  the  speed  with 
which  Ban  Jellachich  had  been  striving  to  execute  his  famous 
flank-movement,  and  consequently  could  not  suppose  that  a  Hun- 
garian column  was  already  in  Stuhlweissenburg. 

Leaving  the  infantry  behind,  I  had  again  returned  with  the 
cavalry  and  artillery,  by  P.  Foveny,  to  the  road  from  Tacz  to 
Stuhlweissenburg,  and  was  on  a  forced  march  thither,  when  I 
met,  coming  from  that  direction,  a  patrol  of  hussars,  which  had 
been  sent  to  seek  a  junction  withPerczel,  and  from  whose  report 
I  concluded  that  the  enemy  would  no  longer  find  the  troops  of 
Ban  Jellachich  in  Stuhlweissenburg,  but  our  own.  We  naturally 
availed  ourselves  of  this  favorable  circumstance  immediately  to 
turn  our  front  again  to  the  road  from  Aba  to  Stuhlweissenburg, 
on  which  we  resolved,  at  any  cost,  to  attack  the  advancing 
enemy. 

In  the  execution  of  this  project  I  was  interrupted,  howevei: 
by  two  parlementaires  (trumpets)  from  the  hostile  column  (it 
was  the  commander  of  the  troop  himself  and  his  adjutant),  who 
came  to  declare  to  us  that  the  Croats  had  entered  Hungary  with 
no  hostile  intention,  and  that  least  of  all  would  they  fight  against 
the  royal  Imperial  troops. 

I  was  just  then  enveloped  in  a  Szicr.^  In  reply  to  this»decla- 
ration  of  the  ptirlementaires,  I  threw  off  the  Sziir,  and  accom- 
panied this  di'splay  of  my  Honved  uniform  with  the  question, 
whether  the  i^arlementaire  and  his  troops  had  likewise  no  hos- 
tile intentions  against  me  and  mine,  who,  though  we  were  not 
royal  imperials,  were  nevertheless  good  royalists.  His  answer 
was  confined  to  the  repeated  assurance  that  the  Croats  had  not 
entered  Hungary  as  enemies.  A  general  hilarity  followed  this 
ingenuous  assertion. 

I  contented  myself,  in  reply,  with  taking  out  my  watch,  and 
fixing  the  time  when  I  would  attack,  if  they  had  not  previously 
laid  down  their  arms.  Fifteen  minutes  appeared  to  me  quite' 
long  enough  for  consideration.  Before  the  expiration  of  the  time 
I  received  the  report,  that  the  hostile  column  would  make  no 
resistance.     It  amounted  to  above  1000  infantry. 

The  cheapness  of  this  not  inconsiderable  advantage  made  me 
*  A  top-coat  made  of  coarse  thick  woolen  stuff. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  41 

at  first  suspicious,  and  I  took  the  greatest  precaution  in  approach- 
ing the  spot  where  the  Croat  troop  awaited  to  be  disarmed.  But 
I  soon  learned  that  while  their  commander  was  treating  with  us, 
our  main  body  had  suddenly  made  its  appearance  on  their  only 
line  of  retreat  to  General  Roth's  main  body. 

Perczel  had  left  Seregelyes  early  on  the  5th  of  October  to  follow 
his  vanguard,  and  reached  the  road  from  Aba,  on  which  the 
Croat  column  had  advanced  toward  Stuhlweissenburg,  only  after 
it  had  already  carelessly  passed  at  the  height  of  Seregelyes. 
This  happy  accident  obtained  for  us,  without  combat,  a  propor- 
tionately large  number  of  prisoners,  as  well  as  their  muskets — 
of  incomparable  greater  value  to  us. 

While  Perczel  was  occupied  with  arrangements  respecting  the 
prisoners  of  war  who  had  laid  down  their  arms,  he  having  with 
his  main  body  reached  the  hostile  troop  before  myself,  a  prisoner 
was  sent  to  me  by  my  outposts  in  Tacz.  This  man,  a  courier 
of  General  Roth,  had  received  a  letter  from  his  general,  address- 
ed "To  the  commander  of  the  royal  Imperial  troops  in  Stuhlweis- 
senburgh,"  with  orders  to  take  it  to  this  place. 

From  this  letter  it  was  evident  that  General  Roth  had  been 
abandoned  without  orders  to  his  fate,  and  was  then  actually  in  a 
very  critical  position.  This  might  also  have  induced  him  the 
same  day  to  seek  for  a  mediation,  on  the  way  to  which  he  was 
met  by  Moriz  Perczel.  Immediately  after  the  events  just  related, 
Colonel  Perczel  marched  with  his  main  body  to  Tacz  ;  and  a  few 
hours  after  our  arrival  there.  General  Philippovich,  as  General 
Roth's  delegate,  appeared  before  the  line  of  our  outposts,  and 
was  conducted  to  the  colonel's  head-quarters. 

Here  he  declared  that  the  former  conflicts  between  the  Croat 
and  Hungarian  troops  were  merely  the  consequences  of  misun- 
derstanding, and  desired  an  unobstructed  retreat  into  Croatia. 
Perczel,  on  the  other  hand,  required  an  unconditional  surrender. 
As  might  have  been  expected,  no  arrangement  was  come  to; 
and  toward  evening  hostilities  recommenced. 

"We  immediately  advanced  to  Csosz,  and  rewiained  encamped 
at  the  southern  extremity  of  this  place  during  the  night  of  the 
5th  of  October.  But  the  enemy  left  Soponya  on  the  same  nig-ht, 
hoping  to  get  the  start  of  us  in  his  retreat  by  Lang,  Kalozd,  and 
Degh,  toward  Croatia. 

On  the   morning  of  the   6th  of  October,   with  the  cavalry 


42  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

of  our  corps  (two  squadrons  of  hussars),  I  hastened  after  him, 
along  the  route  just  mentioned.  Perczel  was  to  follow  as  quickly 
as  possible  with  the  artillery. 

Not  until  after  we  reached  Lang  did  I  ascertain  that  the 
enemy  had  passed  Kalozd  toward  Degh.  at  the  same  time,  a 
shorter  route  from  Lang  to  Degh  was  pointed  out  to  me,  without 
touching  Kalozd.  While  with  the  cavalry  I  pursued  the  longer 
route  by  Kalozd,  I  recommended  Perczel,  who  meanwhile  had 
scarcely  left  his  camp  at  Csosz,  to  take  the  shorter  road,  that  he 
might  retrieve  the  time  lost.  The  result  of  later  inquiries,  how- 
ever, showed  that  the  direct  line  of  communication  between  Lang 
and  Degh  was  impracticable  for  heavy  trains.  This  I  reported 
to  Perczel  without  delay,  and  expressly  warned  him,  still  in  time, 
against  taking  the  route  just  recommended,  unless  its  practicabil- 
ity could  previously  be  placed  beyond  doubt. 

Perczel,  however,  gave  no  heed  to  this  warning,  but  marched 
from  Lang,  not  by  Kalozd,  but  directly  to  Degh,  encountered 
serious  obstacles,  and  did  not  arrive  with  his  fatigued  and  hungry 
troops  till  late  in  the  evening ;  whereas  I  and  the  hussars  had 
come  up  with  the  enemy  about  mid-day,  but  was  unable  to 
attack  him  with  success,  or  effectually  disturb  his  orderly  re- 
treat. 

This  new  loss  of  time,  which  the  enemy  well  knew  how  to 
improve,  gave  them  another  important  start  of  us ;  while  our 
troops  had  been  uselessly  and  excessively  fatigued. 

The  conclusion  was  evident,  that  the  frequent  repetition  of 
similiar  blunders  would  frustrate  our  object,  which  was,  in  fact, 
nothing  less  than  the  total  destruction  of  Roth's  corps. 

This  apprehension  of  mine  contrasted  strangely  with  the  con- 
tents of  a  dispatch  from  the  Committee  of  Defense  of  the  Diet, 
which  reached  me  on  the  morning  of  the  same  day.  In  it  I  was 
charged,  as  independent  commander  of  our  expedition  against 
General  Roth,  so  soon  as  I  should  have  annihilated  his  corps,  to 
prepare  a  similar  fate  for  another  hostile  chief  of  faction,  whose 
name  I  forget. 

I  had  communicated  the  original  of  this  dispatch  to  Perczel 
before  he  left  the  road  to  Kalozd  with  our  main  body,  and  in- 
tended at  first  to  leave  the  reply  to  him.  But  irritated  at  the 
prolonged  non-appearance  of  the  main  troops,  I  resolved  during 
the  afternoon,  to  answer  it  myself,  which  I  did  as  follows  : 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  43 

"  Having  since  the  3d  of  this  month  been  removed  from  the  chief  con- 
duct of  the  operations  which  have  for  their  ohject  the  destruction  of  the 
auxiliary  Croat  corps  commanded  by  General  Roth,  it  was  with  no  small 
surprise  that  I  learned,  by  a  decree  which  I  received  to-day  from  the  Com- 
mittee of  Defense,  that  I  was  expected  not  only  to  annihilate  the  said 
corps,  but  likewise  to  repulse  the  Serbians,  who  threaten  an  irruption  into 
the  country. 

"The  Committee  of  Defense  seems  to  be  utterly  ignorant  of  the  state 
of  affairs  in  the  camp ;  and  I  take  the  liberty  hereby  to  declare,  that  I  can 
by  no  means  hold  myself  responsible  for  the  success-  of  the  expedition 
against  Roth,  convinced  as  I  am,  that  it  would  be  the  greatest  injustice 
to  call  one  man  to  account  for  the  faults  of  another. 

"Our  cause  is  too  sacred  for  me  to  hesitate  to  speak  the  truth,  even 
when  so  doing  may  have  the  appearance  of  mean  jealousy. 

"  This  premised,  I  would  call  the  attention  of  the  honorable  Diet  to  the 
fact  that,  besides  oratory  and  good-will,  military  knowledge. is  essential  to 
the  right  management  of  troops. 

"  The  command  given  to  me  on  the  2d,  I  had  to  deliver  up  to  Perczel 
on  the  3d. 

"  Degh,  6th  of  October,  1848." 

At  the  same  time  I  wrote  to  Perczel,  reproaching  him  with 
the  loss  of  time  caused  by  his  imprudence,  and  announcing  my 
firm  resolution  to  proceed  for  the  present  according  to  the  tenor 
of  the  above  letter,  and  more  energetically  against  him,  in  case, 
through  his  fault,  this  campaign  should  miscarry,  to  the  great 
detriment  of  the  country. 

By  this  I  intended,  either  to  make  Perczel — whose  military 
abilities  unfortunately  did  not  inspire  me  with  the  least  confi- 
dence— receive  more  tractably  my  counsels  relative  to  the  con- 
duct of  the  war,  or  to  effect  my  removal  from  his  corps  ;  because 
I  really  could  not  accustom  myself  to  the  spirit  in  which  he 
began  to  act,  and  which  had  been  evident  enough  even  on  the 
first  day. 

Nevertheless  I  employed  the  afternoon — which  had  not  been 
improved  for  any  important  operation  against  the  enemy — in 
observing  the  movements  of  the  Croat  corps,  which  retreated  on 
the  same  day  from  Degh  toward  Ozora,  along'  the  river  Sio, 
followed  by  me  with  a  few  hussars  to  the  edge  of  the  forest  lying 
between  these  places,  and  in  collecting  as  exact  information  as  I 
could  respecting  the  motions  of  the  southern  militia  (of  Tolna), 
which  had  been  placed  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 

This  information  was  favorable  enough.  The  passages  over 
the  Sio,  which  lay  in  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat,  it  was  reported, 
had  already  been  destroyed,  so  that  we  should  be  certain  of 


44  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

reaching  the  enemy,  thus  retarded,  on  the  following  day  near 
Ozora.  The  inhabitants  of  the  district,  however,  thought  it 
would  not  be  advisable  to  cross  the  forest  with  artillery,  because 
the  transport  of  heavy  trains  along  the  very  deeply-rutted  roads 
of  this  sandy  soil  would  be  extremely  difficult.  For  our  purpose 
— I  was  further  informed — the  forest  could  be  skirted  only  at  its 
eastern  extremity,  by  a  pretty  good  way  through  the  fields  lead- 
ing from  Degh  by  Szilas-Balhas  to  Ozora.  But  this  was  a  con- 
siderable circuit ;  and  it  would  accordingly  be  advisable  for  the 
column  to  set  out  on  its  march  to  Szilas-Balhas  before  nightfall, 
that  it  might  not  be  too  much  exhausted  when  it  made  its  ap- 
pearance next  morning  on  the  battle-field. 

The  northern  edge  of  the  forest  is  about  an  hour's  march  from 
Degh.  As  far  as  this  I  had  followed  the  enemy.  To  follow 
him  further  seemed  dangerous,  nay  superfluous ;  since  the  in- 
habitants of  the  district  all  agreed  in  asserting  that  he  could  take 
only  one  direction,  namely,  to  Ozora,  if  indeed  he  intended  to 
cross  the  Sio.  I  therefore  returned  with  the  vanguard  to  Degh, 
and  immediately  sent  the  artillery — which  arrived  first  of  the 
main  body — together  with  the  cavalry,  to  Szilas-Balhas,  without 
waiting  for  Perczel's  arrival,  or  asking  his  consent. 

It  was  night  before  Perczel  himself  reached  Degh.  He  vehe- 
mently called  me  to  account  for  the  last  letter  I  had  written  to 
him  ;  and  went  so  far  as  to  scofl'  at  the  impotency  of  my  proceed- 
ings against  him. 

"  Perhaps  you  do  not  know,"  he  exclaimed,  "  that  my  party  is 
the  predominant  one,  not  only  in  the  Diet,  but  also  in  the  Com- 
mittee of  Defense  ;  and  that  I  need  only  pronounce  a  single  word 
to  crush  you  at  any  moment  I" 

My  answer,  that  I  did  not  serve  his  party,  but  my  country, 
and  was  there  for  its  welfare  even  against  his  party,  irritated 
him  still  more.  He  formed  the  leaders  of  the  several  independent 
divisions  of  his  corps  into  a  kind  of  purifying  commission,  and 
cited  me  before  it.  He  claimed  the  presidency  of  the  commission 
for  himself 

"  This  major,"  thus  he  opened  the  proceedings,  pointing  to  me, 
"has  himself  confessed,  as  you  know,  gentlemen,  that  he  did 
wrong,  when  he,  the  day  before  yesterday,  as  commander  of  my 
vanguard,  advanced  with  it  to  Tacz,  while  the  main  body  was 
still  in  Szolga  Egyhaza,  and  dared,  on  his  own  responsibility,  to 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  4C: 

attack  this  place,  where  the  enemy  was  in  great  force.  Further, 
this  major  yesterday  evening  moved  on  with  the  vanguard  from 
Tacz  to  Csosz,  again  without  my  authority,  and  even  without 
my  knowledge.  He  also  dares  to  censure  my  conduct,  and  to 
denounce  me  to  a  government  which  has  been  called  into  power 
by  my  party,  nay  is  composed  of  my  party."  (Several  members 
of  the  commission  expressed  great  indignation.)  *'  Justify  your- 
self I"  cried  Perczel  to  me,  after  he  had  finished. 

"  The  severe  criticism,"  I  replied,  *'  to  which  I  subject  my 
own  actions,  entitles  me  to  be  equally  severe  on  the  actions  of 
others.  You  have  to-day  led  your  main  body,"  I  continued, 
"  contrary  to  my  representations,  by  a  road,  of  the  practicability 
of  which  you  could  not  have  been  convinced.  In  consequence 
you  encountered  obstacles,  to  remove  which  cost  you  the  time 
that,  had  you  listened  to  me,  you  might  have  saved,  and  em- 
ployed in  overtaking  and  attacking  to-day  the  fleeing  enemy. 
To  make  up  for  the  time  lost  is  no  longer  in  your  power.  By 
your  fault  the  enemy  has  gained  an  advantage  which,  wisely 
improved,  may  place  him  beyond  our  reach.  A  lucky  accident 
can  alone  make  good  this  loss.  And  this,  if  it  should  happen, 
will  be  more  than  you  deserve.  But  even  the  luckiest  accident 
would  be  without  benefit  to  us,  if  such  a  fault  as  you  committed 
to-day  be  repeated.  This  is  the  expanded  meaning  of  the  few 
words  I  wrote  to  you  this  afternoon. 

"  I  could  have  left  matters  as  they  were,  had  I  not  received — 
as  you  know — a  dispatch  from  the  Committee  of  Defense, 
w^herein  I  am  treated  as  independent  commander,  and  held  re- 
sponsible for  the  success  of  this  expedition.  I  owe  it  to  myself 
to  refuse  to  be  accountable  for  your  faults.  This  I  have  done  in 
my  reply  to  the  Committee  of  Defense ;  and  at  the  same  time 
warned  it  in  future  to  be  more  cautious  in  the  choice  of  inde- 
pendent leaders.  And  that  you  might  know  how  you  stand 
with  me,  I  at  the  same  time  informed  you  of  the  step  I  had 
taken  against  you.  If  my  conduct  appears  to  you  to  be  insubor- 
dinate, you  can  inflict  on  me  the  punishment  which  the  law  pre- 
scribes. But  he  is  a  scoundrel,  who,  in  consequence  of  such  open 
demeanor,  has  the  impudence  to  accuse  me  of  denouncing  him  I'^ 

After  this  reply,  there  were  apparently  only  two  ways  open  to 
Perczel ;  either  to  retract  the  accusation  of  denunciation  he  had 
brought  against  me,  or  the  duel. 


46  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Perczel  found  a  third  :  he  called  for  the  guard,  and  ordered 
me  to  be  immediately  shot. 

It  seemed  as  if  I  should  hardly  have  the  necessary  time  left 
me  to  prepare  for  death.  Several  members  of  the  assembly,, 
however,  interceded  so  energetically  in  my  behalf,  that  Perczel 
preferred  at  last  to  let  me  live,  and  to  retract  his  accusation. 

It  was  unfortunately  impossible  to  pass  over  here  in  silence 
this  scandalous  scene,  because  a  knowledge  of  it  is  indispensable 
toward  forming  a  judgment  on  the  position  which  Perczel,  after 
this,  constantly  endeavored  to  take  against  me. 

Immediately  after  this  scene,  the  purifying  commission — to- 
gether with  myself,  who  had  been  accused  before  it — was 
changed  into  a  council  of  war ;  and  I  now  reported  my  recent 
information  respecting  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  as  well  as 
concerning  the  positions  and  doings  of  the  militia  in  their  rear ; 
further,  as  to  the  dispositions  I  had  made  in  consequence  of  this 
information.  These  latter  again  enraged  Perczel  against  me. 
With  reason  he  objected  that  I  had  no  authority  for  making  such 
dispositions  ;  but  with  less  reason,  that  his  corps  was  thereby 
denuded  of  the  whole  of  its  artillery  and  cavalry,  and  that  a 
judicious  arrangement  of  the  troops  for  the  following  day  was 
now  impossible. 

"You  have  crossed,"  he  exclaimed,  "  all  my  plans  by  this  pre- 
cipitate, self-willed,  bad  arrangement,  I  intended  to  awe  the 
enemy  by  passing,  en  front,  the  forest  between  Degh  and  Ozora 
with  my  whole  corps.  This  is  now  no  longer  possible,  you  hav- 
ing sent  my  cavalry  and  cannons  God  knows  where  I" 

After  I  had  made  some  remarks  on  the  impracticability  of  this 
strange  scheme,  I  declared  that  I  was  willing  to  take  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  dispositions  I  had  made,  if  the  infantry  was 
employed  agreeably  thereto.  I  meant  that  the  column  making 
the  circuit  of  the  wood,  after  being  well  re-inforced  by  infantry, 
should  open  the  attack  ;  while  the  rest  of  the  infantry,  crossing 
the  forest  line  between  Degh  and  Ozora,  a  cheval  of  the  road  con- 
necting these  places,  and  occupying  the  south  edge,  Avas  kept  e7i 
reserve,  and  only  in  case  the  enemy,  in  spite  of  the  attack  of 
the  column,  attempted  to  break  through  toward  the  east  in 
the  direction  of  the  still-remaining  bridges  over  the  Sio,  should 
rush  out  and  attack  him  flank  and  rear ;  or,  in  case  he  aimed 
at  seeking  refuge  in  the  forest,  should  endeavor  to  prevent  him. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  47 

"If,"  I  added,  "the  Croats  nevertheless  conquer,  we  are  too 
weak  to  hinder  their  retreat  into  their  own  country.  But  if  they 
do  not  succeed,  or  if  they  shrink  from  a  battle,  they  will  then  be 
forced  by  us  to  the  west  toward  the  Flatten  lake  ;  and  thus,  in- 
closed between  the  lake,  the  Sio,  and  our  troops,  there  will  be 
no  alternative  for  them  but  either  to  surrender  or  fight  for  their 
lives." 

After  a  long  and  vehement  debate,  this  proposal  was  adopted. 

I  undertook  the  command  of  the  column  that  was  to  skirt  the 
wood  ;  and  early  in  the  forenoon  of  the  7th  of  October,  1848, 
reached  its  southern  side  ;  the  enemy  being  encamped  to  the 
northeast  of  us,  in  a  great  hollow  square  within  gun-range.  The 
heights  on  my  left,  as  far  as  the  river  Sio,  had  been  occupied 
since  the  preceding  evening  by  the  local  militia  of  Tolna.  The 
commander  of  this  division  of  the  militia  had  unquestionably  a 
very  large  share  in  the  successful  issue  of  this  expedition. 

On  the  report  of  a  patrol  of  hussars,  that  Perczel  had  already 
reached  the  southern  edge  of  the  forest,  to  the  north  of  the  hostile 
camp,  I  gave  the  signal  to  attack.  But  before  the  as  yet  un- 
practiced  artillerymen  could  execute  this  order,  a  trumpet  ad- 
vanced from  the  hostile  square,  and  rendered  any  attack  super- 
fluous. 

I  was  not  present  at  the  parley  which  took  place.  But  when 
it  was  ended,  Perczel  ordered  his  sub- commanders  to  assemble 
near  the  enemy's  square.  He  had  likewise  summoned  the  hostile 
general  and  his  superior  officers. 

I  arrived  at  the  place  appointed  for  meeting  just  at  the  mo- 
ment when  Perczel  had  decided  on  the  fate  of  the  latter.  They, 
as  well  as  the  soldiery,  were  to  lay  down  their  arms,  and  were 
ordered  to  be  escorted  to  Pesth,  but  the  soldiery  to  their  own 
country.  Meanwhile,  however,  the  whole  hostile  corps  were  to 
remain  together  in  the  camp,  until  the  best  of  our  troops  had 
been  marched  round  them,  as  it  were  in  triumph.  By  this 
Perczel  intended  to  distinguish  in  an  especial  manner  several 
divisions  of  his  corps.  But  scarcely  were  the  rest  of  the  army, 
including  the  militia,  aware  from  the  incessant  shouts  of  Eljen 
(vivat),  that  the  proximity  of  the  enemy  no  longer  endangered 
their  lives,  than  they  of. their  own  accord  left  their  ranks,  and 
came  running  up  in  wild  disorder,  that  they  also  might  have  a 
closer  view  of  the  Croats. 


48  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY. 

In  spite  of  the  urgent  representations  of  his  sub-commanders. 
Perczel  seemed  to  take  pleasure  in  this  confusion.  It  was  not 
till  the  militia  began  to  seize  on  the  bayonet-muskets,  which  the 
Croats  had  laid  down,  intending  to  carry  them  off  as  memorials 
of  this  glorious  day,  that  Perczel  perceived,  too  late,  the  con- 
sequences of  his  weakness. 

With  the  exception  of  twelve  antiquated  cannons,  out  of  thq 
whole  equipment  of  Uoth's  corps  he  could  place  only  a  very 
small  portion  at  the  disposal  of  the  Committee  of  Defense. 


CHAPTER  lY. 

On  the  7th  of  October,  1848,  the  Croat  corps  of  General  Roth 
had  ceased  to  exist ;  the  southern  militia  was  on  its  way  home ; 
and  Perczel  was  proceeding  with  his  troops  to  Ozora,  where  he 
rested  during  the  8th.  On  the  same  day  I  was  prompted  to  the 
rank  of  Honved  colonel,  and  received  an  order  to  return  im- 
mediately to  Pesth.  I  left  Ozora  on  the  9th,  and  arrived  late  in 
the  evening  at  Kalozd,  where  I  had  to  halt  for  fresh  horses. 
Here  I  heard  by  chance  that  the  intendant  of  the  late  Count 
Eugene  Zichy  had  secreted  "  a  great  quantity  of  very  valuable 
jewelry,"  being  part  of  the  estate  of  his  lord,  and  that  he  kept  it 
concealed,  with  the  intention,  probably,  of  withholding  it  from 
the  state  ;  to  which  now — so  every  body  said — the  Count's 
whole  property  belonged. 

To  ascertain  in  the  shortest  way  how  far  this  rumor  was  true, 
I  went,  accompanied  by  several  officers  of  my  suite,  among  whom 
was  my  auditor,  and  conducted  by  the  principal  informer,  to  the 
residence  of  the  said  intendant ;  and  having  previously  stationed 
some  attendants  on  the  outside,  and  also  at  the  several  points  of 
communication  in  its  interior,  with  the  auditor  only  I  entered 
one  of  the  rooms  to  obtain,  by  surprise,  a  confession  from  him, 
in  case  he  intended  concealment.  This  precaution,  however, 
seemed  superfluous ;  the  intendant  declaring,  without  circum- 
locution, that  he  had  several  valuables  concealed  ;  and  that 
he  was  very  glad  of  this  opportunity  of  being  relieved  from  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  49 

charge  of  them.  Accordingly,  while  he  went  to  fetch  the  arti- 
cles in  question,  I  called  into  the  room  the  officers  who  had  re- 
mained outside,  and,  having  given  him  a  receipt  for  them,  took 
possession,  in  their  presence,  of  several  really  valuable  things ; 
after  they  had  been  inspected,  a  list  made  of  them,  and  the  cases 
sealed  that  contained  them. 

On  this  occasion  I  learnt  from  the  intendaut  that,  immediately 
after  the  arrest  of  the  Count,  a  certain  Lieutenant  Vasarhelyi 
and  his  men  had  arrived  at  Kalozd,  had  searched  the  castle,  and 
had  forcibly  carried  off  some  iron  chests  containing  valuables,  a 
great  number  of  costly  weapons,  and  also  a  hatard  (state-car- 
riage) drawn  by  four  beautiful  horses  :  that  a  few  days  later, 
when  the  Croats  had  retreated,  the  Count's  stud  had  been  plun- 
dered by  several  officers  of  Colonel  Perczel's  corps ;  that  the  castle, 
especially  its  kitchen  and  cellar,  had  been  constantly  put  in  requi- 
sition by  officers ;  that  those  formerly  subject  to  the  Count  did 
great  damage  to  the  estate  ;   and  much  more  to  the  same  effect. 

To  put  an  end  to  the  latter  disorders  (the  extortions  on  the 
part  of  the  officers  having  necessarily  ceased,  the  scene  of  war 
being  now  removed  to  remote  districts),  I  left  my  auditor  in 
Kalozd,  that  he  might  make  a  complete  inventory,  in  the  short- 
est possible  time,  of  the  whole  property  of  the  Count,  both  fixed 
and  movable,  and  place  the  said  property  under  the  superintend- 
ence of  the  functionary  from  whom  I  had  received  the  jewelry  ; 
and,  in  particular,  that  he  should  proclaim  martial  law  against 
all  who,  from  covetousness  or  malice,  dared  to  injure  the  prop- 
erty of  the  late  Count.  And  to  give  weight  to  this  measure,  I 
left  a  trusty  officer  with  twenty-four  men  as  garrison  in  Kalozd. 

Having  made  these  arrangements,  I  left  Kalozd,  carrying  with 
me  the  jewels,  and  continued  my  journey  to  Adony  without 
interruption. 

The  10th  of  October  was  spent  at  Adony  in  transacting  sev- 
eral military  affairs.  Toward  evening,  the  steamer  which  was 
conveying  Generals  Roth  and  Philippovich,  with  their  officers,  to 
Pesth,  arrived  at  Adony.  I  availed  myself  of  this  opportunity  to 
reach  Pesth  early  on  the  morning  of  the  11th  ;  and  directly  after 
my  arrival,  drew  up  the  following  report  to  the  Diet : 

HoNouED  Diet — On  the  9th  of  this  month,  passing  through  Kalozd,  I 
learned  : 

1.   That  certain  jewels,  which  had  been  the  property  of  Count  Eugene 

C 


60  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Zichy,  executed  by  sentence  of  court-martial  for  high  treason,  were  in  the 
custody  of  the  Seignorial  Hofrichter  Konrad  Durneisz. 

2.  That  the  inhabitants  of  Kalozd,  by  their  continual  plunderings,  are 
injuring  the  movable  portions  of  the  property  especially,  which  now  belongs 
to  the  state. 

I  have  consequently,  in  the  name  of  the  Diet,  and  counting  on  its  sub- 
sequent sanction,  ventured  to  take  the  followiug  steps  : 

1.  I  have  received  from  the  Hofrichter  Konrad  Durneisz  the  jewels 
specified  in  the  inclosed  inventory,  and  hereby  deliver  them  up  into  the 
hands  of  the  president  of  the  honored  Diet. 

2.  I  have  charged  the  local  authorities  of  Kalozd,  by  the  resolution 
here  inclosed,  to  proclaim  martial  law  against  all  who  in  future  should 
dare  to  injure  the  movable  or  other  property  belonging  to  the  estate  of 
Kalozd. 

3.  I  have  instructed  my  auditor,  G.  E,.,  to  make  an  inventory  of  the 
whole  estate  of  Kalozd,  with  all  its  movables,  and  to  place  if,  together 
with  the  official  inventory,  under  the  superintendence  and  responsibility 
of  the  said  Konrad  Durneisz,  and  subsequently  to  report  upon  the  pro- 
ceedings. 

4.  I  have  charged  Major  K.,  who  was  stationed  in  Kalozd  on  the  said 
day,  to  leave  there,  till  further  orders,  an  officer  with  twenty-four  men  for 
the  formation  of  a  court-martial. 

Pesth,  11th  of  October^  1848.  (My  signature  follows.) 

In  this  report  the  President  of  the  Diet  is  said  to  be  the  person 
into  whose  hands  I  deposited  the  jewels  taken  by  me  at  Kalozd  ; 
while  it  was  actually  Kossuth  in  person  who  received  them  from 
me,  in  the  presence  of  several  members  of  the  Committee  of 
Defense. 

The  cause  of  this  contradiction  is,  that  when  I  wrote  this 
report  in  BTungarian,  reproduced  here  in  a  German  translation,  I 
was  not  aware  of  the  true  position  of  the  Committee  of  Defense, 
and  for  security  addressed  it  directly  to  the  whole  of  the  Diet, 
knowing  that  the  Committee  of  Defense  was  composed  of  mem- 
bers of  the  Diet. 

I  therefore  myself  took  this  report,  with  its  inclosures,  the 
inventory  of  all  the  jewels  I  had  received  in  Kalozd,  the  jewels 
themselves,  and  the  document  for  proclaiming  martial  law  in 
Kalozd,  to  Kossuth,  who  was  then  staying  at  the  Glueen-of- 
England  Hotel.  He  was  so  unwell  as  to  be  confined  to  his  bed. 
This,  however,  did  not  prevent  him  from  taking  a  personal  share 
in  the  most  important  afiairs  of  the  day.  I  was  therefore  admit- 
ted to  him ;  and  handed  over  to  himself,  as  has  been  already 
stated,  my  report  to  the  Diet,  with  the  jewels  and  the  other  doc- 
uments.    I  also  remember  that,  at  my  especial  request,  the  con- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  51 

tents  of  the  cases  were  immediately  compared  with  the  original 
inventory,  in  the  presence  of  Kossuth  and  several  other  persons, 
and  were  found  intact.  But  whether  the  correct  delivery  of  the 
jewels  was  certified  to  me  in  writing  or  not,  I  can  not  now 
remember.  It  is  also  very  possible  that,  having  been  personally 
present  at  the  comparison  of  the  jewels  with  the  inventory,  and 
being  thereby  satisfied  that  nothing  was  missing,  I  afterward 
wholly  forgot  to  ask  for  a  receipt :  as  in  the  course  of  this  day  I 
was  not  only  a  passive  spectator,  but  also  an  active  participa- 
tor in  the  transaction  of  matters  of  the  highest  importance,  and 
well  calculated  to  make  me  neglect  so  ordinary  a  precautionary 
measure. 


CHAPTER  V. 

The  degree  of  firmness,  so  unusual  at  that  time,  which  I  had 
shown  as  president  of  the  court-martial  against  Count  Zichy ;  the 
open  and  decided  blame  with  which  I  had  censured  freely,  and 
even  in  writing,  the  armistice  concluded  with  Ban  Jellachich, 
immediately  after  it  was  agreed  upon ;  the  success  of  the  Hun- 
garian arms  against  Roth's  corps,  which  my  friends  attributed 
more  to  the  measures  I  had  taken,  single-handed,  against  the 
will  of  Perczel,  than  to  what  had  been  done  in  executing  his 
orders  ; — all  this  might  have  directed  the  attention  of  the  leaders 
of  the  Hungarian  movement  toward  me,  and  made  them  believe 
that  I  was  the  man  who  would  succeed  in  giving  decision  to  the 
wavering  operations  of  Moga's  army. 

In  the  course  of  the  very  day  on  which  I  had  delivered  Zichy's 
jewels  to  the  Committee  of  Defense,  I  and  one  of  my  comrades, 
who  had  been  promoted  at  the  same  time  as  myself  to  the  rank 
of  Honved  colonel,  were  invited  by  Kossuth  to  a  consultation  on 
the  question,  whether  the  time  had  not  now  come  for  promoting, 
off-hand,  several  Honved  staff-officers  even  to  the  rank  of  general. 
This,  Kossuth  thought,  appeared  to  be  the  sole  guarantee  that 
the  staff' of  command  would  fall  into  trusty  hands,  when  vacated 
by  the  hourly-expected  resignation  of  General  Moga  and  that  of 


52  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

his  comrades,  Generals  Teleki  and  Holtsche,  or  by  their  "being 
suddenly  pensioned,  which  seemed  necessary. 

My  comrade  spoke  first,  and  declared  himself  decidedly  against 
this  measure.  "  By  so  doing,"  he  exclaimed,  "you  would  com- 
mit a  crying  injustice  ;  because  the  greater  number  of  staff- 
officers  of  Moga's  army  are  our  seniors  in  rank,  and  are  more 
deserving  than  ourselves. 

"  Be  the  ground  on  which  you  stand  as  an  independent  Hun- 
garian government,"  he  added,  "  ever  so  legal,  you  can  not 
maintain  yourselves  at  present  without  the  regular  troops.  And 
yet  you  do  all  you  can  to  weaken  their  sympathies  for  the  just 
cause  of  the  country.  It  is  in  the  soldier's  nature  to  be  attached 
to  his  superior,  so  long  as  that  superior  conscientiously  fulfills  his 
duties.  Any  slighting  to  the  superior  becomes,  in  that  case,  like- 
wise a  mortification  to  the  inferior.  I  will  not  affirm  that  those 
divisions  whose  commanders  should  be  slighted  by  our  promotion 
would  instantly  forget  their  oath  to  the  Constitution ;  but  dis- 
content is  to  be  feared ;  and  a  dissatisfied  army  has  seldom  suc- 
ceeded in  nailing  victory  to  their  colors." 

This  was  in  entire  accordance  with  my  own  views ;  and  I 
hastened  to  throw  a  still  clearer  light  upon  the  consequences  of 
our  sudden  promotion,  dragged  in,  as  it  were,  by  the  hair  of  the 
head.  "We,  ourselves,"  I  exclaimed,  "once  belonged  to  these 
bodies  of  troops,  and  occupied  therein  somewhat  inferior  posi- 
tions ;  and  now,  after  a  short  space  of  time,  unmarked  by  any 
exploits,  we  should  suddenly  appear  as  the  commanders  of  those 
who,  a  short  time  before,  were  our  superiors.  Even  although  I 
admit  that,  in  spite  of  all  this,  we  might  still  reckon  upon  a  cer- 
tain obedience,  nevertheless  by  no  means  upon  a  cheerful,  un- 
wearied one  ;  and  least  of  all,  upon  the  affection  and  confidence 
of  troops  who  would  see  their  former  and  sometimes  distinguished 
leaders  slighted  by  us,  the  parvenus  (as  they  would  now  call  us). 

"You  fear,"  I  continued,  "the  pohtical  tendencies  of  the 
present  leaders  of  the  troops  ?  The  soldier  generally  cares  very 
little  about  politics.  He  does  what  he  is  ordered,  and  asks  dis- 
tinct orders;  he  requires  in  his  chiefs,  on  every  occasion,  a  de- 
cisive coming  forward  and  leading  the  way.  This  is  applicable 
to  the  officer  as  well  as  to  the  soldier.  None  of  my  present 
comrades,  after  they  had  sworn  to  the  Hungarian  Constitution, 
would  ever  have  imagined  that  they  had  to  follow  any  orders 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  6. 

except  those  of  the  Hungarian  Ministry  of  War,  had  they  not 
been  allured  from  the  distinctly-marked  and  straight  course  of 
blind  obedience  into  the  intricate  labyrinthan  way  of  the  delib- 
erative one.  This  has  been  done.  The  government  in  Vienna, 
as  well  as  that  in  Pesth,  conscious  of  their  weakness,  have  both 
forced  the  army  into  this  field ;  and  now  they  expect  from  it — 
the  former,  the  restitution  of  its  power  over  Hungary ;  the  latter, 
the  preservation  of  what  has  been  gained. 

"  But  the  leaders  of  the  independent  bodies  of  troops,  distrust- 
ing as  Hungarians  the  government  in  Vienna,  and  as  soldiers 
that  in  Pesth,  have  become  irresolute ;  and  this  irresolution  has 
already  spread  itself  into  the  lowest  ranks  of  their  inferiors.  The 
Committee  of  Defense  seems  to  be  aware  of  this,  and  thinks  that 
the  most  appropriate  remedy  for  the  evil  is  to  promote  us,  and 
send  us  to  Moga's  army  ;  but  this  measure  would  only  cause  the 
irresolute  troops  to  become  also  dissatisfied. 

*'  The  present  commanders  of  the  regiments  must  be  distin- 
guished and  promoted.  If  they  accept  these  favors  they  are 
permanently  gained,  and  with  them  their  inferiors ;  if  not,  away 
with  them ! 

"  If  the  maintenance  of  the  Constitution  is  at  all  possible  by 
force  of  arms,  it  can  be  effected  only  in  this  way." 

'•  And  who  are  the  staff'  oflScers  in  Moga's  army,"  asked  Kos- 
suth in  return,  "  whom  you  believe  to  be  the  most  meritorious 
and  most  to  be  relied  upon  ?" 

I  had  no  answer  to  give,  because  Moga's  army  was  entirely 
strange  to  me  ;  but  my  comrade  named  several,  and  the  promo- 
tion of  some  of  them  was  immediately  decided  on. 

Soon  after  this,  my  comrade  withdrew.  I  wished  to  do  so 
too,  but  was  detained  by  Kossuth  ;  and  then,  for  the  first  time, 
I  learned  the  real  object  of  my  recall  from  Perczel's  corps. 

The  whole  of  the  Committee  of  Defense  had  a  particular  dis- 
trust of  General  Moga  and  those  nearest  him.  The  doubtful 
issue  of  the  first  engagement  with  the  invading  Croat  army  on 
the  29th  of  September,  at  Velencze,  Pakozd,  and  Sukoro ;  the 
discouraging  disorder  in  which  the  defensive  position,  victoriously 
maintained  by  our  troops  till  the  end  of  the  battle,  had  been  left 
by  them  during  the  succeeding  stormy  and  dark  night,  to  take 
up  another  at  Martonvasar ;  the  armistice  of  three  days,  which 
had  been  granted  immediately  afterward  to  Ban  Jellachich,  by 


/4  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  skillful  improvement  of  which  the  Croat  army  had  been 
enabled  to  retreat  without  opposition  across  the  Lajtha ;  the 
want  of  energy  with  which  the  consequent  pursuit  of  Ban  Jella- 
chich  had  been  prosecuted,  and  its  sudden  abandonment  at  the 
Lajtha  at  the  very  moment  when  it  could  apparently  have  been 
persevered  in  most  successfully  ;  these  were  the  facts  which  had 
shaken  the  confidence  of  the  Committee  of  Defense  in  the  straight- 
forwardness of  General  Moga's  war-operations. 

But  as  the  royal  Commissary  Ladislaus  Csanyi,  invested  with 
unlimited  authority,  and  associated  with  him,  continued,  in  his 
reports  to  the  Committee  of  Defense,  positively  to  deny  that  there 
was  any  ground  for  suspecting  Moga,  the  members  of  the  com- 
mittee, fearing  lest  the  general  and  his  associates  had  already 
succeeded  in  imposing  on  Csanyi  also,  were  desirous  of  obtaining 
the  judgment  of  a  competent  and  trustworthy  man,  formed  from 
his  own  inspection,  on  the  movements  of  Moga.  I  was  to  be  this 
man ;  and  therefore  received  the  secret  mission  to  repair  imme- 
diately to  his  head-quarters  at  Parendorf,  there  ostensibly  to  place 
myself  at  the  disposal  of  the  commander  of  the  army,  but  really 
to  penetrate  into  the  spirit  of  the  man,  and  instantly  to  reveal 
the  least  indications  of  treachery. 

I  confess  that  I  did  not  myself  approve  Moga's  war-operations ; 
I  attributed  to  him,  however,  less  of  intentional  treason  than  of 
want  of  penetration  and  resolve.  Nevertheless,  I  thought  treason 
possible,  and  accepted  the  mission  ;  with  this  modification,  how- 
ever, that  I  should  not  confine  myself  to  merely  disclosing  actually 
existing  treacherous  designs,  but,  at  the  same  time,  should  en- 
deavor to  frustrate  them  at  whatever  danger.  This  modification 
was  unconditionally  sanctioned  by  the  Comm.ittee  of  Defense,  and 
had  almost  led  to  my  further  promotion,  namely,  to  that  of  Hon- 
ved  general.  Kossuth,  at  least,  spoke  about  his  intention  of 
having  a  general's  commission  immediately  prepared  for  me  to 
take  with  me,  that  I  might  thereby  be  prospectively  empowered 
in  flagranti  to  assume  the  command  of  the  army,  if  necessary ; 
passing  over  all  the  other  royal  Imperial  generals,  besides  Moga, 
who  were  with  the  army.  This  measure,  however,  was  not 
carried  out ;  why,  I  never  knew. 

In  the  night  between  the  11th  and  12th  of  October,  I  was 
already  on  my  way  to  Parendorf,  and  reached  Moga's  head- 
quarters early  on  the  morning  of  the  13th. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

MoGA  immediately  assigned  to  me  the  command  of  the  van- 
guard, at  that  time  the  outposts  on  the  Lajtha  ;  while  its  former 
commander  was  employed  upon  another  point. 

Before  I  entered  on  my  new  post,  I  had  to  announce  in  person 
to  the  royal  Commissary  Csanyi  my  arrival  at  the  army.  On 
this  occasion  I  saw  him  for  the  first  time.  He  was  brief  with 
me.  His  manners,  his  whole  exterior,  distinguished  him  favor- 
ably from  all  the  other  civil  authorities  of  the  Hungarian  revolu- 
tion :  it  at  once  inspired  confidence  and  commanded  respect. 
These  qualities  are  certainly  not  always  the  emanations  of  a 
manly  character  :  in  Csanyi  they  were.  The  man  who  had 
impressed  me  at  first  sight,  I  learned  afterward  to  revere. 

The  most  advanced  Hungarian  videttes  stood  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Lajtha,  being  in  connection,  with  some  intervals, 
from  Wilfleinsdorf  to  Hollern  ;  the  staff  of  the  outposts  was 
quartered  in  the  railway  station  at  Bruck,  quite  near  to  the 
Lajtha,  consequently  on  the  outmost  line  of  the  videttes.  The 
ijiain  troop  of  the  outposts  encamped  at  scarcely  a  quarter  of  an 
hour's  distance  behind  it. 

Immediately  after  I  had  entered  on  my  new  post  I  asked  to 
be  allowed  either  to  draw  back  my  main  troop  or  to  advance  the 
line  of  my  videttes,  because  to  observe  the  enemy  was  altogether 
impossible  while  prohibited  from  crossing  the  Lajtha ;  and  the 
protection  of  the  army,  under  the  present  establishment  of  the 
vanguard,  was  defective  in  the  highest  degree.  As  the  outposts 
were  now  situated,  the  enemy  could  at  any  time  and  by  single 
patrols  alarm  not  only  the  main  troop  of  the  outposts  behind 
Bruck,  but  likewise  that  of  the  army  before  Pareiidorf 

To  these  representations  I  received  for  answer,  that  it  was  no 
longer  worth  while  to  undertake  comprehensive  changes  in  this 
respect,  the  army  being  about  to  cross  the  Lajtha  in  a  few  days. 
In  fact,  the  first  advance  took  place  in  the  afternoon  of  the  17th 
of  October. 


56  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  dispositions  I  received  were  :  to  march  about  half  an 
hour's  distance  on  the  way  through  the  fields  from  Bruck  to 
Fischamend,  and  establish  the  outposts  in  an  extensive  semi- 
circle from  Wilfleinsdorf  to  Pakfurth. 

The  main  army  passed  likewise  through  Bruck,  and  encamped 
d  cJieval  of  the  main  road  from  Bruck  to  Schwechat,  at  the  same 
height  as  the  main  troop  of  the  vanguard. 

It  happened  to  me  in  this  expedition,  as  it  often  does  in 
mancBuvres  in  time  of  peace  :  before  the  outposts  were  estab- 
lished, there  came  an  order  to  fall  back.  The  main  body  of  the 
army  marched  again  across  the  Lajtha  before  midnight ;  and  I 
was  obliged,  notwithstanding  all  my  renewed  representations,  to 
take  up  with  my  brigade  my  old,  unchanged  position  behind  the 
Lajtha. 

The  general  staff  in  Parendorf  had  kept  secret  the  cause  of 
this  sudden  return  to  the  former  camp.  It  was  only  whispered 
that  the  Committee  of  Defense  had  itself  commanded  this  "  Halt !" 
and  "  Right-about  I" 

It  appeared  now  as  if  it  were  intended  to  confine  us  to  the 
defensive ;  because  I  received,  directly  after  our  return,  strict 
orders  to  destroy  all  artificial  passages  over  the  Lajtha,  as  well 
as  to  render  the  existing  natural  ones  impassable,  and  to  occupy 
them.  The  latter  part  of  my  orders  could  not  be  executed,  on 
account  of  the  great  extension  of  the  line  and  the  shallowness  of 
the  river,  so  that  it  became  useless  to  carry  into  effect  the  first 
part  of  them.  The  general  staff,  however,  would  listen  to  no 
counter-representations  :  the  bridges  had  to  disappear. 

In  the  head-quarters  at  Parendorf  a  momentarily  impending 
attack  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  was  every  day  talked  of;  and 
nevertheless  the  troops  were  dislocated  in  such  a  manner  as  even 
the  leisurely  routine  of  the  service  in  time  of  peace  would  not 
have  excused.  Of  many  a  body  of  men,  even  the  chief  of  the 
general  staff  could  not  tell  whether  they  still  existed,  or  where. 
Others  of  them,  about  whose  distribution  he  gave  the  most 
detailed  accounts,  suddenly  made  their  appearance  in  an  oppo- 
site direction ;  their  arrival  having  been  preceded  by  very  alarm- 
ing reports  from  thence,  of  the  approach  of  some  hostile  corps, 
which,  by  the  way,  could  with  just  as  much  probability  have 
come  from  the  moon. 

It  can  not  be  denied  that  all  this  seemed  to  indicate  the  exist- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  57 

ence  of  systematic  treason :  but,  be  this  as  it  may,  the  proceed- 
ings in  the  Hungarian  head-quarters  at  Parendorf  made  me  feel 
that  they  were  merely  the  consequence  of  the  very  same  per- 
plexity under  which  the  Pesth  Diet,  with  the  Committee  of 
Defense  at  its  head,  was  laboring. 

Deliberately  planned  treason  presupposes  a  fixed  determina- 
tion. But  over  Parendorf,  as  over  Pesth,  there  then  hung  the 
,  heavy  thick  mist  of  an  indistinct  perception  of  what  ought  really 
to  be  done. 

In  a  few  days  after  my  arrival  at  the  camp,  I  felt  that  my 
ambiguous  mission  had  entirely  failed  ;  failed  especially  in  that 
sense  in  which  it  had  been  conceived  and  undertaken  by  me. 

Determined,  at  any  price,  to  force  the  commander  of  the  army, 
whom  the  gentlemen  of  the  Committee  of  Defense  believed  to  be 
a  secret  ally  of  the  chief  of  the  Croat  army,  to  reveal  his  inten- 
tions, I  had  found  in  him  a  straightforward,  open  man,  who  had 
already,  long  before  my  arrival,  declared,  without  being  called 
upon  to  do  so,  that  although  he  would  still  continue,  in  obedience 
to  the  emperor's  orders,  to  defend  Hungary  against  the  attacks 
of  the  Croats,  yet  that  he  would  not  cross  the  frontiers  of  the 
country  unless  compelled  ;  and  that  he  declined,  beforehand,  to 
be  responsible  for  the  consequences  of  such  a  step. 

I  had,  therefore,  either  immediately  to  abandon  my  ambiguous 
position  in  the  camp,  or  to  lower  myself  by  denouncing  the  pitiful 
nntirgues  plotted,  from  purely  selfish  motives,  by  a  few  coryphei  of 
the  camp  as  well  as  of  the  head-quarters ;  their  sole  object  being, 
in  case  of  a  favorable  issue  of  Hungari/m  affairs,  to  elevate  their 
contrivers  as  high  as  possible,  and,  in  an  unfavorable  one,  to  save 
them. 

Choosing  the  former,  I  devoted  all  my  attention  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  those  duties  which  devolved  on  me  as  commander 
of  the  outposts. 

My  brigade  consisted  of  five  battalions  of  volunteer  National- 
guards — a  second  edition  of  the  local  militia  augmented  by  fire- 
arms. These  battalions,  however,  were  already  divided,  like 
?"the  regular  ones,  into  companies,  and  provided  with  officers  ;  but 
the  latter  were,  with  a  few  exceptions,  almost  wholly  destitute 
of  military  knowledge. 

I  compelled  them  to  employ  the  time  of  easy  outpost-service 
in  that  training  of  which  they  stood  so  much  in  need.     This,  of 


58  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTJNGAEY. 

course,  was  not  possible  without  the  use  of  severe  measures. 
These  produced  discontent,  opposition.  Frequent  and  urgent 
complaints  of  my  despotic  severity  reached  the  head-quarters ; 
but  meeting  with  no  attention,  were  carried  to  the  royal  Com- 
missary Csanyi.  It  was  fortunate  for  me  that  Csanyi  was  an 
old  soldier,  and  knew  how  to  estimate  such  complaints.  There 
was  nothing  left  for  the  poor  malcontents  but  to  bite  the  sour 
apple,  and  learn  to  obey.  So  difficult  was  this,  that  it  cost* 
many  a  man  his  life. 

To  accustom  my  brigade  to  the  divers  nerve-shaking  aspects 
of  war,  I  often  caused  the  chain  of  videttes,  as  well  as  the  camp 
behind  Bruck,  particularly  at  night-time,  to  be  thrown  into 
alarm  ;  I  took  advantage  of  every  rumor  about  the  enemy,  how- 
ever vague  it  might  be,  to  make  my  troops  believe  that  he  was 
actually  marching  against  us  ;  and  at  such  times  sent  out  across 
the  Lajtha,  on  my  own  responsibility,  small  divisions  as  recon- 
noitering  patrols  ;  and  so  forth. 

This  latter  experiment  drew  on  me  a  severe  reprimand  from 
the  head-quarters.  Because,  it  was  said,  we  had  to  act  on  the 
defensive,  and  to  avoid  all  offensive  hostilities,  that  we  might 
not  provoke  the  opposing  troops  to  sanguinary  reprisals  ;  as  we 
did  not  know  whether  they  belonged  to  the  Croat  or  to  any 
other  corps. 

But  as  a  contradiction  to  this  reprimand,  in  the  course  of  the 
next  day  a  Honved  captain  made  his  appearance  with  an  im- 
provised section  of  pioneers,  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  the  re- 
cently-destroyed bridges,  so  far  as  was  absolutely  necessary. 

Scarcely  was  this  work  finished,  when  the  dispositions  lor  a 
second  advance  over  the  Lajtha,  on  the  21st  of  October,  followed. 

This  time  we  broke  up  in  the  morning,  and  halted  only  near 
Stix-Neusiedel,  in  face  of  a  weak  division  of  cavalry  that  await- 
ed us  between  Gallbrunn  and  Stix-Neusiedel,  which  the  fire  from 
two  batteries  compelled  to  retreat  behind  Gallbrunn.  Accord- 
ing to  some  of  the  inhabitants  of  Stix-Neusiedel,  Gallbrunn  was 
occupied  by  hostile  infantry,  and  I  received  orders  to  take  it 
by  storm.  It  did  not  come  to  this ;  for  another  "  Halt !"  and 
"  Right-about  I"  of  the  Committee  of  Defense  suddenly  stopped 
the  advance  of  my  storming-columns  against  the  place,  which 
was,  moreover,  unoccupied.  We  accordingly  encamped  between 
Stix-Neusiedel,  and  Gallbrunn  a  cheval  of  the  road,  and  marched 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTJNGARY.  69 

next  morning  at  day-break  back  to  Parendorf — I  with  my  brigade 
once  more  in  our  old,  inevitable  position  behind  the  Lajtha. 

During  these  two  advances  it  was  always  distinctly  said  that 
our  ofiensive  movements  were  against  Ban  Jellachich's  army, 
which  had  to  be  attacked  and  destroyed  in  behalf  of  the  young 
constitutional  liberty  of  Austria,  not  only  on  this  side  the  Lajtha, 
but  also  beyond  it. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  asked  why  the  pursuit  of  Ban 
Jellachich  had  been  at  all  interrupted,  the  answer  was,  that  at 
that  time  they  had,  of  necessity,  to  respect  the  territory  beyond 
the  Lajtha  as  neutral  ground,  in  the  confident  expectation  that 
the  Croats  would  be  disarmed  by  Austria,  the  remainder  of  Ban 
Jellachich's  army  broken  up,  and  consequently  the  originators 
of  the  unhappy  civil  war  be  deprived  of  the  power  to  renew  it. 

Thus  reasoned  the  non-military  men,  in  opposition  to  the  views 
which  had  gained  ground  among  the  regidar  troops  of  the  camp 
at  Parendorf,  including  the  two  Honved  battalions  which  were 
there.  Though  scarcely  one  of  these  divisions,  when  engaged  in 
the  pursuit  of  Ban  Jellachich,  would  have  given  it  up  within 
the  limits  of  the  country  without  positive  orders,  they  all,  never- 
theless, now  believed  that,  by  having  driven  the  enemy  beyond 
them,  they  had  done  as  much  as  their  new  military  oath  (to 
defend  the  Constitution  of  Hungary)  required  of  them  ;  while  by 
the  aggressive  crossing  of  their  own  frontiers  they  feared  to  violate 
^their  old  oath  of  fidelity  to  the  monarch. 

In  consequence  of  this  apprehension,  several  deputations  of 
officers  appeared  before  Csanyi,  to  declare,  in  the  name  of  the 
troops  to  which  they  belonged,  their  opinion  that  the  Lajtha 
ought  ?iot  to  be  crossed. 

I  do  not  know  in  what  way  and  by  whom  the  regular  troops 
had  been  so  successfully  relieved  from  this  fear,  as  to  take  part 
in  the  two  expeditions  beyond  the  frontiers  on  the  I7th  and  21st; 
because  I  had  always  abundant  occupation  in  Bruck,  and  seldom 
went  into  the  camp  at  Parendorf;  and  then  only  on  account  of 
some  pressing  affair  relating  to  the  service. 

As  for  myself,  it  was  perfectly  plain  to  me  what  was  the  duty 
of  every  Hungarian,  soldier  or  not  soldier,  in  the  then  existing 
circumstances.  Obedience  was  due  to  the  executive  power  ap- 
pointed by  the  collective  Hungarian  Diet,  so  long  as  the  Diet 
itself  continued  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  Constitution. 


60  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  administration  of  the  country  by  the  Committee  of  Defense 
instituted  by  the  Diet  in  the  stead  of  the  retired  ministry  of  Batthy- 
anyi,  was,  it  is  true,  not  based  on  the  constitution.  But,  in  the 
face  of  the  Croat  invasion,  supported  by  the  minister  of  war  at 
Vienna  ;  in  the  face  of  the  subsequent  illegal  nomination  of  the 
unfortunate  Count  Lamberg  as  commander-in-chief  of  all  armed 
forces  in  Hungary  (the  Croat  included),  and  he  having  been  just 
as  illegally  authorized  to  dissolve  the  Hungarian  Diet — the  form- 
ation of  the  Committee  of  Defense  was,  after  the  retirement  of 
Count  Batthyanyi,  only  a  measure  demanded  in  self-defense. 


CHAPTER  VH. 

The  interruption  of  the  second  offensive  attempt  on  the  21st 
of  October  was  caused  by  the  necessity  of  waiting  for  Kossuth, 
who  was  already  approaching  with  a  reinforcement  of  12,000 
men  and  several  batteries. 

Meanwhile  the  first  proclamation  of  Field-marshal  Prince 
Windischgratz  reached  the  regular  troops  in  the  camp  at  Paren- 
dorf  It  was  evidently  intended  to  intimidate,  but  totally  missed 
its  aim.  The  officers  of  the  regular  troops  felt  only  a  just  indig- 
nation that  Prince  "Windischgratz  should  suppose  that  they 
would  break  their  military  oath,  and  could  be  recalled  under  a 
threat  of  capital  punishment,  from  a  post  which  had  been  in- 
trusted to  them  by  their  monarch,  and  for  which  they  had  been 
mustered  by  his  nephew,  the  Palatine  of  Hungary,  against  Ban 
Jellachich. 

The  appearance  of  this  proclamation,  however,  had  a  consider- 
able influence  on  the  general  discussions  upon  the  question,  whether 
the  Lajtha  was  to  be  crossed  again,  or  not.  For  numerous  voices 
rose  once  more  against  the  crossing  of  the  Lajtha ;  because,  as 
it  was  thought,  the  offensive  would  then  no  longer  be  directed 
against  Ban  Jellachich  alone,  but  also  against  Prince  Windisch- 
gratz, who,  correctly  speaking,  had  hitherto  committed  no  act  of 
hostility  against  Hungary.  Nevertheless,  others  contested  this 
opinion,  asserting  that  Prince  Windischgratz  had  already  openly 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  61 

enough  shown  his  hostihty  to  Hungary,  by  joining  Ban  Jellachich ; 
and  that  the  very  fact  that  he  had  done  so,  was  a  still  further 
justification  of  the  offensive.  The  majority,  however,  dissented 
from  the  latter  opinion. 

According  to  my  judgment,  the  decision  of  the  preliminary 
question — whether,  and  how  far,  the  crossing  of  the  frontier  was 
necessary  or  not  for  the  protection  of  the  endangered  Constitu- 
tion— was  the  indispensable  condition  of  both  propositions.  But 
that  decision  appertained  to  the  Diet  alone.  So  long  as  it  was 
unknown,  any  participation  in  the  agitations  for  or  against  the 
offensive  seemed  to  me  to  have  no  object.  I  kept  myself  aloof 
from  them. 

But  when,  soon  after  the  appearance  of  the  above  proclama- 
tion, I  was  summoned  to  the  head-quarters,  and  was  directly 
called  upon  by  Moga,  in  the  presence  of  several  staff-officers,  to 
state  undisguisedly  my  opinion  about  the  impending  offensive,  I 
then  declared  myself,  from  purely  military  considerations,  de- 
cidedly against  it. 

"  Yes,  here,"  exclaimed  Moga,  in  evident  agitation,  **  all  cry 
out  against  it ;  but  before  the  Commissaries  no  one  ventures  even 
to  open  his  mouth  ;  and  I  am  then  always  outvoted.  On  you 
alone,"  continued  he,  turning  toward  me,  "  I  still  rely.  Take 
courage,  and  speak  before  the  president  as  undisguisedly  as  yoa 
have  now  spoken  here." 

"^  Only  after  this  scene  did  I  begin  to  comprehend  how  it  could 
incidentally  have  happened  that  the  Lajtha  had  already  been 
twice  crossed  ;  and  that  the  offensive  thus  begun  had  notwith- 
standing been  again  broken  ofl^  without  our  having,  as  it  were, 
even  seen  the  enemy. 

The  solution  of  this  enigma  evidently  lay  in  the  insignificance 
of  the  majority  of  those  persons,  who,  by  virtue  of  their  position 
in  the  camp  as  well  as  at  the  head-quarters,  were  called  upon  to 
exercise  an  influence  on  the  decisions  of  the  council  of  war.  On 
this  side  the  Lajtha,  they  voted,  out  of  fear  of  the  Commissaries, 
against  Moga,  and  the  frontiers  had  to  be  crossed  on  the  offensive ; 
but  on  the  other  side  the  Lajtha,  out  of  much  greater  fear  of  the 
enemy,  they  voted  against  the  Commissaries,  and  Moga  was 
allowed  to  lead  the  army  back  again  to  Parendorf. 

Such  experience  might  have  determined  the  commander  of  the 
army  to  augment  his  council  of  war,  before  the  arrival  of  the 

:_____ _._ i^.:^Mm._ 


62  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

President  Kossuth,  by  some  new  members,  on  whom  somewhat 
more  of  reliance  could  be  placed.  This  was  probably  the  reason 
of  my  sudden  call  to  the  head-quarters.  I  was  late,  and  did  not 
enter  the  room  in  which  the  council  of  war  was  held  until  after 
all  the  other  members  had  already  expressed  their  opinion  about 
the  offensive,  which  was  similar  to  my  own.  My  colleagues,  in 
giving  their  votes,  had  probably  allowed  the  formula  in  use  pre- 
viously to  March,  ''  as  in  duty  bound,  agreeing  with  his  Excel- 
lency the  high-born  Referant,"  to  display  itself  so  strongly,  that 
Moga  prospectively  saw  himself  once  more  abandoned,  if,  with 
tlbis  council  of  war,  he  should  bring  the  subject  under  discussion 
before  Kossuth,  the  president  of  the  Committee  of  Defense.  Hence 
the  indignation  with  which  he  received  my  declaration  also ;  and 
hence  likewise  his  urgent  request,  superfluous  in  my  case,  that  I 
would  defend,  before  the  president  himself,  the  conviction  I  had 
just  expressed. 

An  opportunity  for  so  doing  was  about  to  present  itself  in  a 
few  hours.  Kossuth  was  expected  in  Nikelsdorf  (Miklosfalva)  on 
the  evening  of  the  same  day  ;  and  Moga  resolved  to  receive  him 
there  with  the  assembled  council  of  war. 

A  part  of  the  reinforcement  which  Kossuth  brought  with  him 
had  already  reached  Nikelsdorf,  when  we  arrived  thither  from 
Parendorf.  Kossuth  also  soon  made  his  appearance.  A  quarter 
of  an  hour  afterward  the  council  of  war  was  assembled  in  his 
temporary  lodgings,  and  presided  over  by  him. 

Kossuth  opened  the  deliberation  with  a  speech  calculated  to  re- 
present the  crossing  of  the  frontiers  of  the  country  in  favor  of 
besieged  Vienna  as  a  moral  necessity  for  Hungary,  and  any 
thought  of  neglecting  to  do  so  as  a  dishonorable  one.  He  depicted 
in  glowing  colors  the  merits  of  the  inhabitants  of  Vienna  in  respect 
of  the  young  liberty  of  Hungary ;  their  magnanimous  sacrifices 
for  Hungary's  welfare  ;  and  finally,  the  miseries  of  the  block- 
ade, which,  in  so  doing,  they  had  brought  down  upon  their 
city. 

"Vienna  still  stands" — thus  he  concluded  his  speech — "still 
unshaken  is  the  courage  of  her  inhabitants,  our  most  faithful  allies 
against  the  attacks  of  the  reactionaiy  generals.  But  without  our 
assistance,  they  must  nevertheless  succumb  ;  for  they  fight  a  too 
unequal  battle. 

"  Let  us,   therefore,  make  haste,  gentlemen,  to  pay  a  debt 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY.  63 

which  must  appear  sacred  to  us,  mindful  of  what  we  owe  to  our 
brethren  in  Vienna. 

"  We  must  to  the  help  of  the  inhabitants  of  Vienna  I  The 
honor  of  the  nation  demands  it  of  us.  And  we  can  do  it  with  an 
assurance  of  victory ;  because  I  bring  to  the  brave  army,  which 
has^but  recently  driven  before  it  the  fleeing  enemy  over  the  fron- 
tiers, 12,000  warriors — untried  indeed,  but  animated  with  patriotic 
ardor  for  the  fight,  and  burning  with  desire  to  contend  with  their 
tried  comrades  for  the  laurel  on  the  battle-field.  Yes,  we  will  do 
it !  "We  will  advance !  Our  friends  in  Vienna  are  anxiously 
reckoning  upon  it ;  and  the  Hungarian  has  never  abandoned  his 
friend !" 

Moga  spoke  next,  evidently  having  in  view  mainly  to  divert 
the  discussion  from  the  field  of  sentimental  politics,  and  partly  to 
remind  us  of  our  military  oath,  partly  to  call  attention  to  the  want 
of  discipline  in  the  army,  and  thereby  give  us  a  hint  from  what 
point  of  view  solely  and  exclusively  we  had  to  judge  of  the  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  of  the  offensive,  as  well  as  of  its 
admissibility  or  inadmissibility,  and  to  give  our  votes  accordingly. 
He  concluded  his  speech,  certainly  not  an  ineffective  one,  by  an 
energetic  »appeal  to  all  the  members  of  the  council  of  war  to  speak 
out  fearlessly  their  convictions. 

A  long  silence  was  the  comfortless  answer  to  this  invitation.  I 
refrained  from  speaking,  out  of  consideration  for  my  seniors.  But 
•\vhen  Moga  had  reiterated  his  appeal  with  the  words,  "  Now, 
then,  gentlemen,  speak  !  you  have  spoken  very  decidedly  in  Par- 
endorf  I"  I  put  all  regard  for  others  aside,  and  began  :  "  Though 
one  of  the  youngest  members  in  this  assembly,  both  in  rank  and 
in  experience,  yet  I  speak  first,  because  the  silence  of  my  seniors 
seems  to  indicate  that  they  wish  to  reserve  to  themselves  a  later 
opinion. 

"The  President  has  thrown  light  upon  the  necessity  of  the 
offensive  in  favor  of  Vienna  in  a  political  point  of  view. 

"  Neither  is  the  solidarity  between  our  fighting  in  self-defense 
and  the  insurrection  in  Vienna  clear  to  me,  nor  do  I  know  the 
intimate  connection  between  the  events  at  Vienna  and  those  at 
Pesth  ;  nay  even  about  the  naked  facts,  only  unvouched-for  re- 
ports have  occasionally  reached  me. 

"  The  pressing  necessity  for  our  offensive  against  the  hostile 
army  on  the  other  side  of  the  Lajtha  I  must  therefore  leave  to  be 


64  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY. 

decided  by  those  who,  from  their  discernment  in  political  matters, 
their  knowledge  of  the  connection  and  real  nature  of  the  events 
beyond  the  frontiers  of  our  country  with  those  in  its  interior,  as 
well  as  from  their  public  position,  are  called  thereto. 

"  If  I  am  ordered  to  cross  the  Hungarian  frontiers  with  a  hostile 
intent,  being  incapable  of  judging  at  present  of  the  political  ten- 
dency of  this  step,  I  shall  obey  without  contradiction.  But  if  I 
am  asked  whether,  in  our  present  circumstances,  I  advise  the 
offensive,  I  can  give  an  answer  only  from  a  military  point  of  view, 
and  that  from  the  following  considerations  : 

"  Apart  from  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy,  we  have 
to  ask  ourselves  not  only  whether  our  army  is  in  that  condition 
which  is  necessary  for  the  success  of  any  offensive  operation  in 
general,  but  in  particular  when  such  an  operation  is  to  be  carried 
on  in  a  neutral,  not  to  say  hostile  territory. 

"  Troops  intended  to  act  on  the  offensive  must  be  capable  of 
manoeuvering ;  that  is  to  say,  each  division  must  have  the  dex- 
terity to  execute  the  movements  ordered  in  the  prescribed  time, 
and  in  unison  with  the  adjoining  divisions. 

"  Only  a  very  small  part  of  our  army  is  capable  of  manoeuver- 
ing. The  few  regular  troops,  and  one  or  two  Honved  battalions 
excepted,  it  consists  of  divisions  which  fall  into  confusion  in  the 
simplest  movements  on  the  exercise-ground ;  and  they  are  in 
general  commanded  by  men  who,  from  their  inadequate  military 
knowledge,  are  calculated  only  to  heighten  the  confusion  when 
once  introduced. 

"  On  the  battle-field,  a  movement  executed  with  precision  by 
separate  divisions  in  critical  moments  often  decides  the  contest ; 
but  mostly  the  calm  and  orderly  keeping  together  of  the  troops, 
confiding  in  the  firmness  of  their  commander ;  and  the  calm 
resolution  of  the  latter,  relying  upon  the  steady  obedience  of  his 
inferiors.  In  all  the  divisions  of  the  National-guard  and  the  Vol- 
unteers, these  being  the  elements  of  which  almost  two-thirds  of 
our  army  consists,  we  can  not  suppose  this  reciprocal  confidence, 
because  the  conditions  necessary  for  it  are  wanting. 

"  Every  offensive,  to  be  carried  on  successfully,  further  requires 
certain,  regular  supplies  for  the  troops  ;  otherwise  it  miscarries 
from  their  physical  weakness.  Disciplined  troops  can  be  fur- 
nished with  provisions  for  several  days  in  advance  ;  not  so  the 
undisciplined.     It  seems  burdensome  to  the  National-guard,  as 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  65 

well  as  to  the  Volunteer,  to  drag  with  him  his  own  rations  for 
some  days  on  the  march,  already  toilsome  enough  without  this. 
He  satisfies  his  present  hunger,  and  sells  or  gives  away  the  rest, 
or  even,  without  hesitation,  throws  it  away.  Hence  arises  the 
necessity  for  having  even  their  next  day's  provisions  carried  after 
the  troops  ;  and  the  army  is  encumbered  by  a  train  of  wagons 
which  alone  is  not  infrequently  sufficient  to  impede  its  motions 
just  at  the  most  critical  moment.  Moreover,  even  if  we  deny  the 
existence  of  this  latter  fatality,  it  is  still  true  that,  from  the  utter 
want  of  a  regular  internal  management  in  the  divisions,  even 
when  the  provisions  are  carried  after  the  army,  still  the  support 
of  each  man  is  not  secured  ;  because  the  officers  do  not  know  how 
to  manage  and  superintend  judiciously  the  equal  distribution  of 
the  provisions ;  or  rather,  in  their  stupid  indolence,  they  do  not 
trouble  themselves  at  all  about  it.  And  so  it  happens,  as  I  wit- 
ness almost  daily  among  my  own  brigade  in  the  camp^  that  in 
one  and  the  same  battalion,  to  which  even  more  than  the  abun- 
dantly sufficient  total-ration  is  given  in  mass,  some  companies  are 
hungry,  while  the  others  have  a  superabundance,  and  overload 
their  stomachs  from  fear  of  a  fast-day  being  near  at  hand.  "What 
the  worth  of  a  famished  soldier  is,  probably  every  one  of  the  gen- 
tlemen present  can  judge  from  his  own  experience. 

"  The  ofiensive  requires,  finally,  troops  hardy  and  accustomed 
to  fight.  The  majority  of  ours  belong  not  to  this  category.  On 
the  battle-field  two  opposing  powers  contend  for  the  mastery  over 
the  steadfastness  of  the  soldier.  Honor,  patriotic  enthusiasm, 
perhaps  also  the  fear  of  the  punishment  which  the  articles  of  war 
decree  against  the  cowardly  soldier,  urge  him  forward ;  while 
the  death  thundered  against  him  from  the  enemy's  artillery 
frighten's  him  back.  According  as  the  one  or  the  other  of  these 
two  powers  gains  the  upper  hand,  the  troops  vanquish  or  are 
vanquished.  The  history  of  war  teaches  us  that  young  troops, 
although  well  disciplined  and  well  led,  more  frequently  experi- 
ence the  latter  fate.  What  destiny  could  we  prognosticate  for 
our  undisciplined  and  ill-led  battalions  ? 

"  And  besides  all  this,  I  must  also  express  my  apprehension, 
that  by  this  ofiensive  we  are  in  danger  of  losing  forever  the 
sympathy  supposed  to  be  felt  for  us  on  the  other  side  the  Lajtha ; 
for  what  the  Croats  have  spared,  our  Volunteers,  our  National- 
guards  will  hardly  spare — the  property  of  the  rural  population. 


66  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

During  our  second  advance  to  Stix-Neusiedel  I  saw  with  my  own 
eyes  the  traces  of  the  devastation  which  our  troops  left  behind 
them  in  that  district  as  their  memorials  ;  and  as  yet  no  scarcity, 
of  food  had  taken  place,  which,  considering  the  defective  prepa- 
rations for  our  support,  is  the  more  certainly  to  be  expected  the 
further  we  advance.  Though  I  have  heard  from  time  to  time 
complaints  about  the  thefts  committed  by  the  Croats,  I  found 
nevertheless,  for  instance,  the  expensive  props  of  the  vine-grower 
left  untouched  in  all  the  vineyards  ;  but  these,  after  our  depart- 
ure, in  spite  of  the  complaints  of  their  proprietors,  and  notwith- 
standing the  strict  prohibition,  were  burnt,  and  the  cultivated 
fields  maliciously  trodden  down.  The  Hungarian  militia-man 
seldom  makes  a  distinction  between  the  German  who  fights 
against  us,  and  the  German  who  wishes  us  victory  or  at  least 
remains  neutral.  Hiszen  csak  a  nemete  I  ('  It  belongs  only  to 
the  German')  so  runs  the  common  saying,  by  which  he  thinks 
himself  authorized  to  commit  every  kind  of  devastation  on  a 
foreign  territory.  Such  abuses  can  be  prevented  only  by  the 
strictest  discipline ;  but  I  must  once  more  repeat,  it  is  in  this 
very  thing  that  we  are  deficient. 

"  As  I  might,  however,  be  reproached  with  exaggeration,  I 
will  run  the  risk  of  a  harmless  test,  the  result  of  which  will 
show  us  whether  we  can  hazard  or  not  the  proposed  offensive. 

"  Let  us  issue  an  order,  for  instance,  that  the  whole  camp  be 
ready  to  start  on  the  day  after  to-morrow  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  and  let  us  convince  ourselves  how  far  this  order  has 
been  executed.  If  we  find  the  whole  camp  duly  prepared — 
though  not  just  precisely  at  the  fixed  hour,  yet  say  two  hours 
later — then  will  I  unconditionally  vote  for  the  offensive." 

Kossuth  was  evidently  displeased  with  my  declarations,  and 
put  to  me  the  question  :  ' '  How  high  did  I  estimate  the  enthu- 
siasm  which  his  address  would  call  forth  among  the  troops." 

"  In  the  camp,  and  immediately  after  the  address,  very  high; 
but  after  the  endurance  of  hardships,  and  in  presence  of  the 
enemy,  very  low,"  was  my  answer. 

"  Then  you  think,"  he  asked  again,  irritated,  "  that  we  shall 
not  bring  back  a  single  man  of  our  army  ?" 

"  For  the  safety  of  the  National-guards  and  the  Volunteers," 
I  replied,  "■  their  nimbleness  is  to  me  a  sufficient  guarantee  ;  but 
the  few  good  troops  which  we.  possess  might  be  ruined  by  it,  and 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  67 

with  them  the  material  which  we  so  pressingly  need  for  training 
up  a  useful  army." 

Kossuth  concluded  the  deliberation  without  a  decision  being 
come  to ;  but  he  held  out  a  prospect  of  its  being  resumed  at 
Parendorf  Hereupon  I  took  my  leave,  and  returned  immedi- 
ately to  Bruck. 

On  the  following  day  Kossuth  arrived  at  Parendorf  His  first 
official  act  in  the  camp  was  to  assemble  the  officers  of  the  reg- 
ular troops  before  his  lodgings,  and  read  to  them  a  letter  ad- 
dressed to  Prince  Windischgratz,  wherein,  so  far  as  I  remember, 
he  pointed  out  the  right  of  the  Hungarians  in  opposition  to  Ban 
Jellachich  and  his  party,  and,  based  upon  this,  demanded  of  the 
Prince  that  the  Ban  and  his  corps  should  be  disarmed,  that  it 
might  thereby  be  shown  that  the  Hungarian  Constitution,  recent- 
ly sanctioned  by  the  king,  was  deemed  sacred.  He  demanded 
likewise,  I  think,  the  raising  of  the  blockade  of  Vienna ;  but 
especially,  within  a  short,  fixed  time,  a  satisfactory  answer  to 
this  letter,  in  default  of  which  Hungary  would  be  compelled  to 
attack  and  annihilate  her  enemy  and  his  allies,  even  on  neutral 
ground. 

Two  trumpets  took  their  departure  with  this  ultimatum  to 
Prince  Windischgratz,  immediately  after  it  had  been  communi- 
cated to  the  officers. 

The  contents  of  this  letter,  which  I  have  here  given  only  very 
superficially,  met  with  considerable  sympathy  from  those  present, 
so  far  as  I  could  remark  ;  and  i\  might  be  foreseen  that  the  agi- 
tation for  the  offensive  in  favor  of  Vienna,  if  continued  in  this 
way,  would  not  be  unsuccessful.  Kossuth  might  have  reckoned 
on  this,  and  therefore  have  resolved  by  such  means  to  weaken 
in  its  consequences  the  defeat  sustained  in  the  council  of  war  at 
Nikelsdorf  •  Several  members  of  the  Diet,  who  made  their  ap- 
pearance in  the  camp  as  Hungarian  chasseurs,  likewise  did  all 
they  could  to  gain  parts  of  the  army  for  the  offensive ;  while 
Kossuth  carried  on  the  agitation  on  a  much  larger  scale,  went 
from  one  division  of  the  encamped  troops  to  another,  and  endeav- 
ored by  the  fire  of  his  oratory  to  animate  them  for  the  combat 
against  the  enemy  beyond  the  Lajtha. 

A  regular  council  of  war,  like  that  in  Nikelsdorf,  so  far  as  I 
know,  was  not  again  held.  The  whole  deliberation  was  pro- 
tracted by  discussions  repeated  at  hap-hazard,  which  became 


68  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

daily  more  general,  so  that  the  whole  camp  soon  took  part  in 
them.     Sympathy  for  the  offensive  was  visibly  increasing. 

At  first,  indeed,  several  regiments  declared  that  in  no  case 
would  they  cross  the  Lajtha  against  Prince  Windishgratz,  he- 
cause  this  would  be  an  act  of  open  revolt.  But  after  the  boldest 
defenders  of  this  opinion  had,  one  after  another,  been  very 
plainly  threatened  with  dismissal — and  thus  officers  already  high 
in  station  would  have  been  suddenly  exposed  to  an  uncertain 
fate — the  monitors  gradually  decreased  in  number,  and  soon  the 
last  was  silenced. 

Meanwhile  the  answer  of  Prince  Windishgratz  was  eagerly 
expected.  But  of  the  two  trumpets — a  Konved  colonel  and  a 
captain  of  the  National-guard — only  the  latter  returned ;  the 
former  having  been  taken  prisoner  in  Ban  Jellachich's  camp, 
and  not  again  set  at  liberty. 

This  violation  of  the  law  of  nations  completely  destroyed  every 
opposition,  which  was  perhaps  still  striving  to  maintain  itself  in 
the  camp  of  Parendorf,  against  the  proposal  of  the  President  to 
hasten  to  assist  the  oppressed  inhabitants  of  Vienna.  Kossuth 
appeared,  therefore,  to  be  willing  to  wait  only  for  still  more 
exact  intelligence  from  Vienna  ;  but  when,  instead  of  this,  the 
thunder  of  the  great  guns  from  the  capital  reached  our  ears,  then 
at  last  it  was  said  that  no  more  time  was  to  be  lost ;  and  the 
advance  began  on  the  28th  of  October. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

With  the  right  wing  continually  leaning  against  the  Danube, 
and  on  the  left  protected  as  much  as  possible  by  the  chief  body 
of  the  cavalry — the  main  body  of  the  army  advanced  in  three 
columns  to  the  Fischa. 

My  brigade  was  the  vanguard  during  the  march ;  but  in  the 
battle-array  it  had  to  form  the  left  wing  of  the  centre. 

The  head-quarters  remained  during  the  night  from  the  28th 
to  the  29th  of  October  with  the  reserve  to  the  east  of  Enzersdorf, 
near  the  Fischa.  on  the  edge  of  a  small  wood.     The  right  wing 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  «9 

stood  near  Fischamend,  the  left  near  Margarethen-am-Moos. 
The  villages  Schwaadorf,  Klein-Neusiedel,  and  Fischamend, 
were  occupied  by  our  outposts. 

My  brigade  was  encamped  close  by  Karlsdorf.  In  conformity 
with  an  order  I  had  received,  I  kept  up  a  large  fire  during  the 
whole  night  on  the  highest  point  of  the  nearest  environs,  to  an- 
nounce our  advance  to  the  inhabitants  of  Vienna. 

On  the  29th  we  passed  over  the  Fischa,  without,  however, 
marching  more  than  a  (German)  mile*  this  day  in  the  direction 
of  Schwechat. 

During  the  following  night  we  bivouacked  in  a  somewhat  con- 
centrated position  on  the  eminences  between  the  Fischa  and  the 
Schwechat. 

Scarcely  had  darkness  quite  set  in,  when  the  officer  of  the  gen- 
eral's stafi',  Nemegyei,  present  with  our  left  wing,  saw  visions, 
which,  with  a  rare  scrupulosity,  and  to  our  no  little  trouble,  he 
committed  to  paper,  in  the  form  of  reports  to  the  commander  of 
the  army,  "  that  we  had  already  been  turned."  The  Raab 
scythe-bearers,  consisting  of  several  thousands,  were  immediately 
sent  thither  from  the  reserve  for  the  security  of  the  left  wing. 
They  reached  the  camp  of  my  brigade  without  accident.  From 
us  they  had  perhaps  still  half  an  hour's  march  to  the  ideally- 
menaced  point :  but  the  ordnance-officer  of  the  left  wing,  who 
had  been  appointed  to  conduct  them  thither,  lost  the  direction, 
and  led  them  circuitously  about  during  several  hours,  till  at  last 
they  stopped  from  sheer  exhaustion,  and  left  to  Nemeg}fei 
alone  the  unequal  combat  with  the  spectral  turning-column  of 
the  enemy. 

Insignificant  as  this  incident  seemed  to  be,  it  actually  exerted 
an  important  influence  on  the  disgraceful  issue  of  the  approach- 
ing battle.  The  troops  of  almost  the  whole  centre,  but  especial- 
ly those  of  its  left  wing  (my  brigade)  were  already,  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  30th,  physically  exhausted,  morally  shaken  ;  they 
had  had  no  rest,  and  were  quite  unable  to  resist  the  fatal  effects 
of  the  terrible  rumors  of  the  preceding  night.  As  I  had  foretold, 
I  saw  the  enthusiasm,  which  had  really  been  very  vividly  kin- 
dled by  the  President's  fine  speeches  in  the  Parendorf  camp,  al- 
ready on  the  point  of  extinction.  "We  had  lost  the  battle  before 
it  had  been  begun. 

=*  Equivalent  to  5f  English  miles. — Transl. 


70  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  of  October  my  brigade  had 
been  advancing  for  a  long  time,  when  I  received  orders  instantly 
to  halt,  and  allow  myself  to  be  overtaken  by  the  whole  line  ; 
the  duty  assigned  to  my  brigade,  to  form  the  vanguard  of  the 
army,  being  no  longer  practicable,  on  account  of  the  visible 
proximity  of  the  enemy  opposite  all  points  of  our  extended  line. 
I  obeyed. 

Soon  afterward  an  active  engagement  of  artillery  commenced 
on  the  extreme  right  wing,  and  revealed  to  us  that  it  had  al- 
ready advanced  disproportionately  far.  At  the  same  time  serried 
lines  of  the  enemy  showed  themselves  on  the  eminences  of 
Schwechat.  I  thought  that,  by  attacking  them,  I  should  be 
the  means  of  procuring  for  our  right  wing  more  favorable  chances 
of  combat ;  and  my  left  being  secured  by  the  brigade  of  cavalry 
against  being  passed  round,  the  centre  of  the  army  also  already 
slowly  following  us,  I  resolved,  contrary  to  the  received  orders, 
and' on  my  own  responsibility,  to  attack. 

While  still  twice  as  far  from  these  lines  as  the  range  of  their 
guns,  a  second  order  from  the  commander-in-chief  interrupted  me 
in  the  execution  of  my  project.  "  I  must  halt,"  it  said,  "  and 
attack  only  after  express  orders." 

Meanwhile  the  right  wing  had  advanced  to  Mannsworth,  and 
the  contest  between  the  tirailleurs,  began  on  the  eastern  limit  of 
this  place.  Prom  a  hill  in  front  of  my  brigade  I  could  observe 
it  almost  in  detail.  With  an  unusually  intense  interest  I  watched 
its  progress  :  it  was  the  first  obstinate  encounter  of  tirailleurs,  of 
which  I  had  been  an  eye-witness. 

Our  troops,  quite  contrary  to  my  anticipation,  conducted  them- 
selves very  bravely  :  especially  a  battalion  of  Szeklers,  and  the 
second  volunteer  battalion  from  Pesth,  under  the  command  of 
the  daring  major  of  the  National-guards,  Count  Guyon.  On 
this  occasion  he  had  incontestably  the  greatest  merit ;  for  he 
was  always  to  be  seen  foremost  where  the  danger  was  great- 
est. These  battalions  earned  for  themselves  on  that  day  renown 
for  courage. 

The  battle  round  Mannsworth  was  still  not  completely  decided, 
when  the  centre  of  the  army  arrived  in  the  same  line  with  my 
brigade  :  and  I  was  ordered  to  gain  the  height  in  front  of  Schwe- 
chat, southward  of  the  road  from  Schwaadorf  to  Schwechat,  and 
there  to  wait  till  commanded  to  attack  that  place. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  7f 

In  the  execution  of  this  order,  I  met  with  no  obstacle ;  the 
hostile  lines,  which  had  at  first  shown  themselves  before  Schwe- 
chat,  having  meanwhile  again  disappeared. 

The  other  brigades  of  our  centre  developed  themselves  to  my 
right,  north  of  the  road  just  mentioned,  on  the  open  space  between 
the  latter  and  the  army's  extreme  right  wing,  which  alone  fought 
round  Mannsworth. 

From  the  northeastern  extremity  of  Schwechat  my  neighbor- 
ing brigade  was  saluted  by  an  insignificant  discharge  from  the 
enemy's  artillery  ;  whereupon  the  provisional  chief  of  our  gene- 
ral's staff,  Major  Pusztelnik — to  whom,  in  the  stead  of  the  regu- 
lar chief,  Colonel  Kollmann,  had  been  committed,  for  his  debut 
as  it  were,  the  management  of  the  details  of  this  offensive — or- 
dered all  batteries  of  the  first  line  to  fire. 

Though  I  saw  no  enemy  before  me,  nevertheless,  supposing 
that  Schwechat  might  be  held  by  him,  I  also  made  my  battery 
play  upon  the  place,  intending  thereby  to  facilitate  the  ensuing 
attack  of  the  tirailleurs. 

The  attack  had  scarcely  begun,  when  another  *'  Halt !"  from 
the  general-in-chief  interrupted  it ;  and  condemned  the  whole 
centre,  without  regarding  the  advantages  which  had  already 
been  gained  on  the  right  wing,  to  await,  inactive,  the  issue  of 
the -battle  which  was  just  threatening  to  open  on  our  extreme  left 
wing. 

In  fact,  when  taking  possession  of  the  eminences  near  Schwe- 
chat, we  had  remarked  the  advance  of  a  very  strong  column  of 
hostile  cavalry  from  Zwolfaxing  toward  Rauchenwarth,  whose 
movements  plainly  showed  that  they  intended  to  turn  our  left 
wing. 

Colonel  Michael  Repasy,  commander  of  the  left-wing,  had  re- 
mained unusually  far  behind,  while  we  were  advancing  from  the 
last  bivouac  ;  so  much  so,  that  after  the  drawing-up  of  the  centre 
on  the  eminences  near  Schwechat,  there  was  an  interval  of  more 
than  a  quarter  of  a  mile  (ly'j  English)  between  its  (the  centre's) 
left  wing  and  that  of  the  army.  This  lagging  of  Colonel  Repasy 
was  adduced  as  the  principal  reason  for  the  orders  to  halt,  which 
so  frequently  interrupted  the  advance  of  the  centre. 

It  was,  however,  inexplicable  to  us,  who  were  in  the  centre, 
why  the  general-in-chief  did  not  prefer  to  push  on  more  quickly 
the  left-wing,  which  consisted  only  of  cavalry,  instead  of  con- 


72  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

staiitly  keeping  the  centre  back  :  and  not  less  inexplicable  was 
the  reason  for  our  being  drawn  up  so  as  to  be  exposed  to  the 
grape-shot  from  the  enemy's  position,  beyond  which  we  could 
very  distinctly  observe  speedy  preparations  making  for  an  attack 
with  artillery  on  our  unprotected  fronts  without  being  allowed 
either  to  prevent  or  avoid  it. 

As  we  stood  there  in  a  state  of  inaction,  we  were  not  much 
better  off  than  if  we  had  been  placed  within  the  most  efficient 
gun-range  of  a  fortified  hostile  position,  and  ordered  patiently  to 
wait  till  the  unprepared  enemy  at  his  leisure,  had  taken  his 
measures  against  us. 

The  orders  of  the  general-in-chief  evidently  indicated  his  desire 
to  await  the  hostile  attack ;  but  in  that  case  we  ought  to  have 
retired  at  least  four  times  artillery-range,  so  as  to  draw  the  ene- 
my completely  out  of  Schwechat,  and  deprive  him  of  the  prepon- 
derating advantage  of  his  protected  position  and  the  employment 
of  his  forces. 

By  this  retrograde  movement  of  the  right  wing  and  of  the  centre, 
the  dangerous  interval  between  the  latter  and  the  left  wing, 
which  the  enemy  seemed  just  then  intending  to  attempt,  would 
likewise  be  judiciously  closed  ;  for  opposite  to  this  interval,  in  the 
direction,  namely,  between  Zwolfaxing  and  the  Treasury  paper- 
manufactory,  a  not  insignificant  division  of  the  enemy's  ai:my, 
isolated  from  their  turning  main  column,  was  suddenly  observed, 
which,  though  presumably  destined  only  for  communication  be- 
tween the  turning-column  and  their  principal  position  at  Schwe- 
chat would  nevertheless  by  its  further  advance  have  endangered, 
first  of  all,  the  unprotected  left  wing  of  our  centre,  and  conse- 
quently immediately  my  brigade. 

I  therefore  resolved  in  person  to  seek  for  the  general-in-chief, 
and  induce  him  to  alter  his  plans. 

I  found  him  in  company  with  the  President,  the  Commissaries, 
and  several  deputies,  at  a  point  in  the  rear  whence  the  whole  of 
the  arrangement  of  the  army  could  certainly  be  surveyed,  but 
not  at  all  its  disadvantages  in  regard  to  locality  and  tactics,  in  their 
details.  I  told  him  my  apprehensions  ;  he  paid  no  attention  to 
them.  Exasperated  at  this,  I  could  not  refrain  from  remarking 
that  from  the  point  on  which  he  stood,  he  was  quite  unable  to 
judge  of  the  position  of  the  foremost  line. 

**  I  stand  where  I  can  survey  the  whole  ;  and  do  you  execute 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  73 

in  silence  what  I  order  I"  replied  the  general  to  me,  in  a  haughty 
tone  of  reprimand. 

Kossuth  interfered  accommodatingly,  and  asked  for  a  repetition 
of  the  details  of  our  position,  and  the  disadvantages  attached  to 
it.  But  I  was  now  no  longer  sufficiently  collected  to  reiterate 
a  circumstantial  explanation  of  all  these  matters.  I  replied, 
briefly  and  abruptly,  that  the  dispositions  were  of  such  a  kind, 
that  I  did  not  feel  inclined  to  charge  myself  with  the  responsibil- 
ity of  their  consequences  ;  and  rode  back  in  haste  to  my  brigade, 
without  waiting  for  the  President's  intervention. 

The  hostile  divisions,  observed  opposite  our  gigantic  interval, 
seemed  to  have  come  considerably  nearer  during  my  absence 
Sharper  eyes  than  mine  discovered  that  they  consisted  of  cavalry. 

I  had  only  six  platoons  of  the  tenth  regiment  of  Hussars 
(William)  at  my  disposal. 

The  battalions  of  Honter  Volunteers  and  Gomor  National- 
guards  formed  the  flank  (left)  of  my  position,  disposed  in  form  of 
a  hook ;  they  stood  to  the  south  of  a  deeply-cut  field- way,  leav- 
ing Schwechat  in  the  direction  toward  Rauchenwarth.  This 
seemed  to  me  to  present  a  sufficient  obstacle  to  an  attack  of 
cavalry  directed  against  my  left  flank  ;  and  I  consequently  drew 
back  these  battalions  to  the  ground  lying  to  the  north  of  the 
field-way. 

The  position  of  my  brigade,  which  consisted  on  that  day  of 
four  battalions,  eight  pieces  of  artillery,  and  six  platoons  of  hus- 
sars, was  accordingly  as  follows  : 

On  the  right  wing,  next  to  the  high  road,  stood  the  Nograd 
battalion,  on  its  left  and  near  it  two  guns  ;  then  the  first  batta- 
lion of  Pesth  Volunteers  :  these  divisions  faced  Schwechat.  To 
the  left,  farther  back  than  the  first  battalion  of  Pesth  Volunteers, 
and  forming  a  hook  with  it,  stood  the  battalion  of  Honter  Volun- 
teers, with  their  front  toward  Zwblfaxing  ;  on  its  left  and  near 
it  the  Gomor  National-guards ;  then,  again,  two  pieces  of  artil- 
lery. The  cavalry  was  there  only  to  protect  the  guns,  on  account 
of  want  of  confidence  in  the  foot-soldiers. 

Pusztelnik  had  borrowed  four  of  my  guns,  intending  with  them 
to  betake  himself  to  the  continuation  of  the  south-eastern  outlet 
of  Schwechat — far  beyond  the  reach  of  my  position — and  by 
cannonading  it,  prevent  the  enemy,  as  far  as  possible,  from 
debouching  on  that  point.     Not  till  the  next  day  did  I  see  these 

D 


74  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

guns  igain  !  But  the  enemy  did  debouch  nevertheless,  and  took 
us  by  surprise  with  a  fire  of  artillery  truly  murderous  at  so  short 
a  distance,  and  far  surpassing  that  of  my  four  guns. 

By  his  first  shots  he  at  once  threw  my  battalions  into  irreme- 
diable confusion.  The  Gomor  National-guards  ran  away  first. 
These  were  followed  by  the  Honter  Volunteers,  after  they  had 
overturned  their  commander,  horse  and  all,  in  his  endeavors  to 
stop  them.  Only  with  the  greatest  efibrts  did  he  succeed  in 
working  his  way  out  of  the  agglomeration  of  the  ranks,  who,  in 
their  panic  terror,  were  rushing  headlong  over  one  another.  By 
my  orders  he  hastened  in  advance  of  his  fleeing  battalion,  to 
rally  it,  if  possible,  out  of  the  reach  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  and 
lead  it  forward  again. 

Meanwhile  I  hoped  to  hold  the  place  with  the  first  Pesth  bat- 
talion, which  I  supposed  to  be  still  firm.  But  then  I  wished 
to  attempt  to  storm  the  hostile  battery.  Had  not  my  battalions 
times  innumerable  solemnly  promised  that  they  would  follow 
me  till  death !  Nevertheless,  by  anticipation,  I  gave  up  all  hope 
of  the  return  of  the  Gomor  National-guards. 

During  the  first  minutes  of  the  cannonade  from  the  enemy, 
being  exclusively  occupied  with  the  Honter  Volunteers,  I  had 
not  observed  what  was  taking  place  in  the  first  Pesth  battalion. 
I  now  found  it  also  already  in  confusion  ;  and  its  commander, 
the  National-guard  major.  Count  Ernest  Almassy,  almost  beside 
himself  with  exhaustion,  in  consequence  of  his  strenuous  efTorts 
to  keep  his  men  together.  I  saw  in  an  instant  the  impossibility 
of  maintaining  the  position  with  this  battalion  until  the  return 
of  the  Honter  Vdlunteers  ;  and  yet  I  madly  believed  it  possible 
to  animate  it  to  storm  the  hostile  batteries.  "  Forward  I  for- 
ward against  the  guns  I"  shouted  I  to  the  irresolute  ;  and  Cap- 
tain Gozon  of  the  battalion  seized  the  banner,  ran  ahead  with 
it  some  fifty  paces  toward  the  enemy,  planted  it  in  the  ground, 
and  cried  in  Hungarian,  "Hither,  Magyar  I  here  waves  thy  ban- 
ner !" 

From  thirty  to  forty  of  the  most  courageous  followed  the  in- 
trepid man.  But  while  the  foremost  rank  joined  them  only 
laggardly,  those  behind  deserted  more  and  more ;  and  after  a  few 
minutes  the  battalion  resembled  a  misshapen  elongated  reptile, 
for  the  greater  number  crawled  away  on  all  fours,  while  those 
who  fled  erect  tumbled  over  them.     In  vain  did  Captain  Gozon 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  IIUNGAEY.  75 

again  hold  up  the  banner,  wave  it  high  in  the  air,  and  exhaust 
himself  with  inspiring  shouts  ;  in  vain  did  the  commander  of 
the  battalion,  with  his  adjutant,  at  last  fall  on  the  fugitives — 
they  were  no  longer  to  be  stopped ;  and  even  those  few  who  had 
advanced  at  Gozon's  first  call,  quickly  deserted  him  again  one 
after  the  other ;  and  he  soon  stood  there  alone  with  the  banner. 

I  rode  up  to  him,  gave  him  my  hand  as  a  mark  of  my  esteem 
for  his  heroism,  and  recommended  him  to  save  the  banner. 

Saving  my  guns  was  of  far  more  importance  to  me.  Those  of 
the  left  wing  had  already  been  dragged  away  by  the  battalions 
in  their  flight.     Only  those  of  the  right  wing  remained. 

With  anxious  solicitude  I  therefore  hastened  thither,  and  im- 
periously demanded  of  the  commander  of  the  battery,  what  he 
still  wanted  there  by  himself.  He  excused  himself  by  saying 
that  he  had  received  no  orders  to  retire. 

"Now,  then,  make  haste  and  be  oft' I"  I  exclaimed;  quite 
overlooking,  in  my  excitement,  the  stoical  courage  evinced  by 
this  excuse. 

But  the  man  had  the  blood  of  a  fish  in  his  veins.  "  There  are 
still  some  charges  here,"  replied  he,  in  a  Bohemian-German  dia- 
lect;  "may  I  not  first  fire  them  off'?"  I  was  almost  ashamed 
of  my  anxiety  before  him.  Irritated,  I  gave  a  bluff'  consent,  and 
turned  my  horse  toward  the  high  road,  to  see  what  had  hap- 
pened meanwhile  to  my  neighbour  brigades. 

I  had  supposed  that  the  Nograd  Volunteer  battalion  to  the 
right,  in  the  rear  of  the  guns,  had  run  away  long  ago.  My  sur- 
prise, therefore,  was  indescribable,  when  my  first  glance  in  this 
direction  fell  on  the  serried  and  immovable  mass. 

It  stood  in  the  direction  of  the  most  violent  fire  of  the  hostile 
batteries,  though  in  a  gently-sloping  hollow  protected  from  it. 
This  circumstance  I  overlooked,  however,  in  the  first  instance, 
and  thus  believed  that  I  had  before  me  a  battalion  of  heroes. 
"  Advance  swiftly  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  artillery,  and  then 
form  the  rear-guard  I"  I  called,  encouraged,  to  the  commander, 
and  thought  I  should  still  accomplish  wonders  with  such  heroes. 
AVhat  a  deception  !  Scarcely  was  the  battalion  out  of  its  covert 
and  exposed  to  the  balls  of  the  battery,  when  the  commander 
shouted  with  all  his  might,  "  Volunteers,  forward  I — fire,  all  I" 

But  the  volunteers  remained  immovable  ;  the  whole  mass  dis- 
harged  their  high-presented  muskets  at  the  hussars,  who,  in  pro- 


76  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

tecting  the  retreating  guns,  were  just  passing  close  by  their  front 
(fortunately  none  of  the  shots  hit) ;  and  the  next  minute  the  bat- 
talion of  supposed  heroes  was  already  on  its  way  to  join  the  rest. 
One  of  its  men  alone  disdained  to  take  part  in  the  general  flight, 
and  acted  as  if  he  would  of  himself  form  the  rear-guard  of  my 
whole  brigade. 

Thus,  out  of  nearly  5000  men  of  those  National-guards  and 
Volunteers  about  whose  valor  I  had  already  heard  so  many 
tirades  ;  who,  as  they  themselves  had  repeatedly  asserted,  were 
burning  with  desire  to  measure  themselves  with  an  enemy  whom 
they  never  mentioned  but  with  the  greatest  contempt — there  re- 
mained to  me,  after  a  short  hostile  cannonade,  a  single  man ! 
and  this  one  was  an  elderly,  half-invalid  soldier  I 

The  firmness  with  which  at  Nikelsdorf  I  had  opposed  the  Pres- 
ident's urging  to  the  offensive,  proved,  I  should  think,  clearly 
enough  that  I  was  perfectly  prepared  for  an  unfortunate  debut  of 
these  "  inspired  legions ;"  but  what  I  had  just  experienced  far 
exceeded  my  worst  apprehensions. 

I  thought  I  should  have  sunk  into  the  earth  for  shame  at  the 
unspeakable  cowardice  of  my  countrymen,  and  wished  that  a  ball 
would  strike  me  from  my  horse  I 

Of  my  once-numerous  suite,  only  my  younger  brother  and  a 
first-lieutenant  of  the  tenth  regiment  of  hussars  had  constantly 
kept  near  me  during  moments  of  danger.  Accompanied  by  them 
I  sorrowfully  left  the  field  of  battle — the  witness  of  our  shame — 
and  had  then  no  presentiment  that  the  honor  was  yet  reserved 
for  us  of  taking  part  in  future  combats,  the  consequences  of 
which  would  embitter  to  the  victors  of  Schwechat  the  memory 
of  this  day. 

Slowly  I  rode  toward  the  midst  of  the  centre.  I  almost  feared 
the  sight  of  my  comrades,  whom  I  supposed  to  be  still  engaged 
in  the  battle  with  their  brigades.  Alas,  I  had  no  reason  for  fear. 
The  whole  of  our  forces  from  Schwechat  to  Mannswbrth  was  as 
if  swept  away.  The  other  brigades  were  said — incredible  as  it 
seems — to  have  taken  to  their  heels  even  before  mine. 

Like  a  scared  flock,  the  main  body  of  the  army  was  seen  has- 
tening in  the  greatest  disorder  toward  the  Fischa  for  safety. 
The  broad  plain  was  literally  sown  all  over  with  single  fugi- 
tives ;  nowhere,  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach,  was  a  compact  di- 
vision to  be  perceived. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  77 

It  was  to  be  expected  that  the  enemy  would  take  advantage 
of  his  victory,  resolutely  pursue,  and  render  it  impossible  to  get 
our  train  of  artillery  safely  across  the  Fischa.  This  was  con- 
firmed by  his  advancing  batteries. 

Nothing  else  than  a  desperate  combat  by  the  rear-guard  could 
now  save  the  army.  At  whatever  cost,  something  must  be  done 
to  effect  this.  Fortunately  the  horses  of  my  two  companions 
were  still  pretty  fresh.  I  therefore  dispatched  one  of  them  in 
the  direction  of  Schwaadorf,  the  other  toward  Fischamend,  after 
the  fugitives,  to  stop  and  assemble  as  many  as  they  possibly  could. 

The  result  of  their  exertions  was  hopelessly  small,  about  1000 
men  in  all,  and  even  these  were  continually  on  the  point  of  run- 
ning away  again.     I  no  longer  saw  any  hope  of  preservation. 

But,  next  to  God,  the  enemy  was  on  this  day  merciful  and 
compassionate  to  us,  for — he  did  not  pursue  us. 

Unmolested  we  reached  before  night  the  opposite  bank  of  the 
Fischa  ;  and  equally  unmolested  on  the  next  day  we  entered  again 
the  "  legal  ground"  of  our  country. 

Scarcely  had  the  last  sound  of  the  artillery  before  Schwechat 
died  away,  when  the  strangest  opinions  were  heard  as  to  the 
real  cause  of  the  failure  of  our  offensive  operations 

For  instance,  the  masses  of  deserters  from  the  National-guards 
and  Volunteers — who  had  at  their  command  a  surprising  readi- 
ness for  interpreting  every  defeat  sustained  through  their  coward- 
ice as  being  the  inevitable  result  of  some  treason — asserted  that 
the  inhabitants  of  Vienna,  secretly  leaguing  with  Prince  Win- 
dischgratz,  had  exhorted  us  to  hasten  to  their  assistance,  and 
had  during  the  battle  united  themselves  with  the  hostile  troops 
against  us.  Absurd  as  this  story  sounds,  it  was  but  a  natural 
consequence  of  those  agitations  which  had  led  to  the  expectation 
of  a  sally  of  the  inhabitants  of  Vienna  simultaneously  with  our 
attack,  and  thus  of  the  easiest  victory  over  the  blockading  army. 

Moga's  dispositions  during  the  offensive,  but  especially  during 
the  conflict,  were  likewise  severely  criticised ;  and  by  many  of 
his  inferiors  expressly  interpreted  as  if  he  had  wished  to  deliver 
the  whole  army  into  the  enemy's  hands.  That  this  had  not  suc- 
ceeded— they  further  said — ^was  owing  to  Prince  Windischgratz, 
or  rather  to  his  sub-commanders,  who  purposely  allowed  us  to  es- 
cape with  only  a  black  eye. 

But  the  civil  coryphei  of  the  Hungarian  movement  difiused 


78  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

these  opinions  very  diligently  throughout  the  country ;  on  the 
one  hand,  to  weaken  the  just  reproach  that  they  by  their  agita- 
tions for  the  crossing  of  the  Lajtha  had  led  the  nation  to  take 
a  foolhardy,  pernicious  step ;  on  the  other  hand,  to  revive  the 
drooping  courage  of  the  people,  by  pointing  to  sympathies,  which 
they  said  existed  for  the  cause  of  Hungary  even  in  the  Austrian 
army. 

A  conscientious  estimate  of  the  peculiar  circumstances  under 
which  the  battle  of  Schwechat  had  been  fought,  scarcely  permits, 
however,  an  unreserved  concurrence  in  this  somewhat  bold  judg- 
ment. 

It  c£[n  not  certainly  be  denied,  on  the  one  side,  that  our  gen- 
eral's dispositions  here  and  there  led  to  the  suspicion  that  he 
intended  to  deliver  his  army 'into  the  enemy's  hands.  On  the 
other  side,  it  must  be  admitted,  that  the  enemy  had  entirely 
confined  the  pursuit  of  our  deserting  centre  and  right  wing  to 
sending  at  i-andom  after  us  his  projectiles  from  two,  or,  at  most, 
three  positions  he  had  taken  up  for  his  artillery  when  advancing ; 
while  his  gigantic  turning-column,  opposed  by  our  quite  isolated, 
feeble  left  wing,  under  Repasy,  discontinued  its  attacks  just  at 
the  moment  when  it  had  become  impossible  for  our  general  to 
reinforce  the  left  wing.  It  must  further  be  granted,  that  the 
enemy  could  have  been  hindered  from  pursuing  neither  by  a 
sally  of  the  inhabitants  of  Vienna,  nor  by  the  supposition  that 
our  flight  was  merely  a  feigned  one.  All  this  taken  together 
consequently  furnishes  reason  enough  for  the  supposition,  that 
he  intentionally  let  us  escape  with  only  a  black  eye. 

But  I  oppose  to  this,  that  it  can  not  be  imagined  there  was, 
either  on  the  part  of  Moga  or  on  that  of  his  sub-commanders,  a 
clear  knowledge  of  what  they  really  intended  to  do  on  the  day 
of  the  battle  of  Schwechat  And  I  find  the  more  natural  expla- 
nation of  the  defective  leading  of  our  army,  as  well  as  of  their 
unexpected  preservation,  partly  in  the  embarrassment,  easily 
conceivable  after  thirty  years  of  peace,  of  the  opposite  leaders 
and  their  troops  ;  partly,  perhaps,  also  in  the  circumstance  that 
the  national  excitements  of  the  year  1848  had  not  yet  succeeded 
in  so  completely  effacing  from  the  ranks  of  the  regular  troops  of 
both  armies  the  remembrance  of  the  fellowship  which  had  existed 
among  them  shortly  before,  as  that  it  would  have  been  possible 
for  them  to  fight  against  each  other  like  embittered  enemies. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Early  on  the  31st  of  October,  I  had  received,  during  the 
march,  an  order  from  the  commander  of  the  army  not  to  lead 
my  brigade  again  to  Bruck,  into  the  inevitable  position  on  the 
Lajtha,  but  to  Kitsee  (Kopeseny),  and  to  encamp  before  that 
place. 

Here,  consequently,  there  reached  me,  in  the  night  between 
the  31st  of  October  and  the  1st  of  November,  1848,  the  Pres- 
ident's order  to  appear  before  him  without  delay  at  Presburg 
(Pozson).  At  the  same  time  I  was  invited  to  the  head-quarters 
(in  the  seignorial  castle  of  Kitsee),  Moga  wishing  to  speak  to  me 
previously. 

It  was  past  midnight  when  I  arrived  at  the  head-quarters.  I 
found  Moga  already  retired  to  rest ;  but  his  adjutant  was  wait- 
ing for  me,  and  communicated  to  me  beforehand,  that  his  chief, 
in  consequence  of  a  fall  from  his  horse,  by  which  he  was  severely 
bruised,  had  become  incapable  of  continuing  the  command  of 
the  army,  and  had  proposed  me  to  the  President  as  his  successor. 

I  therefore  rode  immediately  to  Presburg ;  and  very  early  in 
the  morning  of  the  1st  of  November  I  stood  beside  the  President's 
sick-bed ;  for,  in  the  delicate  state  of  his  health,  the  recent  events 
had  brought  on  a  kind  of  fever.  A  violent  fit,  he  assured  me, 
had  just  left  him. 

He  invited  me  to  take  a  seat  near  his  bed,  as  our  conversation 
might  be  of  some  duration,  and  complained  first  of  the  excessive 
cowardice  of  the  National-guards  and  Volunteers,  still  more  of 
the  battalion  of  the  foot-regiment  Preussen,  and  especially  of  its 
commander.  Major  Gyozei,*  a  coward  beyond  compare.  This 
battalion,  according  to  Kossuth,  stood  in  the  second  line  of  the 
middle  brigade  of  the  centre  (in  the  array  before  Schwechat  my 
neighbor  brigade  to  the  right),  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  hos-* 

*  This  was  his  Magyarized  name ;  his  German  name  is  unknown  to 


80  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

tile  cannonade  had  taken  to  flight  the  first  of  all — nay,  during 
the  flight  had  thrown  away  even  their  havresacks  and  cartridge- 
pouches. 

I  remembered,  indeed,  to  have  noticed,  during  my  last  ride  over 
the  position  occupied  by  our  centre,  in  the  direction  indicated,  a 
remarkably  great  mass  of  equipments,  with  white  straps,  that 
had  been  thrown  away,  and  far  around  not  any  dead  or  wounded 
to  be  seen. 

However,  said  Kossuth,  the  National-guards  had  afterward 
succeeded  in  disputing  with  this  regular  battalion  the  palm  of 
greater  cowardice.  Because  when  he  had  left  General  Moga, 
after  many  vain  attempts  to  put  a  stop  to  the  flight  which  now 
had  become  general,  and  had  hastened  back  in  his  carriage  to 
Fischamend — as  was  natural,  only  with  the  intention  of  stopping 
the  fugitives  at  the  bridge  of  the  Fischa — he  found  it  already 
occupied  to  such  a  degree  by  deserters,  that  he  could  himself  get 
over  it  only  in  consequence  of  the  very  energetic  efforts  made  by 
his  armed  followers. 

"  And  this  was  much,"  added  Kossuth,  in  an  explanatory 
manner ;  "  for  I  had  not  remained  a  great  while  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  retreat,  on  that  point  behind  the  place  where 
the  reserve  of  the  army  stood — where,  shortly  before  the  hostile 
attack  on  our  centre,  we  had  for  the  last  time  spoken  together 
in  the  general's  company — and  had  ridden  pretty  quickly  from 
thence  to  Fischamend  I 

"  I  was  now  obliged,"  continued  Kossuth,  '*  to  defer  the  execu- 
tion of  my  original  design  to  a  point  lying  still  farther  on.  I 
ordered  fresh  horses  to  be  put  to  my  carriage,  and  availed  myself 
of  the  time  while  this  was  being  done,  to  address  those  who  were 
fleeing  close  by  my  side,  and  so  perhaps  stop  them.  But,  in  vain. 
They  only  waved  their  hats  in  friendly  salute,  wishing  me  many 
times  long  life,  and  ran  on  unheeding. 

"  Though  disgusted  in  the  highest  degree  at  such  conduct,  I 
could  not  but  see  the  impossibility  of  damming  up  any  where  in 
the  midst  the  stream  of  fugitives  without  the  energetic  co-opera- 
tion of  a  compact  troop  ;  and  this  confirmed  me  still  more  in  my 
resolution  to  overtake  those  who  had  fled  farthest,  before  I  should 
Venture  again  to  attempt  rallying  them. 

"  Meanwhile  the  fresh  horses  had  been  put  to  the  carriage.  I 
had  no  time  to  lose,  and  urged  haste.     But  however  broad  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  81 

main  road  might  be,  I  was  nevertheless  every  here  and  there 
again  and  again  interrupted  in  my  swift  journey  by  a  new  dense 
multitude  of  fugitives. 

"  Behind  almost  each  of  these  crowds  I  was  obHged  to  make 
a  formal  speech  from  my  carriage,  to  be  allowed  at  least  to  drive 
on  before  them.  And  thus  it  happened  that,  in  spite  of  the  re- 
peated change  of  horses,  I  could  not  overtake  the  first  of  the 
deserters  before  I  was  in  front  of  Presburg,  in  the  so-called  Au. 
There  at  last,  eight  (German)  miles  from  Schwechat — the  fel- 
lows must  clandestinely  have  taken  to  their  heels  at  the  earliest 
opportunity  after  the  first  discharge  of  artillery — the  danger  from 
the  enemy  appeared  to  them  no  longer  sufficiently  great  to  make 
them  run  farther.  They  were  camping  contentedly  along  the 
road,  and  were  just  taking  some  refreshment  when  I  arrived 
among  them.  Beside  myself  with  indignation,  I  resolved  to 
sentence  them  to  the  severest  punishments  ;  and  for  this  purpose 
asked  the  name  of  the  division  to  which  they  belonged.  But 
the  wretches  felt  themselves  even  flattered  by  my  '  kind  inquiry ;' 
and  while  some  of  them  repeatedly  called  to  me  with  self-satis- 
faction that  they  were  the  National-guards  of  the  comitate  of 
Komorn,  the  rest  bellowed  continually,  '  Eljen  Kossuth  I'  " 

When  the  President  in  the  council  of  war  at  Nikelsdorf — evi- 
dently offended  at  my  unreserved  description  of  the  state  of  dis- 
cipline existing  in  our  army — had  put  the  question  to  *fTfe,  with, 
a  malicious  sneer,  whether  I  seriously  feared  that  we  should  not 
bring  home  a  single  man  from  the  offensive  across  the  Lajtha,  I 
answered.  "  I  was  not  alarmed  about  the  National-guards  and 
Volunteers — they  had  nimble  legs  I"  I  could  not  now  feel  other- 
wise than  astonished  to  see  how  perfectly  the  President's  own 
experience  justified  my  then  doubted  judgment.  Still  I  refrained 
at  this  time  from  making  any  remark  upon  it ;  because  Kossuth 
appeared  to  me  not  only  physically  but  also  morally  shattered. 

However,  he  was  not  the  latter  by  any  means.  Although, 
after  his  recent  journey  from  Fischamend  to  Presburg,  he  could 
no  longer  answer  so  decidedly  for  the  heroism  of  the  National- 
guards  and  Volunteers  as  he  had  previously  done,  nevertheless  he 
still  attributed  the  chief  blame  of  the  disgraceful  issue  of  our 
offensive  in  favor  of  Vienna  to  the  indecision  of  the  commander 
of  the  army  ;  and  strenuously  maintained  that  a  more  determined 
leading  qf  the  troops  would  have  been  followed  by  victory. 


82  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

"  The  accident  which  has  made  Moga  suddenly  incapable  of 
service,"  added  Kossuth,  "  I  consider  as  a  hint  to  remove  forever 
from  the  command  of  the  army  all  politically-wavering  elements. 
This  seems  to  me  especially  necessary  at  the  moment  when  it  is 
important  to  prepare  for  the  royal  imperial  Field-marshal  Lieu- 
tenant Simunich — who  has  meanwhile  already  hostilely  pene- 
trated into  the  country  from  the  north  as  far  as  Tyrnau  (Nagy 
Szombat) — the  fate  of  Generals  Roth  and  Philippovich,  and 
thereby  simultaneously  to  destroy  on  the  one  hand  a  not  incon- 
siderable part  of  the  hostile  forces,  and  on  the  other  to  rekindle 
anew  the  enthusiasm  of  the  country,  depressed  in  consequence  of 
the  disaster  at  Schwechat — and  thus,  as  it  were,  kill  two  birds 
with  one  stone. 

"  I  have  therefore  advanced  Count  Guyon  from  major  to 
colonel  of  the  National-guards,  and  made  him  commander  of  the 
expedition  against  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Simunich.  His 
heroic  conduct  before  Mannsworth  is  a  guarantee  to  me  that  this 
expedition  will  at  least  not  fail  from  its  leader's  Avant  of  decision. 
It  might  indeed  more  easily  miscarry  through  his  unskillfulness  ; 
for  I  distrust  the  military  knowledge  of  Guyon.  To  obviate  this, 
I  have  placed  by  his  side  as  counsellor  the  chief  of  Moga's  general 
staff,  the  Honved  colonel  Kollmann.  But  then,  according  to  our 
system,  Kollmann,  as  Honved  colonel,  and  still  more  as  his  senior 
in  rank,  is  properly  Guyon' s  superior  ;  and  he  must  consequently 
first  of  all  be  won,  as  he  best  may,  to  a  voluntary  subordination 
to  the  commands  of  the  latter.  For  this,  however,  and  especially 
the  more  to  expedite  the  preparations  for  this  expedition,  in 
which  the  most  trusty  troops  of  the  army  shall  be  employed,  I 
need  the  vigorous  assistance  of  an  energetic  commander  of  the 
army.  Would  not  you  undertake  the  command  of  the  army  ? 
Ifou  seem  to  me  to  be  above  all  others  the  right  man  for  this 
post  I" 

"  What,  then,  will  my  senior  comrades  in  the  army  say,  when 
they  see  themselves  passed  over,  on  my  account,  and  without 
reason?"  replied  I,  interrogatively. 

"I  have  thought  of  that,"  answered  Kossuth,  "and  had  al- 
ready offered  to  several  of  them  the  staff  of  command,  as  soon  as 
I  knew  of  Moga's  accident ;  but  have  received  just  as  many 
answers  declining  to  accept  it.  Hereupon  you  were  proposed  to 
me  for  this  post  by  Moga.     As  to  what  your  comrades  will  say 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  83 

to  it,  you  may  therefore,  I  think,  be  perfectly  easy.  They  will 
be  nominated  generals  together  with  you,  only  you  receive  the 
seniority  of  rank.  If  therefore  you  accept  the  staff  of  command, 
endeavor  above  all  to  set  on  foot  as  quickly  as  possible  the 
expedition  against  Field-marshal  Simunich,  and  to  arrange  any 
differences  between  Kollmann  and  Guyon,  if  such  should  arise, 
before  they  personally  fall  out,  and  thus  render  mediation  impos- 
sible." 

"  I  accept  the  staff  of  command,"  I  answered,  "  and  will  im- 
mediately go  in  search  of  those  gentlemen ;  but  I  must  remark, 
that  I  despair  beforehand  of  any  favorable  result  from  my  medi- 
ation. Why  do  you  not  prefer  to  entrust  Kollmann  with  the 
command  of  the  expedition,  and  associate  Guyon  with  him  as 
sub-commander  ? ' ' 

"  Because  before  Schwechat  I  had  an  opportunity  of  having 
confirmed  by  my  own  observation  the  ambiguous  reputation 
which  Kollmann  has  with  the  army,"  replied  Kossuth.  "  You 
should  but  have  seen  the  pitiful  countenance  with  which  he  was 
stealing  about  before  Schwechat  among  the  commander's  suite, 
and  how  it  at  once  became  irradiated  with  joy,  when,  after  the 
beginning  of  the  general  flight  in  the  centre,  his  leader  turned 
his  horse  toward  the  preserving  Fischa.  I  can  not  tell,  how- 
ever, how  much  of  this  delight  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  tran- 
quilising  thought  that  he  (Kollmann)  in  the  general's  suite  could 
now  honorably  withdraw  himself  from  the  approaching  danger, 
and  how  much  to  malignant  satisfaction  at  the  baffled  debut  of 
his  substitute  Pusztelnik.  This  much,  however,  appears  to  me 
to  be  certain,  that  Kollmann  is  destitute  of  those  moral  qualities 
which,  to  ensure  its  success,  I  presume  to  be  indispensable  in  the 
leader  of  the  expedition  against  Simunich. 

"  Moreover  I  have  already  definitively  charged  Guyon  with  the 
command  of  this  expedition.  If  Kollmann,  therefore,  should  per- 
severe in  refusing  to  recognize  the  former  as  his  chief,  then  Pusz- 
telnik must  again  act  in  Kollmann' s  place." 

Agreeing  with  this  measure,  I  left  the  President,  and  made  a 
vain  attempt  to  arrange  the  wished-for  understanding  between 
Kollmann  and  Guyon,  conformably  with  Kossuth's  intention.  In 
the  meanwhile,  however,  they  had  already  had  words ;  and 
Kollmann  steadily  refused  to  lead  the  expedition  under  Guyon's 
command.     Pusztelnik  was  consequently   associated   with   the 


84  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

latter  as  chief  of  the  general  staff.  Part  of  the  troops  for  this 
campaign  left  Presburg  before  daybreak,  and  all  of  them  in  the 
course  of  the  1st  of  November.  The  rest  of  the  army,  in  the 
mean  time,  was  distributed,  for  the  protection  of  the  frontier,  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  from  the  Neusiedel  lake  to  Pres- 
burg ;  on  the  left  from  Presburg  to  Hochstetten. 

Kossuth  awaited  the  issue  of  the  expedition  in  Presburg,  whi- 
ther also  my  head-quarters  were  transferred. 

A  few  days  after  the  commencement  of  the  expedition  I  re- 
ceived an  invitation  from  the  President  to  a  rendezvous  with  the 
Polish  general  Bem,  who  had  just  arrived  at  Presburg  from 
Vienna,  and  was  immediately  to  start  for  Guyon's  expeditionary 
corps,  to  give  a  new  and  favorable  turn  to  the  operations  of  the 
latter,  which  were  already  near  becoming  a  failure. 

In  consequence  of  this  invitation  I  saw  Bem  for  the  first  time, 
without  knowing  more  of  his  former  fortunes  than  his  sudden  ap- 
pearance in  Vienna  in  the  course  of  the  past  month  of  October, 
and  his  participation  in  the  defense  of  that  city. 

Our  conversation  was  very  short.  He  communicated  to  me 
that  Kossuth  was  sending  him  to  Guyon  to  assist  him  both  with 
his  advice  and  co-operation. 

Some  days  after  this,  Bem  had  again  come  back  to  Presburg ; 
and,  as  Kossuth  had  already  set  out  for  Pesth,  he  invited  me, 
through  Csanyi,  to  a  conference.  This  time  it  lasted  somewhat 
longer.  Bem  told  me  that  he  had  reached  Guyon  a  day  too  late 
to  be  able  to  exercise  any  effective  influence  on  the  course  of  this 
unfortunate  campaign.  He  then  remarked,  what  distinguished 
talents  Guyon  possessed  as  a  general  ;  but  that  the  officers  of 
the  regular  troops  were  still  not  quite  uniform  in  their  obe- 
dience ;  and  so  on.  Finally  he  declared  that  he  should  go 
to  Kossuth  at  Pesth,  that  he  might  be  employed  somewhere  in 
the  field. 

Bem's  presence  produced  a  depressing  effect  upon  me.  I 
knew  neither  whence  he  came,  nor  what  were  his  aims.  His 
emerging  in  Vienna,  which  has  remained  inexplicable  to  me ; 
his  doings  there,  which  I  knew  only  by  report ;  and  now  sudden- 
ly the  devotedness,  just  as  inexplicable,  which  he  constantly 
protested  for  the  defense  of  my  country — these  circumstances  led 
me  involuntarily  to  suppose  him  to  be  something  of  a  "knight 
errant"  in  a  modern  revolutionary  style  of  warfare.     My  coun- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  86 

try's  cause  appeared  to  me  to  be  too  sacred,  too  just,  not  to 
make  me  feel  a  decided  aversion  to  the  companionship  in  arms 
of  such  elements.  Moreover  Bem's  favorable  judgment  with 
respect  to  Guyon,  as  well  as  the  contrary  in  regard  to  the  body 
of  officers  of  the  regular  troops,  so  diametrically  contradicted  my 
own  experience,  that  I  found  therein  very  little  reason  to  expect 
for  my  country  any  enduring  success  from  Bem's  doings  in  the 
field  of  battle. 

Except  on  these  two  occasions  at  Presburg,  I  have  never 
seen  Bern,  nor  have  I  had  any  other  direct  intercourse  with 
him. 


CHAPTER  X. 

The  Constitution  of  Hungary  was  worth  a  sanguinary  contest. 
The  nation  had  acknowledged  this,  and  had  unanimously  risen 
to  the  conflict.  Their  leader  was  the  man  of  their  confidence — 
Kossuth. 

But  being  no  soldier  himself,  he  under-estimated  the  import 
ance  of  the  soldier,  and  believed  that  the  thunder  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  would  be  silenced  by  the  mere  war-cry  of  masses  oi 
people  brought  together  by  extemporised  declamations. 

Soldiers — myself  among  the  number — had  warned  him  against 
such  a  dangerous  self-deception.  The  warning  was  unheeded 
by  him  ;  and  before  Schwechat  he  paid  dearly  for  his  expe- 
rience. 

Then  he  offered  me  the  command  of  the  defeated  army. 

I  hailed  this  step  as  a  proof  that  Kossuth  had  forever  sacrificed 
to  the  welfare  of  the  country  his  anti-military  enthusiasm,  and 
accepted  this  important  post  with  the  clear  conviction  that  the 
combat  of  the  nation  for  its  rights  was  a  combat  in  self  defense, 
and  in  the  firm  belief  that  it  would  remain  so  :  I  accepted  it, 
because  I  felt  inwardly  the  vocation  for  it,  and  that  by  refusing 
it,  I  should  have  violated  my  duty  to  my  country ;  finally,  be- 
cause the  higher  I  stood,  the  more  likely  it  seemed  to  me  that  I 
should  be  able  to  inspire  my  fellow  citizens,  by  my  own  exam- 


86  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

pie,  with  that  devotion  to  the  just  cause  of  the  fatherland,  with- 
out which  it  was  vain  to  think  of  saving  it. 

But  even  during  the  first  days  of  my  new  sphere  of  action 
I  found  that  the  day  of  Schwechat  had  neither  cured  the  civil 
rulers  of  the  error  of  allowing,  in  the  disposal  of  the  armed  forces, 
political  considerations  to  prevail  at  the  expense  of  strategic  ones, 
nor  had  it  deterred  them  from  the  repetition  of  the  experiment 
of  making  war  without  soldiers. 

My  proposition  was — on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  to 
move  back  with  the  main  army  to  Raab,  with  the  advanced 
corps  to  Wieselburg  (Moson)  ;  on  the  left,  to  protect  Presburg 
and  defend  the  principal  passages  across  the  White  Mountains 
(Feher  Hegyek)  with  strong  isolated  detachments  only,  which, 
in  case  of  the  advance  of  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy  should 
effect  their  retreat,  on  the  one  .^ide  to  Leopoldstadt  (Lipotvan), 
on  the  other  to  Komorn  (Komarom)  :  further,  to  reorganize  the 
active  army,  to  transfer  the  seat  of  government,  and  of  the  Diet, 
together  with  the  cadres  of  the  battalions  about  to  be  raised, 
behind  the  Theiss  ;  and  to  make  use  of  the  end  of  autumn  for 
raising  troops,  for  establishing  magazines  and  depots,  and  in  gen- 
eral for  the  organization  of  a  trusty,  well-regulated  army.  It 
was,  however,  rejected. 

In  opposition  to  this,  it  was  said  that  the  frontier  must  re- 
main  occujned,  and  the  reorganization  of  the  army  be  car- 
ried on  in  face  of  the  enemy ;  because  that  with  every  hand- 
breadth  of  country  lost,  there  was  also  a  falling  away  from  us  of 
a  part  of  the  people.  Their  sympathies  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  Constitution  \i^ere  not  yet  sufficiently  well-grounded  to  be 
able  to  resist  the  discomfiture  sustained  in  a  combat  remarkably 
unfortunate  for  us.  Above  all,  the  discouraging  efl^ect  of  the 
defeat  at  Schwechat  must  be  mitigated  as  much  as  possible  by 
the  maintenance  of  the  frontier.  Then  would  the  inhabitants, 
especially  those  of  that  part  of  Hungary  which  is  situated  next 
to  the  seat  of  the  Austrian  government,  accustom  themselves  in 
a  very  short  time  to  the  absence  of  their  former  relation  to  Aus- 
tria, being  obliged,  inconsequence  of  the  blockade  of  the  frontier, 
to  break  off' their  commercial  connections  with  the  non-Hungarian 
territories  of  Austria,  to  confine  their  mercantile  activity  to  the 
interior,  and  thus  mark  the  more  abruptly  the  frontier  of  Hunga- 
ry toward  Austria.      Moreover,  by  means   of  the   hermetical 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  87 

blockade  of  the  frontier,  the  exportation  of  provisions  to  the  cap- 
ital— to  the  detriment  of  the  hostile  army  concentrated  in  and 
around  it — would  also  be  entirely  prevented  ;  the  buyingf-up  of 
the  supplies  of  corn  and  hay  stored  in  the  frontier  comitates,  and 
amassing  them  in  the  fortress  of  Komorn  and  its  environs,  would 
be  secured,  as  well  as  a  favorable  market  for  the  new  Hungarian 
paper-money. 

In  vain  did  I  call  attention  to  the  fact,  that  in  spite  of  all  this, 
by  the  occupation  of  the  frontier,  they  were  merely  striving  for 
transitory  and  secondary  advantages,  and  abandoning  for  these 
the  durable  and  most  important  benefit  which  the  possession  of 
a  well-organized  armed  force  would  secure  to  us ;  while  the  re- 
organization of  the  army,  during  the  harassing  service  of  the 
outposts  along  such  an  extended  line  of  frontier,  would  be  ren- 
dered very  difficult,  nay  almost  impossible. 

I  was  outvoted,  and  might  consider  it  fortunate  that  at  least 
no  objection  was  made  to  the  reorganizing  of  the  army,  by  which 
I  understood  nothing  less  than  the  disbanding  of  the  battalions  of 
National-guards  and  Volunteers,  and  the  formation  of  regular 
Honved  battalions  out  of  the  material  thereby  gained. 

But  scarcely  had  Kossuth  left  Presburg  to  return  to  Pesth, 
when  my  exertions  in  this  direction  also  began  to  be  most  ob- 
stinately obstructed. 

Even  during  the  President's  sojourn  of  some  days  at  Presburg, 
I  had  frequently  had  occasion  to  perceive  that  he  was  opposed  to 
my  purely  military  plans,  not  perhaps  from  his  own  personal  con- 
viction, but  only  in  consequence  of  the  most  prejudicial  influence 
of  those  about  him,  who  had  not  been  very  happily  chosen  for 
the  furtherance  of  the  good  cause.  The  difficulties  which  he  sud- 
denly raised  from  Pesth  against  the  reorganization  of  the  army  as 
I  had  proposed  it,  although  he  had  seemed  perfectly  to  agree  with 
it  when  in  Presburg,  plainly  confirmed  this  supposition.  The 
source  of  these  difficulties,  again,  could  be  found,  in  my  opinion, 
only  in  external  influences,  and  very  probably  in  those  of  the 
members  of  the  Committee  of  Defense.  Though  I  scarcely  knew 
them  by  name,  it  was  nevertheless  sufficient  to  know  that  they 
likewise  v/ere  not  soldiers,  and  that  the  power  of  the  leaders 
of  the  army  had  always  been  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  civil 
power. 

But  by  this  miserable  petty  jealousy  the  salvation  of  the  coun- 


88  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

try  might  be  wrecked,  notwithstanding  the  most  heroic  persever- 
ance in  fight  on  the  part  of  the  nation.  All,  consequently, 
depended  on  creating  a  supreme  power  in  the  state,  which  being 
unrestricted,  would  consequently  be  raised  above  all  such  jeal- 
ousy. 

But  this  power  must  be  vested  in  one  person  ;  it  could  only 
be  the  dictatorship.  The  one  and  only  possible  dictator  of  Hun- 
gary at  that  time  was  Kossuth. 

Though  not  quite  adapted  for  it,  being  ignorant  of  war,  and 
disinclined  to  the  measure  of  maintaining  a  standing  army,  which, 
however,  is  indispensable  in  the  modern  system  of  warfare ;  he 
nevertheless  appeared  to  me  to  be  much  less  obstructive  to  the 
successful  progress  of  our  cause  than  a  governing  collegium,  like 
the  Committee  of  Defense,  in  its  nature  practically  irresponsible, 
and  to  whose  proceedings  the  proverb  of  too  many  cooks  was  very 
often  strikingly  applicable. 

As  dictator — thus  I  reasoned — Kossuth  would  have  to  choose 
his  residence  with  the  principal  army  of  the  country,  therefore 
with  the  army  of  the  upper  Danube.  If  once  for  a  longer  time 
in  his  direct  proximity,  I  hoped  soon  to  gain  him  over  to  my  con- 
viction, that  the  salvation  of  the  country  was  not  possible  othei^ 
wise  than  with  the  assistance  of  a  well-disciplined  armed  forces 
consequently  neither  with  National-guards  nor  with  Yolunteei 
corps.  And  if  theory  had  not  been  sufficient  for  this  purpose, 
new  practical  experiences  a  la  Schwechat  would  do  the  rest  in  a 
very  short  time. 

Once  cured  of  his  illusion  on  this  point,  Kossuth  would  prob- 
ably also  have  soon  duly  subordinated  the  political  motives  for 
the  employment  of  the  armed  forces  to  the  strategic  considera- 
tions. 

From  these  remarks  the  occasion  is  evident  of  the  following 
letter  to  the  Committee  of  Defense,  in  this  instance  written  in 
German : 

"  Presburg,  Wth  November,  1848. 

"  On  the  31st  of  October,  in  the  present  year,  I  was  invited  by 
the  President  to  take  the  command  of  the  Hungarian  army  of  the 
upper  Danube. 

"  I  undertook  it — and  with  it  the  obligation  to  do  whatever 
might  contribute,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  the  salvation  of 
our  oppressed  country.  ^ >*---■: 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  89 

"  The  history  of  all  nations,  which,  though  at  one  time  near 
is  great,  is  ver}^  great,  and  unfortunately  may  hecome  still  greater. 

"  No  true  patriot  ought  to  conceal  from  himself,  that  the  danger 
their  ruin,  have  elevated  themselves  again  to  that  stage  of  ex- 
istence which  includes  the  condition  of  a  permanent  endurance, 
teaches  us  that  there  are  moments  when  all  lesser  considerations 
must  give  way,  if  the  whole  is  to  be  saved ;  teaches  us  further, 
that  without  unity  of  will  preservation  is  impossible  ;  teaches  us 
finally,  that  this  unity  can  be  obtained  only  when  the  confidence 
of  the  whole  nation,  or  at  all  events  of  a  preponderating  part  of 
it,  concentrates  itself  in  one  man,  and  when  the  nation,  placing 
this  one  freely  over  themselves  for  a  certain  time,  voluntarily  does 
homage  to  his  will.  So  has  it  hitherto  been,  and  so  will  it  con- 
tinue to  be.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  course  of  the  world  will 
take  another  direction  out  of  love  to  Hungary. 

"  Whether  all  Hungary  already  stands  so  near  the  brink  of 
ruin,  that  the  hand  of  a  firm  dictatorship  can  alone  save  it  from 
destruction, — this  may  be  judged  of  by  those  men  who  have  con- 
sidered it  adapted  to  the  times  to  place  the  greatest  part  of  the 
Hungarian  army  under  the  orders  of  a  mere  private  individual. 
But  that  this  part  of  the  army  has  been  brought  by  recent  events 
very  near  to  total  dissolution,  is  a  fact  which  no  military  man  by 
profession  can  deny. 

"  To  find  out  with  whom  the  blame  of  this  rests,  must  be  post- 
poned to  a  time  when  the  mental  excitement,  which  just  now 
seems  to  be  ever  on  the  increase,  shall  have  subsided,  and  given 
place  to  a  calm,  comprehensively  just,  nay  considerate  judg- 
ment of  all  the  circumstances.  But  at  present  there  must  be 
speedy  help." 

(The  original  contains  here,  by  way  of  parenthesis,  an  attack 
against  the  then  predominating  mania  for  indulging  in  suspi- 
cions. What  follows  connects  naturally  word  for  word  with  the 
preceding.) 

"  My  business  is  to  propound  T^oz^^;  and  I  therefore  declare  my 
convictions  as  follow : 

"1.  All  nepotism  in  the  promotions  must  for  ever  entirely 
cease. 

"  2.  All  irregular  bodies  of  troops  must  be  strictly  kept  apart 
from  the  regular,  and  placed  under  their  own  separate  com 
manders. 


90  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

"  The  best  plan  would  be,  to  disband  immediately  all  irregular 
troops ;  to  pre-engage  separately  those  individuals  among  them 
who  are  bound  to  military  service,  and  to  employ  them  for  com- 
pleting the  bodies  of  regular  troops  already  existing. 

"  The  rebaptising  of  the  so-called  Volunteer  battalions  to  Hon- 
ved  battalions  is  a  very  unhappy  experiment.  The  name  is 
changed,  but  the  child  remains  the  same. 

"  The  Volunteer  battalions  are  worth  little  or  nothing,  because 
only  a  very  small  number  of  the  officers  and  subalterns  understand 
their  duty.  Can  we  promise  to  ourselves  more  from  these  ap- 
pointments, when  they  are  called  Honved  instead  of  National- 
guards  ?  The  greater  number  remains  notwithstanding  asinus 
in  pelle  leonina. 

"  Some  have  advanced  the  opinion,  that  one  battalion  of  Vol- 
unteers or  National-guards  placed  between  two  Honved  battalions 
is  equivalent  to  a  third  Honved  battalion.  So  long  as  it  does 
not  come  to  bread-breaking,*  this  may  be  so  ;  but  at  the  first 
grape-shot  the  Volunteer  battalion  runs  voluntarily  away,  and 
as  a  rule  carries  off  with  it  involuntarily  both  Honved  battalions 
to  its  right  and  left.  There  have  been  exceptions,  but  how 
many? 

*'  The  officers  of  the  Volunteers,  if  they  wish  to  pass  over  into 
the  ranks  of  the  Honved,  ought  previously  to  undergo  an  examin- 
ation before  a  commission  composed  of  tried,  skillful  officers ;  and 
if  this  examination  proves  satisfactory,  they  should  be  transferred, 
but  only  as  juniors  in  rank.  A  few  exceptions,  the  reward  of 
distinguished  merit,  might  be  made,  according  to  the  decision  of 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  alone.     Moreover, 

"3.  The  promotion  of  officers  within  certain  limits  ought  to  be 
confided  to  the  commander  of  the  army  alone.  Either  the  com- 
mander of  the  army  deserves  this  confidence,  and  then  there  is  no 
risk  run ;  or  he  does  not  deserve  it,  and  then  away  with  him  I 
Only,  no  half-measures  I 

"4.  The  commander  of  the  army  is  made  responsible  for  all  the 
dispositions  of  troops  ;  but  then  nobody  except  himself  ought  to 
dispose  of  his  army. 

"  An  army  without  unity  in  the  command  is  like  a  man  who 
has  fallen  out  with  himself;  neither  from  the  one  nor  the  other 
can  any  thing  decided  be  expected. 

^  i.e.  while  there  is  no  danger. — Transl. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  91 

"  5.  The  army  needs  rest  and  refreshment ;  for  it  is  depressed 
physically  and  morally.  Rest  and  refreshment  it  can  not  find 
here  in  Presburg ; — Presburg,  on  account  of  the  overpowering 
forces  of  the  enemy  menacing  simultaneously  from  Austria,  Mo- 
ravia, Silesia,  and  Gallicia,  is  an  untenable  position,  and  will 
soon  become  the  grave  of  our  army. 

"6.  All  the  Volunteer  battalions  are  covered  with  vermin, 
because  since  Jellachich's  entrance  into  Stuhlweissenburg,  where 
they  lost  their  stock  of  body-linen,  they  have  only  one  set  a-piece. 
If  they  wish  to  wash  it,  they  must  wear  their  cloak  all  day  long 
on  their  naked  body.  In  the  field  this  might  do  ;  but  here,  in 
these  close  quarters,  the  pedicular  disease  has  got  the  upper  hand 
to  such  an  extent,  that  there  are  individuals  whose  skin  is 
already  quite  ulcerated.  At  least  one  set  of  body-linen  for  change 
per  man,  and  more  suitable  quarters,  together  with  rest,  are 
the  only  means  of  remedying  this  disgusting  and  dangerous 
malady. 

"  Fresh  linen  may  be  sent  us,  but  not  better  quarters  and  rest. 

"  The  constant  watchfulness  requisite  to  secure  an  extended 
open  city  like  Presburg  from  hostile  surprises,  is  too  great  to  leave 
to  the  troops  the  resting-time  needful  for  their  absolutely  essen- 
tial purification  and  refreshment.  On  the  other  hand,  Presburg 
does  not  afford  sufficient  space  for  quartering  to  enable  the  troops 
required  for  its  security  to  be  lodged  in  such  a  manner  as  their 
preservation  urgently  demands. 

"7.  All  the  divisions  of  the  National-guards  which  did  not 
engage  themselves  for  the  duration  of  the  war  must  be  imme- 
diately disbanded  ;  because  while  this  real  public  scourge  costs 
immense  sums,  on  account  of  the  enormous  compensation  which 
was  secured  to  it  by  the  comitates  for  the  period  of  its  services, 
it  seems  to  exist  only  for  the  purpose  of  scoffing  at  the  laws,  and 
pestiferously  infecting  our  best-disciplined  troops  with  the  bad 
spirit  by  which  it  is  itself  pervaded.  Therefore  away  with  it ! 
Better  no  army  at  all,  than  one  in  whose  separate  parts  the  laws 
are  scofied  at  in  the  most  scandalous  manner. 

"  The  (Edenburg  National-guards  '  on  foot,'  at  the  mere  news 
that  the  enemy  was  approaching,  immediately  deserted  to  their 
homes  ;  those  '  on  horseback'  did  the  same  a  few  hours  later. 
All  that  remained  of  them  was  the  commander  and  some  officers  I 

"At  the  request  of  the  President  Kossuth,  I  have  taken  the 


92  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

command  of  a  part  of  the  Hungarian  army,  and  it  is  my  most 
sacred  duty  to  see  that  its  honor  is  preserved  unsullied. 

"  A  whole  army  may  he  heaten,  and  forced  to  yield,  without 
injury  to  its  honor ;  hut  if  a  single  division  of  it  plays  the  coward 
and  runs  away  without  having  even  seen  the  enemy,  the  honor 
of  the  whole  army  is  stigmatized. 

"  I  expect,  from  the  ever-lauded  equity  of  the  honorahle  Com- 
mittee of  Defense,  that  I  shall  not  he  expected  again  to  hazard 
the  honor  of  my  hrave  army  by  receiving  into  its  ranks  divisions 
which  deserved  rather  the  disgraceful  name  of  '  Mob  of  run- 
aways,' than  the  honorable  one  of 'Defenders  of  the  fatherland.' 

"  8.  From  points  (5.)  and  (6.)  the  proposition  naturally  fol- 
lows :  to  occupy  Presburg  only  so  far  as  is  absolutely  necessary 
with  a  part  of  the  army  ;  and  to  remove  the  head-quarters  and 
the  main  body  to  some  other  place  which  offers  greater  advan- 
tages as  well  for  the  defense  of  the  country  as  for  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  army.  ^ 

"  This  proposition  I  shall  have  the  honor  of  laying  before  you 
in  my  next  letter."     (My  signature  follows.) 

This  letter  had  as  its  consequence  just  the  contrary  of  what  I 
intended  ;  for  now  Kossuth,  together  with  the  Committee  of  De- 
fense and  the  War-ministry,  opposed  more  decidedly  than  before 
all  my  propositions  and  measures  tending  to  the  consolidation  of 
the  army. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  rough  draughts  of  several 
letters  sent  from  Presburg  to  Kossuth  in  Pesth,  being  accidentally 
at  hand,  furnish  evidence  of  this.  The  originals  are  drawn  up 
in  Hungarian.  I  give  the  passages  quoted  from  the  German 
translation. 

"Presburg,  15th  November,  1848. 
"  Honored  President, 

*'  According  to  the  purport  of  a  decree  of  the  Committee  of 
Defense,  the  individuals  qualified  for  filling  the  positions  of  staff- 
officers  are  to  be  proposed  by  the  commander  of  the  army  and 
the  royal  commissary  ;  but  those  fitted  for  becoming  subalterns 
by  the  regiments  or  battalions  and  the  royal  commissary. 

**  This  decree,  indeed,  deprives  me  of  the  right  of  appointing 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTJNGAUY.  93 

officers  up  to  the  rank  of  captain,  and  of  the  sole  right  of  pro- 
posing those  from  captain  upward,  which  had  been  confided  to 
me  by  you,  honored  President.  But  this  is  not  what  troubles 
me  most  :  it  is  rather  my  experience  that  even  this  more  recent 
decree  is  not  inviolably  observed,  as  I  have  perceived  from  the 
promotion  of  Major  Szaz  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel. 

"  Major  Szaz  decamped  somewhat  nimbly  from  Mannsworth, 
leaving  to  its  fate  a  division  of  his  battalion  which  was  placed 
next  to  the  enemy.  This  is  a  fact ;  and  it  is  in  my  opinion — 
without  wishing  to  dictate — reason  enough  for  not  proposing  him 
for  promotion.  My  good  Major  Szaz,  however,  has  not  fallen  on 
his  head  :  he  is  suddenly  taken  ill,  needs  the  Kaiser-bath  at  Ofen, 
sets  out  immediately  thither,  and,  look  you,  now  he  is  already 
lieutenant-colonel ! 

"  In  the  nomination  of  officers  and  in  promotions  there  reigns, 
generally  speaking,  frightful  abuse.  To-day,  for  instance,  I  read 
in  Kozlony* — I  must  confess  with  surprise — the  promotion  of 
my  younger  brother  to  the  rank  of  captain.  He  had  already 
been  made  Honved  first-lieutenant  without  either  myself  or  him 
knowing  how  this  could  have  happened  ;  for  I  had  promoted 
him  only  to  a  lieutenancy  in  the  National-guards,  and  at  the 
same  time  appointed  him  my  adjutant  (because  I  could  make 
the  best  use  of  him  in  the  organization  of  the  Volunteer  mobile 
National-guard) ;  but  had  firmly  resolved  to  take  no  such  fur- 
ther step  for  him  as  could  even  in  the  remotest  degree  have  the 
appearance  of  favoritism.  I  do  not  know  consequently  whom 
my  brother  has  to  thank  for  these  favors.  But  thus  much  I 
know,  that  both  of  his  promotions  are  just  as  irregular  as  innu- 
merable others  ;  and  I  am  much  inclined  to  suspect  that  his 
latter  advancement  especially  is  nothing  else  than  a  deep-laid 
scheme  to  frustrate  my  exertions  for  the  abolition  of  nepotism. 
But  this  does  not  at  all  divert  me  from  my  purpose." 

"  The  sergeant-majors  of  hussars,  V.  and  H.,  who  have  been 
promoted  to  the  rank  of  lieutenants,  I  pray  to  have  removed  to 
another  regiment,  because  these  are  the  persons  who,  when  in 
Gallicia — for  the  purpose  of  enabling  themselves  to  return  with 
their  men  to  Hungary — carried  along  with  them  their  superior 
officer,  whom  they  bound  ;  and  thus  committed  the  greatest 
military  crime,  though  from  patriotic  motives.  The  country 
*  The  official  gazette  of  the  Committee  of  Defense. 


94  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

rewards  their  zealous  patriotism  by  promotion ;  but  the  service 
strictly  requires  that  they  be  removed  from  the  ranks  of  that 
body  of  troops,  v^^here  they  serve  only  as  dangerous  examples  of 
rew^arded  disobedience." 

"  The  period  of  service  of  the  battalion  of  the  Borsod  National- 
guards  expires  on  the  20th  of  this  month  ;  and  already  on  the 
10th  have  these  people  demanded  to  return  home.  The  royal 
commissary  Csanyi  has  attempted  to  induce  them  to  remain 
longer  on  duty.  But  they  have  repeatedly  declared,  that  they 
vi^ill  positively  not  continue  any  longer  ;  for  they  are  not  such 
fools  as  to  expose  again  their  dear  lives  in  the  last  five  days  of 
their  service,  after  the  good  God  has  preserved  them  hitherto 
from  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns. 

"  I  have  consequently  not  the  least  reason  to  lament  the  de- 
parture of  these  zealous  patriots  ;  but  certainly  cause  enough  to 
complain  of  the  loss  of  so  many  good  muskets  and  equipments. 
I  have  therefore  desired  the  royal  commissary  at  least  to  retain 
their  arms  for  the  defense  of  the  country,  though  he  dismiss  the 
men.  If  this  succeeds,  we  shall  have  gained  more  than  we  shall 
lose  ;  for  the  fifteenth  Honved  battalion,  which  loiters  about  in 
Presburg  without  arms,  can  then  be  immediately  supplied  with 
the  muskets  of  these  Borsoders." (My  signature  follows.) 

"Presburg,  17 th  November,  1848. 
"  Honored  President, 

"  When  I  spoke  earnestly  against  the  formation  of  volunteer 
battalions,  and  the  employment  of  the  scythe-bearers  in  the  field, 
I  was  not  listened  to  by  you,  honored  President,  because,  accord- 
ing to  your  views,  enthusiasm  of  itself  is  sufficient  to  stand  in 
the  stead  of  order,  perseverance  in  sustaining  the  toils  and 
hardships  of  war,  obedience,  discipline,  and  more  of  the  like 
military  and  only  military  virtues.  Would  God  it  were  so  I  mat- 
ters would  then  be  quite  different  with  us.  But,  alas,  Hungarian 
enthusiasm  seems  to  be  only  a  straw  fire. 

"  I  have  already  reported  the  conduct  of  the  Borsod  National- 
guard. 

"  The  day  before  yesterday,  the  Honter  Volunteer  battalion, 
intended  to  be  employed  against  the  enemy,  arrived  without 
arms  on  the  muster-ground.     The  men  declared  at  the  same 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  95 

time  that  they  had  been  sent  by  their  comitate  only  for  a  service 
of  from  six  to  eight,  or  at  most  of  ten  weeks'  duration,  and  that 
this  time  had  expired  long  ago.  Consequently  they  would  not 
move  another  step  against  the  enemy. 

"  The  accompanying  report  of  the  commander  of  the  battalion, 
with  its  documents,  gives  a  more  particular  explanation  of  this 
occurrence,  as  well  as  of  the  deceptive  means  which  had  been 
employed  by  the  local  authorities  of  the  comitate  of  Honter  in 
enlisting  the  volunteers. 

"  The  men  of  the  battalion  of  Zemplin  National-guards  (en- 
gaged for  six  months)  are  also  in  a  state  of  excitement,  because 
they  likewise  have  been  deceived  by  their  comitate,  inasmuch  as 
it  has  not  sent  them  the  necessary  articles  of  clothing.  And  in 
the  cold  November  nights  a  man  is  frozen  if  his  cloak  is  the  only 
cloth  garment  which  he  has  as  a  protection  against  the  cold. 
To-day  two  Zemplin  National-guards  appeared  before  me,  in  the 
name  of  the  whole  battalion,  with  the  request  that  I  would 
permit  them  to  return  to  their  homes,  because  the  cholera  was 
ravaging  their  comitate  in  a  dreadful  manner. 

"This  morning  I  expect  similar  requests  from  all  the  Volun- 
teer battalions. 

"  To  those  of  the  Zemplin  comitate  I  have  answered,  that  I 
would  lay  their  request  before  the  Committee  of  Defense  ;  but 
that  until  the  arrival  of  a  decision  in  their  favor,  they  must  per- 
form their  duties,  otherwise  I  should  be  obliged  to  punish  most 
severely  those  who  were  refractory. 

"  The  period  of  service  of  four-sevenths  of  the  Gomor  National- 
guards  also  expires  about  this  time.  These  most  certainly  do 
not  remain !. 

"  The  metamorphosing  the  Volunteer  into  Honved  battalions 
does  not  succeed  well.  Only  very  few  of  the  men  can  be  pre- 
engaged.  Thus  it  is  chiefly  the  officers  who  are  favorable  to 
this  metamorphosis ;  so  that,  notwithstanding  their  ignorance 
and  uselessness,  they  may  for  a  still  longer  period  receive  their 
large  pay,  and  continue  to  play  their  pranks  in  the  capacity  of 
officers. 

"  They  agitate  against  the  examination  of  officers,  instead  of 
acquiring  some  solid  knowledge.  One  of  the  most  zealous  among 
these  agitators  is  a  captain  of  the  National-guards,  Sigismund 
Thaly,  of  the  Eszterhazy  battalion,  whose  company  will  be  dis- 


96  UY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

missed  to-morrow,  their  time  of  service  having  expired.  On  this 
occasion  dismissal  likewise  awaits  him,  unless  he  shall  previously 
undergo  the  examination.  He  now  suddenly  demands  a  fort- 
night's furlough.  I  see  through  his  plan.  He  wants  a  certificate 
of  leave  of  absence,  to  prove  in  Pesth  that  he  is  still  really  in 
the  service ;  supported  by  it,  he  would  certainly  find  ways  and 
means  to  be  transferred  into  one  or  other  of  the  Honved  battal- 
ions. This  calculation  of  the  captain  of  the  National-guards, 
Sigismund  Thaly,  is  a  pretty  little  scheme,  and  perhaps  not 
entirely  without  prospect  of  success,  because  several  cases  have 
already  shown,  that  to  be  promoted  one  need  only  go  to  Pesth. 

"  Of  the  said  Eszterhazy  battalion  three  companies  will  set 
out  the  day  after  to-morrow  for  their  native  fields  (i.  e.  two  more 
besides  the  company  of  Captain  Sigismund  Thaly).  To  detain 
them  here  any  longer  is  an  impossibility ;  but  I  will  at  least 
make  them  leave  their  arms  behind  them. 

"'Your  army  is  already  weak,  and  yet  you  weaken  it  still 
further  I'  might  be  said  of  my  not  forcibly  detaining  the  home- 
sick. I  know  this  well,  but  still  can  not  do  otherwise  ;  and  the 
less  so,  as  I  have  a  settled  conviction  that  though  my  small 
army,  by  such  departures  'as  these,  will  certainly  be  weakened 
in  numbers,  it  will  nevertheless  be  morally  strengthened  ;  for  in 
war  there  is  nothing  more  disheartening  to  the  soldier  than  the 
apprehension  of  being  left  in  the  lurch  by  his  comrade. 

"  I  have  so  disposed  of  my  forces  as  to  keep  the  enemy  in 
check  from  (Edenburg  as  far  as  Nadas.  I  must,  however,  con- 
fess that,  despite  all  one's  energy,  with  troops  insufficiently  pro- 
tected against  even  the  frosts  of  autumn,  this  is  not  only  difficult 
to  accomplish,  but  also  exposes  the  army  itself  to  very  great 
danger.  The  brigade  at  Nadas,  in  particular,  appears  to  me  to 
be  a  second  Leonidas  troop,  not  so  much  on  account  of  the  over- 
powering forces  of  the  enemy,  as  from  their  endurance  of  the 
hardships  incident  to  their  circumstances  of  time  and  place,  their 
disproportionately  arduous  service,  and  their  want  of  clothing. 

"A  few  days  since  the  cholera  also  began  to  insinuate  itself 
into  the  army,  and  this  to  such  a  degree,  that  out  of  twenty-nine 
who  fell  sick,  eleven  died.  But  all  this  can  not  be  otherwise,  be- 
cause, according  to  your  opinion,  my  task  is,  with  a  corps  of  scarcely 
20,000  men  (of  whom  two-thirds  are  good-for-nothing  volunteers), 
to  defend  at  the  same  time  the  north  of  Hungary,  the  city  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  97 

Presburg,  and  moreover  the  comitates  of  Wieselburg  and  (Eden- 
burg." 

"  The  Committee  of  Defense  has  not  yet  authorized  me  to 
employ  the  troops  according  to  my  own  discretion. 

"  Probably  my  opinions  are  rather  too  radical,  in  maintaining* 
that  it  can  by  no  means  be  decided  in  Pesth,  whether  the  so- 
called  'pass'  of  Nadas  (across  the  "White  Mountains)  can  be 
defended  with  block-houses  or  not.  It  seems  as  if  in  Pesth 
a  difTerent  opinion  prevailed  on  this  subject,  as  w^ell  as  about 
promotions." 

"  I  take  the  liberty,  honored  President,  of  again  calling  your 
attention  to  some  illegal  promotions. 

"  The  comrades  of  a  certain  Merei,  subaltern  officer  in  the 
first  Honved  battalion,  intended  to  expel  him,  because  he  had 
suddenly  pretended  to  be  ill  in  the  camp  at  Parendorf  immedi- 
ately before  the  offensive  over  the  Lajtha.  He  repairs  to  Pesth, 
and,  look  you,  becomes  captain  in  the  eighteenth  Honved 
battalion  !  Soon  afterward  a  sub-lieutenant  of  the  first  Hon- 
ved battalion  is  appointed  first  lieutenant  in  the  eighteenth 
battalion,  but  declares,  on  finding  Merei  there,  that  he  can 
not  accept  the  promotion.  Now  the  body  of  officers  of  this  bat- 
talion will  enter  a  protest  against  Merei' s  being  associated  with 
them. 

"  Beldi,  formerly  a  sub-officer  in  the  hussars,  had  stolen  some- 
thing from  one  of  his  superiors,  was  punished  for  it  by  running 
the  gauntlet  ten  times,  and  being  dismissed ;  but  notwithstand- 
ing this  he  is  now  an  officer  in  a  Honved  battalion." 

(My  signature  follows.) 

In  spite  ol  the  assurance  of  victory  which  characterized  the 
proceedings  of  the  then  civil  rulers  of  Hungary,  and  declared 
itself  plainly  enough  by  their  persevering  in  the  idea — to  say  the 
least  of  it,  very  naive  in  the  eyes  of  a  soldier — of  fighting  the 
battle  of  liberty  with  Volunteers  and  National-guards  ;  Kossuth 
was  nevertheless  one  day  suddenly  overtaken  with  anxiety,  lest 
the  enemy  should  concentrate  his  forces,  which  were  considerably 
superior  to  ours,  upon  a  point  beyond  the  Lajtha — if  not  unob- 
served, yet  unhindered  by  us — and  then  at  once  somewhere  break 
into  the  country,  without  our  being  able  to  stop  Iiim.  Associated 
with  this  anxiety  was  also  the  apprehension  of  the  possible  ex- 

E 


98  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

tinction  of  the  sympathies  of  the  people  for  our  cause,  notwith- 
standing our  occupation  of  the  frontier. 

Both  fears  caused  Kossuth  urgently  to  request  that  I  would 
not  always  stand  so  inactive  on  the  frontiers,  but  rather  open  a 
regular  war  of  partisans*  against  Austria ;  surprise  the  enemy 
with  the  rapidity  of  lightning,  at  one  time  here,  and  immediately 
afterward  in  another  place,  then  in  a  third,  and  so  on — God 
knows  where  else — and  thereby  prevent  him  from  concentrating 
his  forces  on  a  fixed  point,  or  at  least  induce  him  to  think  they 
were  every  moment  necessary  somewhere  else,  and  even  to  at- 
tempt to  realize  it :  thus  he  would  fatigue  and  dispirit  his  troops  ; 
and  render  them  unfit  for  the  execution  of  the  oflensive  dreaded 
by  Kossuth. 

In  such  a  warfare  Kossuth  saw  at  the  same  time  a  rich  source 
of  warlike  heroic  adventures,  which,  duly  diffused  by  the  daily 
press,  would  serve  to  counteract  the  apprehended  extinction  of 
the  sympathies  of  the  people  for  our  struggle. 

These  requirements  of  the  President — occasioned  at  first  by  an 
order  of  the  enemy  to  his  army,  which  led  us  to  expect  a  speedy 
irruption  into  Hungary,  and  of  which  Kossuth  had  subjoined  a  copy 
to  his  letter  to  me — caused  me  to  answer  him  verbatiin  as  follow  : 
"  The  order  of  the  enemy  to  his  army,  which  you  have  com- 
municated to  me,  informs  me  that  it  is  in  fact  no  longer  in  my 
power  to  prevent  his  concentration  ;  because  it  has  already  been 
most  conveniently  effected  on  the  other  side  the  Lajtha,  and  he 
can  advance  across  our  frontier  almost  in  parade-march — for  in- 
stance, at  Kittsee  (Kopcseny),  where  neither  bridges  nor  defiles 
interrupt  his  great  undertakings. 

"  Do  not  take  this  remark  for  pusillanimity.  If  there  be  one 
who  does  not  despair  of  the  cause  of  our  country,  I  am  the  man  I 
But  let  us  not  deceive  ourselves  in  relation  to  the  greatness  of  the 
danger,  of  which  I  recognize  the  factors  more  in  the  feeble  pa- 
triotism of  our  countrymen  than  in  the  rmmerical  superiority  of 
the  enemy.  The  comitates  of  Presburg,  Neutra,  Trencsin,  Wie- 
selburg,  and  CEdenburg,  are  so  many  hothouses,  if  not  of  open 
antipathy  against  us,  at  least  of  the  most  pitiable  inaction. 
"  The  so-called  '  guerrilla  warfare'  would  certainly  find  in  me 

*  Kossuth  erroneously  called  this  mode  of  warfare  "guerrilla  combats  :" 
and  entering  into  his  idea,  I  have  retained  this  appellation  in  my  letter 
of  reply  to  him. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  99 

its  most  zealous  champion.  In  our  present  condition,  however, 
such  a  war  is  impossible.  Impossible,  because  the  rural  popu- 
lation does  not  stand  by  us,  but  shuts  its  doors  against  its  starv- 
ing countrymen.  Impossible  is  such  a  war,  because  our  infantry 
are  almost  barefooted,  and  our  cavalry,  on  their  enfeebled  horses, 
are  scarcely  able  any  longer  to  stagger  after  the  infantry ;  and 
then  the  teams  of  the  artilleiy  I  But  the  saddest  matter  of  all 
is,  that  we  have  no  hope  of  soon  bringing  our  horses  again  into 
good  condition ;  for  the  hay  is  bad,  and  the  oats  are  likewise 
none  of  the  best  I  Impossible  is  a  war  of  that  kind,  because 
scarcely  a  battalion  can  march  even  the  distance  of  one  station 
without  dragging  after  it  a  loi;ig  train  of  wagons  :  now  the  most 
essential  requisite  for  the  so-named  '  guerilla  divisions '  is  facility 
of  motion.  For  so-called  surprises,  which  are  made  only  at  short 
distances,  the  enemy  is  too  far  off." 

(In  the  same  letter  I  throw  light  circumstantially  on  our  pre- 
carious situation  in  the  position  which  has  been  taken  up  on  the 
frontier  as  follows  :) 

"  In  my  opinion,  Presburg  can  be  defended,  unless  the  garrison 
is  to  be  sacrificed,  only  so  long  as  there  remains  in  our  possession,  on 
one  side  Nadas,  on  the  other  Parendorf,  Gattendorf,  and  Kittsec. 

"  The  brigade  at  Nadas  will  maintain  itself  until  the  enemy 
menaces  it  by  a  wide  circuit  in  its  rear ;  or  forces  a  passage  on 
the  spot ;  or,  finally  (if  neither  of  these  cases  should  happen),  so 
long  as  Presburg  is  not  abandoned  by  us,  which  must  inevitably 
take  place  (the  opening  of  the  hostile  offensive  with  an  isolated 
attack  on  Presburg  being  presuppoesd),*  so  soon  as  the  enemy 
shall  have  succeeded  in  taking  the  first  of  the  redoubts ;  partly 
because  I  should  no  longer  be  able  to  depend  upon  our  still  young 
soldiers,  partly  because  the  redoubts  further  back  are  altogether 
insufficient,  from  their  construction,  for  defense. 

"  With  Presburg  the  northwestern  comitates  certainly  fall  like- 
wise :  however,  all  in  vain  I  With  my  small  army,  I  must  by 
no  means  engage  in  any  war  on  the  frontier  ;  for  this  would  be  to 
abandon  it  in  detail,  and  with  it  at  the  same  time  our  country. 
This  is  my  conviction  I 

*'  I  am  very  sorry,  honored  President,  that  this  conviction  of 
mine  is  diametrically  opposed  to  what  you  anticipate  from  the 

*  The  sentences  in  parentheses  are  not  in  the  original  rough-draft ;  they 
are  inserted  only  for  the  easie'.-  understanding  of  the  passages  cited. 


100  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

'  guerrilla  war.'  With  what  hearty  good- will  would  I  accede  to 
the  carrying  out  of  all  your  projects,  were  it  in  any  way  possible 
under  the  existing  local  circumstances  ! 

"  The  defile  of  Nad  as  is  said  to  be  a  pass  which  might  be 
rendered  impracticable  with  little  labor.  For  the  last  six  days, 
under  the  protection  of  a  strong  brigade,  considerable  forces  have 
been  working  at  it ;  and  the  whole  result  obtained  is,  that  if  this 
point  be  left  by  us  to-day,  the  enemy  will  restore  the  road  in  two 
days'  time.  And  soon  this  point  Tnust  be  quitted,  because  the 
men  can  not  endure  the  fatigue  much  longer.  One-third  of  the 
brigade  is  unfit  for  service  from  the  want  of  foot-gear ;  500  men 
are  already  ill.  Half  of  those  who  ,can  do  duty  are  constantly  at 
the  outposts,  day  and  night,  under  the  open  sky,  and  not  even. 

the  Honved  soldiers  have  cloth  garments " 

(My  signature  follows.) 


CHAPTEU  XI. 

If  we  take  into  account  the  numerous  controversies  between, 
the  Committee  of  Defense  and  myself,  which  prevailed  during 
the  first  period  of  my  chief  command  of  the  army,  as  well  as  the 
categorical  language  in  which  I  asserted  my  convictions ;  and  if 
it  be  considered  how  easy  it  was  to  foresee  that  but  a  single  step 
separated  such  language  from  action  ; — the  question  comes  prom- 
ineatly  forward  :  what  could  have  induced  the  revolutionary 
rulers  of  the  civil  power  in  Hungary  to  refrain  from  removing 
me  even  at  that  time  from  the  chief  command  of  the  national 
army  ? 

The  answer  to  this  question  may  perhaps  be  found  in  the  cir- 
cumstance, that  the  more  skillful  and  experienced  military  men 
constantly  refused  to  accept  the  chief  command ;  while  those 
who  were  eager  for  it  possessed  the  confidence  of  the  govern- 
ment even  less  than  myself 

The  royal  commissary  Csanyi — who  was  present  with  the 
army,  and  who,  having  formerly  been  a  soldier,  generally  coin- 
cided in  my  views — by  the  firmness  with  which  he  exerted  his 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  101 

weighty  influence  with  the  government  in  my  favor,  may  also 
have  essentially  contributed  to  my  retaining  the  chief  command 
of  the  army. 

Another  question  will  be  :  what  was  it  that  prevented  me,  in 
spite  of  the  controversies  just  mentioned,  from  resigning  the  chief 
command  ? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  plainly  and  simply  to  be  found 
in  the  motives  which  had  determined  me  to  accept  the  command 
at  all. 

The  obstacles  already  presented  by  the  head,  body,  and  tail  of 
the  Committee  of  Defense  to  my  endeavors,  which  were  the  re- 
sult of  my  clear  conviction  of  what  Hungary  needed,  were  not 
sufficient  to  discourage  me.  But  at  that  time  I  had  no  presenti- 
ment whatever  of  the  existence  of  those  political  tendencies, 
which,  to  my  great  surprise,  Kossuth  disclosed  to  me  five  months 
later.  (It  seems  even  problematical  whether  Kossuth  himself 
had  then  the  slightest  idea  of  what  five  months  afterward  ap- 
peared to  him  to  be  so  indispensably  necessary  for  the  salvation 
of  the  country.) 

My  political  penetration  extended  no  farther  at  that  time  than 
to  the  perception  of  those  intentions  which,  hostile  to  the  Consti- 
tution of  my  country,  were  entertained  on  the  other  side  the 
Lajtha.  And  these  intentions  had  protruded  so  far  out  of  their 
effete  constitutional  mask,  that  they  could  easily  be  discovered 
even  by  that  part  of  the  nation  from  whose  hands  the  hard 
swelling  caused  by  their  recent  toils  had  scarcely  disappeared. 

But  the  circumstance,  that  this  very  part  of  the  nation,  in 
spite  of  all  this,  did  not  recognize  these  intentions,  and  even 
after  it  had  recognized  them,  still  continued  to  be  averse  to  con- 
tend for  the  preservation  of  the  benefij;s  which  had  been  con- 
ferred on  it  while  it  was  in  a  dream ; — this,  I  say,  was  only  a 
most  afflicting  proof  of  the  pernicious  influence  produced  by  its 
hitherto  depressed  position  on  the  moral  and  spiritual  develop- 
ment of  by  far  the  greater  number  of  my  countrymen.  Yet  this 
very  circumstance  justified  in  my  eyes  the  combat,  even  though  its 
success  should  be  confined  for  the  present  merely  to  rendering  im- 
possible the  re-establishment  of  their  former  dependent  condition. 
Even  in  this  case — the  most  unfavorable  that  could  occur — 
the  combat  had,  however,  a  still  higher  import. 

To  metamorphose    Hungary   into    a  conquered   province   of 


102  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Austria — an  object  toward  which,  with  uninterrupted  constancy 
Vienna  had  been  directing  all  her  endeavors  for  three  centuries 
— seemed  now  to  be  also  the  main  purpose  of  the  great  arma- 
ment beyond  the  Lajtha.  It  had  now  been  decided  that  Hun- 
gary, as  a  state,  should  at  last  expiate  by  its  utter  destruction 
the  manifold  annoyances  which  its  former  constitution — com- 
mendable only  in  default  of  a  better — had  caused  to  the  divers 
fathers  of  the  country,  and  to  their  household  and  public  serv- 
ants. This  destruction,  with  regret  be  it  spoken,  had  already 
been  partly  prepared  during  several  years  by  the  national  arro- 
gance of  the  original  Magyars.  Now  it  was  that  those  on  the 
other  side  the  Lajtha  almost  believed  they  had  but  to  strike  the 
finishing  blow. 

The  nation  owed  it  to  its  honor  not  to  await  this  llow  in 
slavish  hu7nility,  perhaps  even  on  its  knees  and  with  bended 
neck. 

I  seemed  to  have  been  destined  to  be  one  of  its  last  leaders ; 
and  though  nothing  less  than  a  national  enthusiast,  yet  the 
grandeur  of  the  situation  filled  me  to  such  a  degree  with  the 
idea  of  identifying  my  personal  honor  as  a  free  man  with  that  of 
the  nation,  that  it  soon  became  my  leading  sentiment. 

It  was  this  idea  especially  which  often  made  the  employment 
of  extremely  strict,  nay  even  harsh  measures  appear  to  me  to  be 
a  duty ;  and  probably  the  involuntary  gleaming  of  this  idea 
through  the  mysterious  gloom  which  concealed  the  motives  of 
my  actions — in  addition  to  my  remarkable  taciturnity  in  decisive 
moments — had  called  into  existence  the  almost  superstitious  con- 
fidence with  which  the  nation — so  uniformly  and  to  the  last 
deceived  in  regard  to  its  desperate  condition  by  Kossuth  and  his 
party — looked  to  me  of  necessity  as  its  saviour,  at  that  time  also 
when,  with  a  simultaneous  disregard  of  every  humane  considera- 
tion, a  last  vain  attempt  for  salvation  could  be  dared. 

A  third  question  will  be  :  whether  I  did  or  did  not  attempt, 
when  in  Presburg,  to  obtain  for  myself  the  dictatorship  ;  and 
what  were  my  reasons  ?  Bid  I  not  distinctly  hear  an  inward 
call  to  seize,  even  with  despotic  power,  upon  the  march  of  my 
country's  destiny ;  had  I  not  even  at  that  time  a  firm  conviction 
of  the  necessity  of  a  dictatorship ;  had  I  not  been  able  to  foresee 
that  Kossuth  would  be  just  as  unsuccessful  a  dictator  as  he  had 
been  a  successful  agitator  ? 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  103 

In  the  face  of  all  these  truths,  unless  I  were  to  deny  their  ex- 
istence, it  would  be  incomparable  more  difficult  for  me  to  answer 
this  question  in  a  mysterious  than  in  a  clear  and  distinct  manner. 

Have  I  ever  aspired  to  the  dictatorship  ? 

No. 

Why  did  I  never  make  any  effort  to  obtain  it  ? 

Because  the  dictatorship  in  my  hands  would  have  been  an 
impossibility,  nay  a  sheer  absurdity. 

Why  would  the  dictatorship  in  my  hands  have  been  an  im- 
possibility, a  sheer  absurdity  ? 

Because  I  spent  the  whole  of  my  early  youth,  up  to  the  month 
of  April  1848 — precisely  the  season  best  adapted  for  acquiring 
information — beyond  the  frontiers  of  my  native  land,  almost 
apart  from  any  connection  with  it,  and  nearly  ignorant  of  my 
country's  customs,  usages,  and  laws,  and  above  all,  wholly 
deficient  in  even  a  superficial  and  general  acquaintance  with  the 
civil  administration ;  ignorant  to  such  a  degree,  that  in  strictly 
political  matters,  for  instance,  I  was  obliged  to  believe,  gener- 
ally on  the  mere  word  of  the  Committee  of  Defense,  that  their 
measures  were  judicious,  and  favorable  to  the  idea  that  directed 
all  my  efforts. 

Because,  being  still  unknown  to  the  country,  and  not  possess- 
ing the  confidence  of  the  nation,  I  could,  under  the  most  favora- 
ble circumstances,  only  have  usurped  the  name  without  the  real 
power  of  a  dictator  ;  and  because,  even  when,  somewhat  later,  a 
part  of  the  nation  began  to  put  confidence  in  me,  my  power  as 
dictator — considering  the  difference  between  my  political  views 
and  those  of  Kossuth,  who  still  continued  to  be  the  most  popular 
man  in  Hungary — would  have  been  by  so  much  the  more  pre- 
carious, the  less  I  was  able  to  replace  his  civil  administration  by 
a  more  suitable  one,  and  to  render  his  agitation  against  me 
abortive  by  more  effective  counteraction. 

These  are  the  reasons  why  the  idea  of  obtaining  for  myself 
the  dictatorship  was  a  sheer  absurdity.  I  never  thought  of  it, 
so  long  as  the  events  of  the  war  and  their  results  left  even  the 
narrowest  field  for  the  exercise  of  the  civil  government. 

Instead  of  this,  with  a  frank  acknowledgment  of  all  my  defi- 
ciencies in  that  matter,  and  chiefly  only  that  I  might  not  lose 
all  my  influence  in  the  adjustment  of  the  approaching  struggle 
in  self-defense,  I  often  accommodated  myself  even  to  positively 


104  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

unsuitable  decrees  of  the  civil  government ;  and  this  principally 
at  the  commencement,  when  ray  removal  from  the  chief  com- 
mand would  have  been  an  easy  task  to  the  Committee  of  De- 
fense. 

Thus  it  happened  that,  in  spite  of  the  numerous  controversies 
between  us,  we  all  remained  at  our  posts — Kossuth,  the  Com- 
mittee of  Defense,  and  the  Minister  of  War  on  one  side  ;  myself 
on  the  other.  My  adversaries,  however,  at  the  beginning,  appa- 
rently only  through  pure  dread  of  the  phantom  of  a  military 
government,  placed  me  in  situations,  against  whose  undermining 
influence  on  my  determination  to  follow  steadily  the  cause  I  had 
chalked  out  for  myself,  I  took  refuge  in  sarcasm,  my  constant 
and  faithful  ally  when  driven  almost  to  desperation. 

The  following  passage,  from  one  of  those  letters  which  I  wrote 
during  my  sojurn  at  Presburg,  is,  it  must  be  admitted,  a  rather 
trivial  production  in  this  strain.  At  the  same  time  this  passage 
sketches  very  faithfully  the  critical  position  of  the  army  on  the 
upper  Danube,  and  not  less  faithfully  the  moderation  of  my 
hopes  for  the  future. 

Presburg,  21sf  November,  1848. 

"  Dear  Friend — When  I  shall  have  been  gathered  to  my 
fathers,  if  your  hand  has  not  mouldered  in  the  grave,  sit  down 
and  write  the  history  of  Don  Q^uixote  the  younger  ;  in  me  you 
will  find  the  hero  of  the  romance. 

"  He  who  never  saw  a  revolutionary  army,  may  undertake  a 
pilgrimage  to  my  camp.  There  is  a  commander-in-chief,  with 
stafl'  and  suite,  not  one  of  them  over  forty  I  There  are  also 
soldiers ;  but  the  real  soldier  among  them  blushes  for  his  com- 
rades. To  command,  is  here  to  make  one's  self  ridiculous.  A 
reprimand  is  declaimed  against  as  an  impertinence,  punishment 
as  a  tyranny.  Therefore  thought  I  with  myself  in  my  simplic- 
ity, '  Eat,  bird,  or  die  1'=^  and  drive  these  worthless  fellows  to  the 
devil — that  is,  if  I  do  not  previously  order  them  to  be  shot.  The 
cholera  assists  ;  and  if  the  enemy  does  his  part,  the  trio  will  soon 
have  finished  the  game. 

"  But  I  can  not  comprehend  this  fellow.  He  is  at  least  twice 
as  strong  as  I  am ;  his  troops  are  well  drilled  and  well  equipped ; 
yet  he  does  not  attack  I 

=*  A  proverb  expressive  of  the  necessity  of  yielding  to  the  force  of  cir- 
cumstances— Transl. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY.  105 

"Can  this  be  mother- wit ;  and  can  he  have  so  much  calcula- 
tion as  to  wish  to  destroy  us  through  inaction  ?  I  can  not  be- 
lieve it,  and  smell  a  rat — in  good  German,  jpaura.  So  much 
the  better  for  us  I  All  his  patrols  ask  only  for  hussars  ;  my  first 
attempt  shall  be,  to  make  him  ask  for  the  Honveds  also.  The 
young  fellows  are  not  much  disposed  to  venture  themselves, 
unless  they  have  each  a  cannon  in  their  haversack,  and  besides 
that  one  hussar  on  their  right,  and  another  on  their  left  hand. 
But  patience  I  The  fever  will  abate  at  length — (it  is  true  the 
Hungarian  fever  generally  lasts  a  good  while) — I  hope  it  will  do 
so  before  next  spring,  that  is,  if  we  live  so  long ;  then  you  may 
rejoice,  trifolium,  "VYindischgratz,  Jellachich,  Harban  I* 

"  Of  guns  I  have  already  enough  to  feed  pigs  with.  This 
very  day  I  have  written  to  Kossuth  not  to  send  me  any  more. 
I  do  not  trust  the  volunteers  ;  they  run  away  very  good-natured- 
ly, and  leave  me  stuck  fast  in  the  mire. 

''  But  I  have  no  percussion-caps ;  and  you,  in  all  probability, 
are  no  better  off.  There  will  be  good  fun.  Is  there  no  supply 
at  all  of  Belgian  caps  ?  Shouldn't  you  think  that,  in  the  end,  a 
flint-musket  would  be  even  better  than  a  percussion-musket — 
without  caps  ? 

**  When  messieurs  the  commanders  of  the  battalions  ask  me 
for  caps,  I  give  them  the  stereotyped  answer :  '  I  am  very  glad 
that  I  have  none.  You  hit  nothing  ;  attack  with  the  bayonet  I' 
Good  God,  what  long  faces  !" 

The  establishment  of  the  fortifications  at  Presburg,  as  well  as 
those  at  Wieselburg  and  Raab,  furnished  me  with  abundant 
matter  for  similar  reflections. 

"When  I  arrived  at  Presburg,  the  defensive  works  were  already 
half  finished.  They  seemed  to  me  wholly  superfluous,  consider- 
ing, on  the  one  hand,  the  menacing  position  which  Field-mar 
shal  Lieutenant  Simunich  occupied  in  our  rear,  and  on  the  other 
taking  into  account  the  very  probable  supposition  that  the  main 
forces  of  the  enemy,  advancing  by  CEdenburg  and  through  the 
forest  of  Parendorf,  would  enter  the  interior  of  the  country  ;  and 

*  Prince  Windischgratz,  Ban  Jellachich,  and  Hurban  (the  latter  a  Scla- 
vonian  ecclesiastic  from  one  of  the  northern  comitates  of  Hungary),  were 
then  considered  to  be  the  representatives  of  the  movement  which  aimed 
at  the  overthrow  of  the  Hungarian  Constitution  and  the  destruction  of  the 
"  State  of  Hungary." 


106  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

thus,  in  an  indirect  manner,  force  those  of  our  troops,  stationed 
on  the  road  to  Presburg  and  near  the  fortress,  to  retreat  in  the 
direction  of  Komorn.  But  these  fortifications  were  likewise  un- 
suitable in  regard  to  their  disposition  as  well  as  to  their  execu- 
tion. Nevertheless,  they  had  the  sympathy  of  the  country,  and 
had  to  be  continued.  Besides,  if  I  had  ordered  them  to  be  sus- 
pended, this  would  have  deprived  me  of  all  influence  for  the  im- 
mediate future. 

With  the  defensive  works  at  Wieselburg  and  Raab  the  case 
was  different.  These  had,  generally  speaking,  my  approbation 
so  far  as  the  necessity  for  their  establishment  was  concerned  ; 
and  this  as  precautionary,  in  case  the  enem.y  should  defer  acting 
on  the  offensive  till  the  following  spring.  From  want  of  time, 
however,  I  was  obliged  to  leave  the  planning  of  the  works,  as 
well  as  their  execution,  entirely  to  Kollmann,  who  was  then  con- 
sidered the  most  celebrated  man  in  his  profession. 

Unacquainted  with  the  nature  and  disposition  of  the  ground 
near  Raab,  I  had  entertained  the  mistaken  notion  that  with  a 
force  so  disproportionate  to  that  which  the  Prince  Windisch- 
gratz  had  at  his  command,  I  should  succeed  in  stopping  at  that 
place  the  further  progress  of  the  enemy ;  and  it  was  not  till  I 
beheld  for  the  first  time  the  fortifications  of  the  encampment  at 
Kaab,  which  were  then  almost  finished,  that  my  mistake  was 
plainly  apparent.  They  had  been  established  for  an  army  of 
80,000  men  at  least,  while  my  whole  forces  amounted  to  scarce- 
ly more  than  12,000  ;  and  the  reciprocal  protection  between  the 
several  isolated  works  had  been  calculated  for  a  distance  which 
defied  the  effect  of  field-pieces  of  the  largest  calibre. 

Thus  the  affairs  of  Hungary  at  the  end  of  the  autumn  of  1848 
were  in  a  very  tottering  condition. 

I  had  been  president  of  the  court-martial  by  which  Count 
Eugene  Zichy^  was  condemned  to  death;  I  was  called  "the 
soul"  of  the  short  and  successful  campaign  against  Generals  Roth 
and  Philippovich  ;  and  it  is  a  fact,  that  after  I  had  been  invested 
with  the  command  over  the  troops  on  the  upper  Danube,  the 

*  From  Presburg  I  had  directed  proceedings  to  be  taken  against  Cap- 
tain Vasarhelyi  of  the  Hunyady-Schar  (belonging  to  Perczel's  corps)  for 
the  plunderings  of  which  he  was  accused  in  the  castle  of  Kalozd.  Here- 
upon I  received  a  report  from  the  south  of  Hungary,  that  Vasarhelyi  had 
fallen  in  an  insignificant  skirmish,  soon  after  the  disarming  of  the  Croat 
corps  under  General  Roth. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  107 

taking  up  of  arms  assumed  afar  more  determined  character  than  it 
had  ever  before  done  ;  but  still  its  real  nature  did  not  at  all  warrant 
the  expectation  of  such  an  energetic  resistance  as  would  have  been 
worthy  of  the  inheritors  of  the  name  of  a  noble  and  heroic  nation. 

The  former  of  these  two  prominent  periods  of  my  last  sphere 
of  action  provoked  the  arrogance  of  the  Committee  of  Defense  ; 
the  latter,  that  of  almost  the  whole  nation.  As  respects  the 
Committee  of  Defense — because  the  former  of  these  two  inci- 
dents having  put  to  flight  its  political  adversaries  in  Hungary,  it 
enjoyed  by  this  means  an  absolute  and  undisturbed  power  ;  as 
respects  the  nation — because  the  latter  brought  into  vogue  the 
silly  delusion,  that  the  Hungarian  by  merely  taking  up  his  scythe 
would  frighten  the  enemy  out  of  the  land,  or  that  he  had  but 
to  disarm  him,  and  send  him  generously  home  again  ! 

The  governors  (Kossuth  and  his  party)  gave  themselves  up 
more  blindly  to  this  delusion  than  those  whom  they  governed ; 
and  placing  no  confidence  in  the  regular  troops,  they  now  be- 
lieved themselves  strong  enough,  and  saw  no  danger  whatever 
in  openly  shewing  to  the  latter  this  want  of  confidence. 

Wounded  by  this  suspicion  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other 
instinctively  scenting  revolutionary  designs  behind  it,  the  regular 
troops  were  even  in  the  month  of  November,  1848,  almost  ripe 
for  revolt. 

The  declaration  which  I  issued  in  the  name  of  the  army,  in 
answer  to  a  second  proclamation  by  Prince  Windischgratz,  stat- 
ing that  the  Committee  of  Defense  was,  in  the  present  condition 
of  Hungary,  its  sole  and  lawful  government,  scarcely  sufficed  to 
retain  the  services  of  the  officers  of  the  regular  troops  for  the 
national  cause.  Better  was  the  impression  I  made  by  defending 
most  energetically  their  interests  against  the  Committee  of  De- 
fense ; — still  better  the  influence  produced  by  the  constant  hom- 
age which  was  paid  to  the  Committee  of  Defense  by  the  minis- 
ter of  war,  Mezaros,  who  held  his  charge  from  the  king — (this 
minister  was  unquestionably  a  lawful  political  compass  to  the 
regular  troops  during  their  revolutionary  wandering  in  Hungary, 
though  a  very  uncertain  one — a  circumstance  of  which  the  offi- 
cers could  not  be  aware  at  that  time) ; — but  the  best  effect  was 
owing  to  the  manner  and  form  in  which  the  sudden  change  on 
the  throne  took  place  during  the  first  half  of  the  month  of  De- 
cember, 1848. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

On  the  14th  or  15th  of  December,  1848,  Field-marshal  Sim- 
unich  attacked  our  brigade  between  Nadas  and  Jablonicz,  and 
forced  it  back  toward  Tyrnau. 

Before  1  resolved  on  quitting  Presburg,  in  consequence  of  this 
disaster,  I  wished  to  endeavor  to  drive  the  enemy  once  more  back 
across  the  White  Mountains,  and  sent  Colonel  Count  Guyon  and 
Lieutenant-colonel  Pusztelnik  with  reinforcements  to  Tyrnau. 

On  the  16th  of  December,  however,  the  general  advance  of  the 
hostile  main  army  took  place  against  the  points  Parendorf,  Neu- 
dorf  (Ujfalu),  Gattendorf  (Gata),  Baumern  (Kortvelyes),  and 
Kittsee,  which  were  occupied  by  our  troops. 

.From  the  great  superiority  of  the  enemy's  forces,  our  resistance 
along  the  whole  line  could  be  only  of  short  duration,  without  dan- 
ger of  being  annihilated. 

The  commander  of  the  brigade  in  Parendorf  had  not  reflected 
upon  this,  and  had  engaged  himself  too  far  in  the  combat,  while 
the  hostile  column  directed  against  Neudorf  met  there  with  but 
an  insignificant  opposition.  By  the  unobstructed  advance  of  the 
latter,  the  former  lost  his  communication  with  the  neighboring 
brigade  in  Gattendorf 

When  this  had  been  reported  to  me  from  Gattendorf,  I  ordered 
the  whole  line  between  Parendorf  and  Presburg  to  be  relinquish- 
ed, in  order  to  commence  the  retreat  to  Altenburg  (Magyar  Ovar), 
and  Wieselburg  (Moson),  as  had  been  determined  upon  before- 
hand. Presburg,  however,  was  to  be  held  during  the  following 
day,  till  our  outposts  from  the  march  had  assembled  there.  The, 
pontoon  across  the  Danube  was  to  be  abandoned  to  the  stream. 
After  the  arrival  of  the  last  outpost  the  garrison  of  Presburg  was 
to  retreat  without  delay  to  Komorn. 

I  left  the  execution  of  this  order  to  Colonel  Aulich,  commander 
of  the  second  foot-regiment  (Alexander). 

My  presence  was  necessary  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube. 
I  left  Presburg,  therefore,  while  yet  night,  between  the  16th  and 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  109 

17th  of  December ;  took  my  way  to  Altenburg  by  Sommerein 
(Somorja),  on  the  Grosse  Schiitt  (Csallokoz),  crossed  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  17th  the  great  Danube  between  Csoleszt  and  Kiliti, 
and  reached  Altenburg  and  Wieselburg  with  a  few  attendants  in 
the  course  of  the  forenoon,  where  I  found  assembled  the  troops 
which  had  been  repulsed  the  preceding  day ;  those  from  N eudorf, 
Gattendorf,  Baumern,  and  Kittsee,  without  loss  ;  but  of  those  who 
had  been  distributed  in  Parendorf,  Neusiedel  (Nezsider),  Weiden 
(Vedeny),  and  Gols  (Gallos),  only  the  cavalry  with  their  guns  and 
the  fourteenth  Honved  battalion.  The  rest  of  the  infantry  and 
artillery,  by  the  speedy  advance  of  the  enemy  upon  Neudorf,  had 
been  forced  from  their  line  of  retreat  to  Altenburg  away  toward 
the  marshes  of  the  Neusiedel  lake.  Across  these,  however,  the 
so-called  Pamhagen  dam,  between  Pamhagen  (Pomogy)  and 
Eszterhaza  leads  ;  but  this  dam  also  was  impassable  at  that  time ; 
and  I  could  not  help  fearing  that  the  missing  divisions  were  irre- 
coverably lost. 

The  spirits  of  the  troops,  in  consequence  of  this  very  sensible 
loss,  were  extremely  depressed.  A  single  cannon-shot  seemed 
sufficient  to  dishearten  the  men,  especially  the  infantry,  to  the 
last  degree.  I  had,  at  least,  to  be  prepared  for  the  worst ;  and 
therefore  sent  back  the  whole  of  the  infantry,  together  with  the 
foot  artillery,  toward  Raab,  before  a  hostile  attack  on  Altenburg 
or  "Wieselburg  could  be  possible  ;  but  I  intended  to  wait  with  the 
cavalry  till  mid-day  of  the  18th  of  December  in  the  camp  of  the 
last-named  places,  to  hinder,  if  necessary,  the  too  speedy  advance 
of  the  enemy  upon  the  main  road. 

Mid-day  of  the  1 8th  came,  without  an  enemy  being  visible ; 
and  I  now  ordered  one-half  of  the  cavalry  likewise  to  retreat  to- 
ward Raab.  This  half,  however,  had  been  on  its  way  scarcely 
half  an  hour,  when  the  remaining  half  was  alarmed  by  a  hostile 
column  of  cavalry  advancing  from  the  west. 

It  is  easily  conceivable  that  the  enemy — whatever  were  his 
intentions — must  be  firmly  repulsed  before  I  could  hope  to  con- 
tinue my  retreat  perfectly  free  from  danger.  The  half  of  the 
cavalry  which  had  already  set  out  was  immediately  ordered  back 
again,  to  form  the  reserve  in  the  impending  encounter,    . 

Both  Altenburg  and  Wieselburg  are  inclosed  by  a  canal  on  the 
west  and  south.  Between  this  canal  and  these  places  we  en- 
camped ;  the  enemy  approached  on  the  other  side  of  it.    All  the 


no  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

bridges  across  the  canal  except  one  had  already  been  destroyed. 
This  one  was  situated  to  the  east  of  our  camp,  on  our  line  of 
retreat  to  Raab. 

Notwithstanding  this,  the  enemy  marched  at  first  directly 
toward  that  part  of  the  canal  which  was  just  opposite  our  front, 
until  some  shots  obliged  him  to  change  the  direction  of  his  march. 
He  inclined  toward  the  south  ;  but  continued  uninterruptedly  his 
advance  against  our  line  of  retreat,  though  describing  a  consider- 
able circuit. 

It  would  certainly  now  have  been  easy  to  have  gained  upon 
him  such  a  considerable  advance,  on  the  shortest  line  over  the 
remaining  bridge  along  the  road  to  Raab,  as  would  have  made 
it  impossible  for  him  to  overtake  us  and  force  us  to  an  engage- 
ment. But  I  feared  above  all  the  pernicious  effects  of  a  repeated 
retreat,  without  previous  combat,  on  the  future  maintenance  of 
my  troops,  and  resolved  to  engage  the  enemy  at  all  hazards.  For 
this  purpose  I  crossed  the  canal  by  the  bridge,  and  advanced  on 
the  other  side  to  meet  him. 

We  encountered  each  other  to  the  south  of  Wieselburg ;  he 
with  his  left,  we  with  our  right  wing  leaning  on  the  canal. 

At  first  it  seemed  as  if  he  intended  to  fight  a  very  serious  conflict. 
He  dispatched  a  part  of  his  forces  to  turn  round  our  left  wmg  to 
the  south  ;  and  from  the  front  of  his  position  promptly  and  spirit- 
edly answered  the  fire  of  our  approaching  guns.  But  when  our  left 
wing  advanced  in  echelons  to  the  attack  of  the  hostile  turning- 
column,  the  enemy  seemed  to  have  suddenly  lost  his  eager  desire 
for  the  contest.  He  abandoned  one  position  after  another,  with- 
out even  bringing  his  forces  into  action  ;  and  before  sunset  he  had 
escaped  from  our  further  attacks  by  means  of  such  a  speedy  re- 
treat in  the  direction  of  Kaltenstein,  that,  as  I  learned  by  a  report 
from  our  extreme  wing,  he  had  not  even  found  the  time  necessary 
for  placing  in  security  such  of  his  men  as  had  become  disabled. 
Some  of  them,  who  were  left  to  save  themselves  by  means  of  their 
still  sound  legs,  had  been  overtaken  by  a  patrol  of  hussars,  and 
cut  down  in  the  first  heat. 

It  was  a  striking  circumstance  in  this  encounter,  that  in  spite 
(ff  the  cannonade,  which  lasted  several  hours,  not  one  of  the  en- 
emy's shots  had  told ;  while  the  positions  which  .he  had  aban- 
doned were  marked  here  and  there  by  traces  of  blood,  and  some 
carcasses  of  horses. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  Ill 

Before  my  arrival  at  Wieselburg  the  Committee  of  Defense  had 
ordered  the  destruction  by  fire  of  all  such  stores  of  corn  and  hay 
as  it  would  not  be  possible  to  transport  to  Komorn.  In  fact,  I 
remarked  even  during  the  fight  the  burning  of  corn-stacks  on  the 
southeastern  extremity  of  Wieselburg.  But  not  far  distant  from 
the  corn  which  had  been  set  on  fire,  a  long  double  row  of  very 
large  hay-ricks  stood  still  untouched ;  and  a  column  of  hostile 
cavalry,  as  we  saw,  had  already  entered  Altenburg  on  the  north, 
between  the  canal  and  the  town,  and  was  just  advancing  toward 
Wieselburg.  A  bold  stroke  was  necessary  to  destroy  likewise 
these  immtMise  supplies  of  hay,  to  the  detriment  of  the  enemy. 
Twelve  hussars  undertook  it  voluntarily ;  they  crossed  to  the 
other  side  of  the  canal  at  the  risk  of  their  lives,  and  notwith- 
standing the  proximity  of  the  enemy,  set  fire  to  all  the  hay-ricks. 
The  like  was  done  in  some  farms  situated  toward  the  Hansag, 
before  our  departure  from  the  field  of  battle. 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th  my  troops  were  stilL  extremely 
dejected ;  the  evening  found  them  full  of  courage.  They  had 
seen  the  enemy  flee ;  and  they  continued  their  retreat,  from  the 
field  of  battle  they  had  victoriously  maintained,  toward  Raab,  in 
the  best  possible  spirits.  This  advantage,  of  the  utmost  import- 
ance to  us  at  that  time,  we  owed  solely  to  the  fortunate  accident 
that  the  hostile  commander  on  this  occasion  had  somewhat  too 
great  a  desire  to  fight  for  a  mere  reconnoitering,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  somewhat  too  little  for  a  serious  engagement. 

Before  midnight  we  reached  Hochstrass  (Otteveny),  and  on 
the  following  day  (the  19th  of  December)  Raab. 

The  stores  of  hay  and  corn  which  were  discovered  by  our 
patrols  nearest  to  the  main  road,  were  likewise  burnt  during 
this  retreat;  that  the  enemy,  obliged  to  meet  his" most  pressing 
wants  by  conveying  supplies  thither  from  great  distances,  might 
be  continually  stopped  in  his  advance. 

Soon,  however,  we  perceived  the  disproportion  between  the 
very  great  loss  to  the  rural  population,  and  the  small  advantage 
to  the  defense  of  the  country,  which  resulted  from  these  hard 
measures,  and  desisted  from  further  devastations. 

In  Raab  the  joyful  news  had  meanwhile  arrived  that  the  divi- 
sions of  infantry  and  artillery  from  Parendorf,  missing  since  the 
16th,  had  nevertheless  succeeded  in  safely  reaching  the  road 
from  CEdenburg  to  Raab,  after  restoring  as  far  as  necessary  the 


112  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

numerous  bridges  over  the  Pamhagen  dam  that  had  been  de- 
stroyed. This  lucky  escape  was  owing  to  the  circumstance,  that 
the  hostile  column,  which  by  the  15th  had  advanced  as  far  as 
(Edenburg,  was  in  the  course  of  the  16th  not  forward  enough  to 
render  impossible  the  debouching  of  the  fugitives  on  the  above- 
named  road  near  Eszterhaza. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

The  President  Kossuth  wrote  to  me  at  Raab,  not  to  give  up 
that  place  for  at  least  ten  days.  In  this  matter  he  had  addressed 
himself  to  the  wrong  person.  To  determine  how  long  Raab 
should  remain  in  our  power  depended,  considering  the  numerical 
superiority  of  the  hostile  troops,  only  and  exclusively  on  the  good 
pleasure  of  Prince  Windischgriitz.  He  was  pleased  to  defer  the 
attack  upon  Raab  until  the  27th  ;  and  thus  it  happened  that  the 
wish  of  the  President,  reckoned  from  the  date  of  his  above-men- 
tioned dispatch,  was  gratified. 

On  what  idea  this  desire  was  based  has  not  even  subsequently 
become  clear  to  me. 

In  the  evening  of  the  26th  a  report  from  the  nortnern  outposts 
on  the  Kleine-Schiitt  (Szigetkoz)  reached  my  head-quarters  at 
Raab,  that  a  strong  hostile  turning-column  coming  from  Zamoly 
had  already  advanced  along  the  great  Danube  so  far,  that  it 
menaced  the  road  from  Raab  to  Gonyo  (one  of  our  lines  of  re- 
treat). A  similar  manoeuvre  of  the  enemy  was  to  be  expected 
on  the  south  of  Raab.  I  now  perceived  the  necessity  of  quitting 
Raab  before  daybreak  next  morning,  and  beginning  the  retreat 
toward  the  capital  in  two  columns.  Two-thirds  of  the  corps, 
together  with  the  head-quarters,  were  directed  to  Dotis  (Tata) 
along  the  so-called  Fleischhacker  road,  one-third  over  Gonyo. 
The  main  road  along  the  Danube  was  to  be  left  open  for  the 
train  of  the  army  and  its  escort,  moving  from  Presburg  by 
Komorn  to  the  capitals. 

It  was  indeed  high  time  to  evacuate  Raab,  if  my  intention  of 
reserving  our   forces  for  the  last  decisive  combat   before  Ofen 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  113 

was  to  be  realized ;  for  the  column  retreating  from  Raab  by 
Oonyo  was  already  attacked  by  the  enemy's  turning-column,  at 
a  short  distance  behind  Raab,  and  could  continue  its  retreat  un- 
liindered  only  after  it  had  repulsed  the  attack. 

I  had  been  induced  to  form  the  intention  just  mentioned  by  the 
heroic  declaration  of  the  government :  they  ivould  be  buried  under 
the  ruins  of  Ofen.  I  had  already  successfully  combated  a  simi- 
lar longing  for  the  ruins  of  Raab,  by  showing  that  Raab  was  not 
Hungary.  Bat  the  tenacity  with  which  Kossuth  seemed  desi- 
rous of  clinging  to  this  idea,  entitled  me  to  suppose  that  the  gov- 
ernment was  really  resolved  on  a  last  decisive  battle  before  Ofen; 
and  I  beheved  I  was  bound  to  subordinate  to  this  magnanimous 
determination  even  my  own  intention,  according  to  which,  as  I 
had  already  declared  in  Presburg,  the  seat  of  the  government 
must  be  transferred  to  behind  the  Theiss. 

The  first  station  of  the  march  of  our  main  column  was  Babol- 
na  and  its  environs. 

Very  early  on  the  next  day,  the  28th  of  December,  the  retreat 
ought  to  have  been  continued.  But  a  strict  observance  of  the 
dispositions  enjoined,  in  an  army  consisting  for  the  most  part  of 
young,  little-disciplined  troops,  is  a  rare  occurrence.  And  so  it 
happened  that  the  early  hour  fixed  for  setting  out  on  the  march 
on  the  28th  was  not  kept.  The  rear-guard  was  obliged  to  wait 
before  Babolna  for  the  moving  off  of  some  retarded  divisions 
belonging  to  the  main  body,  and  was  there  overtaken  by  a  troop 
of  the  enemy  in  pursuit. 

The  commander  of  the  rear-guard  perceiving  the  danger  which 
threatened  him,  if  he  engaged  in  a  serious  contest  at  the  entrance 
of  a  defile,  as  the  road  through  Babolna  was,  posted  his  artillery 
and  infantry  at  gun-range  behind  the  village ;  but  one  half  of 
the  cavalry  had  to  oppose  the  entrance  of  the  enemy  into  the 
village  until  the  other  half,  following  the  artillery  and  infantry, 
should  have  taken  up  their  position  in  the  rear,  at  a  distance 
necessary  for  the  attack. 

But  on  this  unlucky  day  even  the  generally  brave  hussars  had 
not  their  heart  in  the  right  place.  They  fled  without  awaiting 
the  attack,  precipitated  themselves  on  the  still-marching  divisions 
of  infantry  and  on  the  artillery,  throwing  the  former  into  confu- 
sion, startling  the  horses  of  the  latter,  and  completely  discoura- 
ging all  the  divisions  of  the  rear-guard.     In  vain  the  commander 


114  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

of  the  rear-guard  opposed  the  fugitives  ;  in  vain  he  exhorted  the 
divisions  of  infantry  to  remain  compact  and  to  offer  a  firm  resist- 
ance ;  a  panic  terror  paralyzed  every  energy.  Even  before  the 
enemy's  cavalry  debouched  from  Babolna,  the  batallions  had  lost 
all  firmness ;  two  of  them  saved  themselves,  in  scattered  flight, 
on  some  tracts  of  intersected  ground  ;  the  third  was  overtaken  by 
the  hostile  cavalry,  and  partly  cut  down,  partly  made  prisoners. 

The  hussars  fled  without  stopping  till  they  came  to  the  Czonczo 
brook  near  Nagy  Igmand.  Here  the  partly  steep,  partly  marshy 
banks  first  set  bounds  to  their  wild  flight.  Besides  the  battalion 
mentioned  we  also  lost  an  ammunition-chest 

The  main  body,  together  with  the  head-quarters,  reached  on 
this  day  Felso-Galla ;  the  rear-guard,  Banhida,  on  the  north- 
western declivity  of  that  chain  of  mountains  which,  being  the 
continuation  of  the  Bakony  forest,  extends  in  manifold  windings, 
in  a  northeastern  direction  mainly,  as  far  as  the  Danube  near 
Visegrad,  and  bears  the  name  of  Vertesi  Hegyek. 

"  Here" — so  said  every  one — "  the  enemies  of  the  country 
sludlfitid  their  grave  I  The  people  are  already  preparing  to  dig 
it  broad  and  deep  !  The  few  roads  and  ways  which  lead  across 
this  ridge  shall  be  destroyed ;  then  it  becomes  an  impregtmble 
gigantic  fortress,  and  the  people  ready  to  vanquish  or  die 
THEREON  I  The  Fleischhacker  road  runs  betiveen  Banhida  and 
Bicske  through  a  defile,  as  does  also  the  road  from  Kis-Ber  to 
Moor  at  Sdrkdny.  Here,  as  there,  a  single  resolute  division 
can  stojJ  a  wliole  army  T' 

And  I — to  whom  the  skeleton  of  the  principal  mountain- 
chains,  roads,  and  rivers  of  Hungary  was  then  scarcely  familiar, 
and  who  knew  of  the  nature  of  the  Vertesi  Hegyek  only  gener- 
ally that  they  existed — allowed  myself  to  be  induced  by  this 
talk  to  agree  to  the  following  plan  of  defense. 

The  head-quarters  of  the  corps  of  the  upper  Danube  were  to 
be  removed  back  for  the  winter,  in  the  last  extremity,  as  far  as 
Bicske ;  the  winter-quarters  to  be  established  along  the  Vertesi 
Hegyek,  with  their  principal  stations  at  Almas,  Tata,  Banhida, 
Kecsked  and  Ondod.  Moriz  Perczel,  meanwhile  advanced  to 
the  rank  of  general — who  would  by  no  means  subordinate  him- 
self to  the  command  of  the  army  of  the  upper  Danube,  and  wish- 
ed moreover  to  remain  independent — had  taken  on  himself  the 
defense  of  the  Sarkany  defile  by  means  of  a  small  regular  corps, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY  115 

and  of  the  tracts  of  ground  lying  between  this  defile  and  the 
Flatten  lake  (Balaton)  by  patrolling  columns.  The  so-called 
guerrilla  warfare  would  in  this  way  be  applied  on  the  largest 
scale,  and  protect  the  organization  of  a  most  imposing  army,  to 
be  concentrated  in  the  capitals  and  their  environs. 

In  conformity  with  this  plan,  General  Perczel  was  conducted 
sufficiently  early  from  Papa  to  Kis-Ber,  that  he  might  immedi- 
ately commence  his  part  of  the  duty,  by  occupying  and  defending 
the  Sarkany  defile. 

I  believed,  it  is  true,  in  the  possibility  of  a  general  rising  of  the 
people  causing  very  considerable  disturbances  in  the  combined 
operations  of  even  a  larger,  well-disciplined,  and  Avell-led  army  ; 
nay,  I  still  believe  it.  But  I  did  not  believe  that  the  all-perva- 
ding and  enduring  enthusiasm  indispensable  for  this  existed 
among  the  Hungarian  rural  population,  whose  indolence  had. 
long  ago  become  proverbial,  and  whose  warlike  spirit,  extolled  to 
the  stars,  I  had  already  learned  to  appreciate,  by  my  own  expe- 
rience, in  its  utter  worthlessness. 

The  little  sympathy  for  the  national  contest,  whic?i,  during  my 
retreat  from  Raab  to  the  capitals,  I  met  with  almost  every  where 
in  the  country,  did  not  consequently  tak»  me  unawares.  But 
much  more  surprised  was  I  by  the  view  which  I  obtained,  on 
the  very  day  of  the  disaster  at  Babolna  and  directly  after  it,  du- 
ring a  reconnoitering  ride  in  the  mountains  represented  as  being 
so  extremely  impracticable,  of  their  real  nature,  as  well  as  of  the 
defensive  works  so  highly  lauded  in  the  communications  of  the 
Committee  of  Defense.  These  latter  had  been  eulogised  to  such 
a  degree,  that,  during  my  retreat  from  Raab,  I  almost  feared  %ve 
should  hardly  be  able  to  find  a  passage  open  for  our  own  safety. 
"We  met  indeed  with  ditch-works  on  the  road,  which  we  could 
march  past  without  the  least  interruption — not,  as  it  might  be 
supposed,  through  the  space  which  had  been  left  for  us,  but  far 
and  wide,  to  the  right  and  to  the  left.  We  found  likewise  some 
abatis  constructed,  to  the  utility  of  which  our  good-natured  Hon- 
veds,  in  their  childlike  naivete,  bore  the  most  conscientious  testi- 
mony by  setting  light  to  them  for  the  purpose  of  warming  them- 
selves at  the  fire.  But  we  searched  in  vain  for  the  place  which 
some  government  commissary  had  taken  for  a  *'  defile." 

In  consequence  of  my  having  been  undeceived  in  these  respects 
I  removed  the  head  quarters  on  the  29th  of  December  to  Bicske  ; 


116  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

and  perceiving  that  the  whole  great  plan  fox  the  defense  of  the 
Vertesi  mountain-range  wa.sjust  as  great  an  absurdity,  I  began 
to  draw  my  troops  nearer  to  the  mountains,  that  I  might  secure 
the  Fleischhauer  road  as  far  as  possible. 

It  was  more  than  probable  that  the  enemy's  main  army  would 
advance  on  this  road ;  while,  on  the  contrary,  only  his  secondary 
forces  would  take  that  from  Uaab  by  Kis-Ber,  Sarkany,  and  Moor, 
which  General  Perczel  with  his  corps  would  be  so  much  the 
more  capable  of  resisting,  as  I  had  already  detached  a  strong 
column  of  cavalry,  with  a  battery,  from  Raab  to  Ondod,  to  the 
north  of  Moor,  and  during  the  retreat  from  Kocs  a  brigade  by 
Kecsked  and  Majk  to  Csakvar,  to  prevent  his  being  turned 
round  on  the  right,  and  to  maintain  him  in  communication  with 
my  corps. 

The  part  of  my  troops  which  had  been  ordered  for  the  retreat 
from  Raab  by  Gonyo  to  Dotis  was  consequently  drawn  back  to 
Zsambek  ;  while  Colonel  Guyon  retreated  after  crossing  the 
Danube,  on  the  main  road  to  Vorosvar,  having  previously,  on  his 
way,  hazarded  an  engagement  in  Tyrnau,  which  was  equally 
unlucky  as  aimless,  with  the  far  superior  forces  of  Field-marshal 
Simunich,  and  had  tjien  marched  toward  Komom. 

The  rest  of  my  forces,  which  on  the  16th  of  the  same  month 
were  disposed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  had  partly  re- 
mained as  garrison  in  Komorn,  and  partly  had  rejoined  me  while 
I  was  still  in  Raab. 

Immediately  after  my  arrival  at  Bicske  on  the  evening  of  the 
29th  of  December,  I  learned  that  a  carriage-road  existed  from 
this  place  to  A.-Galla,  sufficiently  practicable  to  turn  round  upon 
it,  even  with  artillery,  any  position  a  cheval  of  the  Fleischhauer 
road  between  these  places.  Certainty  on  this  point  appeared  to 
be  of  great  importance  with  reference  to  the  dispositions  next  to 
be  made.  I  employed  the  30th  of  December  to  obtain  in  person 
this  certainty ;  left  for  that  purpose  my  head-quarters  early  in 
the  morning,  and  returned  only  toward  evening,  at  the  moment 
when  whole  swarms  of  dispersed  troops  from  Perczel' s  corps  ar- 
rived with  the  disastrous  news,  that  General  Perczel  had  been 
attacked  by  the  Austrians  between  Moor  and  Sdrkdny,  and  had 
suffered  a  total  defeat. 

My  army,  then  divided  into  six  brigades,  occupied  on  the  30th 
of  December  the  following  positions  :  a  brigade  on  the  main  road 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  117 

of  Vorosvar,  one  in  Zsambek,  one  in  Bicske,  one  in  Csakvar,  one 
in  F.-Galla,  and  one  in  Buda-Ors. 

Several  of  these  brigades  had  furnished  their  contingent  for 
the  formation  of  the  column  which  had  been  detached  to  Ondod, 
as  has  been  mentioned  before.  But  this  column  had  already 
joined  Perczel  before  the  unfortunate  engagement  near  Moor,  and 
was  consequently  at  the  moment  not  disposable. 

By  those  of  Perczel's  corps  who,  having  been  dispersed  to 
Bicske,  had  reached  our  camp,  almost  all  his  battalions  were 
numerously  represented.  Hence  it  might  be  concluded  that  his 
forces  had  been  so  scattered,  that  he  would  not  be  able  to  pre- 
vent with  the  remainder  the  victorious  advance  of  the  hostile 
right  wing  on  any  point  before  the  capitals ;  while  the  accounts 
of  the  fugitives  at  the  same  time  all  led  to  the  apprehension, 
that  in  his  flight  he  had  taken  the  direction  of  Stuhlweissenburg, 
and  thereby  given  an  opportunity  to  the  hostile  right  wing  to 
separate  him  from  me  by  a  resolute  advance  from  Moor  over 
Lovas-Bereny. 

To  avert  this  impending  danger,  during  the  night  between  the 
30th  and  the  31st  of  December  the  brigade  from  Bicske  was 
dispatched  to  Baracska,  that  of  Csakvar  to  Vail,  that  of  Zsambek 
to  Soskut,  and  at  the  same  time  that  of  F.-Galla  to  Bia.  After 
the  accession  of  FerczeVs  co7'ps,  the  offensive  ivas  to  be  resimied 
against  the  enemy's  right  wing,  for  the-  purpose  of  giving  a 
r)wre  favorable  turn  to  the  campaign  by  its  destruction. 

But  the  defeat  of  General  Perczel  had  broken  at  once  the 
Roman  courage  of  the  Cmnmittee  of  Defense. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  31st  of  December,  1848, 1  received 
a  decree,  signed  by  Kossuth,  and  drawn  up  in  this  instance  in 
Germa7i,  wherein  I  was  ordered  to  retreat  ivith  my  corps  d'armee 
tvithout  delay  into  the  first  line  before  Ofen,  that  is,  on  the 
height  of  Teteny,  Buda-Ors,  Budakeszi,  and  Hidegkut. 

I  replied  by  sending  a  report  of  the  last  dispositions,  and  be- 
sides took  the  liberty  of  decidedly  blaming  the  retreat  thus 
ordered  ;  but  was  nevertheless  obliged  to  desist  from  the  offensive 
against  the  hostile  right  wing ;  for  without  the  assistance  of 
Perczel's  corps  I  had  no  expectation  of  success,  and  it  was  not 
to  be  doubted  that  Perczel,  from  personal  hostility,  ivould  take 
part  against  me  for  this  order  of  the  Committee  of  Defense. 

Still  in  the  course  of  the  31st  of  December,  as  soon  as  General 


118  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Perczel,  coming  from  Stuhlweissenburg,  had  entered  the  protect- 
ing sphere  of  my  brigades,  I  drew  back  that  of  Vail  to  the  height 
of  Hanzsabeg,  and  that  of  Baracska  to  Tarnok.  The  divisions 
of  the  army  which  had  been  sent  to  Bia  and  Soskut  remained 
there  ;  those  of  Yorbsvar,  however,  received  an  order  from  the 
Committee  of  Defense  immediately  to  approach  the  capitals. 
The  head-quarters  advanced  to  Promontorium. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

On  the  1st  of  January,  1849,  the  main  body  of  my  army  con- 
sequently stood  in  an  extensive  circuit  from  Hanzsabeg  as  far  as 
to  Bia.  I  had  left  my  head-quarters  very  early  in  the  morning 
to  convince  myself  personally  that  the  dispositions  ordered  the 
night  before  had  been  strictly  observed  by  all  the  divisions.  I 
met  the  ruins  of  Perczel' s  corps  on  the  road  between  Teteny  and 
Hanzsabeg,  and  finally  Perczel  himself  He  rode  close  to  my 
carriage,  and  surprised  me  with  the  assurance  that  he  had  in- 
deed abandoned  the  field  of  battle  at  Moor,  but  that  this  circum- 
stance did  not  in  the.  least  justify  the  supposition  that  he  had 
been  beaten ;  his  loss  being  far  exceeded  by  that  of  the  enemy, 
as  was  made  evident  by  the  continual  arriving  of  the  dispersed 
troops. 

"Especially,"  said  I,  interrupting  him,  "if  you  deduct  from 
your  loss  those  runaways  also — there  are  far  more  than  a  thou- 
sand of  them — whom  I  caused  to  be  driven  together  one  by  one 
in  Bicske,  and  transported  to  Ofen,  where  they  are  awaiting  your 
orders  upon  the  Generalswiese.  You  probably  establish  your 
head-quarters  in  Pesth  ?" 

"Yes,"  replied  he,  "for  my  personal  presence  with  the  gov- 
ernment is  absolutely  necessary  at  this  time ;  but  to  my  troops 
I  shall  grant  some  days'  rest,  and  shall  therefore  quarter  them 
in  Ofen.  The  enemy  will  not  recover  for  a  long  time  from  the 
severe  blow  I  have  given  him  near  Moor,  and  therefore  you  have 
nothing  at  all  to  fear.  I  will  for  certain  be  on  the  spot  at  the 
right  moment." 


xr- 

MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY^.  '  119 

At  that  time  I  could  still  compassionately  laugh  at  Perczel's 
boasting ;  for  I  was  then  ignorant  of  what  a  few  days  later  I 
could  no  longer  doubt,  namely,  that  the  manner  of  speaJciiig  and 
acting  of  this  man  was  the  element  in  which  the  Committee  of 
Defense,  nay  even  a  great  'part  of  the  Diet,  mx)st  complacently 
moved ;  a  manner  of  speaking  and  acting,  which,  void  of  any 
steady  moral  basis,  was  well  calculated  to  give  birth  to  the  seri- 
ous apprehension,  that  the  loyal  personal  sacrifices  of  the  army 
for  the  Constitution  might  be  abused  as  a  cloak  for  the  execu- 
tion of  pla7is  of  high-treason,  and  mweover  most  ruinous  to  the 
country. 

When,  late  in  the  afternoon,  I  returned  to  my  head-quarters 
through  Buda-Ors  I  was  informed  that  meanwhile  a  deputation 
sent  by  the  Diet  to  the  hostile  general-in-chief,  Prince  "Windisch- 
gratz  had  been  there,  and  had  demanded  an  escort  to  the  hostile 
outposts,  for  which  they  had  been  directed  to  the  brigade  in 
Hanzsabeg. 

These  deputies  had  also  brought  a  letter  for  me  from  Kossuth. 

I  felt  as  if  I  had  fallen  from  the  clouds  when  I  learned  from 
it  that  the  Government  and  the  Diet  had  the  day  before  decided  : 

Once  7nore  to  enter  on  the  way  of  accommodation ;  and  at 
the  same  time 

To  transfer  its  seat  from  Pesth  to  Debreczin  ;  whilst  I 

Should  give  to  the  enemy  a  decisive  battle  in  the  first  line 
before  Of  en  ;  but  in  doing  so, 

Keep  in  view  the  salvation  of  the  army  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Danube,  and  in  every  possible  way  the  preservation  of 
the  capitals. 

Kossuth,  to  whose  memory  it  could  not  but  be  still  very  vividly 
present  how  irritated  Prince  Windischgratz  had  been  with  him 
even  before  the  battle  at  Schwechat,  now  suddenly  once  more 
entered  upon  the  way  of  accommodation  ! 

Could  he  from  this  step  hope  for  any  thing  for  his  country? 
No. 

Was  this  an  upright  step  ?     No ;  it  was  merely  one  void  of 

COUNSEL. 

Kossuth,  who  during  the  last  two  months  had  constantly 
refused  my  repeated  advice  to  remove,  while  it  was  yet  time, 
the  seat  of  government  to  behind  the  Theiss,  asseverating  that 
the  government  would  die  first  at  Raab,  then  before  Ofen  ; — 


120  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Ko.ssuth,  I  say,  thought  now  was  the  time  suddenly  to  perceive 
that  Ofen  and  Pesth  were  all  Hungary  y^si  as  little  as  Raab, 
and  that  the  government,  in  case  of  necessity,  could  die  even  in 
Debreczin,  or  elsewhere. 

What  could  so  suddenly  have  induced  Kossuth  subsequently 
to  follow  my  advice  ? 

Could  it  be  a  prophetic  glance  into  the  approaching  glorious 
future  ?     Oh,  no  I     It  was  only  la  peur  pour  la  peau. 

Probably  it  was  merely  the  saine  motive  which  had  determ- 
ined him  to  order  me  to  give  the  enemy  a  decisive  battle  before 
Ofen — perhaps  to  cover  his  flight  to  Debreczin. 

To  this  supposition  it  might  at  least  be  objected,  that  the  flight 
of  the  government  needed  no  protection,  since  the  speed  with 
which  it  could  be  accomplished  by  railway  as  far  as  Szolnok 
took  away  all  danger  of  hostile  pursuit ;  and  that  perhaps  Kos- 
suth so  urgently  demanded  a  battle  to  be  fought  on  the  right 
bank  only  "  for  the  honor  of  the  nation,"  or  for  the  purpose  of 
gaining  time  to  remove  the  multifarious  stores  of  provisions. 

However,  be  that  as  it  may,  the  task  which  Kossuth  had 
assigned  to  me  could  only  have  been  assigned  by  such  a  general 
as  Kossuth. 

The  chain-bridge,  then  the  sole  communication  over  the  Da- 
nube, which  was  scarcely  frozen,  was  only  barely  practicable  ; 
it  could  be  made  use  of,  but  not  without  precaution.  Precaution 
presupposes  leisure  ;  but  it  is  just  of  this  that  there  is  least 
during  a  retreat  after  a  decisive  and  lost  battle  ;  unless  a  part 
of  the  defeated  army  should  sacrifice  itself  in  an  obstinate  fight 
by  its  rear-guard,  to  secure  for  the  main  body  the  time  necessary 
for  its  retreat. 

But  an  obstinate  fight  by  the  rear-guard  is  conceivable  only 
when  there  is  a  simultaneous  use  made  of  all  the  advantages 
accidentally  offered  for  the  defense  on  the  line  of  retreat.  Houses 
and  rows  of  houses,  among  other  things,  present  such  advantages. 

To  enable  me  to  give  a  last  decisive  battle  to  the  enemy  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  I  had  previously  to  reunite  the 
parts  of  my  army  which  had  been  separately  stationed  on  the 
Fleischhauer  road  and  on  the  main  road  to  Stuhlweissenburg. 
But  the  protection  of  both  roads  had  to  be  kept  in  view  at  the 
same  time  as  this  junction.  This  was  possible  only  where  the 
two  roads  opened  into  one   and  the  same  level  valley,  conse- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  121 

quently  between  Buda-Ors  and  Promontorium  on  the  one  side, 
and  the  Brocken  (Gellerthegy)  on  the  other.  Upon  every  point 
further  distant  from  Ofen  the  concentration  of  the  main  army 
could  only  have  been  effected  on  one  of  the  two  hostile  lines  of 
attack,  while  the  other  must  have  been  abandoned,  and  with  it 
at  the  same  time  our  line  of  retreat  to  Ofen. 

The  field  presented  by  local  circumstances  for  the  desired  last 
decisive  battle  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  lay,  therefore, 
at  a  distance  from  Ofen  and  the  chain -bridge  not  far  exceeding 
the  bounds  even  of  the  most  sluggish  hostile  pursuit  after  a  lost 
battle. 

How  could  the  rear-guard  stop  this  pursuit,  when  neither  the 
suburbs  of  Ofen  nor  the  town  itself  were  allowed  to  be  occupied 
and  defended,  that  they  might  not  be  exposed  to  the  dangers  of 
a  hostile  attack  ?  And  how  was  sufficient  time  to  be  got  for 
saving  the  defeated  army  with  precaution,  in  spite  of  the  un- 
retarded  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  on  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube, 
over  the  chain-bridge,  which  had  been  made  practicable  only  so 
far  as  was  absolutely  necessary? 

I  hastened  early  in  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  January  to  Pesth, 
to  put  these  questions  to  Kossuth,  and  call  upon  him  to  renounce 
either  the  battle  or  the  salvation  of  the  army,  or  at  least  his 
regard  for  the  capitals  »and  the  sympathies  of  the  proprietors  of 
the  houses.  In  case  he  should  accede  to  none  of  these  modifica- 
tions, I  was  determined  voluntarily  to  resign  my  post.  This 
latter  determination  had  been  finally  come  to  principally  by  my 
deliberation  upon  the  motives  of  his  intended  flight  to  Debreczin. 

But  the  President  was  no  longer  in  Pesth  when  I  arrived 
there  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  January,  1849. 

With  the  care  of  the  defense  of  the  country  he  had  charged 
General  Yetter  as  substitute  of  the  minister  of  war  Meszaros, 
who — as  was  generally  said — had  been  sent  to  destroy  a  hostile 
corps  under  the  royal  imperial  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Count 
Schlick,  which  had  already  advanced  as  far  as  Kaschau. 

I  addressed  myself  consequently  with  my  request  to  General 
Vetter,  and  invited  him  at  the  same  time  to  take  the  command 
in  my  stead,  because  the  unfortunate  results  of  the  campaign 
had  made  me  doubt  my  ability  for  the  post  confided  to  me. 
General  Yetter,  however,  said  that  he  was  not  inclined  to  en- 
danger his  .renown  as  a  general,  acquired  laboriously  in  the  war 

F 


122  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

against  the  Uaizen,  by  undertaking  the  conduct  of  a  relinquished 
campaign.  Nevertheless,  he  promised  to  call  together  a  council 
of  war,  in  which  my  present  task  should  be  modified,  so  as  to 
render  it  practicable,  and  a  decision  be  come  to  upon  the  meas- 
ures to  be  next  taken  for  the  defense  of  the  country. 

This  council  of  war  was  assembled  in  the  course  of  the  day, 
under  the  presidency  of  the  royal  Commissary  Csanyi,  and  came 
to  the  following  resolutions  : 

''The  principal  object  in  vieiv  should  be  the  saving  of  the 
army  on  to  the  left  bayik  of  the  Danube. 

"■After  accomplishing  the  retreat,  General  Perczel  with  his 
corps  was  to  draw  back  toward  Szohiok  ;  ivhile  I  with  mine, 
by  Waizen  ( Vdcz),  had  to  operate  against  the  Jiostile  corps  of 
Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Simunich  on  the  Waag. 

"  The  expedition  hi  the  south  against  the  Raizen  and 
Serbians  %vas  to  be  abandoTwd,  and  the  fmxes  employed  in 
it  (under  the  command  of  Colonel  Count  Vecsey)  draivn  to 
the  middle  Theiss,  for  the  protection  of  the  new  seat  of  goverrv- 
ment. 

''In  case  of  extremity,  the  three  corps  d'armee  of  Mezdros, 
Perczel,  and  Vecsey  were  to  joi7i  each  other  during  their  con- 
centric retreat  to  Debreczin  ;  while  it  was  left  to  me,  according 
to  circumstaiices,  to  choose  for  my  point  of  retreat  Komorn  or 
the  upper  Theiss'' 

The  object  of  the  council  of  war  in  detaching  me  into  the 
northwestern  comitates  was  to  divert  the  hostile  main  army 

FROM  THE  shortest  LINE  OF  OPERATION  AGAINST  DeBRECZIN. 

Meanwhile  from  4000  to  5000  infantry  had  been  concentrated 
in  Waizen. 

"  These  I  tvas  to  receive  on  my  march  through  Waizen;  but 
for  them  I  was  to  give  up  from  my  corps  to  General  Perczel, 
witlwut  delay,  one  battalion  of  infantry,  twelve  squadrons  of 
hussars,  and  a  battery  of  twelve-pounders. 

"  That  the  retreat  of  my  corps  d'armAe  from  its  position  on 
the  right  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  across  the  chain-bridge 
might  be  possible  without  danger,  the  enemy's  frindpal  attack 
was  not  to  be  awaited. 

"  For  the  protection  of  this  retreat  General  Perczel  was  to  oc- 
cupy the  intrenched  pi'indpal  appi'oaches  to  Of  en'' 

Perczel,  however,  declared  that  he  could  not  do  so  before  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  123 

following  day,  almost  his  whole  corps  being  dispersed  through  the 
capitals. 

I  saw  from  this  that  I  could  not  rely  on  Perczel,  and  resolved 
in  the  mean  time  myself  to  take  charge  of  the  protection  of  my 
retreat. 

On  the  2d  of  January  my  six  brigades  stood  thus  : 

In  Teteny  ; 

Near  Hanzsabeg,  with  the  outposts  toward  Ersci  and  Marton- 
vasar ; 

In  Soskut,  with  the  outposts  in  Tarnok,  Zamor,  and  Barathaza  ; 

In  Buda-Ors,  with  the  outposts  in  Bia ; 

Outside  Altofen  (0-Buda),  with  the  outposts  toward  Kovacsi, 
Vorosvar,  and  Sz.-Endre  ;  and 

In  the  suburb  of  Ofen,  "  Christinenstadt." 

In  consequence  of  these  resolutions  of  the  council  of  war,  on 
the  3d  of  January  I  removed  the  brigades  from  Hanzsabeg  and 
Buda-Ors  to  Ofen,  and  that  of  Soskut  to  Buda-Ors ;  ordered  the 
outposts  upon  the  Fleischhauer  road  back  as  far  as  Csik ;  while 
the  brigade  of  Hanzsabeg  was  not  to  draw  in  its  outposts  till  they 
had  been  relieved  by  those  of  Teteny. 

The  commander  in  Hanzsabeg  had  not  observed  this  precau- 
tionary measure,  but  withdrew  his  outposts  before  those  of  Teteny, 
who  were  to  relieve  them,  had  arrived  on  the  spot,  and  began 
his  march  to  Ofen,  without  remarking — in  spite  of  its  being  sun- 
shiny mid-day — ^that  a  hostile  corps,  coming  from  Martonvasar, 
was  upon  his  heels. 

It  was  only  a  lucky  accident  that  saved  the  brigade  of  Teteny 
from  an  unintentional  attack  of  the  enemy  in  broad  daylight. 

A  division  of  hussars  just  in  the  nick  of  time  threw  itself  upon 
the  cuirassiers,  by  whom  the  outposts  of  the  Teteny  brigade,  while 
on  their  march  toward  Hanzsabeg,  had  been  attacked,  and  were 
obstinately  pursued  already  nearly  as  far  as  Teteny. 

A  violent  conflict  ensued,  in  which  the  cuirassiers  suffered  con- 
siderable loss. 

Their  flight  delayed  the  attack  of  the  hostile  corps,  and  afforded 
to  the  Teteny  brigade  the  time  necessary  to  prepare  for  battle. 

The  brigade  which  was  on  its  march  from  Hanzsabeg  back  to 
Ofen  had  meanwhile  reached  Promontorium.  On  the  first  news 
of  the  enemy's  attack,  I  ordered  it  immediately  to  return,  and 
advance  again  by  Teteny  to  Hanzsabeg.     It  deployed  to  the  left 


124  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNG  AST. 

of  the  road  to  Stuhlweissenburg,  while  the  Teteny  brigade  was 
turned  toward  the  right. 

Although  there  were  only  about  4000  men  on  the  spot  at  my 
disposal,  I  was  determined  to  advance  on  the  offensive. 

The  combat,  however,  had  scarcely  assumed  a  somewhat  more 
active  character,  when  suddenly  an  officer,  who  had  been  de- 
spatched to  me  from  Pesth,  arrived  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  re- 
ported to  me,  tJiat  General  Vetter  desired  I  would  not  allow 
myself  to  be  led  into  any  offensive,  the  enemy  having  crossed 
the  Danube  below  Hanzsabeg,  for  the  purpose  of  threatening  the 
capitals  from  the  left  bank  likewise. 

On  receiving  this  information  I  immediately  began  the  retreat, 
and  continued  it  as  far  as  Promontorium,  without  being  pursued 
by  the  enemy. 

There  I  allowed  the  troops  to  rest  for  some  hours,  after  which, 
together  with  the  head-quarters,  they  were  to  continue  the  retreat 
before  midnight,  with  one  part  as  far  as  Ofen,  with  the  other  as 
far  as  Pesth  ;  while  I  myself  rode  to  Buda-Ors,  to  order  the  brigade 
of  that  place  also  to  retreat  to  the  left  bank.  Ofen  remained  oc- 
cupied till  the  following  day  (4th  of  January)  by  my  rear-guard, 
when  it  was  relieved  by  General  Perczel's  troops,  and  followed 
my  main  body,  which  was  already  on  its  march  for  Waizen. 

General  Yetter  was  much  displeased  with  this  precipitate  "sal- 
vation of  the  army  on  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  ;"  and 
when,  moreover,  the  news  of  the  enemy's  having  crossed  the  river 
below  Hanzsabeg — the  immediate  cause  of  my  retreat — proved  to 
be  unfounded,  this  retreat  then  appeared  in  fact  to  have  been 
over-hurried,  at  least  by  one  day.  What  had  been  done,  how- 
ever, could  not  be  undone. 

But  General  Perczel  declared,  "  he  would  rather  see  the  cap- 
itals reduced  to  a  mass  of  ruins,  than  ivithdraw  without  a  con- 
test:' 

Fortunately  for  Ofen  and  Pesth,  Perczel  belonged  to  that  party 
whose  last  proclamations  (if  there  remained  no  other  historical 
documents  of  this  period)  would  induce  posterity  to  dig  for  the 
bones  of  the  former  Committee  of  Defense  under  the  walls  of 
Ofen. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

In  the  night  between  the  4th  and  5th  of  January,  1849,  I 
quitted  Pesth  with  my  head-quarters,  and  reached  Waizen  in  the 
course  of  the  next  day. 

The  Hungarian  armed  rising — although  originally  stirred  up 
by  the  officious  instigation  of  the  nationalities  against  each  other 
systematically  introduced  from  Vienna,  and  diametrically  opposed 
to  the  realization  of  the  idea  of  a  collective  Austrian  unity,  sub- 
sequently not  less  officially  enounced — was  nevertheless  purely 
7^iON ARcnic AJ.-constittitional :  and  herein  lay  its  strength  ;  for  it 
was  to  this  circumstance  solely  that  it  owed  the  co-operation  of 
the  regular  troops. 

Besides,  in  the  year  1848  Hungary  could  be  insurgent  only  in 
a  monarchical  point  of  view. 

A  proof  of  this,  experienced  innumerable  times,  is,  that  the 
agitations  in  favor  of  the  arming  succeeded  onhj  ivhen  they  were 
attempted  "  in  the  name  of  the  King.'' 

A  proof  of  this  are  the  great  difficulties  that  had  to  be  sur- 
mounted, when  it  was  necessary — -in  contradiction  to  the  pro- 
clamations dispersed  in  great  numbers  by  the  authorized  or 
unauthorized  agents  of  the  reactionary  party,  and  furnished  with 
the  King's  sig7iature — to  procure  for  the  Pesth  government,  all 
legitimate  as  it  was,  an  active  support  in  the  country. 

A  proof  of  this  is  the  being  obliged  to  paralyze  the  effect  of 
those  reactionary  proclamations  by  others,  drawn  up  with  a  con- 
trary intent,  and  likeivise  in  the  King's  name. 

Nay,  even  anti-dynastic  ideas  ivere  exotic  growths  in  Hun- 
gary. If  these  were  to  be  acclimatized,  the  political  soil — 
although  the  Vienna  government  measures  had  right  valiantly 
dug  it  up — must  nevertheless  previously  have  a  corresponding 
manuring. 

The  manure  necessary  for  this  purpose  came,  so  far  as  I  know, 
from  two  sources — I  am  not  certain  ii primary  ones ;  namely, 

From  the  free  exercise  of  popular  oratory,  and 


126  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

From  the  fails  accomplis  of  the  Committee  of  Defense. 

Of  these  two  kinds  of  manure,  diverse  in  origin,  which  has 
been  the  most  favorable  to  the  acclimatizing  of  these  exotic  ideas 
is,  I  think,  not  yet  decided ;  but  this  much  is  certain,  that  the  old 
soldiers  first  scented  the  filth  of  the  Committee  of  Defense, 
and  were  not  inclined  to  allow  the  legal  sail,  on  which  they 
had  unfortunately  to  fight  against  their  former  comrades,  to  be 
dejiled. 

We  should  certainly  go  too  far  were  we  to  attribute  to  the  po- 
litical sagacity  of  the  old  soldiers  this  scenting — perhaps  prema- 
ture— of  anti-dynastic  tendencies  in  the  acts  of  the  President 
Kossuth,  dating  them  from  the  year  1848. 

As  soon  as  religious,  political,  and  national  ideas  divide  man- 
kind, there  is  a  generally  prevalent  inclination  to  suppose  in  those 
of  a  different  opinion  the  want  of  all  social  as  well  as  private 
virtues ;  and  inversely,  from  the  recognized  deficiency  in  some 
just  then  prized  virtue,  it  is  commonly  immediately  concluded 
that  the  person  deemed  blameworthy  holds  the  opinion,  religious, 
political,  or  national,  which  happens  to  be  most  detested. 

This  weakness  was  not  foreign  to  the  old  troops,  of  monarchic- 
constitutional,  nay,  specifically  dynastic  opinions ;  and  herein, 
I  believe,  was  the  source  of  their — alas  jD-ophetic — presentiment. 

In  the  end  of  October  they  had  confided  in  Kossuth's  assevera- 
tions, J,hat  the  offensive  beyond  the  Lajtha  was  intended  only  for 
the  punishr>ie7it  of  Ban  Jellachich,  and  his  allies,  the  Ban  being 
with  reason  hated  on  account  of  his  intrigues,  which  first  dis- 
united the  army,  and  against  whom,  besides,  they  had  been  mus- 
tered by  the  King's  cousin.  In  the  beginning  of  December  they 
had  received  as  true  and  genuine  Kossuth's  declarations  that, 
according  to  the  literal  meaning  of  their  military  oath,  they  had 
to  become  surety  with  body  and  soul,  notwithstanding  the  'pro- 
claimed change  in  the  throne,  for  King  Ferdinand  V.  and  the 
Constitution  sanctioned  by  him.  They  had  suffered  for  this 
belief,  and  thereby  became  still  more  inaccessible  to  doubt  what 
Kossuth  said. 

When,  after  this,  they  had  come  to  the  painful  conclusion, 
that,  with  the  superior  forces  of  the  enemy,  victory  was  no  longer 
conceivable,  then  they  wished,  out  of  a  national  and  military 
feeling  of  honor,  for  a  last  and  decisive  combat — a  gloi'ious  fall! 

Kossuth  met  them  half-way,  and  promised  them  this  combat 


MT  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  127 

before  the  walls  of  Ofen  ;  he  himself — thus  he  vowed — ivoulcl 
there  jperish  with  them  ! 

And  the  old  soldiers  calculated  upon  it. 

But  Kossuth,  having  had  sufficient  time  to  consider,  since  the 
battle  of  Schwechat  (on  the  30th  of  October)  till  the  moment 
when  he  declared  his  resolution  to  be  buried  under  the  walls  of 
Ofen  (about  the  end  of  December),  whether  the  removal  of  the 
seat  of  government  from  Pesth  to  Debreczin  would  not  perhaps 
be  more  conducive  to  the  welfare  of  the  country — and  neverthe- 
less discovering  for  the  first  time  the  necessity  of  this  change  of 
residence  only  when  he  ought  to  have  redeemed  his  magnanimous 
solemn  promise  ;  it  seemed  as  if  the  so  sudden  recognition  of  the 
possibility  of  saving  the  country  just  as  well  from  Debreczin  had 
itjg  motive  less  in  patriotism  than  in  perceiving  that  Debreczin 
happened  to  be  several  day's  march  farther  than  Pesth  from  the 
head-quarters  of  Field-'jnarshal  Prince  Windischgratz ;  and 
Kossuth,  by  his  improvised  official  "  Sauve  qui  peut /"  behind 
the  Theiss,  seemed  only  a  posteriori  to  have  furnished  proof  that 
he  was  incapable  of  dying  for  the  fatherland. 

In  a  word  :  The  hero  Kossuth  debased  himself  to  a  braggart ; 
and  in  the  eyes  of  the  monarchically-minded  brave  old  soldiers, 
Kossuth  the  braggart  could  only  be  a  republican  ! 

Distrust  took  the  place  of  confidence  in  the  old  troops  toward 
Kossuth.  A  part  of  the  officers  quitted  our  ranks  suddenly  ;  the 
rest  visibly  wavered. 

Only  their  confidence  in  me  could  still  secure  the  latter. 

But  this  had  already  been  struck  two  violent  blows. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  near  Wieselburg  I  had  communi- 
cated to  Kossuth,  in  rather  frivolous  phrase,  the  events  of  the 
day,  intending  to  mitigate  the  painful  impression  which  the  re- 
port of  another  retreat  must  make  on  him. 

The  issue  of  this  contest,  favorable  for  us  directly  on  the  battle- 
field ;  the  entirely  unimpeded  easy  retreat  from  "Wieselburg  to 
Hochstrass,  in  the  face  of  the  danger  of  seeing  our  whole  corps 
dispersed,  to  which  the  most  insignificant  hostile  pursuit  would 
have  exposed  us — had  given  me  the  right  to  call  the  combat 
near  Wieselburg  a  victorious  one  for  us. 

"  Ma  gybztunk .'"  ('  To-day  we  have  vanquished  I')  I  wrote  to 
Kossuth,  and  depicted  in  glowing  colors  the  resolute  bearing  of 
the  hussars  during  the  engagement ;  and  closed  with  the  en- 


128  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

couraging  words,  "  Csak  rajta!  majcl  elhdmink  mi  a  czudarok- 
kali''     ('  Cheer  up  I  we  will  yet  be  rid  of  these  fellows  !') 

Kossuth  had  considered  it  judicious  to  make  this  private  letter 
public  through  the  daily  press. 

Furthermore,  the  Government  had  printed  and  partly  dis- 
tributed a  proclamation  to  the  army,  drawn  up  in  the  spirit  of 
its  last  Pesth  resolutions — I  know  not  by  whom — and,  without 
my  authority,  containing  my  signature.  In  this  I  was  made  to 
urge  the  army  to  a  last  decisive  battle  under  the  walls  of  Ofen, 
in  contradiction  to  the  retreat  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube, 
which  directly  afterward  had  been  ordered  by  me  in  person. 

The  errmieous  supposition,  that  those  private  communications 
about  the  Wieselburg  battle  had  been  intended  by  myself  for 
publication,  and  that  this  proclamation  to  the  army  was  genuine 
— from  the  great  resemblance  of  both  of  them  to  the  official 
rodomontades  of  Messrs.  Kossuth,  Perczel,  and  several  others — 
shook  so  much  the  confidence  even  of  those  officers  who  had  not 
then  deserted  me,  that  I  was  obliged  to  make  haste  to  strengthen 
it  anew  by  an  open  exposition  of  the  tendency  of  our  combat,  as 
I  understood  it.  I  did  this  in  the  following  address  to  my  corps 
d'armee. 

"To    THE    ROYAL    HUNGARIAN    CORPS    d'aRMEE    OF    THE    IJpPER    DaNUBE. 

"  The  advantages  which  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy  has 
obtained  over  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube,  but  especially  the 
more  recent  events,  seem,  through  their  naturally  discouraging  influence, 
to  have  shaken  in  some  cases  even  that  noble  self-reliance  which  united 
lis  all  in  this,  the  most  just  of  struggles. 

"  To  re-animate  this  shaken  self-reliance,  and  thus  revive  that  courage 
which  has  perhaps  in  some  measure  been  depressed,  is  the  first  duty  of  the 
leader. 

"I  discharge  this  duty  especially  by  opening  to  the  corps  d'armee  of 
the  upper  Danube  the  prospect  of  more  favorable  opportunities,  through 
the  impending  diversion  against  a  portion  of  the  enemy ;  but  I  hope  to 
raise  the  self-reliance  of  the  corps  d'armee  principally  by  speaking  out 
openly  and  honestly  my  judgment  and  conviction  concerning  what  has 
already  been  done,  as  well  what  we  have  yet  to  do. 

"I  accepted  the  post  which  was  offered  to  me,  because  I  believe  the 
cause  of  Hungary  to  be  a  just  one. 

"And  I  will  maintain  xnY  post,  so  long  as  it  is  entrusted  to  me,  should 
even  the  best  among  us  become  irresolute,  and  withdraw  their  arm  from 
the  good  cause. 

"This  consciousness  enables  me,  in  judging  of  the  events  since  the  1st 
of  November.  1848,  undisguisedly  to  confess  my  own  mistakes:  hoping 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  129 

thereby  to  give  to  the  corps  d'armee  the  surest  guarantee  that  more  judi- 
cious measures  will  be  taken  in  future. 

"  I  erred  when  1  ceased  to  urge  the  Committee  of  Defense,  by  unanswer- 
able arguments,  to  desist  from  the  defense  and  blockade  of  the  frontier ; 
since  all  the  other  mischances  to  which  the  corps  d'armee  has  been  unde- 
servedly exposed  arose  solely  from  the  fact,  that  in  consequence  of  the 
harassing  fatigues  of  the  outpost  service,  the  organization  as  well  as  the 
augmentation  and  consolidation  of  the  army  remained  only  pious  wishes. 

"I  erred  when,  in  the  head-quarters  at  Bicske,  I  gave  effect  to  the 
positive  order  of  the  Committee  of  Defense  to  retreat  with  the  corps 
d'armee  into  the  first  line  before  Ofen;  because  through  this  retreat,  for 
which  there  was  but  little  reason,  the  corps  d'armee  was  placed  in  the 
ambiguous  light  of  evading  a  serious  conflict,  which  would  have  been 
decisive  for  the  good  cause. 

"  But  I  had  received  these  orders  from  that  authority,  which  the  respon- 
sible Hungarian  minister  of  war.  General  Meszaros,  elected  by  the  country 
to  this  post,  and  confirmed  by  our  King  Ferdinand  V.,  himself  recognized, 
and  still  continues  to  recognize,  as  the  supreme  governing  power ;  for 
upon  its  mandate  he  himself  took,  and  under  its  aegis  retains,  the  com- 
mand over  the  army  on  the  Theiss  against  General  Count  Schlick,  hostilely 
opposed  to  us.  And  I  could  do  this  with  the  calm  consciousness  that  I 
was  committing  no  illegal  action,  nor  misleading  the  royal  Hungarian 
corps  d'armee,  intrusted  to  my  command,  into  any  such  action,  so  long  as 
the  Committee  of  Defense  did  not  disavow  itself. 

"But  when,  on  the  1st  of  January,  1849,  while  the  corps  d'armee  of 
the  upper  Danube,  prepared  for  the  combat,  and  notwithstanding  the 
ordered  retreat  to  the  first  line  near  Ofen,  was  still  posted  at  Hanzabeg, 
Tarnok,  Soskot,  Bia,  &c. — the  Committee  of  Defense,  instead  of  justifying, 
by  its  heroic  perseverance  when  in  the  proximity  of  danger,  the  confidence 
which  we  had  always  reposed  in  its  loyalty,  in  an  unaccountable  manner 
suddenly  left  the  capital ;  and  by  doing  so,  and  stiil  more  by  sending  a 
deputation,  without  our  knowledge  and  consent,  to  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  hostile  troops,  placed  us  in  a  perplexing  and  desperate,  nay,  even 
ambiguous  position ; — then  it  was  that  in  many  a  one  among  us  the  sus- 
picion must  have  arisen  that  we  had  been  degraded  from  the  eminence  due 
to  us  as  defenders  of  the  constitutional  liberty  of  Hungary,  down  to  that 
abasement  in  which  the  usual  methods  for  the  furtherance  of  personal 
private  interests  are  accustomed  to  be  successfully  pursued. 

"  Without  denying  the  loyalty  of  the  Committee  of  Defense — however 
deeply  it  may  have  shaken  by  its  sudden  disappearance  from  the  capital 
our  confidence  in  it — I  believe  it  to  be  my  duty  to  invite  the  corps  d'armee, 
that  it  may  be  preserved  from  the  most  miserable  of  all  fates,  that  of  utter 
internal  dissolution,  either,  after  mature  deliberation,  to  adopt  as  its  own 
the  following  declaration,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  secure  us  against  any 
suppositions  injurious  to  our  honorable  position  ;  or  to  declare  openly  what- 
ever difierent  views  it  may  entertain  on  the  subject." 

{My  signature  follows.) 

This  declaration  runs  thus  : 

"  The  royal  Hungarian  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube — the  nucleus 
of  which,  with  the  stafi",  once  belonged  to  the  Austrian  united  forces,  until, 


no  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

after  the  recognition  of  the  royal  Hungarian  ministry  of  war,  the  Hungarian 
regiments  were  placed  exclusively  under  its  authority — in  obedience  to  the 
will  of  the  constitutional  King  of  Hungary,  took  oath  to  the  Hungarian 
constitution.  It  was  at  first  opposed,  under  the  chief  command  of  the 
Archduke  Palatine,  to  the  royal  imperial  troops  under  Jellachich ;  and,  in 
spite  of  the  saddest  political  confusions,  always  faithful  to  its  oath,  has 
hitherto  complied  only  with  the  orders  of  the  responsible  royal  Hungarian 
ministry  of  war,  or  with  those  of  the  Committee  of  Defense,  declared  by 
the  former  authority  to  be  legal. 

"  Supported  by  this  irrefutable  fact,  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Dan- 
ube accordingly  protests  most  decidedly  against  the  supposition  of  having 
ever  served  the  private  interests  of  any  party  in  Hungary,  and  declares  that 
all  such  rumors  are  infamous  calumnies.  But  the  same  irrefutable  fact  of 
the  vmshaken  fidelity  with  which  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube, 
in  fighting  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Hungarian  constitution,  has  inde- 
fatigably  submitted  itself  to  all  decrees  of  the  Committee  of  Defense,  and 
this  in  spite  of  the  most  inexpressible  privations  and  deceptions,  fairly 
entitled  the  corps  d'armee  to  expect  that  the  Committee  of  Defense  would 
at  least  scrupulously  avoid  one  thing,  namely,  placing  the  corps  d'armee 
in  an  ambiguous  position. 

"  After  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  had  protected  the  front- 
ier, according  to  the  orders  of  the  Committee  of  Defense,  during  a  month 
and  a  half  with  a  rare  self-denial,  by  the  most  fatiguing  outpost  service ; 
— after  it  had  victoriously  repulsed  the  enemy,  though  much  stronger,  in 
the  battle  at  Wieselburg  ; — after  it  had  undauntedly  held  the  desperate 
position  at  Raab,  until  the  moment  when  its  right  flank  was  already  turned 
by  the  enemy,  and  when  its  own  retreat,  necessary  for  the  salvation  of  the 
capitals,  could  be  rendered  possible  only  by  an  obstinate  conflict  with  the 
hostile  turning-column ; — after  it  had  held  itself  ready  for  fight,  partly 
before,  partly  behind  Dotis,  B^nhida,  Neszmely,  Csakviir,  Zamoly,  Ondod, 
and  Sarkany,  until  the  victorious  advance  of  the  enemy's  right  wing  by 
Moor  caused  us  to  resume  the  ofiensive  by  Martonvasar,  though  obliged  in 
consequence  of  the  positive  order  of  the  Committee  of  Defense  to  exchange 
this  oflensive  for  the  defensive  before  Ofen  ;  and  all  this  without  having 
met  with  those  much-dreamt-of  sympathies  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  cir- 
cle on  the  other  side  the  Danube,  and  without  even  the  least  preparation 
having  been  made  by  the  Committee  of  Defense  to  hinder  the  advance  of 
the  enemy's  superior  forces  on  the  main  and  by-roads  to  the  communica- 
tions of  the  above-named  places  ; — there  remained  but  one  consoling  pros- 
pect for  the  much-suffering  corps  d'armee — that  of  a  decisive  combat  im- 
mediately in  front  of  and  in  the  capitals  of  Hungary. 

"  The  former  resolute  tone  of  the  decrees  of  the  Committee  of  Defense, 
as  well  as  its  proclamations  to  the  people,  justified  the  expectation,  that 
at  this  decisive  moment,  so  long  desired  and  now  at  last  come,  it  would 
display  an  all-inspiring  energy. 

"And  instead  of  all  that  should  and  could  have  been  done,  there  arrived 
at  the  head-quarters  at  Promontoriura,  on  the  1st  of  January,  1849  : 

"  1.  The  information  that  the  Committee  of  Defense  had  left  the  cap- 
itals. 

*'  2.  A  decree  of  the  Committee  of  Defense,  that  a  decisive  battle  should 
be  fought  upon  the  first  line  before  Ofen,  at  the  height  of  Teteny,  Bia, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTJNGAEY.  131 

&c.,  but  without  sacrificing  the  corps  d'armee,  or  exposing  the  cap- 
itals to  a  bombardment ;  that  is  to  say,  were  the  battle  lost,  the 
corps  d'armee,  in  spite  of  only  one  passage  being  secured  across,  and 
in  spite  of  the  pursuing  enemy,  should  be  saved  upon  the  left  bank 
of  the  Danube,  without  the  defense  of  the  town. 
"3.   The  order  to  escort  a  deputation  to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 

enemy's  army. 
"  Any  one  of  these  three  facts,  viewed  separately,  would  have  been  suf- 
ficient in  itself  to  shake  the  confidence  of  the  corps  d'armee  in  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Committee  of  Defense  ;  but  taken  together  they  must  excite 
apprehensions  that  the  corps  d'armee  had  been,  up  to  this  moment — to 
use  the  mildest  expression — a  useful  but  dangerous  tool  in  unpracticed 
hands. 

"  To  be  able  to  maintain  its  position  unshaken  and  upon  strictly  lawful 
grounds  amid  the  political  intrigues  to  which  our  poor  country  may  very 
shortly  be  exposed,  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  publicly  makes 
the  following  declaration  : 

"1.  The  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  remains  faithful  to  its 
oath,  to  fight  resolutely  against  every  external  enemy  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  constitution  of  the  kingdom  of  Hungary  sanctioned  by 
King  Ferdinand  V. 
"2.  With  the  same  resolution,  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube 
will  oppose  itself  to  all  those  who  may  attempt  to  overthrow  the  con- 
stitutional monarchy  by  untimely  republican  intrigues  in  the  interior 
of  the  country. 
"3.  It  is  a  natural  consequence  of  the  right  understanding  of  constitu- 
tional monarchy — a  form  of  government  for  the  maintenance  of  which 
the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  is  determined  to  contend  to  the 
last — that  it  can  obey  only  and  exclusively  those  orders  which  are 
forwarded  to  it  in  the  form  prescribed  by  law  through  the  responsible 
royal  Hungarian  minister  of  war,  or  through  his  representative  ap- 
pointed by  himself  (at  present  General  Vetter). 
"4.  The  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube,  mindful  of  the  oath  taken 
to  the  constitution  of  Hungary,  and  mindful  of  its  own  honor,  having 
remained  perfectly  conscious  of  what  it  has  to  do  and  is  determined  to 
do,  declares,  finally,  that  it  will  adhere  to  the  result  of  any  conven- 
tion made  with  the  enemy,  only  if  it  guarantees  on  the  one  hand  the 
integrity  of  the  constitution  of  Hungary,  to  which  the  corps  d'armee 
has  sworn,  and  on  the  other,  if  it  is  not  inimical  to  the  military  honor 
of  the  corps  d'armee  itself. 

(My  signature  follows.) 

Neither  within  or  without  my  corps  d'armee,  to  my  knowl- 
edge has  any  voice  puhlicly  been  heard  against  this  proclama- 
tion. 

The  old  soldiers  regained  their  confidence  in  me  and  in  the 
cause  which  I  represented,  and  ceased  to  waver. 

They  could  not  anticipate  that  they  had  come  out  of  the  rain 
to  get  under  the  spout — thanks  to  the  dependence  of  the  war- 


132  MY  LIPE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

minister  Meszaros  on  the  president  Kossuth ;  a  fact  of  which 
tliey  were  not  then  aware. 

I,  on  the  contrary,  had  already  remarked  when  in  Preshurg 
manifold  indications  that  Meszaros  was  not  independent,  but  had 
considered  these,  at  that  time,  only  as  a  natural  consequence  of 
his  really  powerless  position,  from  the  good  understanding  exist- 
ing between  myself  and  Kossuth,  and  found  no  reason  for  sus- 
pecting that  symptoms  of  a  moral  defect  remained  in  the  cour- 
ageous old  soldier — the  original  existence  of  which  could  not  be 
reconciled  either  with  Meszaros  remaining  at  his  post,  nor  with 
the  obstinacy  with  which  he  had  hitherto  opposed  every  modifi- 
cation in  war-business  though  approved  of  by  experienced  mil- 
itary men — after  this  jxnverless  position  of  the  minister  of  war 
had  been  changed  into  a  powerful  one  by  my  decided  espousing 
of  his  side. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

The  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube,  according  to  the 
muster-rolls  consisting  of  from  15,000  to  16,000  men,  underwent 
in  Waizen  a  new  classification  into  four  divisions  :  two  wing- 
divisions,  one  centre  division,  and  one  reserve. 

Colonel  Aulich  commanded  the  division  of  the  right  wing. 
Colonel  Kmety  that  of  the  centre.  Colonel  Count  Guy  on  that  of 
the  reserve.  The  command  of  the  division  of  the  left  wing  was 
likewise  confided  to  a  Honved  colonel. 

Each  division  consisted  of  two  brigades,  under  distinct  brigade- 
commanders. 

These  divisions  were  almost  equal  in  strength,  and  differed 
little  from  each  other  in  their  relative  proportions  of  the  three 
kinds  of  force  (infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery). 

The  division  of  the  left  wing  alone  was  directed  from  Waizen 
along  the  Danube  as  far  as  the  Eipel  (Ipoly),  but  afterward  in  a 
northwestern  direction,  on  the  shortest  line,  toward  Tyrnau.  The 
division  of  the  right  wing  moved  at  the  same  time  by  Retsag, 
Nagy-Oroszi,  Szanto,  Levencz  (Leva),  Yerebely,  toward  Leopold- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  133 

stadt,  the  fort  on  the  Waag  to  "be  relieved.  The  right  flank  was 
followed  at  intervals  of  a  day's  march  by  the  centre  and  the  re- 
serve. 

By  detaching  the  division  of  the  left  wing  between  the  fortress 
of  Komorn  and  the  hostile  corps  concentrated  round  Leopoldstadt, 
it  was  intended  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  latter  at  first  from 
the  danger  menacing  from  the  south,  and  to  induce  it  to  lay 
itself  open  to  our  principal  attack  from  the  east. 

On  the  10th  of  January  the  divisions  of  both  wings  reached 
the  little  river  Zsitva,  the  right  wing  near  Yerebely,  the  left  two 
(German)  miles  southward  from  that  place  ;  the  division  of  the 
centre,  together  with  the  head-quarters,  Levencz ;  that  of  the 
reserve,  Szanto. 

The  division  of  the  right  wing  (Aulich)  was  the  van-guard, 
and  the  division  of  the  reserve  (Guyon)  the  rear-guard  of  the 
corps  d'armee. 

On  the  said  day  the  Aulich  division  on  its  entrance  into  Vere- 
bely  encountered  the  van-guard  of  the  hostile  corps  under  Field- 
marshal  Lieutenant  Simunich ;  while  the  Guyon  division,  just 
when  marching  out  from  Ipolysag  was  overtaken  and  attacked 
by  the  hostile  corps  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Csorich,  which 
had  been  ordered  to  pursue  us. 

The  reports  of  both  occurrences  reached  my  head-quarters  at 
Levencz  almost  at  the  same  time. 

Colonel  Count  Guyon,  too  weak  to  repel  the  hostile  attack, 
had  soon  withdrawn,  with  little  loss,  and  speedily  continued  his 
march  to  Szanto. 

The  division  of  the  left  wing  advanced  on  the  11th  of  January 
from  the  river  Zsitva  to  Komjathi  on  the  river  JSTeutra ;  the 
other  three  divisions  of  the  corps  d'armee  had  to  rest  a  day  in 
their  stations  of  Verebely,  Levencz,  and  Szanto. 

I  left  Levencz  on  the  morning  of  this  day  to  ride  to  Szanto, 
that  I  might  learn  the  particulars  of  the  conflict  which  had  taken 
place  at  Ipolysag.  On  my  route  I  heard  some  discharges  of  artil- 
lery from  the  direction  of  Szanto.  I  could  only  suppose  that  the 
Guyon  division  had  been  again  attacked,  and  quickened  my  pace. 

At  about  half  an  hour's  distance  from  Szanto  I  found  the 
Guyon  division  in  a  defensive  position  a  cheval  of  the  road,  ex- 
pecting the  attack  of  the  enemy,  though  he  was  nowhere  to  be 
seen.     The  cannon-shots  had  been  fired  at  a  party  of  our  own 


134  MY  LIFE  ANP  ACTS  IN  HITNGAUY. 

recruits,  which  marched  across  the  fields  toward  the  division,  for 
the  purpose  of  joining  it. 

Colonel  Count  Guy  on  was  certainly  a  very  brave  officer,  but 
his  ignorance  equaled  his  braveiy.  Without  having  sent  out 
even  a  single  patrol  from  Szanto  toward  Ipolysag,  which  would 
have  brought  him  long  ago  the  certain  news  that  the  enemy  was 
still  in  Ipolysag  ;  he  had  given  away  to  the  unfounded  apprehen- 
sion that  he  was  most  obstinately  pursued,  had  started  at  day- 
break from  Szanto  toward  Levencz,  and  believed  that  he  must 
prepare  for  a  mortal  combat  on  the  very  spot  where  I  found  him 
vainly  expecting  the  enemy.  He  had  taken  the  recruits  for  a 
hostile  turning-column.  The  few  shots  which  he  fired  at  them 
completely  sufficed  to  frighten  the  poor  devils  hap-hazard  into 
tJiat  valley  which  was  situated  between  his  position  and  the 
declivity  on  which  they  had  just  marched.  But  Colonel  Guyon 
thought  this  movement  was  a  desperate  attempt  to  attack  his 
position,  until  at  last  he  was  awoke  from  his  dream  by  some 
volunteer  hussars  who  had  been  ordered  to  charge  the  recruits. 

While  Colonel  Guyon  expected  the  enemy  in  his  position  be- 
tween Szanto  and  Levencz,  the  latter  could  unobserved  take  the 
shortest  road  from  Ipolysag,  by  Nemeti,  to  Schemnitz  (Selmecz- 
banya),  and^  occupy  the  district  of  the  mountain-towns  without 
drawing  a  blade  ;  or  he  could  rest  himself  in  Ipolysag  for  one  or 
even  two  days,  after  his  recent  forced  march,  and  make  the 
brave  Colonel  Guyon  for  the  present  maintain  his  most  injudi- 
ciously chosen  position — against  ennui. 

After  I  had  emphatically  represented  this  to  Colonel  Guyon,  I 
ordered  his  division  back  into  the  places  lying  nearest  to  the  road 
toward  Levencz,  that  it  might  the  more  speedily  be  supp(;iied  by 
the  Kmety  division,  stationed  in  Levencz  in  the  event  of  a  hostile 
attack,  perhaps  even  in  the  course  of  the  day,  being  made  upon 
their  cantonment. 

The  principal  object  of  our  operations,  commenced  from  Waizen 
was,  as  I  had  already  indicated  in  my  proclamation,  to  act  on 
the  offensive  against  the  hostile  corps  under  Field-marshal 
Lieutenant  Simunich,  and  especially  to  relieve  the  fmt  of  Leo- 
poldstadt  on  the  Waag,  blockaded  by  him. 

The  first  intimation  I  had  of  the  untenableness  of  this  fort — 
even  against  a  mere  bombardment — was  when  I  was  in  Raab, 
and  when  it  was  already  too  late  to  withdraw  its  garrison  and 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  135 

armament  without  danger.  This  had  now  to  be  done  after  all, 
if  possible,  by  the  relief  of  the  fort. 

Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Csorich's  hostile  operations  in  my 
rear — although  we  had  expected  something  of  the  kind,  nay,  by 
our  eccentric  retreat  from  the  capitals  had,  as  has  been  mention- 
ed, fully  calculated  on  it — rendered  my  offensive  against  Field- 
marshal  Lieutenant  Siraunich  an  undertaking  attended  with 
great  risk. 

Nevertheless  I  persisted  in  its  execution,  until  at  length  the 
well-founded  representations  of  the  new  chief  of  my  general  staff 
— appointed  in  the  stead  of  Lieut. -colonel  (formerly  Major)  Pusz- 
telnik,  who  was  unfit  for  this  post — succeeded  in  deciding  me  to 
choose  another  object  for  my  operations. 

He  urged  me  to  consider  : 

That  the  leading  idea  of  our  march  toward  the  north,  namely, 
•'  the  diversion  of  the  hostile  main  forces  from  the  Theiss,  so  as 
to  render  possible  the  organization  of  new  troops  behind  that 
river,''  presupposed,  as  a  fundamental  consideration,  i)ajQ  preserva- 
tion of  the  corps  d'armee. 

That  to  effect  both  of  these  objects,  we  must  restrict  ourselves 
to  mere  demonstrations,  and  avoid  any  actual  combat  that  would 
endanger  the  existence  of  the  corps. 

That  should  we,  in  the  end,  not  succeed  in  relieving  Leopold- 
stadt  ;  being  surrounded  on  the  north,  east,  and  west  by  hostile 
corps  who  were  confident  of  victory,  we  should  be  forced  to  re- 
treat toward  the  south,  to  the  fortress  of  Komorn,  or  to  fight 
our  way  between  Gran  (Esztergom)  and  Komorn  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Danube.  But  in  the  first  of  these  cases  we  ran  the 
risk  of  discouraging  the  garrison  of  this,  the  most  important  bul- 
wark in  the  country,  far  more  than  it  would  have  been  by  the 
closest  investment ;  while  in  the  latter  case  we  should,  in  addi- 
tion, expose  our  own  corps  to  the  greatest  danger. 

That,  consequently,  the  injurious  results  of  a  failure  in  the 
attempt  to*  relieve  Leopoldstadt  bore  a  striking  disproportion  to 
the  advantages  which  could  result  to  us,  even  under  the  most 
favorable  circumstances,  from  its  successful  deliverance. 

That,  from  the  position  just  taken  up  by  the  hostile  forces,  the 
relief  of  Leopoldstadt  was  almost  without  any  further  influence. 

That  this  relief,  according  to  the  intention  of  the  leading  idea 
of  our  march  toward  the  north,  was  to  be  nothing  else  than  the 


136  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY. 

commencement  of  those  demonstrations  by  which  we  hoped  "  to 
divert  the  hostile  'main  artnij  from  the  Theiss."" 

That  the  deliverance  of  the  garrison  of  Leopoldstadt,  and  the 
reinforcement  of  our  corps  d'armee  thereby,  was  only  a  secondary 
aim — a  welcome  addition,  as  it  were,  to  the  advantages  which 
our  cause  would  derive  from  the  realization  of  this  idea. 

But  this  idea — the  chief  of  my  general  staff  argued  farther — 
was  already  realized,  the  enemy  having  fallen  into  the  snare  eve^i 
earliei  than,  witJwut  under-esti'niating  him,  we  could  have  ex- 
pected. 

The  moment  of  greatest  danger  for  our  cause  was  fortunately 
gone  by  ;  for  a  hostile  ofiensive  from  Pesth  against  Debreczin  Avas 
scarcely  any  longer  to  be  feared,  now  that  Field-marshal  Lieu- 
tenant Csorich  had  been  sent  on  our  track. 

It  was  therefore  impossible  for  me  not  to  perceive  that  our  next 
operations  must  now  be  directed  solely  to  the  deliverance  of  the 
corps  d'armee  from  a  position  which  was  already  critical  enough 
to  endanger  its  very  existence.  To  effect  this,  even  the  garrison 
of  the  fort  of  Leopoldstadt  must  be  sacrificed,  if  necessary.  How- 
ever great  this  sacrifice  might  appear,  any  attempt  to  save  the 
garrison  was  connected  with  still  greater  disadvantages.  The 
line  of  the  retreat  into  the  mountain-towns  was  still  open  to  us 
for  the  next  twenty-four  hours ;  but  not  after  the  expiration  of 
that  time.  The  rigor  of  the  season  augmented  the  hardships  of. 
the  war— carried  on  now  by  us  under  the  most  unfavorable  cir- 
cumstances— to  such  a  degree,  that  they  of  themselves  were 
sufficient  to  destroy  our  troops  even  without  direct  co-operation  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy.  Some  days'  rest  seemed  to  him  to  have 
now  become  of  the  most  urgent  importance  in  reference  to  the 
existence  of  the  corps  d'armee.  A  great  part  of  it  was  but  very 
imperfectly  clad.  The  supplies  of  cloth,  leather,  and  linen,  which 
we  had  discovered,  and  taken  with  us,  at  the  last  moment,  when 
marching  out  from  Waizen,  might  perhaps  be  sufficient  to  rem- 
edy this  deficiency.  But  of  this  stock  of  cloth,  leathei*,  and  linen, 
garments  had  previously  to  be  made.  This,  however,  could  not 
be  accomplished  while  on  the  march.  For  this  purpose  several 
days'  rest  was  necessary.  This  would  be  secured  to  us  by  the 
immediate  occupation  of  the  mountain-towns,  and  moreover  an 
important  part  also  of  our  line  of  retreat  toward  the  upper  Theiss. 

Consequently  he  could  by  no  means  approve  of  the  offensive 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  137 

against  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Simunich,  and  proposed  the 

RETREAT  SIDEWAYS  INTO   THE  DISTRICT  OF  THE  MOUNTAIN-TOWNS. 

More  brilliant,  more  alluring — he  said  finally — might  appear 
to  me  the  deliverance  of  Leopoldstadt ;  more  favorable  perhaps 
to  my  renown,  if  it  succeeded  ;  but  to  avoid  any  critical  conflicts 
seemed  to  him  at  present  nevertheless  more  judicious,  even  if  we 
thereby  repeatedly  exposed  ourselves  to  the  suspicion  of  faint- 
heartedness. If  the  affairs  of  Hungary  were  still  as  bad  as  they 
luere  a  fm'tnight  ago,  he  would  not  advise  a  retreat.  But  they 
were  now — he  said — already  incomparably  better,  thanks  to  the 
blindness  of  the  enemy  !  The  uninterrupted  continuation  of 
the  offensive  against  Debreczin  might  have  destroyed  at  one  blow 
the  sineivs  of  our  resistance.  But,  as  it  seemed,  Prince  Windisch- 
gratz  preferred  to  prepare  for  us  a  lingering,  torturing  death. 
What  have  we  to  do  now  ?  Let  us  continue  to  give  him  the 
oppoi-tunity  of  trifling  away,  i7i  these  preparations,  nwre  time 
and  strength:  the  nation  will  probably  recover  in  the 

MEANWHILE  FROM  ITS  FIRST  PANIC  TERROR. 

I  could  not  deny  the  correctness  of  these  opinions,  and  gave  up 
the  offensive  against  Field-marshal  Simunich,  though  not  with- 
out inward  reluctance. 

This  reluctance  sprang  from  the  painful  thought  of  abandoning 
the  garrison  of  Leopoldstadt  to  certain  destruction,  among  whom 
also  were  two  men,  who  having  been  my  intimate  friends  in  early 
days,  remained  still  dear  to  me. 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

By  the  "  district  of  the  mountain-towns"  is  here  to  be  under- 
stood, without  regard  to  political  divisions,  that  tract  of  land  in 
the  valley  of  the  river  Gran,  which  includes  especially  the  towns 
of  Schemnitz  (Selmeczbanya),  Kremnitz  (Kormoczbanya),  Altsohl 
(0-Z61yom),  and  Neusohl  (Beszterczebanya). 

The  Gran  (Garam)  flows  through  this  district  from  Neusohl  to 
Heiligenkreuz  (Szentkereszt)  almost  at  a  right  angle,  turning 
from  the  western  direction  in  which  it  reaches  Neusohl  suddenly 


138  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY. 

to  the  south,  and  at  Altsohl  bends  again  just  as  suddenly  to  the 
west,  at  Heiligenkreuz  first  resuming  the  new-shaped  direction 
of  its  course  from  the  source  to  the  mouth. 

The  lofty  boundaries  of  the  valley  of  the  Gran,  partly  covered 
with  forests,  partly  rocky,  to  the  south  as  well  as  to  the  north, 
can,  so  far  as  they  limit  the  district  just  named,  be  traversed 
with  artilleiy  only  at  detached  points  ;  while  an  offensive  ad- 
vance with  strong  columns  from  the  south  into  the  valley  itself 
appears  to  be  hazardous  on  account  of  the  frequent  crossing  of 
the  road  from  one  bank  of  the  river  to  the  other,  with  the 
dangerous  proximity  of  a  hostile  cantonment  in  and  around 
Schemnitz. 

Two  main  roads,  leading  from  the  south  into  the  district  of 
the  mountain-towns,  meet  at  Schemnitz,  one  from  Ipolysag  by 
Nemeti,  the  other  from  Levencz  by  Frauenmarkt  (Bath).  There 
exists,  besides,  another  western  by-road,  which,  near  Zsarnock 
and  by  Hodrics,  joins  Schemnitz  with  the  road  that  likewise 
leads  from'  the  south  upward  into  the  valley  of  the  Gran. 

The  other  approaches  from  the  south  into  the  district  of  the 
mountain-towns  conduct  to  Altsohl,  having  previously  united 
into  one  road  two  or  three  (German)  miles  before  reaching  this 
town. 

Across  the  northern  boundaries  of  the  valley  of  the  Gran  two 
roads  lead  out  of  the  valley  of  the  Turocz  from  Mosocz  into  the 
territory  of  the  mountain-towns  ;  on  the  one  side  by  Turcsek  to 
Kremnitz,  on  the  other  by  Hermanecz  to  Neusohl ;  and  a  third 
out  of  the  upper  valley  of  the  Vag  from  Rosenberg,  across  the 
mountain  of  Sturecz,  likewise  to  Neusohl. 

Further,  a  fourth  line  of  communication  leads  out  of  the  valley 
of  the  Neutra  from  Privigye  to  Kremnitz. 

Neusohl  and  Kremnitz  were  at  that  time  menaced  only  from 
the  valley  of  the  Turocz,  and  this  by  the  hostile  brigade  of  Ma- 
jor-general Gotz  and  his  allies  the  Sclavonian  militia  ;  but  the 
above-mentioned  approaches  were  easy  to  defend,  and,  as  well  as 
the  valleys  of  the  upper  Waag  and  Gran,  were  still  in  our 
possession. 

The  southern  mountain-towns,  Altsohl  and  Schemnitz,  appeared 
to  be  more  seriously  menaced  than  the  two  northern  ones,  espe- 
cially Schemnitz,  it  being  exposed  to  attack  from  three  sides  at 
the  same  time. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  139 

But  innumerable  difficulties  awaited  the  aggressor,  by  reason 
of  the  extremely  rigorous  winter,  and  the  deep  snow  on  the 
mountains  :  and  the  chief  of  my  general  staff  could  therefore 
really  predict  with  much  probability,  that  we  should  be  able  to 
maintain  ourselves  in  the  mountain-towns  easily  until  our  troops 
should  have  recovered  themselves. 

The  position  of  our  corps  d'armee  on  the  evening  of  the  11th 
of  January  1849  was,  as  before  mentioned,  the  following  : 

The  division  of  the  left  wing  in  Komjathi,  on  the  river  Neutra. 

The  Aulich  division  in  Verebely,  on  the  river  Zsitva. 

The  Kmety  division  in  Levencz,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river 
Gran. 

The  Guyon  division  in  Varsany,  on  the  road  from  Ipolysag  to 
Levencz. 

Before  us,  in  Neutra  (Nyitra),  on  the  river  of  the  same  name, 
stood  a  part  of  the  hostile  corps  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant 
Simunich ;  in  our  rear,  in  Ipolysag,  that  of  Field-marshal  Lieu- 
tenant Csorich. 

Schemnit'z,  the  next  to  our  position  and  at  the  same  time  most 
important  point  for  us  of  the  mountain-towns,  was  consequently 
nearer  to  us  than  to  the  two  hostile  corps  ;  the  road  from  Levencz 
to  Schemnitz  could  not  be  endangered  by  either  of  them  so  long 
as  we  were  posted  as  above  indicated  :  nevertheless  it  was  pos- 
sible, if  we  delayed  any  longer  in  Levencz,  that  Field-marshal 
Lieutenant  Csorich  might  reach  this  point  before  us,  if  he  had 
started  early  on  the  11th  from  Ipolysag,  by  Nemeti,  toward 
Schemnitz,  advancing  onward  in  the  valley  of  the  Schemnitz- 
Bach.  In  fact,  on  the  evening  of  the  1 1th  we  were  informed  by 
a  scout,  that  a  hostile  column  had  been  seen  in  the  course  of  the 
day  marching  along  the  road  from  Ipolysag  to  Schemnitz  ;  its 
strength,  however,  was  not  indicated  more  precisely. 

For  the  purpose  of  again  getting  the  start  of  this  column,  the 
Kmety  division  had  to  set  out  during  the  night  between  the  11th 
and  12th  of  January  from  Levencz,  by  Frauenmarkt,  toward 
Schemnitz. 

The  Aulich  division  left  Verebely  on  the  12th,  and  took  its 
route  by  St.  Benedict  (Szent  Benedek)  and  Heiligenkreuz  to 
Kremnitz. 

The  division  of  the  left  wing,  leaving  Komjathi  likewise  on 
the  12th,  should  follow  it  as  far  as  Heiligenkreuz  ;  but  from 


140  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

thence  march  to  Altsohl,  occupy  this  place,  and  advance  its 
outposts  immediately  toward  the  south  as  far  as  Dobronyiva 
(Dobrona). 

During  the  course  of  the  12th,  in  order  to  protect  these  opera- 
tions, the  Guyon  division  should  oppose  to  the  uttermost  the 
advance  beyond  Levencz  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Csorich. 

Being  forced  to  suppose  that  there  was  an  offensive  under- 
standing between  the  movements  of  the  two  hostile  corps,  which 
menaced  us  in  front  and  rear,  there  remained,  notwithstanding 
all  the  circumspection  of  the  chief  of  my  general  staff,  reason 
enough  to  apprehend,  on  the  one  hand,  that  we  should  find 
Schemnitz  already  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  on  the  other,  see 
the  division  of  our  left  wing  destroyed. 

Fortunately,  however,  there  existed  only  an  "  observing''  un- 
derstanding between  the  two  hostile  corps  ;  and  thus  it  became 
possible  for  us  to  lead  the  corps  d'armee  "of  the  upper  Danube" 
without  accident  into  the  district"  of  the  mountain-towns. 

The  Kmety  division,  together  with  my  head-quarters,  reached 
FrauQnmarkt  during  the  night  between  the  11th  and  12th. 
From  hence  a  small  column  of  infantry  with  two  guns  was 
dispatched  without  delay  across  the  mountains  to  Prinzdorf 
(Prencsfalu),  on  the  road  to  Nemeti,  with  directions  to  turn  to 
the  south  immediately  after  reaching  that  point,  to  occupy  the 
narrow  valley  of  Teplicska,  and  to  send  out  patrols  as  far  as 
Nemeti.  The  main  body  of  the  Kmety  division  continued, 
likewise  during  the  night,  its  march  to  Schemnitz,  and  arrived 
thither  early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  12th,  while  almost  at  the 
same  moment  some  lancers  of  the  corps  of  Field-marshal  Lieu- 
tenant Csorich  were  taken  prisoners  in  Nemeti  by  the  patrols  of 
the  Prinzdorf  column. 

On  the  15th  of  January  the  divisions  stood  thus  : 

The  Aulich  division  in  Kremnitz,  with  the  outposts  to  the 
north  in  Perk,  to  the  south  and  west  in  Heiligenkreuz. 

The  Kmety  division  in  Neusohl,  with  the  outposts  toward  the 
northwest  in  Hermanecz. 

The  division  of  the  left  wing  in  Altsohl,  with  the  outposts 
toward  the  south  in  Dobronyiva,  toward  the  southeast  in 
Szalatna  ;  and 

The  Guyon  division  in  Schemnitz  and  Windschacht,  with  the 
outposts  toward  the  south,  on  the  road  to  Levencz. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  141 

For  the  protection  of  both  flanks  of  the  Guyon  division,  Princz- 
dorf  and  Teplicska,  on  the  road  to  Nemeti,  continued  to  be  occu- 
pied by  a  detachment  of  the  Kmety  division  ;  and  Zsarnocz, 
westward  from  Schemnitz,  in  the  valley  of  the  Gran,  on  the  road 
to  St.  Benedict,  by  a  part  of  the  Aulich  division. 


CHAPTEU  XVIII. 

The  troops  on  their  march  had  found  the  communications  into 
the  mountain-towns  partly  covered  with  ice,  partly  blocked  up 
with  snow,  and  only  with  great  exertions  had  they  been  able  to 
advance.  The  same  obstacles  could  not  but  make  it  appear 
doubtful  whether  there  would  be  any  hostile  attack  against  the 
mountain-towns  for  a  considerable  time.  But  scarcely  had  the 
divisions  entered  their  presumptive  winter-quarters  when  a  thaw 
came  on,  and  smoothed  for  the  enemy  the  roads  which  ice  and 
snow  had  made  so  very  difficult  for  us. 

It  is  true  that  Colonel  Aulich,  soon  after  his  arrival  in  Krera- 
nitz,  had  by  repeated  forced  reconnoiterings  toward  Turcsek  on 
the  road  from  Kremnitz  to  Mosocz  so  energetically  frustrated  the 
attacks  intended  by  the  brigade  of  Major-general  Gotz  and  the 
Sclavonian  free-troops,  that  we  could  not  in  future  be  molested 
from  this  side  ;  but  the  danger  menaced  more  seriously  in  the 
south. 

The  corresponding  news  received  from  scouts  announced  the 
approach  of  considerable  hostile  forces  on  the  roads  from  Frauen- 
markt  and  St.  Benedict. 

The  detachment  in  Zsarnocz,  which  ought  to  have  yielded 
only  to  a  superior  hostile  attack,  abandoned  this  position ; 
whether  through  ignorance  or  cowardice  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
mander could  not  be  ascertained. 

Zsarnocz  had  again  to  be  occupied  by  us,  in  order  to  secure 
Schemnitz,  in  case  of  a  hostile  attack  on  the  road  to  Frauen- 
markt.  The  Guyon  division,  however,  could  not  be  further 
weakened  by  detaching  any. part  of  its  troops.  Consequently 
the  Aulich  division  received  an  order  to  occupy  Zsarnocz  again 


142  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

with  a  battalion  of  infantry.  Thtf  commander  of  the  battalion 
dispatched  for  this  purpose,  while  on  his  march  from  Heiligen- 
kreuz  toward  Zsarnocz,  heard  it  rumored  that  the  enemy  was 
already  in  possession  of  the  place,  and  turned  immediately  to 
the  "  right  about,"  because  his  orders  happened  to  say  nothing 
about  "  attacking,"  and  also  made  no  mention  of  the  possibility 
of  the  enemy's  being  in  Zsarnocz. 

On  the  20th  of  January,  when  in  Neusohl,  I  received  intelli- 
gence of  this  unwelcome  incident,  and  hastened  the  same  night 
to  Kremnitz,  to  lead  in  person  a  column  from  thence  to  Zsar- 
nocz. 

On  the  evening  of  the  21st  of  January  I  had  reached  it  with 
a  battalion  of  the  foot-regiment  Alexander,  a  squadron  of  the 
ninth  regiment  of  hussars,  and  a  three-pounder  battery  of  six 
pieces.  The  hostile  Colonel  CoUery,  by  advancing  from  the 
south  upward  along  the  valley  of  the  Gran,  had  arrived  at 
Zsarnocz  the  day  before  with  the  twelfth  battalion  of  chasseurs, 
some  cavalry,  and  about  half  a  rocket-battery,  but  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  21st  of  January  had  continued  his  march  by 
Hodrics  toward  Schemnitz. 

By  the  attack  which  it  was  to  be  foreseen  the  hostile  turning- 
column  would  make  on  the  following  day,  the  Guyon  division 
could  easily  be  forced  to  abandon  its  position  near  Windschacht, 
and  as  a  consequence  even  Schemnitz. 

To  frustrate  this  I  resolved  to  march  after  Colonel  Collery  and 
attack  him  in  his  rear. 

Colonel  Guyon  was  informed  of  this  project  during  the  night 
between  the  21st  and  22d  of  January,  and  ordered  on  his  part  to 
anticipate  the  attack  of  the  enemy's  turning-column. 

The  road  from  Zsarnock  to  Schemnitz  leads,  as  has  been  said, 
by  Hodrics,  in  a  narrow  valley,  ascending  to  the  northern  thickly- 
wooded  bank,  at  first  gently  in  the  bottom  of  the  valley,  but 
above  the  last-named  place  rather  steeply.  Here  the  road  had 
been  made  impracticable  in  several  places  by  natural  abatis, 
which  so  far  as  was  absolutely  necessary  were  manned  by  us, 
but  only  with  volunteers,  and  more  for  observation  than  for 
defense. 

"When  I  broke  up  very  early  on  the  22d  of  January  from  Zsar- 
nocz toward  Hodrics,  I  hoped  to  find  the  enemy  still  delayed  by 
the  abatis,  and  occupied  in  removing  them,     I  was,  however, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY.  143 

soon  informed  that  he  had  succeeded  in  overcoming  all  these  hin- 
drances during  the  course  of  the  preceding  night. 

From  Hodrics  I  despatched  strong  patrols  in  a  southeastern 
direction,  partly  to  harass  likewise  the  enemy  posted  before  Wind- 
schacht,  partly  to  give  intelligence  to  the  Guyon  division  of  our 
approach,  which  I  always  presumed  to  be  still  in  its  position 
before  Windschacht. 

Higher  up  than  those  parts  of  the  road  on  which  the  remains 
of  the  removed  abatis  were  still  to  be  seen,  we  encountered  the 
enemy.  He  had  occupied  the  declivity  of  the  mountain  above 
the  road  with  sharp-shooters  on  a  point  favorable  for  commanding 
the  road. 

I  ordered  a  company  on  to  the  height  of  the  wooded  mountain- 
side, to  eject  the  hostile  sharp-shooters,  or  at  least  divide  their 
fire,  and  thus  facilitate  the  advance  of  a  storming-column  of  in- 
fantry along  the  road. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Pusztelnik — a  short  time  before,  as  has  been 
mentioned,  the  chief  of  my  general  staff,  but  now  commander  of 
the  brigade  to  which  belonged  the  battalion  of  the  foot-regiment 
Alexander  engaged  in  this  attack — had  voluntarily  joined  this 
expedition,  and  undertook  in  person  the  command  of  the  company 
sent  on  to  the  height. 

In  case  the  storm  on  tlje  road  should  be  repulsed,  I  ordered 
two  guns  to  advance  and  be  unlimbered  :  intending  by  their  fire 
to  stop  the  pursuing  enemy,  and  protect  our  preparations  for  a 
renewed  attack.  The  rest  of  the  battery  remained  with  the 
rear-guard,  as  did  also  the  greater  part  of  the  cavalry. 

Several  hussars  had  voluntarily  galloped  along  that  part  ol 
the  road  which  the  fire  of  the  enemy  commanded,  but  were 
received  with  such  a  brisk  volley  of  musketry,  that  they  were 
forced  to  turn  back  as  quickly  as  possible.  This  of  itself  sufhced 
to  discourage  the  infantry,  among  whom  was  a  very  large  num- 
ber of  recruits.  Nevertheless  our  sharp-shooters  on  the  declivity 
meanwhile  opened  their  fire ;  and  now  I  believed  the  moment 
had  arrived  for  advancing  the  storming-column  on  the  main- 
road.  But  after  the  first  hostile  shots,  it  turned  back  ;  and  there 
was  the  less  chance  of  stopping  it,  as  the  enemy  itself  sent  for- 
ward along  the  road  a  small  division  of  chasseurs  with  crossed 
bayonets. 

A  panic  terror  seized  the  infantry  and  the  cannoneers  of  the 


144  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

two  unlimbered  guns.  They  turned  in  disgraceful  flight.  The 
hussars  would  have  barred  their  passage,  but  they  crawled  away 
under  the  horses,  although  the  horsemen  kept  slashing  at  them 
with  their  swords.  In  the  dreadful  confusion  thereby  produced, 
the  artillery-horses  took  fright ;  and  of  the  rest  of  the  battery,  ex- 
cept one  piece,  part  tumbled  down  the  declivity,  part  could  not 
at  all  be  got  again  under  way. 

The  commander  of  the  battery,  struck  by  a  ball  from  the 
enemy,  had  fallen  near  the  two  unlimbered  guns  ;  while  his 
men,  leaving  their  pieces  behind  them,  ran  away  with  the  imple- 
ments necessary  for  loading. 

During  my  fruitless  efforts  to  keep  the  most  courageous  of 
the  infantry  together  for  the  protection  of  these  guns,  I  was  my- 
self forced  back  by  degrees  to  the  place  where  they  had  been 
planted.  Some  balls  whistling  past  us  in  rapid  succession  caused 
me  soon  to  be  left  completely  alone.  Even  my  adjutant,  an  in- 
trepid valorous  man,  had  disappeared.  As,  however,  I  had  not 
seen  him  fall,  his  absence  gave  me  some  ground  of  hope ;  for  I 
was  convinced  he  had  left  me  only  for  the  purpose  of  stopping, 
if  possible,  the  fugitives  farther  behind,  and  rallying  them  for 
another  attack.  Nevertheless  I  saw  that  with  such  troops  victory 
was  absolutely  impossible,  though  I  hoped  at  least  to  be  able  to 
save  the  artillery.  I  was  therefore  constrained  to  remain  where 
I  was,  although  alone. 

Close  to  the  guns  stood  an  ammunition-cart  placed  athwart 
the  road.  Behind  it  I  sought  meanwhile  a  partial  shelter  from 
the  enemy's  balls. 

The  noise  of  my  troops  fleeing  toward  the  valley  now  scarcely 
reached  my  ears  ;  but  in  its  stead  I  distinguished  from  the  oppo- 
site direction  confused  shouts,  and  at  intervals  the  sounds  of  the 
Austrian  popular  hymn.  Next  moment  the  storming  hostile 
chasseurs  broke  forth  from  the  last  turn  of  the  road.  This  stag- 
gered me  too.  Undecided  whether  I  should  yield  to  the  natural 
instinct  that  urged  me  to  save  myself,  or,  in  despair  at  the  humili- 
ation I  had  suffered,  aw^ait  the  thrust  of  the  hostile  bayonets,  I 
looked  at  one  time  in  the  direction  of  my  fleeing  troops,  and  then 
toward  the  advancing  enemy.  Suddenly  it  seemed  to  me  as  if 
they  wavered  at  the  sight  of  the  guns,  as  if  the  "  Hurrah  1"  died 
on  their  lips.  With  prompt  decision  I  searched  for  the  match. 
But  whether  it  was  that  I  overlooked  it,  or  that  the  fugitive 


UY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  145 

gunners  had  taken  even  this  with  them,  I  did  not  find  it — and 
thereby  completely  discouraged,  I  also  now  took  to  flight. 

I  was  on  foot — my  preservation  therefore  extremely  improba- 
ble. I  had  thought  of  this  too  late.  I  now  sought  to  escape  the 
searching  looks  of  the  pursuing  enemy  by  leaping  onward  to  the 
wooded  slopes,  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  ground  unobserved 
among  the  trees ;  but  stumbling  at  almost  every  leap,  I  was 
obliged  immediately  to  come  down  again  to  the  open  road. 

The  hostile  chasseurs  were  already  close  enough  behind  me  to 
take  sure  aim  ;  which  they  indeed  did  ;  but  the  road  being  much 
inclined,  I  fortunately  sank  at  every  step  under  the  line  of  sight, 
and  thus  my  shako  received  a  ball,  which  was  probably  destined 
for  my  skull ;  all  the  others  whistled  harmlessly  past  me.  The 
brave  chasseurs  evidently  shot  rather  too  eagerly.  "With  some 
what  more  coolness  in  their  aim,  they  might  have  spared  both 
themselves  and  their  commander-in-chief  much  trouble  next 
spring. 

However,  I  meanwhile  did  my  best  to  shorten  as  much  as  pos- 
sible the  time  during  which  I  had  to  serve  them  as  a  walking 
target. 

A  cavalry  horse  without  a  rider,  coming  from  the  side  of  the 
enemy,  galloped  suddenly  past  me.  About  a  hundred  paces 
from  me  a  hussar  stopped  it  for  his  wounded  dismounted  com- 
rade, whom  he  would  not  abandon  in  spite  of  the  danger  to  his 
own  life.  After  he  had  assisted  him  to  escape,  he  accidentally 
caught  sight  of  me,  rode  speedily  toward  me,  and  offered  me  his 
own  horse,  with  the  remark,  that  his  life  was  of  less  value  than 
mine. 

This  magnanimity  had  an  altogether  peculiar  effect  on  me.  I 
suddenly  believed  that  the  day  need  not  yet  be  given  up  for  lost. 
"  You  had  better  gallop  after  these  scamps  of  infantry,  and  bring 
some  back  to  me ;  but  they  must  be  such  fellows  as  you  I"  I 
impetuously  called  to  the  heroic  hussar.  "  All  is  in  vain  I"  re- 
plied he,  with  an  oath  ;   "  they  are- Sclavonians,  not  Magyars  I" 

This  observation  on  their  nationalty  was  certainly  just,  but 
the  conclusion  deduced  from  it  not  quite  correct ;  for  the  coward 
cannoneers  were  Magyars,  not  Sclavonians.  Moreover,  the  next 
moment  seemed  as  if  it  would  give  the  hussar  the  lie  even  in  re- 
gard to  the  Sclavonians ;  for  scarcely  had  he  finished  his  swear- 
ing, when  round  the  next  projection  behind  which  the  road  loses 

G 


146  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

itself  downward,  a  column  of  infantry,  led  by  my  adjutant,  ar- 
rived swiftly  for  my  deliverance. 

I  had  not  been  deceived  in  the  adjutant.  My  newly  roused 
determination  not  yet  to  give  up  the  contest  now  ripened  more 
quickly  into  action.  "  Follow  me  !"  I  called  to  them,  they  ap- 
pearing very  resolute ;  "  your  comrades  will  not  remain  behind, 
when  they  know  that  we  are  again  advancing.  This  brave 
hussar,"  I  confidently  added,  "will  take  care  of  that ;  will  you 
not,  comrade  ?" — and  without  stopping  for  an  answer,  I  again 
advanced  up  to  the  mountain.  The  Sclavonians  probably  under- 
stood very  little  of  what  I  shouted  to  them  in  Hungarian ;  how- 
ever, they  followed  fearlessly. 

The  enemy's  fire  now  grew  more  animated  :  we  had  no  time 
to  return  it.  I  felt  continually  urged  to  address  my  men.  He 
who,  himself  in  danger,  inspires  others  with  courage,  most 
strengthens  his  own. 

"Follow  me  I"  I  repeatedly  called  out;  "you  see  they  hit 
nothing  1"  But  unfortunately  just  then  a  ball  did  hit ;  a  man 
in  the  first  rank  fell  moaning  to  the  ground  ;  and  in  a  twinkling 
the  rest  had  again  taken  to  flight. 

The  sudden  extinction  of  a  last  hope,  that  has  unexpectedly 
emerged — even  though  it  may  be  but  a  foolish  one — shakes  more 
vehemently  than  the  gradual  disappointment  of  all  previous 
well-founded  expectations. 

*'  It  is  all  over  for  to-day  !"  cried  the  adjutant.  "  Forever  I" 
I  added,  in  despair. 

"When  I  retired  from  the  guns,  I  had  already  given  up  the  day 
for  lost,  just  as  much  as  now ;  but  the  knowledge  of  this  dis- 
graceful necessity  had  not  there,  as  here,  been  forced  upon  me  all 
at  once.  There  I  still  had  regard  to  my  own  safety ;  here  I  re- 
nounced it. 

This  desperate  indifference  must  also  in  part  be  attributed  to 
the  unusual  relaxation  of  my  physical  powers.  On  the  summit 
of  moral  enthusiasm  death  is  sought — in  the  depth  of  physical 
exhaustion  it  is  no  longer  avoided.  The  simultaneous  coinci- 
dence of  both  conditions  in  one  and  the  same  individual  appears 
to  me  impossible.  Only  in  the  intermediate  phases  can  either 
valor  or  cowardice  be  spoken  of. 

"  Let  us  save  ourselves,  before  it  be  too  late  !"  called  out  my 
adjutant,  seized  me  by  the  arm,  and  dragged  me  away  with  him 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  147 

down  hill.  The  hussar  also — (he  had  been  right  this  time  wdth 
regard  to  the  Sclavonians) — rode  again  up  to  me,  and  once  more 
invited  me  to  mount  his  horse.  Irritated  at  this  request,  and 
angry  at  the  annoyance  of  being  dragged  along,  I  endeavored  to 
disengage  my  arm  from  the  adjutant ;  but  he  would  not  let  go, 
even  when  a  ball  from  the  enemy  passing  between  us  had  almost 
lamed  the  elbow  of  the  arm  with  which  he  held  me :  whereupon 
perceiving  that,  by  a  further  opposition  on  my  part,  not  only  my 
own  life,  but  the  lives  of  my  two  faithful  companions  also,  would 
be  endangered,  I  immediately  began  again  voluntarily  to  take 
part  in  the  flight,  and  exert  my  last  physical  powers. 

In  the  vicinity  of  the  uppermost  houses  of  Hodrics  stood  a  car- 
riage for  the  severely  wounded  ;  but  these  had  one  and  all  been 
made  prisoners  of  war.  I  could  therefore  avail  myself  of  the 
carriage  without  scruple  in  order  to  overtake  my  troops.  Not 
till  I  reached  the  lower  part  of  the  village  did  I  succeed  in  com- 
ing up  with  them. 

Here  I  found  the  hussars  still  endeavoring  to  drive  together 
the  dispersed  infantry.  It  was  a  humiliating  spectacle  ;  but  far 
more  humiliating  was  the  thought  that  I  was  the  commander  of 
such  a  troop  ;  and  the  boldest  imagination,  after  such  events, 
would  have  been  baffled  in  its  attempt  to  discover  within  the 
bounds  of  probability  the  elements  of  the  subsequent  necessity 
for  a  Russian  intervention  in  Hungary  in  favor  of  "  independent 
united  Austria." 

I  intended  then  and  there  to  decimate  the  infantry  and  the 
servers  of  the  lost  guns ;  but  a  glance  at  the  thinned  ranks  told 
me  that  they  were  already  more  than  decimated. 

Our  loss  amounted,  besides  the  five  guns  and  some  hussars,  to 
almost  two  companies  of  infantry.  Lieutenant-colonel  Pusztelnik 
was  also  missing.  He  had  been  wounded  and  taken  prisoner,  as 
we  learnt  afterward. 

The  enemy  did  not  pursue  us  further  ;  so  that  our  march  back 
from  Hodrics  to  Zsarnocz  could  at  least  be  performed  in  order. 

Here  I  gave  a  short  rest  to  the  troops ;  but  I  felt  myself  irre- 
sistibly impelled  further  on,  the  sooner  to  obtain  full  certainty  as 
to  the  fate  of  the  Guyon  division. 

That  it  must  have  simultaneously  suffered  a  defeat  was  beyond 
a  doubt. 

But  these  questions  urgently  demanded  an  answer :  whither 


148  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

and  how  far  it  had  been  forced  back  ? — whether,  in  its  first 
fright,  it  had  not  even  perhaps  receded  as  far  as  Neusohl,  and 
thus  made  it  possible  for  the  enemy,  swiftly  following  in  its  track, 
to  cut  off  on  the  one  hand  the  division  in  Altsohl,  on  the  other 
that  in  Kremnitz,  from  each  other  and  from  the  remaining  two 
in  Neusohl ;  and  thereby  divide  my  corps  d'armee  into  throe 
parts,  and  destroy  them  separately  ? 

This  nobody  in  Zsarnocz  could  give  me.  The  dispositions  for 
the  Aulich  division  had  also  to  be  issued  in  the  course  of  the  next 
night,  nay  even  partly  executed.  Accompanied  by  my  adjutant, 
I  accordingly  hastened  forward  in  a  carriage  to  Kremnitz. 

I  had  been  warned  in  Zsarnocz  not  to  travel  without  a  strong 
escort,  because  a  hostile  division  from  Hodrics,  across  the  north- 
ern ridge  of  the  mountain,  could  long  ago  have  reached  the  road 
from  Zsarnocz  to  Heiligenkreuz,  and  I  had  to  take  this  route.  I 
paid  no  attention,  however,  to  the  warning. 

Not  far  from  the  place  which  had  been  pointed  out  as  danger- 
ous to  my  safety,  a  menacing  "  Halt  I  who  goes  there  ?"  in  Ger- 
man, interrupted  the  course  of  the  horses  ;  and  next  moment  our 
carriage  was  surrounded  by  foot-soldiers  with  white  straps.  The 
challenge  in  German  and  the  white  straps  made  us  suspicious. 
My  adjutant  would  not  immediately  produce  the  colors.  "  A 
general,"  he  answered,  delaying ;  and  "  Of  what  battalion  are 
you  ?"  he  asked,  in  return,  harshly,  at  the  same  time  leaning  out 
over  the  carriage,  that  he  might  discover,  in  spite  of  the  dark- 
ness, some  more  distinct  mark  among  the  soldiers.  "  Never 
mind  about  the  battalion  I — what  general?"  was  the  answer, 
accompanied  by  a  closer  advance  of  the  soldiers  to  the  carriage. 

Our  situation  was  not  pleasant.  We  were  now  obliged  to 
explain.  If  it  should  be  followed  by  a  hostile  declaration,  we 
could  be  saved,  perchance,  only  by  a  shot  at  the  importunate 
questioner,  a  jump  on  to  the  coach-box,  and  a  lusty  lash  at  the 
horses. 

I  had  soon  considered  this ;  and  rising  by  degrees  from  my 
seat,  seized  a  pistol,  noiselessly  cocked  it,  and  thus  awaited, 
ready  for  the  leap,  with  suppressed  breathing,  what  should 
happen. 

Meanwhile,  my  companion  still  delayed  with  the  information. 
Continually  endeavoring  to  recognize  before  we  should  be  recog- 
nized, he  leant  forward  still  more  over  the  carriage-door  toward 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  149 

the  soldiers,  who  had  come  quite  close.  The  short  pause  seemed 
to  me  an  eternity.  I  thought  I  could  scarcely  wait  longer  for 
the  moment  of  decision. 

"  It  is  Alexander  infantry  I"  the  adjutant  at  last  called  out, 
and  gave  the  desired  information  without  more  ado  ;  for  he  had 
recognized  a  sergeant  of  the  troop,  to  whom  he  rememhered  hav- 
ing given  in  person  a  certain  order  on  the  morning  before  the  dis- 
astrous conflict.  The  Alexander  infantry  at  that  time  still  wore 
white  straps.  This  circumstance,  however,  had  not  occurred  to 
either  of  us  in  the  first  moment  of  surprise,  any  more  than  that 
the  chasseurs  who  had  been  opposed  to  us  M  Hodrics  had  black 
straps. 

This  sergeant,  together  with  the  small  number  of  men  now 
distributed  round  our  carriage,  was  the  remains  of  the  company 
I  had  sent  from  Hodrics,  during  our  advance,  as  a  reconnoitering 
patrol,  toward  "Windschacht.  It  had  been  suddenly  attacked  on 
all  sides,  while  marching  through  the  forest,  and  the  greater  part 
of  it  taken  prisoners.  Only  these  few  succeeded  in  cutting  their 
way  through  rearward,  and  passing  Hodrics  where  the  footpath 
leads  from  the  southern  declivity  across  the  little  place  to  the 
northern  ridge  of  the  mountain ;  having  previously  awaited,  in  a 
hiding-place  hard  by,  the  marching  past  of  a  hostile  patrol,  which 
was  observing  our  retreat  to  Zsarnocz.  Unmolested,  they  then 
reached;  after  crossing  the  above-mentioned  ridge  of  the  mount- 
ain, the  road  from  Zsarnocz  to  Heiligenkreuz  ;  and  were  just  on 
the  point  of  joining  their  battalion  in  Zsarnocz  when  they  met 
us. 

'  I  directed  them  to  wait  where  they  were  for  their  battalion, 
which  was  on  its  march  back  ;  and  then  continued  my  journey 
to  Kremnitz  without  further  interruption. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

In  Kremnitz  I  found  already  authentic  news  of  Colonel  Guyon, 
which  unfortunately  confirmed  almost  all  my  apprehensions. 
He  had  been  defeated  on  the  preceding  day,  the  21st  of  January, 
at  Windschacht,  and  obliged  to  retreat  to  Schemnitz.  On  the 
following  night  he  received  my  order  to  attack  the  hostile  turn- 
ing-column. This  he  attempted  to  do  next  morning  ;  but  his 
men — like  mine  at  Hodrics — made  off  as  soon  as  the  enemy's 
first  shots  had  been  fired.  Meanwhile  he  was  forced  by  the  at- 
tack directed  against  him  from  Windschacht  to  evacuate  Schem- 
nitz also  ;  nay,  the  depression  of  his  troops  compelled  him  even  to 
cross  the  Gran  near  Breznicska,  and  fall  back  as  far  as  Bucsa. 

The  junction  of  the  Aulich  division  with  the  other  divisions  on 
the  road  leading  through  the  valley  of  the  Gran  seemed  now,  as 
I  had  feared,  to  be  impossible.  For  this  road  formed  at  several 
points,  quite  close  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river  Gran,  narrow  de- 
files, open  toward  the  left  bank.  But  I  had  little  reason  to  sup- 
pose that  an  enemy,  who  was  not  deterred  from  carrying  out  his 
operations  by  the  necessity  for  such  daring  marches  as  Colonel 
Collery's  recent  one  from  the  lower  valley  of  the  Gran  by  Zsar- 
nocz  and  Hodrics  toward  Schemnitz,  would  leave  unoccupied  the 
left  bank  of  the  Gran,  opposite  the  just-mentioned  points — very 
unfavorable  for  the  march  of  the  Aulich  division  through  the 
valley  of  the  Gran — as  he  had  already  obtained,  in  consequence 
of  Colonel  Guyon's  hasty  retreat  to  Bucsa,  undisturbed  possession 
of  the  left  bank  of  the  Gran  along  this  road. 

To  effect  a  junction  of  the  Aulich  division  with  the  main  body 
of  the  corps  d'armee  in  the  north  of  JSTeusohl — through  the  valley 
of  the  little  river  Turocz,  by  Perk,  Turcsek,  Stuben  toward  Mo- 
socz,  and  then,  turning  to  the  right,  Cseremosne,  Bartoska,  and 
the  mountain  Hermanecz — seemed,  if  possible,  still  more  danger- 
ous, an  account  of  Major-general  Gbtz's  menacing  position  upon 
this  line,  and  the  unfavorable  disposition  of  the  inhabitants  of 
this  district  toward  us. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY.  151 

There  was  consequently  nothing  left  for  us  but  to  make  use  of 
the  precarious  road  across  the  mountain-ridge  between  Kremnitz 
and  Neusohl,  even  at  the  risk  of  losing  a  part  of  the  baggage  and 
artillery. 

From  Kremnitz,  as  well  as  from  Neusohl,  steep  forest-paths 
lead  close  under  the  highest  point  of  the  mountain  chain ;  and 
the  path  here  is  formed  by  a  rocky  ridge,  which  can  be  crossed 
only  by  a  single  foot-passenger  at  a  time.  The  inhabitants  of  the 
mountain  declivities  use  these  paths,  as  we  were  assured,  only 
occasionally  during  the  winter,  and  then  with  light  sledges,  in 
such  a  manner  that,  when  arrived  below  the  ridge,  they  unload 
them,  take  them  to  pieces,  drag  every  thing,  one  by  one,  over 
the  ridge  to  the  opposite  continuation  of  the  path,  there  put  the 
sledges  together  again,  and  seated  upon  them  slide  down  with 
their  freight  to  the  place  of  their  destination. 

For  the  purpose  of  rendering  possible  the  use  of  this  com- 
munication, already  sufficiently  difficult  on  account  of  its  steep- 
ness, independently  of  that  fatal  impediment,  an  opening  had  once 
been  made  through  the  rocky  ridge  at  the  narrowest  part  of  its 
base ;  but  this  tunnel  en  miniature  had  since,  bit  by  bit,  fallen 
in  again. 

"We  had  consequently  to  clear  it  out,  and  considerably  enlarge 
large  it,  so  as  to  be  able  to  pass  through  it  with  our  artillery. 

This  was  accomplished  on  the  24th  of  January ;  and  during 
the  following  night  the  Aulich  division  also  passed  through  the 
tunnel,  in  both,  cases  not  without  excessive  exertions  on  the  part 
of  the  troops. 

But  in  the  meantime  the  Guyon  division  and  that  of  the  left 
wing  were  threatened  with  the  unforeseen  danger  of  being  sepa- 
rated from  the  main  body  of  the  army,  and  destroyed  while 
isolated. 

In  the  same  night  on  which  the  Aulich  division  had  effected 
its  difficult  march  over  the  Szkalka  (the  name,  I  believe,  of  the 
short  spur  which,  extending  from  the  spot  where  the  rivers  Gran 
and  "Waag  branch  off  in  a  southeastern  direction  between  the 
mountain-towns  Neusohl  and  Kremnitz,  is  terminated  by  the 
Laurinberg),  so  rapid  a  thaw  once  n>ore  suddenly  set  in,  that 
the  Gran,  overflowing  its  banks  by  the  next  morning,  inundated 
the  roads  between  Neusohl,  Altsohl,  and  Bucsa,  to  the  height  of 
several  feet.     The  divisions  in  Altsohl  and  Bucsa  were  thereby 


152  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

not  only  completely  isolated  from  the  main  body  in  Neusohl,  but 
even  from  each  other  ;  and  their  situation  seemed  incomparably 
more  dangerous  than  that  of  the  Aulich  division  had  recently 
been,  principally  because,  on  the  one  hand,  to  my  knowledge,  no 
obstacle  stood  in  the  way  of  the  victorious  enemy  in  Schemnitz, 
which  could  have  prevented  him  from  attacking  the  Guy  on  divi- 
sion at  Bucsa  with  superior  forces,  and  destroying  it  utterly,  or 
immediately  taking  it  all  prisoners,  since  Guy  on' s  retreat  to  Alt- 
sohl  or  Neusohl  through  the  inundated  ground  was  impossible  ; 
— on  the  other  hand,  because  during  the  last  few  days  repeated 
reports  had  arrived  from  the  division  in  Altsohl,  that  numerous 
patrols  of  cavalry  were  advancing  more  and  more  boldly  from 
Karpfen  (Karpona)  toward  Altsohl,  and  these  must  be  considered 
as  the  precursors  of  an  attack  soon  to  be  expected  from  this  di- 
rection likewise. 

A  speedy  decrease  of  the  hemmed-in  waters  was  not  at  all  to 
be  expected,  in  consequence  of  the  heaped-up  masses  of  ice 
which  stopped  the  course  of  the  Gran  ;  and  any  attempt  to  wade 
through  the  deluged  expanses  of  the  roads,  threatened — so  the 
inhabitants  of  that  district  asseverated — certain  destruction  to 
the  troops. 

The  loss  of  a  part  of  my  corps  appeared  at  this  time  inevitable ; 
for  neither  from  Bucsa  nor  from  Altsohl  did  there  exist  even  a 
barely  practicable  road  to  Neusohl,  on  which  a  circuit  might 
have  been  made  round  the  fatal  inundation. 

"We  owed  our  deliverance  from  this  desperate  situation,  strange- 
ly enough,  to  the  effects  of  a  tragi-comical  event  which  happened 
on  the  22d  of  January — consequently  before  the  inundation — to 
the  Guyon  division  in  Bucsa,  immediately  after  its  retreat  from 
Schemnitz. 

Colonel  Guyon — void  alike  of  fear  and  of  penetration  as  he  al- 
ways was — had  scarcely  arrived  in  Bucsa  with  his  defeated 
division,  exhausted  by  its  march,  when  he  resolved,  after  a  short 
rest,  to  set  out  again  toward  Schemnitz,  that  he  might  take  im- 
mediate revenge  on  the  victors  of  the  day.  Now  as  his  soldiers 
were  utterly  destitute  of  the  military  ardor  necessary  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  this  project,  he  thought  to  impart  it  by  means 
of  brandy  ;  this  made  them  drunk,  however,  rather  than  eager 
for  combat.  Moreover,  discipline,  never  the  strongest  feature  in 
the  Guyon  division,  had  soon  fallen  so  very  low,  that  even  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  153 

daily  false  alarm,  "  The  enemy  is  approaching !"  was  sufficient 
to  create  such  a  confusion  in  the  camp,  as  could  scarcely  have 
been  exceeded  after  a  total  defeat.  The  most  terrified  ran  back 
as  far  as  Neusohl.  The  dispersed  divisions,  hovv^ever,  by  de- 
grees again  assembled  in  Busca  :  but  the  dread  of  an  attack  had 
once  taken  possession  of  them ;  it  mounted  afterward  with  the 
waters  of  the  Gran,  and  became  at  last  stronger  than  the  fear  of 
being  drowned.  Only  in  this  way  was  it  possible  for  Colonel 
Guyon  to  attempt  the  retreat  by  the  deeply-inundated  roads  : 
and  the  success  of  his  hazardous  enteprize  brought  suspicion  on 
the  inhabitants  of  the  district  of  having  represented  the  dangers 
connected  with  it  as  so  formidable  from  treacherous  hostility 
toward  us. 

The  division  in  Altsohl  had  far  greater  difficulties  to  contend 
with  in  a  similar  attempt.  It  had  to  cross  the  river  itself,  by 
means  of  the  overflowed  bridge,  and  where  the  stream  was  very 
rapid ;  its  road  also  lay  considerably  deeper  under  water.  But 
the  example  of  the  Guyon  division  had  its  effect :  and  some  hours 
later  the  whole  of  the  four  divisions  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the 
upper  Danube  were  assembled  at  Neusohl. 

"We  afterward  learned,  it  is  true,  that  we  might  quite  comfort- 
ably have  awaited  the  subsiding  of  the  waters ;  for  the  hostile 
brigade  of  Major-general  Wiess,  by  which  we  supposed  Altsohl  to 
be  menaced,  had  been  suddenly  drawn  back  toward  Pesth  ;  and 
the  victors  at  Windschacht,  Hodrics,  and  Schemnitz  believed 
themselves  too  feeble  for  further  attacks,  nay  even  expected  to  be 
attacked  by  us.  But  we  had  no  suspicion  whatever  of  all  this  ; 
although  it  by  no  means  seldom  happens  that  mutual  fears  are 
entertained  on  both  sides,  and  often  without  reason  on  either  part. 

We  should,  however,  not  have  been  able  to  protract  our  stay 
in  the  mountain-towns,  even  had  we  been  informed  of  these  cir- 
cumstances early  enough.  For  the  really  irresistible  enemy  who 
drove  us  out  of  them  was  hunger  ;  the  thaw  having  made  the 
roads  to  the  southern  comitates,  whence  we  had  to  obtain  our 
provisions,  impassable,  and  thus  the  transport  from  thence  of  corn 
for  a  long  time  was  impossible. 

Directly  after  my  arrival  in  Schemnitz  I  received  an  order  from 
the  war-minister  Meszaros  to  begin  my  march  bafck  toward  the 
upper  Theiss  without  delay,  and  to  act  against  Field-marshal 
Lieutenant  Count  Schlick,   in  concert  with  the  then  Colonel 


154  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Klapka,  who,  in  the  stead  of  the  war-minister,  had  just  taken 
the  command  of  the  latter's  corps,  which  had  been  repeatedly 
miserably  defeated  by  Count  Schlick.  I  was  to  attack  the 
Schlick  corps  from  the  southwest,  while  Klapka  intended  to 
assail  it  from  the  south. 

The  same  reasons  which  had  decided  me  when  in  Levencz  to 
adopt  the  side-march  to  the  mountain-towns  had  in  Schemnitz 
made  me  resolve  not  to  obey  at  present  the  above  order  of  the 
minister  of  war :  for  I  could  not  hesitate  to  estimate  the  disad- 
vantages which  might  arise  to  the  country  from  this  disobedience, 
only  very  low  in  comparison  with  those  which  must  have  been 
the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  anticipated  destruction  of  the 
corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube. 

Aft^  the  unexpected  success  in  concentrating  the  corps  d'armee 
in  Neusohl,  circumstances  were  quite  changed,  and  instead  of 
justifying  a  continued  disobedience  to  this  order,  urged  me,  on 
the  contrary,  no  longer  to  delay  the  commencement  of  the  retreat 
to  the  upper  Theiss. 

The  question  now  was,  not  whether,  but  hoiv  this  retreat 
should  be  accomplished. 

Only  two  ways  were  at  that  time  open  to  us  from  Neusohl : 
either  through  the  valley  of  the  upper  Gran  as  far  as  Vorbsko, 
from  thence  across  the  southern  limits  of  the  district  of  the  Gran 
valley  into  the  Murany  valley  and  that  of  the  little  river  lolsva, 
then  by  Tornalja,  Putnok,  into  the  supposed  circuit  of  the  opera- 
tions of  Klapka' s  corps  ;  or  through  the  Zips  (Szepes  megye),  the 
Saros,  and  Abanjvar  comitates. 

On  i\ie  first  line  a  hostile  conflict  was  highly  probable,  on  the 
latter  it  was  certain,  and  moreover  with  the  dreaded  victorious 
corps  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick,  which  just  then  occu- 
pied these  comitates. 

In  spite  of  this,  however,  we  chose  the  latter  route,  because  on 
the  former  we  had  to  fear,  in  consequence  of  the  continuance  of 
mild  weather,  impassable  roads,  and  at  Tornalja  hostile  attacks 
from  two  opposite  directions  even  during  our  march ;  because, 
informed  in  time  of  our  movement,  the  corps  of  Field-marshal 
Lieutenant  Schlick,  or,  at  all  events,  a  part  of  it — from  Kaschau 
(Kassa)  along  the  road  from  Torna,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
brigade  of  Major-general  Wiess,  which  we  then  supposed  to  be 
already    near    Altsohl,    by   Vamosfalva    (Milna),    Zelene,    and 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  155 

Rimaszombat,  on  the  other— could  reach  Tornalja  long  before 
us,  and  either  await  us  ready  for  combat,  or  fall  upon  us  even 
during  our  march. 

On  the  route  through  the  Zips,  on  the  contrary,  we  could 
reckon,  even  with  continued  thaw,  if  not  upon  good  yet  upon  firm 
roads  ;  were  ourselves  the  assailants;  and  had  not  to  fear  any  un- 
expected attack  in  the  flanks  or  the  rear  during  our  whole  march  ; 
since,  according  to  what  we  then  believed  to  be  the  position  of 
the  hostile  forces,  we  could  neither  be  overtaken  on  that  route, 
nor  by  the  forced,  march  of  any  hostile  corps  on  another  route 
could  we  lose  the  start  w  hich  we  had  already  gained,  and  which 
we  just  then  most  urgently  wanted  to  enable  us  deliberately  to 
prepare  our  attacks  on  the  corps  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant 
Schlick,  and  to  execute  them  undisturbed  in  flank  and  rear. 

In  consequence,  the  following  plan  of  retreat  was  projected : 
The  Hungarian  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  to  begin  its 
retreat  from  Neusohl  toward  the  upper  Theiss,  through  the  Zips, 
in  two  columns  of  equal  strength.  One,  composed  of  the  Guyon 
division  and  that  of  the  left  wing,  to  move  through  the  valley  of 
the  Gran,  then  by  Pohorella,  Vernar,  Sztraczena,  and  Huta,  to 
Iglo  ;  the  other,  formed  by  the  Aulich  and  Kmety  divisions,  to 
march,  after  having  passed  over  the  ground  between  the  Waag 
and  the  Gran,  through  the  valley  of  the  upper  AYaag  into  that 
of  the  Poprad,  and  then  by  Donnersmark  (Csotortokhely)  to- 
Leutschau  (Locse). 

The  successful  attainment  of  the  two  last-specified  objects  of 
the  march  must  absolutely  precede  any  idea  of  a  serious  ofliensive 
against  the  corps  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick. 

The  southern  column,  which  had  to  proceed  through  the 
valley  of  the  Gran,  received  for  rear-guard  a  tram  of  several 
hundred  wagons,  laden  with  stores  of  various  kinds  belonging  to 
the  state,  among  which  were  supplies  of  military  clothing,  a 
movable  musket-manufactory,  a  stock  of  sugar  and  cofiee,  tin, 
copper,  materials  for  muskets,  and  so  on.  These  were  mostly 
things  ordered  by  the  Committee  of  Defense,  wdiich  we  found 
prepared  in  different  places  on  our  march  from  Waizen  to  Schem- 
nitz,  partly  already  on  the  way  to  the  capitals,  which  were  now 
occupied  by  the  enemy,  partly  only  ready  to  be  sent  thither  ;  and 
made  them  accompany  our  movements,  that  they  might  arrive 
as  safely  as  possible  at  the  new  seat  of  the  government. 


156  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

To  do  more  for  the  protection  of  a  train  of  wagons,  which  had 
grown  to  an  unueual  length,  seemed,  however,  to  be  a  too  ex- 
hausting service  for  the  troops,  who  were  besides  already  excess- 
ively harassed  by  the  retreat  in  forced  marches ;  and  as  I  would 
not  send  it  in  advance,  because  the  most  insignificant  hostile 
rumor  coming  from  the  point  whither  we  were  retreating  would 
have  caused  it  to  stop,  and  thus  have  interrupted  in  their  march 
the  divisions  behind  it — the  wagons  had  to  follow  the  troops  as 
they  best  could. 

These  stores  would,  it  is  true,  fall  a  certain  prey  to  the  enemy, 
if  it  occurred  to  him  to  pursue  our  southern  column ;  but  then 
he  had  also  to  remove  out  of  his  way  the  whole  train  before  he 
could  overtake  the  divisions,  which  would  be  already  two  days' 
march  in  advance  of  him ;  and  the  commander  of  the  small 
detachment  accompanying  the  train — not  indeed  to  defend  it, 
but  only  to  maintain  order  in  its  transport — had  been  charged  to 
abandon  to  the  enemy  the  booty  only  piecemeal,  where  practica- 
ble, and  thereby,  as  well  as  by  frequently  barricading  the  road 
with  wagons,  and  finally  by  carrying  with  him  or  destroying  the 
draught-horses,  render  pursuit  as  difficult  as  possible. 

The  permanent  advance  which  was  secured  to  the  southern 
column  in  consequence  of  the  execution  of  these  measures  was 
important  enough  to  indemnify  us  for  the  loss  of  the  state's 
stores ;  for  it  must  not  be  overlooked,  that  our  retreat  from  the 
mountain-towns  to  the  upper  Theiss  was  at  the  same  time  an 
offensive  movement  against  Count  Schlick's  corps,  and  that  our 
principal  aim  had  to  be  directed  toward  endeavoring  not  to  be 
overtaken  by  the  hostile  brigades  of  Generals  Gotz  and  Prince 
Jablonowski,  which  came  behind  us  before  we  had  forced  our 
march  through  the  district  in  which  Field-marshal  Lieutenant 
Schlick  was  operating  at  that  time. 

However,  the  enemy  did  not  pursue  the  southern  column,  and 
the  whole  of  the  stores  consequently  remained  at  the  disposal  of 
the  government. 

A  quantity  of  precious  metal,  partly  coined,  partly  uncoined, 
which  we  had  found  in  the  mountain-towns,  was  to  be  conveyed 
for  greater  security  under  the  protection  of  the  northern  column, 
and  afterward  handed  over  to  the  government.  (This  was  ac- 
complished from  Kaschau.) 

This  plan  of  retreat  was  promptly  put  in  execution. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  157 

On  the  27tli  of  January,  1849,  the  last  troops  of  the  corps 
d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  left  the  mountain-town  Neusohl. 
My  head-quarters  marched  with  the  northern  column,  and 
reached  Rosenberg  (Rozsahegy)  on  the  28th. 

Here  there  arrived  from  the  Zips  a  messenger — sent  by  Field- 
marshal  Windischgratz,  as  he  said — who  requested  a  secret  con- 
ference with  me. 

This  I  granted  him. 

He  assured  me  it  was  the  desire  of  Field-marshal  Windisch- 
gratz that  I  should  lead  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube 
to  his  serene  highness — this  I  did  not  for  a  moment  doubt ;  and 
if  I  acceded  to  this  desire,  a  full  amnesty  and  a  life  free  from 
care,  though  out  of  Austria,  would  be  guaranteed  to  me — this 
also  I  did  not  doubt  in  the  least.  But  when  the  messenger  had 
finished,  I  nevertheless  called  into  the  room  some  staff-officers, 
communicated  to  them  the  object  of  the  secret  conference  which 
had  just  taken  place,  and  handed  to  the  messenger  a  litho- 
graphed copy  of  my  proclamation  from  Waizen,  as  the  answer 
for  HIM  who  Jiad  sent  him,  with  the  remark,  that  this  was  the 
ultimatum  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  and  of  its 
commander. 

During  our  retreat  from  the  Lajtha  as  far  as  Buda-Pesth,  we 
had  met,  as  has  been  mentioned,  with  but  little  sympathy  on 
the  part  of  the  population  ;  in  the  mountain-towns,  and  the 
comitates  bordering  on  the  north,  the  majority  was  disposed  even 
against  us ;  still  the  people  remained  generally  passive,  except  a 
few  tricolor  demagogues,  whose  activity,  however,  had  no  other 
result  than  causing  some  individuals,  renowned  as  black-and- 
yellow  zealots,  to  be  arrested  by  my  orders  in  Schemnitz,  trans- 
ported to  Neusohl,  and  there  after  some  days  again  set  at  liberty. 
But  a  dozen  obscure  Sclavonian  agitators  were  carried  with  us 
as  prisoners  from  St.  Nikolaus  (Szent  Miklos),  and  afterward 
sent  to  Debreczin.  . 


CHAPTER  XX. 

The  necessary  orders  having  previously  been  given  to  the  rear- 
guard for  securing  by  a  demonstration  the  march  of  the  northern 
cohimn  against  the  hostile  brigade  of  Major-general  Gotz,  which 
was  pressing  on  after  us  from  the  comitate  of  Turocz  through 
that  of  Arva,  and  it  having  been  likewise  charged  with  the 
destruction  of  all  the  bridges  in  the  valley  of  the  Waag  over 
which  we  had  passed  ;  the  main  body  of  the  Schlick  corps  just 
then  operating,  though  unsuccessfully,  against  Tokja,  with  the 
intention  of  forcing  the  passage  over  the  Theiss  at  that  place  ; 
both  columns  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  could 
consequently  easily  and  exactly  execute  the  detailed  orders  given 
when  in  Neusohl  for  the  whole  march  from  the  mountain-towns 
into  the  Zips,  and  on  the  2d  of  February,  1849,  they  stood  al- 
ready— the  southern  column  with  its  head,  the  Gruyon  division,  in 
Iglo  in  the  valley  of  the  Hernad,  the  northern  at  the  same  height 
with  it  in  the  valley  of  the  Poprad. 

Lieutschau  was  on  that  day  still  occupied  by  a  feeble  division 
of  the  Schlick  corps.  Colonel  Guyon  took  no  notice  of  it,  and 
sent  away  his  officers,  who  were  awaiting  his  orders,  with  the 
soporific  injunction  that  the  next  day  should  be  a  day  of  rest. 

But  a  critical  night  had  still  to  precede  that  following  day. 
In  its  course  the  Guyon  division  in  Iglo  was  surprised  by  the 
hostile  column  of  Leutschau,  and  lost  a  piece  of  artillery.  The 
enemy  himself,  however,  unwisely  induced  by  the  confusion 
which  the  surprise  had  caused  in  Guyon's  camp  to  continue 
his  attack  longer  than  was  advisable  with  his  small  forces,  lost 
a  part  of  his  rocket-battery,  whereupon  he  retreated  hastily  by 
Kirchdrauf  (Szepes-Varalja)  to  the  Branyiszko,  that  saddle  of 
the  mountain-chain  separating  the  comitates  of  Saros  and  Zips, 
over  which  the  shortest  communication  between  Leutschau  and 
Eperjes  leads. 

Although  this  sudden  attack  could  not  be  called  a  successful 
one,  on  account  of  the  sensible  loss  which  the  enemy  had  suffered, 
yet  it  furnished  a  proof  of  the  spirit  of  warlike  resolution  which 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  159 

distinguished  the  corps  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick,  and 
presaged  hindrances  to  our  further  attempt  at  breaking  through 
toward  the  upper  Theiss  ;  the  accomplishment  of  which  we  had 
to  hasten  so  much  the  more,  as  the  united  hostile  brigades  of 
Generals  Gotz  and  Prince  Jablonowski,  with  their  allies  the 
Sclavonian  militia,  were  pressing  on  after  us  in  the  valley  of  the 
Waag,  being  now  only  two  days'  march  in  our  rear ;  and  as  their 
attack  on  our  rear,  if  combined  with  the  simultaneous  energetic 
opposition  of  the  Schlick  corps  in  our  front,  might  very  easily 
cause  the  ruin  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube. 

There  was,  it  is  true,  another  expedient  left  us,  by  which  it 
would  have  been  possible  to  accomplish,  without  combat,  the 
junction  of  our  corps  d'armee  with  that  of  Colonel  Klapka,  and 
then  immediately  attack  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick  from 
the  south  and  southwest — the  original  idea  of  the  war-minister 
Meszaros.  This  expedient  consisted  in  removing  the  corps 
d'armee  into  the  valley  of  the  little  river  Bodva,  starting  from 
Iglo  in  two  columns  ;  to  be  executed  with  the  one  by  Rosenau 
(Rosnyo-banya),  Harskut,  Almas,  Gorgo,  Torna  to  Moldau  (Sepsi), 
and  the  other  by  Svedler,  Einsiedel  (Remete),  Stosz,  Metzen- 
seifen,  to  Jaszo.  But  then  the  enemy  would  also  have  been 
more  favorably  situated  for  the  junction  of  his  forces,  now  sep- 
arated by  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube;  and  the  fame 
of  the  Schlick  corps,  which  had  so  much  influence  on  our  troops, 
would  have  been  still  more  dangerously  increased. 

The  reasons  which  prevented  us  from  adopting  this  plan  were 
in  fact  mainly  of  a  moral  nature.  They  were  the  same  which 
impelled  us  to  force  our  way  through  the  mountain-road  over 
the  Branyiszko,  while  only  demonstrations  were  made  in  the 
Hernad  valley  by  Krompach  and  Klukno  ;  the  same  reasons 
which  determined  me,  in  forcing  this  passage,  to  put  in  front 
those  troops  in  which  the  least  confidence  could  be  placed. 

In  consequence  of  tittle-tattle  exaggeration,  the  mountain-road 
across  the  Branyiszko  had  gained  the  renown  of  being  a  defile, 
and  moreover  impregnable  from  the  west.  To  force  the  Brany- 
iszko was  at  that  time  equivalent  to  taking  the  bull  by  the 
horns.  But  this  was  just  the  point  to  which  I  wished  finally 
to  bring  my  infantry,  which,  with  the  exception  of  only  a  few 
battalions,  was  not  to  be  trusted. 

The  Guyon  division  consisted  of  infantry  of  the  thirty-third 


160  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Honved  battalion,  which  had  been  totally  routed  on  the  21st  of 
January  at  "Windschacht ;  of  the  thirteenth  Honved  battalion, 
which  had  completely  failed  us  on  the  following  day,  imme- 
diately after  the  first  shot  of  the  hostile  chasseurs  in  the  attack 
undertaken  from  Schemnitz  against  the  turning-column  of  Col- 
onel Collery ;  furthermore,  of  a  battalion  of  what  were  called 
pioneers,  a  platoon  of  Hungarian  volunteer  chasseurs,  and  two 
Honved  battalions  raised  in  JSTeusohl  only  a  fortnight  ago,  con- 
sisting of  quite  raw  recruits  sent  in  by  the  rural  districts.  The 
thirty-third  and  thirteenth  battalions,  ever  since  the  days  of 
"Windschacht  and  Schemnitz,  remained,  as  may  be  conceived,  in 
the  odor  of  cowardice,  and  were  ripe  for  decimation ;  the  pioneers 
and  Hungarian  chasseurs,  about  thirty  men  strong,  were  for 
action  still  unknown  quantities,  because  untried  ;  but  what 
could  be  expected  from  the  fourteen-day  soldiers  of  both  the  last- 
mentioned  bodies  of  troops  ?  The  other  three  divisions  had  at 
least  one  or  two  tried  battalions. 

But  the  taking  by  storm  of  the  Branyiszko  by  these  last  would 
have  produced  only  an  insignificant  sensation  among  the  corps 
d'armee  :  for  every  one  was  convinced  beforehand  that  these  few 
good  battalions  always  valorously  did  their  duty  in  presence  of 
the  enemy.  Nay,  it  was  even  to  be  feared  that  a  victory  gained 
by  the  best  troops  would  support  the  fixed  idea  that  this  favor- 
able result  could  have  been  obtained  only  by  these  very  battal- 
ions. The  more  vivid  their  recollection  of  the  defeats  lately 
suffered,  the  more  this  would  have  caused  the  highly  dangerous 
want  of  self-confidence  to  be  felt  by  the  less  trusty  divisions.  In 
this  way  the  trusty  troops  would  have  lost  in  numerical  strength 
and  the  unixu^ly  ones  would  have  gained  nothing ;  while,  on 
the  contrary,  an  insignificant  victory  gained  by  the  latter  must 
become  to  the  whole  corps  d'armee  a  source  of  higher  self-confi- 
dence, in  comparison  with  which  the  perhaps  greater  numerical 
loss  would  appear  hardly  worthy  of  notice. 

Therefore  the  Guyon  division  aloTie  was  sent  on  before  to 
attack  the  hostile  position  on  the  Branyiszko,  while  the  division 
of  the  left  wing,  designed  for  the  support  of  the  foimer,  had  to 
remain  in  Kirchdrauf  (Szepes-Varalja),  and  the  Kmety  division 
to  make  a  demonstration  on  the  road  along  the  Hernad.  The 
Aulich  division  remained  in  the  valley  of  the  Poprad  to  support 
the  rear-guard,  the  head-quarters  in  Leutschau. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  161 

On  the  5tli  of  Februaiy,  1849,  the  Guyon  division  attacked  the 
enemy  in  his  position  on  the  Branyiszko ;  while  the  officers  of 
the  head-quarters  and  their  column  innocently  arranged  a  soiree 
dansante  in  Leutschau  for  the  night  from  the  5th  to  the  6th. 
Since  our  side-march  from  Levencz  and  Verebely  into  the  dis- 
trict of  the  mountain-towns,  where  our  situation  began  to  be  a 
critical  one,  I  recommended  to  the  divisions  the  employment  of 
similar  preservatives  against  that  poor-sinner  state  of  mind 
which  only  too  easily  gets  hold  of  the  officers  of  an  isolated  army 
seriously  and  continually  menaced  from  all  sides — as  the  corps 
d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  was  at  that  time — and  immediately 
seizing  also  on  the  men,  guarantees  victory  to  the  enemy  even 
before  the  battle  has  commenced. 

I  was  myself,  however,  on  that  day  too  much  racked  by  incer- 
titude about  the  issue  of  the  combat  on  the  Branyiszko,  to  take 
part  this  time,  as  on  former  occasions,  in  the  quickly  organized 
ball.  Alone  in  my  lodgings  I  awaited  with  painful  impatience 
a  report  from  the  field  of  battle. 

Of  Colonel  Klapka  we  knew  on  the  5th  of  February  only  thus 
much,  that  he  had  still,  on  the  24th  of  January,  the  defensive 
task  of  frustrating  the "  advance  of  the  Schlick  corps  d'armee 
across  the  Theiss,  near  Tokaj  ;  so  we  were  informed  by  a  letter 
written  in  French  by  Colonel  Stein,  adjutant-general  of  the  war- 
minister,  and  containing  the  autograph  signature  of  the  minister 
of  war,  Meszaros,  dated  from  Debreczin,  the  24th  of  January, 
1849,  which  reached  me  only  on  the  5th  of  February,  that  is, 
on  the  twelfth  day  after  it  had  been  dispatched.  Meanwhile,  it 
is  true,  rumors  had  reached  my  head-quarters  about  two  encoun- 
ters, favorable  for  the  Hungarian  arms,  which  Colonel  Klapka 
was  said  to  have  had  with  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Count 
Schlick  on  the  22d  of  January  at  Tarczal,  and  on  the  following 
day,  the  23d,  at  Bodrog-Keresztur  ;  the  said  private  letter  of  the 
24th  of  January,  however,  did  not  mention  the  matter  ;  and  as 
the  distance  of  these  places  from  Debreczin  was  only  about 
twelve  (German)  miles,  the  news  of  both  victories  would  have 
reached  the  latter  place  before  the  sending  away  of  this  letter. 
We  had,  therefore,  so  much  the  greater  reason  to  doubt  the  au- 
thenticity of  the  rumors  about  the  victories  of  Colonel  Klapka  at 
Tarczal  and  Bodrog-Keresztur,  because  these  appeared  under  the 
same  2^07npous  form  as  that  under  which  many  a  defeat  suffered 


162  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

by  us  had  been  obliged  to  do  duty  as  victory,  to  raise — as  they 
said — the  spirits  of  the  people. 

According  to  the  tenor  of  this  official  communication,  and  that 
we  might  act  with  certainty,  we  could  by  no  means  calculate 
upon  a  simultaneous  energetic  offensive  of  Colonel  Klapka  against 
Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick.  All  we  could  expect  was, 
that  Colonel  Klapka,  on  the  news  of  our  approach,  would  closely 
follow  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick,  who  very  probably 
was  hastening  against  us  from  the  Theiss.  A  resolute  rear- 
guard, however,  could  nevertheless  easily  detain  him  until  the 
Field-marshal  should  have  succeeded  in  getting  rid  of  our  corps 
d'armee. 

In  more  precise  terms  : 

Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Count  Schlick  stood  with  his  main 
army  on  the  24th  of  January  at  Tokaj,  on  the  Theiss,  on  the 
offensive  against  Debreczin ;  Colonel  Klapka  with  his  corps, 
opposite  to  him,  on  the  defensive. 

The  supposition  that  the  enemy  had  been  successful  in  his 
offensive  would  have  been  an  especially  favorable  one  for  the 
corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  in  its  position  on  the  5th  of 
February,  1849.  In  order  to  preserve  ourselves  against  optimist 
illusions,  we  had  to  assume  that  the  certain  news  of  our  approach 
had  found  the  Schlick  corps  still  on  this  side  the  Theiss. 

Moreover,  Colonel  Guyon,  four  days  before  his  arrival  at  Iglo, 
early  in  the  morning  of  the  30th  of  January,  had  pryingly  fallen 
upon  a  post  of  intelligence  dispatched  in  our  direction  from  the 
hostile  column  in  Leutschau,  and  so  unskillfully  that  some  of  these 
men  escaped.  They  could  on  the  same  day  have  carried  to 
Leutschau  the  certain  report  of  our  approach ;  and  on  the  next 
day,  31st  of  January,  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick  in  Tokaj 
— if  nearer  to  Kaschau,  the  worse  for  us — could  know  what  he 
had  to  do,  in  case  he  did  not  under-estimate  the  corps  d'armee 
of  the  upper  Danube — a  circumstance  which  could  not  be  sup- 
posed in  a  general  like  him. 

The  distance  from  Tokaj  to  Korotnok  on  the  western  foot  of 
the  Branyiszko  is  nineteen  (German)  miles,  consequently  five 
successive  marches  of  four  miles  per  day.  To  accomplish  this 
task  presupposes  £l  brave,  hardy  infantry ;  it  does  not,  however, 
exceed — especially  in  winter — the  maximum  of  what  they  can 
accomplish. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTJNGAUY.  163 

The  troops  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick  were  inured  to 
fatigue,  and  brave. 

It  was  impossible  for  the  Klapka  corps  to  persevere  in  these 
forced  marches  toujours  a  la  piste  of  the  main  body  of  the  Schlick 
corps.     "Why  ? 

Because  the  pursuer  while  following  can  never  neglect  certain 
precautionary  measures — and  these  cost  time ;  because  the  pur- 
sued again  and  again  stops  the  pursuer  by  opposing  to  him  part 
of  his  forces  as  rear-guard ;  because  this  rear-guard,  besides  its 
direct  resistance,  has  moreover  considerable  means  at  its  disposal 
for  interrupting  repeatedly  the  progress  of  the  pursuer  on  a  road 
intersected  by  many  important  local  impediments,  as  is  that  from 
Tokaj  to  the  Branyiszko. 

The  strength  of  the  Schlick  troops  was  generally  estimated  at 
about  15,000  men.  It  is  clear  that  the  forced  march  of  five  days 
must  produce  a  considerable  number  of  stragglers.  But  even 
these  taken  into  account,  together  with  the  rear-guard.  Field- 
marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick  on  the  5th  of  February  could  oppose 
to  us  10,000  men,  in  two  columns  at  the  same  height,  one  on  the 
Branyiszko,  the  other  at  Klukno  on  the  Hernad ;  while  Colonel 
Klapka  on  the  same  day  could  have  advanced  scarcely  further 
than  Kaschau. 

Moreover,  the  road  into  Gallicia  was  open  to  the  baggage  of 
the  Schlick  corps. 

The  attack  upon  the  hostile  position  on  the  Branyiszko  on  the 
5th  of  Februaiy,  if  repulsed,  would  only  excite  the  enemy  to  as- 
sume the  offensive,  and  this  probably  with  the  intention  of  again 
defeating  us  before  Colonel  Klapka  had  overtaken  him  ;  while  I 
should  be  obliged — on  the  one  hand  by  the  pursuit  of  the  Gotz 
and  Jablonowski  brigades,  together  with  their  allies  the  Sclavon- 
ian  militia,  on  the  other  by  my  determination  no  longer  to  avoid 
the  combat — ^to  act  likewise  on  the  offensive,  namely,  to  a  com- 
pulsory renewal  of  the  attack  of  the  5th ;  and  thus  the  conflict 
between  the  Schlick  corps  and  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper 
Danube  on  the  6th  of  February  must  become  a  decisive  one. 

By  these  combinations  the  issue  of  the  attack  of  the  5th  already 
obtained  for  us  almost  the  importance  of  an  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion, *'  To  he,  or  not  to  be?''  and  the  painful  impatience  with 
which  I  was  awaiting  Guyon's  report  becomes  explicable — the 
more  so,  as  the  news  received  from  Kirchdrauf  in  the  course  of 


164  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  afternoon,  that  there  had  arrived  thither  already  several 
"wagons  full  of  wounded  from  the  Guyon  division,  had  placed 
beyond  doubt  the  actual  beginning  of  a  serious  battle  on  the 
Branyiszko. 

This  news  certainly  did  not  sound  unfavorable,  considering  that 
running  away,  and  even  leaving  the  wounded  behind,  after  each 
serious  engagement,  had  hitherto  been  exclusively  the  course  fol- 
lowed by  the  most  of  the  infantry  of  the  corps  d'armee,  especially 
that  belonging  to  the  Guyon  division.  But  the  higher  these  hopes 
of  mine  had  been  raised  hereby,  the  deeper  they  sunk  on  account 
of  the  inconceivably  long  delay  of  all  further  news. 

Despairing,  I  stood  on  the  threshold  of  a  reckoning  with  the 
past. 

The  perception  of  unavoidable  great  dangers  at  hand,  if  con- 
sciousness does  not  refuse  its  assistance,  urges  us  irresistibly  to 
that  height  of  intellectual  activity,  whence  the  still-hoping 
glance  more  boldly  than  at  other  times  endeavors  to  pierce  the 
vail  of  futurity,  so  as  to  discover  beyond  it  more  favorable  con- 
junctures ;  but  whence  the  already-despairing  searches  in  the 
opposite  direction  for  that  crossing  of  the  roads  where  we  perhaps 
took  the  wrong  direction. 

The  dangers  which  menaced  the  existence  of  the  corps  d'armee 
of  the  upper  Danube,  and  next,  through  it,  that  of  the  father- 
land, were  unavoidably  near  and  great. 

The  perception  of  this  had  not  indeed  shaken  my  self-reliance, 
but  it  had  put  hope  to  flight,  and  in  its  room  came  the  question, 
imperiously  demanding  an  answer  : 

Whether  it  would  not  have  been  better  to  have  forborne  that 
step,  which  had  led  me  so  far  as  to  prevent  me  now  from  return- 
ing, although  thousands  looked  up  to  me  with  the  firm  confidence, 
that  I  would  not  let  them  be  destroyed  in  the  desperatio^n  of 
fruitless  efforts  ! 

Whether  it  would  not  have  been  better  to  have  issued  to  the 
corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube,  instead  of  the  defying  pro- 
clamations at  Waizen,  a  pacific  summons  to  a  voluntary  laying- 
down  of  arms. 

Although  I  had  perceived  when  in  Presburg : 

That  the  repeated  attempts  of  the  Vienna  ministers  to  over- 
throw the  constitution  of  Hungary  by  force  of  arms  were  7Wt  less 
revolutionary,  because  our  attempt,  on  German-hereditary  ground, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  165 

to  attack  the  Croat  Ban  Baron  Jellachich  in  revolt  against  the 
lawful  government  of  the  country,  even  when,  or  xdAhexonly  when, 
he  had  crept  under  the  iegis  of  Field-marshal  Prince  "Windisch- 
griitz  and  his  army — had  been  apparently  an  aggressive  act 
against  Austria. 

That  the  constitution  of  Hungary  was  worth  a  sanguinary 
contest. 

That  such  a  contest  was  sufficiently  justified  by  the  single  re- 
sult of  rendering  impossible  for  the  present  the  re-establishment 
of  its  foi-mer  dependent  conditimi. 

That  the  nation  now  more  assuredly  owed  it  to  its  hmwr  to 
seize  the  sword  for  the  existence  of  Hungary  as  a  state,  because 
hitherto  it  had  unfortunately  indolently  looked  on  while  the  rude 
arrogance  of  several  from  its  midst  drove  the  greatest  part  of  the 
Sclavonians  and  Romanians  into  open  revolt,  and  thus  foolishly 
promoted  only  the  views  of  those  who  desired  nothing  more  earn- 
estly than  the  ruin  of  the  state  of  Hungary. 

All  this  I  had  perceived  while  yet  in  Presburg. 

Nevertheless  I  was  forced  to  admit  when  in  Waizen  : 

That  the  nation  cared  desperately  little  for  its  honor,  and  that 
I  had  not  the  power  to  force  it  to  act  otherwise. 

That  the  enemy  had  an  armed  force  at  its  command /«r  su- 
perior to  ours. 

That  consequently  the  contest — though  demanded  thrice  over 
— must  remain  a  fruitless  one. 

In  addition  to  this  came  the  apprehension— excited  by  his  un- 
worthy public  conduct— oi\VL\x\g\3,Q^  on  the  part  of  Kossuth,  which 
might  be  sufficient  to  justify,  though  only  anachi'onistically,  the 
acts  of  violence  of  the  Vienna  government. 

What  then  was  it  that,  considering  the  visible  degeneracy  of 
the  nation,  the  gigantic  superiority  of  the  enemy,  and  my  shaken 
confidence  in  the  purity  of  Kossuth's  politics — could  still  prevent 
me  from  recognizing  as  my  first  duty  to  my  companions  in  arms 
the  speediest  renunciation  of  all  further  resistance  ? 

It  was  the  conviction  that,  if  the  overthrowing  of  the  reformed 
constitution  of  Hungary  succeeded  at  the  first  assault,  millions  of 
families,  for  the  sake  of  a  few  thousands,  would  immediately  be 
brought  again  under  the  old  yoke  of  subjection. 

And  those  who  looked  up  to  me  with  firm  confidence  that  I 
would  not  allow  them  to  perish  in  the  desperation  of  fruitless 


166  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

efforts,  DID  WELL  IN  TRUSTING  ME  ;  foi  710  effort  is  fruitless  when 
it  is  made  in  defense  of  the  most  essential  'personal  rights  of  mil- 
lions ;  and  every  day  that  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube 
passed  under  my  command  was  gained  for  the  securing  of  these 
rights — gained  moreover  for  the  very  salutary  chastisement  (un- 
fortunately not  the  directly  personal  one)  of  those  men  who  (I 
mention  as  an  instance  only  one  fact)  had  been  sufficiently  un- 
principled to  advise  the  monarch  to  bind  to-day  a  part  of  the 
army  by  an  oath  to  the  Hungarian  Constitution,  and  expect  to- 
morrow this  very  part  of  the  army — perhaps  out  of  loyal  instinct'^ 
— to  make  common  cause  with  the  enemies  of  the  Constitution 
they  had  sworn  to. 

Thus  I  became  quits  with  the  past ;  thus  I  remained  from 
this  time  protected  against  all  weapons  which  the  future  might 
turn  against  me  with  the  intent  of  mortally  injuring  the  sinews 
of  my  firm  resolve  to  save  or  to  avenge  the  constitution — 
namely,  the  conviction  that  I  had  to  regret  nothing  of  all  I  had 
already  done  for  this  purpose,  nor  the  consequences  of  it. 

With  the  equanimity  of  resignation  I  now  awaited  the  still- 
delayed  news  of  the  issue  of  the  battle  on  the  Branyiszko. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

The  night  between  the  5th  and  6th  of  February  was  half 
passed,  when  an  officer  delivered  to  me  Colonel  Guyon's  written 
report,  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  his  position,  begun  his 
retreat  toward  Eperjes,  and  was  being  vigorously  pursued. 

Colonel  Guyon  sent  me  at  the  same  time  one  of  the  enemy's 
dispatches  that  had  been  seized.  It  contained  an  urgent  request 
from  the  commander  of  the  hostile  column  opposed  on  the  Hernad 
to  our  Kmety  division — which  was  making  demonstrations  along 
the  same  road  toward  Kaschau — to  the  hostile  commander  on  the 
Branyiszko,  Major-general  Count  Deym,  for  assistance,  especially 
artillery. 

The  situation  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  ap- 
peared now  to  be  suddenly  essentially  changed. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  167 

From  this  hostile  dispatch  we  could  conclude  with  certainty : 

That  the  hostile  column  on  the  Hernad  must  be  much  weaker 
than  that  which  had  been  dislodged  from  the  Branyiszko ; 
and  that,  consequently, 

Before  Eperjes  we  could  scarcely  any  longer  mieet  with  resist- 
ance. 

For  if  Major-general  Deym  could  have  thought  it  possible  at 
all  to  prevent  our  advance  with  his  comparatively  feeble  brigade 
— if  I  remember  right,  scarcely  2000  men  strong — even  by  the 
total  loss  of  all  his  troops,  he  would  assuredly  not  have  aban- 
doned the  position  on  the  Branyiszko ;  just  as  he  would  hardly 
have  left  it,  if  he  had  entertained  the  slightest  hope  of  receiving 
any  considerable  reinforcement  in  the  course  of  the  day,  or  even 
of  the  following  night,  by  arresting  some  division  of  the  Schlick 
corps  on  its  advance  against  us,  and  already  sufficiently  near  for 
the  purpose. 

The  surprisingly  small  strength  of  the  enemy  dislodged  from  the 
Branyiszko — according  to  the  supposition  that  we  had  before  us 
on  the  evening  of  the  5th  the  Schlick  main  army  in  two  col- 
umns, on  the  Branyiszko  and  on  the  Hernad — showed,  first  of 
all,  that 

Either  the  passage  of  the  enemy  across  the  Theiss  near  Tokaj 
had  succeeded,  and  consequently  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick 
already  menaced  Debreczin,  and  resolutely  marching  against  this 
object,  doubtless  the  most  important,  deliberately  abandoned  the 
base  of  his  operations  ; 

Or,  that  he  had  undervalued  the  importance  of  the  corps 
d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  previous  to  the  successful  and  yet 
miscarried  surprise  of  Iglo  (in  the  night  from  the  2d  to  the  3d  of 
February),  but  that  after  this  surprise  there  was  no  longer  suffi- 
cient time  to  oppose  to  us  a  greater  force  on  these  barriers. 

Both  indications  urged  us  to  a  speedy  continuation  of  the  of- 
fensive thus  favorably  commenced. 

On  the  6th  the  Aulich  division  was  removed  from  the  Poprad 
valley  into  the  line  of  Kirchdrauf,  Krompach ;  the  head-quarters 
to  Kirchdrauf  I  hastened  in  a  carriage  after  Colonel  Guyon  to- 
ward Eperjes,  to  convince  myself  of  the  real  position  of  affairs. 
I  did  not  succeed,  however,  in  overtaking  him ;  for  I  had  to  be 
back  again  in  Kirchdrauf  before  evening,  to  resolve  upon  the 
dispositions  for  the  following  day,  and  to  issue  them.     But  I 


;^-L'. 


168  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

came  up  with  the  division  of  the  left  wing,  which  followed  close 
on  the  Guy  on  division,  and  learnt  from  its  commander  that  Col- 
onel Guyon  had  already  reached  Eperjes,  and  found  it  evacuated 
by  the  enemy. 

This  unexpected  hasty  abandonment  of  the  base  of  operations 
led  us  to  suppose  that  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick,  after 
the  loss  of  the  Branyiszko,  had  suddenly  resolved  to  effect  espe- 
cially the  junction  of  his  corps  with  the  brigades  of  the  Major- 
generals  Gotz  and  Jablonowski ;  that  he  intended  to  accomplish 
this  on  the  shortest  communication  between  Kaschau  and  Leut- 
schau,  by  Bela,  Hamor,  and  Klukno ;  and  for  this  reason  drew 
back  with  such  uncommon  celerity,  on  the  road  to  Eperjes  to- 
ward Kaschau,  the  part  of  his  corps  which  had  been  repulsed 
from  the  Branyiszko.  By  doing  so  he  could  meanwhile  have  his 
baggage  escorted  safely  from  Kaschau  by  Jaszo,  Schmolnitz 
(Szomolnok),  into  the  Zips. 

This  supposition  was  by  no  means  improbable  in  itself,  because 
we  knew  nothing  whatever  of  Klapka's  operations,  except  what 
we  learnt  from  the  official  communication  of  the  24th  of  Janu- 
ary, and  the  still  earlier  rumors  about  the  encounters  at  Tarc- 
zal  and  Keresztur ;  and  this  decided  us  (on  the  7th  of  February) 
to  leave  the  whole  Kmety  division  on  its  former  line  of  demon- 
stration on  the  Hernad,  but  to  dispose  the  Aulich  division  from 
Kirchdrauf  only  as  far  as  half-way  toward  Eperjes,  while  the 
head-quarters,  together  with  the  division  of  the  left  wing,  were 
trasferred  to  Eperjes. 

According,  however,  to  information  obtained  by  scouts  in  the 
evening  of  the  7th,  the  enemy  seemed  again  to  have  evacuated 
Eperjes  for  the  purpose  of  concentrating  himself  behind  the  river 
Tarcza,  and  once  more  advancing  against  us ;  since  the  scouts 
reported  that  they  had  seen  large  masses  of  troops  moving  from 
Kaschau  toward  Eperjes. 

It  was  then  to  be  expected  that  the  enemy  would  attack  on 
the  following  day ;  and  as  a  precaution  the  Aulich  division  was 
now  ordered  all  the  way  to  Eperjes ;  while  the  Kmety  division 
received  instructions  to  advance  on  the  direct  road  toward  Kas- 
chau by  Hamor  and  Bela,  from  the  8th  onward  no  longer  merely 
making  demonstrations,  but  attacking  in  earnest  where  it  met 
with  resistance ;  and  as  soon  as  it  should  hear  a  continued  can- 
nonade in  the  direction  of  its  left  flank,  immediately  to  march 


J%m.. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  169 

awaiiist  Kaschau,  and  even  if  its  attacks  should  be  repeatedly  re- 
pulsed, incessantly  to  begin  them  anew. 

Intending  to  let  the  enemy  come  over  the  Tarcza  before  we  re- 
sumed the  projected  offensive  against  him,  we  remained  during 
the  night  from  the  7th  to  the  8th  on  the  defensive ;  and  were 
surprised  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  by  the  news,  tho.t  tJie  enemy 
Jiad  demolisJied  the  bridge  over  the  river  Tarcza  at  Leinesdn. 

I  say  ''surprised,''  because — after  the  enemy  had  sufficiently 
convinced  us  by  the  advance  of  his  main  body  toward  the  Tarcza, 
which  had  begun  on  the  previous  evening,  that  he  did  not  intend 
the  execution  of  the  above-mentioned  junction  with  the  Gotz  and 
Jablonowski  brigades — we  had  no  reason  to  take  this  advance 
for  a  defensive  measure,  unless  we  had  presupposed  as  certain 
the  closest  proximity  of  Klapka's  corps  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 
But  this  we  could  not  do,  since  all  our  scouts  sent  to  look  out  for 
Klapka,  either  did  not  come  back  at  all,  or  if  they  did,  it  was 
without  bringing  us  any  intelligence.  Not  till  after  the  retreat 
of  the '  enemy  from  Lemesdn  did  an  emissary,  whom  Colonel 
Klapka  had  sent  to  me  several  days  previously,  succeed  in  reach- 
ing my  head-quarters. 

Now  the  communication  over  the  Tarcza  had  first  to  be  re- 
stored. Considering  the  little  experience  and  imperfect  equip- 
ment of  my  corps  of  pioneers,  this  required  much  time.  We 
hoped  to  find  near  Felso-Olcsar  a  communication  still  remaining 
across  the  river.  Information  collected  beforehand  confirmed  this, 
and  made  us  resolve  to  advance  in  two  columns  from  Eperjes 
toward  Kaschau,  with  the  Aulich  division  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tarcza  to  the  passage  just  named  ;  but  with  the  Guyon  division 
and  that  of  the  left  wing  on  the  main  road  over  the  bridge  near 
Lemesan,  which  should  be  previously  repaired. 

Before  the  arrival  in  our  camp  of  Klapka's  emissary,  we  be- 
lieved that  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick  intended  to  fall  back 
only  as  far  as  the  mountain  of  Kaschau,  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
us  there  a  decisive  battle,  when  we  should  have  been  nearer  to 
the  town  of  Kaschau — the  point  of  junction  of  the  line  of  retreat 
of  his  main  body — as  well  as  to  the  column  detached  on  the  direct 
road  from  Kaschau  to  Leutschau  against  our  Kmety  division. 

We  intended  in  that  case,  by  advancing  on  the  main  road  of 
Eperjes  with  the  Guyon  division  and  that  of  the  left  wing,  to  oc- 
cupy him  in  front  until  the  Aulich  division  should  have  accom- 

H 


170  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

plished  its  passage  across  the  Tarcza  at  Felso-Olcsar,  but  then 
immediately  to  pass  over  to  the  real  decisive  attack  upon  the 
front  and  right  flank  of  his  position  ;  while  the  Kmety  division, 
advised  by  the  thunder  of  the  guns,  had  to  do  the  same  upon  the 
isolated  line  of  attack  which  had  been  assigned  to  it. 

But  since  we  had  been  apprised- — as  has  been  said,  only  late  in 
the  course  of  the  8th  of  February — by  our  emissary,  that  Colonel 
Klapka  had  been  some  days  already  acting  on  the  offensive 
against  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick — the  chief  of  my  gen- 
eral staff  called  my  attention  to  the  circumstance,  that  Count 
Schlick  very  probably  intended  to  evacuate  Kaschau  and  fall 
back  by  Torna  into  the  district  of  the  operations  of  the  Austrian 
chief  army ;  and  I  therefore  abandoned  the  intention  of  awaiting 
the  Aulich  division,  which  might  possibly  be  delayed  by  its  pas- 
sage over  the  river  at  Felso-Olcsar.  The  Guyon  division  and  that 
of  the  left  wing  had  to  attack  the  enemy  immediately  and  with- 
out hesitation,  wherever  they  might  find  him. 

But  the  restoration  of  the  bridge  at  Lemesan  went  on  so  slowly, 
that  our  advanced  troops  did  not  reach  Kaschau  till  the  morning 
of  the  10th  of  February,  while  the  enemy  had  left  the  town  on 
the  evening  of  the  9th.  At  the  same  time  Klapka's  corps  also 
arrived  at  Kaschau,  and  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube 
was  now  again  united  on  the  Theiss  with  the  Hungarian  forces, 
which  had  meanwhile  been  greatly  strengthened. 

In  the  course  of  the  same  day  Colonel  Klapka  appeared  in 
Kaschau  ;  and  late  in  the  evening  I  repaired  thither  myself,  to 
deliberate  with  him  and  arrange  our  further  operations. 

Klapka — after  he  had  succeeded  by  the  battles  at  Tarczal, 
Bodrog-Keresztur,  and  Tokaj  (on  the  22d,  23d,  and  31st  of 
January),  in  frustrating  the  attempt  of  the  Schlick  corps  to  cross 
the  Theiss — in  the  beginning  of  February  had  assumed  the 
offensive  against  it  on  his  own  behalf,  without  knowing  any 
thing  more  of  me  than  that  I  still  continued  the  struggle  in  the 
mountain-towns,  in  spite  of  the  instructions  of  the  war-minister 
to  hasten  back  to  the  upper  Theiss. 

Only  the  unexpected  hasty  falling  back  of  the  Schlick  corps 
on  all  lines  toward  Kaschau,  after  the  hot  days  of  Tarczal, 
Keresztur,  and  Tokaj,  led  Klapka  to  the  conclusion  that  I  must 
already  have  left  the  mountain-towns  and  appeared  in  the  rear 
of  his  adversary.     He  then  accelerated  his  own  advance  to\vard 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  171 

Kaschau,  summoning  all  his  strength,  and  thus  rendered  it  abso- 
lutely impossible  for  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick  to  execute 
his  purpose,  resolved  upon  too  late,  of  falling  with  all  his  forces 
first  upon  me,  and  then  turning  himself  anew  against  Klapka 
only  after  he  had  vanquished  me. 

Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick  must  now  have  seen  that 
he  would  be  attacked  in  Kaschau  at  latest  on  the  10th  of  Feb- 
ruary by  both  Hungarian  corps  in  the  north  and  south  simul- 
taneously, and  evacuated,  as  has  been  mentioned,  the  town  on 
the  9th,  in  order  to  save  his  corps  by  a  bold  though  dangerous 
retreat  through  Torna  toward  Waizen. 

Although  this  retreat  was,  so  to  say,  executed  before  Klapka's 
eyes,  he  was  nevertheless  unable  to  prevent  it,  because  on  the 
9th  the  main  body  of  his  corps  was,  in  spite  of  accelerating  his 
advance  to  the  utmost  of  his  power,  still  in  part  one,  in  part 
two  days'  march  in  the  rear  behind  the  Hernad,  and  as  the 
advanced  troops  alone  were  then  and  there  at  his  disposal.  But 
this  only  made  him  resolve  to  pursue  the  fleeing  enemy  more 
energetically;  and  for  this  purpose,  on  the  10th  of  February  he 
disposed  one  half  of  his  main  body  as  far  as  Enyiczke  and  Nagy- 
Ida,  while  the  other  half  arrived  at  Hidas-Nemeti.  and  two 
divisions  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  at  Kas- 
chau. 

Thus  stood  matters  when  Colonel  Klapka  and  myself  saw 
each  other  again,  on  the  evening  of  the  said  day,  for  the  first 
time  since  the  evacuation  of  the  capitals. 

On  the  11th  of  February  Klapka  expected,  by  means  of  a 
forced  march,  to  approach  the  enemy  sufficiently  near  to  be  able 
to  overtake  him  by  the  following  or  at  latest  the  second  day 
thereafter,  and  at  least  to  disperse  him  in  detail.  I  was,  how- 
ever, during  the  same  time,  to  prevent  at  any  cost  the  junction 
of  the  Schlick  corps  d'armee  with  the  Gbtz  and  Jablonowski 
brigades,  which  had  followed  me  as  far  as  the  Zips  ;  and  when 
successful  in  this,  was  to  attack  them. 

Thus  we  aimed  at  weakening  in  every  possible  way,  if  not  at 
the  entire  destruction  of  the  hostile  forces  in  upper  Hungary,  so 
as  thereby  to  render  the  chief  army  of  Field-marshal  Prince 
Windischgratz  less  able  to  withstand  the  attacks  which  were 
to  be  directed  against  it  from  the  middle  Theiss. 

We  agreed  in  an  instant  on  the  earlier  details  of  our  separate 


172  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

operations.  The  results  of  these  operations  to  become  the  basis 
of  later  ones. 

My  wish  to  examine  the  corps  d'arm6e  of  Colonel  Klapka,  or 
at  all  events  a  part  of  it,  decided  me  to  start  in  a  carriage 
during  the  night  from  the  10th  to  the  11th  for  Hidas-Nemeti 
where,  as  has  been  mentioned,  a  part  of  the  corps  was  just  then 
stationed.  I  intended  to  accompany  these  troops  on  the  11th  of 
February  on  their  march,  in  order  to  observe  them  more  ilosely 
during  it,  and  that  I  might  be  enabled  to  institute  a  comparison 
between  them  and  those  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper 
Danube. 

This  part  of  Klapka's  corps  was  to  leave  Hidas-Nemeti  on  the 
11th,  and  follow  that  part  which  had  already  advanced  as  far 
as  Nagy-Ida  and  Enyiczke. 

But  on  its  way  it  was  overtaken  by  a  new  order  of  Klapka, 
in  obedience  to  which  it  had  immediately  to  return  and  march 
back  toward  Miskolcz. 

Greatly  surprised  at  this  unexpected  disposition,  in  direct  con- 
tradiction to  our  agreement  of  the  preceding  evening,  I  left  the 
column,  which  was  now  returning  again  toward  Hidas-Nemeti, 
and  hastened  to  Klapka's  head-quarters  at  Enyiczke,  for  the 
purpose  of  learning  the  reason  of  this  counter-march  ;  which  I 
found  to  be,  that  an  order  had  suddenly  arrived  from  Lieutenant- 
general  Dembinski,  for  Colonel  Klapka  instantly  to  set  out  back 
again  toward  Miskolcz,  by  forced  marches,  with  the  whole  of 
his  corps. 

Klapka  was  at  that  time  under  Dembinski's  chief  command. 
He  consequently  believed  himself  bound  to  obey,  and  I  could 
not  prevent  him  ;  but  I  resolved  to  undertake  immediately — 
though  late — the  pursuit  of  the  Schlick  corps  abandoned  by  him, 
with  a  part  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  ;  without, 
however,  giving  up  the  offensive  against  the  Gotz  and  Jablo- 
nowski  brigades. 

The  division  of  the  left  wing  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper 
Danube  had  therefore  in  the  course  of  the  day  (the  11th)  to  start 
from  Kaschau,  and  hasten  after  the  Schlick  corps. 

The  latter  had  by  this  time,  it  is  true,  gained  an  advance  of 
two  days'  march — thanks  to  Dembinski's  order  ;  during  the  next 
two  days,  however,  its  rear-guard  was  overtaken,  and  on  the 
13th  at  daybreak  surprised  near  Szen.     The  enemy  lost  in  all 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  173 

perhaps  from  60  to  70  cavalry  and  about  100  infantry ;  but  this 
was  the  sole  result  of  the  pursuit — and  the  last  of  my  acts  as  the 
independent  commander  of  the  royal  Hungarian  corps  d'armee 
of  the  upper  Danube. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

At  the  same  time  as  the  account  of  the  successful  surprise  at 
Szen,  a  dispatch  from  the  minister  of  war  once  more,  after  a 
long  pause,  arrived  at  my  head-quarters. 

It  contained  two  most  important  documents  : 

1.  An  ordre  de  hataille  for  the  whole  Hungarian  forces. 

2.  The  nomination  of  the  Polish  Lieutenant-general  Dembin- 
ski  as  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  Hungarian  troops,  ex- 
cept those  which  were  under  Bem's  chief  command  in 
Transylvania,  the  garrisons  of  the  fortresses  that  were  in 
our  hands,  and  the  troops  surrounding  those  occupied  by 
the  enemy. 

According  to  this  I  also  was  placed  under  Dembinski's  orders. 

The  first  named  document  divided  the  whole  of  the  Hungarian 
forces  into  isolated  divisions  of  from  4,0.00  to  6,000  men  each, 
which  received  the  appellation  "  division  of  the  army,"  and  a 
number  as  a  distinctive  mark.  These  divisions  were  to  serve 
the  commander-in-chief  in  his  strategic  combinations  as  a  war- 
operative  unity.  The  former  corps  d'armee  were  consequently 
divided,  according  to  their  strength,  into  from  two  to  three  such 
divisions  of  the  army. 

The  strength  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube — 
amounting  still  to  from  15,000  to  16,000  men  in  consequence  of 
our  losses  in  the  mountain-towns  having  been  from  time  to  time 
compensated  for  by  continual  recruitings — was  not  known  in 
Debreczin  at  the  time  when  this  ordre  de  hataille  was  drawn  up. 
The  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  accordingly  figured  as  a 
single  army-division,  the  XVIth,  in  the  said  document.  (After- 
ward, however,  I  was  charged  to  divide  it  into  three  army-divi- 
sions, while  it  received  as  corps  d'armee,  instead  of  the  designa- 


174  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

tion  "  of  the  upper  Danube,"  the  number  VIL  By  the  appella- 
tion the  "  seventh  corps  d'armee"  will  therefore  in  future  always 
be  meant  the  former  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube.) 

The  rumor  had  preceded  these  dispatches  by  some  days,  and 
had  encountered  considerable  antipathies  in  the  corps  d'armee  of 
the  upper  Danube.  The  greater  number  of  the  officers  had,  like 
myself,  not  even  the  slightest  knowledge  of  the  glorious  war- 
like past  of  Lieutenant-general  Dembinski ;  while  the  sudden  re- 
call of  the  Klapka  corps  to  Miskolcz,  and  the  immediate  favorable 
consequences  of  this  measure  to  the  fleeing  enemy,  were  not  ex- 
actly calculated  to  create  all  at  once  confidence  in  the  talents  of 
the  unknown  foreigner  as  a  general.  These  officers,  not  dissatis- 
fied with  my  command  hitherto,  did  not  consider  my  being  subor- 
dinated to  the  authority  of  this  foreigner,  whose  debut  was  so  un- 
lucky, as  in  any  way  justifiable,  and  believed  that  the  motives 
for  Dembinski's  appointment  as  commander-in-chief  must  be 
sought. 

Partly  in  the  animosity  of  the  Committee  of  Defense  against 
me,  caused  by  the  proclamation  of  Waizen  ; 

Partly  in  the  intention  to  give  them  a  leader  who  did  not 
recognize  that  proclamation. 

The  first  supposition  raised  the  sympathies  of  the  officers  for 
me,  and  at  the  same  time  their  jealousy  of  the  relatively-increas- 
ing importance  of  the  other  Hungarian  corps  in  consequence  of 
the  degradation  of  the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube  to  a 
simple  army-division  ;  while  the  second  quite  sufficed  to  awaken 
again  the  apprehensions  of  "  republican  intrigues,"  declared  first 
after  the  evacuation  of  the  mountain-towns,  and  for  a  while  ap- 
peased bv  the  proclamation  of  Waizen,  which  was  silently  ac- 
knowledged by  the  government. 

The  consequence  of  this  was,  that  consultations  took  place  in 
almost  all  the  divisions  about  measures  of  resistance,  more  or  less 
energetic,  against  the  recent  decree  of  the  war-minister  Meszaros, 
who  through  it  fell  under  the  suspicion  of  allowing  himself  to  be 
made  a  tool  of  by  the  Committee  of  Defense. 

I  was  informed  of  these  agitations,  however,  only  when,  in  con- 
sequence of  them,  three  divisions  had  already  declared  themselves 
positively  against  my  subordination  to  Dembinski's  orders,  and 
for  the  independency  of  my  position  as  commander  of  the  corps 
d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube.     Nay,  the  Kmety  division  especi- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  175 

ally  assured  me  of  its  absolute  obedience,  even  in  case  I  should 
judge  it  to  be  necessary  to  lead  it  against  Debreczin.  The 
Guyon  division  only,  in  opposition  to  the  other  three  divisions  of 
the  corps,  gave  an  evasive  declaration  ;  but  with  it,  and  as  com- 
mentary on  it,  the  information  arrived  at  the  same  time  from 
this  very  division  that  Colonel  Guyon  had  made  this  declaration 
toithout  Jiaving  consulted  the  body  of  his  officers. 

From  these  expressions  of  such  a  lively  antipathy  against  Dem- 
binski's  being  commander-in-chief,  though  they  had  been  evinced 
only  after  previous  agitations,  I  could  nevertheless  not  avoid  com- 
ing to  the  conclusion,  that  the  older  officers  in  particular,  with 
whom  the  agitations  originated,  felt  just  as  strongly  as  myself  an 
apprehension  that  Hungary's  combat  in  self-defense  would  ac- 
quire, sooner  or  later,  through  the  participation  of  foreign  ele- 
ments in  it,  an  aggressive  signification  against  Austria,  by  which 
the  invasion  of  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz  would  be 
afterward  justified.  But  this  conclusion  led  me  next  to  the 
thought,  either  to  retire  from  my  post,  or  straightway  to  oppose 
myself  with  the  corps  d'armee  to  the  recent  decree  of  the  war- 
minister. 

However,  I  could  not  long  fail  to  see  that  the  former  step  would 
immediately  have  brought  with  it  the  dissolution  of  the  whole 
corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube.  For  had  not  its  bravest,  its 
most  useful  officers  repeatedly  declared,  that  they  M^ould  take  part 
in  the  combat  only  so  long  as  w?/  participation  in  it  guaranteed 
to  them  the  maintenance,  on  the  part  of  the  Committee  of  De- 
fense also,  of  the  principles  expressed  in  the  proclamation  of 
Waizen  ?  Now  the  dissolution  of  my  corps  d'armee  would  very 
considerably  have  weakened  Hungary's  means  of  resistance  ;  and 
consequently  by  retiring  I  should  have  injured  the  cause  of  my 
country  more  than,  for  instance,  his  serene  highness  Field-mar- 
shal Prince  Windischgratz,  whose  especial  charge  it  was.  I 
therefore  could  not  leave  my  post. 

But  if  I  remained  at  my  post  and  would  not  obey,  then  I 
must  be  prepared  for  its  resulting  in  my  dismissal,  the  conse- 
quences of  which  would  have  been  tantamount  to  those  of  my 
voluntary  retirement. 

After  calm  reflection,  there  was  nothing  left  for  me  but  to  obey, 
and  console  myself  meanwhile  with  the  vain  hope,  that  the 
recent  measures  of  the  government,  though  they  had  not  their 


176  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

origin  in  a  correct  perception  of  the  true  interests  of  our  distressed 
country,  yet  still  were  not  to  be  exclusively  ascribed  to  impure 
motives. 

Once  resolved  on  obedience,  I  had  next  to  think  on  the  means 
of  paralyzing  the  spirit  of  resistance  against  the  decree  of  the  war- 
minister,  which,  by  these  agitations,  had  been  stirred  up  in  the 
whole  corps  d'armee  ;  and  to  do  this  without — by  an  unwise  de- 
creeing of  punishments  against  the  continuance  of  the  agitations 
which  apparently  had  been  introduced  imder  my  segis,  because 
by  officers  high  in  rank — giving  rise  to  a  suspicion  that  I  ap- 
proved of  Dembinski's  being  appointed  commander-in-chief,  and 
thereby  weakening,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  country,  the  confi- 
dence of  the  corps  in  me,  and  thus  obtaining  instead  of  a  prompt 
obedience,  because  voluntary,  at  most  a  passive,  because  forced 
one. 

That,  on  the  other  hand,  I  must  not  approve  of  the  agitations 
was  plain ;  but  neither  could  I  ignore  them  entirely,  for  it  was 
already  generally  known  that  I  had  been  informed  of  their  result. 
I  thought  I  should  solve  this  difficult  problem  best  by  issuing  the 
follow  pacifying  address  to  the  corps  d'armee,  avoiding  therein 
all  political  matters,  and  assuming  that  the  corps  d'armee  was, 
as  it  were,  wounded  only  in  its  esprit  cle  corps. 

"  Order  of  the  Day. 

"  The  decree  of  the  Minister  of  war  of  the  12th  of  February,  1849,  places 
the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube,  with  the  changed  appellation  of 
the  '  Royal  Hungarian  sixteenth  division  of  the  army'  under  the  chief  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant-general  Dembinski. 

"  In  officially  communicating  this  to  the  whole  sixteenth  division  of  the 
army,  I  most  solemnly  call  upon  all  the  staff  and  superior  officers  under 
my  command  to  treat  this  apparent  humiliation  with  the  same  indifference 
with  which  I — resigning  my  independence  as  commander  of  a  corps  d'armee, 
in  obedience  to  the  decree  of  the  united  Diet — submit  myself  freely  to  the 
orders  of  the  Lieutenant-general  Dembinski,  who  is  said  to  be  a  worthy 
general,  and  one  grown  gray  in  war.  (My  signature  follows.) 

"  Kaschau,  Uth  of  February,  1849." 

This  address  had  the  desired  effect.  The  agitations  in  my 
favor  against  Dembinski — though  as  I  heard  afterward,  secretly 
continued — were  in  future  without  any  disturbing  influence  on  the 
free  submission  of  the  corps  to  the  orders  of  the  general-in-chief 

The  minister  of  war  Meszaros,  however,  regarded  this  order 
of  the  day  as  the  corpus  delicti  of  a  daring  attempt  on  my  part 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  177 

to  stir  up  mutiny  against  himself  and  Dembinski,  and  resolved  to 
reprimand  me — as  it  seemed  very  seriously. 

This  reprimand  was  nevertheless  a  well-deserved  one,  because 
I  had  omitted  to  inform  the  war-minister  of  the  circumstances 
which  had  called  this  order  of  the  day  into  existence  ;  although 
I  had  omitted  to  do  so  only  for  this  reason,  because  therein  1 
must  inevitably  have  thrown  a  very  clear  light  on  his  nullity  as 
war-minister  in  regard  to  Kossuth  and  the  Committee  of  Defense. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  the  above-mentioned  dispatches 
from  the  minister  of  war,  I  also  received  an  order  from  Dembinski 
immediately  to  communicate  to  him  circumstantially  what  was 
the  strength  of  my  corps,  how  and  where  it  was  distributed,  and 
what  plan  of  operations  I  had  at  that  time  in  execution. 

Dembinski  received  all  this  information  without  delay. 

My  plan  of  operations  was  that  concerted  with  Klapka  a  few 
days  previously.  In  my  communication  I  pointed  out  the  import- 
ance of  the  continued  occupation  of  Kaschau,  the  advantageous 
position  of  my  corps  d'armee  just  then,  and  the  extremely  un- 
favorable situation  of  the  Gotz  and  Jablonowski  brigades,  and 
their  allies  the  Sclavonian  militia.  I  did  not  fail  also  to  c^li 
Dembinski's  attention  to  what  a  favorable  opportunity  w^as  oflbr- 
ed  to  us  at  this  moment  of  defeating  separately,  on  the  one  hand 
the  last-named  hostile  forces,  on  the  other  the  Schlick  corps  ;  and 
perhaps,  by  my  rapid  advance  to  the  relief  of  Komorn,  of  com- 
pelling Field-marshal  Prince  "Windischgratz  again  to  relinquish 
his  offensive  operations  against  the  Theiss ;  and  by  these  means 
secure  to  ourselves  time,  of  which  we  had  still  no  superfluity,  to 
prepare  for  a  decisive  stroke. 

Dembinski's  answer  was  to  this  effect,  that  he  did  not  by  any 
means  overlook  the  value  of  my  suggestions  relative  to  the  near- 
est operations  ;  but  that  he  perceived  the  moment  for  the  intend- 
ed decisive  blow  had  already  arrived,  and  could  not  be  deferred : 
he  therefore  urgently  summoned  me  for  the  present  to  leave  to 


178  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

their  fate  the  brigades  of  Gbtz  and  Jablonowski,  together  with 
their  allies  the  Sclavonian  militia,  and  lead  my  corps  d'armee, 
as  soon  as  possible,  from  their  position  around  Kaschau  to  Mis- 
kolcz. 

In  consequence  of  this  order  I  left  Kaschau  ;  and  dividing  my 
corps  into  two  columns,  marched  one  by  Enyiczke,  Forro,  Szikszo, 
the  other  by  Moldau  and  along  the  valley  of  the  Bodva,  to  Mis- 
kolcz. 

Dembinski  received,  with  a  report  hereupon,  at  the  same  time 
a  detailed  account  of  the  daily  stations  on  the  route.  By  this 
means  he  could  send  his  dispositions  direct  to  any  single  division 
during  the  march,  instead  of  forwarding  them  through  me. 

The  two  columns  of  the  seventh  army  corps  were  of  the  same 
strength.  Each  of  them  consisted  of  two  divisions  (I  still  retain- 
ed meanwhile  the  original  plan  of  having  the  corps  d'armee  in 
four  divisions) :  the  column  in  the  valley  of  the  Bodva,  of  the 
division  of  the  left  wing  (the  command  of  which,  after  the  volun- 
tary retirement  of  its  former  commander,  was  confided  to  Colonel 
afterward  General  Poltenberg),  and  the  Guyon  division ;  the 
second  column — that  on  the  high  road  from  Kaschau  to  Miskolcz 
— consisted  of  the  Aulich  and  Kmety  divisions.  At  the  head  of 
both  columns  were,  in  the  valley  of  the  Bodva,  the  Poltenberg 
division,  on  the  main  road  the  Aulich  division.  On  the  20th  of 
February,  according  to  the  plan  for  the  march,  the  former  should 
have  arrived  at  the  height  of  Edeleny,  the  latter  at  Szikszo. 

On  the  same  day,  while  on  the  way  from  Forro  to  Szikszo, 
the  latter  received  Dembinski's  order,  by  turning  westward  into 
Szikszo  from  the  main  road,  to  continue  its  march  with  the  least 
possible  interruption  as  far  as  Sajo-Szent-Peter. 

That  I  might  obtain  some  certain  information  respecting  the 
movements  of  the  Gotz  and  Jablonowski  brigades,  I  had  re- 
mained later  in  Kaschau,  and  left  this  town  only  with  the  last 
sections  of  my  corps.  I  did  not,  therefore,  learn  the  altered  route 
of  the  Aulich  division  till  afterward,  from  a  report  of  its  com- 
mander. 

"Whether  this  deviation  from  the  line  of  march  toward  Miskolcz 
was  for  a  part  of  the  distance  only — a  temporary  one — or  rather 
was  the  starting-point  of  a  new  line  of  operations,  perhaps  re- 
moved to  the  road  to  Lossoncz,  was  for  me  now  a  most  import- 
ant question,  because  on  it  depended  the  arrangements  to  be 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  179 

made,  by  way  of  precaution,  relative  to  providing  for  the  corps. 
I  thought  I  should  receive  an  explanation  soonest  by  proceeding 
to  Dembinski's  head-quarters  at  Miskolcz,  and  accordingly  hast- 
ened thither  in  the  first  instance,  on  the  21st  of  February. 

Both  Dembinski  and  his  adjutant  were  absent ;  and  nobody  at 
his  head-quarters  could  give  me  the  desired  explanation. 

This  uncertainty  as  to  the  position  of  the  seventh  army  corps, 
of  which  the  Aulich  and  Poltenberg  divisions  should,  according 
to  the  original  plan  of  march,  have  already  reached  Miskolcz  on 
the  21st ;  the  conviction  that  Dembinski  had  taken  no  care  what- 
ever to  provide  for  them  in  the  new  district  of  location,  and  that 
consequently  these  divisions  for  that  day  at  least  must  either 
suffer  from  hunger,  or  resort  to  the  forcible  seizure  of  the  most 
essential  supplies  ;  and,  in  the  next  place,  the  apprehension  of 
seeing  undermined  the  hitherto  good  discipline  of  the  seventh 
corps  through  the  repeated  occurrence  of  such  demoralizing  cir- 
cumstances, which  though  certainly  not  always  unavoidable,  yet 
generally,  and  in  this  case  especially,  could  very  easily  have  been 
guarded  against :  all  this  induced  me  to  represent,  in  a  letter  to 
General  Dembinski,  the  injury  which  must  result  to  the  success 
of  our  arms,  if  he  directed  the  movements  of  isolated  parts  of  an 
army  corps  without  at  the  same  time  giving  due  infoi-mation  on 
the  subject  to  its  commander,  who  was  responsible  for  the  main 
tenance  of  his  troops  in  a  warlike  condition. 

The  letter  which  contained  these  representations  was  delivered 
at  Dembinski's  head-quarters,  with  a  request  that  I  might  be 
immediately  informed  of  his  return. 

He  did  not  return,  if  I  recollect  rightly,  till  the  morning  of 
the  22d  of  February ;  and  I  at  once  waited  upon  him,  in  com- 
pany with  the  chief  of  the  general  staff,  as  well  as  the  then 
adjutant  of  the  seventh  army  corps,  and  another  officer  of  my 
suite. 

As  I  entered  with  my  companions,  Dembinski  had  just  finished 
reading  my  last  letter  to  him ;  he  had  perhaps  also  already  seen 
the  "  Order  of  the  Day,"  of  the  14th  of  February,  from  Kaschau, 
given  above ;  and  probably  both  had  violently  excited  him 
against  me ;  for  scarcely  had  I  introduced  myself  and  my  com- 
panions, when  he  attacked  me  with  uproarious  vehemence.  He 
expatiated  on  his  services  to  Hungary,  and  the  great  sacrifices  he 
had  already  made  for  the  salvation  of  my  country. 


180  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

"  I  have  laid  down  the  supreme  command  in  my  fatherland* 
to  save  this  poor  comitry,"  cried  he ;  "  yes,  I  have  just  now 
saved  your  corps,  while  you  do  not  trouble  yourself  at  all  about 
it.  Do  you  know  where  your  divisions  are  ?  No  I  you  do  not 
know  I  Yet  you  reproach  me.  I  came  to  Hungary  only  on  the 
condition  that  I  should  be  intrusted  with  the  supreme  command 
over  all  the  Hungarian  troops  ;  and  the  government  has  em- 
powered me  to  have  you  shot,  if  you  do  not  obey.  I  have  met 
you  with  kindness,  because  I  know  that  it  must  mortify  a  Hun- 
garian to  serve  under  a  non-Hungarian.  But  you  reproach  me 
for  my  orders,  instead  of  obeying  them  I" 

Dembinski  was  somewhat  exhausted  by  the  excessive  strain- 
ing of  his  voice,  and  gasped  a  moment  for  breath.  1  wished  to 
take  advantage  of  this  involuntary  pause  to  show  him  that  his 
orders,  so  far  as  they  concerned  me,  had  been  punctually  fol- 
lowed. But  he  probably  attributed  to  me  an  aggressive  inten- 
tion, and  interrupted  me  with  the  question,  several  times  repeated 
in  the  greatest  passion  :  whether  I  thought  he  had  not  courage 
enough  to  fight  a  duel  with  me.  Without,  however,  waiting  for 
my  answer,  he  suddenly  digressed  to  recent  events. 

"I  advised  you  to  be  very  cautious  on  your  march  toward 
Putnok,"  continued  he ;  "  why  have  you  not  followed  my  ad- 
vice ?"  and  so  on. 

It  was  to  Dembinski's  adjutant,  who  was  present,  and  made 
meanwhile  unceasing  efforts  to  calm  his  chief,  that  I  owed  at 
last  the  opportunity  of  speaking.  I  now  enumerated  all  the 
orders  which  had  come  to  me  from  him,  showed  that  they  had 
been  punctually  followed,  and  wished  to  know  what  order  I  had 
disobeyed. 

As  he  could  make  no  reply  to  this,  he  again  began  talking  of 
the  above  advice,  which  I  had  not  followed. 

But  I  reminded  him,  that  disregard  of  well-meant  advice  was 
not  disobedience ;  that,  besides,  his  advice  had  been  quite  super- 
fluous, as  the  march  of  the  seventh  army  corps  from  Kaschau  to 
Miskolcz  had  been  already  arranged  with  an  eye  to  the  danger 
which  threatened  from  Putnok ;  and  I  finally  requested  him  to 
send  me  only  orders,  and  to  communicate  to  me  also  such  as  he 
should  think  it  necessary  to  give  in  a  direct  manner  to  separate 

*  Dembinski  probably  meant  that  which  was  intended  for  him  in  spe 
of  a  new  insurrection  in  Poland. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  181 

divisions  of  my  corps  ;  but  that,  once  for  all,  I  thanked  him  most 
courteously  for  his  advice. 

Hereupon  I  and  my  companions  took  our  leave. 

I  could  not  on  this  occasion  resist  the  impression,  that  I  had 
just  made  the  acquaintance  of  a  man  who  would  be  much  more 
in  his  proper  place  as  the  inmate  of  a  lunatic  asylum  than  as  the 
leader  of  an  army. 

Dembinski's  adjutant,  a  circumspect  man,  followed  us  directly, 
and  sought  to  excuse  the  unwonted  violence  of  his  chief,  by 
representing  it  as  the  consequence  of  my  letter,  which  had  been 
taken  as  conveying  censure.  He  assured  me  besides,  that  Dem- 
binski  already  saw  that  in  his  passion  he  had  given  way  to  un- 
just expressions ;  adding  that,  for  these  reasons,  he  hoped  no  ob-, 
stacle  would  be  made  on  my  part  to  smoothing  the  way  for  a 
future  entente  cordiale  between  us. 

I  declared  to  Dembinski's  adjutant,  that,  on  the  contrary,  I 
intended  to  take  care  to  preserve  a  good  understanding  between 
myself  and  his  chief;  but  would  therefore  raise  my  demands  on 
his  exertions  in  the  service  of  my  country  so  much  the  higher. 

Dembinski's  performances  up  to  that  time,  however,  so  far  as 
I  was  acquainted  with  them,  justified  but  very  slender  expecta- 
tions. 

On  the  5th  of  February  he  had  crossed  the  firmly  frozen 
Theiss  near  Lok,  below  Tokaj,  with  the  then  Kazinczy  army- 
division,  and  had  marched  at  first  to  Miskolcz.  There  he  learned 
on  the  9th,  or  at  latest  in  the  night  between  the  9th  and  the 
10th,  that  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick  had  left  the  town 
of  Kaschau,  taking  the  road  to  Torna.  On  the  11th  he  ordered 
back  to  Miskolcz  the  Klapka  corps  (from  this  time  called  the 
first  army  corps),  which  was  pursuing  the  enemy  ;  but  while  on 
its  march  made  it  turn  toward  Sajo-Szent-Peter  and  Putnok. 
On  the  14th  of  February  Dembinski  attacked,  with  only  the 
Kazinczy  division  the  main  body  of  the  retreating  Schlick  corps 
at  Tornalja.  The  attack  was  repulsed  at  its  very  beginning ; 
whereupon  Dembinski  drew  the  Klapka  corps,  together  with  the 
Kazinczy  division,  which  had  at  the  same  time  been  broken  up 
and  incorporated  with  it,  back  to  Miskolcz,  and  from  thence 
made  them  advance  on  the  road  of  Mezo-Kovesd  toward  the 
capitals.  The  seventh  army  corps  he  likewise  called  back  from 
Kaschau  to  Miskolcz,  to  make  it  follow  the  first  corps. 


182  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Now  the  question  was,  why  Dembinski,  who  certainly  intended 
to  attack  Schlick's  retreating  corps  in  earnest  and  not  in  mere 
fun,  had  not  done  this  two  days  sooner  (on  the  12th)?  Tor- 
nalja  is  only  seven  (German)  miles  from  Miskolcz  ;  Dembinski 
could  consequently  quite  easily  have  stood  before  Tornalja  on 
the  12th. 

The  answer  to  this  might  perhaps  be  found  in  the  recalling 
of  the  first  army  corps  from  Nagy-Ida  and  Enyiczke  to  Miskolcz, 
and  would  be,  that  Dembinski  did  not  dare  to  go  against  the 
Schlick  corps  with  the  feeble  Kazinczy  division  alone. 

But  this  explanation  is  contradicted  by  the  fact,  that  on  the 
14:th  he  had  nevertheless  actually  dared  the  attack  with  only 
ihe  Kazinczy  division;  while  the  first  army  corps  remained 
inactive  at  Putnok. 

Then  again,  in  excuse  of  Dembinski,  it  might  be  assumed  that 
he  had  moved  the  first  army  corps  nearer  to  the  point  of  attack 
only  that,  being  protected  by  it  in  his  rear,  he  might  be  able  to 
execute  his  attacks  with  the  Kazinczy  division  the  nioie  boldly 
and  obstinately.  Irrespective  of  the  strategic  disproportion  which 
existed  in  the  present  case  between  the  modest  offensive  opera- 
tions of  a  single  weak  division  and  the  imposing  protective  meas- 
ures which  had  required  a  whole  corps  d'armee,  this  supposition 
is  contradicted  by  the  notorious  haste  with  which  Dembinski  at 
once  utterly  abandoned  the  attack  on  the  marching  column  of 
the  Schlick  corps,  as  soon  as  the  enemy  had  seemed  disposed 
seriously  to  accept  the  combat. 

Irresolution  stamped  this  mismanaged  offensive  of  Dembinski 
against  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick. 

A  further  performance  of  Dembinski  was  the  following  : 

While  the  seventh  army  corps,  as  has  been  mentioned,  was 
marching  in  two  columns  of  equal  strength  and  on  the  same 
height,  the  one  in  the  Bodva  valley,  the  other  on  the  high  road 
from  Kaschau  to  Miskolcz,  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Schlick 
made  an  offensive  movement  from  Rimaszombat  by  Putnok  to- 
ward Miskolcz.  Dembinski,  informed  of  this  sufficiently  early, 
was  quite  right  in  concentrating  both  the  Guyon  and  Poltenberg 
divisions  when  advancing  toward  Sajo-Szent-Peter,  the  point 
menaced  next  by  the  enemy,  and  moreover  drew  toward  him 
also  the  Aulich  division  from  Szikszo,  in  order  energetically  to 
repulse  the  enemy.      To  this  measure  nothing  can  be  objected. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  183 

But  now  the  enemy — apprised  of  this — suddenly  gives  up  the 
offensive,  and  withdraws,  by  a  forced  retreat,  from  the  dan- 
ger of  a  disadvantageous  conflict.  And  what  does  Dembinsld 
then? 

He  allows  the  three  divisions  from  early  in  the  morning  till 
late  at  night,  in  battle  array,  to  await — evidently  in  vain — the 
attack  of  the  enemy,  while  man  and  horse  are  perishing  with 

HUNGER  AND  THIRST. 

This  mistake  made  me  apprehend  a  great  want  of  penetration 
on  the  part  of  Dembinski. 

But  irresolution  and  want  of  penetration  are  not  among  the 
qualities  desired  in  a  general. 


I 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

It  seemed  as  if  Dembinski  seriously  intended  to  assume  the 
offensive  against  the  Austrian  army. 

In  the  evening  of  the  same  day  on  which  I  had  spoken  for  the 
first  time  with  him  (22d  of  February),  I  received  an  order  to 
follow  the  first  army  corps  on  the  main  road  toward  Mezo- 
Kovesd. 

All  the  dispositions  during  this  advance  were  forwarded  to  us, 
already  elaborated  in  their  details,  from  Dembinski's  war-oflice. 

On  the  24th  of  February  the  head-quarters  of  Lieutenant- 
general  Dembinski  were  in  Mezo-Kovesd,  mine  in  Mezo-Keresztes. 

I  availed  myself  of  the  afternoon  of  that  day  to  pay  a  visit  to 
Dembinski ;  for  I  really  wished  to  bring  about  a  good  understand 
ing  between  him  and  me. 

He  received  me  in  such  a  manner  as  plainly  showed  that  he 
intended  to  make  me  forget  his  absurd  behavior  during  our  first 
meeting  in  Miskolcz. 

He  had  just  got  Klapka's  report  of  a  sudden  attack  made 
during  the  preceding  night  on  those  troops  of  the  Schlick  corps 
which  had  entered  Petervasara  the  day  before,  but  which  had 
been  only  partially  successful. 

Some  days  earlier  a  hostile  division  of  cavalry  had  been  sur- 


184  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

prised  in  Kompolt  by  Aristid  Dessewffy,  first  lieutenant  in  the 
first  army  corps,  and  had  suffered  severe  loss. 

These  attacks  greatly  incensed  Dembinski  against  Klapka. 
He  asserted  that  by  such  surprises  our  offensive  was  only  re- 
vealed to  the  enemy  before  the  time ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
they  prevented  the  enemy  from  discovering  his  own  intentions. 

It  can  not  be  denied  that  there  was  a  certain  originality  in 
this  opinion.  Its  originality  was  especially  evident  in  the  nat- 
ural consequence  resulting  from  it,  which  in  the  present  instance 
plainly  amounted  to  this,  that  Dembinski  would  have  been  better 
pleased  if  Colonel  Klapka  had  allowed  himself  to  be  suddenly 
attacked  by  the  Austrians  ;  because  then,  on  the  contrary,  they 
%vould  have  revealed  their  offensive  prematurely,  and  Klapka 
would  have  been  prevented  from  discovering  Dembinski' s  in- 
tentions. 

Besides  Klapka,  the  government  also  was  on  this  day  the  ob- 
ject of  Dembinski's  dissatisfaction.  He  complained,  that  the 
seat  of  the  government  being  fixed  in  Debreczin,  and  the  neces- 
sity of  continually  protecting  that  town,  greatly  increased  the 
ditficulty  of  his  task  against  the  enemy.  Further,  that  the 
government  could  not  be  depended  on  for  the  fulfillment  of  its 
promises  :  thus,  for  instance,  it  had  been  promised  to  him,  that 
from  the  16th  of  February  onward  there  should  constantly  be  a 
fortnight's  provisions  for  60,000  men  at  his  disposal  in  Tiszafiired ; 
while  according  to  the  reports  which  had  just  been  received  from 
thence,  the  wants  of  the  next  five  days  were  scarcely  pro- 
vided for. 

The  entente  cordiale  between  Dembinski  and  myself  seemed 
now  to  be  in  a  fair  way.  Dembinski  had  already  made  me  the 
confidant  of  his  vexation  at  Klapka's  sudden  attacks,  and  at  the 
unfulfilled  promises  of  the  government. 

Satisfied  with  these  results  of  my  initiative  at  accommodation, 
I  returned  toward  evening  to  my  head-quarters  at  Mezo-Keresztes. 

In  Dembinski's  war-office  the  detailed  dispositions  for  the  next 
days  had  been  delivered  to  the  chief  of  the  general  staff  of  the 
seventh  army  corps,  who  had  accompanied  me  on  this  visit,  in 
case  Dembinski  should  think  proper  to  admit  him  to  a  consulta- 
tion in  common — while  Dembinski  himself  had  not  said  a  word 
about  them  to  me,  and  had  evidently  been  endeavoring  to  avoid 
any  conference  upon  our  operations.     Thus  I  learned  only  after 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  185 

I  had  already  left  Dembinski  what  was  to  be  done  on  the  en 
suing  days. 

The  dispositions  made  known  the  intention  of  first  occupying 
the  little  river  Tama  from  Sirok  as  far  as  Bod ;  but  at  the  same 
time  in  the  details  the  tendencij  to  isolate  from  each  other  the 
divisions  of  one  mid  the  same  army  corps  was  striking. 

While  the  one  half  of  the  first  army  corps  was  ordered  to 
Sirok,  and  the  other  to  Kapolna,  the  Poltenberg  division  of  the 
seventh  army  corps,  advancing  from  Mezo-Kosved  through  Kc» 
recsend,  had*^to  place  itself  between  the  former  two,  and  occupy 
Verpelet  and  Fel-Dobro,  while  the  Aulich  division  should  take 
its  direction  to  Kal. 

To  perceive  the  disadvantages  of  thus  intermingling  two  army 
corps  accustomed  to  the  peculiarities  of  their  own  commanders, 
no  very  rare  perspicacity — one  would  think — is  wanted. 

Dembinski  consequently  was  either  destitute  of  even  this  per- 
spicacity, or  the  motive  of  this  measure,  uncalled  for  by  the 
circumstances,  and  materially  restricting  the  capacity  of  the 
separated  divisions  as  well  as  of  the  whole  army  corps  for  ren- 
dering service,  was  no  other  than  a  definite  endeavor  on  his  part 
to  accustom  the  separated  divisions  to  being  isolated  from  their 
commanders  of  army  corps,  thereby  weakening  the  dreaded 
influence  of  these  commanders  on  the  minds  of  their  troops,  and 
thus  to  render  possible  the  predominance  of  his  own  influence. 

Dembinski  had  given  me  to  understand  on  the  24th  of  Feb- 
ruary in  Mezo-Kovesd,  that  he  was  desirous  of  speaking  with 
me  again  on  an  early  day,  but  that  on  the  following  day  he 
would  remove  his  head-quarters  to  Erlau  (Eger.)  This  intima- 
tion induced  me  to  pay  him  a  second  visit  in  the  forenoon  of 
next  day,  the  25th,  while  he  was  still  in  Mezo-Kovesd,  and 
before  his  departure  for  Erlau.  But  I  no  longer  found  him  in 
his  old  head-quarters  ;  and  supposing  that  he  had  probably  some 
important  affair  to  discuss  with  me,  I  immediately -continued  my 
ride  as  far  as  Erlau. 

I  overtook  him  on  the  road  thither,  entered  with  him  into 
Erlau,  and  there  awaited  his  orders. 

Toward  evening  he  excused  himself,  that  he  had  found  neither 
time  nor  opportunity  for  a  conference  with  me,  and  appointed 
the  next  day  at  his  head-quarters. 

I  had  to  ride  back  during  the  night  to  Mezo-Kovesd,  to  make 


186  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

some  important  arrangements  in  my  own  head-quarters,  which 
on  the  26th  of  February  were  to  be  at  that  place. 

In  the  forenoon  of  the  26th,  however,  I  was  back  again  in 
Erlau,  expecting  Dembinski's  orders. 

This  time  he  spoke  with  me  only  upon  some  measures  relating 
to  the  subsistence  of  the  troops.  But  in  the  further  course  of 
the  conversation  he  put  some  questions  to  me  about  the  ground 
and  the  manner  of  fighting  which  were  best  suited  to  the  troops 
of  the  seventh  army  corps.  I  told  him  that  hitherto  they  had 
learnt  only  the  little  war  in  the  mountains. 

He  then  inquired  what  kind  of  troops  in  the  corps  were  most 
to  be  depended  upon.  Before,  however,  I  could  answer,  he  said 
that  he  believed  our  infantry,  as  a  whole,  could  not  be  relied  on, 
but  that  from  the  cavalry  he  expected  extraordinary  services. 
I  confirmed  his  supposition  in  so  far  as  related  to  the  seventh 
army  corps — the  other  corps  I  hardly  knew  by  name  ;  at  the 
same  time  calling  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  our  cavalry, 
though  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy  in  agility  and  perseverance, 
was  by  no  means  its  equal  in  numerical  strength. 

Dembinski  hereupon  assured  me,  with  much  earnestness,  that 
he  uncommonly  wished  for  a  few  thousand  more  men  than 

WERE   JUST    THEN  AT   HIS   DISPOSAL. 

It  can  not  in  fact  be  denied  that  therein  Dembinski  had 
SOMETHING  in  common  with  the  most  celebrated  generals. 

Meantime  midday  had  arrived.  Dembinski  was  entertained 
by  a  prebendary  in  Erlau,  and  invited  me,  together  with  the 
chief  of  the  general  stafi'  of  my  army  corps,  who  had  again 
accompanied  me  on  this  visit,  to  dine  with  him. 

The  meal  was  nearly  over  ;  we  were  just  adding  the  best  to 
the  good — the  world-renowned  Erlau  wine — when  suddenly  it 
was  reported  that  a  brisk  thundering  of  cannon  was  heard  in  the 
direction  of  Verpelet. 

Dembinski  denied  it  a  priori,  and  did  so  even  very  angrily 
when  the  report  was  confidently  repeated. 

Having  opened  a  window  of  the  saloon,  I  had  meanwhile 
convinced  myself  with  my  own  ears  of  the  correctness  of  the 
report,  and  now  invited  Dembinski  to  do  the  same. 

Unwillingly  he  quitted  the  table,  came  near  the  window,  and 
listened  ;  his  countenance  expressing  the  conviction  that  we 
were  all  deceived. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  187 

The  repeated  hollow  sound  of  the  ground,  however,  was  too 
distinctly  perceptible,  and  too  similar  to  the  distant  thunder  of 
cannon,  to  be  mistaken  for  any  other  sound.  From  the  moment 
when  Dembinski  was  forced  to  acknowledge  this,  his  demeanor 
degenerated  into  the  fury  of  a  demoniac  ;  above  all,  he  bawled 
for  a  carriage  and  horses.  But  the  only  available  means  of  con- 
veyance in  all  his  head-quarters  was  a  farmer's  cart,  which  had 
brought  me  and  my  companion — the  chief  of  the  general  staff 
of  the  seventh  army  corps — from  Mezo-Kovesd  to  Erlau,  and 
stood  ready  for  our  return.  We  invited  Dembinski  to  allow  him- 
self to  be  conveyed  in  our  company  to  the  proximity  of  the  field 
of  battle.  He  had  no  choice,  and  was  obliged  to  comply.  I 
urged  haste. 

The  poor  vehicle  might  have  taken  us  forward  about  100 
paces,  and  we  were  still  within  the  town,  when  suddenly  a  few 
of  the  more  curious  from  among  the  masses  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Erlau  sprang  forward,  and  laying  hold  of  the  reins  of  the 
horses,  asseverated  in  good  Hungarian,  that  it  was  impossible 
for  them  to  suffer  the  general-in-chief  to  be  taken  a  single 
step  further  in  such  a  miserable  cart.  This  would  be — they 
thought — a  disgrace  to  the  town  of  Erlau,  nay,  to  the  whole 
nation. 

Irritated  at  this  foolishness,  I  authoritatively  ordered  the  un- 
welcome champions  of  the  honor  of  the  town  and  nation  to  get 
out  of  the  way.  Dembinski,  who  understood  not  a  syllable  of 
Hungarian,  fell  into  a  still  greater  passion  than  myself,  f.nd 
assisted  me  with  his  menacing  gestures ;  the  chief  of  the  general 
staff  helped  us  in  our  shouting  and  swearing,  and  the  guardians 
of  Erlau's  honor  yielded  ;  we  got  again  under  way. 

Dembinski  now  wished  to  know  what  these  people  had  want- 
ed. I  interpreted  to  him  their  practical  views  in  reference  to 
the  honor  of  their  town  and  nation ;  when,  lo,  he  made  the  cart 
stop,  and  declared  he  would  wait  till  better  horses  and  a  more 
respectable  carriage  could  be  procured. 

I  had  been  very  wrong  to  behave  so  brutally  to  the  champions 
of  their  civic  and  national  honor  I 

Dembinski,  however,  very  soon  repented  of  his  hasty  determ- 
ination ;  for  in  spite  of  the  evident  speed  with  which  one  of  the 
patriots  had  set  off,  with  the  intention  of  placing  his  equipage  at 
our  service,  a  considerable  time  elapsed  without  our  getting  sight 


188  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

of  the  respectable  carriage  promised  us,  and  the  thunder  of  the 
artillery  rather  increased  than  diminished. 

From  a  conceivable  precaution  we  had  meanwhile  kept  our 
seats  in  the  much-despised  hay-cart.  The  patriot  with  the 
equipage  might  possibly  delay  too  long,  or  in  the  end  altogether 
fail  us.  Dembinski  and  I  were  seated  on  a  bundle  of  straw, 
which  had  been  laid  across  the  racks,  and  had  partly  been  forced 
by  our  weight  into  the  body  of  the  wagon,  which  became  nar- 
rower toward  the  bottom. 

The  thunder  of  the  battle — as  has  been  said — rather  increased 
than  diminished.  At  each  new  hollow  sound  along  the  ground 
Dembinski  started  up,  but  just  as  often  fell  back  again  on  his 
seat  with  all  his  weight.  These  shocks  operating  upon  one  side 
of  the  bundle  of  straw  under  us,  it  was  by  jerks  more  and  more 
pushed  to  my  side,  and  at  last,  together  with  me,  over  the  low 
rack  of  the  wagon ;  while  Dembinski  on  his  side  sank  in  ever 
deeper  and  deeper,  and  finally  so  deep  that  he  could  no  longer  sit 
upright. 

This  situation  seemed  to  me  not  befitting  the  dignity  of  the 
general-in-chief  I  feared  that  to  the  honorable  public  it  might 
even  appear  ridiculous.  The  incidental  remark  of  a  patriot  very 
close  to  us,  that  that  gentleman  (pointing  to  Dembinski)  must  be 
a  very  brave  man,  because  he  was  growing  so  extremely  angry 
at  each  explosion  of  cannon,  while  he  (the  speaker)  was  filled 
with  alarm — certainly  convinced  me  that  my  apprehensions  as 
to  the  ridicule  were  unfounded ;  nevertheless  I  advised  the  gen- 
eral to  alight  meanwhile  until  the  new  means  of  conveyance 
should  arrive.  Already  out  of  all  patience,  however,  Dembinski 
would  now  hear  neither  of  alighting  nor  of  waiting  any  longer, 
but  wished  to  continue  again  without  delay  our  jouifney  in  the 
wagon.  Against  this  the  honorable  public  protested  anew, 
crowded  together  in  front  of  our  horses,  and  said  that  the  caleche 
would  be  there  immediately.  This  indeed  made  its  appearance 
next  moment,  and  thus  prevented  the  unequal  contest  which 
threatened  to  take  place  between  the  impatient  general  and  the 
patient  patriots  of  Erlau. 

In  this  new  and  really  more  respectable  carriage  we  proceeded 
uninterruptedly  toward  Verpelet.  But  the  nearer  we  approached 
the  field  of  battle,  and  the  louder  the  thunder  of  the  great  guns 
became,  the  more  Dembinski's  expressions,  both  in  words  and 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  189 

gestures,  were  unlike  those  of  a  being  endowed  with  reason. 
One  absurdity  followed  another  from  the  trembling  lips  of  the 
commander-in-chief,  while  at  one  time  rowing  alternately  with 
his  arms  and  legs,  as  if  he  would  accelerate  the  motion  of  the 
carriage,  at  another  repeatedly  starting  up  from  his  seat,  next 
threatening  with  his  fists  m  the  direction  of  the  battle-field,  he 
revealed  to  us  the  state  of  his  mind  in  all  its  pitifulness.  This 
state  was  the  moral  agony  of  a  braggart,  who  having  pretended 
to  be  a  strong  swimmer,  was  now  seized  with  mortal  fear  lest 
he  should  be  drowned,  because  the  water  into  which  he  had 
ventured  happened  to  reach  up  to  his  neck  I 

As  far  as  I  could  make  out  from  the  mass  of  nonsense. with 
which  we  were  regaled  by  Dembinski  during  this  journey,  it 
must  on  this  day  have, been  still  very  far  from  the  intention  of 
the  Hungarian  general-in-chief  to  give  battle  to  the  enemy.  At 
least  his  oft-repeated  exclamations,  '*  This  I  did  not  wish  yet ! 
It  is  too  soon  yet !"  mainly  indicated  this. 

But  if  this  was  the  case,  then  was  it  in  fact  by  no  means 
handsome  on  the  part  of  Messieurs  the  Austrian  generals  to  at- 
tack us  without  saying  a  single  word  about  it  to  any  one,  or  even 
previously  asking  Mr.  Dembinski  whether  it  would  be  agreeable 
to  him  just  then  ! 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

Dembinski's  last  dispositions  in  detail,  dated  from  the  head- 
quarters at  Mezo-Kovesd,  the  24th  of  February,  for  the  first  and 
seventh  army  corps,  and  a  division  of  the  second  corps,  which 
was  then  cantoned  in  Tiszafiired  and  Poroszlo,  extended  to  the 
26th  of  February  inclusive.  In  consequence  of  these  dispositions, 
on  this  day — during  which  we  were  attacked  so  completely 
contrary  to  Dembinski's  wish — his  forces  stood  : 

A  division  of  the  first  army  corps  in  Sirok  ; 

The  Poltenberg  division  of  the  seventh  corps  in  Verpelet  and 
Fel-Dobro ; 


190  ^      MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  other  division  of  the-  first  corps  in  Al-Dobro,  Totfalva, 
Kapolna,  and  Kompolt ; 

A  division  of  the  second  corps  in  Kal. 

The  first  and  second  army  corps  consisted  each  of  two  divi- 
sions; while  the  seventh  corps  contained  four,  as  has  been  al- 
ready often  mentioned. 

One  division  of  the  second  army  corps  Dembinski  had  left 
behind  in  Poroszlo  and  Tiszafiired,  to  defend  the  passage  across 
the  Theiss. 

But  three  divisions  of  the  seventh  corps  stood  on  the  26th  of 
February  in  Muklar  (Aulich),  in  Mezo-Kovesd  (Guyon),  and  in 
Abrajiy  (Kmety). 

During  our  journey  from  Erlau  to  Verpelet  we  had  discovered 
that  Kapolna  was  the  centre  of  the  engagement,  and  turned 
therefore  from  Szalok  by  Domend  and  Kerecsend  on  to  the  high 
road  of  Gyongyos,  which  leads  to  Kapolna.  The  day  was  com- 
ing to  a  close,  the  fire  of  the  guns  began  already  to  be  seen,  when 
we  reached  the  last-mentioned  place. 

While  still  outside  the  town  we  met  the  standards  of  a  regi- 
ment of  hussars  which  had  been  ordered  to  attack. 

In  the  Austrian  army  there  exists  the  custom — I  know  not 
from  what  period — of  the  cavalry  leaving  its  standards  com- 
pletely out  of  action,  so  as  not  to  run  the  risk  of  losing  them  mal 
a  propos  in  an  attack.  This  custom  certainly  says  less  for  the 
self-reliance  of  the  troops  than  for  their  wise  precaution.  It  had, 
however,  been  introduced,  and  our  hussar  regiments  had  re- 
tained it,  in  order  to  make  partie  egale  with  their  adversaries. 

We  ordered  three  men  from  the  escort  of  the  standards  to  alight, 
and  mounted  their  horses.  Dembinski  and  the  chief  of  the  gen- 
eral staff  of  the  seventh  army  corps  rode  to  Kapolna  ;  I,  by  Dem- 
binski's  direction,  to  Kal.  I  was  to  take  measures  to  keep  the 
Tama,  near  the  latter  place,  in  our  possession ;  he  would  do  the 
same  near  Kapolna. 

While  I  was  still  on  my  way,  the  combat  near  Kal  suddenly 
ceased.  I  had  indeed  no  particular  desire — in  the  probably  pre- 
cipitate and  disorderly  retreat  of  our  troops,  which  might  per- 
haps be  the  cause  of  the  sudden  interruption  of  the  engagement 
— to  encounter,  alone  as  I  was,  the  advancing  enemy,  and  pre- 
ferred going  round  the  place  eastward.  After  thus  having  crossed 
the  road  to  Szikszo,  and  reached  that  from  Fiizes  to  Abrany,  I 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  191 

learned  from  some  peasants  that  the  division  of  the  second  army- 
corps,  for  which  I  was  seeking,  had  at  the  very  commencement 
of  the  battle  advanced  across  the  Tarna,  and  was  still  on  the 
other  side.  The  night  was  very  dark ;  I  wandered  about  for  a 
long  time,  until  I  succeeded  in  finding  the  division.  It  had  ef- 
fected its  passage  across  the  Tarna  by  making  use  of  a  ford  that 
was  practicable  with  difficulty.  I  called  the  attention  of  the 
commander  to  the  danger  to  which  his  troops  were  exposed  by 
their  position,  close  to  the  ford  that  might  easily  be  missed,  by 
the  mere  essay  of  a  night  attack  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  ;  and 
ordered  him  immediately  to  make  the  division  fall  back  to  the 
left  bank,  and  leave  only  the  outposts  on  the  right. 

Meantime  the  hostile  rocket-battery  before  Kapolna  also  finally 
ceased  its  efforts  to  set  fire  to  that  place,  after  having  vainly  con- 
tinued them  till  the  night  became  very  dark  ;  and  the  combat 
was  extinct  along  the  whole  line,  without  Dembinski  or  myself 
having  exercised  any  influence  on  its  course.  In  my  then  subor- 
dinate position,  there  reached  me  mostly  merely  private  rumors 
about  Klapka's  doings,  as  well  as  about  the  details  of  this  first 
day's  battle  of  Kapolna  in  general.  Only  this  much  I  know  for 
certain,  that  our  troops  maintained  on  that  day  (26th  of  February) 
the  whole  line  of  the  Tarna  from  Verpelet  as  far  as  Kal,  and  did 
not  abandon  it  till  the  second  day  of  the  battle  (the  27th.) 

The  main  body  of  the  division  of  the  second  army  corps  having 
been  quartered  in  Kal  as  well  as  was  practicable,  and  provided 
with  victuals,  I  hastened  back  to  Kapolna,  to  learn  what  Dem- 
binski intended  to  do  on  the  following  day. 

I  found  the  commander-in-chief  at  a  farm-house  situated  oa 
the  main  road  eastward  from  Kapolna  ;  but  could  not  speak  with 
him,  he  being  already  asleep  when  I  reached  his  night-quarters. 
He  had,  however,  given  the  following  dispositions  for  the  next  day 
(the  27th  of  February) : 

"  The  Aulich  division  advances  for  the  reinforcement  of  the 
extreme  left  wing  of  the  army  from  Maklar  to  Kal,  joins  there 
the  division  of  the  second  army  corps,  and  hinders  the  enemy  from 
crossing  the  Tarna. 

"  The  Guyon  division  has  to  advance  from  Mezo-Kovesd  as  far 
as  Kapolna,  to  strengthen  the  centre  ; 

"  And  the  Kmety  division  from  Abrany  as  far  as  Kerecsend, 
and  there  remain  en  reserve. 


\\3  R  A  /Ty 


]92  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

"  The  remaining  divisions  have  to  maintain  their  positions  on 
the  Tarna." 

Colonel  Klapka  continued  to  be  entrusted  with  the  right  wing, 
and  myself  with  the  left,  near  Kal,  during  the  next  day  also  ; 
while  Dembinski  reserved  to  himself  again  the  command  of  the 
centre. 

The  drawing  up  of  the  special  orders  necessary  in  consequence 
of  these  dispositions,  as  well  as  dispatching  them  with  the  great- 
est speed  to  the  divisions,  had  been  committed  by  Dembinski  to 
the  chief  of  the  general  staff  of  the  seventh  army  corps.  He  was 
destitute,  however  of  almost  all  means  for  discharging  this  import- 
ant commission.  Dembinski's  orderly  officers  had  remained  be- 
hind in  Erlau,  mine  in  Mezo-Kovesd.  Our  being  in  Kapolna 
was  known  in  neither  of  those  places.  A  single  officer — of  the 
division  of  the  first  army  corps,  which  was  in  action  near  the 
latter  place,  whom  Dembinski  had  taken  for  the  purpose  of  send- 
ing him  as  a  courier  to  Erlau — was  at  our  disposal,  but  only  in 
so  far  as  the  dispatches  could  go  through  Erlau.  The  chief  of 
the  general  staff"  of  the  seventh  army  corps  happened  fortunately, 
on  the  morning  of  the  26th  of  February,  to  have  ordered  two  of 
my  orderly  officers  from  Mezo-Kovesd  to  Erlau,  that  they  might 
be  there  in  readiness  on  any  unforseen  emergency  during  our 
presence  in  Dembinski's  head-quarters.  To  this  precaution  he 
now  owed  the  possibility  of  sending  the  orders  to  the  Aulich  di- 
vision (in  Maklar)  and  to  the  Kmety  (in  Abrany),  by  Dembin- 
ski's courier  to  Erlau,  and  from  thence  by  these  two  orderly  offi- 
cers on  to  Maklar  and  Abrany. 

When,  on  returning  from  Kal,  I  arrived,  as  has  been  mention- 
ed, at  Dembinski's  night-quarters  near  Kapolna,  the  courier  of  the 
commander-in-chief  had  been  gone  a  long  time  with  the  dispatches 
for  Aulick  and  Kmety.  I  expressed  a  serious  apprehension  that 
the  dispatch  for  the  Kmety  division  in  Abrany,  especially, 
would  reach  its  destination  too  late,  on  account  of  the  great  cir- 
cuit through  Erlau  ;  but  I  soon  perceived  that,  under  existing 
circumstances,  it  had  not  been  possible  to  adopt  any  better  plan. 

Dembinski  had  given  the  dispositions  only  late  at  night.  Then 
the  chief  of  the  general  staff!'  of  the  seventh  army  corps — if  he 
wished  to  send  the  orders  direct  to  one  or  other  division — would 
first  have  had  himself  to  seek  in  the  camp  for  the  requisite  officer  ; 
but  the  night  was  pitch  dark,  and  the  troops  were  camping  with- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  193 

out  watch-fires,  on  account  of  the  proximity  of  the  enemy  ;  the 
places  where  they  were  encamped,  as  well  as  the  localities  around 
Kapolna  were  unknown  to  him.  Thus  he  had  to  fear  he  might 
wander  about  uselessly  half  the  night,  without  finding  a  camp ;  and 
even  if  he  should  be  successful,  it  still  remained  doubtful  wheth- 
er any  one  of  the  officers  would  immediately  have  condescended 
to  the  nocturnal  ride  as  courier.  An  order  of  the  chief  of  the 
general  staff  of  the  seventh  army  corps  had  no  weight  with  the 
officers  of  the  first  army  corps,  to  whom  he  was  scarcely  known 
by  name. 

It  was  consequently  to  be  feared,  that  in  this  way,  even  under 
the  most  favorable  circumstances,  more  precious  time  might  be  lost 
than  the  circuitous  route  by  Erlau  would  take  ;  besides,  the  for- 
warding of  an  important  dispatch  by  the  first,  best  officer  who 
happens  to  be  at  hand,  is  always  running  a  risk,  and  was  es- 
pecially so  in  our  army,  which  swarmed  with  uncertain  officers. 

The  chief  of  the  general  staff  of  the  seventh  army  corps  intend- 
ed to  deliver  in  person  the  dispatch  to  the  Guyon  division  in 
Mezo-Kovesd  ;  it  seemed  to  me,  however,  more  advisable  to  let 
him  remain  near  the  commander-in-chief,  and  to  go  myself  with 
the  dispatch  to  Mezb-Kovesd.  I  could  the  rather  venture  to  do 
this,  even  at  the  risk,  if  stopped  by  any  unforeseen  obstacle,  of  ar- 
riving too  late  at  my  post  in  Kal,  as  in  that  case  the  command 
of  the  left  wing  of  the  army  would  have  devolved  upon  Colonel 
Aulich  ;  and  as  he  had  far  more  experience  and  tact  on  the  bat- 
tle-field than  myself,  my  accidental  delay  would  by  no  means  have 
had  a  really  unfavorable  influence  on  the  issue  of  the  contest. 

The  arrival  of  the  Guyon  division  on  the  field  of  battle  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment  was  of  great  importance — of  incompar- 
ably more  than  my  presence  in  Kal  at  the  beginning  of  the  action. 
Time  pressed,  and  I  hastened  to  discharge  the  duty  of  courier. 

The  route  which  I  took  from  Kapolna  to  Mezo-Kovesd  lay 
through  Kerecsend.  Here  I  quite  unexpectedly  met  with  Col- 
onel Poltenberg.  By  his  patrols,  who  had  been  sent  toward 
Kapolna  after  the  termination  of  the  combat,  and  who  in  the 
darkness  probably  had  taken  a  wrong  direction,  he  had  been  in- 
formed in  Fel-Dobro  that  Kapolna  was  already  occupied  by  the 
enemy ;  whereupon  he  led  his  division  from  Fel-Dobro  back  to 
Kerecsend,  fearing  he  might  be  isolated.  I  corrected  Poltenberg's 
erroneous  suppositions  about  the  result  of  the  conflict  of  the  past 


194  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

day,  communicated  to  him  his  task  for  the  next  morning,  adding 
that  he  must  of  necessity  advance  again  to  the  Tama  before  day- 
break ;  and  then  continued  my  way  to  Mezo-Kovesd. 

I  arrived  about  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  (on  the  27th  of  Feb- 
ruary), ordered  the  troops  quartered  there  to  be  roused,  and  gave 
to  Colonel  Guyon  the  order  to  advance  with  the  greatest  speed 
to  Kapolna — but  myself  awaited  its  execution ;  for  however 
much  Guyon  could  be  relied  upon  in  the  field  of  battle  itself — 
that  is,  when  the  performance  of  his  task  did  not  require  any 
particular  discernment,  but  only  purely  personal  valor — he  little 
answered  all  other  demands  that  war  makes  on  the  leader  of 
large  independent  bodies  of  troops.  His  arrangements  commonly 
reminded  one  of  the  motto,  "  Every  thing  imprudently — Every 
thing  inopportunely !"  they  had  consequently  corresponding  re- 
sults. 

Thus  it  happened  this  time,  that  in  spite  of  my  reiterated 
urging  him  to  haste,  he  delayed  the  departure  of  his  division 
until  it  was  broad  daylight. 

Only  after  it  had  arrived  at  Kerecsend,  and  the  distribution  of 
spirits,  as  usually  officially  ordered  by  Guyon  before  every  engage- 
ment, was  well  over,  could  I  at  last  with  confidence  report  to  the 
commander-in-chief  the  approach  of  the  Guyon  division. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

Dembinski  had  just  been  forced  to  evacuate  Kapolna  when  I 
came  up  with  him,  some  hundred  paces  eastAvard  of  his  last 
night-quarters,  with  the  announcement  of  the  approach  of  the 
Guyon  division.  While  yet  at  some  distance,  he  called  to  me, 
why  was  I  not  at  my  post ! — and  continually  pointing  in  the  di- 
rection of  Verpelet,  he  exclaimed  repeatedly,  "The  right  wing 
already  retreats,  because  you  are  not  at  your  post." 

"  The  right  wing  does  not  concern  me ;  I  command  the  left/' 
was  my  answer. 

"  But  I  have  sent  you  an  order  to  command  the  right  wing," 
he  exclaiitied. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  196 

"  I  know  of  no  such  order,"  I  replied,  vexed  at  this  new  occa- 
sion of  a  conflict  with  the  commander-in-chief 

"  Then  ride  instantly  to  Verpelet,"  he  imperiously  ordered  me, 
"  and  there  take  the  command  ;  for  the  two  colonels  are  rivals." 

I  now  knew  what  I  had  to  do ;  briefly  made  my  report  of  the 
approach  of  the  Guyon  division ;  and  without  wasting  another 
word,  hastened  across  the  fields  toward  Yerpelet. 

While  on  my  way  thither,  I  began  to  reflect  on  what  Dem- 
binski  could  have  meant  by  the  two  rival  colonels.  From  the 
position  of  the  army  he  could  evidently  have  referred  only  to 
Klapka  and  Poltenberg :  but  the  former  commanded  an  army 
corps,  while  the  latter  was  merely  the  commander  of  a  division, 
was  far  younger  in  rank,  and  was  besides  altogether  free  from  any 
pretension  which  could  have  justified  the  supposition  that  he  dis- 
puted with  Klapka  the  chief  command  of  the  right  wing. 

The  right  wing  was  in  fact  retreating,  though  probably  not 
because  Poltenberg  had  resisted  Klapka's  orders,  but  because  the 
united  forces  of  Klapka  and  Poltenberg  were  not  strong  enough 
to  cope  with  the  Schlick  corps. 

In  order  to  join  the  Austrian  chief  army  on  the  shortest  line — 
in  sight  of  Dembinski's  army — the  Schlick  corps  had  during  the 
preceding  night  successfully  forced  the  defile  at  Sirok,  which  was 
occupied  by  a  division  of  the  first  army  corps  under  Klapka's  per- 
sonal command ;  the  other  corps  being  stationed,  as  has  been 
mentioned,  near  Kapolna. 

Klapka  had  retreated  with  his  division,  after  the  loss  of  the 
defile,  as  far  as  Verpelet,  where  he  joined  himself  to  the  Polten- 
berg division,  sent  thither  in  the  meanwhile  by  Dembinski,  for 
the  purpose  of  defending  the  passage  across  the  Tama  against  the 
Schlick  corps,  which,  advancing  from  Sirok  by  Szent-Maria,  ap- 
peared on  the  morning  of  the  second  day  of  the  battle  at  Kapolna 
(27th  of  February)  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tarna,  opposite  Ver- 
pelet. Field-marshal  Schlick,  however,  fmxecl  the  passage,  and 
both  Hungarian  divisions  were  driven  back. 

To  bring  these  to  a  stand,  and  to  lead  them  forward  again,  was 
therefore  the  task  which  Dembinski  had  just  assigned  me. 

On  the  southeastern  heights  near  Verpelet  I  already  encoun- 
tered some  of  Poltenberg' s  pieces  of  horse-artillery,  the  servers  of 
which  had  been  cut  down  by  the  hostile  cavalry.  The  resolute 
attack  of  a  squadron  of  Alexander  hussars,  vigorously  supported 


196  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

by  the  fire  of  the  fourteenth  Honved  battalion,  had,  it  is  true,  re- 
gained from  the  cuirassiers  the  cannons  that  had  Ijeen  lost ;  but 
as  they  for  the  moment  were  without  servers,  they  had  to  be 
withdrawn  from  the  combat. 

Soon  after  the  guns,  I  came  upon  a  part  of  the  infantry — more 
consueto,  in  most  admired  disorder — and  at  last  upon  the  cavalry, 
well-serried,  but  not  retiring  en  echiquier ;  the  retreat  was,  in- 
stead, a  general  one,  and  altogether  without  plan  or  regularity  ; 
the  batteries  went  on  heedlessly  among  the  divisions.  The  gen- 
eral impression  produced  on  me  by  the  whole  scene  was,  that 
nothing  more  could  be  done  that  day. 

Poltenberg's  confident  personal  bearing  contradicted  this  com- 
fortless conclusion  ;  though,  on  the  other  hand,  the  unmistakable 
expression  of  despondency  in  Klapka's  features  seemed  to  justify 
it. 

The  reason  of  this  very  different  state  of  mind  in  the  two 
leaders  on  one  and  the  same  point  was  probably  to  be  found  in 
recent  events.  The  Kalpka  division  during  the  last  night  had 
accomplished  nothing  at  Sirok,  and  just  now  at  Verpelet  but  very 
little  ;  while  Colonel  Poltenberg  was  satisfied  with  the  behavior 
of  his  troops  during  the  preceding  evening  at  Fel-Dobro,  as  well 
as  in  the  late  conflict  at  Verpelet. 

I  found  both  colonels  in  consultation  as  to  what  was  to  be  im- 
mediately done  then  and  there.  Klapka  declared  that  he,  for  his 
part,  would  ride  toward  Erlau  in  pursuit  of  the  half  of  his  divi- 
sion which  had  retreated  in  that  direction,  and  again  lead  it 
against  the  enemy.  Should  this,  he  said,  be  no  longer  possible, 
he  would  confine  himself  during  the  day  to  protecting  Erlau. 

I  had  nothing  to  say  against  the  execution  of  this  idea ;  the 
less  so,  as  the  other  half  of  the  division  of  the  first  army  corps, 
under  the  direction  of  the  commander  of  division  Bulharin  (a 
Pole),  remained  there  at  my  disposal. 

Colonel  Klapka  accordingly  did  as  he  had  said ;  and  I  took 
the  further  command  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  now  weak- 
ened by  a  fourth. 

The  said  half  of  the  Bulharin  division,  thus  placed  at  my  dis- 
posal, consisted  of  three  battalions  and  an  incomplete  battery  of 
three-pounders.  The  three  battalions  strolled  on  without  com- 
pactness, in  picturesque  groups,  like  peasants  to  the  festival  of 
their  church's  dedication,  only  somewhat  quicker,  toward  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  197 

heights  before  Domend  and  Kerecsend.  The  train  was  conse- 
quently so  expanded  on  all  sides,  that  at  present  it  was  useless  to 
think  of  compacting  the  ivhole  of  the  brigade  which  had  been 
committed  to  me.  I  must  be  content  if  I  should  accomplish  this 
with  a  part  of  it. 

Indicating  as  the  place  of  my  next  position  the  nearest  emi- 
nences toward  Kerecsend,  which  commanded  the  widest  extent 
of  ground,  I  dispatched  the  officers  of  my  suite  to  combine  on 
this  point  as  many  as  possible  of  the  three  scattered  battalions. 

Poltenberg's  division  had  remained  together.  It  had  to 
re-establish  a  junction  between  the  Bulharin  half  division 
— the  extreme  right  wing  of  the  army — and  the  centre  near 
Kapolna. 

To  the  east  of  Verpelet  an  insignificant,  narrow,  undulating 
ridge  of  eminences  stretches  from  north  to  south  toward  the  high 
road  between  Kapolna  and  Kerecsend,  and  terminates,  north  of 
the  road,  in  a  summit  well  wooded  on  its  eastern  declivity.  It 
is  situated  about  half  an  hour's  distance  northwest  of  Kerecsend, 
and  commands  the  whole  ridge.  From  it  sinks  an  elongated 
hill,  being  the  last  lateral  spur,  toward  Fel-Dobro,  and  forming 
with  the  ridge  a  re-entering  angle,  the  sides  of  which  diverge  to- 
ward the  northwest,  that  is,  toward  Verpelet. 

The  northern  declivity  of  this  hill  is  pretty  steep,  the  western, 
on  the  contrary,  slopes  more  gently ;  while  toward  the  south- 
west and  south — consequently  in  the  direction  of  Kapolna  and 
the  high  road — the  undulating  ground,  converging  with  the  not 
less  gently  sloping  southern  declivity  of  the  said  summit,  becomes 
level. 

Colonel  Poltenberg  established  himself  with  his  division  on  this 
hill,  while  the  Bulharin  half  division  was  employed  for  the  occu- 
pation of  the  ridge  north  of  the  summit. 

But  the  summit  itself  was  to  serve  as  a  last  hold  for  the  said 
half  division,  in  case  it  should  be  repulsed  from  the  ridge  by  the 
enemy. 

From  this  summit  not  only  the  ridge  toward  the  north,  far  be- 
yond gun-range,  could  be  surveyed,  but  also  the  whole  battle-field 
of  Kapolna. 

When  the  Poltenberg  division  and  the  Bulharin  half  division 
were  established  on  the  two  points  above  mentioned,  the  position 
of  our  army  was  in  echelons  from  the  centre  to  the  right.     The 


198  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

centre  facing  Kapolna  and  the  left  wing  facing  Kal  stood  nearly 
at  the  same  height.  By  the  rapid  advance  of  Field-marshal 
Schlick,  however,  the  hostile  army  soon  arrived  in  a  line  parallel 
with  our  own. 

Field-marshal  Schlick,  after  having  successfully  forced  the 
passage  of  the  Tarna  at  Verpelet,  had  immediately  prepared  him- 
self for  pursuing  us,  and  disposed  his  left  wing  on  the  northern 
continuation  of  the  ridge  occupied  by  the  Bulharin  half  division, 
his  right  against  Kapolna,  while  his  centre  advanced  straight 
to  the  interval  between  Poltenberg's  position  and  that  of  the 
Bulharin  half  division,  or — what  is  equivalent — to  the  re-en- 
tering angle  formed,  as  has  been  mentioned,  by  the  occupied 
heights. 

By  this  manoeuvre  Field-marshal  Schlick  re-established  his 
junction  with  the  left  wing  of  the  hostile  chief  army,  which  ad- 
vanced simultaneously  against  us  by  Al-Dobro,  and  arrived  at 
the  same  time  with  it  in  an  oblique  direction  against  the  front  of 
the  centre  and  of  the  right  wing  of  the  main  army. 

The  hostile  position  formed,  consequently,  during  the  ensuing 
action,  a  line  broken  forward,  while  our  position,  parallel  with 
it,  described  one  broken  backward. 

Field-marshal  Schlick  had — judging  from  his  ensuing  disposi- 
tions for  attack — very  correctly  perceived  that,  by  forcing  both 
the  positions  of  our  right  wing,  he  should  most  contribute  toward 
disengaging  the  centre  of  the  Austrian  main  army,  the  further 
advance  of  which,  after  the  successful  dislodging  of  Dembinski 
from  Kapolna,  was  very  considerably  impeded  by  our  centre, 
which  had  been  reinforced  by  the  Guyon  division. 

He  accordingly,  while  yet  out  of  the  reach  of  our  guns,  divi- 
ded the  centre  likewise  of  his  corps,  employing  one  half  in  an  at- 
tack on  Poltenberg's  position,  the  other  in  forcing  the  Kerecsend 
height. 

By  the  designation  "Kerecsend  height"  is  here  to  be  under- 
stood particularly  only  the  ridge  of  heights  occupied  by  the  Bul- 
harin half  division  ;  but  in  the  latter  period  of  the  action,  its 
southern  extremity,  the  summit  covered  with  wood  toward  the 
east — therefore  the  extreme  right  wing  of  the  battle-array  of  our 
army. 

Not  till  after  our  centre  should  have  effected  its  retreat  over 
the  bridge  at  Kerecsend — a  retreat  to  which  we  were  in  fact  com- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  199 

pelled  in  consequence  of  the  violent  and  dangerous  attacks  of  the 
Schlick  corps  on  our  right  wing — was  Poltenberg  to  be  allowed 
to  retire  from  his  hill,  while  the  Kerecsend  height  had  to  be  held 
to  the  last,  to  cover  his  own  retreat. 

Poltenberg  successfully  accomplished  his  task,  in  spite  of  the 
repeated  violent  attacks  of  the  Schlick  corps.  The  details  of  its 
execution,  however,  escaped  me  ;  my  attention  up  to  the  last  mo- 
ment of  the  action  being  chiefly  engaged  by  the  defense  of  the 
Kerecsend  height. 

When  1 — in  riding  back  to  the  Kerecsend  height  from  that 
point  near  Verpelet  where  I  had  encountered  Colonels  Klapka 
and  Poltenberg  for  the  first  time  this  morning,  and  had  arranged 
with  them  what  was  further  to  be  done — arrived  there,  the 
three  straggling  Klapka  battalions  which  had  been  appointed 
for  its  defense  were  for  the  most  part  again  assembled,  and  the 
guns  of  the  battery  of  three-pounders  were  likewise  already 
planted. 

The  Kerecsend  height  served  the  Hungarian  army  during  the 
further  course  of  the  engagement  as  a  point  of  support  on  the  ex- 
treme right :  it  can  readily  be  defended  against  an  attack  from 
the  north.  A  hostile  turning  of  our  right  could  so  easily  be  frus- 
trated by  the  other  half  of  the  Bulharin  division — which  after  the 
loss  at  Verpelet  had  fled  toward  Erlau,  and  which  Colonel  Klap- 
ka had  promised  again  to  lead  against  the  extreme  left  flank 
of  the  Schlick  corps — that  a  serious  intention  of  attempting  to 
turn  our  right  could  never  with  probability  be  supposed  in  the 
enemy. 

In  spite  of  this  considerable  advantage,  the  Bulharin  half  divi- 
sion seemed  to  me  nevertheless  to  be  insufficient  for  the  energetic 
defense  of  the  Kerecsend  height ;  as  I  could  not  expect,  judging 
from  the  former  conduct  of  the  battalions,  that  they  would  re- 
pulse the  attacks  of  the  enemy  with  remarkable  valor,  and  as  the 
incomplete  battery  of  three-pounders  would  neither  awe  the  as- 
sailant by  its  calibre  nor  by  the  number  of  its  guns. 

In  the  seventh  army  corps  there  existed,  besides  the 'often-men- 
tioned four  divisions,  also  a  reserve,  called  "  the  column  of  the 
head-quarters."  This  column — originally  composed  in  Waizen 
after  the  evacuation  of  the  capitals,  and  chiefly  intended  for  ser- 
vice in  the  head-quarters  only — consisted  of  two  companies  of 
grenadiers,  from  thirty  to  forty  men  of  the  German  legion,  and 


200  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

half  a  squadron  of  hussars  of  different  regiments  not  belonging  to 
the  army  corps :  it  had  subsequently  received  important  acces- 
sions in  the  mountain-towns,  consisting  of  the  small  remains  of  a 
battalion  of  Ernest  infantry,  which  Colonel  Guyon  had  imperilled 
in  the  street-fight  with  the  corps  of  Field-marshal  Simunich  in 
the  town  of  Tyrnau,  and  of  two  seven-pound  howitzer  batteries 
each  of  five  pieces — vvhich  had  been  formed  of  the  howitzers 
of  the  batteries  of  the  corps,  for  the  especial  purpose  of  making 
eventual  attacks  on  places,  or  in  general  on  pieces  of  ground  not 
accessible  to  direct  shot — and  finally  by  that  part  of  a  rocket- 
battery  which  had  been  taken  from  the  enemy  in  the  sudden 
attack  at  Iglo. 

This  column  of  the  head-quarters,  together  with  the  Guyon  di- 
vision, had  advanced  in  the  morning  from  Mezo-Kovesd  to  Ker- 
ecsend,  and  had  been  since  then  kept  en  reserve  on  the  bridge 
westward  of  that  place. 

I  now  ordered  the  two  batteries  of  howitzers  to  the  Kerecsend 
height,  and  had  them  planted  on  the  northern  declivity  of  the 
summit. 

At  half  gun-range  before  these  stood  the  three-pounders  ;  at  a 
further  distance  of  about  a  thousand  paces,  a  gentle  descent  of 
the  ground  allowed  the  left  wing  of  the  enemy  a  covered  and 
easy  access  to  our  ridge  of  heights.  From  this  slope  emerged  at 
first  a  division  of  hostile  cavalry  ;  at  sight  of  which  the  Bulharin 
battalions  were  immediately  disposed  to  flee  into  the  wood,  which 
covered  the  whole  eastern  declivity  of  the  ridge.  We  succeeded, 
however,  in  delaying  their  flight  at  least  till  the  beginning  of  the 
real  attack. 

This  division  of  hostile  cavalry — which  had  evidently  been 
advanced  only  for  the  purpose  of  a  provisional  reconnoitering  of 
our  position — was  immediately  driven  back  by  the  fire  of  our 
three-pounders  ;  and  this  again  encouraged  our  intimidated  in- 
fantry. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Aristid  Dessewffy,  properly  commander  of 
the  cavalry  of  the  first  army  corps,  but  at  that  moment — I  know 
not  by  what  accident — remaining  separated  from  his  troops  and 
without  employment,  voluntarily  undertook,  during  the  defense 
of  the  Kerecsend  height,  the  duty  of  Bulharin,  the  helpless  and 
inactive  commander.  Immediately  after  the  division  of  hostile 
cavalry  had  disappeared,  he  proceeded  with  a  part  of  the  infantry 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  201 

against  the  real  column  of  attack,  and  arrested  its  advance  over 
the  slope  to  the  part  of  the  ridge  where  we  were  posted. 

The  enemy  now  directed  one  of  his  battalions  from  the  centre 
to  storm  the  Kerecsend  height  on  its  western  declivity,  in  order 
to  make  way  for  the  attacking-column.  If  the  storming  had 
succeeded,  this  battalion  would  have  appeared  on  the  height  in 
Dessewfiy's  rear,  in  the  straight  line  between  him  and  our  three- 
pounders,  and,  on  the  one  hand,  would  have  dislodged  the  three- 
pounders,  whose  fire  could  produce  no  effect  so  long  as  Dessewfiy 
was  posted  in  their  front,  without  annoying  him  also  ;  on  the 
other  hand  would  have  obliged  DessewfTy  to  withdraw  in  a 
lateral  direction  over  the  eastern  declivity,  and  thus  have  push- 
ed him  afterward  entirely  out  of  the  combat.  The  storming  bat- 
talion, however,  did  not  stand  the  fire  of  our  howitzers,  but  when 
at  the  foot  of  the  western  declivity  turned  toward  the  north ; 
and  later  probably  joined  the  column  which  attacked  Dessewfiy 
in  front,  and  by  which  he  was  gradually  pressed  back. 

Meanwhile  I  gained  time  to  occupy  with  infantry,  by  way  of 
precaution,  the  wooded  declivity  of  the  summit — our  last  point 
of  support,  as  has  been  mentioned — in  case  the  whole  ridge  should 
be  taken  by  the  enemy.  Unfortunately  I  had  at  my  disposal  for 
this  purpose  at  that  moment  only  those  troops  of  the  seventh  army 
corps  that  could  least  be  depended  upon,  namely,  the  Tyrol  chas- 
seurs. These,  together  with  the  Poltenberg  division,  had  been 
ordered  early  in  the  morning  to  Verpelet,  but  had  taken  to  flight 
from  thence  by  themselves,  and  had  assembled  only  upon  the 
Kerecsend  height.  They  pleaded  as  their  excuse,  that  not  hav- 
ing bayonet-muskets,  they  could  not  stand  against  the  attack  of 
the  hostile  cavalry.  I  hoped  they  would  now  render  so  much 
the  better  service  in  the  defense  of  the  wooded  declivity,  as  an 
attack  of  cavalry  was  not  to  be  feared  there. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Dessewfiy  with  his  sharp-shooters  was  mean- 
while again  so  far  pressed  back,  that  the  enemy  from  the  slope 
could  gain  the  top  of  the  ridge  with  masses  of  infantry  and  a 
rocket  and  field-piece  battery  ;  and  now  the  Bulharin  battalions 
could  no  longer  be  made  to  keep  their  ground  ;  they  evacuated 
the  whole  of  the  ridge,  running  over  the  eastern  wooded  declivity 
down  into  the  valley  of  the  rivulet  which,  coming  from  Szollat, 
flows  by  the  west  end  of  Kerecsend,  where  the  bridge  of  Kerecs- 
end joins  its  there  elevated  banks  on  a  level  with  the  main  road 


^02  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

leading  over  it.  Lieutenant-colonel  DessewfTy  accordingly  return- 
ed alone  to  the  summit,  abandoned  by  his  troops. 

The  forces  of  infantry  at  my  disposal  were  thereby  diminished 
to  the  few  hundred  Tyrol  chasseurs,  who,  as  has  been  mentioned, 
occupied  the  eastern  wooded  part  of  the  summit.  I  accordingly 
for  my  reinforcement  drew  near  me  the  battalion  of  Ernest  in- 
fantry from  the  column  of  the  head-quarters. 

In  the  mean  time  that  part  of  the  Bulharin  division  in  pursuit 
of  which,  after  the  loss  of  Verpelet,  Colonel  Klapka  had  hastened 
toward  Erlau,  in  order  to  lead  it  once  more  against  the  enemy, 
unexpectedly  attacked  in  its  flank  the  column  advancing  along 
the  ridge. 

This  attack  in  the  flank,  however,  was  speedily  repulsed,  and 
the  hostile  rocket  and  field-piece  batteries  were  brought  into  ac- 
tion against  our  howitzers  and  three-pounders.  The  latter  I  im- 
mediately took  entirely  out  of  action,  because,  with  their  small 
calibre,  they  must  have  been  uselessly  destroyed  in  the  unequal 
contest.  Soon  after  I  also  withdrew  the  six  howitzers,  which 
had  already  become  unfit  for  service,  partly  from  want  of  ammu- 
nition, partly  in  consequence  of  damages  they  had  sustained. 
The  rest  of  the  howitzer  batteries,  consisting  of  four  pieces,  had 
therefore  to  persevere  alone  to  the  end  of  the  conflict. 

The  enemy  now  advanced  to  within  half  gun-range  of  our 
position  on  the  summit ;  posted,  from  want  of  breadth  in  the 
ridge,  his  rocket-stands  to  the  right  (from  the  enemy),  his  bat- 
tery of  field-pieces  to  the  left  backward  ;  and  immediately  opened 
a  murderous  fire.  The  rockets,  little  as  they  used  formerly  to 
injure  us  on  the  plain,  produced  now  a  literally  levelling  efiect 
in  sweeping  over  the  rising  arched  ground. 

This  rendered  our  position — the  last  we  had  to  lose — almost 
untenable.  The  Ernest  battalion  was  just  arriving  on  the  sum- 
mit ;  from  its  valor  I  expected  considerable  relief  in  our  desper- 
ate situation.  It  was  of  the  first  importance  to  take  the  rocket- 
battery  by  storm,  or  at  least  to  dislodge  it.  I  dispatched  the 
battalion  by  the  western  declivity  of  the  summit,  covered  with 
only  a  few  trees,  that  along  it,  protected  as  far  as  possible,  it 
might  get  near  the  rocket-battery.  But  this  battalion,  which 
had  recently  been  completed  with  recruits,  could  scarcely  be 
brought  forward  above  a  hundred  paces.  It  then  ran  away 
toward  the  valley,  and  withdrew  between  Poltenberg's  position 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  203 

and  the  summit,  out  of  the  action.  Two  attempts  to  dislodge 
the  rocket-battery  by  means  of  an  attack  with  a  squadron  of 
Alexander  hussars  failed  likewise  ;  while  the  Tyrol  chasseurs  at 
the  same  time  evacuated  the  wood  on  the  eastern  declivity  of  the 
summit. 

The  four  howitzers  could  maintain  their  position  only  so  long 
as  this  parcel  of  forest  remained  in  our  possession.  I  conse- 
quently sent  for  the  last  sections  of  the  reserve  which  were  still 
at  my  disposal — the  grenadiers  and  the  two  mixed  platoons  of 
hussars — in  order  to  charge  the  former  with  the  further  mainten- 
ance of  the  parcel  of  forest,  and  to  attempt  once  more  with  the 
latter  to  dislodge  the  rocket-battery. 

The  hussars  arrived  first  at  the  howitzers.  Captain  Szey- 
mond,  who  led  them,  had,  however,  scarcely  given  the  word  of 
command  to  attack,  when  a  rocket-case  struck  him  from  his 
horse.     His  men  refused  to  proceed. 

The  grenadiers  also  in  the  mean  time  had  reached  the  height, 
and,  ranged  on  the  edge  of  the  forest,  awaited  my  orders.  Some 
bullets  from  the  hostile  field-battery  happened  to  pass  over 
their  heads ;  and  these  fellows,  as  tall  as  trees,  became  all  at 
once  very  diminutive — scarcely  higher  than  their  bear-skin  caps. 

This  was  an  unfortunate  debut.  But  I  already  knew  from 
experience,  that  the  least  obstacle  thrown  in  the  way  of  an  enemy 
gains  actually,  as  its  consequence,  a  certain,  though  not  always 
important  amount  of  time.  I  therefore  ordered  the  grenadiers, 
in  spite  of  their  spiritless  conduct,  and  after  some  energetic  re- 
primands for  such  an  exaggerated  reverence  of  the  hostile  bullets, 
to  advance  at  a  storming-pace  into  the  wood  as  far  as  its  northern 
edge,  and  hold  it. 

A  new  difficulty  arose  in  the  wood.  By  the  first  bullets,  at 
which  the  grenadiers  were  so  much  frightened  while  still  on  the 
wooded  height,  they  saw  perfectly  well  the  real  focus  of  the  dan- 
ger, and  showed  no  mean  desire  to  avoid  it,  and  go  off  in  an 
eastern  direction  down  the  declivity.  I  remarked  this  just  in 
the  nick  of  time,  quickly  sprang  from  my  horse,  and,  assisted  by 
the  brave  officers  of  these  troops,  succeeded  in  bringing  them  at 
last  into  the  right  direction,  the  northern.  Not  till  then  did  I  re- 
turn to  the  undefended  part  of  the  summit,  where  the  howitzers 
stood. 

Here,  however,  a  notable  mishap  befell.     The  commander  of 


204  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

these  howitzers,  while  I  was  occupied  in  the  wood,  had  perceived 
the  impossibility  of  holding  out  any  longer,  and  begun  the  retreat 
over  the  top  of  the  summit  the  more  speedily,  as  the  protection 
of  the  battery  (Alexander  hussars)  had  been  forced  to  yield  by  the 
fire  of  the  hostile  rockets  and  guns.  While  one  of  the  howitzers 
was  being  limbered,  a  projectile  from  the  enemy  struck  the  team, 
and  killed  one  of  the  horses.  The  terrified  men  cut  the  traces 
of  the  other  horses,  and  galloped  after  the  pieces  which  had  al- 
ready been  started. 

I  found  the  commander  of  the  battery  and  the  cannoneers  en- 
gaged in  unsuccessful  efforts  to  push  the  abandoned  piece  up-hill. 
In  order  to  get  it  under  way,  the  assistance  of  far  more  men  was 
necessary.  I  hastened  toward  the  western  declivity  of  the  sum- 
mit, in  the  hope  of  still  finding  there  a  part  of  the  Ernest  battal- 
ion. In  their  stead  I  found  some  skirmishing  hussars  of  the  Al- 
exander regiment.  A  captain  of  this  regiment  was  just  about 
assembling  them.  I  called  him  with  his  men  to  give  assistance. 
Chance  had  made  me  hit  on  the  right  man ;  in  spite  of  the 
sharp  fire,  he  was  on  the  spot  in  a  twinkling  with  some  hussars. 

The  enemy,  however,  must  have  remarked  how  matters  were 
going  on  here ;  for  his  projectiles  fell  ever  thicker  about  the 
stuck-fast  howitzer.  The  more  urgently  necessary  appeared  to 
me  my  own  presence  there.  The  brave  captain  of  hussars,  on 
the  contrary,  was  in  fear  for  my  life,  and  pressed  me  to  quit  the 
dangerous  place,  engaging  his  honor  for  the  safety  of  the  how- 
itzer. This  circumstance,  and  the  simulfaneous  arrival  of  my 
younger  brother,  on  whose  resolute  perseverance  I  could  also  rely, 
induced  me  to  comply.  1  rode  speedily  across  the  highest  point 
of  the  summit  toward  the  southern  declivity,  which  was  secured 
against  the  enemy's  fire. 

During  the  hot  conflict  I  had  not  observed  what  was  taking 
place  in  our  centre.  I  now  saw  with  satisfaction  that  the  mis- 
sion of  the  extreme  right  wing  was  accomplished  ;  for  the  centre 
was  already  wholly,  and  Poltenberg  partly  over  the  bridge  at 
Kerecsend.  I  was  anew  more  anxious  about  the  greatly  endan- 
gered howitzer,  and  determined  partly  to  stop  Poltenberg's  re- 
treat, and  dispatch  one  of  his  battalions  across  the  summit  to  its 
hard-pressed  position.  But  this  advance  was  scarcely  half-exe- 
cuted when  the  brave  captain  of  hussars  appeared  with  the  piece 
on  the  summit,  and  thus  nobly  redeemed  his  word  of  honor.     He 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  205 

conducted  the  train  ;  my  younger  brother — whose  horse  a  bullet 
had  killed  under  him — closed  it ;  the  cannoneers,  some  hussars, 
and  the  ever-fearless  Aristid  DessewfTy  drew  the  howitzer.  The 
latter  had  suddenly  arrived  on  the  spot  during  my  absence,  and 
readily  interested  himself  in  its  rescue. 

Now  that  this  had  been  effected,  I  immediately  ordered  the  just- 
advanced  battalion  of  the  Poltenberg  division  to  return,  and  again 
continue  its  retreat  over  the  bridge  at  Kerecsend ;  while  the 
grenadiers,  whom  the  enemy  had  pressed  down  over  the  wooded 
declivity  into  the  valley  of  Kerecsend,  passed  the  rivulet  above 
the  bridge,  and  marched  back  across  the  fields  to  the  northern 
entrance  of  the  village. 

During  the  combat  on  the  Kerecsend  height  I  had  received 
two  orders  from  Dembinski.  One  was  the  retarded  one,  intended 
to  call  me  early  in  the  morning  to  Verpelet  to  take  the  command 
of  the  right  wing  of  the  army ;  the  other  contained  instructions 
to  maintain  the  Kerecsend  height  until  he  (Dembinski)  with  the 
centre  should  have  effected  his  retreat  over  the  Kerecsend  bridge, 
and  then  to  draw  back  to  the  eminence  behind  Kerecsend  (east 
of  the  place). 

When  I  reached  this  eminence  with  the  Poltenberg  division 
and  the  column  of  the  head-quarters,  I  found  there  the  Kmety  di- 
vision, which  had  only  shortly  before  arrived  from  Abrany.  The 
orderly  officer,  charged  with  the  marching  order  from  Erlau  to 
this  division,  had  lost  the  road  in  the  dark  night,  and  reached 
Abrany  only  late  in  the  morning ;  hence  the  delay  in  the  arrival 
of  the  Kmety  division  at  Kerecsend. 

Dembinski,  it  was  said,  was  wounded,  and  had  ridden  to  Mak- 
lar.  According  to  the  dispositions  which  he  had  issued  in  Ke- 
recsend after  the  retreat,  that  division  of  the  first  army  corps 
which  had  stood  in  the  centre,  and  the  division  of  the  second 
army  corps  of  the  left  wing,  had  already  started  for  Mezci-Kovesd, 
the  Guy  on  division  to  Maklar.  This  latter  place  was  also  desig- 
nated as  the  station  of  retreat  for  the  Poltenberg  division  and 
the  columns  of  the  head-quarters  of  the  seventh  army  corps. 
The  Aulich  division  had  to  bivouack  near  Szikszo  to  protect  the 
road  to  Mezo-Kovesd ;  and  the  Kmety  division  on  the  eminences 
of  Kerecsend  to  protect  Maklar  and  provide  for  the  out-post  service. 

Thus  ended  Dembinski's  offensive,  which  he  had  assumed 
against  the  Austrian  main  army  for  the  re-conquest  of  the  capitals. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

Dembinski  had  given  up  the  second  day's  battle  at  Kapolna  as 
lost.  The  reasons  for  this  were  palpable — we  had  been  defeated  ; 
and  the  troops  urgently  needed  a  short  respite,  to  render  them 
again  quite  fit  for  the  field,  after  the  harassing  fatigues  of  the 
day. 

But  to  judge  from  their  location  after  the  battle,  as  stated  at 
the  end  of  the  preceding  chapter,  Dembinski,  with  the  battle, 
gave  up  at  the  same  time  all  further  resistance  :  and  the  more 
I  considered  the  circumstances  which,  conspiring  together,  had 
caused  the  loss  of  the  recently  fought  action,  the  less  I  found 
that  this  step  was  imperative. 

These  circumstances  were  : 

1.  The  loss  of  Sirok  on  the  night  preceding  the  second  day's 
battle,  and,  as  a  consequence  of  it,  the  junction  of  the  Schlick 
corps  with  the  hostile  main  army  on  the  very  field  of  battle, 
whereby  a  hostile  force,  numerically  and  morally  superior, 
was  brought  into  action  with  our  right  wing,  isolated  by  the 
distance  of  more  than  a  (German)  mile  from  its  centre. 

2.  The  too  late  arrival  on  the  field  of  almost  a  third  of  our 
army. 

3.  The  separation  of  the  divisions  of  one  and  the  same  army 
corps  from  each  other. 

1.  To  relieve  the  right  wing  in  time  was  impossible,  its  dis- 
tance from  the  centre  and  the  reserve  being  at  the  first  too  great 
(even  supposing  that  the  Kmety  division  had  reached  Kerecsend 
early  enough). 

Dembinski  could  avoid  this  defect  in  the  next  position — per- 
haps behind  Kerecsend,  as  I  supposed — in  which  he  might  intend 
to  withstand  the  enemy. 

2.  The  too  late  arrival  of  the  Kmety  division  left  the  army 
without  a  strong,  sufficient  reserve. 

The  army  being  now  concentrated,  Dembinski  had  no  longer 
to  fear  this  disadvantage  in  the  next  engagement. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HtJNGARY.  207 

3.  By  the  dismemberment  of  the  different  army  corps,  bodies 
of  troops  quite  strange  to  each  other  were  brought  into  close  con- 
tact during  the  conflict,  none  of  the  divisions  knowing  in  what 
degree  they  could  rely  on  the  steadfastness  of  the  divisions  near 
them  on  their  right  and  left ;  a  circumstance  which  can  not  be 
overlooked  with  impunity.  By  this  dismemberment  of  the  dif- 
ferent army  corps,  half  of  the  first  corps  was  also  deprived  of  the 
skillful  guidance  of  Klapka,  and  I  was  obliged  to  command  a  por- 
tion of  his  troops,  which  were  stranger  to  me  than  those  of  the 
enemy,  and  that  at  a  time  when  they  had  to  perform  extraordi- 
nary duty ;  whereas  such  services  can  be  secured  only  by  the  per- 
sonal influence  of  a  commander  familiar  with  the  peculiarities  of 
the  troop. 

Dembinski,  taught  by  the  disastrous  consequences  of  his  unskil- 
ful experiment  of  separating,  could  easily  reunite  the  different 
army  corps  before  the  next  combat,  and  then  confidently  expect 
far  more  from  their  conduct  on  the  field  of  battle. 

I  found  accordingly — as  has  been  said — the  entire  abandon- 
ment of  all  resistance  nothing  less  than  commanded. 

On  the  contrary,  there  existed  circumstances  which  most  de- 
cidedly encouraged  to  the  resolute  continuance  of  the  combat  on 
the  next  day.     These  circumstances  were  : 

The  behavior  of  our  troops  during  the  battle,  and  that  of  the 
enemy  after  it. 

This  behavior  had  been  throughout  surprisingly  good.  Disor- 
ders had  occurred — but  only  as  the  exceptions — under  my  per- 
sonal command,  in  the  extreme  right  wing  of  the  army,  namely, 
on  the  Kerecsend  height :  these,  however,  were  sufficiently  ex- 
cused, partly  by  the  fact  that  the  commander  and  troops  were 
strangers  to  each  other  ;  partly  because  some  bodies  of  the  troops 
— as,  for  instance,  the  battalion  of  Ernest  infantry  (which  had 
been  filled  up  only  a  fortnight  ago  with  quite  raw  recruits),  the 
grenadiers,  and  the  two  platoons  of  mixed  hussars — stood  fire  for 
the  first  time  on  that  day ;  and  partly  by  the  greatness  of  the 
task  which  I  had  assigned  to  the  troops.  Even  these  disorders 
were  only  of  short  duration,  and  the  shaken  ranks  for  the  most 
part  could  easily  be  restored  to  order,  even  within  reach  of  the 
hostile  fii^.  It  seemed  as  if  the  days  of  Schwechat,  Parendorf, 
Babolna,  and  Hodrics  would  never  again  return  ! 

The  behavior  of  the  enemy  after  the  battle,  on  the  contrary, 


208  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNOARY. 

evinced  no  trace  of  that  consciousness  of  victory,  which  subse- 
quently found  such  highly  poetical  expression  in  the  famous  bul- 
letin of  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz. 

The  sun  of  the  27th  of  February  1849  stood  yet  pretty  high  in 
the  heavens  when  the  last  thunder  of  cannon  at  Kapolna  had  long 
died  away,  and  the  victor  nevertheless  declined  any  pursuit ;  in 
spite  of  the  strong  inducement  thereto  furnished  by  Dembinski's 
dispositions. 

Was  not  this  a  silent  Te  Deum  for  the  permission  at  last 
quietly  to  take  breath  over  the  dear-bought  laurels  of  victory  ? 

The  heroically  bold  Schlick,  to  whom  alone,  without  reserva- 
tion, belongs  the  honor  of  the  day,  had  advanced  the  foremost 
against  us ;  but  even  he,  after  he  had  occupied  the  Kerecsend 
height,  evacuated  by  our  right  wing,  uttered  a  distinct  "  Enough 
for  to-day,"  and  made  his  troops  immediately  prepare  their  bivou- 
ac-fires before  our  eyes. 

(And  no  wonder  I  He  had,  during  the  last  twenty-four  hours, 
been  obliged  to  travel  with  his  brave  corps  a  distance  of  fully  six 
(German)  miles  ;  on  his  way  to  force  three  positions  ;  and  be- 
side to  take  in  tow  the  Field-marshal  together  with  the  chief 
army.  A  handsome  stroke  of  work  this  !  In  the  end,  the 
Schlick  corps  would  perhaps  also  have  to  pursue ;  while  the 
chief  army,  which  during  the  same  time  had  scarcely  gained 
half  a  mile  of  ground,  allowed  itself  quietly  to  dream  something 
about  the  "  total  destruction"  of  the  rebels  ?) 

But  a  conqueror,  who,  after  victory,  even  when  invited  by  cir- 
cumstances, does  not  pursue,  places  himself  involuntarily  on  an 
almost  equal  moral  level  with  the  vanquished.  Such  a  one 
after  the  victory  is  absolutely  not  more  formidable  than  before  it. 

Field-marshal  Windischgratz  after  the  battle  of  Kapolna  was 
such  a  conqueror  :  and  on  this  very  account  it  seemed  to  me  that 
Dembinski's  dispositions,  for  retrograding  after  the  battle  in  such 
headlong  haste,  were,  considering  the  surprisingly  good  behavior 
of  our  troops,  not  only  uncalled  for  but  decidedly  blamable. 

They  were,  however,  already  for  the  most  part  executed  when 
I.  was  informed  of  them ;  and  although  the  Kmety  division  urged 
me  again  and  again,  Dembinski  being  wounded,  to  take  the 
chief  command  and  annul  his  insulting  dispositions,  it  could  not 
very  well  be  done.  I  should  by  such  a  step  have  been*guilty  of 
unjustifiable  precipitancy.     Colonel  Kmety  could  not  help  soon 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  209 

perceiving  this  himself,  and  promised  to  yield  to  what  for  the 
present  was  unavoidable.  I  then  rode  to  Maklar  to  seek  for  Dem- 
binski,  and  learn  the  nature  of  his  wound. 

I  inquired  a  long  time  in  vain  for  his  .lodging.  Several  were 
pointed  out  to  me,  which  had  been  destined  for  Dembinski  and 
his  suite  ;  but  in  none  of  them  could  the  commander-in-chief  at 
that  moment  be  found  ;  every  where  it  was  said  he  had  just  been 
there. 

That  I  might  the  sooner  discover  his  abode,  I  left  officers  of 
my  suite  in  each  of  the  quarters  indicated,  charging  them  as  soon 
as  Dembinski  should  arrive  in  one  of  them  to  forward  informa- 
tion of  it  to  me  without  delay  to  a  certain  specified  point  in  the 
place. 

This  measure  caused  a  misunderstanding.  Dembinski  thought, 
when,  on  returning  to  the  place  which  he  had  selected  for  him- 
self, he  found  one  of  my  orderly  officers  there,  that  I  had  left 
meanwhile  somebody  to  retain  it  for  myself,  and  received  me  with 
bitter  reproaches  about  this  presumed  arrogance  on  my  part,  since 
to  him,  the  commander-in-chief,  were  due  the  most  commodious 
quarters,  and  so  on. 

But  I  intended  just  then  to  establish  my  head-quarters  in  the 
bivouac  of  the  Kmety  division,  and  therefore  naturally  could  not 
for  a  long  time  understand  Dembinski's  fracas. 
Dembinski's  wound  did  not  seem  to  be  mortal. 
His  further  dispositions  were  :  the  troops  should  proceed  with 
their  cooking,  and  the  whole  army  return  on  the  following  morn- 
ing to  Mezo-Kovesd. — The  troops  would  very  willingly  have 
cooked,  if  they  had  but  had  something  to  cook. 

Notwithstanding  my  subordination  to  Dembinski's  chief  com- 
mand, I  had  taken  care  from  the  first  that  the  regular  supplies 
of  the  seventh  army  corps  should  be  through  its  own  intendancy  ; 
while  the  support  of  Dembinski's  whole  army  had  been  transfer- 
red to  the  government  commissary-in-chief,  Bartholomiius  von 
Szemere,  who  was  invested  with  unlimited  powers. 

This  non-central  system  of  support  brought  the  military  organ- 
ised supply-branch  of  the  seventh  army  corps  into  frequent  con- 
flict with  Szemere's  officials,  and  occasioned  the  peremptory  de- 
cree of  the  commander-in-chief,  that  in  future  the  separate  divi- 
sions of  the  army  should  receive  their  provisions  directly  from 
Szemere. 


210   .  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Now  Szemere  was  deemed,  and  not  undeservedly,  an  adminis- 
trative genius ;  for  he  managed  the  supplies  of  Dembinski's 
army  at  least  so  ingeniously  that  the  troops  almost  perished  of 
hunger. 

Accordingly  their  discontent  with  Dembinski's  mode  of  war- 
fare naturally  soon  rose  to  the  highest  pitch  ;  for  the  vote  of  dis- 
trust, which  he  had  by  his  premature  retreat  called  forth  against 
himself,  was  subscribed  by  many  thousand  empty  stomachs  so 
much  the  more  willingly,  and  with  a  severe  clause,  because  the 
conviction  was  general  among  the  army,  that  he  never,  never 
forgot  the  filling  of  his  own  belly. 


CHAPTER    XXYIII. 

The  night  between  the  27th  and  28th  of  February,  which 
followed  the  second  day  of  the  battle  of  Kapolna,  passed  without 
disturbance. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  28th  all  the  divisions  of  the  army 
marched  back  to  Mezo-Kovesd.  The  Kmety  division  formed  the 
rear-guard.  A  considerable  hostile  column  of  cavalry  followed 
close  at  its  heels. 

Dembinski  ordered  the  camp  to  be  pitched  at  the  west  end  of 
Mezo-Kovesd  a  cheval  of  the  road  to  Kerecsend.  To  the  south 
of  it  the  Poltenberg  division  stood  next,  then  the  first  army  corps, 
and  on  the  extreme  left  wing  one  division  of  the  second  army 
corps.  To  the  north  of  the  road  the  Guyon  division  was  estab- 
lished next,  and  on  the  extreme  right  wing  the  Aulich  division. 

Between  Mezo-Kovesd  and  Maklar  a  broad  plateau,  slightly 
elevated  above  the  southern  plains,  extends  from  northwest  to 
southeast.  The  village  of  Szihalom  stands  partly  on  its  south- 
western gradual  declivity.  From  this  plateau  the  ground  flat- 
tens undulatingly  toward  Mezo-Kovesd,  and  is  intersected  by  sep- 
arate, deeply  sunk  veins  of  water  in  an  almost  perpendicular  di- 
rection with  the  roadfrom  Szihalm  on  to  Kovesd.  The  ground 
slopes  in  the  same  manner  along  the  Erlau  road  toward  Mezo- 
Kovesd. 


MY-  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY.  211 

Our  camp  in  front  of  this  place  was  consequently  commanded 
direct  by  those  two  sides,  from  which  a  hostile  attack  mainly 
threatened  us,  and,  notwithstanding  the  veins  of  water  winding 
to  and  fro  in  our  front,  it  was  destitute  of  the  most  essential  ad- 
vantages of  a  defensive  position ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  our 
capability  for  the  offensive  was  not  a  little  embarrassed  by  those 
very  veins  of  water. 

Dembinski  in  the  choice  of  this  camp  was  probably  laboring 
under  the  fixed  idea,  that  the  enemy,  satisfied  for  the  time  being 
with  our  retreat  as  far  as  Mezo-Kovesd,  on  this  day  would  un- 
dertake nothing  more  against  us.  The  circumstance,  that 
neither  the  further  line  of  retreat  had  been  specified,  nor  any  in- 
structions issued  how  to  proceed  in  case  of  being  attacked,  be- 
trayed with  still  greater  certainty  the  present  prevalence  of  that 
fixed  idea  in  Dembinski. 

And  thus  all  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  success  of  a 
hostile  surprise  in  broad  daylight  were  fulfilled  on  our  part  as 
sufficiently  as  possible. 

This  attack  we  had  not  long  to  wait  for. 

The  Kmety  division,   shortly  before  its   arrival  within  gun- 
range  of  the  camp,  was  all  at  once  very  vehemently  assailed  by 
the  hostile  column  which  had  only  observed  it  close  at  hand  for 
a  long  time,  and  was  in  parts  thrown  back  upon  the  surprised ' 
camp  itself 

I  was  on  my  way  to  Dembinski's  head-quarters,  to  disabuse 
him,  if  possible,  of  the  above-mentioned  fixed  idea,  when  the  first 
firing  of  artillery,  by  which  the  onset  announced  itself,  anticipa- 
ted my  intention. 

Dembinski,  however,  was  just  at  dinner,  and,'  through  the 
welcome  clattering  of  plates  and  glasses  in  his  immediate  vicinity, 
failed  to  hear  the  less  agreeable  thunder  of  cannon  from  afar. 
My  oral  announcement  of  the  hostile  attack  consequently  found 
him  wholly  unprepared;  nevertheless  he  hastened  immediately 
to  the  point  of  danger  ;  myself — delayed  by  the  awkwardness 
of  a  hussar  to  whom  I  had  entrusted  my  horse — a  few  minutes 
after  him. 

On  the  western  outlet  of  Mezo-Kovesd  a  bridge  has  to  be  cross- 
ed. On  it  I  encountered  a  half-battery  of  the  Kmety  division  in 
hasty  flight.  The  commander  of  this  battery  solemnly  protested 
that  the  whole  camp  had  been  scattered,  and  that  he  had  only 


212  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY. 

very  narrowly  succeeded  in  saving  his  guns.  The  poor  man  was  so 
terrified,  he  could  no  longer  trust  his  own  eyes  ;  otherwise  he,  as 
well  as  myself,  might  have  been  convinced  by  one  glance  from  the 
bridge  in  the  direction  of  the  camp,  that  the  danger  was  by  no  means 
so  great  as  he  represented  it.  I  ordered  his  battery  to  halt  and  return. 

About  a  thousand  paces  from  Mezo-Kovesd,  on  the  other  side 
of  a  second  bridge,  over  which  the  road  from  Mezo-Kovesd  to 
Szihalom  and  Kerecsend  leads,  I  found  the  Kmety,  Guyon,  and 
Aulich  divisions  drawn  up  in  battle-array,  and  the  cavalry  of 
the  last  division  (the  ninth  regiment  of  hussars)  just  returning 
from  a  successful  attack  ;  while  the  Poltenberg  division,  the  first 
army  corps,  and  the  isolated  division  of  the  second,  joined  speed- 
ily the  advancing  right  wing. 

The  enemy  had  already  hastened  as  far  back  as  the  elevation 
of  Szihalom,  and  watched  from  thence,  with  great  self-denial, 
the  successful  efix)rts  of  some  hussars  to  get  under  way  the  half-bat- 
tery which  had  been  taken  from  him  by  the  ninth  regiment  of  hus- 
sars, and  bring  it  to  our  front,  a  gun-range  and  a  half  further  back. 

But  Dembinski,  in  very  bad  humor,  probably  in  consequence 
of  his  interrupted  dinner,  inveighed  continually — not  perhaps 
against  the  enemy,  but  against  our  advancing,  called  the  suc- 
cessful attack  a  piece  of  stupidity,  and  finally  ordered — when  the 
repetition  of  similar  outpourings  had  been  rendered  disagreeable 
to  him  by  the  pithy  answers  of  some  hussar  officers — for  the 
whole  front  of  the  army  a  thoughtful  "  Halt  I" 

He  then  made  us  await  nightfall  where  we  were.  The  ene- 
my, in  his  turn,  might  now  indulge  in  the  same  reflections  on  us 
as  we  had  lately  done  on  him,  when  he  had  suflered  a  few  hus- 
sars to  carry  off'  his  guns  under  his  very  nose. 

It  is  already  known,  from  what  has  preceded,  that  Colonel 
Guyon  was  suddenly  attacked  in  the  night  between  the  2d  and 
3d  of  February  at  Iglo  by  a  column  of  the  Schlick  coi^s,  on 
which  occasion  a  piece  of  artillery  was  taken  from  him.  This 
gun,  the  capture  of  which  by  the  enemy  Colonel  Guyon  had 
constantly  denied,  it  so  chanced  was  now  one  of  the  three  pieces 
just  taken  by  us.  The  former  assertion  of  Guyon,  that  the  miss- 
ing cannon  must  have  lost  its  way  in  the  ivoods  of  Iglo,  amid 
the  general  confusion  which  occurred  during  the  surprise,  could 
— in  spite  of  the  contradictory  circumstance,  that  this  cannon 
had  really  been  in  the  enemy's  possession — out  of  respect  for 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  213 

Guyon's  well-known  love  of  truth,  of  course  not  be  doubted; 
and  there  consequently  arose  about  the  cannon,  missing  since 
the  day  at  Iglo,  the  dark  suspicion  that  it  had  there  been  with- 
drawal from  the  Guyon  division  with  a  treacherous  intent,  and 
delivered  to  the  Schlick  corps,  which  a  week  later  was  retreat- 
ing from  Kaschan  by  Torna  and  Tonalja  I — This  supposition 
may  be  thought  absurd ;  however,  every  country  has  its  own 
customs  !  In  my  country  the  supposition  of  some  treachery  is 
the  common  favorite  formula  according  to  which  the  most  natu- 
ral unpleasant  occurrences  are  analysed  in  a  piquantly-mystical 
manner,  which  also  incidentally  tickles  the  national  vanity. 

One  fine  day  the  Kozlbny — evidently  with  the  intention  of 
rendering  one  of  my  personal  opponents  popular  in  the  country 
— had  dithyrambically  reported,  that  Guyon  at  Iglo  (just  during 
that  fatal  night  between  the  2d  and  3d  of  February)  had  utterly 
annihilated  the  enemies  of  the  fatherland.-  How  then  could  it 
have  been  possible  for  the  destroyed  to  take  a  cannon  from 
their  destroyer  ?  * 

I  have  mentioned  above  an  officer  of  artillery,  whom  I  had 
encountered  with  his  battery  in  wild  flight  on  the  bridge  of 
Mezo-Kovesd,  immediately  after  the  commencement  of  the  hos- 
tile attack  on  our  camp.  I  ordered  him  to  be  shot  for  the  crime 
of  cowardice,  of  which  he  had  been  guilty  by  his  flight,  and  in- 
tended to  have  the  sentence  executed  in  flagranti,  as  a  warning 
example,  in  front  of  the  division  to  which  he  belonged.  Dera- 
binski,  however,  from  whom,  as  he  was  present,  I  had  previous- 
ly to  obtain  permission  for  the  execution  of  the  sentence,  par- 
doned the  delinquent. 

Another  otherwise  brave  officer,  of  the  first  army  corps,  hap- 
pened shortly  before  the  hostile  attack  to  have  got  drunk,  and  in 
this  state  had  made  unlawful  booty.  When  attempted  to  be  ar- 
rested, he  resisted  arms  in  hand,  and  thereby  lost  his  life,  being 
pierced  by  the  balls  of  the  escort. 

Darkness  had  meanwhile  set  in  ;  Dembinski  refired  to  rest. 
Soon  afterward  the  troops  also  were  allowed  to  re-occupy  their 
former  encampments,  and  those  divisions  could  now  cook,  to  which 
fate,  under  the  guise  of  Szemere  and  his  commissaries  of  supply,  had 
by  way  of  exception,  been  favorable  during  the  day.  The  rest  were 
obliged  previously  to  solicit  contributions,  but  with  indifierent  suc- 
cess ;  for  the  patriots  of  Mezo-Kovesd  were  wise,  prudent  people. 


CHAPTER  XXTX. 

The  morning  of  the  1st  of  March,  found  us  still  in  the  camp 
at  Mezo-Kovesd,  full  of  fasting  resignation  to  Dembinski's  will, 
which  had  not  yet  been  pronounced.  Toward  midday  it  was  at 
last  made  known. 

"  In  order  to  secure  to  the  troops^^ — so  it  was  said  in  the  in- 
troduction to  the  dispositions  for  this  day — "  tlie  time  necessary 
for  their  refreshment,  cantonments  are  assigned  to  them''  These 
cantonments  were : 

For  the  whole  first  army  corps,  and  the  isolated  division  of  the 
second  corps,  Eger-Farmos  ; 

For  tke  Aulich  division,  Lovo  ; 

For  the  Kmety  and  Pbltenberg  divisions,  Szent-Istvan ; 

For  the  Guyon  division,  Negyes. 

As  these  cantonment-stations — only  two,  three,  the  furthest 
four  hours'  march,  Eger-Farmos  scarcely  half  an  hour  more 
from  the  hostile  camp  than  Mezo-Kovesd — were  situated  in  a 
plain  as  easily  accessible  to  the  enemy  as  to  us  ;  and  as  by  trans- 
ferring our  army  into  them  a  hostile  attack  seemed  at  most  to  be 
delayed  only  for  the  time  which  the  enemy  needed  to  find  out 
one  or  the  other  cantonment-station  and  to  reach  it;  and  as  we 
could  not  suppose  that  Dembinski  by  the  rest  and  refreshment 
which  were  promised  to  the  troops  in  the  new  cantonments 
meant  merely  that  which  would  last  for  afeiv  hours, — we  could 
not  at  once  comprehend  how  these  dispositions  would  answer  the 
object  for  which  they  had  been  intended,  according  to  the  intro- 
duction. On  the  contrary,  the  apprehension  that  our  position  in 
these  cantonsnents  might  become  incomparably  more  'perilous 
tlian  in  Mezo-Kovesd  was  awakened  by  the  most  superficial 
comparison  of  both  situations. 

However  few  the  advantages  offered  for  defense  by  the  camp 
at  Mezo-Kovesd,  the  army  was  at  least  united  there,  not  so  dis 
membered,  and  moreover  stronger  by  the  Kmety  division,  than 
on  the  last  day  of  the  battle  of  Kapolna. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  215 

An  attack  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  even  if  executed  with 
his  whole  force,  had  here — the  relation  of  mutual  strength 
mainly  considered — less  chance  than  at  Kapolna.  And  even  if 
victory  should  again  he  on  the  side  of  the  enemy,  there  still  re- 
mained to  our  general-in-chief  the  possibility  of  obviating  a 
greater  misfortune  by  timely  dispositions. 

The  cantonments  which  we  were  to  occupy,  on  the  contrary, 
dismeTnbered  the  army. 

If  the  enemy  intended  to  attack  us  in  Mezo-Kovesd,  as  Dembin- ' 
ski's  introduction  to  this  disposition  tacitly  presupposed,  then  the 
already-mentioned  dista7ices  of  the  cantonment-stations  at  Szent- 
Istvan,  Lovo,  and  Eger-Farmos,  from  Mezo-Kovesd  were  not 
great  enough  to  prevent  him  from  a  further  advance  against  one 
of  them.  No  matter  which  he  attacked,  he  could  secure  to 
himself  but  too  easy  a  victory ;  while  our  commander-in-chief, 
through  the  great  distance  of  the  separate  divisions  of  the  army 
from  each  other,  as  well  as  from  his  head-quarters  in  Poroszlo, 
was  utterly  unable,  after  a  hostile  attack  had  once  commenced y 
to  make  dispositions  time  enough  to  avert  a  serious  disaster. 
The  dispositions  for  the  cantonments,  however,  did  not  contain  a 
syllable  of  any  jp'ecautionary  measure  in  case  of  such  an  attack, 
not  even  a  point  of  junction  or  of  retreat  was  indicated  in  them. 

This  defect  in  the  dispositions  was  the  more  striking  as,  with 
the  simultaneous  removal  of  the  first  army  corps  and  the  isolated 
division  of  the  second  corps  to  Eger-Farmos,  it  could  no  longer  be 
the  result  of  the  fixed  idea,  that  the  enemy  certainly  would  not 
attach  the  cantonments.  The  circumstance  that  Eger-Farmos, 
the  cantonment-station  which  was  situated  nearest  to  the  enemy, 
had,  in  comparison  with  the  others,  been  occupied  in  such  remark- 
able  strength,  pointed  directly  to  the  fact  that  the  thought  of  form- 
ing a  strong  rear-guard  had  been  influential  in  bringing  about 
these  dispositions.  This  thought,  however,  could  have  originated 
only  in  the  supposition  of  a  hostile  attack  ;  while,  on  the  contrary, 
this  supposition  was  flatly  contradicted  by  the  carelessness  with 
which  the  beginning  of  the  eccentric  retreat  from  Mezo-Kovesd 
into  the  cantonments  had  been  delayed  till  full  midday,  and  thus 
this  manoeuvre,  which  could  so  easily  have  been  accomplished 
unobserved  under  Ihe  veil  of  the  past  night  or  the  fog  of  the  morn- 
ing, had  been  exposed  to  the  spying  looks  of  the  enemy's  ad- 
vanced troops  in  Szihalom. 


216  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

To  these  enigmatical  contradictions  we  found  rw  solution ; 
and  as  our  confidence  in  Dembinski  had  moreover  been  already 
shaken,  we  could  not  greatly  enjoy  the  thought  of  the  "  promised 
rest  and  refreshment,"  when  we  broke  up  about  midday  of  the 
1st  of  March  from  the  camp  of  Mezo-Kovesd  for  the  cantonments. 

My  head-quarters  closely  adjoined  the  Poltenberg  and  Kmety 
divisions,  which  were  ordered  to  Szent-Istvan. 

About  two  hours  before  nightfall  the  promised  rest  and  re- 
'freshment  was  disturbed  by  a  vehement  and  continuous  thunder- 
ing of  artillery,  which  penetrated  to  us  from  the  direction  of 
Eger-Farmos. 

Colonel  Klapka — who  was  located  in  this  place  with  the 
whole  first  army  corps  and  the  isolated  division  of  the  second 
corps — had  been  attacked  ;  and,  considering  the  proximity  of  the 
united  hostile  army,  there  was  no  reason  for  supposing  but  that 
this  attack  had  been  made  with  far  superior  forces.  Under 
these  circumstances  it  was  to  be  feared  that  Colonel  Klapka 
would  be  defeated,  and  pressed  back  toward  Poroszlo,  and  that 
consequently  the  Aulich  division  in  Lovo  would  be  endangered ; 
and  it  was  my  duty  to  prevent,  if  possible,  these  calamities,  by 
ordering  the  Poltenberg  and  Kmety  divisions  to  advance  without 
a  moment's  delay  to  Eger-Farmos.  I  could  execute  this  duty 
the  easier  as  Szent-Istvan  was  of  no  strategic  importance  at  all 
to  us. 

The  shortest  and,  as  we  were  assured,  best  way  from  this 
place  to  Eger-Farmos  is  through  Lovo  ;  but  this  best  way  was 
impracticable. 

We  had  scarcely  advanced  halfway  when  the  thunder  of  cannon 
from  Eger-Farmos  suddenly  ceased.  Klapka's  defeat,  as  well  as 
the  advanced  darkness,  might  be  the  cause  of  this ;  the  greater 
was  the  necessity  for  hastening  our  march.  But  all  our  eflbrts 
were  rendered  abortive  by  the  accumulation  of  obstacles  which 
impeded  our  progress  on  this  road,  almost  impassable  during  this 
season. 

In  front  of  Lovo  we  had  to  cross  the  Kanya  brook,  which  had 
overflowed  its  banks.  The  darkness  of  the  night  and  the  depth 
of  the  water  rendered  unavoidable  the  use  of  a  good  many  pre- 
cautionary measures,  which  took  up  time.  Not  till  after  mid- 
night was  our  passage  completely  effected,  and  the  Aulich,  Pol- 
tenberg, and  Kmety  divisions  again  reunited. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  217 

Some  of  our  troops  stationed  at  Eger-Farmos  had  reached 
Lovo  several  hours  earlier.  From  these  we  now  learned,  that 
on  the  road  from  Szihalom  through  Szemere  the  enemy  had  con- 
tinually flanked  Colonel  Klapka's  march  from  Mezo-Kovesd  to 
Eger-Farmos,  and  had  attacked  him  most  violently  with  artillery 
immediately  after  his  arrival  at  Eger-Farmos ;  but  that,  after 
an  obstinate  resistance,  he  had  retreated  toward  Poroszlo,  where- 
by these  sections  of  troops,  being  separated  from  their  main  body, 
had  been  obliged  to  fall  back  on  Lovo. 

This  information  decided  me  to  break  up  the  camp  at  Lovo 
after  a  short  rest,  and  to  march  back  with  the  Aulich,  Polten- 
berg,  and  Kmety  divisions  by  Ivanka  toward  Poroszlo,  sending 
at  the  same  time  an  order  to  the  Guyon  division  in  Negyes  to  do 
the  same. 

How  fatigued  and  weary  soever  the  troops  might  have  been 
when  Dembinski  sent  them  at  midday  of  the  1st  of  March,  1849, 
from  the  camp  of  Mezo-Kovesd  for  their  refreshment  into  the 
cantonments  of  Negyes,  Szent-Istvan,  Lovo,  and  Eger-Farmos,  the 
rest  they  found  there  was  so  quickly  refreshing,  that  they  were 
already  enabled  early  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  March,  1849, 
— invigorated  in  the  highest  degree !  ? — to  reunite  themselves  in 
Poroszlo. 

Eighteen  short  hours  had  sufficed  to  place  in  the  clearest  light 
the  geniality  of  the  theory,  according  to  which  Dembinski  had 
projected,  in  the  golden-mouthed*  morning-hour  of  the  1st  of 
March,  1849,  the  refreshment  dispositions  for  his — by  the  way 
be  it  said — more  hungry  than  fatigued  army.  This  theory  is 
naturally  developed  from  these  dispositions,  as  follows  : 

"  2%e  rest  necessary  for  re-invigorating  a  defeated  army  is 
secured  by  occupying  dispersed  cantonments  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  enemy'' s  operations,  in  a  plain,  of  which  the 

INTERSECTIONS  OF  THE  GROUND  DO  NOT  PERHAPS  OBSTRUCT  A 
victorious  enemy  IN  HIS  ADVANCE,  BUT  CERTAINLY  EMBARRASS 
THE  JUNCTION  OF  THE  PARTS  OF  AN  ARMY  WHICH  ARE  SEPARATELY 
CANTONING." 

Or,  in  other  terms,  and  at  the  same  time  applicable  to  the 
present  case : 

*  "  The  hours  of  the  morning  have  their  mouth  full  of  gold,"  a  German 
proverb,  which  has  its  equivalent  in  the  English,  "Early  to  bed,  and  early 
to  rise,  makes  a  man  healthy,  wealthy,  and  wise." — Transl. 

K 


218  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

''  If  an  already  defeated  army,  which  continues,  still  exposed 
to  the  attacks  of  the  enemy,  is  to  be  secured  agai?ist  them,  sepa- 
rate it IF  POSSIBLE,  UNDER  TH^jpENEMY's  EYES intO  from  four 

to  five  parts,  more  or  less  equal  to  each  other,  and  confidently 
distribute  these  separate  parts  into  tlie  near  surrounding  places, 
several  hours  distant  from  each  other,  betioeen  which  places 
there  exist  in  part  no  communications  at  all,  in  part  such  as 
are  practicable  only  ivith  uncommo7i  difiicidty  ;  for  in  a  civil- 
ized enemy  there  can  always  with  certainty  be  assumed  to 
be  so  much  of  good-breeding  as  that,  at  once  recognizing 

AND  honoring  THE  EMINENTLY  PEACEFUL  INTENTIONS  OF  HIS 
ADVERSARY,  HE  WILL  INSTANTLY  CEASE  FROM  THE  OFFENSIVE." 

Field-marshal  Windiscligratz  had  m  fact  j ustified  such  a  flat- 
tering supposition  by  the  remarkable  moderation  with  which  he 
pursued  us  only  on  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Kapolna,  and  even 
then  with  forces  so  small  that  it  was  not  at  all  difficult  for  us  to/ 
repulse  their  attack  without  inconvenience — as  has  been  already 
mentioned — and,  at  the  same  time,  take  from  them  three  guns. 
Prince  Windiscligratz  afterward  also  proved  himself  not  quite 
unworthy  of  such  a  flattering  supposition,  since  he  again  attacked 
xvith  forces  7iot  superior  our  three  divisions,  which  were  moving 
before  his  eyes  to  Eger-Farmos  ;  whereby,  of  course,  was  caused 
Klapka's  retreat  by  night  to  Poroszlo,  which,  though  somewhat 
inconvenient  it  is  true,  was  otherwise  almost  without  loss. 

Or  could  what  Dembinski  took  for  the  courteous  good-breeding 
of  Prince  Windischgratz  have  been  only  the  expression — in  spite 
of  the  days  of  Kapolna — of  continued  contempt  for  his  adver- 
sdiry?  Could  neither  the  days  of  Kapolna,  nor  that  of  Mezo- 
Kovesd  have  sufficed  to  correct  that  disdainful  opinion  of  the 
importance  of  our  resistance,  for  which  indeed  sufficient  grounds 
had  been  furnished  at  first  by  the  great  retreat  from  the  Lajtha 
to  beyond  the  Danube,  and  the  simultaneous  reports  of  victory 
circulated  by  the  Committee  of  Defense  ? 

Whatever  may  be  the  answers  to  these  questions,  the  short 
campaign  between  Windischgratz  and  Dembinski,  since  the  sec- 
ond day  of  the  battle  of  Kapolna,  had  now  assumed  on  bath 
sides  the  character  of  what  is  called  at  drafts  a  "  losing-game." 
It  is  well  known  that  this  game  is  won  by  the  player  ivho  first 
gets  rid  of  all  his  men.  To  this  end,  his  endeavor  is,  to  move 
his  men  always  unprotected  in  front  of  those  of  his  adversary, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  219 

that  they  may  be  taken.  Both  commanders  proved  themselves 
very  adroit  at  this.  Thus  did  Field-marshal  Windischgratz,  on 
the  28th  of  February,  at  Mezo-Kovesd ;  thus  did  General  Dem- 
binski  on  the  day  after,  the  1st  of  March,  at  Eger-Farmos.  But 
the  latter  was  unmistakably  master,  and  would  most  certainly 
have  won — that  is,  would  hsive  first  lost  all  his  draftsmen — un- 
less the  jEit  had  suddenly  come  upon  them,  at  first  by  arbitrary 
moves  to  spoil  the  losing-game,  which  in  the  cantonments  stood 
so  extremely  favorable  for  Dembinski,  and  finally  even  to  turn 
out  their  lord  and  master ;  and  all  this  simply  because  they 
(Dembinski's  draftsmen)  had  taken  into  their  heads  the  notion 
that  with  them  only  a  winning  game  should  be  played. 


CHAPTEU  XXX. 

When  I  arrived,  early  in  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  March, 
with  the  Aulich,  Poltenberg,  and  Kmety  divisions,  at  Poroszlo, 
Colonel  Klapka  informed  me,  that  in  consequence  of  Dembinski's 
dispositions  of  the  preceding  evening  for  cantonment,  the  com- 
manders of  the  three  divisions  under  his  (Klapka' s)  command  in 
Eger-Farmos,  had  declared,  in  the  name  of  their  officers,  that 
they  would  no  longer  receive  any  order  from  Dembinski,  unless 
it  was  counter-signed  either  by  himself  (Klapka)  or  by  me.  The 
commanders  of  these  divisions  (Dessewffy  in  the  stead  of  Bulha- 
rin)  immediately  afterward  repeated  the  same  declaration  to  me 
in  person,  Klapka  being  present. 

Dembinski  had,  before  ray  arrival  at  Poroszlo,  ordered  the 
three  divisions  united  under  Klapka  to  retreat  without  delay 
behind  the  Theiss.  Conformably  to  this  order  they  were  just 
about  to  march,  when  their  commanders  informed  me  of  this 
desire  to  metamorphose  the  absolute  commander-in-chief  Dem- 
binski into  a  constitutional  one. 

But  I  could  not  suppose  it  possible  that  such  experienced  sold- 
iers as  Colonel  Klapka  and  his  three  commanders  of  division 
were  in  earnest  in  proposing  the  application  of  the  constitutional 
principle  to  the  command  of  an  army  during  war ;  and  took 


220  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

this  request  simply  for  a  consilium  abeundi,  which  was  to  be 
laid  before  the  commander-in-chief  Dembinski.  But  as  such  an 
extraordinary  measure  required  at  least  the  concurrence  of  an 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  army ;  and  as  the  four  divisions 
of  the  seventh  army  corps — consequently  more  than  one  half  of 
the  arm.y — had  not  yet  refused  obedience  to  the  commander-in- 
chief  ;  and  as  I  was  moreover  of  opinion  that  such  an  important 
step  ought  not  to  be  taken  in  too  much  Imste — with  Klapka's 
consent,  I  called  upon  these  three  commanders  of  division  to  com- 
ply for  the  present  unconditionally  with  Dembinski's  arrange- 
ments, until  the  retreat  of  the  whole  army  behind  the  Theiss, 
which  seemed  just  then  to  be  his  intention,  should  have  been 
accomplished,  when  they  would  have  an  opportunity  of  deliber- 
ately consulting  upon  the  subject. 

The  commanders  of  division  declared  themselves  willing  to  do 
so,  and  returned  to  their  troops,  as  did  also  Colonel  Klapka ; 
while  I  hastened  to  Dembinski's  head-quarters,  to  announce  to 
him  the  arrival  of  the  Aulich,  Poltenberg,  and  Kmety  divisions 
in  Poroszlo,  and  obtain  his  further  orders  for  them. 

Dembinski  received  me  very  ungraciously ;  talked  of  not  know- 
ing how  to  obey,  of  running  away  from  every  hostile  cannon-ball ; 
declared  that  it  had  not  been  his  plan  to  return  again  behind  the 
Theiss,  but  that  we  forced  him  to  do  so,  and  that  for  this  reason 
he  had  already  ordered  the  retreat.  The  seventh  army  corps 
had  immediately  to  follow  Klapka's  divisions. 

Having  been  dismissed  with  this  injunction,  I  hastened  to 
appoint  places  where  the  seventh  army  corps  should  encamp 
(the  Guyon  division  also  had  meanwhile  arrived  from  Negyes), 
until  Klapka's  divisions,  on  their  retreat  from  Poroszlo  over  the 
Theiss,  should  be  far  enough  in  advance  not  to  embarrass  the 
marching  of  the  seventh  army  corps  in  their  rear. 

Dembinski  at  the  same  time  removed  his  head-quarters  to 
Tiszafiired.  I  did  not  see  him  again  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Theiss. 

Besides  the  seventh  army  corps,  six  squadrons  of  cavalry  be- 
longing to  the  second  corps  were  also  at  the  same  time  in  Porosz- 
lo. They  belonged  to  that  army  division  which  the  comman- 
der-in-chief, during  his  just-terminated  offensive  operation,  had 
left  behind  in  Poroszlo  and  Tiszafiired,  to  secure  the  passage 
across  the  Theiss  between  these  two  places ;   and,  according  to 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  221 

Dembinski's  last  dispositions,  were  to  remain  in  Poroszlo  to  observe 
the  enemy,  even  after  the  retreat  of  the  seventh  army  corps  be- 
hind the  Theiss  had  been  effected. 

I  was  just  ready  to  commence  the  retreat,  when  the  enemy, 
advancing  toward  Poroszlo  on  the  road  from  Besenyo,  suddenly 
began  to  deploy  before  us  in  scarcely  stronger  force  than  our  own. 

At  first  he  seemed  as  if  he  intended  to  attempt  an  attack  on 
our  camp. 

Considering  the  fatal  characteristics  of  our  line  of  retreat,  re- 
treat for  the  moment  could  not  be  thought  of 

This  line  consisted  of  a  causeway,  just  wide  enough  to  allow 
two  vehicles  to  pass  each  other.  The  Theiss  had  already  over- 
flowed ;  this  causeway  was  the  sole  communication  between  Po- 
roszlo and  the  bridge  over  the  Theiss. 

Poroszlo  is  a  locality  stretching  from  north  to  south,  and  lying 
on  an  elevation,  which  limits  westward  the  extent  of  inundation 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Theiss,  here  above  a  league  in  breadth. 
This  elevation  slopes  steeply  toward  the  east,  and  forms  at  the 
same  time  the  right  bank  of  the  brook  Csero,  the  left  bank  of 
which  is  situated  in  the  inundated  ground  itself,  across  which 
the  causeway  leads  to  the  bridge  over  the  Theiss,  which  is  about 
a  league  further  off.  The  connection  of  the  causeway  with  the 
elevation  commanding  it,  and  on  which  Poroszlo  stands,  is  ef- 
fected by  means  of  a  wooden  bridge,  resting  on  piles,  over  the 
brook  Csero 

The  clear  space  between  the  eastern  row  of  houses  of  Poroszlo 
and  the  slope  of  the  bank  of  the  brook  Csero  admits  of  batteries 
being  planted,  which,  the  causeway  lying  in  a  vertical  direction 
with  this  row  of  houses,  would  command  it  (the  causeway) 
lengthways,  and  expose  it  to  a  cross-fire;  consequently  the  troops 
retreating  on  it  could  be  literally  sivept  down,  without  any  possi- 
bility being  presented  to  them  of  planting  more  than  one  gun — 
namely,  on  the  causeway  itself — against  the  hostile  batteries, 
which  gun  would  then  evidently  have  to  form  the  extreme  rear- 
guard. 

Poroszlo,  in  its  breadth — in  the  direction  from  west  to  east — is 
intersected  by  several  streets.  One  of  them  opens  on  to  the  clear 
space,  between  the  right  bank  of  the  Cserc)  and  the  eastern  front 
of  the  houses,  exactly  opposite  the  bridge ;  the  other  streets  open, 
part  of  them  above,  part  below  the  bridge. 


222  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAP.Y. 

The  seventh  army  corps  remamed.  as  has  been  said,  still  in 
the  camp  before  the  long  western  boundary  of  the  place,  when 
the  enemy  deployed  in  our  front  at  about  gun-range  and  a  half 
distance.  The  view  was  unobstructed  ;  our  retreat  could  not  he 
masked. 

To  begin  such  a  retreat  under  the  eyes  of  the  enemy  must 
invite  him  to  attack,  and  to  immediate  pursuit. 

While  of  all  the  streets  which  intersect  the  place  in  its  breadth, 
we  could  make  use  of  only  that  one  which  opens  opposite  the 
causeway,  if  we  would  avoid  obstacles  incalculable  in  their  con- 
sequences, occasioned  by  the  concourse  of  several  retreating  col- 
umns immediately  before  the  bridge  ;  the  enemy,  by  advancing 
through  the  other  streets,  could  reach  the  clear  space  before  the 
eastern  front  of  the  houses  sim.ultaneously  with  our  last  section, 
plant  his  guns  in  the  direction  of  the  causeway,  and  sans  gene 
begin  the  work  of  destruction.  In  doing  so,  the  direct  injury 
which  his  fire  would  have  caused  to  us  would  have  been  not  at 
all  comparable  to  what  would  have  ensued  in  consequence  of  the 
thronging  on  the  narrow  causeway.  I  feared  that  in  the  cha- 
otic confusion  I  should  be  forced  to  see  several  guns  and  ammu- 
nition-chests tumbling  down  over  the  slopes  of  the  road  ;  and  1 
preferred  to  accept  where  I  was  even  an  unequal  contest,  and 
defend  myself  to  the  last,  than  to  begin  the  retreat  under  such 
untoward  circumstances. 

The  first  offensive  advance  of  the  enemy  was  followed  by  a 
similar  movement  on  our  part ;  the  suspension  of  our  advance 
by  the  falling  back  of  the  hostile  vanguard.  After  which  both 
parties  contented  themselves  with  observing  each  other  during 
the  day. 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  a  patrol  of  hussars,  which  had  been  sent 
out  in  the  direction  of  Heves,  returned  with  some  prisoners,  lan- 
cers, whom  the  commander  of  the  hostile  column  in  Heves  had 
charged  with  a  despatch  "  to  the  royal  imperial  Field-marshal 
Lieutenant  Count  Wrbna  in  Poroszlo."  The  contents  of  this 
dispatch  informed  us  that  we  had  no  hostile  attack  to  fear  from 
Heves. 

In  my  suite  there  served  as  courier,  among  others,  a  harmless 
Lo-Preszti  hussar.  This  remarkable  troop  was  distinguished  prin- 
cipally by  its  red  cloaks.  The  harmless  fellow  felt  cold,  and  was 
enveloped  in  his  cloak,  when  the  lancers  were  brought  in.    Where- 


MY  LIFE  AND-  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  223 

upon  one  of  them  took  the  red-cloaked  Lo-Preszti  hussar  for  the 
executioner,  who — so  the  tale  ran  in  the  hostile  camp — used  first 
to  cut  ofi^  the  ears  of  the  prisoners,  and  after  a  while  their  heads 
also.  The  brave  lancer,  at  the  mere  sight  of  the  red  Lo-Preszti 
hussar,  was  now  naturally  seized  with  the  gallows-fever,  and  re- 
covered only  after  being  well  recruited  by  means  of  bacon,  bread, 
and  wine. 

There  was  no  longer  any  prospect  of  our  being  attacked  in  the 
course  of  the  day.  The  enemy  before  us  seemed  to  feel  himself 
too  weak,  and  intended  to  await  reinforcements,  which  might 
arrive  during  the  night. 

We  were  consequently  obliged  to  effect  the  delayed  retreat  under 
cover  of  night,  in  order  to  avoid  the  danger  of  an  overpowering 
attack,  which  was  to  be  expected  next  day. 

I  issued  the  orders  necessary  for  this  purpose,  and  reported  to 
Dembinski  the  cause  of  the  delay. 

The  second  hour  after  midnight  was  fixed  for  leaving  the 
camp.  Before  midnight,  however,  I  received,  in  answer  to  my 
report,  Dembinski' s  order  to  remain  in  Poroszlo  with  the  seventh 
army  corps  during  the  next  day  also,  and  accept  a  combat,  in 
case  the  enemy  should  attack. 

Dembinski  evidently  wished  to  try  his  Juck  once  more  at  the 
"  losing  game,"  and  that  with  the  seventh  army  corps  alone. 
But  I  had  no  desire  for  such  a  game  ;  and  declared  to  Dembinski, 
in  a  special  letter — after  a  concise  review  of  the  principal  points 
in  his  career  till  now  as  commander-in-chief — 

That  this  order  appeared  to  me  to  have  for  its  object  to  expose 
to  useless  slaughter  the  best  Hungarian  corps ;  a  corps  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  which  I,  as  its  commander,  was  responsible  to  the  coun- 
try ; — that  the  favorable  opportunities  for  striking  decisive  blows 
had  been  neglected  by  him  (Dembinski)  at  Tomalja,  Kerecsend 
(immediately  after  the  battle  of  Kapolna),  and  Mezo-Kovesd  ; — 
that  the  present  position  of  the  seventh  corps,  with  a  long  open, 
indefensible  defile  in  its  rear,  was  badly  adapted  for  accepting  a 
serious  combat,  by  which  he  seemed  now  suddenly  to  be  anxious 
to  make  up  for  lost  time  ; — that  the  corps  must,  on  the  contrary, 
be  saved  as  quickly  as  possible  from  this  dangerous  position ; — 
but  that  this  was  only  possible  by  the  retreat  during  the  night, 
which  I  had.  already  ordered  ;  and  that  I  was  ready  to  answer 
before  a  council  of  war  for  this  act  of  disobedience. 


224  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY 

Before  daybreak  of  the  third  of  March  I  had  already  quitted 
Poroszlo  with  the  seventh  army  corps,  and  left  behind  me  there, 
in  order  to  observe  the  enemy,  only  the  six  squadrons  of  cavalry 
of  the  second  army  corps. 

I  reached  without  interruption  the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss. 
The  hostile  corps,  however,  the  attacks  of  which  I  thought  to 
avoid  by  this  retreat  during  the  night,  had  at  the  same  time 
marched  back  from  Poroszlo  to  Besenyo  ;  and  thus  once  more 
the  one  had  been  in  fear  of  the  other,  and  both  again  without 
reason. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

The  decided  vote  of  want  of  confidence  in  Dembinski  on  the 
part  of  the  commanders  of  division  under  Klapka  had  in  the 
meantime  found  the  most  lively  echo  in  the  divisions  of  the 
seventh  army  corps.  The  army  was  thus  already  in  fact  with- 
out a  leader. 

General  Repasy,  commander  of  the  second  army  corps,  and 
Colonel  Klapka,  perceived,  as  well  as  myself,  that  this  state  of 
the  army  could  not  continue  long  without  endangering  the 
country. 

We  therefore,  without  constraint,  agreed  to  lose  no  time  in  as- 
sembling the  staff-officers  of  the  divisions  of  our  corps  that  were 
not  then  on  service,  to  deliberate  how  this  condition  might  most 
judiciously  be  remedied ;  but  to  invite  the  government  commis- 
sary-in-chief, Bartholomaus  von  Szemere,  to  take  part  in  the  con- 
sultation, that  even  the  appearance  of  the  army  conspiring  against 
the  government  might  he  avoided. 

The  conclusion  to  which  this  assembly  of  staff-officers  came, 
as  well  as  the  reasons  for  the  resolution,  may  be  briefly  summed 
up  as  follows  : 

That  to  beat  the  enemy,  and  yet  endure  hunger,  might  be  put 
up  with.  To  be  beaten  by  the  enemy,  but  at  least  to  have  after- 
ward enough  to  eat  and  drink,  might  perhaps  also  be  tolerable. 
But  to  be  repeatedly  beaten,  and  moreover  endure  hunger  as  well 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  225 

as  all  imaginable  fatigues,  was  too  bad,  and  could  no  longer  be 
borne. 

That  Lieutenant-general  Dembinski — especially  by  the  man- 
ner in  which  he,  as  commander-in-chief,  had  conducted  his  offens- 
ive intended  for  the  reconquest  of  the  capitals — had  brought  all 
these  calamities  on  the  army,  and  in  consequence  had  forfeited/or- 
ever  its  confidence. 

The  representative  of  the  government,  Bartholomiius  von 
Szemere,  who  was  present,  was  consequently  requested  to  take 
suitable  measures  for  removing  Lieutenant-general  Dembinski 
from  the  chief  cormnand  of  the  army  ;  and  for  transferring  it — 
until  the  definite  appointment  of  Dembinski's  successor — to  one 
of  the  commanders  of  army  corps  present. 

In  order  to  let  Szemere  be  completely  free  in  the  choice  of  a 
commander-in-chief  ad  interim,  I  declared  beforehand  that  I 
had  no  objection  whatever  to  his  appointing  to  the  temporary 
chief  command  either  of  my  young  comrades,  Repasy  or  Klapka. 
But  both  of  them,  on  their  part,  judging  it  fitting  that  the  pro- 
visional command  of  the  army  should  be  entrusted  to  me,  as 
being  in  rank  the  eldest  commander  of  a  corps — there  was  no 
longer  any  choice  left  to  Szemere  ;  and  he  consulted  with  me 
as  to  the  way  in  which,  with  the  least  ofiense,  Dembinski  could 
be  removed  from  the  chief  command. 

We  thought  to  proceed  in  the  most  delicate  way  by  Szemere's 
immediately  inviting  the  commander-in-chief  by  letter  to  avoid 
the  bitter  pill  intended  for  him,  by  a  voluntary  retiring  from  his 
post,  and  to  transmit  to  him  (Szemere),  in  a  confidential  way, 
his  journal  of  operations,  together  with  the  rest  of  the  proto- 
cols. 

Dembinski,  however,  either  did  not  believe  in  the  possibility 
of  being  removed  in  consequence  of  a  simple  Vote  of  want  of 
confidence  on  the  part  of  the  army,  or  he  hoped  to  gain  the 
crown  of  martyrdom  ;  for  he  positively  would  not  hear  of  a  volun- 
tary retirement.  It  seemed  likewise  possible  that  he  doubted  the 
genuineness  of  the  vote  of  want  of  confidence  on  the  part  of  the 
army,  and  considered  it  to  be  merely  forged,  perhaps  by  me. 
He  had  consequently  in  the  first  place  to  be  entirely  freed  from 
this  illusion. 

To  this  end,  Szemere,  accompanied  by  Repasy,  Klapka,  and 
myself,  and,  unless  I  am  mistaken,  also  by  Aulich  and  the  chief 


226  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

of  the  general  staff  of  the  seventh  army  corps,  went  next  day  to 
Dembinski's  head-quarters. 

But  that  no  conciliatory  means  might  be  left  untried,  Szemere 
saw  Dembinski  at  first  alone,  and  announced  to  him  beforehand 
what  awaited  him  next  moment,  if  he  should  continue  to  refuse 
voluntarily  to  lay  down  the  staff  of  command. 

This  measure  also  having  been  unsuccessful,  Szemere  summon- 
ed us — who  had  meantime  been  waiting  in  the  ante-chamber — 
to  enter  likewise,  and  then  declared  to  Dembinski  in  our  pres- 
ence, that  the  army  had  no  longer  any  confidence  in  his  command 
and  that  he  could  not  fail  to  perceive  how  the  want  of  this  con- 
fidence paralyzed  his  further  efficiency  as  commander-in-chief. 

Dembinski  seemed  to  be  laboring  under  the  supposition  that 
all  this  had  for  its  object  less  the  removing  him  from  the  chief 
command  than  the  satisfying  our  eager  desire  for  the  disclosure 
of  his  plan  of  operations,  which  had  formed  the  basis  of  his  un- 
successful ofi^ensive,  and  which  was  carefully  kept  secret  by  him : 
for  the  substance  of  his  answer  to  Szemere's  declaration  was  the 
following  reminiscence  of  that  campaign  to  which  he  owes  his 
ante-March,  Conversationslexicon  celebrity  : 

"  One  day  during  my  retreat  in  Lithuania,"  thus  Dembinski 
began  his  tale,  "  my  officers  came  to  me,  and  desired  to  know 
whither  I  was  leading  them.  Gentlemen,  I  replied,  do  you  see 
my  cap  here  ?" 

Hereupon  Dembinski  actually  seized  his  indoor-cap,  and  put 
it  on  his  head. 

"  If  I  could  suppose,"  he  continued,  proceeding  with  his  an- 
swer to  the  said  officers,  "  that  this  cap  had  any  perception  of 
what  I  think,  and  whither  I  am  leading  you"  (the  officers  in 
Lithuania,  not  us),  "  I  would  throw  it  on  the  ground  and  trample 
it  under  my  feet,  and  in  future  go  about  without  a  cap." 

With  this  Dembinski  tore  the  poor  cap  off  his  head  again, 
crumpled  it  up  for  awhile  in  evident  indignation,  and  threw  it 
mercilessly  on  the  ground. 

He  must  give  us  the  same  answer — he  hereupon  intimated — - 
so  often  as  we  should  ask  him  about  his  plan  of  operations. 

Dembinski  here  plainly  overlooked  how  essentially  different 
his  position  was  with  respect  to  us  from  what  it  had  been  tvith 
respect  to  the  officers  in  Lithuania. 

These  officers  wished  only  to  know  whither  he  was  leading 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTJNGAUY.  227 

them ;  we  knew  already  whither  he  Imd  led  us — namely,  into 
the  sauce. ^ 

These  only  doubted  of  his  capacity  as  a  general ;  we  no  longer 
doubted  of  the  contrary. 

These  were  still  willing  to  follow  him  on  certain  conditions ; 
we  no  longer  on  any  whatever. 

I  strongly  suspect  that  in  Dembinski  it  was  only  "  the  vanity 
of  authorship"  which  led  him  to  cite  to  us,  so  mal  a  jyt'opos,  his 
smart  answer  to  these  officers. 

After  a  long  discussion,  without  result,  between  Dembinski 
and  Szemere,  during  which  the  honor  of  spokesman  on  our  part 
was  left  to  the  latter  exclusively,  this  scene  terminated  with 
Dembinski's  repeated  declaration,  that  he  would  not  voluntarily 
retire — whereupon  we  took  our  leave. 

Szemere,  however,  had  now  to  bite  the  sour  apple,  and,  by 
virtue  of  his  unlimited  power,  officially  to  inform  Lieutenant- 
general  Dembinski  that  he  must  without  delay  give  up  the  chief 
command  of  the  army  to  me. 

As  soon  as  I  was  convinced  that  Dembinski  had  received  this 
order  from  Szemere,  I  charged  the  chief  of  the  general  staff  of 
the  seventh  army  corps  to  take  possession  of  the  registers  of  the 
service,  which  were  kept  at  the  quarters  of  the  chief  command. 
Dembinski,  however,  had  taken  them  meanwhile  under  his  own 
oharge,  and  obstinately  refused  to  give  them  up.  The  chief  of 
the  general  staff  of  the  seventh  army  corps  took  up  the  raiatter 
in  good  earnest,  and  placed  a  guard  at  Dembinski's  door. 

I  quite  approved  of  this  measure,  and  immediately  informed 
the  government  commissary-in-chief,  Szemere,  of  Dembinski's 
arrest.  Szemere  had  not  been  prepared  for  this  turn  of  affairs, 
declared  that  he  did  not  at  all  agree  to  Dembinski's  being  arrest- 
ed, and  immediately  set  him  at  liberty. 

Next  day  the  President  Kossuth,  with  the  war-minister  Mes- 
zaros  and  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Vetter,  arrived  at  Tisza- 
fiired. 

For  Szemere  had  reported  to  Debreczin — undoubtedly  immedi- 
ately after  the  arrival  of  my  last  letter  from  Poroszlo  to  Dem- 
binski— that  mutiny  had  broken  out  in  the  army. 

Even  before  Szemere's  letter,  two  staff-officers,  dispatched  by 
Klapka  and  myself,  had  arrived  at  Debreczin,  in  order  to  open 
*  i.  e.  into  the  very  jaws  of  destruction. — TransL 


228  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  eyes  of  the  government  as  to  the  chief  causes  of  the  doubtful 
progress  of  our  war-operations. 

The  government  took  this  step  for  an  omen  confirming  Sze- 
mere's  report. 

Hence  Kossuth's  speedy  journey  from  Debreczin  to  Tiszafiired. 

Now  commenced  a  lengthened  examination  of  the  staff-officers 
of  the  army.     The  point  of  it  was  directed  against  me. 

Meszaros  and  Vetter  discharged  the  functions  of  judicial  exam- 
iners. 

My  letter  from  Poroszlo  to  Dembinski  did  not  appear  in  itself 
svjficient  reason  for  instituting  proceedings  against  me ;  while, 
nevertheless,  a  notable  satisfaction  was  desired  to  be  given  to 
Dembinski. 

He  had  probably — ^just  as  he  did  before  me  on  the  morning  of 
the  2d  of  March  in  Poroszlo,  so  now  in  Tiszafiired  before  Kos- 
suth and  his  colleagues — thrown  the  blame  of  his  (Dembinski's) 
retreat  behind  the  Theiss  on  the  army  itself,  and  especially  on 
Klapka  and  myself,  and  might  thus  have  excited  the  suspicion, 
that  both  of  us  had  frustrated  the  execution  of  his  plan  of  opera- 
tions, which  was  unknown  to  us,  by  our  intentionally  bringing 
on  battles  unfavorable  in  their  results — for  instance,  on  the  days 
of  Kapolna  and  Eger-Farmos — and  this  to  render  it  impossible 
for  him  to  remain  Hungarian  commander-in-chief 

The  discovery  of  facts  confirmatory  of  this  suspicion  appeared, 
consequently,  to  be  the  chief  aim  of  these  examinations.  Had 
this  been  attained,  two  birds  would  have  been  killed  with  one 
stone — "Dembinski"  and  "victory"  would  have  ceased  to  be 
contradictions;  and  myself  and  my  proclamation  of  "Waizen 
would  have  ended  our  struggles  ! 

The  latter  especially  caused  Kossuth  much  vexation.  Chiefly 
to  render  harmless  its  and  its  author's  influence  had  Dembinski 
been  written  for  to  Paris — were  the  independent  army  divisions 
invented.  The  royal  Hungarian-constitutional  cm-ps  d'ar- 
mee  of  the  upper  Danube  should  disappear  in  the  army  of  tlie 
Polish-Hungarian  revolution,  that  "  Octavianus"  Kossuth 
might  be  enabled  at  last,  unrestrained,  to  enact  with  "  Anto- 
nius"  Bem  and  *'  Lepidus"  Dembinski,  "  a  triumvirate  en  minia^ 
ture^ 

It  is  easily  conceivable  that  the  more  Dembinski's  unexpected 
failure  again  enveloped  in  mist  the  already  bright  prospect  hereof, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  229 

the  more  earnestly  must  Kossuth  have  desired  that  "  the  blame 
of  this  failure''  should  be  brought  home  to  Klapka  and  me. 
Meszaros  and  Vetter  accordingly  examined  with  might  and  main 
— I  forget  now  during  how  many  days. 

They  did  not  find,  however,  what  they  sought. 

"Dembinski"  and  *' victory"  constantly  remained  contradic- 
tions ;  myself  and  the  proclamation  of  Waizen  were  not  yet  to 
end  our  struggles ! 

My  punishment  for  disobedience  to  Dembinski  was  confined  to 
a  long-winded,  humorous  lecture,  which  Meszaros  read  me  one 
day  just  after  dinner,  in  Vetter's  presence,  after  the  examination 
of  all  the  staff'-officers  was  concluded. 

"  In  vino  Veritas'' — he  began — "  says  a  Latin  proverb  ;  I 
have  therefore  to-day  intentionally  taken  some  glasses  of  wine 
more  than  I  needed,  to  enable  me  to  tell  you  the  truth  frankly. 
Soon  after  you  was  appointed  general  and  commander  of  the 
corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube,  I  must  remark  that  you 
failed  in  that  respect  for  the  war-minister  which  I  should  have 
thought  you  owed  him.  Times  innumerable  you  have  slighted 
me  by  sending  your  proposals  direct  to  the  Committee  of  Defense. 
*  The  old  Meszaros  ig  an  old  pigtail;  why  lose  time?'  you  may 
have  thought.  I  accommodated  myself  to  it ;  for  I  am  no  friend 
to  sycophancy.  Then  I  heard  one  fine  morning,  you  had  sud- 
denly proclaimed  that  old  Meszaros  was  the  sole  authority  you 
acknowledged  in  the  country.  You  can  conceive  my  righteous 
astonishment  at  this  ?  you  can  conceive  how  difldcult  it  was  for 
me  to  comprehend  the  reason  of  this  distinction  of  my  insignifi- 
cant self — expected  least  of  alJ  from  you?  you  can  conceive 
what  trouble  it  cost  me  merely  to  identify  myself  rightly  with 
my  new  dignity  as  the  sole  authority  recognized  by  you  in  the 
state  ?  At  last  I  succeeded,  however  ;  and  I  now  believed  I 
could  the  more  certainly  reckon  on  your  obedience,  the  more  you 
had  to  make  good  in  this  respect  for  former  times.  But  what  a 
deception  I  You  were  pleased  merely  to  jest,  and  have  been  no 
more  obedient  to  me  since  than  before ;  and  just  as  little  have 
you  obeyed  more  recently  the  man  whom  I  appointed  your  com- 
mander-in-chief. It  seems,  therefore,  as  if  you  had  been  chosen 
by  Providence  to  give  the  he  to  the  proverb  which  says  that  *  He 
who  would  command,  must  first  learn  to  obey.' " 

This  introduction  was  then  followed  by  some  rhapsodical  re- 


230  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

citals  from  the  military  regulations  of  the  royal  imperial  Austrian 
army;  and  a  kind  "  take  it  not  amiss"  sweetened  at  the  end  even 
the  few  bitternesses  which  during  the  harmless  lecture  had  escaped 
from  the  kind-hearted  old  gentleman,  probably  against  his  will. 

I  thought  I  could  not  show  my  gratitude  for  so  much  gentle 
forbearance  better  than — while  passing  over  in  considerate  silence 
an  investigation  into  the  alleged  inconsistencies  in  my  conduct 
toward  Meszdros — by  confining  myself  to  the  justification  of  my 
disobedience  to  Dembinski,  which  I  did  by  some  counter-citations 
from  the  same  military  regulations  whence  the  war-minister  had 
taken  the  really  reprimanding  part  of  his  discourse. 

Meszaros  availed  himself  of  my  answer  to  resume  the  discourse, 
and  informed  me  that  Dembinski  had  already  been  removed  from 
the  chief  command,  and  that  Vetter  would  take  it. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

Kossuth  either  had  not  the  courage  to  oppose  the  judgment 
pronounced  against  Dembinski  by  the  assembly  of  staff-officers, 
or  he  perceived  that  it  wa-s  just ;  suffice  it — Dembinski  did  not 
immediately  obtain,  so  far  as  I  know,  any  satisfaction  whatever 
for  the  afiront  he  had  sufl^ered.  It  was  left  to  him  to  see  how  he 
should  console  or  avenge  himself 

Some  days  after  the  retreat  of  the  army  to  Tiszafiired,  Colonel 
John  Damjanics — having  crossed  the  Theiss  at  Czibakhaza  with 
his  army  division  (one  half  of  the  third  army  corps) — appeared 
suddenly  on  the  railway  from  Pesth  to  Szolnok,  between  the  hos- 
tile brigades  under  Ottinger  in  Abany  and  Kargern  in  Szolnok, 
attacked  the  latter,  and  defeated  it. 

Dembinski  now  claimed  the  honor  of  this  victory  exclusively 
to  himself;  because,  about  a  week  or  a  fortnight  before,  he  had 
sent  to  the  third  army  corps,  which  stood  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Theiss,  opposite  Szolnok  and  at  Czibakhaza,  an  order  to  attack 
the  enemy  in  the  beginning  of  March.  Neither  Damjanics  nor 
his  brave  troops,  nor  the  indolence  of  the  hostile  brigade  under 
Ottinger  in  Abany,  nor  the  comfortable  feeling  of  security  of  that 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  231 

under  Kargern  in  Szolnok,  which  allowed  itself  to  be  literally- 
surprised  in  the  midst  of  a  boundless  plain  in  broad  daylight — 
nothing  of  ftll  this,  according  to  Dembinski's  view,  had  any 
merit  in  the  victory — only  he  alone  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  was  solely  owing  to  me — said  Dembinski  further — that  this 
victory  could  not  now  exert  any  favorable  influence  on  the  oper- 
ations of  our  chief  array :  for  through  my  treason  the  battle  of 
Kapolna  had  been  lost ;  I  had  been  the  cause  why  the  canton- 
ment-stations Eger-Farmos,  Lovo,  Szent-Istvan,  and  Negyes — in 
which  he  intended  to  await  the  victory  of  Szolnok,  in  order  to 
advance  again  immediately  toward  the  capitals — had  to  be  evac- 
uated by  our  army ;  nay,  even  the  last  possibility  of  suddenly 
resuming  the  offensive  had  been  destroyed  by  me  alone,  in  re- 
treating from  Poroszlo  across  the  Theiss,  contrary  to  his  express 
command. 

Thus  Dembinski  consoled — thus  avenged  himself;  and  Count 
Guyon  seconded  him  therein. 

But  the  declarations  which  escaped  from  Dembinski  at  this 
occasion  about  his  most  secret  war-operative  thoughts,  when  com- 
bined with  the  events  already  communicated  during  the  campaign, 
enable  us  to  perceive,  almost  in  its  details,  the  plan  of  operations 
according  to  which  Dembinski  thought  to  reconquer  the  capitals. 

During  the  second  half  of  February  Dembinski  had  at  his 
disposal  ten  army  divisions,  the  strength  of  each  of  which  varied 
on  an  average  from  4000  to  4500  men,  baggage  train  included. 

Seven  of  these  army  divisions  he  destined  for  attack  along  the 
high  road  of  Gyongycis. 

One  he  left  at  Tiszafiired  and  Poroszlo  for  the  protection  of 
the  passage  across  the  Theiss  between  these  places. 

Two  army  divisions  (the  third  anny  corps)  had  to  take  Szol- 
nok in  the  beginning  of  March,  and  then  to  make  a  demonstra- 
tion on  the  railway-line  against  the  capitals. 

Dembinski's  plan  of  operations  was  consequently  this  ; 

Demonstration  along  the  railroad  ;  principal  attack  along  the 
high  road  of  Gyongyos. 

A  demonstration — to  answer  its  object,  namely,  to  make  the 
enemy  believe  that  the  demonstrating  column  is  the  princi- 
pal column  for  attack — must  be  undertaken  with  reference  to 
such  circumstances  of  time  and  place  as  do  not  beforehand  pre- 
vent the  enemy  being  deceived. 


232  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Bearing  this  rule  in  mind,  Dembinski  had  quite  correctly  de- 
ferred the  commencement  of  the  demonstration  on  the  railroad 
till  the  beginning  of  March ;  for,  having  been  opposed  as  late  as 
the  21st  of  February,  with  the  seventh  army  corps  to  Field- 
marshal  Schlick  at  Sago-Szent-Peter,  and  as  this  place  was  at 
least  nine  good  marching  stations  distant  from  the  point  where 
the  demonstration  on  the  railroad  was  to  be  commenced — the 
enemy  would  have  perceived  immediately,  from  the  attack  on 
Szolnok,  made,  for  instance,  before  the  3d  of  March,  that  our  main 
FORCE  was  by  no  means  to  he  sought  for  behind  this  column. 

We  ought  not,  in  justice,  to  suppose  that  Dembinski  intended 
to  bring  his  principal  column  of  attack  on  the  main  road  of  Gy- 
ongyos  into  conflict  with  the  enemy  seven  or  eight  days  before 
the  beginning  of  this  demonstration  along  the  railroad  ;  for  this 
would  have  been  sheer  nonsense,  and  Dembinski's  plans  of  opera- 
tions were  always  based  on  a  distinct,  definite  idea — only  in  their 
eocecution  he  alivays  got  into  difficulties.  Moreover  we  must  re- 
member that  Dembinski  had  as  early  as  the  26th  of  February 
repeatedly  asserted  that  he  had  by  no  means  wished  for  the  con- 
flict on  the  Tarna. 

We  may  therefore  be  completely  at  rest  on  this  point,  namely, 
that  Dembinski  wa,s,  from  the  first  determined  to  await  the  begin- 
ning of  the  demonstration,  nay  even  its  consequences,  favorable 
for  our  principal  attack  ;  and  his  advance  from  Miskolcz  as  far 
as  the  Tarna  must  appear  to  us  consequently  only  as  an  arrange- 
ment for  the  intended  principal  attack. 

Dembinski  undoubtedly  intended  to  steal  away  unobserved  with 
his  seven  army  divisions  to  the  Tarna,  in  order  to  remain  there 
hidden  until  this  demonstration  should  have  been  begun.  For 
this  reason  it  was,  that,  on  the  24th  of  February,  at  Mezo-Kovesd, 
he  complained  so  bitterly  to  me  about  Klapka's  sudden  attacks 
on  Kompolt  and  Petervasara,  and  was  quite  right  in  maintaining 
that  Klapka  was  disclosing  to  the  enemy  his  (Dembinski's)  inten- 
tions ;  for  these  surprises  plainly  directed  the  enemy's  attention 
to  our  principal  column  of  attack. 

It  is  true  that  Klapka  might  oppose  to  this,  that  the  principal 
column  of  attack  could  not  have  reached  the  Tarna  unobserved, 
unless  Dembinski  had  had  ready  at  least  thirty  thousand  invisi- 
ble-caps, so  that  each  of  our  soldiers  might  have  drawn  one  of 
them  over  his  ears,  and  thus  become  invisible.     This,  however, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  233 

will  not  at  all  prevent  Dembinski — as  we  already  know  him — 
from  afterward  maintaining  that  the  execution  of  his  plan  of 
operations  was  wrecked  entirely  in  consequence  of  Klapka's  sur- 
prises ;  for  its  execution  we  must  consider  as  wrecked  with  the 
first  discliarge  of  cannon  on  the  26th  of  February. 

The  two-days'  battle  of  Kapolna,  which  this  discharge  of  can- 
non opened,  seems  to  have  been  given  by  the  commander-in-chief 
only  par  depit.  As  soon  as  it  was  lost,  however,  he  had  again 
ready  a  new  definite  plan  of  operations.  We  deduce  this  directly 
from  his  own  declarations  made  in  consequence  of  the  victory  at 
Szolnok.  The  lines  of  operation  remained  the  same  as  those  in 
the  first  plan,  only  Dembinski  had  this  time  to  abandon  the  decep- 
tion by  means  of  demonstration,  just  because  this  deception  was 
no  longer  possible  after  the  battle  of  Kapolna.  He  consequently 
intended  only  to  await  the  taking  of  Szolnok,  and  then  imme- 
diately to  resume  the  offensive  on  the  main  road  of  Gyongyos. 
He  calculated  naturally  on  this,  that  the  resolution  with  which 
the  third  army  corps  would  advance  on  the  railroad  must  oblige 
Field-marshal  Windischgratz  either  to  weaken  his  main  forces 
by  detachments  to  the  railway-line,  or  even  completely  retreat 
toward  the  capitals. 

To  this  plan  of  operations  also,  and  the  combinations  on  which 
its  execution  depended,  considered  in  itself,  not  m.uch  can  be  ob- 
jected :  only  in  the  preliminary  arrangements  for  it,  Dembinski 
had  again  overlooked  a  trifling  matter. 

As  is  known,  he  intended  to  conceal  his  defeated  and  pursued 
seven  army  divisions  for  the  time  being  in  the  oft-mentioned  can- 
tonments, and  to  let  them  rest  until — as  has  been  said — Szolnok 
should  be  taken.  In  order  to  be  quite  sure  that  these  seven 
army  divisions  should  n/Jt  be  discovered  in  their  hiding-places, 
Dembinski — since  we  had  no  invisible-caps  in  our  possession — by 
way  of  wise  precaution,  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Kapolna, 
should — ^beginning  with  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz,  and 
ending  with  the  last  hostile  private  soldier — have  so  pasted  up 
the  eyes  of  each  man,  that  the  whole  Austrian  army  had  re- 
mained at  least  during  eight  days  in  total  blindness.  Dem- 
binski having  neglected  to  do  this,  had  to  see  his  second  plan  of 
operations  also  wrecked  in  the  combat  at  Eger-Farmos,  and  re- 
treated in  despair  behind  the  Theiss. 


CHAPTER  XXXIIL 

After  Dembinski's  dismissal  in  the  camp  at  Tiszafiired,  it 
was  felt  to  be  urgently  necessary  that  the  troops  should  immedi- 
ately march.  Tiszafiired,  whose  stores  were  exhausted,  proved 
to  be  very  unfavorably  situated  for  the  speedy  importation  of 
large  supplies — especially  at  that  time,  when  the  inundation  had 
just  set  in.  The  conjoint  chief  command,  which — as  we  shall 
presently  see — had  succeeded  to  Dembinski,  was  destitute  of  the 
firmness  requisite  for  energetically  repressing  disorders  arising  in 
the  camp. 

In  place  of  the  just- wrecked  plan  of  operations  Yetter  and 
Dembinski  projected  a  new  one,  namely  : 

Demonstration  on  the  high  road  of  Gyongyos  with  the  seventh 
army  corps. 

Principal  attack  on  the  railway-line  with  the  first,  second, 
and  third  corps. 

This  plan  of  operations  was  submitted  to  the  President  for  his 
approval.  Undoubtedly  Kossuth  had  good  manners  enough  to 
find  it  incomparable ;  nevertheless — he  might  perhaps  have 
thought — it  would  at  the  same  time  be  desirable  to  be  at  once 
quite  certain  that  no  accessory  circumstance  had  been  neglected 
therein,  in  itself  insignificant,  and  yet  perhaps  important  enough 
to  be  espied  by  envious  eyes,  and  immediately  sharply  criticised. 
Gorgei  or  Klapka — Kossuth  might  have  thought  further — will 
certainly  discover  directly  any  weak  point  in  this  plan  of  opera- 
tions, and  if  we  omit  previously  to  ask  their  judgment  upon  it, 
though  only  j)ro  farma,  they  will  do  all  they  can  to  damage  it 
with  the  troops ;  nay  principally  on  account  of  the  troops,  with 
which  both  these  commanders  of  army  corps  seem  unfortu- 
nately to  be  very  popular,  this  precaution  is  indispensable. 
Finally,  Kossuth  might  have  offered  to  take  upon  himself  person- 
ally to  confer  with  me  about  the  plan  of  operations,  leaving  to 
General  Vetter  to  speak  with  Klapka  on  the  subject. 

Thus  I  explain  to  myself  the  occasion  of  a  tete-a-tete  between 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  235 

me  and  Kossuth,  during  which  he,  after  some  hints  about  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  consideration  which  must  still  be  shown  toward 
Dembinski,  suddenly  began  upon  the  plan  of  operations,  expressly 
assuring  me  that  Dembinski  and  Yetter  had,  indeed,  projected  it, 
but  that  he  (Kossuth)  nevertheless  wished,  before  he  had  it  put 
into  execution,  to  hear  my  judgment  upon  it.  I  answered,  that 
a  plan  of  operations  was  soon  made,  and  that,  as  far  as  regarded 
them-y,  there  was  just  as  little  to  object  against  this  as  against 
the  one  recently  abandoned  ;  the  main  point  was  the  execution, 
the  details  of  which  depended  upon  the  effect,  not  always  to  be 
foreseen,  of  the  hostile  counter-movements,  as  well  as  upon  a 
great  number  of  other  casualties. 

Hereupon  I  was  dismissed,  with  the  assurance  of  deeply-felt 
thanks,  and  so  forth ;  but  was  shortly  after  again  sent  for  by  the 
President. 

This  time  Kossuth — naturally  again  under  four  eyes — ^began 
in  an  especially  confidential  manner  :  that  the  definitive  nomina- 
tion of  Vetter  as  commander-in-chief  was  still  undecided  upon, 
nay,  all  things  considered,  was  not  even  very  probable ;  that  I 
had  consequently  still  further  to  act  as  provisional  commander- 
in-chief,  and  immediately  to  prepare  for  the  execution  of  the  new 
plan  of  operations. 

"Without  hesitation  I  declared  myself  ready — taking  Kossuth's 
hints  about  the  still  undecided  definitive  promotion  of  Vetter,  in 
the  first  instance  for  nothing  else  than  the  natural  consequence 
of  a  rising  scruple  on  the  part  of  the  latter  in  the  meanwhile — 
and  hastened  to  consult  with  Klapka  and  the  chief  of  the  gen- 
eral staff  of  the  seventh  army  corps  about  the  dispositions  to  be 
first  made  for  the  troops,  according  to  the  new  plan  of  opera- 
tions. 

Soon  after  I  had  left  Kossuth,  Yetter  came  in  quest  of  me,  and 
likewise  charged  me  with  the  same  commission  as  I  had  already 
received  from  the  former  ;  but  he — in  contradiction  to  Kossuth 
— assigned  as  the  sole  and  exclusive  reason  for  it,  the  circum- 
stance that  the  personnel  of  his  war-office  had  been  left  behind 
in  Debreczin,  and  that  he  was  therefore  not  able  immediately  to 
take  the  chief  command  in  due  form.  He  alleged  this  with  such 
ingenuousness  as  in  him — a  man  who  seemed  to  be  void  of  every 
kind  of  dissimulation — must  be  considered  a  proof  that  he  had  no 
presentiment  of  the  doubtfulness  of  his  promotion,  which  Kos- 


236  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARy. 

suth  had  expressly  specified  as  the  reason  of  my  further  acting 
as  provisio7ial  commander-in-chief  of  the  army. 

I  sought  in  vain  for  a  valid  reason  for  this  ambiguous  behavior 
on  the  part  of  the  President.  The  sole  supposition  which  oc- 
curred to  me  was,  that  Kossuth  wished  thereby  merely  to  allay 
my  presumed  discontent  at  Vetter's  appointment  to  the  chief  com- 
mand, already  definitively  indicated,  that  I  might  not,  so  long  as 
the  army  remained  in  Tiszafiired,  and  consequently  in  close  con- 
tact with  me,  perchance  entertain  the  idea  of  instigating  the 
troops  against  Vetter.  This  supposition,  however,  seemed  to  me 
not  sufliciently  tenable.  It  would  have  been  so  perhaps,  if,  with 
Vetter's  previous  knowledge,  Kossuth  had  given  these  hints  about 
the  improbability  of  his  promotion.  That  the  President,  how- 
ever, had  dared  to  give  these  intimations  behind  Vetter's  backy 
and  had  thereby  seriously  compromised  him — who  conducted 
himself  toward  me  already  as  actual  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army — but  had  at  the  same  time  exposed  himself  to  the  danger 
of  being  compromised  by  me  with  Vetter  ; — all  this  found  in  tJiat 
supposition  no  foundation  whatever. 

Only  later  experience  led  me  subsequently  to  suppose,  that  Kos- 
suth, probably  while  in  Tiszafiired,  had  felt  that  "  longing  fm' 
the  staff  of  command,''  which  afterward  tormented  him  so  often  ; 
that  he  therefore  had  taken  advantage  of  Dembinski's  removal  to 
introduce  a  kind  of  interregnum  in  the  chief  command  of  the 
army,  during  which  he  could  satisfy  this  *'  longing"  at  least  for  a 
time ;  and  that  his  ambiguous  behavior  toward  Vetter  and  my- 
self, as  well  as  the  ivhole  comedy  with  the  plan  of  operations, 
had  its  origin  only  in  his  intention  to  pi'olong  the  interregnum 
as  much  as  possible,  whereby  Kossuth  might  not  have  failed  to 
make  way  for  his  direct  influence  with  the  army  in  future. 

My  proceedings  during  the  interregnum  were  confined  to  sign- 
ing the  order  of  march  for  the  first  and  second  corps — which 
were  sent  from  Tiszafiired  down  toward  Czibakhaza — and  to 
reducing  the  four  army  divisions  to  three,  this  having  been 
ordered  long  ago,  as  has  been  mentioned,  by  the  war-minister, 
and  the  possibility  of  executing  the  order  having  at  last  presented 
itself  in  Tiszafiired. 

Kossuth  in  the  mean  time  had  received  critical  news  from 
Komorn.  The  commander  of  the  fortress,  General  Torok — it 
was  said — was  Tiot  eaual  to  the  post  which  he  held  ;  he  was 


p*' 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  237 

altogether  deficient  in  firmness  ;  a  more  energetic  man  must 
speedily  be  put  in  his  place,  if  we  would  not  run  the  risk  of  losing 
the  fortress. 

The  President  now  consulted  with  me  about  the  choice  of  a 
new  commander  of  the  fortress.  I  proposed  Colonel  Guyon  for 
this  post,  as  what  was  wanting  here  was  merely  an  energetic 
man,  and  as  the  military  council  of  the  fortress  consisted  of  men 
who  were  able  to  supply  Colonel  Guyon's  deficiency  in  the 
knowledge  necessary  to  every  commander  of  a  fortress. 

Kossuth  adopted  this  suggestion ;  nevertheless,  to  be  quite 
secure,  he  thought  it  necessary  to  appoint  another  commander 
besides  Guyon  for  the  fortress  of  Komom.  His  choice  fell  on  the 
then  Colonel  Lenkey.  Both  had  now  to  look  out,  how  they  should 
get  into  the  fortress :  he  who  first  succeeded  in  doing  so,  was  to 
remove  Torok  from  his  post,  and  take  the  command  of  the  fortress 
upon  himself 

The  President  previously  made  both  of  them  generals,  and  at 
the  same  time  also  Colonels  Damjanics,  Klapka,  and  Aulich. 

Count  Guyon  consequently  left  the  seventh  army  corps ;  his 
division  was  broken  up,  and  its  troops  incorporated  into  the 
other  three  divisions  ;  while  the  command  of  the  division  of  the 
right  wing,  which  had  become  vacant  by  Aulich's  nomination  to 
general  and  commander  of  the  second  army  corps,  was  given  to 
the  senior  colonel  of  the  latter. 

The  enemy  having  forced  back  our  out-posts  from  Poroszlo, 
and  having  burnt — after  an  attempt  at  a  hasty  reconnoitering 
toward  the  wretchedly  constructed  tete-de-pont  of  the  Theiss — 
the  Poroszlo  bridge  over  the  brook  Csero ;  and  the  crossing  of 
the  river  being  impracticable  on  any  other  point  between  Tisza- 
fiired  and  Tokaj,  partly  on  account  of  the  inundation,  partly  of 
the  present  want  of  materials  for  a  bridge — the  seventh  army 
corps  had  now,  with  this  changed  aspect,  to  march  up  the  river 
as  far  as  Rakamaz,  opposite  Tokaj,  in  order  here  to  gain  at  last 
the  right  bank  of  the  Theiss. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  I  gave  expression  to  the  conjecture, 
that  Kossuth  in  Tiszafiired  had  striven  primarily  only  for  tlie 
establishment  of  his  direct  influence  with  the  army.  Apart 
from  the  evident  pains  he  took  to  leave  the  post  of  commander- 
in-chief  unoccupied  as  long  as  possible,  whereby — easily  circum- 
venting the  indolent  war-minister — he  brought  himself  into  im- 
mediate contact  with  the  several  commanders  of  the  troops — I 
find  this  conjecture  confirmed  especially  by  his  successful  attempts 
to  secure  to  himself  for  the  future  also  this  g-wasz-good-naturedly- 
patriarchal  official  relation  between  him  and  myself 

How  these  attempts  could  be  successful  with  me  will  become 
evident  from  what  follows  :• 

I  had  not  seen  Kossuth  from  the  beginning  of  November  1848 
till  the  early  part  of  March  1849,  and  had  kept  up  no  direct 
intercourse  whatever  with  him  since  his  flight  from  Pesth  to 
Debreczin.  The  correspondence  between  us,  active  as  it  had 
been  during  my  sojourn  in  Presburg,  was  entirely  interrupted 
some  time  before  the  evacuation  of  the  capitals.  Kossuth  had,  in 
fact  tried,  while  I  was  with  the  then  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper 
Danube  in  the  mountain-towns,  to  renew  our  correspondence; 
but  without  success,  for  I  did  not  answer  his  letters.  This  I 
beheved  I  owed  to  those  officers  of  the  corps  d'armee,  who  con- 
tinued to  take  part  in  the  defense  of  the  country  only  in  conse- 
quence of  my  iwoclamation  of  Waizen. 

Being  obliged,  however,  only  too  soon  to  discover  that  Meszaros 
was,  on  the  one  hand,  unfortunately  altogether  unworthy  of  the 
confidence  which  the  officers  had  placed  in  the  firmness  of  his 
political  opinions,  and,  on  the  other,  was  in  general  calculated 
rather  to  bring  the  regular  defense  of  the  country  by  degrees 
completely  into  decay  than  to  promote  it ; — it  seemed  to  me 
much  more  advantageous  for  the  security  of  the  political  basis 
on  which  I  wished  to  maintain  the  war  against  Austria,  as  well 
as  for  the  continuance  of  the  contest  itself,  that  I  should  no  longer 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  239 

throw  any  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  direct  understanding  between     / 
Kossuth  and  myself. 

For  this  reason  I  had  put  the  steps  which  became  necessary 
for  removing  Dembinski  from  the  chief  command  directly  under 
the  3Bgis  of  the  government,  by  causing  Szemere  to  take  part  in 
the  assembly  of  staff-officers  ;  for  this  reason  also,  on  the  arrival 
of  Kossuth  in  Tiszafiired,  I  determined  to  press  on  him  as  much 
as  possible  a  thorough  consideration  of  the  dangers  which  would 
ensue  to  Hungary  from  the  intermixture  of  revolutionary  tenden- 
cies with  the  legal  cause  of  our  combat  in  self-defense.  I  thought 
I  should  obtain  this  object  most  surely  by  surprising,  as  it  were, 
Kossuth  with  the  following  question  :  whether  he  did  not  thinh 
that  Hungary  might  he  still  quite  satisfied  ivith  the  constitu- 
tion of  1848,  IF  THE  PORTFOLIOS  OF  WAR  AND  FINANCE  WERE 
AGAIN    TRANSFERRED    TO    THE    MINISTRY    OF    ViENNA.       KoSSUth's 

answer  was  an  evasive  one ;  he  thought  only,  he  said,  that  the 
liberty  of  Hungary  would  be  constantly  in  danger,  so  long 
AS  Poland  also  was  not  free,  and  that  ivith  the  freedom  of 
Hungary  the  freedom  of  Europe  likewise  would  certainly  be 
lost. 

The  most  natural  question  on  my  part  would  now  have  been, 
what  Kossuth  meant  by  the  freedom  of  Hungary,  Poland,  and 
Europe  ;  but  he  prevented  me  from  any  further  scrutiny  of  his 
political  creed  by  the  declaration,  which  under  existing  circum- 
stances was  a  very  important  one,  that  he  held  it  to  he  the  most 
SACRED  duty  of  all  %vho  meant  honorably  by  the  country,  to 
agitate  no  question,  and  to  venture  on  no  step,  the  investi- 
gation OR  CONSEQUENCES  OF  WHICH  might  divide  the  nation 
into  parties,  and  so  only  increase  the  power  of  the  common 

ENEMY  OF  ALL. 

There  was  a  severe  reproof /or  me  in  this  declaration  ;  for  it 
was  I  who  had  already,  by  the  proclamation  of  Waizen,  agitated 
such  a  questio7i  and  ventured  on  such  a  step.  But  the  more 
keenly  I  felt  the  censure  contained  in  the  declaration  just  made 
by  Kossuth,  the  more  strongly  did  I  believe  it  contained  a  guar- 
antee that  he  would  himself  undertake  nothing  by  which  the 

power  of  THE  COMMON  ENEMY  OF  US  ALL  SHOULD  BE  INCREASED. 

On  the  strength  of  this  belief  I  completely  gave  up  all  further 
op2)osition  to  Kossuth,  and  endeavored  to  combat — unfortunately 
in  vain — merely  from  the  point  of  Hungarian  national  honor. 


240  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

even  his  Poland  ma7iia,  with  which, /rcw^  political  aversion, 
I  could  by  no  means  connect  myself.  This  belief  strengthened 
anew  my  confidence  in  Kossuth  ;  while  his  conduct,  simulating 
reciprocal  confidence,  rendered  me  completely  inaccessible  to  any 
sus'picion  against  him. 

After  these  premises  it  was  no  longer  difficult  for  Kossuth  to 
regulate  the  relation  between  us  quite  as  he  thought  jyro'per ; 
not  difficult  for  him  to  persuade  me  that  in  Debreczin  there 
existed  a  party  which  was  striving  to  call  forth  a  decision  of  the 
Diet,  in  accordance  with  which  the  nation  would  have  to  sur- 
render to  Prince  Windischgratz  at  discretion;  that  he  could 
hardly  any  longer  oppose  with  sufficient  energy  the  agitations  for 
this  purpose,  as  he  could  not  absent  himself  even  for  one  day, 
without  having  to  fear  that  a  motion  made  with  this  intent 
might  obtain  the  majority  of  the  Lower-chamber  ;  that  he  could 
venture  on  this  journey  to  Tiszafured  only  because  the  represen- 
tatives had  pledged  to  him  their  word  of  honor  that  they  would 
come  to  NO  conclusion  ivhatever  during  his  absence,  ivhich  had 
been  limited  to  a  certain  number  of  days,  and  that  he  had  to  be 
back  at  Debreczin  without  fail  before  the  expiration  of  the  fixed 
term,  in  order  to  preserve  the  nation  from  the  most  disgraceful 
of  all  fates,  from  self  degradation,  self-abandonment  ;  that 
there  was  but  one  thing  which  could  save  him  for  some  time, 
and  with  him  the  whole  country,  from  this  painful  situation,  and 
this  one  thing  was — a  victory  I — even  if  not  a  decisive  one,  at 
least  one  upon  which  a  retreat  of  our  troops  did  not  again  im- 
mediately follow  ;  for  that  in  Debreczin  the  watchword  ran,  it  is 
true,  literally,  ''Victory  m-  death!""  but  in  reality  signified,  ''A 
victory  !  or  we  die  from  anguish." 

Taking  all  this  for  genuine  truth,  how  could  I  suspect  in  the 
members  of  this  party  (later  the  peace-party)  the  advocates  of 

MY  political  creed  ? 

After  I  had  already  received,  as  has  been  mentioned,  a  lecture 
from  the  war-minister  for  my  disobedience  to  Dembinski,  Kossuth 
asked  me :  if  I  had  been  in  Dembinski's  place,  what  I  would 
have  done  with  Gorgei  ?  "  I  would  have  had  him  shot,"  I  replied  ; 
"for  if  I  had  been  in  Dembinski's  place,  I  would  not  have 
issued  orders  a  la  Dembinski,  consequently  icould  have  given 
no  occasion  whatever  fm'  a  similar  disobedience." 

Of  this  answer  Kossuth  reported  to  the  Diet  only  the  first 


')  '1  A  /?  V 

MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARyS^^^CAL^t;;.: 

clause :  the  second  clause,  containing  my  reason,  he  passed  over 
in  silence  ;  and  thus  represented  me  as  the  poor  repentant  sinner 
pardoned  by  him. 

The  members  of  the  later  peace-party  taking  this  also  for 
genuine  truth,  how  could  they  suspect  in  me,  thejpor  sinner  par- 
doned BY  Kossuth,  an  advocate  of  their  political  creed  ? 

Kossuth  by  lying  had  interposed  a  thick  vail  between  his  polit- 
ical opponents,  and  thus  retained  free  scope  for  the  prosecution 
of  his  own  "  personal"  policy. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

Kossuth,  Meszaros,  and  Vetter  had  left  Tiszafiired  again,  and 
had  returned  to  Debreczin  ;  the  first  and  second  army  corps  were 
on  their  route  to  Szolnok ;  the  seventh  corps  had  now  to  cross 
the  Theiss  at  Tiszafiired,  in  order  to  begin  the  demonstration  on 
the  main  road  of  Gybngyos ;  and  as  yet  nobody  knew  who  com- 
manded the  army ! 

The  troops  might  suppose  it  was  myself;  while  I  was  con- 
vinced of  the  contrary,  but  without  knowing  any  thing  more  pre- 
cisely about  the  futflre  nomination  of  the  commander-in-chief, 
than  that,  as  has  been  already  mentioned,  on  the  one  hand, 
Kossuth  had  contradicted  the  probability  of  Tetter's  being  ap- 
pointed to  this  post ;  on  the  other,  only  that  Vetter  had  acted  as 
if  he  were  already  invested  with  the  office.  Neither  the  latter 
circumstance  nor  Dembinski's  removal  were  officially  known ; 
Meszaros  had  sunk  within  these  few  days  in  Tiszafiired  complete- 
ly to  naught ;  Kossuth  was  still  irresolute ;  and  thus  the  army 
strolled,  in  a  good-natured  spontaneity  as  it  were,  toward  an 
uncertain  destination. 

So  long  as  the  impossibility  of  passing  the  Theiss  with  the 
seventh  army  corps  at  Tiszafiired,  or  between  this  point  and 
Tokaj,  had  not  been  proved  by  attempts,  I  had,  as  commander 
of  this  corps — which  moreover,  according  to  the  new  plan  of 
operations,  had  to  operate  independeyitly — no  particular  reason 
to  trouble  myself  much  whether  Peter  or  Paul  should  become 

L 


243  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

commander-in-chief.  But  when  the  inevitable  necessity  suddenly 
forced  itself  on  me,  of  gaining  the  right  bank  of  the  Theiss  by 
means  of  the  considerable  circuit  by  Tokaj,  then  I  had  to  fear 
that  the  delay — impossible  to  be  foreseen  at  Kossuth  and  Vetter's 
departure  from  Tiszafiired  resulting  therefrom  to  the  demonstra- 
tion on  the  main  road  of  Gybngyos,  might  essentially  embarrass 
the  future  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  in  the  immediate 
execution  of  the  new  plan  of  operations.  I  hastened  therefore  to 
Debreczin,  to  learn  to  whom  the  command  of  the  army  had  at 
last  really  been  confided,  and  in  order  immediately  by  word  of 
mouth  to  inform  the  new  commander  of  this  delay  in  the  demon- 
stration, and  to  urge  him  at  once  to  decide  that  the  previous 
plan  of  operations  should  remain  in  full  force  in  spite  of  this 
delay,  or  if  not — ivhat  task  was  next  to  be  assigned  to  the  seventh 
army  corps. 

On  my  arrival  at  Debreczin,  I  found  Kossuth  just  on  the  point 
of  writing  to  me.  He  could  now  orally  discuss  with  me  the 
subject  of  his  intended  written  communication.  At  first  he  asked 
me  what  qualifications  I  required  in  the  future  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  army. 

"  That  he  he  a  soldier  and  a  Hungarian  ;  in  other  respects, 
whether  older  or  younger  in  rank  than  myself  is  to  me  indifier- 
ent,"  was  my  answer. 

Hereupon  Kossuth  informed  me  without  any  further  circumlo- 
cution, that  he  had  already  signed  Vetter's  nomination  as  com- 
mander-in-chief. At  the  same  time  he»  asked  me  my  judgment 
of  him.  I  replied,  that  I  could  not  yet  give  any  opinion  on  Vet- 
ter,  having  been  only  twice  in  contact  with  him,  and  then  but 
very  transiently ;  that  those,  however,  who  professed  to  know 
him,  represented  him  as  an  experienced,  brave  soldier. 

Now  it  was  not  this  which  Kossuth  wished  to  know  about  Yet- 
ter,  but  whether  I  did  not  think  him  capable  of  treason  to  the 
country. 

In  answer  to  this  question  I  assured  the  President  that  Vettcr 
had  made  on  me  the  impression  that  he  was  a  man  of  honor. 

I  intended  now  to  take  my  leave,  in  order  to  find  the  new  com- 
mander-in-chief, transact  with  him  my  business  relating  to  the 
service,  and  then  very  speedily  rejoin  my  corps.  Kossuth,  how- 
ever, asked  me  to  stay  a  little  longer,  as  the  first  distribution  of 
the  recently  created  order  of  military  merit  was  about  to  take 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  243 

place  at  his  residence,  and  he  should  be  pleased  if  I  would  assist 
in  person  on  the  occasion. 

Soon  afterward  the  then  civil  and  military  coryphei  of  Hungary 
who  were  present  at  Debreczin  assembled  at  Kossuth's. 

Kossuth  opened  the  ceremony  by  a  short  speech  appropriate  to 
the  occasion  ;  then  called  over  the  names  of  those  who  had  been 
found  worthy  of  having  first  conferred  on  them  the  order  of  the 
second  class  of  military  merit  (there  were  three  classes) ;  and  in 
conclusion  decorated  such  of  the  persons  named  as  happened  to 
be  present. 

The  ceremony  was  over,  Yetter  was  present,  and  my  time  was 
short  ;  I  therefore  availed  myself  of  the  occasion  to  state  to  him 
the  reason  for  my  being  there  ;  and  after  I  had  received  his  an- 
swer, that  in  spite  of  the  delay  in  crossing  the  Theiss,  the  task  of 
the  seventh  army  corps  in  the  operations  for  the  next  campaign, 
remained  the  one  already  mentioned,  I  again  left  Debreczin — a 
few  hours  after  my  arrival  there — and  hastened  back  to  my 
head-quarters  at  Egyek. 

Among  those  who  were  decorated  with  the  order  of  the  second 
class  of  military  merit  were  also  Perczel  and  myself;  nay — if  I 
am  not  mistaken — even  General  Count  Vecsei,  whose  merits  in 
the  field  at  that  time,  so  far  as  I  know,  never  sufficed  to  raise  the 
standard  of  value  above  the  freezing-point.  General  Klapka,  on 
the  contrary,  was  passed  over,  ''out  of  consideration''  for  Mes- 
zdros — as  was  said. 

In  order  to  understand  how  an  iiijustice  toward  Klapka  could 
be  demanded  out  of  "  consideration''  for  Meszdros,  we  must  re- 
member that  Meszaros,  after  he  had  been  repeatedly  unmercifully 
beaten  by  Field-marshal  Schlick,  had  transferred  the  command 
of  his  utterly  demoralized  corps  to  Klapka,  and  that  he,  a  few 
weeks  later,  with  the  same  troojys,  had  successfully  engaged  the 
same  enemy  in  several  hot  battles. 

This  "  consideration"  for  Meszaros,  at  Klapka' s  expettse,  be- 
comes perfectly  explicable,  if  we  consider  that  Meszaros  himself, 
as  war-minister,  could  not  pilay  a  passive  part  in  the  scrutiny 
of  tliose  who  were  to  be  decorated.  Nay,  we  are  obliged  to  recog- 
nize such  "  consideration"  positively  as  a  postulate  of  the  most 
tender  duty  toward  one's  self,  when — as  in  the  present  instoMce 
— ONE  AND  THE  SAME  human  skin  incloses  him  who  is  both  the 
object  and  the  agent  in  the  "  consideration." 


CHAPTEU  XXXVL 

The  tete-de-po7it  between  Tiszafured  and  Poroszlo  had  al- 
ready received  an  adequate  number  of  troops  from  the  second 
army  corps.  Directly  after  my  return  from  Debreczin,  the  whole 
seventh  army  corps  consequently  was  marched  from  Egyek  and 
Csege  by  Tiszapolgar,  Szent-Mihaly,  Tiszalok,  and  JN'agy-Falu  to 
Rakamaz. 

In  the  stead  of  the  bridge  on  piles  over  the  Theiss,  uselessly 
destroyed  by  fire  in  the  month  of  January  out  of  excessive  fear 
of  an  offensive  against  Debreczin  on  the  part  of  Field-marshal 
Schlick,  the  passage  over  the  Theiss  between  Rakamaz  and  Tokaj 
had  been  re-established  by  means  of  a  floating  bridge.  Over  the 
river  Hernad  at  Gesztely  was  thrown  a  similar  bridge,  time 
enough  to  enable  the  seventh  army  corps,  after  its  passage  over 
the  Theiss,  to  advance  without  impediment  from  Tokaj  by  Mis- 
kolcz  to  the  main  road  of  Gyongyos,  and  pursuing  it  further,  with 
the  division  of  the  right  wing  as  far  as  Szikszo,  with  those  of  the 
centre  and  of  the  left  wing  as  far  as  Szihalom  and  Mezo-Kovesd. 

In  Tokaj  the  army  corps  had  suffered  a  diminution  of  eight 
squadrons  of  hussars,  which,  according  to  the  order  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, had  to  be  sent  to  Czibakhaza  for  the  reinforce- 
ment of  the  main  body  of  the  army. 

In  Miskolcz  the  army  corps  sustained  another  loss  of  from  300 
to  400  infantry,  one  platoon  of  hussars,  and  two  guns.  Of  these 
troops  an  independent  column  was  formed  and  detached  into 
the  northern  comitates  against  the  Sclavonian  militia,  which  the 
hostile  brigades  under  Gotz  and  Jablonowski  had  left  there, 
when  they  marched,  after  Dembinski  had  retreated  behind  the 
Theiss,  from  Kaschau  by  Miskolcz  into  the  district  of  the  opera- 
tions of  their  chief  army. 

It  was  also  in  Miskolcz  that  I  saw  for  the  first  time  the 
octroyed  constitution  of  the  4th  of  March  with  its  boundless 
proviso;  that  obtruded  gigantic  hond^  with  the  clause,  **  I  will 

pay  WHEN  IT  PLEASES  ME  !" 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY.  245 

In  Mezo-Kovesd  we  received  information  from  a  scout  that 
the  nearest  hostile  corps  was  stationed  at  Heves,  while  on  the 
main  road  before  us,  even  as  far  as  Gyongyos,  no  enemy  had 
been  seen. 

The  demonstration  had  consequently  to  begin  with  the  march 
to  Heves ;  and  the  army  corps  at  the  height  of  Szikszo  was 
directed  from  the  main  road  in  two  columns  toward  the  south, 
one  of  which  advanced  by  Erdotelek,  the  other  by  Besenyo.  An 
over-hasty  patrol  of  hussars  betrayed  to  the  enemy  our  approach 
too  soon.     He  drew  back — so  said  the  report — toward  Jasz-Apati. 

We  thought  we  had  now  once  more  to  continue  our  demon- 
stration against  the  capitals  parallel  with  the  main  road,  to 
induce  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz — whose  attention 
must  have  been  already  directed  to  us  in  consequence  of  the 
reports  of  the  column  which  had  retreated  from  Heves — to 
detach  larger  forces  against  us,  and  thus  facilitate  in  a  direct 
manner  the  advance  of  our  main  army  on  the  railway-line 
against  the  capitals.  Vetter  had,  however,  meanwhile  crossed 
the  Theiss  at  Czibakhaza  only  to  retreat  again  immediately 
behind  it,  and  again  to  project  a  new  plan  of  operations,  the 
execution  of  which  had  to  begin  with  marching  back  from 
Czibakhaza  to  Tiszafiired  and  passing  the  Theiss  between  this 
place  and  Poroszlo.  The  seventh  army  corps  was  ordered,  from 
its  position  at  Besenyo  and  Erdotelek,  to  protect  this  passage. 

This  was  the  end  of  the  demonstration  of  the  seventh  army 
corps  against  the  capitals,  as  well  as  of  the  whole  second  of- 
fensive, which  had  scarcely  begun. 

About  the  same  time  I  charged  the  small  expeditionary  corps, 
which  had  been  detached  from  Miskolcz  into  the  northern  comi- 
tates against  the  Sclavonian  militia,  to  direct  its  inroads  mainly 
toward  Komorn.  Thereby,  on  the  one  hand,  an  end  would  be 
put  to  the  patrolling  about  of  hostile  detachments  in  the  valley 
of  the  Eipel  (Ipoly) ;  on  the  other,  the  enemy  would  be  induced, 
by  thabold  marches  of  this  insignificant  expeditionary  column, 
to  suppose  the  approach  of  a  stronger  corps,  as  well  as  the  inten- 
tion to  relieve  Komorn  by  its  means. 

After  two-thirds  of  the  main  army  had  debouched  at  Poroszlo, 
the  seventh  army  corps  as  vanguard  lined  the  Tarna  from.  Fel- 
Dobro  as  far  as  Bod,  and  awaited  in  this  position  the  approach 
of  the  main  bodv. 


246  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY 

Meanwhile  divers  rumors  were  heard  about  the  details  of  the 
passage  across  the  Theiss  at  Czibakhaza,  and  the  retreat  behind 
the  river  immediately  subsequent  thereupon  ;  and  these  rumors, 
taken  together,  attributed  to  Field-marshal  L.  Vetter,  if  possible, 
still  less  ability  for  the  post  of  commander-in-chief  than  Dem- 
binski  had  shown.  I  could  not  therefore  but  apprehend  that  I 
should  see  the  just-impending  offensive  founder  once  more  in 
consequence  of  incapacity  in  the  command.  This  thought  left 
me  no  peace. 

"While  my  army  corps  was  stationed  on  the  Tarna,  and  had 
every  prospect  of  remaining  inactive  during  some  days,  I  started, 
about  the  end  of  March,  from  Kerecsend  for  Tiszafiired,  where 
Kossuth,  Vetter,  Damjanics,  Klapka,  and  Aulich  were  then  stay- 
ing. I  hoped  to  succeed  so  far  as  that  the  new  plan  of  opera- 
tions, in  case  it  was  already  adopted,  as  well  as  the  nearest 
preparations  for  its  execution,  might  previously  be  brought  be- 
fore a  military  council  to  be  deliberated  upon. 

Of  the  persons  just  named,  Generals  Damjanics  and  Klapka 
were  the  first  whom  I  met  in  Tiszafiired.  Before  them  I  gave  vent 
in  some  severe  remarks  to  my  vexation  at  the  purposeless  moving 
to  and  fro  of  the  army  with  which  Field-marshal  L.  Vetter  had 
entered  on  his  new  charge ;  and  was  not  a  little  surprised  when 
Damjanics  interrupted  me,  in  order  to  accuse  himself,  in  Vetter's 
stead,  of  deserving  the  blame  of  the  recent  sudden  abandonment 
of  the  plan  of  operations ;  for  he  it  was  who — contrary  to  his 
former  custom — intimidated  by  the  news  that  the  enemy,  60,000 
strong,  stood  opposite  them,  had  proposed  the  immediate  return 
of  the  troops,  when  they  had  scarcely  effected  their  passage  over 
the  Theiss. 

I  had  never  before  either  seen  or  spoken  to  Damjanics.  The 
manly  frankness  which  he  showed  by  accusing  himself  in  Vet- 
ter's stead — although  averse  to  him  in  his  inmost  soul — won  for 
him  at  once  my  esteem  and  confidence  ;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  certainty  that  Field-marshal  L.  Vetter  had  no  jpart  in 
the  blame  of  the  miscarriage  of  the  late  offensive  deprived  me 
of  every  reason  for  doubting  the  capability  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  for  his  post. 

I  naturally  desisted  now,  without  further  hesitation,  from  my 
original  design  of  having  the  project  for  the  nearest  operations 
submitted  to  the  judgment  of  a  military  council,  and  confined 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  247 

myself  to  informing  the  President  Kossuth,  and  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  army  Yetter,  that  I  had  come,  as  presumptive 
leader  of  the  vanguard,  merely  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  oral 
information — consequently  more  circumstantial — relative  to  my 
special  mission  during  the  next  advance. 

Vetter  informed  me  that  he  intended  for  the  present  to  confine 
himself  to  a  single  compact  advance  along  the  main  road  as  far 
as  Gyongyos,  and  to  arrange  the  movements  to  be  executed 
further  on  than  Gyongyos  according  to  those  of  the  enemy,  but 
at  all  events  to  maintain  the  offensive  until  something  decisive 
should  happen. 

Thus,  in  the  end  of  March,  1849,  the  Hungarian  chief  army 
— according  to  the  documents,  the  baggage-train  included,  not 
quite  42,000  men  strong,  vv^ith  about  160  pieces  of  artillery,  two 
being  tw^elve-pound  batteries  of  six  guns  each — was  concentrated 
in  the  near  environs  of  the  battle-field  of  Kapolna,  in  order  for 
once  to  act  at  last  in  earnest. 

On  the  31st  of  March  we  had  already  reached  with  the  main 
body  Gyongyos,  with  the  advanced  troops  (the  seventh  array 
corps)  Hort,  without  drawing  a  blade. 


CHAPTER  XXXVn. 

During  our  advance  to  Gyongyos  and  Hort,  Field-marshal  L. 
Vetter  suddenly  fell  ill ;  and  the  Hungarian  army  was  again 
without  a  leader,  facing  the  enemy,  who  was  ready  for  fighting. 

According  to  rank,  it  seemed  to  be  due  to  me  as  a  matter  of 
course  to  act  as  Vetter's  representative  in  the  chief  command. 
I  felt,  however,  an  inward  repugnance  to  demanding  that  here 
rank  alone  should  decide,  while  I  Tnyself  adopted  the  principle 
of  allowing  the  mere  rank  to  exercise  an  influence  in  the  choice 
of  my  sub-commanders  only  between  candidates  of  almost  equal 
aptitude. 

I  therefore  insisted  only  on  the  speedy  filling  up  of  the  vacant 
chief  command ;  while  Damjanics  and  Klapka  expressly  de- 
manded that  it  should  be  transferred  to  me,  as  the  senior  in  rank 


248  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

of  the  commanders  of  corps.  Kossuth  was  consequently  obliged 
to  appoint  me  at  least  as  Vetter's  provisional  substitute.  He 
had  thereby  probably  to  overcome  two  concentrically-opposed 
sentiments,  namely,  his  childish  fear  of  my  presumptive  rivalry, 
and  his  own  longing  for  the  staff  of  the  chief  command ;  be- 
cause only  thus  can  it  be  explained  how — in  spite  of  the  press- 
ing necessity  for  a  leader  being  given  to  the  army  which  was 
advancing  on  the  offensive — several  days  could  elapse  from  the 
arrival  of  the  medical  report  stating  Yetter's  physical  inability 
to  take  a  personal  share  in  the  campaign,  until  my  nomination 
as  commander-in-chief  ad  interim. 

I  believe  I  make  no  mistake  in  asserting  that  it  was  on  the 
evening  of  the  30th  of  March  1849,  that  Kossuth's  order  for  me 
to  appear  in  Erlau  without  delay  reached  me  in  Gyongyos.  I 
arrived  at  Erlau  during  the  same  night,  received  there  on  the 
morning  of  tlie  31st  of  March  from  Kossuth  the  charge  to  take 
the  command  of  the  army  meanwhile,  until  Vetter  should  re- 
cover, and  returned  in  the  evening  to  Gyongyos. 

In  the  mean  time  we  were  informed  by  scouts  that  the  enemy 
was  about  to  concentrate  his  main  forces  at  Godollo,  and  had 
established  intrenchments  on  the  points  of  passage  across  the 
little  river  Galga,  as  well  as  at  the  convent  of  Besenyo.  Thus 
it  seemed  as  if  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz  intended  to 
maintain  the  defensive,  and  await  our  principal  attack  on  the 
main  road  from  Gyongyos  to  Pesth. 

This  line  of  attack  being  intersected  by  the  two  little  rivers 
Zagyva  and  Galga,  the  marshy  banks  of  which  of  themselves 
rendered  the  advance  of  an  army  uncommonly  difficult,  Klapka 
proposed  to  attack  on  the  Gyongyos  main,  road  only  with  the 
seventh  army  corps  ;  while  with  the  first,  second,  and  third  corps, 
from  Gyongyos  by  Arokszallas  and  Jasz-Bereny,  to  turn  the  de- 
fensive position  of  the  enemy  on  the  Galga  in  its  right  flank. 

All  attacks  combined  with  far  turnings  expose,  it  is  well 
known,  one  of  the  two  parts  of  the  army  on  the  offensive,  which 
are  isolated  from  each  other  during  the  manoeuvre  of  turning,  to 
the  danger  of  being  attacked  and  beaten  by  a  hostile  superior 
force,  whereupon  the  other  part  commonly  shares  the  same  fate. 

The  extent  of  this  danger  bears  an  exact  relation  to  the  extent 
of  the  circuit  which  the  turning-column  makes. 

In  the  above-mentioned  project  of  Klapka,  for  instance,  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  249 

seventh  army  corps  had  by  itself  to  be  exposed  during  at  least 
four  or  five  days  to  the  overpovi^ering  attack  of  the  hostile  main 
army  presumed  to  be  on  the  Galga ;  a  space  of  time  during 
which  Prince  Windischgratz  and  his  counselors  must  necessarily 
have  been  asleep  to  be  too  late  in  remarking  the  movement  of 
our  principal  column  of  attack. 

But  when  I  nevertheless  voted  for  the  execution  of  Klapka's 
project,  I  did  so  only  because  I  had  already  repeatedly  experi- 
enced— as,  indeed,  only  a  short  while  ago  under  Dembinski — 
that  if  opposed  to  Prince  Windischgratz,  many  a  strategic  sin 
might  be  committed  altogether  with  impunity. 

My  appointment  to  Vetter's  post  obliged  me  to  remit  the  com- 
mand of  the  seventh  army  corps  to  the  oldest  commander  of 
division  in  the  corps,  for  whom  again  was  •  substituted  in  his 
command  the  oldest  staff-officer  of  the  division. 

Vetter  having  retained  his  staff  in  Tiszafiired,  I  also  transferred 
to  the  chief  of  the  general  staff  of  the  seventh  army  corps  the 
management  of  the  details  of  the  collective  operations  of  the 
army,  and  put  in  his  place  in  the  seventh  army  corps  a  staff 
officer  of  hussars  fortunately  competent  for  the  office. 

It  was  understood  as  a  matter  of  course  that  all  these  changes 
were  to  be  considered  only  as  temporary,  so  long  as  Vetter's  re- 
turn still  remained  in  prospect. 

Klapka's  project  of  turning  the  enemy  had  received,  besides 
my  assent,  also  that  of  the  provisional  chief  of  the  general  staff 
of  the  whole  army,  and  the  beginning  of  the  turning  was  fixed 
for  the  2d  of  April.  On  the  same  day  the  seventh  army  corps 
was  to  commence,  by  its  advance  as  far  as  Hatvan  on  the 
Zagyva,  its  attacks  on  the  position  of  the  enemy  on  the  main 
road  from  Gyongyos  to  Pesth.  The  results  of  a  reconnoitering, 
undertaken  the  day  before  (1st  of  April),  from  Hort  toward  this 
point,  gave  us  reason  to  suppose  that  the  enemy  (the  Schlick 
corps)  would  make  a  vigorous  resistance. 

Field-marshal  Schlick  did  more  than  that.  He  even  took  up 
the  offensive  (on  the  2d  of  April)  simultaneously  with  our  seventh 
army  corps.  The  encounter  between  it  and  the  Schlick  corps 
took  place  half  way  from  Hort  to  Hatvan. 

The  royal  Hungarian  seventh  army  corps  conquered. 

Hatvan  and  the  line  of  the  Zagyva  from  Szent-Jakab  as  far 
as  Fenszaru  were  the  immediate  fruit  of  this  victory,  equally  im- 


250  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

portant  to  us  in  a  strategic  as  in  a  tactic  point  of  view :  in  a 
strategic,  because  the  possession  of  the  line  of  the  Zagyva  essen- 
tially facilitated  the  masking  of  the  manoeuvre  of  our  principal 
column  of  attack ;  in  a  tactic,  because  the  seventh  army  corps, 
about  15,000  strong,  in  the  position  of  Hatvan  could  resist  any 
repeated  hostile  attack  that  could  be  attempted  far  more  success- 
fully with  half  its  strength,  than  in  that  at  Hort  with  its  whole. 
I  had  purposely  remained  in  my  head-quarters  at  Gyongycis 
during  the  battle  at  Hatvan,  consequently  far  from  the  field,  that 
I  might  not  embarrass  during  the  action  my  substitute  in  the 
seventh  army  corps  on  his  debut  as  independent  commander. 
So  that  the  favorable  issue  of  this  battle  brought  us,  besides  the 
material  advantage,  also  the  moral  one  of  the  satisfactory  con- 
viction that  to  the  new  commander  of  the  seventh  army,  corps 
could  confidently  be  intrusted  the  accomplishment  of  the  highly 
important  mission  which  fell  to  the  share  of  this  corps  during  the 
turning-manoBuvre  of  the  principal  column  of  attack ;  and  the 
already  commenced  turning  was  continued  with  so  much  the 
more  confidence. 


CHAPTER  XXXVni. 

The  first,  second,  and  third  army  corps* — about  27,000  men 
in  all — were  stationed  during  the  battle  of  Hatvan,  on  the  2d  of 
April,  at  Arokszallas  ;  in  the  evening  of  the  3d  of  April  they 
reached  Jasz-Bereny ;  Kossuth  and  I  arrived  simultaneously 
with  them  at  the  latter  place,  both  having  left  Gyongyos  that 
morning. 

General  Klapka  had  meanwhile  been  informed  that  the  corps 
of  Ban  Jellachich  had  been  seen  in  the  course  of  the  day  march- 
ing from  Alberti  toward  Pilis  along  the  railway  line. 

According  to  our  plan  of  march  we  had  to  reach  on  the  4th 

*  The  strength  of  these  three  army  corps  was  at  that  time  very  unequal ; 
the  first  (Klapka)  amounted  to  from  11,000  to  12,000  men;  the  second 
(Aulich)  reached  about  9,000  ;  the  third  (Damjanics)  fluctuated  between 
6,000  and  7,000  ;  the  baggage-train  included. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  251 

of  April,  with  the  first  corps  Tapio-Bicske,  with  the  third  Nagy- 
Kata,  with  the  second  Tapio-Szele. 

In  consequence  of  the  news  about  the  proximity  of  the  Croats, 
Klapka  left  at  daybreak,  on  the  4th  of  April,  the  camp  at  Jasz- 
Bereny,  in  order  to  advance  over  Tapio-Bicske  on  the  direct 
route  toward  Pesth,  so  as  aggressively  to  cross  the  supposed 
movement  of  the  Ban  against  Godollo,  and  thereby  frustrate,  if 
possible,  his  junction  with  Prince  Windischgratz.  General  Dam- 
janics,  with  the  third  corps,  followed  close  behind  Klapka  as  far 
as  Nagy-Kata.  General  Aulich  moved  with  the  second,  as  ar- 
ranged, to  Tapio-Szele. 

The  victory  of  our  seventh  army  corps  at  Hatvan,  which,  as 
is  known,  had  been  gained  without  my  personal  co-operation,  had 
determined  me  to  adopt  the  plan  of  leaving  in  future  the  hands 
of  all  the  commanders  of  corps  completely  free  in  the  execution 
of  the  task  assigned  them,  and  to  interfere  only  at  critical  times : 
for  if  my  personal  influence  as  commander-in-chief  had  a  de- 
cidedly favorable  effect,  it  ought  to  be  reserved  for  moments 
of  the  most  imminent  danger ;  if  it  had  not,  then  I  undoubtedly 
did  better  the  seldomer  I  made  it  felt. 

Thus  Klapka  also  was  not  to  be  embarrassed  in  the  least  by 
my  presence  during  his  offensive  against  the  Ban.  Not  till  late 
in  the  morning  of  the  4th  of  April  did  I  leave  Jasz-Bereny,  in 
order  to  remove  my  head-quarters  to  Nagy-Kata,  after  having 
advised  Kossuth — being  concerned  for  his  personal  safety — rather 
to  await  the  results  of  the  day  in  the  former  place. 

I  was  with  my  suite  perhaps  halfway  to  Nagy-Kata,  when 
we  saw  thick  clouds  of  smoke  ascending  from  behind  it,  appear- 
ing to  indicate  an  artillery  action  ;  but  hearing  no  thundering  of 
cannon,  although  the  distance  was  apparently  short,  we  took  these 
clouds  of  smoke  to  be  merely  the  consequence  of  an  accidental  fire- 
brand, and  troubled  ourselves  no  more  about  it.  This  delusion, 
however,  did  not  last  long.  In  the  next  quarter  of  an  hour  I 
received  a  report,  that  Klapka  had  encountered  the  enemy  near 
Tapio-Bicske,  and  was  already  retreating. 

We  now  hastened  our  ride,  and  soon  found  this  Job's-post  un- 
fortunately more  than  sufficiently  confirmed  ;  for  already  in  Nagy- 
Kata  we  met  the  first  army  corps  fleeing  en  debandade  from 
Tapio-Bicske  back  thither. 

I  inquired  first  of  all  for  General  Klapka,  its  commander ;  but 


252  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

he  being  no  where  to  be  found,  I  next  attempted  to  stop  and 
arrange  again  the  frightened  and  dispersed  battalions.  My  suite 
assisted  me  therein  with  great  devotedness.  From  useless  ex- 
hortations it  came  to  flat,  and  at  last  to  sharp  strokes ;  however, 
the  hostile  projectiles  had  constantly  far  more  effect  than  our 
blades.  I  had  soon  sufficiently  convinced  myself  of  it ;  and  now 
sent  to  General  Damjanics,  who  was  with  his  corps  in  the  camp 
behind  Nagy-Kata,  an  order  by  the  most  severe  measures  to  put 
a  stop  to  the  flight  of  the  first  corps,  to  arrange  it,  and  send  it 
again  in  advance.  At  the  same  time  I  ordered  my  suite  to 
assist  General  Damjanics  therein,  while  I  continued  my  original 
route  toward  Tapio-Bicske,  in  order  to  make  myself  in  the 
mean  while  acquainted  with  the  position  and  strength  of  the 
enemy.  * 

The  last  swarms  of  the  first  army  corps  had  not  quite  passed 
me,  when  an  officer,  whom  I  remembered  to  have  seen  once  in 
Klapka's  suite,  galloped  on  from  the  direction  of  the  abandoned 
field  of  battle.  "With  the  intention  of  learning  from  him  some- 
tliing  more  particular  respecting  the  fate  of  his  chief,  I  barred 
his  way. 

"  Save  yourself ....  Klapka  has  fallen  ....  a  battery  is  lost 
....  all  away  ....  the  enemy  already  here  .  .  .  .  !  I  I"  cried 
he,  while  still  far  from  me,  and  anticipating  my  questions. 
One  might  have  taken  this  ill-omened  man,  from  his  laconic 
reports,  for  a  Spartan,  had  he  not  been  at  the  same  time  so 
anxiously  endeavoring,  first  on  the  right,  and  then  on  the  left, 
to  get  past  me.  I  held  the  edge  of  my  sabre  across  his  nose,  that 
he  might  at  last  stop  his  horse  and  give  me  an  answer.  But 
now  it  was  evident,  that  this  pseudo-Spartan  knew  nothing 
certain  either  about  Klapka  or  the  army,  least  of  all  about  the 
enemy  ;  and  I  let  him  immediately  continue  his  course. 

In  the  next  moment,  quitting  the  southwestern  extremity  of 
Nagy-Kata,  I  stood  upon  the  field  of  battle  abandoned  by  the 
fugitive  first  corps ;  at  gun-range  before  me  the  little  river 
Tapio,  which  can  not  be  forded  on  account  of  its  marshy  banks  ; 
on  the  other  side  of  it,  at  the  distance  of  about  half  a  (German) 
mile,  Tapio-Bicske  ;  between  it  arid  the  river  the  ground  hilly 
and  sandy,  near  the  river  more  level ;  the  only  bridge  across  the 
river  Tapio,  and  at  the  same  time  the  single  direct  communica- 
tion between  these  places,   already  crossed  by  a  part  of  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  253 

enemy's  infantry,  under  the  protection  of  the  hostile  artillery 
planted  along  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river ;  the  openly  dis- 
played forces  of  the  enemy  small  in  proportion  to  those  of  the 
defeated  first  army  corps ;  the  regaining  of  the  bridge  by  all 
means  our  next  task ;  this  was  the  sum  of  what  I  was  able  to 
perceive  at  a  first  glance. 

General  Damjanics  had  taken  up  a  position  before  the  south- 
western extremity  of  Nagy-Kata,  which  faced  the  field  of  battle, 
with  half  of  his  forces,  the  Visocki  division,  at  the  very  com- 
mencement of  Klapka's  retreat,  in  order  to  receive  him.  These 
troops  stood  consequently  already  prepared  for  action,  while 
those  of  Klapka  were  still  fleeing.  The  numerical  strength  of 
the  Visocki  division  certainly  did  not  amount  to  a  third  part  of 
the  first  army  corps,  but  it  comprised  the  third  and  ninth  Honved 
battalions,  besides  a  battalion  of  the  Schwarzenberg  regiment 
under  the  command  of  the  high-spirited  Count  Charles  Leiningen- 
Westerburg,  and  defeated  forthwith  the  same  enemy  who  had 
just  discomfited  Klapka's  whole  corps. 

While  a  battery,  planted  along  the  river  below  the  bridge, 
vigorously  attacked  the  position  of  the  hostile  artillery,  the  third 
and  ninth  Honved  battalions  advanced  concentrically  against  the 
bridge  itself  The  tirailleurs  at  the  first  onset  drove  back  to 
the  opposite  bank  the  swarm  of  the  enemy's  sharp-shooters,  who 
had  already  advanced  to  this  side  of  the  river.  The  serried 
sections  of  both  battalions,  full  of  emulation,  prepared  to  storm 
the  bridge ;  but  instead  of  at  once  impetuously  advancing  over 
it,  out  of  rivalry  they  ran  foul  of  each  other  when  close  to  it. 
The  honor  of  first  storming  was  vigorously  contended  for  by  the 
ninth  and  third  battalions  in  turn.  The  commander  of  the  third 
battalion  fortunately  put  a  speedy  end  to  the  dispute  by  a  heroic 
impromptu  action.  With  swift  resolve  he  seized  the  banner  of 
the  ninth  battalion,  rode  with  it  over  the  bridge  amid  the  hostile 
grape-shot,  and  next  moment  the  two  battalions,  exasperated 
against  each  other,  stormed  in  unison,  the  third  battalion  follow- 
ing its  brave  commander,  the  ninth  its  banner. 

The  enemy  quitted  the  position  along  the  river,  and  retreated 
behind  the  nearest  sand-hills.  Here  he  offered  indeed  once  more 
an  energetic  resistance ;  but  it  lasted  no  longer  than  the  passage 
of  the  Visocki  division  over  the  bridge.  As  soon  as  this  was 
effected,  the  enemy  repulsed  anew  began  his  retreat,  and  having 


254  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

evacuated  even  Tapio-Bicske,  posted  himself  for  the  last  time  on 
the  heights  to  the  southwest  of  this  place ;  he  did  not,  however, 
again  await  our  attack,  but  preferred  a  hasty  retreat  toward 
Koka  to  any  further  conflict. 

When  we  arrived  at  the  place  of  his  last  position,  he  had 
already  got  beyond  the  fire  of  our  guns ;  he  could  only  be 
reached  by  our  cavalry.  It  was  consequently  my  intention  to 
have  him  pursued  by  them. 

General  Damjanics  meanwhile — after  he  had  succeeded  in 
stopping  and  re-forming  the  Klapka  corps,  and  had  dispatched 
it  together  with  the  ramaining  half  of  his  own  corps  from  Nagy- 
Kata  toward  Tapio-Bicske — hastening  in  advance  of  these  troops 
with  the  rest  of  his  cavalry,  had  arrived  at  the  Visocki  division. 
From  him  I  requested  that  a  troop  might  be  detached  in  pur- 
suit of  the  enemy.  He  appointed  for  this  purpose  the  whole  of 
his  cavalry,  the  Hanover  and  Ferdinand  hussar  regiments,  under 
the  command  of  the  then  Colonel  (afterward  General)  Joseph 
von  Nagy-Sandor. 

Nagy-Sandor  led  the  hussars  brilliantly  forward  :  it  appeared 
to  us  as  if  the  queue  of  the  hostile  column  began  to  disband 
itself.  Nagy-Sandor  commenced  the  pursuit  with  some  well- 
executed  changes  of  direction,  sometimes  to  the  left,  sometimes  to 
the  right :  the  fleeing  enemy  gained  ever  more  ground.  Nagy- 
Sandor  made  hereupon  a  decided  turn  to  the  left  against  the 
peaceful  village  of  Pand,  situated  far  from  the  line  of  the 
enemy's  retreat,  blockaded  it,  took  it  afterward  by  storm  ;  and 
finally  returned  from  the  pursuit  with  a  few  private  servants  as 
captives,  and  as  booty  the  baggage  of  their  masters.  The  flee- 
ing enemy  must  have  felt  deeply  indebted  to  him. 

The  first  army  corps  and  the  rest  of  the  third  had  meanwhile 
also  arrived  on  the  southwestern  heights  of  Tapio-Bicske.  I 
ordered  them  to  bivouac  there ;  and  rode  back  to  the  village,  for 
the  purpose  of  speaking  with  General  Klapka,  who,  as  I  just 
learnt,  h^^d  been  seen  there.  To  my  great  satisfaction,  I  found 
that  no  mischance  had  happened  to  his  person.  Less  satisfac- 
tory were  his  communications  about  the  circumstances  which 
had  brought  on  the  defeat  of  the  first  corps. 

"When  just  about  entering  Tapio-Bicske,  it  was  surprised  on 
the  outskirts  of  this  place  by  the  fire  of  hostile  infantry.  The 
head  of  the  column  was  dispersed  like  chaff  before  the  wind, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  255 

and  the  enemy,  speedily  developing  his  forces,  immediately  as- 
sumed the  offensive. 

Klapka,  in  order  to  gain  time  for  deploying  his  long  marching- 
column,  ordered  a  part  of  his  cavalry  to  charge  the  enemy.  But 
the  first  regiment  of  hussars  (Emperor),  which  he  had  appointed 
to  make  the  attack,  unfortunately  belonged  to  the  most  uncertain 
troops  in  our  army.  Its  staff-officers  attacked,  but  their  divisions 
turned  back,  threw  themselves  on  Klapka's  columns  which  were 
deploying,  and  spread  terror  and  confusion  among  them.  One 
single  battery  stood  firm,  while  all  the  other  parts  of  the  corps, 
now  seeking  safety  in  flight,  hastened  back  to  the  bridge  over 
the  Tapio.  The  enemy  captured  the  abandoned  battery,  and 
could  now  direct  the  destructive  fire  of  his  guns,  henceforth  un- 
obstructed, upon  the  masses,  which,  unable  to  resist,  were  al- 
ready close  to  the  entrance  of  the  Tapio  bridge,  and  thronged 
together  in  a  densely  entangled  clew.  Absolute  despondency 
reigned  in  their  ranks.  Some  sought  refuge  against  the  hostile 
balls  in  the  marshes  of  the  Tapio — escape  from  the  roaring  of 
the  death  that  threatened,  in  the  dismal  silence  of  the  extinction 
that  awaited  them. 

All  efforts  on  the  part  of  Klapka  to  re-organize  his  troops  for 
fight  were  in  vain.  He  had  at  last  to  think  of  his  own  safety. 
He  descended  along  the  river  toward  Tapio- Szele,  and  was  for- 
tunate enough  to  discover  in  this  direction  a  second  passage 
across  the  Tapio  ;  on  account  of  the  great  circuit  h.e  had  to 
make,  however,  he  did  not  reach  Nagy-Kata  till  the  Visocki 
division  had  already  advanced  to  the  attack. 

However,  the  speedy  and  successful  prosecution  of  this  offen- 
sive tranquilized  him  at  least  as  to  the  further  fate  of  his  own 
corps  ;  and  utterly  exhausted,  he  now  sought  first  of  all  the  rest 
so  urgently  necessary  to  recruit  him. 

Those  about  him  had  probably  kept  that  circumstance  secret 
out  of  consideration  for  him  ;  and  this  naturally  explained  the 
divers  rumors  afloat  respecting  his  fate  ;  one  representing  him 
as  wounded  and  a  prisoner,  another  as  having  fallen  on  the  field 
of  battle,  a  third  as  suffocated  in  the  marshes  of  the  Tapio  ; 
which  altogether,  considering  the  events  of  the  day,  appeared 
certainly  more  credible  than  the  real  cause  of  his  long  absence 
from  the  first  army  corps. 

Klapka's  loss  on  that  day  was  therefore  important  in  a  mate- 


256  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTJNGARY. 

rial  no  less  than  in  a  moral  point  of  view ;  for  besides  a  consider- 
able number  of  men  able  to  bear  arms  and  a  whole  battery,* 
he  lost  also  a  good  part  of  our  confidence  in  his  wise  foresight 
before,  as  well  as  in  his  steady  perseverance  during  danger. 

Both  losses  were  naturally  felt  equally  by  all  of  us,  but  the 
moral  perhaps  more  sensibly  by  us  than  by  him.  We  got  over 
the  material  loss,  however,  and  consoled  ourselves  for  the  moral 
one  with  the  hope  that  Klapka,  by  the  defeat  of  his  whole  corps, 
as  well  as  by  the  victory  gained  directly  afterward  by  one  half 
of  the  third  corps,  would  be  rendered  more  circumspect,  and  at 
the  same  time  incited  to  endeavor  to  be  in  future  more  prudent 
and  firmer. 

The  premature  disclosure  of  our  plan  for  the  principal  attack, 
however — in  consequence  of  the  participation  of  the  Visocki 
division  in  the  combat,  rendered  necessaiy  by  Klapka's  defeat — 
could  neither  be  undone  by  philosophizing,  nor  could  we  console 
ourselves  with  any  well-founded  hopes  respecting  it ;  and  it  was 
only  the  apprehension  of  seeing  our  seventh  army  corps  at  Hat- 
van  endangered  in  the  highest  degree  by  even  the  shortest  inter- 
ruption of  the  offensive,  that  determined  us  to  persevere  in  the 
turning-manoeuvre,  though  it  had  been  betrayed. 

For  this  reason,  in  spite  of  the  uncommon  fatigues  of  the  pre- 
ceding evening,  the  first  army  corps  had  to  advance  on  the  5th 
of  April  as  far  as  Siily,  the  third  as  far  as  Szecsci  on  the  line 
of  retreat  of  the  enemy,  leading  toward  Koka,  while  the  second 
corps  was  sent  to  T6-Almas.  The  latter  place  was  for  us  on 
that  day  the  most  important  point  to  reach.  For  it  was  possible 
that  the  army  of  the  Ban,  with  the  rear-guard  of  which  we  had 
been  engaged  the  day  before  near  Tapio-Bicske,  felt  strong  enough 
to  attempt  by  itself  near  Fenszaru  to  cross  the  Zagyva,  which 
was  watched  at  this  point  on  our  part  only  by  a  standing  patrol, 
and  then,  appearing  to  the  southeast  of  Hatvan — consequently 
in  the  rear  of  our  seventh  army  corps — with  the  simultaneous 
assistance  of  the  Schlick  corps  in  front,  to  take  it  between  two 

*  After  the  conflict  at  Tapio-Bicske,  it  was  commonly  said  in  our  army 
that  the  Visocki  division  had  regained  from  the  enemy  the  battery  taken 
from  Klapka.  1  do  not  remember,  however,  to  have  received  any  official 
report  to  that  effect;  and  as  far  as  I  could  see  with  my  own  eyes,  the 
enemy  in  his  retreat  before  the  Visocki  division  left  behind  on  the  field  of 
battle  only  one  long  howitzer  and  an  ammunition-chest  which  had  caught 
fire. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  257 

fires.  To  hinder  this  manoBuvre,  or  in.  case  the  Ban,  though  it 
seemed  not  probable,  should  have  employed  already  the  night 
between  the  4th  and  5th  of  April  in  executing  it,  to  take  him 
in  the  same  snare  which  he  had  laid  for  our  seventh  army  corps 
— was  the  strategic  idea  on  which  was  based  the  above-men- 
tioned direction  to  T6-Almas,  given  to  General  Aulich  with  the 
second  army  corps. 

I  betook  myself  thither  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon,  while 
my  head-quarters  remained  behind  in  Szent-Marton-Kata,  where 
at  the  same  time  Kossuth  with  his  attendants  arrived  from  Jasz- 
Bereny. 

When  I  reached  To- Almas,  the  corps  of  the  Ban,  coming  from 
the  west,  was  just  passing  Zsambok,  and  moved  in  a  single  long 
column  toward  Fenszaru  ;  thus  confirming  our  previous  supposi- 
tion as  to  the  next  operation  of  this  corps. 

I  was  detei-mined  quietly  to  await  the.  beginning  of  his  pass- 
age over  the  Zagyva,  and  then  immediately  to  attack  with  the 
second  corps,  at  the  same  time  sending  the  third  from  Szecso  to 
Dany,  and  the  first  from  Siily  to  Koka.  The  hostile  column, 
however,  when  it  reached  the  Zagyva,  suddenly  halted,  and 
soon  afterward  turned  back  again,  directing  its  march  in  the 
opposite  direction  toward  Godollo. 

From  the  position  of  both  armies  decisive  conflicts  being  in 
prospect  for  the  next  two  days,  I  preferred  now  to  reserve  the 
strength  of  the  second  army  corps,  and  confined  myself  to  harass- 
ing the  marching  back  of  the  hostile  corps  from  the  Zagyva  only 
by  two  squadrons  of  hussars. 

We  could  not  explain  to  ourselves  on  that  day  what  the  Ban 
could  have  intended  by  the  two  contrary  manoeuvres  which  fol- 
■  lowed  each  other  in  so  short  a  time ;  for  this  momentary  appear- 
ing on  the  Zagyva  was  evidently  not  sufficient  for  a  demonstra- 
tion against  our  seventh  army  corps,  and  there  were  far  too 
many  troops  for  a  mere  reconnoitering  of  the  passage  across  the 
river  at  Fenszaru,  for  which  a  common  patrol  would  have  been 
quite  enough. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

On  the  6th  of  April  the  first  and  third  army  corps  were  or- 
dered to  advance  as  far  as  Isaszeg,  the  second  as  far  as  Dany. 
My  head-quarters  adjoined  the  latter ;  while  I  intended  to  await 
with  some  attendants  at  Koka  either  the  uninterruptedly  ex- 
ecuted advance,  or  the  commencement  of  a  probable  conflict. 

Considering  the  short  distance,  we  had  not  the  least  doubt 
that  the  thunder  of  an  action  with  artillery,  if  fought  at  Isaszeg, 
would  be  quite  distinctly  heard  in  Koka. 

Early  in  the  forenoon  the  forest  of  Isaszeg  caught  fire.  The 
rural  inhabitants  of  the  district  said  that  the  Croats  had  set  fire 
to  it  intentionally,  in  order  to  render  it  impossible  for  our  army 
corps  to  advance  through  it. 

About  midday  the  Damjanics  and  Klapka  army  corps  encoun- 
tered the  Ban  near  Isaszeg ;  the  thunder  of  artillery,  however, 
did  not  penetrate  over  to  us  at  Koka,  and  the  clouds  of  smoke 
ascending  from  the  burning  forest  by  their  gigantic  extent  con- 
cealed from  us  the  smoke  of  the  battle  at  Isaszeg.  Just  as  little 
prepared  for  the  one  as  for  the  other  event,  I  had  neither  made 
it  known  in  the  head-quarters  at  Dany,  nor  to  the  two  army 
corps  which  had  been  directed  to  Isaszeg,  that  I  was  to  be  found 
in  Koka ;  and  thus  I  did  not  receive  till  about  three  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  by  a  hussar  who  had  been  sent  in  advance  with 
my  horses,  a  report  of  the  commencement  of  the  combat  and  of 
its  unfavorable  turn. 

In  alarm  I  hastened  to  reach  the  battle-field ;  having  pre- 
viously dispatched  an  officer  of  my  suite  to  General  Aulich  with 
an  order  to  start  immediately  with  the  second  army  corps  for 
Isaszeg. 

I  had  no  idea  that  Aulich  was  already  on  his  way ;  that  the 
chief  of  the  general  staff,  who  had  remained  behind  in  Dany,  had 
made  him  advance  soon  after  the  commencement  of  the  conflict. 
The  more  gloomily,  during  my  anxious  ride  from  Koka  to  the 
battle-field,  I  felt  my  hope — to  call  the  day  still  ours — shrouded 
in  night  by  the  apprehension  that  Aulich  would  arrive  too  late, 


¥ 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  259 

the  more  joyously  was  it  illumined,  as  by  the  stroke  of  a  magic 
wand,  when,  about  half  a  mile  from  Isaszeg,  in  the  forest,  which 
was  still  in  flames  in  different  parts,  I  suddenly  saw  before  me 
the  second  army  corps. 

Almost  at  the  same  instant,  an  officer  of  hussars  of  the  seventh 
army  corps  came  galloping  toward  me — seemingly  from  the  ex- 
treme left  wing  of  the  enemy — with  a  report  that  the  enemy  had 
abandoned  the  line  of  the  Galga  without  drawing  a  blade,  and 
that  the  seventh  army  corps  had  marched  to  Godollo.  Now  I 
believed  I  was  quite  certain  of  victory. 

We  could  judge  only  approximately,  by  our  ear,  of  the  position 
of  the  battle  ;  for  the  forest  did  not  permit  us  to  see  far. 

A  little  to  the  right  from  the  direction  of  the  forest-way  on 
which  the  Aulich  corps  advanced  to  the  battle-field,  the  thunder 
of  cannon  was  the  most  lively,  on  both  sides  framed  as  it  were 
by  the  crepitating  fire  of  musketry.  On  the  left  wing  the  dis- 
charge of  small  arms  seemed  to  be  far  more  feeble,  and  the 
point  from  which  it  could  be  heard  much  further  distant  fromi  the 
line  of  artillery-fire  than  that  on  the  right. 

Aulich,  led  by  this  indication,  directed  two  battalions  of  his 
corps  to  the  right,  forward,  to  reinforce  the  extreme  right  wing, 
while  he  pursued  unceasingly  with  his  main  body  the  forest- 
way  on  which  he  was,  which  seemed  to  lead  straight  to 
the  left  wing  of  the  line  of  artillery-fire,  as  perceived  by  the 
ear.  Between  this  point  and  that  of  the  engagement  of  tirail- 
leurs, which  was  heard,  as  has  been  said,  much  more  to  the 
left,  we  supposed  there  was  a  wide  interval  in  our  line  of  battle : 
I  now  took  likewise  the  same  direction,  and  outstripping  the 
Aulich  column,  had  soon  left  it  behind  me,  when  there  suddenly 
emerged  before  me  some  isolated  battalions  of  the  Klapka  corps, 
which  were  once  more  retreating  as  they  pleased. 

Consequently  our  ideas  as  to  the  situation  of  the  combat  were 
unfortunately  confirmed.  The  left  wing  under  Klapka  had 
already  taken  to  flight ;  only  the  right  under  Damjanics,  and  on 
the  extreme  left  two  battalions — likewise  sent  thither  by  Dam- 
janics for  Klapka' s  assistance — still  remained. 

At  the  mere  sight  of  the  fleeing  battalions  of  Klapka  I  could 
scarcely  contain  my  indignation ;  for  the  recent  disgraceful 
behavior  of  these  troops  before  Tapio-Bicske  was  present  to  my 
mind. 


k 


260  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Under  threats  of  the  most  degrading  punishments,  I  ordered 
them  to  return  instantly  to  the  battle-field. 

Q,uickly  and  lightly  they  had  stepped  out  while  retreating ; 
now  that  they  had  again  to  march  forward,  they  dragged  them- 
selves toilsomely  along  as  if  near  sinking  to  the  ground  from 
weariness. 

One  of  the  commanders  of  these  battalions  seemed  to  have  his 
heart  in  the  right  place.  "  My  battalion  retreats  by  the  order  of 
General  Klapka !"  he  called  to  me  in  a  haughty  tone.  I  con- 
sidered this  assertion  an  empty  excuse ;  but  the  commander  of 
the  battalion  maintained  it  obstinately,  and  said  that  Klapka, 
who  was  not  far  off,  and  was  retreating  in  person  with  his  main 
body,  would  confirm  it. 

I  hastened  in  search  of  him ;  and  found  him  in  the  direction  indi- 
cated, actually  occupied  with  arranging  his  retreating  main  body. 

To  my  question,  what  was  the  meaning  of  this  retreat,  while 
Damjanics,  on  the  contrary,  alone  kept  his  ground  on  the  battle- 
field ?  he  declared  he  was  forced  to  advise  the  giving  up  of  the 
combat,  for  his  infantry  had  not  a  single  cartridge  left,  and  was 
besides  already  too  much  exhausted.  "  Victory,"  he  added,  "  no 
longer  possible  to-day,  may  be  possible  to-morrow ;"  and  the  ex- 
pression on  his  features  showed  me  that  he  had  but  spoken  out 
his  inmost  conviction. 

Here  my  authority  as  commander-in-chief  was  at  an  end. 
Klapka's  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  the  retreat  had  first  to  be 
shaken,  before  I  could  expect  to  see  my  order  again  to  attack 
executed. 

I  consequently  called  upon  General  Klapka  to  consider  that  he 
himself  had  projected  the  plan  of  attack,  from  the  execution  of 
which  he  intended  to  desist  to-day,  to  find  it  to-morrow  undoubt- 
edly still  more  difiicult ;  that  he  himself  had  recognized  as  an 
indispensable  condition,  the  execution  most  punctually  of  the 
ordered  dispositions  day  by  day,  and  at  any  cost ;  that  the  reasons 
on  which  he  founded  his  dissuasion  from  the  combat  were  not  at 
all  valid,  for  the  infantry  seemed,  judging  by  its  speed  in  the 
retrograde  movement,  to  be  by  no  means  so  much  exhausted,  as 
that  it  could  not  yet  essay  some  attacks  with  the  bayonet,  and 
for  this  they  had  still  cartridges  enough,  even  if  they  had  ab- 
solutely fired  away  the  last.  "  Conquer  to-day  I"  I  called  out  at 
last,  "  or  back  behind  the  Theiss  I     Such  is  the  alternative.     I 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  261 

know  of  no  third.  Damjanics  still  continues  the  battle — Aulich 
advances  :  we  must  conquer  !" 

A  resolute  "  Forward !"  was  the  surprising  reply  of  Klapka ;  and 
I  now  hastened  again  to  the  field  of  battle  to  animate  the  brave 
Damjanics  to  a  still  further  perseverance,  by  the  joyful  news  of 
the  speedy  arrival  of  Aulich,  and  the  renewed  advance  of  Klapka. 

The  same  way,  which  I  had  left  a  few  moments  ago  for  the 
purpose  of  finding  Klapka,  led  me  to  the  northwestern  edge  of 
the  forest.  The  field  of  battle  was  now  extended  before  me,  to 
the  right  and  to  the  left  bounded  in  form  of  a  bow  by  this  edge. 

The  line  of  battle  which  our  troops  occupied — in  its  eastern 
(right)  half  ever  firmly  maintained  by  Damjanics,  in  the  western 
(left)  already  given  up  by  Klapka — leant  with  both  wings  on  the 
last  northern  spurs  of  the  forest  of  Isaszeg  lying  in  our  rear,  these 
spurs  projecting  toward  the  enemy. 

Before  the  centre  of  our  line  of  battle,  at  gun-range  distance, 
lay  the  point  on  which  the  brook  Rakos,  the  course  of  which 
from  Godollo  thus  far  is  a  southeastern  one,  suddenly  turns  west- 
ward to  the  village  of  Isaszeg,  situated  immediately  in  front  of 
our  left  wing. 

We  stood  consequently  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rakos,  parallel 
with  its  lower  (western)  course  and  its  imaginary  prolongation 
toward  the  east ;  while  the  enemy  was  posted  opposite  to  us — 
close  above  the  deviation  of  the  brook  from  southeast  to  west — a 
cheval  of  its  bed  :  with  the  right  wing  beyond  (to  the  north  of) 
the  burning  village  of  Isaszeg,  on  the  plateau  of  a  high  com- 
manding steep  ravine  along  the  right  bank,  with  the  left  wing, 
however,  on  the  left  bank,  across  the  sloping  ridge,  which  is  here 
no  longer  wooded,  and  which,  flanking  the  upper  course  of  the 
Rakos,  stretches  northward  to  GoduUo,  and  on  the  southern  de- 
clivity of  which  lies  that  projection  of  the  forest  of  Isaszeg  which 
was  occupied  by  our  right  wing. 

The  nature  of  the  ground  required  on  both  sides  the  employ- 
ment of  the  infantry  on  the  extreme  wings,  while  on  the  wide 
plain  between  them  the  battle  was  waged  exclusively  by  the 
cavalry  and  the  artillery. 

At  the  moment  when  I  arrived  in  the  centre  of  our  line,  the 
point  of  support  of  our  left  wing  (the  height  covered  by  the  forest- 
spur  to  our  left,  which  advances  to  the  brook  Rakos  close  below 
Isaszeg)  had  been  taken  by  storm  in  spite  of  the  obstinate  resist- 


262  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

ance  of  the  two  battalions  which  Damjanics  had  detached  thither, 
as  above  mentioned,  to  reinforce  Klapka.  Between  this  point  and 
General  Damjanics'  left  wing  (which  lay  in  the  centre  of  qur 
original  line  of  battle),  opposite  to  the  enemy's  right  wing,  gaped 
the  immense  interval  caused  by  Klapka's  precipitate  retreat.  The 
left  wing  of  the  Damjanics  army  corps  was  consequently  quite 
isolated.  The  greatest  part  of  the  cavalry  of  this  corps,  which 
had  been  concentrated  here  for  the  protection  of  Damjanics'  left 
wing,  was,  however,  already  in  retreat  when  I  arrived  on  the  spot. 

I  instantly  stopped  the  retreat,  and  ordered  the  hussars  imme- 
diately to  march  forward  again  at  the  same  height  as  the  far- 
advanced  right  wing. 

While  this  was  being  executed,  I  rode  toward  that  spur  of  the 
forest  which — as  our  right  point  d'appui — the  infantry  of  the 
third  corps  (Damjanics)  still  continued  to  defend  firmly  against 
the  attacks  with  the  bayonet  made  by  the  hostile  left  wing,  and 
where  Damjanics  in  person  was  also  just  then. 

I  found  this  brave  man,  in  spite  of  the  critical  position  in  which 
Klapka's  unjustifiable  retreat  had  placed  him,  unshaken,  un- 
daunted. Nothing  was  further  from  his  thoughts  than  giving 
up  the  combat ;  although  the  unsparing  expressions  in  which  he 
gave  vent  to  his  indignation  at  Klapka's  behavior,  plainly  showed 
that  he  had  by  no  means  overlooked  the  danger  of  being  taken  in 
his  left,  and  opened  out  by  the  hostile  right  wing. 

I  tried  to  tranquillize  Damjanics,  by  assuring  him  that  Klapka 
was  again  advancing.  His  confidence  in  Klapka,  however — 
already  greatly  shaken  in  consequence  of  the  day  of  Tapio-Bicske 
— seemed  now  to  be  completely  destroyed. 

"  What  avails  this  advance  ?"  cried  Damjanics ;  "  if  a  drunken 
Honved  complains  of  sickness,  and  another  throws  open  the  lid 
of  his  cartridge-box,  Klapka  will  straightway  lament  afresh  that 
his  battalions  are  tired  to  death,  and  have  no  more  cartridges  ;  will 
immediately  turn  back  anew,  and  leave  me  again  in  the  lurch." 

The  news  of  the  proximity  of  Aulich,  and  of  the  two  battal- 
ions, which,  as  has  been  mentioned,  had  been  sent  in  advance 
from  the  second,. army  corps  to  reinforce  the  extreme  right  wing, 
appeared  the  more  to  pacify  General  Damjanics. 

The  quick  remark,  that  now  it  was  possible  to  advance  again, 
with  which  Damjanics  received  my  communication  that  Aulich 
would  soon  arrive,  not  only  now  rendered  superfluous  every  ex- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  263 

hortation  to  continued  perseverance,  but  it  made  me  even  fear 
that  Damjanics  intended  to  resume  directly  the  offensive  against 
the  hostile  left  wing. 

I  say  "  fear,"  because  by  the  first  glance  at  the  field  of  battle, 
I  had  been  convinced,  that  strategically  the  offensive  was  at  pre- 
sent ordered  only  to  our  left  iving,  while  the  right  had  to  content 
itself  with  maintaining  its  position. 

In  order  to  justify  this  conviction  I  must  again  mention  the 
report  which  was  made  to  me,  before  I  met  Klapka,  by  an  officer 
of  hussars  of  the  seventh  army  corps  relative  to  the  advancing  of 
this  corps  toward  Godollo,  on  the  road  of  Gyongyos  to  Pesth. 

Admitting  this  report  to  be  correct,  and  perceiving,  from  the 
strength  of  the  enemy  immediately  in  front  of  us,  that  he  had  left 
behind  for  the  protection  of  Godollo  but  an  insignificant  force, 
1  could  confidently  expect  the  speedy  and  victorious  appearance 
of  our  seventh  corps  in  the  rear  of  the  hostile  left  wing.  It  could 
not  be  doirbted  that  a  defeat  awaited  the  latter  in  consequence 
of  the  double  attack  in  front  and  rear,  of  which  this  expectation 
gave  prospect.  This  wing  could  avoid  the  danger  of  this  double 
attack  only  by  a  well-timed  retreat  to  Godollo.  A  premature 
offensive  on  the  part  of  our  troops  nearest  to  it  would  have  directly 
forced  him  to  this  saving  retreat,  and  this  the  more  certainly  the 
more  victorious  they  should  be.  By  such  a  premature  offensive 
of  our  right*  wing  we  should  consequently  destroy  our  prospect- 
ive defeat  of  the  hostile  left. 

The  chief  duty  of  our  right  wing  consequently  was  to  remain  on 
the  defensive  until  the  first  discharge  of  cannon  from  the  seventh 
army  corps  in  the  rear  of  the  hostile  left  should  be  heard.  Not 
till  that  welcome  signal  was  our  right  wing  allowed  to  assume 
the  ofiensive. 

Very  differently  stood  affairs  with  our  left  wing  and  with  the 
right  of  the  enemy. 

The  latter  was  in  possession  of  a  strong  position  for  artillery  to 
the  north  of  Isaszeg.  From  thence  it  protected  the  place  itself, 
as  well  as  the  road  which  passes  through  it  to  the  capitals.  This 
was  indeed  the  task  with  which  the  enemy's  right  wing  seemed 
willing  mainly  to  content  itself  Its  delaying  to  advance  from 
its  strong  position  against  General  Damjanics'  left  wing,  exposed 
by  Klapka's  retreat,  betrayed  this  clearly  enough. 

*In  the  original  "linken,"  left;  but  evidently  a  misprint. — Transl. 


264  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Here,  therefore,  nothing  was  to  be  gained  by  the  defensive  on 
our  part ;  while  an  energetic  attack  might  obtain  for  our  left  wing 
possession  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Rakos,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  possibility  of  keeping  even  pace  with  the  later  offensive  of 
our  right  wing. 

I  now  hastily  communicated  these  views  to  General  Damjan- 
ics ;  since,  as  has  been  mentioned,  his  animated  exclamation, 
that  the  advance  could  now  immediately  begin  again,  made  me 
fear  a  premature  offensive  of  our  right  wing. 

Damjanics,  however,  showed  that  he  quite  agreed  in  my  views, 
and  at  once  assured  me  that  he  would  confine  himself  mean- 
while to  maintaining  the  forest-spur  on  our  extreme  right  wing, 
while  I  hastened  in  the  first  instance  to  take  the  guidance  of  the 
battle  in  the  centre. 

The  cavalry  of  the  third  corps,  which  I  had  only  just  ordered 
to  advance,  was  once  more  in  retreat  when  I  reached  it  after 
the  conversation  with  Damjanics. 

Several  hostile  projectiles  quickly  succeeding  one  another  had 
struck  its  ranks.  The  men  intended  to  abandon  this  violently 
attacked  point.     I  had  to  prevent  them. 

The  head  of  the  Aulich  army  corps  was  already  so  near  the 
edge  of  the  forest,  that  it  could  reach  it  in  a  few  minutes,  in  order 
immediately  to  deploy  enfrcmt  to  the  left  of  the  Damjanics  corps. 
The  opening,  however,  was  situated  just  in  the  direction  of  the 
hostile  front  fire  by  which  the  hussars  were  then  suffering. 

A  retreat  of  the  latter  would  have  brought  the  fire  still  nearer 
to  the  opening,  and  have  indirectly  endangered  Aulich's  deploy- 
ing. At  the  same  time  large  masses  of  cavalry  emerged  in  front 
of  our  centre. 

In  order  to  anticipate  their  onset,  and  likewise  for  the  purpose 
of  silencing  as  quickly  as  possible  this  galling  fire  (if  I  remember 
rightly,  it  came  from  a  rocket-battery),  I  sent  the  second  reg- 
iment of  hussars  (Hanover)  to  attack. 

Whether  a  part  of  the  third  regiment  of  hussars  (Ferdinand) 
— perhaps  a  division* — assisted  also,  I  can  not  now  say  with 
certainty. 

In  the  very  beginning  of  the  advance  the  hussars  got  into  the 
line  of  the  oblique  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns  planted  to  the  right 
of  our  centre  ;  allowed  themselves,  from  the  dreaded  activity  of 
*  Half  of  a  regiment  of  cavalry, — Transl. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  265 

these  guns,  to  swerve  from  the  straight  direction,  and  fell  into  a 
marked  deviation  to  the  left. 

The  masses  of  hostile  cavalry  in  front  of  our  centre,  at  first 
concealed  from  my  sight  by  the  beginning  of  the  attack,  now 
became  visible  again  on  the  right  of  the  hussars  in  consequence 
of  this  deviation  to  the  left. 

Fearing  that  the  hussars  might  be  overtaken  in  their  right 
flank,  I  caused  them,  having  at  that  moment  no  others  at  my 
disposal,  to  be  followed  en  dehandade  by  a  platoon  of  the  third 
regiment  of  hussars  (Ferdinand),  which  was  posted  near  there  for 
the  protection  of  the  battery  of  the  left  wing  of  the  third  corps. 

An  uncommonly  vehement  fire  of  serried  masses  of  infantry 
suddenly  called  my  attention  ofi'  from  the  centre  to  the  extreme 
right  wing. 

The  attack  was  in  progress,  the  straight  fire  of  the  hostile  cen- 
tre was  already  silenced,  the  van  of  the  Aulich  army  corps  was 
debouching  from  the  forest,  and  during  it  was  not  distracted  by 
the  oblique  fire  of  the  guns  of  the  hostile  left  wing.  I  conse- 
quently thought  I  could  leave  without  uneasiness  the' centre  for 
some  time,  in  order  to  convince  myself  personally  how  matters 
stood  in  the  forest-spur  to  our  right,  where  the  battle,  as  has 
been  mentioned,  had  now  become  very  hot. 

When  I  had  advanced  some  distance  into  the  wood  which 
forms  this  forest-spur,  toward  the  extreme  right  wing,  it  seemed 
to  me  as  if  I  had  come  just  between  the  enemy's  and  our  line 
of  tirailleurs  ;  for  I  heard  firing  simultaneously  to  the  right  and 
to  the  left  before  me  :  I  could  not,  however,  perceive  either  to 
the  right  or  left  the  tirailleurs  themselves.  I  believed  conse- 
quently that  our  sharp-shooters  had  already  retreated  very  far, 
and  turned  immediately  to  the  right  for  the  purpose  of  overtak- 
ing them  and  driving  them  again  forward.  I  now  met  the  two 
battalions  sent  in  advance  from  the  Aulich  corps,  when  it  was 
on  its  way  to  assist  the  right  wing.  Their  edaireurs,  confused 
by  the  fury  of  the  combat  on  the  furthermost  line,  were  firing  at 
random  before  them  during  their  advance.  The  brave  battalions 
of  the  third  corps — again  repulsing  just  then  a  desperate  attack 
of  the  hostile  left  wing  with  that  vehement  fire  of  tirailleurs 
which  I  had  supposed,  in  the  first  moment  of  surprise,  to  come 
from  the  enemy — were  thus  taken  in  the  rear  by  the  fire  of  their 
own  succourers. 

M 


266  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

I  hastened  to  stop  this  dangerous  confusion,  and  then  returned 
again  to  the  centre. 

My  first  glance,  when,  on  riding  out  of  the  forest-spur,  I  gained 
an  unobstructed  prospect,  fell  upon  the  opposite  wooded  declivity 
to  our  left. 

The  flashing  of  the  separate  shots  in  the  twilight  of  the  evening 
enabled  me  distinctly  to  perceive  on  that  declivity  two  parallel 
lines  of  fire,  which  approached  ever  nearer  the  village  of  Isaszeg. 

From  this  I  discovered  with  satisfaction  that  Klapka  had  been 
in  earnest  with  his  resolute  "Forward!"  by  which.he  had  inter- 
rupted my  representations  against  continuing  his  retreat.  He 
had  resumed  the  offensive  in  an  energetic  manner. 

In  front  of  our  centre  I  saw  the  hussars  returning  from  the 
attack.  They  were  still  so  far  off',  that  it  was  impossible  to  de- 
cide whether  they  were  pursued  or  not.  Fearing  that  the  former 
might  be  the  case,  I  intended  just  to  ride  toward  them,  for  the 
purpose  of  trying  if  their  flight  could  not  be  put  a  stop  to,  when 
the  hussars  seemed  suddenly  to  halt.  And  not  without  reason  ; 
for  one  of  Aulich's  batteries,  having  been  planted  in  the  centre, 
while  they  were  attacking,  and  I  was  with  the  right  wing,  had 
taken  the  return  of  our  cavalry  for  an  attack  of  the  enemy's 
horse,  and  had  directed  its  fire  against  it.  I  discovered  this  mis- 
take, so  destructive  to  the  hussars,  soon  enough  to  spare  them  its 
further  sad  consequences ;  unfortunately,  however,  they  had  suf- 
iered  considerable  loss  from  the  fire  of  this  battery  hefwe  I  again 
reached  the  centre. 

In  spite  of  this  misfortune  they  had  remained  in  good  order, 
and  returned — by  no  means  pursued  by  the  enemy — back  again 
to  the  position  they  had  occupied  before  the  onset. 

After  this  attack  the  enemy  did  not  again  disturb  our  centre. 
But  on  both  wings  the  combat  still  raged — most  vehemently  on 
our  right.  The  hostile  left  wing  had  already  repeated  his  vigor- 
ous attacks  several  times  with  scattering  impetuosity,  and  hereby 
had  soon  rendered  the  defensive  of  our  right  wing,  at  first  volun- 
tary, now  a  necessity ;  for  the  combat  in  the  forest,  which  lasted 
several  hours,  dispersed  our  battalions ;  so  that  if  an  offensive 
was  to  be  assumed  with  them,  they  would  first  have  to  be  ral- 
lied again,  and  for  this  some  time  was  needed,  which,  with  the 
repeated  assaults  of  the  hostile  left  wing,  could  not  be  spared. 
In  vain  had  I  been  expecting  every  minute  till  sunset  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  267 

emerging  of  our  seventh  army  corps  in  the  rear  of  the  dangerous 
enemy. 

The  seventh  corps  was  nowhere  to  be  seen ;  and  the  hostile 
left  wing  could. unimpeded  continue  his  attacks  till  the  last  gleam 
of  evening  twilight. 

The  deep  darkness  of  the  night  at  last  commanded  the  suspen- 
sion of  hostilities  here  also.  The  combat  had  already  ceased  on 
all  sides.     But  still  I  knew  not  whether  we  had  conquered 

In  the  centre,  where  I  commanded  in  person,  the  combat  had 
not  been  decisive,  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  against  this  point  be- 
ing weak  and  inconsiderable. 

The  contest  had  been  decisive  only  on  both  wings. 

To  call  the  day  ours,  Damjanics  ought  to  have  maintained  his 
position,  Aulich  and  Klapka  taken  Isaszeg  by  storm. 

The  painful  feeling  of  uncertainty  about  this  urged  me  to  hasten 
first  to  the  right  wing.  About  it  I  was  the  most  anxious ;  for,  as 
is  known,  the  erroneous  report  of  the  advance  of  our  seventh  corps 
had  induced  me,  in  spite  of  the  attacks  of  the  enemy  here  being 
the  most  dangerous,  to  have  this  point  most  feebly  occupied,  only 
with  about  the  fourth  part  of  the  infantry,  while  the  other  three- 
fourths  were  employed  against  Isaszeg. 

It  seemed  to  me,  consequently,  to  be  a  good  omen  for  the  issue 
of  the  battle,  that  I  found  Damjanics  still  in  his  former  position. 
Neither  himself  nor  his  adversary  had  yielded.  Both  had  en- 
camped on  the  field  of  battle. 

I  had  soon  returned  again  to  the  centre,  in  the  expectation  that 
perhaps  a  report  from  the  left  wing  had  meanwhile  arrived  there. 
Its  arrival,  however,  was  delayed  too  long  for  my  impatience : 
so,  accompanied  by  some  officers,  I  rode  straight  to  Isaszeg,  for 
the  purpose  of  learning  as  soon  as  possible  in  whose  possession 
the  place  was.  Not  far  from  it,  a  challenge  in  German  made 
us  start.  It  might  be  the  enemy ;  but  it  might  also  be  one  of 
those  old  hussars,  to  whom  the  identity  of  the  Hungarian  "  Allj- 
ki  vagy?"  with  the  German  ''Halt!  wer  da?''  (Haiti  who 
goes  there  ?)  was  still  not  quite  clear. 

We  replied  in  Hungarian.  "Aulich"  was  the  answer.  It 
was  he  indeed.  Returning  from  Isaszeg,  he  brought  the  joyful 
news,  that  the  right  wing  of  the  enemy  was  retreating  toward 
Godollo. 

The  victory  was  ours  ! 


CHAPTER  XL. 

With  the  victory  at  Isaszeg,  Hungary,  alas,  was  already  to 
have  attained  the  culminating  point  of  her  greatness.  So  Kos- 
suth willed  it  I 

The  enemy's  victory  at  Kapolna  had  as  ks  consequence  the 
proclamation  of  the  octroyed  constitution  of  the  4th  of  March, 
1849,  for  United  Austria. 

This  constitution  on  its  birthday  presupposed  Hungary  to  be 
conquered,  and  while  it  gave  a  prospect  to  the  peoples  of  Austria 
of  constitutional  happiness,  after  the  expiration  of  a  provisional 
eternity,  it  destroyed  at  the  same  time  the  Hungarian  constitu- 
tion of  the  year  1848,  together  with  the  ancient  rights  of  the 
kingdom  of  Hungary,  which  it  declared  to  be  a  political  corpse, 
courageously  mutilated  this  corpse,  and  by  way  of  precaution 
poured  over  the  wounded  surfaces  the  permanently  dissociating 
aquafortis  of  the  equal  right  of  the  nationalities,  that  the  ampu- 
tated limbs  might  not  unite  again  to  the  trunk,  even  on  the  day 
of  the  apocalyptically-promised  constitutional  resurrection. 

The  provisionally  mutilated  kingdom  of  Hungary,  however, 
chanced  still  to  number  some  soldiers  with  whom  the  octroyed 
abortion  of  Austria's  centralists  availed  no  more  than  the  value 
of  the  paper  which  imposed  on  the  astonished  world  the  assump- 
tion, that  the  battle  of  Kapolna  had  been  the  unexpected  throes 
of  this  untimely  birth,  and  that,  consequently.  Field-marshal 
Prince  Windischgratz  also  had,  in  some  measure,  assisted  at  the 
delivery. 

These  soldiers  of  Hungary  were  of  opinion  that  the  Vienna 
ministers  might  continue  till  death  octroying,  centralizing,  and 
proclaiming  equal  rights,  without  thereby  changing  the  limits  of 
even  one  single  picssta,  so  long  as  Field-marshal  Prince  Windisch- 
gratz remained  captivated  by  the  illusion  that  he  had  fulfilled  his 
mission  to  Hungary  non  plus  ultra  by  the  victory  at  Kapolna, 
and  that  he  could  settle  the  rest  merely  by  forcibly  collecting 
declarations  of  submission. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  269 

These  soldiers  of  Hungary  greeted  the  octroyed  constitution  as 
the  presumed  deliverer  from  the  painful  incertitude  in  which 
they  had  been  placed  by  the  true  Hegira  of  the  Hungarian  revo- 
lution— Kossuth's  flight  from  Pesth  to  Debreczin ;  the  incertitude, 
namely,  whether  the  more  decided  enemies  of  the  constitution  of 
the  year  1848  dwelt  ''beyond  the  March  and  Lajtha,''  or  ''be- 
yond the  Theiss;''  whether  they  had  chiefly  to  resist  the  troops 
of  the  former,  the  army  of  Prince  Windischgratz,  or  the  cham- 
pions of  the  latter,  the  Poles  and  republicans. 

By  the  octroyed  constitution,  on  the  one  hand,  the  duplicity 
with  which  Prince  Windischgratz  called  himself  and  his  army 
within  the  frontiers  of  Hungary  "constitutional,"  was  indeed 
placed  in  the  clearest  light ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  legality  of 
the  standing  of  these  soldiers  of  Hungary  was  so  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly proved,  that  it  immediately  appeared  incontestable  even 
to  the  doubters  by  profession. 

It  would  have  been  denying  ex  professo  to  President  Kossuth 
every  trace  of  mother-wit  to  suppose  that,  whatever  were  his 
political  tendencies,  after  the  appearance  of  the  octroyed  consti- 
tution he  could  even  for  a  moment  think  to  force  Hungary  from 
its  defensive  position — at  an  earlier  period  already  imposingly 
firm,  and  by  the  new  constitution  become  completely  unassaila- 
ble— into  an  offensive  one,  by  which  it  could  obtain,  besides  the 
approbation  of  fools,  only  Russo- Austrian  blows,  and  at  most  the 
part — unworthy  of  a  manly  nation — of  a  competitor  with  the 
Polish  emigration  for  the  happiness  of  being  pitied  by  sentimental 
Europe. 

On  the  modest  supposition,  consequently,  that  kind  dame 
Nature  had  not  withheld  from  President  Kossuth  such  a  small 
degree  of  mother-wit  as  sufficed  for  this  latter  recognition,  the 
Poles  and  fatherland  republicans — the  champions,  as  has  been 
mentioned,  of  those  enemies  of  the  constitution  of  1848  living 
"  beyond  the  Theiss'' — appeared  to  us  (I  believe  it  is  self-evi- 
dent, that  I  reckoned  myself  also  among  those  "  soldiers"  of 
Hungary  here  spoken  of)  as  harmless  cavaliers,  to  whom  fate 
seemed  to  have  assigned  as  the  element  wherein  they  had  to 
live  and  move,  hardly  the  living  stream  of  the  history,  at  most 
the  marsh  of  the  chroniqUe  scandaleuse,  of  Hungary. 

We  considered  them  hardly  worth  notice ;  but  believed  we 
had  discovered  what  Hungary  exclusively  wanted,  when  we 


270  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

answered  the  octroyed  constitution  briefly  and  firmly  with  the 
days  of  Hatvan,  Tapio-Bicske,  and  Isaszeg. 

We  believed,  on  the  one  hand,  that  Kossuth's  overweening 
arrogance  had  been  reduced  within  the  bounds  of  attainable, 
reasonable  aims  by  the  unhappy  conclusion  of  the  year  1848, 
the  warning  proclamation  of  "Waizen,  the  disgraceful  debut  of 
Dembinski,  the  defeats  of  Bem  from  time  to  time,  the  realized 
attempt  at  Russian  intervention  in  Transylvania  ;  by  the  loss  of 
the  fortress  of  Esseg,  of  the  Banat  and  the  Bacska  ;  but  especially 
by  the  greatness  of  the  sacrifices  which  the  late  successes  on  the 
field  of  battle  had  cost  us  :  on  the  other  hand,  that  his  confidence 
in  our  honest  resolve  to  defend  to  the  last  the  rights  of  the  coun- 
try had  been  firmly  established  by  these  same  successes  of  our 
arms. 

We  hoped,  further,  that  Hungary  would  deem  it  her  honor  to 
resemble  a  man,  who,  conscious  of  his  strength,  and  alike  re- 
moved from  arrogance  and  despondency,  entering  the  lists  in  a 
good  cause — and  only  in  such — aspires  to  a  noble  prize,  even 
should  it  be  death  on  the  shield. 

Nay,  we  confidently  expected  that  the  nation  with  heart  and 
soul  would  join  us,  who  had  not  wavered  in  misfortune,  who  re- 
solved not  to  grow  giddy  in  prosperity. 

Vain,  however,  was  all  our  believing;  hoping,  expecting  I 

Kossuth  thought  on  the  unhappy  conclusion  of  the  year  1848, 
only  to  admire  the  ingenuity  of  his  flight  from  Pesth  to  Debrec- 
zin.  The  warning  proclamation  of  Waizen,  Dembinski's  disgrace- 
ful debut,  were  considered  by  him  as  clear  proof  of  my  striving 
for  the  military  dictatorship.  From  Bem's  defeats,  the  losses  of 
Esseg,  Banat,  and  the  Bacska,  he  deduced  only  the  mischievous 
conclusion,  that  Hungary  having  not  much  more  to  lose,  had  the 
more  to  gain.  In  regard  to  the  attempt  at  intervention  on  the 
part  of  Russia,  he  fondly  dreamt  of  the  infallibility  of  the  coun- 
ter-interventions of  France,  England,  Germany,  America,  and 
Turkey  in  favor  of  Hungary  ;  and  while  he  under- valued  the  heavy 
sacrifices  which  had  purchased  our  recent  victories,  the  victories 
themselves  served  only  to  raise  his  arrogance  to  absolute  mad- 
ness, and  Kossuth's  madness  was  unfortunately  the  gospel  of 
the  credulous  nation. 

Had  Kossuth  possessed  the  courage  to  share  only  once  the 
dangers  in  the  battle-field  of  those  whose  victories  he — so  full  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  271 

his  own  importance — considered  to  be  the  immediate  emanations 
of  his  personal  presence  at  the  head-quarters,  the  end  of  the  next 
week  would  have  found  him,  if  not  wiser,  at  least  more  prudent. 
But  he  lacked  this  courage ;  and  Hungary,  as  has  been  said, 
was  to  have  attained  with  the  victory  of  Isaszeg  the  culminating 
point  of  her  greatness. 


t 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

In  consequence  of  the  retreat  of  the  enemy's  right  wing  from 
Isaszeg  to  Godollo,  their  left  also  had  necessarily  to  evacuate  the 
field,  and  this  during  the  night,  which  put  an  end  to  the  battle 
of  Isaszeg.     The  left  retreated  likewise  to  Godollo. 

The  advance  on  our  part  to  the  attack  of  the  camp  which  the 
enemy  had  established  in  front  of  this  place  ought  to  have  com- 
menced very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  April.  Our  re- 
serve of  ammunition,  however,  had  not  yet  arrived,  on  account  of 
the  delay  caused  by  the  precautionary  measures  rendered  in- 
dispensable by  its  passage  through  the  burning  plaiies  of  the 
Isaszeg  forest,  and  our  need  of  ammunition  obliged  us  to  await  at 
Isaszeg  till  its  arrival. 

Meanwhile  it  was  discovered  that  that  part  of  the  battle-field 
lying  nearest  to  Isaszeg  was  thick-sown  with  still-unopened  pack- 
ets of  cartridges,  which  the  men  of  the  Klapka  battalions  had 
thrown  away  on  the  previous  day,  without  doubt  during  the  first 
moments  of  the  encounter,  in  order  to  induce  General  Klapka, 
by  showing  him  their  empty  cartridge-boxes,  to  give  up  the  com- 
bat. Klapka  having  assigned  as  the  principal  reason  for  his 
first  retreating  from  Isaszeg,  that  his  battalions  had  no  cartridges, 
I  can  not  forbear  calling  the  sudden  idea  (although  obsolete)  of 
these  battalions  of  unhesitatingly  throwing  away  their  cartridges 
a  very  successful  one — but  only  in  the  case  of  Klapka. 

The  reserve  of  ammunition  at  last  arrived  at  Isaszeg;  but 
among  the  cartridges  distributed  to  the  infantry  some  were  dis- 
covered the  contents  of  which  consisted  for  the  most  part  of  com- 
mon road-dust.     I  never  learnt  who  it  was  that  had  acquired 


272  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

for  himself  this  new  kind  of  merit  in  the  eyes  of  the  hostile 
army. 

It  may  be  conceived  that  separating  the  cartridges  filled  with 
sand  delayed  still  further  our  advance  against  Godollo  ;  and 
Field-marshal  Windischgratz  found  thus  sufficient  time  to  en- 
ter unmolested  on  his  retreat  from  Godollo  toward  the  capitals, 
chosen  from  strategic  reasons  [sic). 

His  rear-guard  had  already  reached  Kerepes,  when  we  again 
united  with  the  seventh  army  corps  at  Godollo,  toward  which 
it  had  been  likewise  advancing  by  Bag  and  Aszod. 

The  seventh  army  corps  had  received — if  I  mistake  not — on 
the  5th  of  April  an  order  to  take  Aszod  in  the  course  of  the  6th, 
and  to  secure  for  itself  the  passage  across  the  Galga  for  the  7th, 
on  which  day  it  had  to  advance  on  the  offensive  against  Go- 
dollo. 

On  the  5th  the  enemy  had  advanced  with  numerous  forces 
from  Aszod  toward  Hatvan,  and  seemed  at  first  to  intend  to  at- 
tack the  position  of  the  seventh  corps  there,  but  under  the  pro- 
tection of  his  cavalry  he  soon  moved  back  again  toward  Aszod. 

The  commander  of  the  seventh  army  corps  now  attacked  this 
cavalry  with  two  divisions  of  hussars,  and  was  repulsed  with 
loss. 

Nevertheless,  conformably  to  the  received  order,  the  day  after 
(6th  of  April)  he  assumed  the  offensive  with  his  whole  corps — 
with  the  divisions  of  the  left  (Poltenberg)  and  of  the  right  wing 
against  Aszod,  and  with  that  of  the  centre  (Kmety)  against  Bag 
— but  found  these  places  already  evacuated  by  the  enemy.  The 
officer  who — as  has  been  mentioned  in  Chapter  XXXIX. — met 
me  in  the  forest  of  Isaszeg,  while  on  my  way  from  Koka  to  the 
battle-field,  was  sent  to  me  by  him  from  Aszod  with  a  report 
that  the  advance  of  his  corps  to  Aszod  and  Bag  was  accomplish- 
ed. This  officer,  during  his  ride  from  Aszod  toward  the  right 
wing  of  our  position  before  Isaszeg,  while  crossing  the  main  road 
to  Bag  had  probably  remarked  by  chance  the  Kmety  division 
marching  along  it,  and  taken  it  for  the  whole  seventh  army 
corps  advancing  against  Godollo.  Hence  the  positiveness  with 
which  he  announced  to  me  that  the  seventh  army  corps  was 
already  on  its  direct  march  to  Godollo. 

Colonel  Kmety,  arrived  with  his  division  in  Bag,  heard  there 
the  thunder  of  cannon  from  Isaszeg,  which  was  not  audible  at 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY.  273 

Aszod,  and  really  importuned  the  commander  of  the  seventh 
army  corps  to  begin  the  offensive  against  GodoUo  hmnediately , 
although  his  orders  fixed  it  not  till  the  next  day  ;  but  in  vain  I 
The  commander  thought  he  was  obliged  to  confine  himself  to  ob- 
serving the  orders  received  from  the  head-quarters. 

However,  Colonel  Kmety  did  not  allow  himself  by  any  means 
to  be  prevented  by  the  scruples  of  his  commander  from  advanc- 
ing at  least  with  his  division  alone  against  Godollo.  But  when 
halfway  thither,  before  the  convent  of  Besenyo,  he  encountered 
a  hostile  position,  to  force  which  his  small  body  was  not  suffi- 
cient ;  and  the  Damjanics,  Aulich,  and  Klapka  army  corps  had 
consequently  to  gain  the  victory  at  Isaszeg  without  the  co-oper- 
ation of  the  seventh  army  corps. 

It  is  true  that  now — in  consequence  of  the  excessive  dread  the 
commander  of  the  seventh  army  corps  had  of  undertaking  any 
step  which  exceeded  the  distinctly  prescribed  line — the  merit  of 
these  three  army  corps  in  the  victory  at  Isaszeg,  as  well  as  the 
moral  importance  of  this  victory  in  favor  of  the  Hungarian  arms, 
seemed  much  raised ;  nevertheless  we  had  the  more  seriously  to 
regret  that  the  commander  of  the  seventh  army  corps  had  not 
followed  Kmety' s  wise  advice,  because,  by  not  doing  so,  time 
was  given  to  the  enemy  to  avoid  a  defeat  which  was  more  than 
probable,  considering  the  reciprocal  position  of  the  armies  on  the 
6th  of  April. 

After  the  junction  had  been  effected,  on  the  7th  of  April,  in 
Godollo,  between  the  army  corps  which  were  advancing  from 
Isaszeg  and  the  seventh  corps,  a  part  of  the  latter  was  charged 
with  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  who  w£Cs  retreating  toward  the 
capitals.  This  pursuit  had,  however,  small  result,  and  after  the 
exchange  of  some  shots  with  the  hostile  rear-guard,  was  imme- 
diately abandoned  again. 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

In  the  course  of  the  7th  of  April,  a  few  hours  after  our  entry, 
Kossuth  also,  with  his  attendants,  arrived  at  GodoUo.  He  ap- 
peared satisfied  with  the  services  of  the  army,  and  spoke  much 
and  well  of  the  eternal  thanks  of  the  nation. 

After  a  while  he  desired  to  converse  with  me  alone  in  his 
chamher.  On  this  occasion  I  obtained  the  first  indications  of  the 
leading  tendency  of  his  politics. 

Now — said  he — the  time  is  come  to  answer  the  octroyed  con- 
stitution of  the  4th  of  March  by  the  separation  of  Hungary  from 
Austria. 

The  patience  of  the  nation — he  continued — was  exhausted ; 
if  it  would  show  itself  at  all  worthy  of  liberty,  it  must  not  only 
not  tolerate  the  unreasonable  assumption  of  the  octroyed  consti- 
tution, but  it  must  moreover  exact  heavy  reprisals.  The  peo- 
ples of  Europe  would  judge  of  the  worth  of  the  Hungarian  nation 
according  to  the  answer  it  should  give  to  that  constitution.  Their 
sympathies  would  depend  upon  that  judgment  (sic.)  England, 
France,  Italy,  Turkey,  even  all  Germany  itself,  not  excepting 
Austria's  own  hereditary  states,  were  waiting  only  till  Hungary 
should  proclaim  itself  an  independent  state,  to  impart  to  it  their 
material  aid,  and  that  the  more  abundantly,  as  they  had  hitherto 
been  sparing  of  it.  The  sore-tried,  oppressed  sister  nation  of  the 
Poles  would  speedily  follow  the  example  of  Hungary,  and  united 
with  it  would  find  a  powerful  ally,  both  for  defense  and  ofiense, 
in  the  Porte,  whose  interests  had  so  often  suffered  from  the  policy 
of  Austria  and  Russia,  With  the  freedom  of  Hungary,  the  free- 
dom of  Europe  would  fall ;  with  Hungary's  triumph  there  would 
be  as  many  successful  risings  against  hated  tyranny  as  there  were 
oppressed  peoples  in  Europe. 

"  Our  victory  is  certain,"  were  nearly  the  words  in  which  he 
continued ;  "  but  we  can  do  much  more  than  for  ourselves  alone, 
we  can  and  must  fight  and  conquer  for  the  freedom  of  all  who 
wish  us  the  victory.     Our  word,   however,   must  precede  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  275 

deed,  our  cry  of  victory,  the  assured  victory  itself,  and  announce 
its  redeeming  approach  to  all  enslaved  peoples,  that  they  may 
be  watchful. and  prepared,  that  they  may  not  stupidly  sleep  away 
the  moments  destined  for  their  salvation,  and  so  afford  time  for 
our  common  enemies  again  to  recover,  to  assemble  and  strengthen 
themselves  anew.  We  can  not  be  silent  now  that  the  octroyed 
constitution  has  denied  our  very  existence.  Our  silence  would 
be  half  a  recognition  of  these  acts,  and  all  our  victories  would  be 
fruitless  I  We  must  therefore  declare  ourselves  I  But  a  decla- 
ration such  as  I  should  wish  would  raise  the  self  esteem  of  the 
nation,  would  at  once  destroy  all  the  bridges  behind  the  still 
undecided  and  wavering  parties  within  and  without  the  Diet, 
would  by  the  proximity  and  importance  of  a  common  object 
force  into  the  background  mere  party  interests,  and  would  thus 
facilitate  and  hasten  the  sure  victory." 

"All  this  is  not  quite  clear  to  me,"  was  nearly  my  answer. 
"Words  will  not  make  Hungary  free  ;  deeds  can  alone  do  that. 
And  no  arm  out  of  Hungary  will  execute  those  deeds  ;  but  rather 
armies  will  be  raised  to  prevent  their  execution.  Yet,  granted 
that  Hungary  of  itself  were  strong  enough  at  the  present  moment 
to  dissociate  itself  from  Austria,  would  it  not  be  too  weak  to 
maintain  itself  as  an  independent  state  in  a  neighborhood  in 
which  the  Porte,  in  spite  of  a  much  more  favorable  position,  has 
already  been  reduced  to  an  existence  by  sufferance  only  ?  We 
have  lately  beaten  the  enemy  repeatedly — that  is  undeniable. 
But  we  have  accomplished  this  only  with  the  utmost  exertion  of 
our  powers.  The  consciousness  that  our  cause  was  just  has 
enabled  us  to  effect  this.  The  separation  of  Hungary  front 
Austria  would  no  longer  be  a  just  cause  ;  the  struggle  for  this 
would  not  be  a  struggle ^/br,  but  against  the  law;  not  a  struggle 
for  self-defense,  but  an  attack  on  the  existence  of  the  united 
Austrian  monarchy.  And  while  we  should  hereby  mortally 
wound  innumerable  ancient  interests  and  sympathies ;  while  we 
should  hereby  conjure  up  against  our  own  country  all  the  un- 
happy consequences  of  a  revolution  uncalled  for  by  any  circum- 
stances ;  while  we  should  hereby  force  the  old  troops,  the  very 
kernel  of  our  army  to  violate  their  oath,  and  thus  morally  shake 
them — we  should  find  ourselves  weaker  day  by  day ;  while  at 
the  same  time  in  every  neighboring  state  a  natural  ally  of  our 
opponents  would   arise  against  us,   the    disturbers  of  the 


276  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

BALANCE  OF  POWER  IN  EuROPE.  *  We  Can  not  put  up  with  the 
octroyed  constitution  in  silence  !'  Granted  !  but  is  what  we 
have  just  done  *  putting  up  with  it  in  silence  V  Could  we  have 
answered  the  octroyed  constitution  of  the  4th  of  March  more 
strikingly  than  we  have  done  ?  I  can  not  decide  what,  or  how 
much,  is  advantageous  to  the  peoples  of  Europe  ;  but  that  to  the 
peoples  of  Hungary  the  smallest  victory  on  the  battle-field  brings 
more  profit  and  honor  than  the  most  arrogant  declaration,  I  see 
clearly  enough  ;  and  I  once  more  repeat,  that  battles  won  for 
the  legitimate  King  Ferdinand  V.  and  the  constitution  sanction- 
ed by  him,  are  the  best  answers  that  Hungary  can  give  to  the 
chimeras  of  the  Austrian  ministers." 

Kossuth  inquired  doubtingly,  whether  I  really  believed  that 
the  old  troops  had  ever  thought  seriously  of  Ferdinand  V.  and 
the  constitution  of  the  year  1848. 

"  Of  what  else  should  they  have  thought,"  I  exclaimed, 
*'  when,  immediately  after  the  evacuation  of  the  capitals,  determ- 
ined on  a  voluntary  departure  to  the  enemy's  camp,  the  only 
means  that  remained  to  retain  them  for  the  Hungarian  cause — 
which  is  principally  indebted  to  them  for  its  success  hitherto — 
was  my  proclamation  of  Waizen  ?  "What  was  the  real  significa- 
tion of  that  demonstration  which  my  corps  d'armee,  without  my 
participation  or  knowledge,  proposed  to  make  against  General 
Dembinski,  in  Kaschau,  but  their  anxiety  lest  in  me  they  should 
lose  a  commander  who  respected  their  military  oath  ?  I  have 
shared  prosperity  and  adversity  with  these  troops.  I  know  their 
feelings.  And  should  King  Ferdinand  V.  stand  here  before  us 
now,  I  would  invite  him,  without  the  slightest  hesitation,  I — 
unarmed  and  unprotected — to  follow  me  into  the  camp,  and  re- 
ceive their  homage  ;  for  I  am  certain  there  is  not  one  in  it  who 
would  refuse  it  to  him." 

Kossuth,  apparently  but  little  edified  by  my  want  of  enthu- 
siasm for  his  political  ideas,  abruptly  broke  off  our  conference ; 
nor  did  he  ever  mention  to  me  one  syllable  more  of  the  separa- 
tion of  Hungary  from  Austria. 

It  is  even  now  an  unrevealed  mystery  to  me  whether  he  ever 
communicated  these  ideas  to  the  other  leaders  of  the  troops,  and 
if  so  when,  and  with  what  success. 

A  second  subject  of  discourse  in  Godollo  between  Kossuth  and 
myself  was,  what  means  should  be  taken  to  secure  a  humane 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  277 

treatment  to  our  officers  made  prisoners  by  the  hostile  army.  It 
was  reported  that  the  Hungarians  in  general,  but  especially  the 
officers,  who  had  been  captured,  were  treated  in  the  enemy's 
camp  with  unexampled  inhumanity ;  that  the  latter  were  con- 
sidered as  guilty  of  high-treason,  no  notice  whatever  being  taken 
of  those  officially  managed  intrigues — not  by  Hungary,  however 
— through  which  the  troops  who  had  sworn  to  the  Hungarian 
constitution  were  forced  into  a  hostile  position  against  their 
former  comrades. 

This  subject  had  already  been  discussed  in  Debreczin  before  the 
Committee  of  Defense,  in  consequence  of  which  a  letter  from  the 
war-minister  to  the  commander  of  the  hostile  army  reached  our 
head-quarters,  which  was  to  be  laid  before  the  President  Kossuth, 
and  after  his  approval,  forwarded  to  the  hostile  outposts. 

The  tone  of  this  letter,  however,  would  have  been  well  calcu- 
lated to  convince  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz,  that  on  the 
2d,  4th,  and  6th  of  April  he  had  in  fact  as  totally  beaten  us  as  his 
memorable  bulletins  strove  to  make  the  world  believe  was  the  case. 

It  was  consequently  rejected  ;  and  I  myself  drew  up  a  letter 
for  the  commander  of  the  Austrian  invading  army  in  Hungary, 
wherein  I  assured  him,  among  other  things,  that  we  intended  to 
respond  to  every  single  execution  of  Hungarian  officers  taken 
prisoners,  by  the  execution  of  three  Austrian  officers  from  among 
our  captives. 

This  declaration  was  now  forwarded — after  Kossuth  had  ex- 
pressed his  satisfaction  with  it — in  several  copies  to  the  hostile 
outposts. 

The  third  and  at  that  time  most  pressing  question  which  I 
discussed  with  Kossuth  in  Godollo  related  to  the  object  to  be 
next  chosen  for  the  operations  of  our  army. 

Kossuth  was  of  opinion  that  we  should  immediately  advance 
from  Godollo  by  the  shortest  line  against  the  capitals,  and  take 
them  by  storm.  Not  without  difficulty  could  he  be  dissuaded 
from  this  idea.  For — said  he — all  our  victories  had  no  real 
importance,  so  long  as  the  capitals  remained  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  Only  their  reconquest  could  afford  to  the  country  a 
real  proof  of  the  success  of  our  work  of  liberation.  This  alone 
was  able  quickly  to  raise  the  spirit  of  the  nation,  and  give  it 
strength  to  eiidure.  This,  above  all,  must  be  kept  in  view ; — 
for  that  with  the  failure  of  the  nation's  hope  of  a  quick  and 


278  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

favorable  final  result  of  these  war-operations  would  fail  also 
simultaneously  all  the  resources  so  urgently  demanded  for  the 
energetic  continuance  of  the  combat. 

Nevertheless,  how  incontestable  soever  this  assertion  of  Kos- 
suth's, instead  of  the  capitals,  Komorn  had  to  be  chosen  as  the 
next  object  of  operations,  even  though  there  was  danger  that  the 
nation,  through  the  delay  hence  resulting  to  the  reconquest  of 
Buda-Pesth,  should  fall  back  into  its  former  condition  of  discour- 
agement. 

r 

I  endeavored  consequently  to  convice  the  President,  that  to 

pay  immediate  attention  to  the  wisheb  of  those  who  rated  the 
reconquest  of  the  capitals  higher  than  the  deliverance  of  Komorn, 
would  be  to  commit  a  grave  strategic  error.  Apart  from  this, 
that  these  wishes  must  find  a  satisfaction  alike  tragic  and  de- 
fective in  the  probable  result  of  the  operation  for  attacking  the 
capitals  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  :  a  tragic  one,  because 
thereby  the  defenseless  Pesth  would  be  exposed  to  all  the  mis- 
eries of  a  besieged  town ;  a  defective  one,  because  it  was  not 
conceivable  that  we  should  be  able  from  Pesth  to  drive  out  the 
enemy,  who,  it  might  be  foreseen,  would  settle  in  Ofen. 

At  the  same  time  I  thought  in  necessary  to  call  the  President's 
attention  to  the  fact,  that,  on  account  of  the  peculiarity  of  our 
next  movements,  it  would  not  henceforth  be  so  easy  as  it  had 
hitherto  been,  to  find  for  him  a  perfectly  safe  abode  in  the  prox- 
imity of  the  army,  as  it  would  be  at  the  expense  of  the  unem- 
barrassed pursuit  of  our  strategic  aims. 

After  a  long  debate  Kossuth  seemed  at  last  to  be  convinced  of 
all  this,  and  refrained  afterward  not  only  from  making  any  ob- 
jection to  the  execution  of  our  further  operations — to  be  directed 
next  to  the  deliverance  of  the  fortress  of  Komorn — but  also  re- 
solved on  returning  from  Godollo  to  Debreczin,  for  which  place 
he  set  out — if  I  mistake  not — on  the  10th  of  April. 

But  however  ardently  Kossuth  while  on  the  way  may  have 
mused  over  what  was  most  for  Hungary's  benefit,  two  things,  at 
all  events,  he  appears  to  have  overlooked : 

1 .  That  Hungary  had  already  plenty  to  do,  if  it  would  guard 
itself  meanwhile  from  the  blessings  of  the  octroyed  constitution 
and  its  appendix  of  provisos — the  tape- worm,  by  which,  as  soon 
as  born,  it  was  enfeebled — if  it  would  remain  in  possession  of  its 
rights ;  and 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  279 

2.  That  Hungary,  if  it  strove  to  be  independent  of  Austria, 
resembled  a  fool,  who  should  wish  to  separate  his  head  and 
arms  from  his  trunk,  that  he  might  be  able  to  walk  about  more 
easily. 


CHAPTER  XLIIL 

I  DO  not  remember  that  any  one  else  of  importance  in  the 
Hungarian  camp,  except  Dembinski  and  Kossuth,  had  ever  se- 
riously entertained  the  idea  of  regaining  the  capitals  by  means  of 
an  actual  attack,  directed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube.  But 
if,  nevertheless,  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz,  or  his  tem- 
porary substitute,  believed  the  realization  of  such  an  idea  on  our 
part  to  be  probable,  it  was  most  opportune  for  us ;  since,  while 
we  had  first  only  the  deliverance  of  Komorn  in  view,  it  may 
easily  be  conceived  that  it  must  have  been  of  very  great  im- 
portance to  us  to  make  the  enemy  believe  that  we  thought  of 
nothing  else  but  the  immediate  reconquest  of  the  city  of  Pesth. 

With  this  view,  the  chief  of  the  general  staff  of  the  army,  who, 
like  myself,  was  acting  ad  interim,  projected  the  following  plan 
of  operations  : 

"  The  seventh  army  corps  to  gain  the  line  of  Fot-Dunakeszi, 
and  interrupt  the  direct  communication  between  Waizen  and  the 
capitals  on  the  Danube,  as  well  as  on  its  left  bank. 

"  The  second  army  corps  (Aulich) — reinforced  by  a  small  in- 
dependent column,  which,  during  the  advance  of  the  principal 
army  on  the  road  of  Gyongyos  toward  Godollo,  had  been  left  behind 
to  secure  the  passages  across  the  Theiss  at  Szolnok  and  Czibakha- 
za,  and  had  been  ordered  to  follow  on  the  railM^ay-line  of  Szolnok 
only  after  the  day  of  Tapio-Bicske — to  occupy  the  main  road  of 
Kerepes,  the  road  of  Keresztur,  and  the  railway-line  of  Szolnok. 

"  Both  these  army  corps  to  demonstrate  from  their  positions  in 
the  direction  of  Pesth. 

"  Meanwhile  the  third  (Damjanics)  and  first  (Klapka)  army 
corps  to  march  on  the  shortest  line  from  Godollo  to  Waizen,  take 
this  town,  if  it  be  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  continue  their 


280  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

marcli  without  interruption  by  Retsag,  Nagy-Oroszi,  Ipolysag,  to 
Levencz  (Leva.) 

"  As  soon  as  the  two  last-named  army  corps  have  taken  Wai- 
zen,  the  two  army  divisions  of  the  wings  of  the  seventh  corps 
to  follow  them  from  Dunakeszi,  while  the  division  of  the  centre 
(Kmety)  continues  by  itself  the  demonstration  against  Pesth, 
thus  masking  the  departure  of  the  other  two  divisions. 

"  After  the  third,  first,  and  the  above-mentioned  two-thirds  of 
the  seventh  army  corps  have  finally  left  Waizen  on  the  road 
indicated  toward  Levencz,  the  second  army  corps  (Aulich)  to 
undertake,  besides  the  line  of  demonstration  which  had  till  then 
been  assigned  it,  that  likewise  of  the  Kmety  division,  while  the 
latter  to  start  for  Waizen,  and  remain  there. 

"  The  further  operations  of  the  main  column  directed  by  Wai- 
zen to  Levencz  will  be,  to  cross  over  the  river  Gran,  and  deliver 
the  fortress  of  Komorn." 

We  could  herein  by  no  means  assume  so  much  passivity  on 
the  part  of  the  commander  of  the  hostile  main  army  concentra- 
ted before  Pesth,  as,  to  our  astonishment,  he  subsequently  dis- 
played. We  had  to  expect  that,  weary  at  last  of  the  ever-re- 
peated demonstrations  with  which  General  Aulich  had  to  regale 
him,  he  would  exchange  the  defensive  for  the  offensive,  in  order 
to  rid  himself  once  for  all  of  his  troublesome  adversary.  The 
consequences  of  this  must  have  been  to  threaten  next  the  lines 
of  communication  which  had  hitherto  existed  between  the  main 
body  of  our  army — on  its  march  by  Levencz  to  Komorn — and 
the  government  as  well  as  war-supplies  existing  behind  the 
Theiss. 

The  most  important  of  these  lines  of  communication  was  the 
main  road  of  Gyongyos.  However  many  were  the  advantages 
it  offered  us,  both  on  account  of  its  shortness  and  practicability, 
we  had  nevertheless  to  prepare  to  renounce  the  regular  use  of 
it  during  the  continuance  of  the  above-indicated  operations.  As 
a  compensation  for  its  loss,  the  road  leading  from  Miskolcz  by 
Putnok,  Lossoncz,  Balassa-Gyarmat,  and  Ipolysag  to  Levencz, 
must  serve  our  turn. 

The  rendering  both  lines  of  communication  as  secure  as  pos- 
sible was  the  principal  task  of  the  Kmety  division  in  Waizen ; 
which  moreover,  had  to  preserve  the  connection  between  the 
main  body  of  our  army  on  the  Gran  and  the  second  army  corps 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  281 

before  Pesth,  as  well  as  to  serve  the  latter  as  a  reserve  in  case 
of  necessity. 

I  was  firmly  resolved  to  keep  steadily  in  view  the  deliverance 
of  Komorn,  even  at  the  risk  of  the  hostile  main  army  before  Pesth 
meanwhile  assuming  the  offensive  against  our  isolated  second 
army  corps  (Aulich.) 

In  this  latter  case,  as  a  matter  of  course  there  would  remain 
for  Aulich  nothing  else  to  do  than — after  disputing  every  inch  of 
ground  with  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible — to  begin  his  eccen- 
tric retreat  toward  Tiszafured,  Szolnok,  and  Czibakhaza,  and 
confine  himself,  if  it  came  to  the  worst,  to  the  occupation  of  the 
points  of  passage  across  the  Theiss,  particularly  easy  to  maintain 
during  the  inundation. 

In  other  respects,  a  continuous  offensive  on  the  part  of  the 
hostile  main  army  encamped  before  Pesth  against  Aulich,  and 
consequently  against  the  basis  of  our  operations,  appeared  to  me 
already  less  alarming,  because  Kossuth,  before  his  departure  from 
Godollo  to  Debreczin,  had  assured  me,  by  all  that  is  sacred,  that 
General  Bern  was  already  on  his  march  from  Transylvania,  which 
had  meanwhile  been  completely  reconquered,  toward  Baja  on  the 
lower  Danube,  and  would  certainly  have  crossed  the  river  there 
by  the  middle  of  April  with  a  force  of  at  least  16,000  men,  in 
order  to  turn  immediately  to  the  north  toward  Raab,  and  after 
effecting  the  junction  of  his  troops  with  ours  would  take  the  chief 
command  of  the  whole  army  in  Vetter's  place. 

This  certainty  moreover  considerably  lessened  the  reasonable 
apprehension  that  the  commander  of  the  hostile  main  army  be- 
fore Pesth,  by  the  first,  best  energetic  offensive  attempt  against 
Aulich,  would  convince  himself  of  the  numerical  weakness  of  the 
troops  of  his  opponent,  and  therein  immediately  recognizing  our 
real  intentions,  would  oppose  them  with  energy  on  the  shortest 
line  from  Pesth-Ofen  by  Gran  (Esztergom)  and  the  bridge  over 
the  Danube  there  ;  for  in  this  case  Bem's  appearing  in  the  rear 
of  the  enemy  would  easily  release  our  main  column  in  the  valley 
of  the  Gran. 

Thus  the  more  confidently  was  the  execution  of  the  above- 
communicated  plan  of  operations  commenced  on  the  8th  of 
April,  1849,  from  Godollo. 

In  the  mean  time  a  hostile  courier,  sent  from  Waizen  to  G6- 
dollo,  fell  into  our  hands.     His  dispatches  confirmed  the  suppo- 


282  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

sition  that  Waizen  was  garrisoned  by  the  enemy ;  the  imperial 
Gotz  and  Jablonowski  brigades  were  stationed  there. 

In  the  evening  of  the  10th  of  April  I  received  in  Godcillo,  by 
an  orderly  officer  of  General  Damjanics,  a  report  that  Waizen 
had  been  taken  by  storm  by  the  third  army  corps  (Damjanics) 
in  the  course  of  the  forenoon,  in  spite  of  the  obstinate  resistance 
of  the  two  imperial  brigades. 

That  the  hostile  commander-in-chief  did  not,  from  this  storm- 
ing of  Waizen,  already  discover  what  were  our  intentions,  I  can 
only  explain  on  the  supposition  that  he  had  really  taken  for  a 
stronger  corps  that  insignificant  expeditionary  column  of  the 
seventh  army  corps  which — as  has  been  said  in  the  XXXVIth 
Chapter — had  been  sent  about  the  middle  of  March  from  Miskolcz, 
originally  against  the  Sclavonian  militia,  who  at  that  time  had 
been  left  behind  in  Kaschau  and  Eperjes  by  the  Gotz  and  Jab- 
lonowski brigades,  which  column  however,  was  afterward  directed 
toward  Komom. 

The  hostile  Colonel  Almasy,  detached  into  the  valley  of  the 
upper  Eipel,  probably  to  destroy  this  expeditionary  column,  with 
a  force  notoriously  more  than  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  succeeded 
in  reaching  Lossoncz  toward  the  end  of  March.  Here,  however, 
he  allowed  himself  to  be  surprised  in  bright  midday  by  this  ex- 
peditionary column  ;  a  part  of  his  troops,  together  with  the  mil- 
itary chest,  to  be  taken  from  him  ;  and  himself  for  ever  deterred 
from  any  further  offensive. 

Our  slender  expeditionary  column — consisting,  as  is  well  known, 
of  only  a  few  hundred  infantry,  thirty-two  hussars,  and  two  guns 
— in  the  enemy's  account  of  this  mishap  had  probably  increased 
to  the  bulk  of  an  army  corps,  and  thus  led  the  commander  of  the 
hostile  army,  concentrated  before  Pesth,  to  suppose  that  this  pre- 
sumed Hungarian  army  corps — closely  following  after  the  column 
of  the  Austrian  Colonel  Almasy,  which  after  the  sudden  attack 
at  Lossoncz  was  retreating  helter-skelter  toward  the  Danube — 
had  suddenly  appeared  before  Waizen,  and  had  driven  from  thence 
the  Gotz  and  Jablonowski  brigades,  intending  immediately  to  join 
the  main  body  of  our  arm^y  in  the  attack  on  the  position  of  the 
Austrian  main  army  before  Pesth. 

The  moral  impression  of  this  surprise  at  Lossoncz  seemed 
moreover,  during  our  offensive  operations  against  Godollo,  to 
have  already  influenced  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz  ir. 


MY   LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  283 

the  disposition  of  his  troops.  At  least  the  circumstance  that  the 
hostile  army  corps  under  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Csorich  still  con- 
tinued to  occupy  Waizen  during  the  battle  of  Isaszeg — which  the 
enemy  might  have  foreseen  with  certainty  for  at  least  thirty-six 
hours — can  likewise  be  explained  only  on  the  assumption  that 
the  expeditionary  column  of  the  seventh  army  corps,  which  had 
surprised  Colonel  Almasy  in  Lossoncz,  had  been  seen  by  him  in 
the  multiply ing-glass  of  the  first  panic  terror — a  mockeiy  indeed 
of  all  calculation — and  its  numerical  strength  at  least  twenty 
times  over-estimated  ;  and  that  Field-marshal  Prince  Windisch- 
gratz  had  necessarily  been  induced  by  the  result  of  this  exagger- 
ation to  dispose  the  Csorich  army  corps  on  the  road  from  Waizen 
to  Lossoncz. 


CHAPTER   XLIV. 

The  news  of  the  successful  dislodgment  from  "Waizen  of  the 
Gotz  and  Jablonowski  brigades  determined  me  to  transfer  the 
head-quarters  during  the  night  between  the  10th  and  11th  of 
April  from  Godollo  to  that  town. 

There  I  first  learned  the  following  important  details  of  the  en- 
gagement : 

When  General  Damjanics,  appearing  with  the  third  army  corps 
before  Waizen,  observed  the  enemy's  preparations  for  a  serious 
defensive,  he  at  the  same  time  saw  that  the  opportunity  was  fa- 
vorable for  completely  destroying  or  forthwith  capturing  him. 

With  this  view,  the  first  army  corps  (Klapka),  which  followed 
close  behind  the  third  (Damjanics),  was  to  turn  the  town  of 
Waizen  to  the  east,  masked  by  the  ground,  and  occupy  the  ene- 
my's only  line  of  retreat,  the  road  from  Waizen  to  Yerocze,  while 
the  third  corps  had  to  obstruct  him  in  front  until  this  manoeuvre 
should  be  executed. 

Klapka,  agreeing  in  this  plan,  prepared  immediately  to  exe- 
cute the  turning  ;  but  nevertheless  did  not  reach  the  fitting 
centre  of  gravity  of  the  hostile  line  of  retreat  until  the  enemy, 
meanwhile  retreating  from  Waizen  had  passed  it. 


284  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Klapka  now  attributed  to  the  undue  haste  of  General  Dam- 
janics,  the  latter  to  Klapka' s  tardiness,  the  failure  of  the  man- 
CEUvre  calculated  for  the  complete  defeat  of  the  enemy :  while 
the  mediating  supposition,  that  Klapka' s  intention  had  been  de- 
tected by  the  enemy  before  it  was  too  late,  and  had  been  frustra- 
ted by  an  accelerated  retreat,  seemed  to  be  contradicted  by  the 
obstinacy  with  which  the  enemy  had  endeavored  to  dispute  with 
General  Damjanics  every  foot  of  ground,  nay  even  the  town 
itself 

This  disagreement  between  the  two  commanders  of  corps, 
Damjanics  and  Klapka,  originating  from  the  day  ofTapio-Bicske, 
and  considerably  heightened  by  that  of  Isaszeg,  assumed  thus,  in 
consequence  of  the  day  of  "Waizen,  a  character  that  gave  rise  to 
serious  reflection. 

Moreover,  on  this  day,  besides  Klapka,  the  colonel  and  com- 
mander of  the  cavalry  of  the  third  corps,  Nagy-Sandor,  and  the 
Polish  legion,  some  hundred  men  strong,  had  also  drawn  upon 
themselves  the  most  violent  indignation  of  General  Damjanics  : 
Nagy-Sandor,  because  during  the  engagement  he  complied  with 
an  order  to  advance,  perhaps  in  an  equally  satisfactory  manner 
as  that  in  which  we  remember  he  executed  the  order  to  pursue 
on  the  day  of  Tapio-Bicske ;  the  Polish  legion  through  the  fol- 
lowing : 

The  bridge  at  the  southern  extremity  of  Waizen — ^briskly  de- 
fended by  the  hostile  tirailleurs,  who  had  been  pressed  back  to 
the  very  skirts  of  the  town — was  to  be  taken  by  storm.  The  same 
Hungarian  staff-officer,  who  on  the  4th  of  April  had  so  gloriously 
distinguished  himself  as  commander  of  the  third  Honved  battalion 
at  the  storming  of  the  bridge  across,  the  Tapio,  animated  the  Po- 
lish legion,  stationed  not  far  off,  to  the  storm,  and  intended,  by 
seizing  their  banner,  to  lead  them  on  in  person.  The  Polish  stan- 
dard-bearer, however,  refused  to  part  with  the  banner  intrusted 
to  him,  and  the  whole  legion  declined  to  storm. 

This  bridge  was  now  taken  by  the  sections  of  the  third  and 
ninth  Honved  battalions  in  just  as  resolute  a  manner  as  that 
across  the  Tapio  on  the  4th  of  April  had  been  won  ;  and  the 
same  heroic  staff-officer,  who  here  again  led  the  storm  with  the 
banner,  had  his  horse  killed  under  him. 

After  the  loss  of  the  bridge  the  enemy  was  no  longer  able  to 
hold  the  southern  entrance  of  Waizen  ;  the  third  and  ninth  bat- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  286 

talions  drove  him  back  at  first  into  the  interior  of  the  town,  until 
at  last  he  began  to  evacuate  it  without  further  resistance. 

The  battalions  of  the  third  corps  now  assembled  themselves, 
and  formed  one  marching-column  arranged  in  the  order  in  which 
they  had  penetrated  into  the  town ;  but  the  Polish  legion,  who, 
as  has  been  said,  had  refused  to  storm  the  bridge,  and  who,  even 
during  the  further  fight-like  advance  into  the  interior  of  the 
town,  had  only  hobbled  behind  the  third  and  ninth  Honved  bat- 
talions, now  knew  how  to  gain,  during  the  rallying,  the  head  of 
this  column,  and  by  this  trick  to  make  it  appear  as  if  the  honor 
of  the  day  belonged  to  it. 

I  had  enough  to  do  to  put  an  end,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  dis- 
putes between  Damjanics  and  the  officers  of  both  his  cavalry 
regiments,  who  espoused  the  side  of  their  commanders  against 
him ;  on  the  other,  to  the  serious  collisions  between  the  Polish 
legion  and  the  Honved  battalions. 

The  enemy  numbered  also  among  his  losses  in  the  combat  of 
the  10th  of  April,  Major-general  Gotz :  mortally  wounded,  he 
fell  into  our  hands,  and  died  the  day  after. 

According  to  our  plan  of  operations,  the  main  body  of  our 
army — the  third  array  corps  (Damjanics),  the  first  (Klapka),  and 
two-thirds  of  the  seventh  corps — after  the  taking  by  storm  of 
Waizen,  began  its  march  without  delay  to  Levencz  ;  the  army 
division  under  Kmety  was  removed  from  Dunakeszi  to  Waizen ; 
and  a  part  of  the  second  army  corps  (Aulich)  undertook  in  its 
stead  the  occupation  of  Dunakeszi. 

For  the  protection,  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  left  flank  of  the 
main  body  marching  to  the  north,  on  the  other,  of  the  Kmety 
division  in  Waizen,  against  the  hostile  attempts  to  be  apprehend- 
ed from  the  upper  Danube,  an  expeditionary  column,  composed 
of  two  divisions  of  hussars  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  from  the 
seventh  army  corps,  was  disposed  along  the  Danube  upward  to 
the  lower  Gran. 

While  the  main  body  approached  Levencz,  we  learned  that 
the  former  expeditionary  column  of  the  seventh  army  corps — 
which  had  surprised  Colonel  Almasy  in  Lossoncz,  and  immedi- 
ately after  this  event  had  been  charged  to  direct  its  expeditions 
toward  the  district  of  the  northern  mountain-towns  and  the  Turocz 
comitate — had  in  the  mean  time  returned  toward  Eperjes,  and 
been  obliged,  by  a  decree  which  had  been  sent  to  it  from  De- 


286  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

breczin,  to  place  itself  at  the  disposal  of  Lieut.-general  Dembin- 
ski,  who  had  again  been  employed  by  Kossuth — namely,  had  been 
intrusted  with  the  command  of  a  new  army  corps  formed  in 
Kaschau. 

The  district  of  the  mountain-towns  being  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  and  our  main  body  seeming  to  be  menaced  thereby  in  its 
rear  during  its  further  movements  from  Levencz  towards  Ko- 
morn,  a  new  expeditionary  column,  under  the  command,  of  my 
elder  brother,  the  Honved  Major  Armin  Gorgei,  was  dispatched 
to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  mountain-towns,  on  the  16th  of 
April,  in  the  first  instance  against  Schemnitz  (Selmeczbanya). 

Our  main  body,  which,  in  consequence  of  similar  detachings 
and  the  losses  it  had  already  sustained  during  the  campaign, 
now  amounted  to  scarcely  more  than  25,000  men,  had  arrived 
on  the  previous  day  at  the  river  Gran,  with  the  first  corps  at  the 
height  of  Levencz  at  Szecse,  with  the  third  above  this  point  at 
0-Bars,  and  with  the  two  army  divisions  of  the  seventh  corps 
below  it  at  Zsemler.  At  each  of  these  three  points  bridges  had 
speedily  to  be  thrown  across  the  river. 

The  enemy,  however,  by  way  of  precaution,  had  removed  or 
destroyed  the  greater  part  of  the  materials  fit  for  this  purpose 
that  had  existed  in  the  near  environs ;  and  the  single  ready-made 
scaffold-bridge  which  we  carried  with  us  scarcely  reached  half- 
way across  the  river,  just  then  swollen  to  an  unusual  height. 

Of  the  three  places  for  crossing  above  mentioned,  that  at 
0-Bars  seemed  to  offer  most  facilities  for  the  construction  of  a 
bridge.  We  intended  to  let  the  third  army  corps,  which  had 
been  disposed  hither,  cross  first,  in  order  to  protect,  by  descend- 
ing along  the  right  bank,  the  passage  to  be  effected  further  down 
between  Szecse  and  Kalna  by  the  first  army  corps,  and  at  Zsem- 
ler by  the  two-thirds  of  the  seventh  corps. 

For  this  purpose  not  only  the  ready-made  scaffold-bridge,  but 
also  other  chief  requisites  for  bridge-building  were  placed  at  the 
disposal  of  the  chief  of  the  Hungarian  pioneers,  who  was  charged 
with  the  formation  of  a  Bridge  at  0-Bars. 

He  proved  himself,  however,  incompetent  for  the  task  assigned 
him ;  and  in  spite  of  all  the  circumstances  favorable  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  bridge  at  0-Bars,  that  between  Kalna  and  Szecse 
was  finished  soonest,  though  not  till  the  night  between  the  17th 
and  18th. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  287 

On  the  17th  of  April  a  courier  from  Debreczin  appeared  at  my 
head-quarters  at  Levencz  with  the  news  that  the  Diet  had  ac- 
cepted Kossuth's  proposition,  that,  as  an  answer  to  the  octroyed 
constitution  of  the  4th  of  March  1849,  the  dynasty  of  Habsburg- 
Lorraine  be  declared  to  have  forfeited  its  hereditary  right  to  the 
throne  of  Hungary  ;  that  the  future  form  of  government  for  Hun- 
gary, however,  be  an  open  question ;  and  for  the  present  that  a 
provisional  government  be  appointed. 

However  completely  such  a  resolution  on  the  part  of  the  Diet 
corresponded  with  my  national  feelings — ^thanks  to  the  manner 
in  which  the  said  dynasty  had  taken  part  against  Hungary  in 
the  civil  war,  originally  stirred  up  by  the  Croat  Ban  Baron  Jel- 
lachich  at  his  own  instance — as  it  could  nevertheless  not  find 
favor — which  I  had  already  by  way  of  warning  explained  to  the 
President  Kossuth  in  Godollo — even  before  the  tribunal  of  the 
most  ordinary  policy,  much  less  before  that  of  a  rational  love  for 
one's  country  ;  so  such  a  resolution  was  very  far  from  being  justi- 
fied by  the  dynastic  disposition  of  the  old  troops,  and  especially  of 
the  old  officers  of  the  army,  on  whom  it  is  self-evident  must  de- 
volve the  task  of  procuring  support  for  it,  not  only  in  the  interior 
of  Hungary,  but  also  beyond  it. 

This  resolution  of  the  Diet  moreover  stood  in  direct  contradic- 
tion to  the  declared  conviction  of  Kossuth  himself  at  Tiszafiired 
in  the  beginning  of  March,  that  it  was  the  most  sacred  duty  of 
all  ivho  meant  honorably  by  the  country  to  venture  on  no  step, 
the  consequences  of  which  might  divide  the  nation  into  parties, 
and  consequently  only  increase  the  poiver  of  the  common  enemy 
of  all.  It  stood  in  still  more  direct  contradiction  to  what  Kos- 
suth had  told  me  at  the  same  time  and  place  respecting  the 
desire  of  the  majority  of  the  Diet  for  cowardly  submission,  the 
real  existence  of  which  was  in  fact  betrayed  by  the  tone  of  the 
letter  addressed  to  Field-marshal  Prince  "Windischgratz,  on  the 
subject  of  the  Hungarian  prisoners  of  war  in  the  hostile  army, 
which  letter  had  been  sent  to  Kossuth  from  Debreczin  to  Godol- 
lo, to  be  by  him  approved  and  forwarded  to  its  destination. 

In  the  face  of  these  contradictions,  as  well  as  in  the  face  of  the 
remarkable  silence  with  which  in  Godollo  Kossuth  had  heard  my 
objections  against  the  expediency  of  an  offensive  step  against 
Austria — without  refuting  them — and  had  made  me  believe  that 
he  had  given  up  his  flagrant  idea  of  answering  the  octroyed  con- 


288  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

stitution  in  any  other  way  than  by  a  still  more  energetic  contin 
uance  of  the  defensive  war,  I  had  to  doubt,  if  not  the  genuineness 
of  the  unofficial  verbal  communications  of  the  Debreczin  courier, 
at  all  events  that  this  resolution  of  the  Diet  was  unchangeable  ; 
and  was  thereby  induced  to  bid  the  courier — who  was  immedi- 
ately hastening  back  to  Debreczin — orally  inform  the  gentlemen 
of  the  Government  and  the  Diet  that  it  was  high  time  they 
ceased  to  be  cowardly  in  adversity,  insolent  in  prosperity. 

To  undertake  any  energetic  step  against  the  Government  and 
the  Diet — however  urgently  such  a  step  seemed  to  be  demanded, 
partly  by  the  general  exasperation  which  the  news  of  that  resolu- 
tion of  the  Diet  called  forth  in  my  head-quarters,  partly  as  a 
consequence  of  my  proclamation  of  Waizen — was  altogether 
impossible,  from  the  circumstance  that,  on  the  one  hand,  I  was, 
with  the  main  body  of  the  army,  above  thirty  (German)  miles 
distant  from  Debreczin  ;  on  the  other,  that  I  was  just  then  occu- 
pied with  our  most  important  strategic  task,  the  relief  of  Komorn. 

Yielding  to  what  was  unavoidable,  I  had  rather  chiefly  to 
consider  how  most  certainly  to  prevent  the  sudden  dissolution  of 
our  army,  the  consequence  mainly  to  be  feared  from  that  fatal 
political  step. 

Here,  however,  I  frankly  confess  I  was  at  my  wits'  end ;  and 
never  should  I  have  been  able  to  exorcise  again  the  spirit  of 
division  which  Kossuth's  political  non  plus  ultra  had  conjured 
up  in  the  ranks  of  the  army,  had  not  events  come  to  my  assist- 
ance in  the  hour  of  greatest  need. 


CHAPTER  XLV. 

Of  the  three  bridges  ordered  to  be  thrown  across  the  river 
Gran,  only  the  middle  one  (between  Kalna  on  the  right,  and 
Szecse  on  the  left  bank)  was  practicable  on  the  18th  of  April ; 
the  lower  one,  at  Zsemler,  was  to  be  finished  on  the  19th  ;  while 
the  completion  of  the  upper  one,  at  0-Bars,  threatened  to  take 
several  days  still. 

The  enemy  had  not  yet  shown  himself  on  the  right  bank  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  289 

the  Cxran  opposite  us,  but  it  was  impossible  he  could  delay  much 
longer ;  and  if  he  made  his  appearance  before  we  had  effected 
the  passage,  although  only  with  the  fourth  part  of  our  troops,  it 
would  be  easy  for  him  effectually  to  obstruct  us,  since  the  right 
bank  commanded  the  whole  extent  of  the  river  occupied  by  us, 
namely,  on  the  middle  and  lower  point  of  the  passage. 

We  therefore,  in  the  course  of  the  18th,  made  use  of  the  only 
bridge  that  was  ready,  between  Kalna  and  Szecse,  for  occupying 
the  right  bank  of  the  Gran,  not  only  with  the  first  corps  (Klapka), 
but  also  with  the  third  (Damjanics),  which  had  meanwhile  been 
ordered  from  0-Bars  down  to  Szecse,  and  proceeded  directly  down 
the  river  toward  Nagy-Sarlo,  to  protect  the  passage  across  the 
Gran,  which  the  two-thirds  of  the  seventh  corps  had  to  effect  at 
Zsemler  on  the  following  day ;  while  the  Klapka  corps  was  for 
the  present  charged  with  observing  the  main  road  toward  Neutra 
(Nyitra),  and  the  carriage  road  toward  Surany. 

Early  in  the  forenoon  of  the  19th  of  April  a  brisk  thunder  of 
artillery  suddenly  resounded  from  the  southwest,  from  the  right 
bank  of  the  Gran,  to  Levencz.  It  was  the  commencement  of  the 
battle  of  Nagy-Sarlo. 

The  third  army  corps  was  to  continue  its  march  on  this  day, 
flanked  on  its  right  by  the  first,  on  the  shortest  line  toward 
Komorn ;  the  two-thirds  of  the  seventh  corps,  after  they  should 
have  crossed  the  river  at  Zsemler,  were  to  advance  on  the  main 
road  toward  Gran  (Esztergom) — if  I  am  not  mistaken — as  far  as 
Damasd,  in  order  to  protect  the  third  corps  on  its  left  flank 
against  a  hostile  attack ;  the  head-quarters,  however,  were  to  be 
transferred  to  one  of  the  nearest  places  north  of  Nagy-Sarlo. 

Now  this  conflict  made  it  questionable  whether  our  whole 
body  should  advance  ;  because,  with  our  utter  want  of  informa- 
tion as  to  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  its  consequences  could  not 
be  foreseen  ;  and  it  appeared  therefore  more  judicious  to  let  the 
head-quarters  abide  in  Levencz  till  the  battle  should  be  decided. 

I  myself  remained  also  in  Levencz,  though,  when  the  first 
thunder  of  artillery  was  heard,  I  was  about  to  ride  to  Zsemler, 
in  order  to  expedite  as  much  as  possible  the  completion  of  the 
bridge  there,  and  the  passage  of  the  two-thirds  of  the  seventh 
army  corps. 

I  intended  personally  to  assist  in  the  conduct  of  the  battle,  but 
only  if  it  should  take  a  decidedly  unfavorable  turn ;  and  in  order 

N 


290  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

in  such  case  to  be  immediately  at  hand,  I  could  not  leave  the 
head-quarters  ;  besides,  from  the  elevated  ruins  of  the  old  castle 
at  Levencz  the  progress  of  the  contest  could  be  unobstructedly 
observed  better  than  from  any  nearer  point. 

All  the  confusion  w^hich  might  have  arisen  from  supposing  mo 
to  be  present  in  the  station  of  the  head-quarters,  wliich  had  been 
appointed  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Gran  for  this  day,  V4^as  obvi- 
ated by  my  sending  thither  several  orderly  officers.  These  officers 
w^ere  to  forward  to  Levencz  all  the  reports  which  should  arrive 
for  me  at  this  place.  In  like  manner  other  orderly  officers  were 
stationed  at  Zsemler,  with  directions  to  keep  me  constantly 
acquainted  with  the  progress  of  the  bridge  constructing  there. 

Finally,  the  bridge  at  Kalna  was  also  manned  with  a  strong 
section  of  the  head-quarter  troops,  in  order  to  stop  and  collect  the 
fugitives  of  our  two  corps  engaged  in  the  combat,  in  case  they 
should  come  there  with  the  intention  of  fleeing  back  to  the  left 
bank  of  the  Gran. 

But  on  this  day  we  had  no  runaways  in  our  ranks ;  the  enemy, 
on  the  contrary,  had  the  more  of  that  article. 

In  spite,  however,  of  all  the  arrangements  I  had  made  for  ob- 
taining the  speediest  information  of  the  progressive  state  of  affairs 
on  the  battle-field,  as  well  as  respecting  the  construction  of  the 
bridge  at  Zsemler,  it  was  only  late  in  the  night  between  the  19th 
and  20th  of  April  that  I  learned  from  the  written  report  of  Gen- 
eral Damjanics,  that  he  had  put  the  enemy  to  ffight. 

At  the  same  time  a  convoy  of  the  severely  wounded  of  the 
seventh  corps  arrived  from  the  battle-field  by  Zsemler  at  Levencz ; 
whereby  I  was  assured  of  the  completion  and  practicability  of 
the  temporary  bridge  across  the  Gran  at  Zsemler,  as  well  as  of 
the  possibility  of  hastening  after  our  main  body  by  a  much 
shorter  route  than  that  by  Kalna. 

Leaving  Levencz  without  further  delay,  I  reached  Zsemler 
during  the  same  night ;  but  on, account  of  the  extreme  darkness 
could  not  till  the  morning  of  the  20th  overtake  the  army  corps 
under  Damjanics  and  Klapka,  which,  on  the  preceding  evening, 
had  already  advanced  beyond  Cseke  toward  Komorn,  in  pursuit 
of  the  enemy. 

Contrary  to  all  expectation,  I  found  Damjanics  again  violently 
excited  against  Kltpka  and  the  commanders  of  his  cavalry.  He 
accused  the  former  of  intending,  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  291 

battle,  once  more  to  betake  himself  to  a  hasty  and  disorderly- 
retreat  ;  the  latter,  of  being  incapable  of  being  urged  to  any 
attack  whatever,  and  of  having  done  literally  nothing  during 
the  action. 

According  to  the  details  obtained  from  other  sources,  the  com- 
manders of  General  Damjanics'  cavalry — so  far  as  I  can  remem- 
ber— seemed  indeed  to  deserve  in  the  fullest  degree  the  reproach 
cast  on  them  :  General  Klapka,  however,  less.  It  is  true,  that 
he  had  asserted  at  first  that  the  enemy  opposed  to  him  was  his 
superior  in  numbers ;  and  on  this  account  had  repeatedly  ur- 
gently demanded  to  be  reinforced  from  the  third  army  corps. 
But  when  his  request  had  been  most  promptly  acceded  to  on  the 
part  of  General  Damjanics,  he  held  out  firmly,  and  essentially 
contributed  to  the  decisive  result  of  the  day  ;  the  honor  of  which 
is  certainly  mainly  due  to  General  Damjanics,  on  the  ground 
that  he,  as  my  substitute  on.  the  field  of  battle,  had  remained 
unshaken,  in  spite  of  the  dubious  behavior  of  Klapka  at  the 
outset. 

The  battle  at  Nagy-Sarlo  (on  the  19th  of  April,  1849),  was  the 
consequence — unexpected  by  the  enemy — of  our  having  crossed 
the  river  Gran,  the  day  before,  on  the  18th,  with  the  first  and 
third  army  corps,  between  Kalna  and  Szecse,  and  of  the  enemy's 
concentric  offensive  movement,  from  the  west  (out  of  the  valley 
of  the  Neutra),  and  south  (from  the  point  where  the  Gran 
empties  itself  into  the  Danube),  commenced  against  us  simulta- 
neously— consequently,  in  any  case,  too  late — with  the  intention 
of  preventing  our  crossing  the  river. 

The  following  two  facts  clearly  prove  that  the  hostile  com- 
mander had  not  been  prepared  for  encountering  two-thirds  of 
our  main  body  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river  Gran.  (On  ac- 
count of  the  late  passage  across  the  Gran  at  Zsemler  of  the  sev- 
enth army  corps,  only  a  part  of  its  cavalry,  under  Poltenberg's 
personal  command,  could  take  part  in  the  action,  near  its  close.) 

1.  His  troops  dispersed  in  disorder,  after  they  had  once  begun 
to  give  way,  in  the  most  diverging  directions  toward  the  west. 

2.  Not  till  a  long  time  after  the  commencement  of  this  de- 
bandade  en  gros  did  hostile  columns,  marching  upward  along 
the  Gran,  emerge  from  the  south  before  our  extreme  left  wing, 
which,  moving  downward  along  the  Gran,  turned  them  on  the 
right,  and  forced  them  now  likewise  to  flee  in  a  western  direction. 


292  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  first  of  these  facts  justifies  the  supposition,  that  no  def- 
inite line  of  retreat  had  been  marked  out,  by  way  of  precaution, 
to  the  hostile  troops.  This,  however,  is  omitted — immediately 
before  an  expected  conflict — only  when  a  leader  is  beside  him- 
self from  absolute  confidence  of  victory  ;  and  to  suppose  such  a 
moral  condition  in  the  Austrian  generals  serving  in  Hungary, 
after  the  days  of  Szolnok,  Hatvan,  Tapio-Bicske,  Isaszeg,  and 
Waizen,  is,  I  should  say,  somewhat  too  difificult. 

In  accordance  with  the  first  fact,  the  second  also  indicates 
that  the  hostile  general,  on  the  18th  of  April,  supposed  that  the 
greatest  part  of  our  main  body  was  still  on  the  other  side  the 
Gran,  and  consequently  that  he  was  prepared  on  the  19th  for 
any  thing  rather  than  for  a  decisive  conflict ;  for,  on  the  contrary 
supposition,  he  must  have  taken  care  especially  of  the  arrival 
in  good  time  of  his  forces  on  the  battle-field. 

These  two  facts  undeniably  justify  the  supposition,  that  the 
Austrians  were  completely  taken  by  surprise  on  the  19th  of 
April  by  the  Hungarian  army  corps  of  Damjanics  and  Klapka 
(at  that  time  amounting  together  to  16,000  men) ;  igx  should  it 
be  denied  that  they  were  surprised,  then  the  Austrian  offensive, 
wrecked  on  that  day,  would,  both  in  its  plan  and  execution,  sink 
utterly  below  the  level  of  criticism. 

On  the  20th  Damjanics  and  Klapka  continued  their  march 
toward  Komorn  as  far  as  Jaszfalu ;  but  the  two-thirds  of  the 
seventh  army  corps  descended  along  the  river  Gran  toward  the 
Danube,  encountered  at  Kemend  a  strong  hostile  column,  at- 
tacked it  without  delay,  and  obliged  it  to  retreat  over  the  pon- 
toon across  the  Gran  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube. 

In  this  contest  the  expeditionary  column  of  the  seventh  army 
corps,  which  had  been  already  dispatched  from  "Waizen  toward 
the  lower  Gran,  partly  co-operated  ;  for  being  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Gran,  and  flanking  the  enemy,  who  was  retreating  along 
the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  it  directed  against  him  the  fire  of 
both  its  guns,  almost  without  intermission. 

This  expeditionary  column  was  to  have  crossed  the  Gran  after 
the  battle  at  Kemend,  and  rejoined  the  main  body  of  the  seventh 
army  corps.  The  bridge  at  Kemend  was  not,  however,  com- 
pleted, and  the  column  was  consequently  obliged  to  march  as  far 
as  Zsemler,  that  it  might  there  at  last  gain  the  right  bank  of 
the  Gran. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  293 

Of  the  enemy  defeated  on  the  previous  day  at  Nagy-Sarlo  only 
some  scattered  groups  showed  themselves  on  this  side  the  little 
river  Neutra,  who  preferred  being  made  prisoners  to  wandering 
about  longer  without  aim. 

We  had  accordingly  up  to  Koraorn  no  longer  to  fear  any  re- 
sistance in  masses.  The  nearer  our  main  body  approached  it, 
however,  the  more  our  still  indispensable  line  of  communication 
by  Levencz  with  the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss  appeared  to  be 
exposed  to  such  hostile  attempts  as  were  practicable  from  the 
northwest  and  southeast.  The  protection  toward  the  southeast 
remained  with  the  two-thirds  of  the  seventh  army  corps — located 
for  this  purpose  at  Kemend,  and  afterward  at  Kobblkut — until 
the  Kmety  army  division,  which  had  been  ordered  from  Waizen 
up  the  Danube  to  Parkany,  should  have  arrived  there  ;  while  for 
protection  toward  the  northeast,  that  expeditionary  column, 
which,  after  the  battle  at  Kemend,  was  obliged  to  march  as  far 
as  Zsemler  to  gain  the  right  bank  of  the  Gran,  after  having 
effected  its  passage,  had  to  make  reaching  Verebely  the  object 
of  its  next  isolated  service. .  The  present  securing  of  our  com- 
munication with  Levencz  toward  the  northwest,  however,  was 
effected  in  the  mean  time  by  two  divisions  of  hussars,  who 
started  during  the  night  between  the  20th  and  21st  of  April 
from  Jaszfalu  toward  Verebely. 

General  Guyon,  since  his  nomination  to  the  command  of  the 
fortress  of  Komorn,  had  several  times  unsuccessfully  attempted 
to  reach  the  fortress  unobserved  through  the  hostile  surrounding 
line,  and  had  thereupon  retreated  again  within  the  circuit  of  the 
operations  of  our  main  body.  In  Jaszfalu  he  resolved  upon  a 
renewed  and  forcible  attempt  to  enter  Komorn  in  spite  of  the 
hostile  surrounding  troops,  and  requested  a  squadron  of  hussars 
for  this  purpose.  He  broke  through  the  hostile  line  on  the  21st 
of  April,  and  surprised  the  garrison,  now  very  low-spirited,  with 
the  reanimating  intelligence  of  the  unexpected  relief  near  at 
hand. 

On  the  22d  this  relief  was  effected  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Danube.  The  Damjanics  and  Klapka  army  corps  bivouacked 
before  the  Waag  tete-de-pont  of  the  fortress  of  Komorn. 


CHAPTER  XLVI. 

The  fortress  of  Komom  is  known  to  lie  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Danube,  and  to  reach  with  only  one  of  its  outworks,  the  so-called 
fort  or  tete-de-pont  of  that  river,  across  to  its  right  bank. 

The  garrison,  whose  firmness  during  the  siege  deserves  in 
general  the  most  honorable  mention,  had  fortunately  maintained 
this  important  outwork,  in  spite  of  repeated  vigorous  bombard- 
ments, and  thereby  secured  to  us  the  possibility  of  throwing  a 
bridge  across  the  Danube  between  it  and  the  fortress,  and  thus 
of  effecting  deliverance  on  the  right  bank  also  in  a  very  short 
time. 

At  the  same  place  a  bridge  of  boats  had  been  thrown  across 
some  weeks  before,  but  within  a  few  days  had  been  sunk  by  the 
enemy's  batteries  on  the  right  bank. 

To  avert  the  recurrence  of  such  a  result,  we  had  recourse  to 
solid  swimming  supports  instead  of  hollow  ones,  that  is,  we  tried 
our  fortune  with  a  floating-bridge. 

Taking  into  consideration  the  efforts  of  the  hostile  batteries  to 
hinder  the  formation  of  the  bridge,  together  with  the  circum- 
stance that  we  found  not  the  least  thing  prepared  for  such  an 
undertaking,  in  consequence  of  the  erroneous  views  prevailing 
generally  in  the  fortress  of  Komorn,  as  well  as  in  the  town,  that 
to  bridge  over  the  Danube  by  means  of  rafts  was  impracticable  ; 
we  might  certainly  be  well  content  to  be  able  to  open  the  offens- 
ive against  the  hostile  blockading  corps  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Danube  on  the  fourth  day  after  the  arrival  of  our  main  body 
within  the  range  of  the  fortification. 

This  offensive  was  to  begin  with  a  nocturnal  surprise  on  the 
hostile  trenches. 

Between  the  proper  inner  fortress  of  Komorn  and  its  western 
outworks — the  so-called  Palatinal  line — is  situated  the  town  of 
Komorn,  with  its  southern  rows  of  houses  only  a  few  steps  dis- 
tant from  the  bank  of  the  stream. 

Directly  in  front  of  the  town,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  295 

— therefore  west  of  the  fort — lay  the  village  of  Uj-Sz6ny,  at  that 
time,  in  consequence  of  the  siege,  only  a  scene  of  conflagration. 
Westward  (up  the  river)  of  it,  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  rises 
to  a  height,  from  which  the  opposite  outwork  (the  Palatinal  line), 
nay  even  the  principal  rampart  of  the  fortress,  are  commanded ; 
the  latter  wall,  however,  only  within  the  widest  range  of  the 
largest  calibre.  This  commanding  point  is  known  in  German 
by  the  name  of  *'  Sandberg,"  in  Hungarian  of  "  Monostor." 

In  the  autumn  of  1848  the  Hungarian  government  had  the 
then  prosperous  village  of  Uj-Szony  surrounded  on  the  west,  south, 
and  southeast  with  earth-works,  in  form  of  a  large  curve,  and 
reaching  from  the  Monostor  as  far  as  the  Danube  fort.  The  ex- 
tensive space  between  it  and  the  river  was  to  serve  as  an  en- 
trenched camp ;  but  the  country  at  the  time  of  the  victorious 
invasion  of  Prince  Windischgratz  was  still  without  an  army  for 
this  camp,  and  the  fortress  of  Komorn  was  destitute  of  the  forces 
necessary  for  the  occupation  and  maintenance  of  its  gigantic  line 
of  defense. 

The  besieger  could  consequently  take  possession  of  the  abandon- 
ed earth- works  without  drawing  a  sword,  and  partly  appropriate 
them  to  his  own  purposes.  He  had  cut  his  trenches  along  the 
main  road  from  Raab  to  Ofen,  which,  parallel  with  the  bank  of 
the  stream,  crosses  the  fortified  camp,  and  had  planted  his  batte- 
ries, so  formidable  to  the  fortress,  on  the  Monostor  and  south  of 
the  Danube  fort ;  against  these  we  directed  the  sudden  attack 
by  which  we  opened  our  offensive  designed  for  the  complete 
deliverance  of  the  fortress. 

In  the  night  between  the  25th  and  26th  of  April,  about  4000 
infantry,  composed  of  the  best  troops  of  the  Damjanics  and  Klapka 
army  corps,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Knezich,  crossed  the 
just-finished  floating-bridge.  One  half  of  the  column  took  for 
the  object  of  its  attack  the  small  market-town  0-Szony,  east 
of  the  Danube  fort ;  the  other  the  hostile  battery  lying  south 
of  it. 

Both  points  were  in  our  hands  by  daybreak  of  the  2Gtli  of 
April ;  as  was  also  the  equipment  of  the  battery,  already  reduced 
to  four  24-pounders  and  two  18-pounders,  together  with  its  guard, 
consisting  of  about  200  men,  who  laid  down  their  arms  without 
further  resistance. 

In  the  same  night,  far  above  the  Palatinal  line,  two  battalions 


296  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

of  the  fortress  troops  crossed  the  Danube  in  boats,  for  the  purpose 
of  executing  simultaneously  a  brisk  tirailleur  attack  on  the  bat- 
teries posted  on  the  Monostor.  By  this  we  intended  to  attract  the 
enemy's  attention  thither,  that  the  attack  with  the  bayonet  on 
the  hostile  battery  erected  to  the  south  of  the  Danube  fort  might 
be  more  certainly  successful.  The  commander  of  the  two  battal- 
ions from  the  fortress,  however,  was  not  equal  to  his  task :  the 
attack  of  tirailleurs  on  the  Monostor  did  not  take  place  ;  but  the 
enterprise  against  0-Sz6ny  and  the  batteries  to  the  south  of  the 
Danube  fort  nevertheless  completely  succeeded. 

As  soon  as  the  news  arrived,  the  Damjanics  and  Klapka  army 
corps,  which  had  remained  during  the  nightly  expedition  of 
Colonel  Knezich  on  the  left  bank,  commenced  in  their  turn  the 
passage  over  the  floating-bridge  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube. 

Two  or  three  days  before,  the  Kmety  division — as  is  known, 
sent  from  Waizen  to  Parkany — had  reached  the  latter  place,  and 
the  other  two-thirds  of  the  seventh  army  corps,  which  had  re- 
mained behind  in  Kobolkut  (at  that  time  under  the  temporary 
command  of  Colonel  Poltenberg),  were  to  join  immediately  the 
Damjanics  and  Klapka  army  corps  in  Komorn  ;  when  suddenly 
there  arrived  intelligence  of  a  hostile  advance  from  Szered  toward 
Neuhausel  (Ersek-Ujvar),  which  caused  the  detaching  of  Polten- 
berg to  Perbete  and  Bajcs,  for  the  protection  of  our  line  of  com- 
munication with  Levencz  :  this  was  so  much  the  more  necessary 
as  we  were  daily  expecting  an  additional  supply  of  ammunition 
by  that  route. 

The  favorable  result  of  the  surprise  by  night,  however,  sug- 
gested as  our  next  enterprise,  to  transport  as  speedily  as  pos- 
sible a  stronger  force  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube ;  and 
while  the  Damjanics  and  Klapka  army  corps  had  to  pass  over 
the  floating-bridge,  a  courier  hastened  to  Perbete  to  inform  Pol- 
tenberg that  he  must  reach  Komorn  with  his  troops  without  loss 
of  time,  and  immediately  follow  these  two  army  corps  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  Danube. 

Meantime  that  half  of  our  troops  for  the  surprise  which  had 
been  sent  against  the  hostile  battery  situated  to  the  south  of  the 
Danube  fort,  after  taking  it  by  storm,  had  turned  eastward  against 
the  other  earth-works,  which  were  disposed  in  a  large  curve  ex- 
tending to  the  Monostor,  and  had  captured  those  nearest  to  them 
one  after  another  at  the  first  assault.     But  the  far-extended, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  297 

isolated  advance  of  this  column  of  infantry,  scarcely  2000  men 
strong,  exposed  it  to  the  most  dangerous  assault  on  the  part  of 
the  main  force  of  the  hostile  besieging  troops  of  all  the  three  arms, 
before  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  was  attained  by  the  first 
sections  of  our  main  body. 

Notwithstanding  the  solidity  of  the  floating-bridge,  it  could 
not  be  made  use  of  without  such  an  amount  of  precaution  as 
caused  considerable  delay ;  between  the  end  of  the  bridge  and 
the  point  on  which  these  2000  men  of  our  troops  of  surprise  were 
engaged  in  unequal  combat  against  the  three  combined  arms  of 
the  enemy,  there  existed  an  obstacle  insurmountable  for  cavalry 
and  artillery — the  trench,  the  lowering  of  which  at  intervals 
occasioned  another  loss  of  time  ;  and  in  this  way  more  than  an 
hour  had  already  elapsed  since  the  commencement  of  the  attack 
of  the  hostile  artillery  against  our  isolated  weak  section  of  in- 
fantry, before  the  first  half-battery  of  the  Damjanics  corps  could 
at  last  take  part  in  the  conflict. 

During  the  following  action  Klapka  had  to  command  our  left 
wing  (toward  0-Szony  and  Mocsa),  Damjanics  the  centre  (toward 
Puszta-Csem  and  Puszta-Herkaly),  while  I  undertook  the  conduct 
of  the  combat  on  the  right  wing  toward  Acs. 

The  contest  between  the  troops  of  surprise  and  the  besieging 
army  lay  in  the  range  of  General  Damjanics  (in  our  centre). 
Thither  the  troops  debouching  by  degrees  on  the  right  bank  were 
first  of  all  directed.  We  could  not,  however,  by  any  means  con- 
fine ourselves  exclusively  to  strengthening  our  centre,  because  it 
remained  nevertheless  for  a  long  time  exposed  to  the  danger  of 
being  overpowered — on  the  one  hand,  on  account  of  the  great 
superiority  of  the  hostile  forces  already  concentrated  against  it ; 
on  the  other,  from  the  slow  arrival  of  our  reinforcements  by  the 
floating-bridge  ;  and  because,  if  it  should  be  overpowered,  which 
was  easily  possible,  we  should  lose  our  sole  point  of  support,  ex- 
cept the  Danube  fort,  on  the  right  bank,  without  having  gained 
in  the  meantime  a  new  one. 

A  new  point  of  support,  however,  and  one  indeed  most  im^ 
portant  for  us — the  Monostor — seemed  just  then  to  be  neglected 
by  the  enemy,  and  while  the  centre  still  held  out,  the  more  easily 
to  be  gained  by  us,  as  I  supposed  for  certain,  that  the  two  bat- 
talions of  the  fortress,  who  were  to  keep  up  a  distracting  tirailleur 
attack  against  the  Monostor,  to  favor  the  nightly  surprise,  but 

N*  ' 


298  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

who  had  failed  in  doing  so,  would  now — several  hours  after  the 
time  fixed — at  least  have  arrived  on  the  spot. 

I  accordingly  interrupted  for  a  time  the  concourse  of  troops 
proceeding  from  the  outlet  of  the  floating-bridge  toward  the 
centre,  in  order  to  turn  off  a  half-battery,  v^th  a  half-squadron 
of  hussars  for  its  protection,  by  themselves  toward  the  Monostor. 
They  found  it  already  abandoned  by  the  enemy,  although  the 
two  battalions  of  the  fortress  had  not  yet  appeared. 

However  enigmatical  the — apparently  voluntary — evacuation 
of  the  Monostor  may  seem,  our  surprise  at  the  enemy's  thus  ex- 
posing himself  did  not  prevent  us  from  improving  it  as  conscien- 
tiously as  possible.  The  half-battery,  with  its  slender  protection 
of  cavalry — although  all  that  our  right  wing  possessed — advanced 
immediately  over  the  Monostor  and  along  the  main  road  toward 
Acs. 

The  object  of  this  advance  was  evidently  to  divert  a  part  of 
the  hostile  forces  which  were  still  acting  with  numerical  supe- 
riority, against  our  centre.  Whether,  and  how  far,  this  object 
was  attained,  I  could,  however,  not  perceive  with  my  own  eyes 
on  account  of  the  distance  between  our  centre  and  the  right 
wing.  I  only  saw  that  my  half-battery,  during  its  isolated  ad- 
vance, was  threatened  by  superior  forces  in  its  right  flank  as  well 
as  in  front,  and  that  it  ran  the  risk  of  being  separated  from  the 
centre  and  destroyed,  unless  the  earth-works  situated  between 
the  centre  and  the  Monostor,  but  nearest  to  the  latter,  were 
speedily  manned  with  infantry. 

Without  delay  I  employed  for  this  purpose  two  battalions  of 
the  Klapka  corps,  which  were  just  passing  over  the  floating- 
bridge  ;  for  our  left  wing,  under  Klapka,  was  at  that  time  the 
least  menaced. 

The  far-advanced  half-battery  withdrew  again  in  the  mean- 
time toward  the  Monostor. 

At  the  same  time  the  adversary  seemed  to  have  recognized — 
too  late,  however — the  importance  of  the  Monostor  to  him ;  at 
least  this  was  indicated  by  the  resolution  with  which  the  hostile 
left  wing  exchanged  its  hitherto  passive  demeanor  for  the  offens- 
ive, in  order  to  dispute  with  us  the  possession  of  the  Monostor. 

The  reader  is  aware,  from  what  precedes,  that  by  the  appella- 
tion "  Monostor"  is  here  meant  the  most  commanding  point  of 
the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  above  Uj-Szony ;  at  the  same  time, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  299 

the  point  on  which  the  fortified  camp  leans  to  the  west.  From 
this  point  the  undulating  ground  descends  toward  the  west  (up 
the  stream),  and  is  covered,  to  the  extent  of  about  double  gun- 
range,*  only  by  vineyards  and  isolated  fruit-trees.  Where  these 
end,  the  wood  begins,  known  to  me  only  by  the  name  *'  Forest 
of  Acs,"  which  extends  along  the  bank  of  the  Danube,  up  the 
stream,  as  far  as  the  brook  Czonczo.  The  width  of  this  forest 
gradually  increases  from  the  vineyards.  At  the  distance  of  three 
or  four  gun-ranges  from  the  Monostor,  however,  a  large  piece  of 
forest  branches  off  from  the  wood  on  the  river-bank,  about  one 
or  two  gun-ranges  in  a  southern  direction  toward  Puszta-Herkaly. 
This  piece  of  forest  is  crossed  near  its  southern  limit  by  the  main 
road  from  Raab.  Between  its  eastern  edge  and  the  fortified 
camp  the  ground  is  free  and  open,  as  well  as  between  its  west- 
ern edge  and  the  brook  Czonczo.  Beyond  the  brook,  on  its  left 
bank,  lies  the  village  of  Acs,  through  which  leads  the  main  road 
from  Raab. 

This  southern  piece  of  forest,  together  with  the  whole  forest  on 
the  river-bank  adjoining  it,  as  far  as  the  vineyards  of  the  Monos- 
tor, were  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  their  line  of  retreat 
toward  Acs  was  hereby  completely  secured.  If  we  intended  se- 
riously to  endanger  this,  we  must  evidently  first  drive  him  fur- 
ther into  the  forest  of  Acs,  at  least  as  far  as  beyond  the  southern 
piece  of  the  forest.  My  original  attempt,  to  advance  with  a  half- 
battery  along  the  main  road  to  Acs,  without  regard  to  the  forest 
on  the  river-bank  flanked  by  it,  could  be  successful  only  as  a 
feint.  However,  the  resolute  offensive,  which  the  hostile  left 
wing  had  now  suddenly  assumed,  proved  that  the  adversary  had 
already  sufficiently  recovered  from  his  first  surprise — to  the  con- 
sequences of  which  we  were  probably  indebted  for  the  very  wel 
come  evacuation  of  the  Monostor — no  longer  to  allow  himself  to 
be  imposed  upon  by  mere  firing  with  blank-cartridges. 

While  the  artillery  and  cavalry  of  the  hostile  left  wing  pressed 
on — at  an  equal  height  with  the  eastern  end  (turned  toward  us) 
of  the  forest  on  the  river  bank — after  our  half-battery  on  its  re- 

*  By  "  gun-range,"  where  this  expression  occurs  in  the  present  work 
without  the  addition  of  a  defined  calibre,  is  always  meant  the  distance  at 
which,  in  hostile  encounters  in  the  open  field,  batteries  of  six-pounders  are 
most  frequently  used.  This  distance  generally  varies  from  800  to  1000 
paces. 


300  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

treat  toward  the  Monostor  along  the  main  road,  a  swarm  of 
tirailleurs  rushed  out  from  this  eastern  part  of  the  forest  toward 
the  vineyards  of  the  Monostor,  which  on  our  part  was  occupied 
only  by  two  companies  of  the  seventeenth  Honved  battalion. 
These  sufficed,  it  is  true,  to  maintain  the  vineyards,  but  not  for 
a  successful  counter-attack,  which  I  intended.  Consequently 
two  other  companies  of  the  same  battalion  were  ordered  forward ; 
this  was  one  of  the  two  battalions  which  I  had  sent  from  the 
Klapka  corps  on  to  the  Monostor,  to  compensate  for  the  still- 
missing  battalions  of  the  fortress. 

The  brisk  shrapnell-fire  of  these  hostile  divisions  of  artillery, 
which  had  closely  followed  our  retreating  battery  on  the  open 
ground  bordering  upon  the  south  of  the  Monostor,  rendered  this 
attack  difficult.  It  nevertheless  succeeded ;  and  soon  after  the 
four  companies  of  the  seventeenth  Honved  battalion  had  estab- 
lished themselves  in  the  forest  on  the  river-bank. 

At  the  same  time  there  arrived  at  the  Monostor  from  our  left 
wing,  as  a  re-inforcement  to  our  right,  the  first  regiment  of  hus- 
sars (Kaiser),  besides  a  half-battery.  The  battalions  of  the  for- 
tress which  had  been  in  vain  expected  for  a  long  time,  also  ar- 
rived at  last.  The  forces  at  my  disposal  consisted  consequently 
of  four  Honved  battalions,  eight  squadrons  of  hussars,  and  eight 
guns.  With  these  I  believed  I  could  now  the  more  confidently 
assume  the  offensive  against  the  hostile  left  wing  in  the  forest, 
as  well  as  in  the  open  ground  contiguous  to  the  south,  because 
Damjanics  had  already  vigorously  repulsed  the  attacks  on  our 
centre,  nay  was  even  acting  on  the  offensive,  so  that  the  earth- 
works next  the  Monostor  no  longer  needed  to  be  defended  by 
troops. 

As  the  principal  object  of  attack  for  the  right  wing  I  chose  the 
above-indicated  piece  of  forest,  which  extends  from  the  forest  on 
the  river-bank  in  a  southern  direction  toward  Puszta-Herkaly  be- 
yond the  main  road.  I  intended  to  attack  it  simultaneously  from 
both  ends ;  in  the  south,  its  point,  with  the  two  battalions  from 
the  fortress  ;  in  the  north,  its  basis  (where  it  joins  the  forest  on 
the  river-bank),  with  the  seventeenth  battalion  ;  while  the  other 
battalion  of  the  Klapka  corps  had  to  remain  in  reserve.  Of 
course  the  hostile  forces  of  artillery  and  cavalry,  developed  on  the 
open  ground  a  clieval  of  the  main  road,  had  previously  to  be 
completely  dislodged. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  301 

Occupied  with  the  accomplishment  of  this  task,  I  had  already 
advanced  nearly  to  gun-range  distance  of  the  piece  of  forest,  when 
I  was  overtaken  by  a  written  report  from  General  Damjanics,  to 
this  effect :  "  The  enemy  has  been  reinforced.  Nagy-Sandor 
with  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  has  been  overthrown.  Klap- 
ka  is  retreating  toward  the  fort  of  the  Danube.  If  the  right  wing 
advances  further,  I  am  no  longer  able  to  protect  it  from  being 
turned  on  the  left,  without  exposing  my  own  left." 

These  news  obliged  me  to  interrupt  my  advance ;  nay,  I  im- 
raiediately  sent  back  the  battalion  of  the  reserve  to  the  Monostor, 
that  it  might  meanwhile  again  occupy  the  earth- works  situated 
nearest  to  this  point, 

I  wrote  to  Damjanics,  that  he,  like  myself,  should  give  way, 
even  to  a  superior  force,  only  tardily  ;  and  if  it  came  to  the  worst, 
maintain  at  any  rate  the  earth- works  of  the  fortified  camp  lying 
within  his  range. 

The  hostile  left  wing  also  seemed  to  have  received  meanwhile 
considerable  reinforcements ;  for  it  now  suddenly  resumed,  with 
superior  force  of  artillery,  the  combat  which  had  already  ceased 
on  its  part ;  while  of  my  eight  guns,  after  a  short  reply  to  the 
hostile  cannonade,  six  pieces  were  silent  from  want  of  ammuni- 
tion. The  chests,  which  had  been  sent  for  the  purpose  of  bring- 
ing us  fresh  supplies  of  ammunition,  had  all  been  returned  to  us 
empty.  Only  two  guns  had  still  some  powder  and  ball  remain- 
ing. The  fire  of  these,  however,  had  to  be  reserved  for  the  pos- 
sible case,  that  the  enemy  might  intend  to  make  a  more  ener- 
getic attempt  than  formerly  to  reconquer  the  Monostor. 

I  consequently  withdrew  all  the  eight  guns  from  the  combat, 
and  sent  them  back  to  the  Monostor.  The  commander  of  the  first 
regiment  of  hussars  had  perhaps  conceived  this  to  be  the  desired 
signal  for  a  general  retreat,  as  he  used  the  utmost  speed  in  reach- 
ing the  Monostor  with  his  regiment,  and  even  outstript  the  guns. 
The  two  battalions  of  the  fortress  would  have  followed  the  ex- 
ample of  the  hussars  :  fortunately,  however,  I  perceived  this  in- 
tention time  enough  to  prevent  it. 

I  had  both  the  battalions  of  the  fortress  marched  up  enfrcmt 
opposite  the  hostile  cannonade,  and  forced  them  to  stand  it  with- 
out flinching.  By  this  open  display,  as  it  were,  of  contempt  of 
death,  I  intended  beforehand  to  make  the  success  of  storming 
our  position  on  the  Monostor  appear  doubtful  to  the  enemy.     I 


302  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY, 

had  great  difficulty  in  this  matter  with  the  troops,  who  were 
accustomed  to  the  protecting  breast- works  of  the  ramparts  of  the 
fortress ;  still  more,  however,  with  the  staff-officer  who  com- 
manded these  battalions.  And  after  all,  the  attempt  to  impose 
upon  the  enemy  by  a  passive  resistance,  turned  out  to  be  super- 
fluous ;  because,  notwithstanding  the  vehemence  of  his  renewed 
attack,  he,  had  no  intention  whatever  of  assuming  the  offensive  ; 
since,  had  he  purposed  the  reconquest  of  the  fortified  camp,  he 
could  not  have  forborne  a  simultaneous  advance  in  the  forest 
along  the  bank  of  the  Danube  against  the  Monostor ;  but  no 
such  advance  was  attempted. 

As  soon  as  I  discovered  this  circumstance — not,  it  is  true,  till 
the  battahons  of  the  fortress  had  sensibly  suffered — I  released 
them  from  their  painful  situation,  allowing  them  to  retire  by 
degrees  out  of  the  reach  of  the  fire  of  the  artillery. 

By  this  means  the  foremost  line  of  battle  of  our  right  wing 
reached  the  same  height  with  that  of  the  centre  under  Damjan- 
ics,  who,  although  stopping  his  advance,  in  consequence  of  Nagy- 
Sandor's  flight  and  Klapka's  retreat  at  the  commencement,  had, 
nevertheless,  firmly  maintained  himself  on  the  ground  he  had 
already  gained. 

By  our  giving  up  the  offensive,  the  day's  battle  came  to  an  end 
early  in  the  afternoon.     An  unconcerted  armistice  took  place. 

The  enemy,  satisfied  that  he  was  no  longer  menaced  by  us, 
wholly  desisted  from  further  attacks  on  our  position  in  front  of 
the  fortified  camp ;  while  the  two  army  corps  under  Damjanics 
and  Klapka  were  condemned  to  an  equal  inactivity  from  the 
want  of  ammunition,  which  had  already  been  generally  felt ;  and 
the  two-thirds  of  the  seventh  army  corps,  hastening  hither  from 
Perbete,  and  having  still  a  pretty  good  supply  of  ammunition,  did 
not  make  its  appearance  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  on 
account  of  its  great  distance  from  Komorn,  until  night  had  set 
in,  namely,  long  after  the  enemy  had  effected  his  retreat  from 
the  field  of  battle. 

The  day,  however,  remained  ours  ;  for  we  had  taken  the  forti- 
fied camp  together  with  the  enemy's  trench,  the  equipment  of  a 
besieging  battery,  and  considerable  stores  of  pioneers'  tools  and 
projectiles — nay,  even  the  tents  of  the  hostile  camp ;  and  had 
completely  delivered  the  fortress  :  while  the  enemy,  far  from  dis- 
puting with  us  the  possession  of  all  this,  contented  himself  with 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  303 

the  hurried  protection  of  his  retreat  from  the  field  of  battle  by 
Raab  to  Wieselburg ;  in  which,  indeed,  the  greatest  service  was 
rendered  to  him  by  the  scarcity  of  ammunition  on  the  part  of  the 
artillery  of  both  the  army  corps  (Damjanics  and  Klapka)  engaged 
in  this  day's  action,  which  prevented  them  from  attacking  him, 
as  well  as  by  the  too  late  arrival  of  Poltenberg  on  the  field  of 
battle. 

With  the  complete  deliverance  of  Komorn,  the  execution  of  the 
plan  of  operations  projected  in  Godollo — after  the  battle  of  Isas- 
zeg — by  our  chief  of  the  general  staff  had  satisfactorily  suc- 
ceeded ;  thanks  to  the  unshaken  firmness  of  General  Damjanics 
during  the  battle  of  Nagy-Sarlo,  as  well  as  to  the  admirable  per- 
severance and  rare  masterly  skill  with  which  General  Aulich 
knew  how  so  long  to  fetter  the  Austrian  principal  army  concen- 
trated before  Pesth,  and  to  deceive  it  as  to  our  real  strategic 
intentions,  until  the  subsequent  perception  of  them  appeared  to 
be  only  the  more  calculated  to  lead  our  bewildered  adversary  to 
his  disgraceful  defeat  at  Nagy-Sarlo. 


CHAPTER  XLYIL 

When,  on  the  17th  of  April  1849,  the  news  of  the  resolution 
adopted  three  days  before  by  the  Diet  reached  my  head-quarters 
at  Levencz,  and  all  the  officers  of  my  suite  who  happened  to  be 
present  immediately  expressed  the  most  undisguised  indignation 
at  this  resolution;  when,  on  the  following  day,  the  officers  of  the 
seventh  army  corps  called  upon  me  for  the  fulfillment  of  the  second 
point  especially  in  the  concluding  declaration  of  my  proclamation 
from  Waizen,  and  moreover  informed  me  beforehand,  that  the 
whole  seventh  army  corps  intended  to  do  the  same  officially  on 
the  first  opportunity ;  while  at  the  same  time  a  disposition  nothing 
less  than  unfavorable  to  the  new  law  seemed  to  prevail  among 
the  army  corps  under  Damjanics  and  Klapka ; — -I  had  seriously 
to  apprehend  that  the  army  was  near  its  dissolution. 

The  peculiar  conjunctures  of  the  moment*  obliged  me  to  resolve, 
in  the  last  extremity — that  is,  if  the  seventh  army  corps  should 
*  See  Chapter  xliv. 


304  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

insist  on  my  acting  in  a  determined  manner,  in  accordance  with 
my  proclamation  of  Waizen  against  the  decision  of  the  14th  of 
April — to  summon  the  staff-officers  of  the  army,  and  likewise 
deputies  from  the  corps  of  subaltern  officers  belonging  to  all  bodies 
of  troops,  to  assemble  for  consultation,  and  set  down  the  declara- 
tion of  the  majority  of  the  assembly  as  a  compromise  between 
the  parties  of  different  opinions  existing  in  the  army. 

The  danger  of  such  a  step,  in  the  face  of  the  conflicts  with  the 
enemy  to  be  expected  ;  the  excitement  of  the  passions  during  the 
discussion  ;  the  depressingly  vivid  exhibition — unavoidable  on  the 
occasion — of  the  pernicious  consequences  to  Hungary  of  the  14th 
of  April ;  the  participation  in  our  further  contests  of  probably 
scarcely  half  of  those  who,  through  the  admitted  difference  of 
opinion  for  and  against  the  law  of  the  14th  of  April — whatever 
the  decision  of  the  majority — would  otherwise  be  forced  to  fight 
against  their  conviction  ; — all  these  undeniable  consequences  of 
this  desperate  resolve  proved  to  me  clearly  enough  that,  as  I 
could  nevertheless  discover  no  better  means,  my  sagacity  was 
here  nonplused. 

In  the  conclusion  of  the  chapter  in  which  the  14th  of  April 
was  mentioned  here  for  the  first  time,  I  was  obliged,  anticipat- 
ing the  chronological  order  of  these  records,  already  to  acknowl- 
edge, that  while  in  this  perplexed  condition,  evenU  came  to  my 
assistance :  and  such  was  really  the  case. 

The  seventh  army  corps — accidentally  not  united — before  the 
battle  of  Nagy-Sarlo  could  come  to  no  decision  upon  the  intended 
demonstration  against  the  law  of  the  14th  of  April.  After  this 
battle,  the  operations  on  our  part,  which  had  been  interrupted 
for  several  days  by  the  tardy  construction  of  the  bridge  across  the 
river  Gran,  had  again  reached  that  point  of  offensive  develop- 
ment, when  they  completely  absorbed  at  the  same  time  both  the 
physical  and  mental  activity  of  the  soldier  ;  and  while  the  known 
success  of  these  operations — the  defeat  of  the  enemy  at  Nagy- 
Sarlo  on  the  19th,  his  retreat  from  the  battle-field  at  Kemend  over 
the  Danube  on  the  20th,  the  partial  deliverance  of  Komorn  on 
the  22d,  its  complete  relief  on  the  26th  of  April,  and  finally  the 
general  retreat  of  the  Austrian  army  toward  the  frontiers  of  the 
country — satisfied  alike  the  adversaries  and  the  non-adversaries 
of  the  14th  of  April ;  the  former  by  this  very  success  were 
strengthened  in  their  idea,  first  of  all  to  exi^el  completely  out  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  305 

the  country  the  external  enemies  to  the  Hungarian  constitu- 
tion of  1848,  in  order  afterward  to  get  rid  more  easily  of  its  in- 
ternal foes,  and  thus  to  restore  that  constitution,  the  overthrow 
of  which  was  the  point  where  the  political  extremes  of  the  Hun- 
gary of  that  day  met. 

Confidence  in  the  possibility  of  realizing  this  idea,  however,  in 
spite  of  the  late  victories,  by  which  it  had  been  raised,  dissolved 
into  pure  enthusiasm  before  a  single  cahn  glance  of  the  soldier  at 
the  recent  past,  the  present,  and  the  near  future. 

The  Hungarian  arms  in  the  space  of  four  weeks  had,  it  is  true, 
performed  such  unwonted  exploits,  as  to  have  prophesied  would 
have  been  to  succeed  in  rivaling  Kossuth's  most  high-flown  pro- 
clamations. With  our  armed  forces,  however,  small  in  proportion 
to  those  of  the  enemy,  I  could  by  no  means  conceal  from  myself, 
that  these  exploits  were  the  extreme  which  Hungary  had  to  ex- 
pect from  her  army  with  its  then  degree  of  military  training. 

"We  were  unfortunately  obliged  to  admit,  according  to  my  own 
experience  in  the  field,  that  it  was  not,  perhaps,  a  high  degree  of 
valor  pervading  the  "  young  army,"  which  had  nailed  victory  to 
our  colors.  Nay,  we  were  forced  to  acknowledge — however  pow- 
erfully self-love  strove  against  it — that  a  considerable  part  of  the  ' 
thanks  of  the  nation  for  the  speedy  and  happy  termination  of  the 
just-described  April  campaign,  was  due  at  bottom  to  Field-mar- 
shal Prince  Windischgratz  and  the  Ban  Baron  Jellachich. 

We  had  gained  bloody  victories.  This,  indeed,  no  bulletins 
could  nullify,  even  with  the  best  intentions  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  ;  but  the  palm  of  most  of  these  victories  was  constantly 
due  only  to  a  small  part  of  our  army,  almost  always  to  one  and 
the  same  part.  In  it  the  young  original  Honved  soldiers  were 
indeed  strongly  represented,  but  still  disproportionately  less  so  than 
the  old  soldiers,  the  regular  ones,  as  they  were  called — the  former 
constituent  parts  of  the  very  army  opposed  to  us.  This  portion 
of  our  force — as  no  reliance  whatever  could  be  placed  on  the  re- 
mainder, the  greater  part  by  far — could  never  at  any  time  be 
spared  ;  it  bore  the  brunt  in  every  engagement ;  the  majority  of 
the  losses  by  which  we  had  to  purchase  every  advantage  on  the 
field  of  battle  had  constantly  fallen  upon  the  ranks  of  our  best 
troops — those  who  could  not  be  replaced. 

And  the  rest  were  very  far  from  having  gained,  during  the 
course  of  the  campaign,  so  much  in  discipline  and  valor  as  to 


306  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

make  up  m  a  moral  point  of  view  for  our  losses.  The  strict 
military  discipline,  which,  assisted  hy  the  older  officers,  I  had  been 
endeavoring  to  introduce,  and  not  altogether  without  success,  into 
the  corps  d'armee  of  the  upper  Danube — now  the  seventh  army 
corps — met  with  little  sympathy  from  the  commanders  of  the 
other  corps,  Aulich  excepted.  As  the  temporary  substitute  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vetter,  however,  I  had 
not  in  fact  sufficient  power  to  keep  my  comrades  energetically  to 
equal  efforts. 

The  greater  part  of  the  hopeful  young  army  could  not  always 
as  yet  be  supplied  with  provisions  for  more  than  one  day  in  ad- 
vance ;  consequently  the  uninterrupted  resolute  pursuit  of  the 
beaten  enemy  was  never  possible ;  but  without  such  a  pursuit 
there  can  be  no  complete  defeat,  and  without  it  no  favorable 
termination  to  a  war,  which,  like  that  between  Hungary  and 
Austria,  especially  after  the  14th  of  April  1849,  could  end  only 
with  the  complete  defeat  of  the  one  or  the  other  armed  force. 

Moreover,  the  camp  of  the  most  of  the  army  corps  literally 
swarmed  with  the  vehicles  of  officers,  non-commissioned  officers, 
and  sutlers,  without  reckoning  the  wagons  necessary  for  the  trans- 
port of  the  daily  supplies.  This  barricade  of  wagons,  inseparable 
from  the  army,  and  extremely  obstructive  to  its  swift,  continuous 
advance,  already  rendered  an  accidentally  called-for  flank  move- 
ment a  problem  difficult  of  solution,  and  any  thought  on  the 
part  of  the  general  of  the  possible  necessity  for  a  retreat  was 
enough  to  make  one's  hair  stand  on  end. 

In  order  accordingly  to  nail  victory  lastingly  to  the  Hungarian 
tricolor  banner  in  this  state  of  discipline  of  the  majority  of  our 
troops,  either  the  army  must  be  augmented  to  such  an  extent,  that 
numerically  superior  forces,  under  the  command  of  skillful  leaders, 
could  be  opposed  to  the  enemy  on  all  points  on  whibh  the  coun- 
try was  menaced  by  him  ;  or  the  leaders  of  the  Hungarian  army, 
in  general  inferior  to  the  enemy  in  number,  discipline,  and  valor, 
must  remain  superior  to  the  hostile  generals,  taking  one  with  an- 
other, in  the  amount  of  the.fortune-of  war  or  of  talent  to  such  a 
degree  as  had  hitherto  been  the  case. 

To  satisfy  the  first  demand  of  this  alternative  was  simply  im- 
possible ;  for,  however  willingly  the  country  might  have  furnish- 
ed the  number  of  recruits  necessary  for  the  formation  of  new  bat- 
talions, the  means  of  equipping  them,  according  to  the  exigencies 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  307 

of  the  modem  system  of  warfare,  were  wanting.  And  the  idea 
of  raising  the  army  to  the  desired  strength  with  scythe-bearers,  or 
perhaps  even  with  Amazons,  may  perhaps  do  well  enough  aa 
clap-trap  in  high-sounding  debates  about  the  invincihleness  of 
this  or  that  nation ;  but  the  lips  of  an  experienced  soldier,  to 
whom  the  esteem  of  his  companions  in  arms  is  still  of  some  im- 
portance, can  not  speak  of  it  without  irony  I 

The  second  demand  of  the  preceding  alternative  could  only  be 
addressed  to  that  firm  in  which  "  pious  wishes"  are  realized. 

It  is  true  the  history  of  war  names  gifted  generals  who  knew 
how  to  secure  victory  in  spite  of  the  inferior  number  of  their 
troops ;  but  nowhere  do  we  find  definite  measures  and  formulas 
given,  by  the  use  of  which  it  would  be  possible  to  discover  be- 
forehand— to  pass  over  the  fortune-of-war  in  silence — first,  the 
strategic  genius  of  an  individual,  then  the  maximum  of  the  rela- 
tive minus  in  the  number  of  troops  which  would  be  compensated 
for  by  a  certain  quantity  of  genius  in  the  general.  Nay,  even 
assuming  that  such  measures  and  formulas  were  indicated  by 
the  art  of  war,  and  that  we  had  the  ability  to  make  the  best  pos- 
sible use  of  them,  we  might,  it  is  true,  have  been  spared  many  a 
sad  mistake  in  the  choice  of  our  own  commanders  of  troops ;  but  to 
preserve  unchanged  the  favorable  proportion  in  which  the  leaders 
of  our  armies  have  hitherto  appeared  to  be  superior  to  the  hostile 
generals  in  fortune-of-war  or  talent  would  nevertheless  have  no 
longer  been  in  our  power,  after  the  chief  command  of  the  hostile 
army  had  been  transferred  from  Field-marshal  Prince  Windisch- 
gratz  to  the  Master  of  the  Ordnance  Baron  Welden.  For  although 
the  latter's  renown,  in  the  light  in  which  it  had  then  penetrated 
to  our  ranks,  appertained  rather  to  the  author  than  to  the  general, 
the  woeful  change  in  the  condition  of  the  Austrian  army  from  De- 
cember, 1848,  to  April,  1849,  had  fully  convinced  us,  that  an  ap- 
pointment to  the  hostile  chief  command  more  favorable  to  us  than 
that  of  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz  was  almost  impossible 
— an  equally  favorable  one  in  the  highest  degree  improbable. 

Our  situation,  after  this  change  in  the  hostile  chief  command, 
in  spite  of  our  late  victories,  threatened  consequently  to  become  at 
all  events  more  critical  than  it  had  previously  been,  altogether  in- 
dependently of  the  fateful  consequences  of  the  14th  of  April  to  us. 

If,  moreover,  I  took  these  also  fully  into  consideration,  I  could 
not  fail  to  perceive  that — with  the  probability  of  seeing  the  hos- 


^ 


308  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

tile  forces  opposed  to  us  soon  augmented  to  an  overwhelming 
superiority — it  was  indeed  quite  indifferent  whether  Field-mar- 
shal Prince  Windischgratz  or  any  other  stood  at  the  head  of  the 
hostile  army.  The  change  in  the  Austrian  chief  command,  by 
the  side  of  the  inauspicious  declarations  of  the  Austrian  soldiers 
who  had  been  made  prisoners  on  the  26th  of  April,  sank  to  a 
subordinate  circumstance,  insignificant  as  regarded  the  question 
of  the  existence  of  Hungary. 

For  these  prisoners  of  war  related,  that  their  officers  had  con- 
soled them  for  the  repeated  retreats  with  the  assurance  that  a 
Russian  army  was  already  about  marching  against  us,  and  that 
the  Austrian  forces  were  retreating  only  in  order  to  await  the 
entrance  of  the  former  into  Hungary. 

These  declarations  were  indeed  derided  by  our  optimists,  as 
flying  rumors.  Nay,  even  to  myself  they  came  unexpectedly  ;  for 
I  had  supposed  that  the  Austrian  Government,  as  it  seemed  now 
to  be  necessary  to  make  an  unusual  sacrifice  for  the  salvation  of 
the  monarchy,  would,  for  reasons  which  it  is  superfluous  to. 
enumerate,  decide  rather  on  the  evacuation  of  Italy  than  on  the 
acceptance  of  foreign  aid.  The  unlooked-for  nature  of  these  de- 
clarations, however,  could  scarcely  weaken  their  credibility  in 
the  eyes  of  those  who  were  unprejudiced  enough  to  consider,  that 
the  hostile  officers,  even  from  jealousy  of  the  victorious  reputation 
of  their  own  army,  would  have  hesitated  to  console  their  bewil- 
dered inferiors  with  the  prospect  of  the  assistance  of  a  foreign 
army,  if  the  same  consolation  had  not  been  given  to  them  by 
their  generals,  and  to  these  by  the  ministers  in  Vienna. 

I  no  longer  doubted  for  a  moment  that  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
would  interfere  with  Hungary. 

Hereupon  our  optimists  again  thought,  that  in  such  a  case 
England,  France,  Sardinia,  North  America,  all  Germany,  Tur- 
key, &c.,  Avould  immediately  declare  war  against  the  Emperor 
of  Russia.  But  however  plausible  this  view  had  been  before  the 
14th  of  April,  after  that  day  its  surprisingly  quick  propagation 
seemed  to  me  to  be  only  a  lamentable  proof  how  largely  a  certain 
epidemic  of  political  eccentricity  prevailed  in  my  country.  More- 
over, it  must  be  quite  indiflerent  to  the  defender  of  any  cause 
which  falls  in  consequence  of  the  hostile  intervention  of  a  third 
party,  whether  the  right  of  this  third  one  to  interfere  is  or  is  not 
afterward  disputed  by  a  fourth  or  fifth. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  309 

The  Debreczin  lawgivers  of  the  14th  of  April  had  with  the 
Russian  intervention  immediately  raised  the  ghost  of  the  last 
hours  of  the  country ;  but  were  not  in  possession  of  the  right 
magic  formula  to  lay  it  again.  They  could  not  compensate  for 
this  by  all  their  optimist  oracular  apothegms ;  could  not  charm 
away  the  gaping  wounds,  of  which  I  mentally  saw  that  my 
fatherland  was  bleeding  to  death ;  could  not  deceive  the  calm 
glance,  before  which,  as  has  been  said,  confidence  in  the  possible 
realization  of  the  idea  of  again  restoring  the  constitution  of  the 
country,  in  defiance  of  its  external  as  well  as  internal  enemies — 
namely,  those  Debreczin  lawgivers — ^melted  away  as  mere  en- 
thusiasm. 

The  facts,  the  consideration  of  which  led  to  this  sorrowful  re- 
sult, lay  open  to  the  glance  of  every  soldier  in  our  main  army — 
they  were  generally  known.  From  them  any  one  might  deduce 
the  same  inference,  before  which  my  belief  in  the  possibility  of 
saving  Hungary  from  the  "  blessings  of  the  octroyed  constitution'* 
had  already  melted  into  thin  air.  For  this  no  peculiar  sagacity 
was  necessary.  A  mind  uninfatuated  and  a  vision  unobstructed 
were  quite  sufficient. 

And  the  blind  belief — which  could  not  withstand  that  infer- 
ence ;  which  alone  kept  the  army  still  together  ;  in  which  alone 
the  old  constitutional  soldiers,  in  spite  of  their  hostile  feeling 
against  the  lawgivers  of  the  14th  of  April,  were  united  with  the 
friends  of  the  latter  in  the  struggle  against  the  army  of  the 
octroyed  constitution — was  consequently  a  very  uncertain  means 
of  unison  for  the  parts  of  the  Hungarian  army  opposed  to  each 
other  in  their  political  opinions.  The  same  troops  which  the 
contest  against  Austria  united  to-day  might  to-morrow  employ 
their  arms  against  each  other.  The  most  dangerous  enemy  of 
the  Hungarian  army  did  not  stand  in  front  of  it,  he  lurked — 
thanks  to  the  14th  of  April,  which  had  aroused  him — in  their 
own  ranks  ;  it  was  the  spirit  of  discord,  silenced  for  the  present, 
but  by  no  means  banished  forever,  by  a  not  less  dangerous  enemy, 
the  spirit  of  arrogance. 

To  cajole  the  former — for  I  distrusted  my  power  of  successfully 
combating  it  openly — to  destroy  the  latter,  on  the  contrary,  at 
one  stroke,  I  saw  was  my  next  task,  if  I  had  still  the  energetic 
prosecution  of  the  war  against  Austria  seriously  at  heart,  which, 
notwithstanding  the  14th  of  April,  was  really  the  case. 


310  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY; 

I  attempted  to  accomplish  this  by  a  proclamation,  the  original 
sketch  of  which,  in  Hungarian,  I  happen  still  to  possess.  I  hero 
give  it  in  the  German  translation. 

"  KoMORN,  29th  April,  1849. 
"Companions  in  Arms  ! 

"  A  month  has  scarcely  elapsed  since  we  stood  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Theiss,  casting  a  doubtful  glance  into  our  doubtful  future. 

"  Who  would  then  have  believed  that  a  month  later  we  should  have 
already  crossed  the  Danube,  and  have  delivered  the  greater  part  of  our  fair 
country  from  the  yoke  of  a  perfidious  dynasty? 

''  The  boldest  among  us  had  not  dared  confidently  to  expect  so  much. 

"But  the  noble  feeling  of  patriotism  had  insphed  youj  and  in  your 
courage  the  enemy  beheld — numberless  legions. 

"  You  have  been  victorious — victorious  seven  times  in  uninterrupted 
succession — and  you  must  continue  to  conquer. 

"  Think  of  this  when  you  again  encounter  the  enemy. 

"Every  battle  we  fought  was  decisive;  more  decisive  still  will  be  every 
one  we  have  yet  to  fight. 

"  On  you  has  devolved  the  happiness,  by  the  sacrifice  of  your  lives,  of 
securing  to  Himgary  her  ancient  independence,  her  nationality,  her  free- 
dom, and  her  permanent  existence.  Such  your  most  glorious,  holiest 
mission. 

"  Think  of  this  when  you  again  encounter  the  enemy. 

"  Many  of  us  imagine  the  wished-for  future  to  be  already  won.  Do  not 
deceive  yourselves  !  This  combat — not  Hungary  alone  against  Austria — 
Europe  will  fight,  for  the  natural,  most  sacred  rights  of  peoples  agamst 
usurping  tyranny. 

"  And  the  peoples  will  conquer  every  where ! 

"  But  you  can  hardly  live  to  witness  the  victory,  if  you  dedicate  your- 
selves to  the  combat  with  unflinching  fidelity;  for  this  you  can  do  only 
with  the  firm  resolve  to  fall  a  sacrifice  in  this  most  glorious,  noblest  victory. 

"Think  of  this'when  you  again  encounter  the  enemy. 

"  And  being  animated  by  the  lively  belief  that  none  of  you  would  pre- 
fer a  degraded  existence  to  a  glorious  death;  that  you  all  feel  with  me 
that  it  is  impossible  to  enslave  a  nation,  whose  sons  resemble  the  heroes 
of  Szolnok,  Hatvan,  Tapio-Bicske,  Isaszeg,  Waizen,  Nagy-Sarlo,  and 
Komorn — I  have  for  you  in  future,  even  amid  the  fiercest  thuiader  of  the 
battle,  but  one  cry  : 

"  Forward,  comrades  !  forward  ! 

"  Think  of  this  when  you  again  encounter  the  enemy." 

The  attack  against  the  dynasty,  which  I  designedly  associated 
with  my  review  of  the  rapid,  fortunate  course  of  the  recent  cam- 
paign, was  intended  to  shake  the  fundamental  aversion  of  the  old 
constitutional  soldiers  to  the  law  of  the  14th  of  April,  and  thus 
in  some  measure  to  become  myself  the  mediator  between  them 
and  the  part  of  the  army  well  disposed  to  the  law. 

This  in  itself  hazardous  attempt — thanks  to  the  popularity 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  311 

which  I  enjoyed  among  the  old  soldiers  of  the  main  army  espe- 
cially— had  nevertheless  the  favorable  result,  that  those  of  the 
officers  belonging  to  this  category  who  could  by  no  means  feel 
that  their  further  participation  in  the  war  was  compatible  even 
with  the  mere  silent  acknowledgment  of  this  law,  quitted  the 
ranks  of  the  active  army,  at  least  with  every  possible  avoidance 
of  any  exciting  eclat ;  while  the  rest — reckoning  the  silent  ac- 
knowledgment as  none  at  all — soothed  themselves  with  the  cir- 
cumstance that  no  official  homage  whatever  had  been  offered  in 
the  name  of  the  army  to  the  law  of  the  14th  of  April. 


CHAPTER  XLVIII. 

The  state  of  affairs  in  the  sphere  of  operations  of  the  Hun- 
garian main  army,  immediately  after  the  26th  of  April  (the  day 
of  the  complete  relief  of  Komorn),  was  as  follows  : 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube — out  of  the  island  of  Schiitt — 
the  Austrian  forces  were  retreating  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag, 
in  part  forced  back,  in  part  merely  followed,  in  the  valley  of 
Turocz,  by  Armin  Gorgei's  expeditionary  detachment ;  along  the 
road  from  Levencz  to  Neutra  by  the  expeditionary  column,  which 
had  been  sent  from  the  seventh  army  corps  to  Verebely  before  the 
relief  of  Komorn ;  in  the  island  of  Schiitt  itself  the  western 
besieging  corps  falling  back  toward  Presburg,  abandoned  that 
part  of  the  island  which  is  situated  next  to  the  fortress,  to  the 
extent  of  one  or  two  days'  march,  to  a  column  detached  from 
the  garrison  of  Komorn. 

On  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  the  Austrian  main  army, 
after  the  evacuation  of  the  city  of  Pesth,  which  took  place  on  the 
23d  or  24th  of  April — leaving  as  a  garrison  in  the  fortress  of 
Ofen  (Budavar)  some  battalions  under  the  command  of  Major- 
general  Hentzi — had  divided  itself  into  two  unequal  parts,  and 
begun  its  retreat  out  of  the  interior  of  the  country  toward  its 
frontier,  on  two  diverging  lines.  The  smaller  part,  the  corps 
d'armee  of  Ban  Baron  Jellachich,  marched  along  the  Danube 
down  to  the  Drau ;  while  the  larger  part  (comprising  that  por- 


Ij^m 


kiVERSITYJ 


312  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

tion  of  the  army  which  had  been  defeated  by  Colonel  Poltenberg 
on  the  20th  of  April  at  Kemend  on  the  river  Gran,  and  obliged 
to  retreat  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  over  the  pontoon  at 
Gran)  retreating  on  the  Fleischhauer  road,  the  shortest  line 
toward  Vienna,  having  been  accidentally  stopped  by  the  battle 
on  the  26th  of  April  in  its  retrograde  movement,  continued  it 
again  on  the  following  day  in  company  with  the  besieging  corps 
of  Komorn. 

On  our  side.  General  Aulich,  as  soon  as  Pesth  was  occupied, 
had  undertaken  the  formation  of  a  bridge  across  the  Danube 
below  the  capitals,  in  order  to  reach  without  delay  the  lines  of 
junction  between  the  garrison  of  Ofen  and  the  Jellachich  corps  ; 
Colonel  Kmety,  on  his  part,  had  the  pontoon  over  the  Danube 
between  Gran  and  Parkany  restored,  and  removed  his  army 
division  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river  near  Gran  ;  while  the  other 
two-thirds  of  the  seventh  army  corps,  under  Poltenberg,  with  the 
Damjanics  and  Klapka  ai-my  corps,  after  the  battle  of  the  26th 
of  April,  remained  together  in  the  fortified  camp  at  Komorn, 
where  we  confined  ourselves,  on  the  27th,  after  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy  toward  Raab,  to  occupying  with  strong  detachments  the 
places  lying  nearest  to  us  on  the  main  road  to  Raab  and  the 
Fleischhauer  road,  and  having  the  enemy's  retreat  observed  by 
means  of  patrols. 

When  we  perceived  from  the  reports  that  arrived,  that  the 
enemy,  not  intending  any  offensive  repelling  operation,  really 
hastened  to  confirm  the  declaration  of  our  prisoners,  that  the 
Austrian  army  would  remain  on  the  defensive  till  the  irruption 
of  the  Russian  army ;  it  would  perhaps  have  been  best  for  us, 
strategically  considered,  without  taking  any  serious  notice  of  the 
hostile  garrison  of  Ofen  and  the  Jellachich  corps,  which  was 
withdrawing  toward  the  south,  speedily  to  have  reunited  the 
main  army,  and  opened  immediately  the  new  campaign  by  an 
offensive  on  the  enemy's  principal  line  of  retreat  by  Raab  toward 
Vienna. 

But  it  so  happened  that  the  batteries  of  the  Damjanics  and 
Klapka  corps  in  the  last  encounter  (on  the  26th  of  April)  had 
fired  almost  their  last  cartridge,  and  the  supplies  of  ammunition, 
which  were  to  come  from  beyond  the  Theiss,  had  suddenly  inex- 
plicably failed.  The  batteries  of  the  two  divisions  of  the  seventh 
army  corps,  under  Poltenberg,  in  the  fortified  camp  at  Komorn 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  313 

— of  the  third  division  of  the  same  corps  under  Kmety,  near  the 
(^ran — and,  if  I  mistake  not,  likewise  those  of  the  second  corps 
(Aulich)  near  the  capitals — were  still,  it  is  true,  able  to  take  the 
field,  but  only  for  one,  or  at  most  two  serious  days'  fighting. 

The  execution  of  the  present  idea  of  an  uninterrupted  prosecu- 
tion of  our  offensive  operations  against  the  hostile  main  army 
was  consequently  delayed  by  the  necessity  of  previously  awaiting 
the  arrival  of  the  next  transport  of  ammunition,  which,  according 
to  the  official  information  received  by  the  commander  of  the 
artillery  of  the  army,  ought  to  have  taken  place  long  ago — a 
necessity  rendered  imperative,  considering  the  certainty  of  finding 
the  enemy's  resistance  as  well  as  the  amount  of  danger  increased 
with  every  step  in  advance.  The  reflections,  moreover — as  may 
be  conceived,  of  an  unusually  vivid  cast,  and  chiefly  of  a  political 
nature — to  which  the  Debreczin  impromptu  of  the  14th  of  April 
gave  rise,  soon  led  to  the  complete  abandonment  of  that  idea ; 
and  this  the  more  certainly,  as  my  two  strategic  counselors  (Gen- 
eral Klapka  and  the  chief  of  the  general  staff)  did  not  agree  in 
their  views  as  to  what  object  of  operations  it  would  be  most  ju- 
dicious for  us  next  to  choose. 

The  chief  of  the  general  staff  persisted  in  his  original  proposal 
to  continue  the  ofiensive  against  the  main  body  of  the  hostile 
army,  which  was  retreating  on  the  road  to  Raab,  with  the 
simultaneous  advance  of  a  part  of  the  garrison  of  Komorn  in  the 
island  of  Schiitt  toward  Presburg  ;  dwelling  at  the  same  time  on 
the  great  probability  of  being  able  within  a  few  days  to  restore 
regularity  in  the  accidentally  interrupted  arrival  of  supplies  of 
ammunition. 

General  Klapka,  on  the  contrary,  pleaded  for  the  urgent  neces- 
sity of  taking  Ofen,  pointing  out  that  this  fortress,  so  long  as  it 
was  occupied  by  the  enemy,  blocked  up  the  chain-bridge,  the 
most  important  communication  for  us  across  the  Danube  during 
the  just-proposed  offensive.  This  communication,  he  added,  was 
the  most  important,  because  situated  on  the  shortest  line  between 
the  active  army  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  and  the  war- 
stores  behind  the  Theiss,  and  as  a  permanent  solid  connection 
between  both  banks  of  the  Danube  the  least  exposed  to  disturbing 
influences. 

General  Klapka  mentioned  further,  that  the  hostile  garrison 
of  Ofen  rendered  insecure  the  nrincipal  communication  with  the 

0 


314  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

roads  leading  from  central  Hungary,  and  stopped  completely  the 
traffic  on  the  Danube  between  the  north  and  south  of  the  coun- 
try. It  was  true  that  another  communication,  out  of  the  im- 
mediate reach  of  the  fortress,  might  be  substituted  in  the  mean 
time,  and  could  be  perfectly  secured  by  closely  investing  the 
fortress  with  a  force  sufficient  to  frustrate  all  sallies  of  the  hostile 
troops  of  occupation ;  but  as  the  deduction  of  such  considerable 
forces  as  seemed  necessary  for  closely  investing  it  could  by  no 
means  be  borne,  considering  the  proposed  offensive  against  Raab, 
only  a  one-sided  palliative  would  be  gained  by  the  investment, 
for  the  traffic  on  the  Danube  would  remain  interrupted,  as  before, 
in  its  most  susceptible  point.  It  could  be  re-established  only  by 
a  resolute  enterprise  against  Ofen  calculated  for  the  reduction  of 
the  fortress. 

Such  an  undertaking  seemed  moreover  to  be  enjoined  by  the 
prospect  of  coming  into  possession  (most  important  to  Hungary) 
of  the  armament  of  the  fortified  place  and  of  the  enormous  quan- 
tities of  war-supplies  of  all  kinds  which  were  stored  there ;  but 
most  urgently  was  it  called  for  by  the  consideration  of  the  inspir- 
ing impulse  to  the  most  strenuous  prosecution  of  the  war,  which 
would  be  imparted  to  the  nation  by  the  reconquest  of  Ofen,  its 
historical  palladium. 

General  Klapka  asserted  finally,  that  the  march  against  Ofen 
had  the  sympathies  of  the  army  in  its  favor  ;  and  if  moreover,  he 
concluded,  there  be  taken  into  consideration,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  certainty  of  becoming  master  of  the  fortress  on  the  first  as- 
sault with  an  imposing  force,  if  not  without  drawing  a  sword 
— a  certainty  which,  according  to  all  the  information  hitherto  re- 
ceived respecting  the  moral  state  of  the  garrison,  was  scarcely  to 
be  doubted  ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  probability  that  the  news  of 
the  unexpectedly  sudden  fall  of  Ofen  would  only  increase  the 
present  consternation  in  the  hostile  camp,  and  thus  the  more  favor 
our  offensive  to  be  commenced  immediately  afterward  with  un- 
divided strength ; — then  the  reconquest  of  Ofen  must  be  acknowl- 
edged to  be  at  present  the  nearest  operation  of  the  war  for  the 
Hungarian  main  army. 

Klapka's  proposal  was  so  far  in  accordance  with  Kossuth's  last 
mtimations  to  me,  as  they  likewise  urged  above  all  things  the 
reconquest  of  Ofen. 

Klapka  agreed  Avith  Kossuth  also  in  believing  the  rumors  about 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  315 

the  dejection  of  the  garrison  of  Ofen.  This  he  did,  nevertheless, 
not  to  such  an  extent  as  Kossuth,  according  to  whom  the  mere 
crossing  of  some  Aulich  battalions  from  the  Pesth  bank  of  the 
Danube  to  that  at  Ofen,  would  be  immediately  followed  by  the 
fall  of  the  fortress.  His  confidence  in  the  truth  of  these  rumors, 
however,  was  still  strong  enough  to  lead  him  to  suppose  that  the 
garrison  of  the  fortress,  in  the  face  of  an  imposing  force,  would 
not  let  it  come  to  a  regular  siege. 

Still  I  most  decidedly  distrusted  these  rumors,  breathing  con- 
tempt of  the  adversary.  They  savored  of  the  very  same  national 
arrogance,  which  had  found  its  ultimate  expression  in  the  law 
of  the  14th  of  April,  and — to  my  surprise — a  thousandfold  echo 
even  in  the  ranks  of  the  "  young  army."  And  if  I  nevertheless 
did  not  deny  the  probability  of  becoming  master  of  Ofen  without 
a  regular  siege,  the  reason  of  this  was  solely  that  I  doubted  the 
possibility  of  rendering  the  place  tenable  by  means  of  some  tem- 
porary fortifications,  it  having  been  acknowledged  to  be  untena- 
ble scarcely  four  months  before,  and  abandoned  by  us  without 
drawing  a  blade  to  the  victorious  army  of  Field-marshal  Win- 
dischgratz. 

However,  neither  the  erroneously  supposed  facility  of  taking 
Ofen,  in  which  Klapka  and  myself  agreed,  although  on  dif- 
ferent grounds,  nor  the  other  reasons  by  which  he  supported  his 
proposal,  nor  Kossuth's  urging  the  same  object  as  Klapka  recom- 
mended to  be  next  aimed  at,  nor  finally  the  circumstance  that  I 
estimated  far  higher  than  the  chief  of  the  general  staff  the  un- 
certainty of  speedily  re-establishing  again  an  uninterrupted  sup- 
ply of  ammunition — none  of  these  sufficed  to  make  Klapka's  plan 
of  operations  appear  "to  me  preferable  to  that  of  the  chief  of  the 
general  staff. 

The  motives  which  chiefly  decided  me  to  abandon  the  idea  of 
an  uninterrupted  prosecution  of  our  offensive  operations  against 
the  hostile  main  army  were,  as  I  have  already  indicated,  mainly 
of  a  political  nature. 

My  personal  conviction  of  the  impossibility  of  inducing  tlwse 
parts  of  the  vmin  army  which  were  opposed  to  the  law  of  the 
lAth  of  April,  even  assuming  the  most  favorable  course  of  the 
proposed  operations  on  the  line  to  Raab,  to  prosecute  them  be- 
yond the  frontier  of  the  country,  led  me — considering  the  in- 
significant military  importance  of  the  western  frontiers  of  Hun- 


316  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

gary  situated  next  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube — to  perceive 
that  the  final  strategic  aim,  which  ought  to  have  formed  the 
basis  of  those  operations,  was  wanting. 

Through  this  conviction  I  was  further  led  to  the  idea  of  giving 
to  those  operations — should  the  fortune-of-war  repeatedly  smile 
upon  us  during  them — at  least  a.  political  conclusion,  by  inviting, 
immediately  after  reaching  the  Lajtha,  in  the  name  of  the  victo- 
rious Hungarian  army,  the  Austrian  Government  as  well  as  the 
Hungarian  Diet  to  prefer  the  way  of  a  peaceable  agreement, 
based  on  the  Hungarian  constitution  of  1848,  to  the  exasperated 
continuance  of  an  unhappy  civil  war. 

The  probability  of  the  success  of  this  step  I  deduced  from  the 
following  considerations  : 

The  octroyed  constitution  of  Olmiitz  which  denied  to  the  king- 
dom of  Hungary  its  further  existence,  and  the  resolution  of  the 
Diet  at  Debreczin  that  of  the  empire  of  Austria,  both  stood  on 
one  and  the  same  level  of  "  impracticability  without  foreign 

AID." 

In  Olmiitz  as  well  as  in  Debreczin  a  great  word  had  been 
spoken,  without  its  having  been  previously  maturely  considered, 
whether  their  own  disposable  forces  were  sufficient  to  justify  the 
word  by  the  deed,  though  only  in  the  sense  of  the  right  of  might. 

Those  at  Olmiitz,  who  had  therein  set  those  at  Debreczin  a  good 
example,  maintained  also  their  precedence — so  it  happened  ac- 
cidentally— in  the  course  that  undeceived  both  in  a  humiliating 
manner. 

The  result  of  the  April  campaign — according  to  the  known 
declarations  of  the  captured  Austrian  soldiers  about  the  impend- 
ing Russian  intervention  in  Hungary — seemed  to  have  forced  upon 
the  Austrian  ministers,  with  the  perception  of  the  greatness  of  the 
danger  into  which  they  had  brought  Austria  by  their  acts,  simul- 
taneously the  extreme  means  for  saving  it — the  aid  of  Russia. 

The  question  now  was,  whether  the  Austrian  Government 
would  be  fmyre  injured  by  desisting  from  the  realization  of  the 
octroyed  constitution,  or  by  the  lie  which  it  was  about  to  give  to 
its  own  power  by  having  recourse  to  Russian  aid. 

According  to  my  simple  notions  of  state-policy,  if  it  seemed  im- 
possible for  the  Austrian  Government  without  foreign  aid  to  carry 
out  the  experiment  of  forming,  although  only  provisionally,  a 
Jia?7wge?ieous  state  from  the  heterogeneous  constituent  parts  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  317 

the  Austrian  monarchy,  under  a  simultaneous  guarantee  of  the 
equality  of  rights  of  the  nationalities  calculated  rather  to  separate 
than  to  unite  them — it  had  been  better  altogether  to  abandon 
this  hopeless  experiment,  and  return  to  Austria's  relation  to  Hun- 
gary, which,  based  on  national  rights,  had  been  regulated  by  our 
constitution  modified  in  the  year  1848. 

The  Austrian  Government — after  the  Hungarian  Diet  should 
have  abandoned  in  like  manner  the  carrying  out  of  its  experi- 
ment, still  more  hopeless  without  foreign  aid,  of  creating  an  in- 
dependent Hungary — could  undertake  this,  without  compromis- 
ing its  authority  in  the  interim'  of  the  country  more  than  it  had 
already  done  by  the  ineffectual  proclamation  of  the  octroyed  con- 
stitution, as  shown  by  the  result  of  the  April  campaign,  or  than 
it  now  seemed  to  be  taking  the  best  way  of  compromising  it 
abroad  likewise,  by  receiving  Russian  aid. 

The  Austrian  Government  could  perfectly  well  disengage  itself 
from  the  octroyed  constitution  without  shaking  the  reverence  for 
the  dynasty,  any  more  than  it  had  already  done  by  overthrowing 
the  constitution  of  Hungary  sanctioned  in  1848. 

It  could  finally  put  its  hand  to  an  agreement  with  the  Hunga- 
rian Diet  based  on  the  Hungarian  constitution  of  1848 — intro- 
duced, as  I  said,  by  the  peaceable  initiative  of  the  Hungarian 
army,  assumed  to  have  victoriously  advanced  as  far  as  the  Lajtha 
— with  the  assured  prospect,  that  the  agreement  would  take 
place  with  some  modifications  of  the  Hungarian  constitution  in 
favor  of  the  central  power  of  Austria  ;  lor  in  case  such  an  agree- 
ment should  have  been  wrecked  by  the  opposition  of  the  Debrec- 
zin  Diet,  I  was  firmly  resolved  to  dare  the  extreme  against  it. 

I  think  it  unnecessary  to  point  out,  how  far  from  me  is  the 
thought  of  pleading  here  for  the  practicability  of  my  just  developed 
idea  of  reconciliation  (at  that  time),  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that 
the  Austrian  Government  still — two  full  years  since  the  last 
active  opposition  of  Hungary  to  the  realization  of  the  octroyed 
constitution  has  been  subdued  by  Russian  aid — thinks  it  can  not 
do  without  the  proviso,  equally  convenient  as  unconstitutional,  as 
well  as  a  state  of  siege,  even  in  tho&e  extra-Hungarian  parts  of 
free,  united,  constitutional  Austria,  in  which  a  similar  opposition 
has  never  been  observable. 

I  confine  myself  simply  to  communicating  the  reflections  on 
the  opportunity  of  carrying  out  the  idea  of  reconciliation,  which 


318  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

were  stirred  up  in  me  during  the  events  I  am  describing,  by  the 
endeavor  to  gain  a  clear  way  for  the  salvation  of  the  fatherland 
between  the  01  miitz  octroyed  constitution  and  the  Debreczin  14th 
of  April — at  that  time  the  Scylla  and  Charybdis  of  the  constitu- 
tional kingdom  of  Hungary. 

A  knowledge  of  that  leading  idea  is  indispensably  necessary  to 
the  formation  of  a  right  judgment  on  my  conduct  during  those 
days. 

The  difficulties  connected  with  the  realization  of  this  idea  of 
reconciliation,  the  precariousness,  nay,  daring  of  the  steps  neces- 
sary to  it,  I  nevertheless  did  not  conceal  from  myself  even  at  that 
time. 

But  what  serious  attempt  to  save  Hungary  from  that  fatal 
dilemma  would  have  been  connected  with  fewer  difficulties  ? 
would  have  been  less  daring,  less  precarious  ? 

And  I  was  urged  to  dare  some  serious  attempt  in  the  direction 
indicated,  by  the  clear  inward  conviction  that  such  an  attempt 
was  not  only  better  fitted  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  nation, 
but  was  also  far  more  conformable  to  its  historical  character, 
than  the  humiliating  acknowledgment  of  the  Olmiitz  octroyed 
constitution  on  the  one  hand,  or  the  arrogance  of  the  Debreczin 
14th  of  April  on  the  other. 

Consequently,  when  I  acceded  to  Klapka's  proposal  to  let  the 
reconquest  of  Ofen  precede  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  our  offens- 
ive operations  against  the  hostile  principal  army,  I  did  so  with 
the  conviction  that  the  attempt  to  facilitate  an  agreement  between 
the  Austrian  Government  and  the  Hungarian  Diet,  based  on  the 
constitution  of  the  year  1848,  must  have  far  more  chance  of 
success  if  the  fortress  of  Ofen  was  previously  ours,  than  if  it  con- 
tinued in  the  possession  of  the  enemy  in  spite  of  our  supposed 
victorious  offensive  operations,  apparently  menacing  Vienna  itself. 

But  the  more  ardently  I  now  wished,  on  the  one  hand,  for  the 
spcedij  fall  of  Ofen,  and  the  greater,  on  the  other  hand,  my  dis- 
trust of  the  innumerable  rumors  about  the  depressed  moral  state 
of  the  garrison  of  the  fortress,  the  more  resolutely,  once  determ- 
ined to  act  against  Ofen,  must  I  accede  also  to  Klapka's  proposal, 
that  it  should  be  undertaken  with  an  imposing  force.  Although 
prejudiced  by  the  preconceived  opinion,  that  the  fortress  of  Ofen 
could  scarcely  be  sufficiently  tenable  to  be  held  long  against  the 
attacks  of  infantry  alone,  if  vigorously  supported  by  a  brisk  fire 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  319 

of  howitzers — the  ammunition  necessary  for  which,  it  so  happen- 
ed, could  in  this  instance  be  taken  from  the  stores  of  the  fortress 
of  Komorn ; — I  nevertheless  believed  in  the  probability  of  an 
energetic  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  garrison,  but  thought  to 
render  it  of  no  avail  by  the  massive  superiority  of  our  forces  on 
all  points  of  attack. 

I  consequently  appointed,  besides  the  second  army  corps  (Au- 
lich),  which  moreover  was  already  stationed  near  the  capitals,  also 
the  first  corps  (Klapka)  and  the  third  corps  (Damjanics),  together 
with  the  Kmety  division  of  the  seventh  corps,  for  the  operations 
against  Ofen  ;  while  only  the  remainder  of  the  latter  corps,  under 
Poltenberg,  was  to  be  directed  against  E-aab  ;  and  a  part  of  the 
garrison  of  Komorn,  on  the  same  height  with  the  former  two 
divisions,  to  advance  on  the  island  of  Schiitt. 

General  Klapka  declared  that  he  completely  agreed  in  this 
measure  ;  the  chief  of  the  general  staff,  however,  only  on  condi- 
tion, that  the  operations  against  Ofen,  once  begun,  were  not  to  be 
given  up  again,  if  we  should  be  suddenly  undeceived  as  to  the 
presupposed  facility  of  taking  the  fortress,  and  thereby  a  vacilla- 
tion be  brought  into  our  operations,  which  would  infallibly  be 
closely  followed  by  the  discouragement  of  our  army,  and  the 
victory  of  the  enemy. 

In  this  consultation  about  the  next  operations  of  the  main 
army  we  kept  in  view  the  hostile  corps  of  Ban  Baron  Jellachich, 
which  had  been  directed  from  Ofen  soutliAvard — trusting  to  the 
assurances  which  Kossuth  had  given  us  during  his  sojourn  at 
Godollb^  about  the  simultaneous  movements  of  General  Bem — 
only  in  so  far  as  we  assumed,  that  he,  who,  according  to  these 
assurances,  was  to  have  crossed  the  Danube  at  Baja  with  a  force 
of  16,000  men  in  the  second  half  of  the  month  of  April,  would 
effect  this  passage,  though  too  late — as  we  thought  wben  in 
Godollo — to  help  us  in  the  relief  of  Komorn,  at  all  events  early 
enough  to  thwart  Ban  Jellachich  in  his  march  toward  the  south. 

*  See  Chapter  xliii. 


CHAPTER   XLIX. 

In  consequence  of  the  resolution  of  the  Diet  at  Debreczin  of 
the  14th  of  April,  the  Committee  of  Defense  was  dissolved,  and 
in  its  stead  a  provisional  governor  of  the  country,  with  a  ministry 
by  his  side,  took  the  reins  of  the  government  of  Hungary. 

The  governor  of  the  country  was  Kossuth.  He  offered  me 
the  portfolio  of  the  minister  of  war.  I  received  his  letter  con- 
taining the  offer  before  the  consultation  upon  our  next  war- 
operations,  described  in  the  preceding  chapter,  had  taken  place. 

This  offer  was  very  welcome  to  me,  inasmuch  as  I  therein 
greeted  the  possibility  of  at  once  putting  a  finishing  stroke  to  the 
use-and-wont  mode  in  which  the  war-ministry  had  been  con- 
ducted, to  the  great  injury,  in  many  respects,  of  matters  relating 
to  the  defense  of  the  country. 

But  in  order  to  charge  myself  in  person  with  the  portfolio,  I 
should  have  been  obliged  to  quit  the  army  ;  and  I  could  by  no 
means  entertain  a  thought  of  this,  so  long  as  I  clung  to  that 
leading  idea,  to  which  Kiapka's  proposal,  that  the  capture  of 
Ofen  should  be  our  next  undertaking,  was  indebted  for  my  assent. 

Generals  Damjanics  and  Klapka  were  also  of  opinion — though 
for  a  different  reason,  since  I  had  not  thought  the  time  was  come 
for  communicating  to  them  this  my  leading  idea — that  I  ought 
to  remain  with  the  army.  Considering  the  uncommon  popularity 
which  I  enjoyed  in  the  main  army — said  they — my  removing 
from  the  chief  command  might  affect  the  troops  in  a  manner 
prejudicial  to  the  successful  progress  of  our  operations. 

The  necessity  for  saving  the  war-ministry  without  delay  from 
the  state  into  which  it  had  sunk,  destitute  alike  of  energy  and 
prudence — the  occasion  just  then  seeming  to  be  favorable  for 
doing  so — was  nevertheless  not  less  evident ;  and  accordingly 
General  Damjanics  offered  to  undertake  for  the  present  in  my 
room  the  direction  of  the  business  of  the  war-ministry. 

Damjanics  was  at  that  time  with  Aulich,  the  Hungarian  gen- 
eral of  the  main  army  most  to  be  relied  upon  before  the  enemy. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  321 

By  his  separation  from  its  ranks  for  a  time,  it  would  suffer  a 
sensible  though  temporary  loss. 

Consequently  it  may  be  conceived  that  the  only  reason  which 
induced  me  to  consent  to  Damjanics  departing  to  Debreczin  as 
my  provisional  substitute  in  the  war-ministry,  was  the  conviction, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  Hungary's  war  in  self-defense,  must  come 
to  a  disgraceful  end,  if  the  real  cancer  of  the  defense  of  the 
country — the  arbitrary  conduct  of  the  separate  independent  com- 
manders of  troops,  and  the  favoritism  prevailing  in  the  nomina- 
tion of  officers  and  promotions — should  continue  as  heretofore, 
from  weakness  or  want  of  discernment,  to  be  encouraged  and 
cherished  in  the  war-ministry  itself;  on  the  other  hand,  that 
Damjanics  was  just  the  man  very  speedily  and  radically  to  ex- 
tirpate these  cancerous  diseases. 

The  loss  might  therefore  truly  be  said  to  be  irreparable,  which 
not  only  the  army  but  the  cause  of  Hungary  in  general  sustained, 
when  General  Damjanics,  on  the  evening  before  the  day  fixed 
for  his  departure  from  Komorn  to  Debreczin,  in  consequence  of 
an  unfortunate  leap  from  a  carriage,  shattered  his  leg,  and  was 
thereby  rendered  forever  unfit  for  service. 

After  this  lamentable  accident,  General  Klapka  declared  him- 
self ready  to  act  as  my  substitute  in  the  war-ministr}^  ^ut 
apart  from  the  circumstance,  that  I  should  miss  him  much  with 
the  army — to  whose  advice  I  always  used  to  attach  great  im- 
portance— he  seemed  to  me  to  be  of  too  yielding  a  nature  to  be 
equal  to  the  Herculean  task  which  awaited  him  at  Debreczin. 

There  was,  however,  no  other  choice  left  me,  if  I  would  not 
run  the  risk  of  seeing  the  ministry  of  war  fall  under  a  perhaps 
still  more  doubtful  guidance  than  that  of  General  Meszaros  had 
Jbeen. 

General  Klapka  consequently  left  the  army,  to  betake  himself 
to  Debreczin.  In  his  stead  Colonel  Nagy-Sandor  undertook  the 
command  of  the  first  army  corps  ;  that  of  the  third  corps  (Dam- 
janics) was  intrusted  to  Colonel  Knezich. 

Both  colonels  were  accordingly  advanced  to  the  rank  of  gen- 
erals. 


CHAPTER  L. 

The  sudden  retardation  of  the  confidently  expected  supplies 
of  ammunition,  had,  on  the  26th  of  April  (the  day  of  the  com- 
plete relief  of  Komorn),  placed  us  in  the  strange  position  of  being 
obliged  to  terminate  a  battle,  favorable  to  us  as  regarded  our 
success  on  that  day,  with  a  defensive  bearing. 

For  the  same  reason  also  we  could  not — as  has  been  mention- 
ed— on  the  following  days  continue  with  our  whole  strength  the 
offensive  operations,  which  had  originally  been  intended  only  for 
the  relief  of  Komorn.  The  speedy  pursuit  of  the  enemy  by  the 
two  Poltenberg  army  divisions — that  third  part  of  our  force 
united  on  the  evening  of  the  26th  of  April  in  the  fortified  camp 
of  Komorn,  of  which  the  artillery  was  still  fit  for  action — did 
not,  however,  promise  any  favorable  result ;  because  the  hostile 
main  army,  which  had  been  opposed  to  us  on  the  26th  of  April, 
had  begun  its  retreat  from  the  field  of  battle  toward  Raab  in  the 
best  order  and  voluntarily :  therefore,  though  retreating,  it  was 
by  no  means  in  such  a  condition  as  that  it  could  not  have  re- 
pulsed, with  sensible  disadvantage  to  the  pursuer  himself,  a  pur- 
suit undertaken  on  our  part  with  proportionately  weak  forces. 

Meanwhile  the  inexplicable,  sudden  retardation  of  the  supplies 
of  ammunition  was  the  very  natural  cause  of  our  irresolution 
during  several  days,  in  consequence  of  which  it  happened  that 
Poltenberg  did  not  reach  E.aab  with  his  two  army  divisions  till 
the  1st  of  May,  after  it  had  been  evacuated  by  the  enemy  ;  and 
the  other  parts  of  our  main  army  could  not  begin  the  blockade 
of  the  fortress  of  Ofen  till  late  in  the  forenoon  of  the  4th  of  May, 
in  the  following  manner  : 

Below  Ofen,  on  the  road  from  Stuhlweissenburg,  secured  against  j 
the  fire  from  the  fortress  by  the  Blocksberg,  the  second  corps     '^ 
(Aulich)  encamped,  and  took  upon  itself  the  close  investment  of 
the  fortress,  commencing  from  the  Danube  as  far  as  up  to  the 
Fleischhauer  road. 

"With  the  investing  range  of  the  second  corps,  that  of  the  first 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  323 

(Nagy-Sandor) — wliicli  established  itself  behind  the  Spitzbergel, 
and  undertook  the  investment  as  far  as  the  little  Schvvabenberg 
— was  in  close  junction. 

From  hence  to  near  the  suburb  (the  Wasserstadt),  situated  to 
the  north  of  Ofen  on  the  bank  of  the  Danube,  the  investing  range 
of  the  third  corps  (Knezich)  extended,  which  had  advanced  on 
the  road  from  Kovacsy  up  to  the  suburb  of  Christinenstadt. 

The  prolongation  of  the  blockading  line  to  the  Danube  again, 
above  the  fortress,  was  assigned  to  the  Kmety  division,  which 
encamped  on  the  southern  extremity  of  Alt-Ofen  (O'-Buda),  north 
of  the  Wasserstadt. 

'  The  principal  rampart  of  the  fortress  crowned  the  elongated 
hill,  which,  rising  close  to  the  bank  of  the  Danube,  adjoins  the 
edge  of  the  plateau  on  which  the  city  proper  of  Ofen  stands.  This 
rampart,  taken  as  a  whole,  formed  in  fact  only  four  fronts  :  two 
long  ones,  almost  parallel  with  the  course  of  the  Danube,  and 
two  others,  short  as  compared  with  the  former  two,  which  joined 
(in  reference  to  the  course  of  the  Danube)  the  upjjc?'  and  lower 
ends  of  the  long  fronts,  and  thereby  completely  inclosed  the  inner 
space  of  the  fortress. 

The  eastern  of  the  two  long  fronts  faced  the  Danube,  or  what 
is  the  same,  the  city  of  Pesth.  It  formed  in  the  ground-plan, 
as  respects  its  principal  form,  an  obtuse  re-entering  angle,  and 
consisted  of  a  line  of  defense  of  remarkable  irregularity,  which 
was  many  times  broken  through  at  unequal  distances. 

In  the  apex  of  the  re-entering  angle  of  this  front,  above  the 
prolongation  of  the  chain-bridge,  was  situated  one  of  the  four 
principal  entrances  to  the  fortress,  the  "  Water-gate." 

Below  this  point,  immediately  on  the  bank  of  the  stream,  was 
a  forcing-pump,  which  supplied  the  town  and  fortress  with  water 
from  the  Danube. 

The  securing  of  this  forcing-pump,  situated  beyond  the  princi- 
pal rampart  at  the  southern  end  of  the  Wasserstadt,  consequently 
quite  exposed  to  any  attacks  from  the  north  and  south  along  the 
bank  of  the  stream,  had  been  effected  by  the  Austrians,  during 
their  occupation  of  the  capitals,  by  several  intrenchments,  formed 
of  palisades  and  of  walls  and  houses  prepared  for  being  defended 
by  infantry,  which  leant  on  the  one  side  against  the  principal 
rampart,  on  the  other  descended  into  the  Danube,  and  Avhich 
separated  from  the  outside,  together  with  the  forcing-pump,  the 


324  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

opening  also  of  the  chain-bridge  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube. 
The  access  from  the  Pesth  bank — the  left — over  the  chain-bridge 
itself,  partly  dismantled  of  its  carriage-way,  was  moreover  defend- 
ed by  a  blockhouse  erected  on  the  prolongation  of  the  bridge  in 
the  space  inclosed  by  the  intrenchments.  The  long  front  in 
question  extended  upward  and  downward  far  beyond  the  points 
on  which  these  intrenchments  leant. 

The  part  of  the  Wasserstadt  nearest  to  the  forcing-pump  lay 
immediately  under  the  northern  half  of  the  Pesth  front,  repeat- 
edly mentioned  ;  while  from  the  high  commanding  principal 
rampart — the  southern  half  of  this  front — the  main  approach 
through  the  Wasserstadt  to  the  forcing-pump,  the  principal  line 
of  attack  of  the  northern  intrenchments  which  protected  it,  could 
be  cannonaded  in  its  length,  passing  over  them. 

These  local  dispositions,  however,  we  learned  to  know  and 
appreciate  only  during  the  siege,  after  having  previously  many 
times  dearly  paid  for  our  experience. 

Thus  much  about  the  eastern  long  or  Pesth  front,  from  recol- 
lection ;  there  being  no  plan  of  the  fortress  of  Ofen,  as  it  then 
stood,  at  my  command. 

The  western  long  front  of  the  fortress  faced  the  Spitzbergel 
with  its  southern  half,  with  its  northern  end  the  little  Schwa- 
benberg. 

Its  principal  rampart  presented  the  aspect  of  a  straight  line 
of  defense,  strengthened  by  projecting  rondels  only  on  two  points, 
the  northern  terminating  one,  and  south  of  its  centre. 

The  rondel  situated,  as  has  been  said,  south  of  the  centre  of 
the  front,  namely,  the  "  Weissenburg"  rondel,  had  to  play  the 
most  important  part  during  the  siege. 

It  divided  the  most  western  long  front  of  the  fortress  into  two 
unequal  halves,  a  southern  (the  shorter),  and  a  northern  (the 
longer  one).  The  principal  rampart  of  the  southern  half  appear- 
ed, compared  with  that  of  the  northern,  to  be  somewhat  re-en- 
tering, and  difiered  moreover  from  it  in  that  not  far  from  the 
Weissenburg  rondel  it  changed  from  a  simple  enclosing  wall  into 
a  terraced  one  ;  while  the  northern  in  its  whole  length  consisted 
only  of  a  simple  uninterrupted  straight  enclosing  wall. 

Through  the  Weissenburg  rondel  itself  another  of  the  four 
principal  entrances  to  the  fortress  led,  the  *'  Stuhlweissenburg- 
gate  ;"  it  was,  however,  blocked  up. 


i 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  325 

Of  the  two  short  fronts,  the  southern  (an  irregular  combina- 
tion, and  one  very  favorable  for  the  defense  in  consequence  of 
the  points  of  support  offered  by  the  locality)  with  the  "  Castle- 
gate"  looked  toward  the  Blocksberg,  and  the  northern  (a  straight 
line  of  defense  with  a  flanking  fire,  like  the  western  long  front) 
with  the  "  Vienna-gate"  toward  that  ridge  of  heights  between 
which  and  the  Danube  the  Wasserstadt  and  Alt  Ofen  are  situated. 

The  hill  on  which  the  fortress  stands  is,  as  it  were,  the  last 

spur  of  this  ridge  of  heights.      Both  are  perceptibly  separated 

"only  by  a  saddle,  over  which  the  Vienna  suburb  extends  from 

the  Wasserstadt  as  far  as  the  nothern  end  of  the  Christinenstadt. 

The  inner  space  of  the  fortress,  corresponding  with  the  two 
long  fronts,  was,  for  its  small  width,  disproportionately  long ; 
while  the  circumstances,  that  the  western  long  (Weissenburg) 
front  presented  an  almost  straight  line  of  defense,  but  the  Pesth 
front  formed  a  re-entering  angle,  necessitated  a  considerable  con- 
traction of  the  inner  space  at  the  apex  of  this  re-entering  angle. 
Just  on  this  contraction  lay,  in  the  Pesth  front,  the  open  Water- 
gate, serving  as  the  principal  communication  with  that  part  of  the 
declivity  and  the  bank  of  the*stream  Avhich  was  protected  against 
our  attacks  by  the  intrenchments ;  in  the  Weissenburg  front  the 
rondel  of  that  name. 

As  the  last-mentioned  long  front  was  divided  by  the  Weissen- 
burg rondel,  the  inner  space  of  the  fortress  seemed  also  to  be 
divided  by  the  foresaid  contraction  into  two  unequal  halves,  a 
southern  shorter,  and  a  northern  longer  one.  In  the  southern, 
besides  the  smaller  part  of  the  town,  stood  likewise  the  royal 
castle,  together  with  the  park  belonging  to  it,  which  was  sur 
rounded  by  a  high  strong  wall,  exposed  on  none  of  its  points  to 
the  straight  effective  fire,  and  formed  the  extreme  line  of  defense 
of  the  southeastern  part  of  the  fortress. 

As  objects  of  attack — the  castle-park,  with  the  castle-gate,  on 
the  west  and  close  to  the  park,  and  the  nearest  parts  of  the  prin- 
cipal rampart,  were  assigned  to  the  second  corps  (Aulich) ;  the 
adjoining  southern  half  of  the  Weissenburg  front  and  its  rondel, 
to  the  first  corps  (Nagy-Sandor)  ;  the  salient  angle  on  the  north- 
ern extremity  of  this  long  front,  together  with  the  adjacent  north- 
ern short  one,  the  Vienna  front  with  its  gate,  to  the  third  ^oorps 
(Knezich) ;  and  the  forcing-pump  on  the  bank  of  the  Danube, 
protected  by  the  intrenchments,  to  the  Kmety  division. 


326  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

In  the  range  of  the  second  corps  on  the  northern  edge  of  the 
Blocksberg,  at  the  commencement  of  the  investment  a  twelve- 
pounder  field-battery  was  planted  against  the  fortress ;  as  well 
as  another  battery  of  the  same  calibre  on  the  little  Schwaben- 
berg,  and  both  the  increased  seven-pounder  howitzer  batteries 
belonging  to  the  seventh  corps,  on  the  ridge  opposite  the  Vienna 
front.  The  battery  on  the  little  Schwabenberg  and  the  two 
howitzer  batteries  were  in  the  range  of  the  third  corps. 

It  was  not  my  intention  to  attack  the  place  without  previously 
having  summoned  the  garrison  to  surrender.  The  over-hasty 
zeal  of  the  commander  of  the  howitzer  batteries,  however,  caused 
a  cannonade  on  our  part  before  this  summons  had  been  sent.    , 

This  attack  was  of  course  stopped  as  speedily  as  was  permitted 
by  the  considerable  distance,  especially  of  the  Blocksberg  battery, 
from  the  head-quarters  at  the  northern  extremity  of  Christinen- 
stadt ;  and  after  this  was  effected,  an  Austrian  officer,  whom  we 
had  brought  with  us  a  prisoner,  was  sent  into  the  fortress  with  a 
written  summons  addressed  personally  to  the  commander  Major- 
general  Hentzi. 

As  I  possess  no  copy  of  this  letter,  of  the  agreement  of  which 
with  the  original  I  could  be  morally  convinced,  I  can  indicate 
here  only  that  part  of  its  contents  which  has  remained  vividly  in 
my  memory. 
It  contained : 

Information  that  Ofen  was 'invested  by  us. 
An  opinion,  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  maintain  the  place 

long  against  us. 
A   summons  to  surrender  it,  with  the  promise  of  honorable 
treatment  as  prisoners  of  war  (the  officers  with  their  arms, 
the  men  without). 
The  assurance  of  a  humane  treatment  of  the  prisoners,  even  in 
case  the  garrison  intended  to  resist  to  the  last,  provided  that 
the  chain-bridge   and  the  city  of  Pesth,  from  which  the 
fortress  had  to  expect  no  attack,  were  spared  :  if  this  con- 
dition were  not  complied  with,  however,  the  pledge  of  my 
word  of  honor,  that  after  the  taking  of  the  fortress,  the 
whole  garrison  should  be  put  to  the  sword. 
An  appeal,  founded  on  the  rumors  that  Major-general  Hentzi 
was  a  native  of  Hungary,  to  his  patriotic  sentiments ;  and 
finally. 


I 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  327 

An  explanation,  that  I  had  chosen  for  the  bearer  of  this  letter 
an  Austrian  officer,  who  was  our  prisoner,  because  our 
trumpets  used  to  be  detained  in  the  Austrian  camp. 

I  remember  further  to  have  declared  in  the  same  letter,  that 
this  violation  of  the  personal  liberty  of  a  hostile  trumpet,  as  well 
as  the  bombardment  of  Pesth,  and  the  attempt  to  destroy  the 
chain-bridge,  were  infamous  acts. 

My  view  of  the  moral  character  of  those  actions  is  still  the 
same :  I  must  now,  however,  here  retract  the  assertion,  that  it 
was  usual  with  the  Austrian  army  to  make  our  trumpets  pris- 
oners. I  know  of  only  the  one  case  of  this  kind,  which  I  have 
mentioned  in  the  seventh  Chapter  of  this  work.  Nevertheless 
my  assertion  at  that  time  appears  to  be  justified,  inasmuch  as, 
rendered  cautious  by  that  case,  I  could  never  again  determine 
to  send  a  Hungarian  officer  as  trumpet  into  an  Austrian  camp ; 
and  the  cases,  where  this  has  been  attempted  by  other  leaders 
of  Hungarian  troops,  and  the  international  usage  which  guaran- 
tees the  inviolability  of  the  trumpet  in  the  hostile  camp  has  been 
respected  on  the  part  of  the  Austrians,  did  not  come  to  my 
knowledge  till  after  the  time  in  which  the  date  of  my  letter  to 
Major-general  Hentzi  falls. 

The  reply  of  Major-general  Hentzi  to  me  contrasted  very 
strangely  with  the  absurd  rumors  of  an  unparalleled  depression 
in  the  garrison  of  Ofen,  in  consequence  of  which  Kossuth  could 
hardly  stop  till  some  of  Aulich's  battalions  had  crossed  the  Dan- 
ube, that  the  said  garrison  might  not  have  to  wait  any  longer  for 
the  plausible  reason  they  desired  for  laying  down  their  arms ;  on 
which  rumors  also  Klapka  had  principally  based  his  proposal, 
first  of  all  to  march  against  Ofen. 

In  this  answer  Major-general  Hentzi  scoffingly  repudiated  the 
assumption,  that  he  would  evacuate  without  resistance  the  place 
confided  to  him ;  declared  Ofen  to  be  a  really  tenable  place, 
although  our  precipitate  retreat  in  the  early  part  of  the  year  1849 
seemed  to  have  proved  the  contrary ;  called  upon  me  immediately 
to  put  a  stop  to  my  firing,  if  I  wished  Pesth  to  be  spared ;  added 
moreover,  that  he  must  in  any  case,  and  directly,  bombard 
Pesth,  because  he  was  forced  by  a  cannonading  which  had  just 
710W  been  commenced  there.^     He  then  corrected  my  erroneous 

*  Major-general  Hentzi's  assertion,  that  a  cannonading  had  taken  place 
from  Pesth  against  Ofen,  was  tmtrue. 


328  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

supposition  that  Hungary  was  his  native  country ;  and  declared 
finally,  that  he  would  hold  out  to  the  last  man,  as  in  duty  and 
honor  bound. 

Meanwhile  General  Klapka,  on  his  journey  from  Komorn 
through  Pesth  to  Debreczin,  had  stopped  some  days  in  Pesth ; 
and  during  this  time,  partly  from  his  own  reflections,  partly  from 
information  obtained  about  the  state  of  the  fortress  of  Ofen  and 
the  disposition  of  the  garrison,  had  become  convinced  that  the 
taking  of  Ofen  might  not  be  so  speedily  accomplished,  as  he  had 
endeavored  to  prove  to  the  chief  of  the  general  staff'  and  myself, 
in  our  consultation  at  Komorn  on  our  further  operations. 

This  new  conviction  caused  him  in  writing  to  dissuade  me 
from  storming  Ofen.  By  the  date,  the  letter  in  which  he  did  so 
(it  was,  if  I  remember  right,  of  the  1  st  or  2d  of  May)  seemed  to 
have  been  intended  to  find  me  still  on  the  march  against  Ofen, 
while  the  means  which  Klapka  had  taken  to  forward  it  to  me  in- 

To  justify  this  assertion,  and  the  bombardment  of  the  city  of  Pesth, 
which  had  actually  been  commenced  in  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  of  May, 
on  the  following  day  a  placard  made  its  appearance,  in  which  Major-gen- 
eral Hentzi  described  even  the  effect  of  one  of  the  balls  fired  from  Pesth  : 

"  The  Ofen  pier" — so  it  was  said  in  this  placard,  as  near  as  I  remember 
— "  has  been  struck  and  injured  by  a  projectile  from  a  cannon  on  tho 
lower  part  of  both  of  its  corners,  facing  the  Pesth  bank." 

This  statement  was  correct,  as  I  convinced  myself  personally  after  the 
fall  of  the  fortress  :  nevertheless  the  assumption,  that  this  projectile  had 
come  from  the  Pesth  hank  was  just  as  incorrect  as  the  whole  assertion  of  a 
cannonading  from  Pesth  was  untrue.  Such  an  attack  could  not  have  taken 
place,  because,  in  order  not  to  expose  Pesth  to  a  bombardment,  I  had 
given,  before  the  investment  of  Ofen,  an  order  to  General  Aulich,  not  only 
to  avoid  any  attack,  nay  even  demonstration  against  the  fortress  from  the 
Pesth  bank,  but  not  even  to  allow  a  gun  to  be  seen  on  any  point  of  the 
bank  situated  within  range  of  the  fortress ;  and  because  the  result  of  a  sub- 
sequent investigation  proved  that  this  order  had  been  conscientiously  obeyed. 

This  damage  on  the  upper  pier  could  consequently  only  have  been  caused 
by  a  ball  from  the  twelve-pounder  battery,  which  had  been  planted  on  the 
Blocksberg. 

I  may  repeat  here,  that  my  intention,  not  to  attack  the  fortress  before 
having  summoned  it  to  surrender,  had  been  frustrated  by  the  precipitancy 
of  the  commander  of  the  howitzer  batteries  ;  that  the  twelve-pounder  bat- 
tery on  the  little  Schwabenberg  and  on  the  Blocksberg  began  to  fire  imme- 
diately after  the  howitzer  batteries  ;  and  that  the  latter  especially,  to  which 
the  order  to  stop  firing  could  not  be  communicated  so  quickly  as  to  the 
others,  on  account  of  the  considerable  distance  from  my  head-quarters  to 
the  point  where  it  was  planted,  had  already  been  playing  unceasingly  when 
Major-general  Hentzi  replied  to  ray  letter. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  329 

dicated  the  contrary  intention ;  for  I  did  not  receive  it  till  after 
Major-general  Hentzi  had  been  very  categorically  summoned  to 
surrender,  and  had  hereupon  given  just  as  categorical  a  refusal. 

After  that  summons,  however,  and  the  reply  to  it,  my  views 
of  what  is  called  "  military  honor"  no  longer  permitted  me  to 
retire  from  before  Ofen,  without  having  previously  exerted  my- 
self to  the  uttermost  to  take  it. 

Moreover,  regard  for  the  honor  of  our  arms,  acting  at  present 
as  a  motive  for  the  siege  of  Ofen,  was  supported  also  by  those 
political  reasons  which  had  mainly  determined  me,  in  the  con- 
sultation held  at  Komorn  about  the  next  operations,  to  give  the 
preference  to  Klapka's  proposal  over  that  of  the  chief  of  the 
general  staff  (see  Chapter  XLVIII). 

If  I  had  then  supposed  that  the  speedy  fall  of  Ofen  would  pre- 
sent a  favorable  opportunity  for  the  attempt  to  invite  to  a  peace- 
able agreement  the  Austrian  Government  as  well  as  the  Hunga- 
rian Diet,  in  the  name  of  the  Hungarian  main  army,  assumed  to 
have  victoriously  advanced  as  far  as  the  Lajtha — I  could  not  fail 
to  perceive,  after  Major-general  Hentzi's  energetic  reply  to  my 
summons,  the  absolute  necessity  there  was  that  Ofen  should  fall, 
whether  sooner  or  later,  before  I  could  have  the  most  remote  idea 
of  daring  this  attempt  with  any  prospect  of  success,  even  if  the 
progress  that  attended  the  immediate  offensive  toward  the  Lajtha 
were  ever  so  successful. 


CHAPTER  LI. 

Major-general  Hentzi  had  not  said  too  much,  when  he 
asserted,  in  his  reply,  that  Ofen,  since  the  occupation  of  the 
capitals  by  the  Austrians,  had  been  changed  into  a  tenable  place. 
I  was  soon  to  have  an  opportunity  of  convincing  myself  of  the 
correctness  of  this  assertion,  and  of  the  precipitancy  of  my  con- 
trary opinion. 

"While  our  prisoner,  the  Austrian  officer,  was  on  his  way  to  the 
fortress  with  my  letter  to  Hentzi,  the  Kmety  division  stood  in  the 
Wafserstadt,  awaiting  the  order  to  storm  the  intrenchments. 


■^^•v 


330  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  trumpet  returned  with  Major-general  Hentzi's  answer; 
and  a  few  minutes  after  the  orders  to  attack  were  on  their  way 
to  the  Kmety  division,  and  the  batteries  posted  on  the  Blocksberg, 
the  little  Schwabenberg,  and  the  ridge  opposite  the  Vienna  front. 
Kmety  attacked  courageously,  as  he  always  did,  and  was  in- 
directly supported  by  the  brisk  fire  of  our  batteries,  which  aimed 
at  the  general  discouragement  of  the  garrison. 

Our  intention  in  storming  the  intrenchments  in  front  of  the 
forcing-pump  was  that  we  might  destroy  the  latter. 

The  fortress  of  Ofen  possessed,  as  far  as  I  knew,  neither  cis- 
terns nor  wells. 

From  time  immemorial  two  aqueducts  had  served  to  remedy 
this  defect.  One  of  them,  which  supplied  the  fortress  with  good 
water  for  drinking,  from  a  spring  on  the  great  Schwabenberg,  we 
had  already  destroyed.  If  we  should  succeed  in  like  manner 
with  the  second,  the  forcing-pump,  every  supply  of  water  would 
be  completely  cut  off  from  the  interior  of  the  fortress  ;  and  the 
garrison,  in  my  opinion,  could  not  hold  out  many  days. 

The  storming  of  the  Kmety  division,  however,  miscarried,  and 
the  losses  we  suffered  in  it  were  sufficient  to  deter  us  from  the 
repetition  of  a  similar  separate  undertaking. 

The  fire  of  our  batteries  also  had  to  be  moderated  even  during 
the  course  of  the  first  day,  and  confined  to  merely  answering  the 
different  hostile  shots,  because  the  enigmatical  hindrance,  which 
had  put  a  stop  to  the  regular  arrival  of  supplies  of  ammunition 
now  for  a  long  time,  was  still  unremoved, 

I  have  a  very  lively  recollection  of  the  fact,  that  the  com- 
mander of  the  artillery  of  the  main  army  did  not  succeed  till 
during  the  further  progress  of  the  siege  of  Ofen  in  discovering  at 
the  same  time  the  cause  of  the  delay  that  had  taken  place  in 
sending  the  ammunition  for  the  field-artillery,  as  well  as  the 
reason  of  this  delay. 

Immediately  after  the  evacuation  of  the  city  of  Waizen  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  (April  10th),  the  rumor  had  been  spread  be- 
yond the  Theiss,  that  the  capitals  of  the  country  were  already  in 
our  hands,  and  that  the  communication  by  means  of  the  Pesth 
and  Szolnok  railway  would  consequently  be  reopened. 

From  this  rumor,  the  individual  charged  with  forwarding  the 
ammunition  to  the  main  army  was  induced  to  direct  the  canvois — 
instead  of  sending  them,  as  hitherto,  by  Miskolcz  and  Ipojysag, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  331 

or  on  the  Gyongyos  main,  road — to  Szolnok,  supposing  that  by- 
making  use  of  the  railway,  they  would  reach  the  place  of  their 
destination  much  sooner.  But  when  doing  so  he  omitted  to  in- 
form the  commander  of  the  artillery  of  the  main  army  that  he 
had  changed  the  route  of  the  transport ;  and  thus  these  supplies 
of  ammunition — which  the  artillery  commander,  after  having 
vainly  expected  their  arriva)  for  some  days  in  the  fortified  camp 
of  Komorn,  had  ordered  to  be  searched  for  on  all  imaginable 
routes,  except,  of  course,  on  the  impracticable  railway  line — re- 
mained undiscovered  for  a  long  time,  first  in  Szolnok,  till  the 
re-opening  of  the  railroad  communication  (in  the  end  of  April  or 
beginning  of  May),  and  afterward  even  in  Pesth  also. 

The  inevitable  consequence  of  this  state  of  things,  the  sudden 
silence  of  our  batteries — after  the  brisk  fire  of  artillery  by  which 
the  storming  of  the  Kmety  division  against  the  intrenchments  had 
been  seconded — which  during  more  than  a  week  had  been  only 
now  and  then  partially  broken  through,  had  probably  assured  the 
enemy  ;  for  all  this  time  he  did  scarcely  any  thing  from  which 
we  could  have  inferred  that  any  notice  was  taken  of  our  prepara- 
tions for  a  very  serious  attempt  to  become  masters  of  the  fortress  ; 
while  we  could  least  of  all  conceal  from  his  observation  those 
preparations  which  most  clearly  betrayed  our  intention  to  efiect 
a  breach  in  a  part  of  the  fortress  wall. 

After  the  unsuccessful  attack  of  the  Kmety  division  on  the  in- 
trenchments, I  agreed  with  the  chief  of  the  general  staff'  to  defer 
the  assault,  which  at  first  we  had  intended  to  undertake  without 
loss  of  time,  until  it  could  either  be  combined  with  the  simul- 
taneous use  of  a  breach,  or  we  should  be  convinced  that  it  was 
impossible  for  us  to  effect  a  breach  with  the  means  of  siege  at  our 
command. 

We  came  to  this  conclusion  from  the  attention  we  paid  to  the 
elevation  (the  Spitzberg)  facing  the  southern  half  of  the  Weissen- 
burg  front,  but  especially  that  short  space  opposite  it  which  lay 
south  of  the  Weissenburg  rondel,  immediately  between  it  and  the 
commencing  point  of  the  terraced  exterior  inclosure  ;  this  eleva- 
tion being  rather  favorable  for  the  erection  of  a  breach-battery. 

For  the  interior  of  the  fortress  at  this  place,  as  well  as  in  by 
far  the  greater  part  of  its  circumference,  was  separated  from  the 
exterior  only  by  a  simple  wall,  which,  though  strong,  was  com- 
pletely exposed  to  our  direct  fire. 


332  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  unusually  great  distance  of  the  point  fit  for  the  erection  of 
the  breach-battery  from  the  wall  of  the  fortress,  however,  ren- 
dered the  probability  of  success  the  more  seriously  doubtful,  as  we 
could  arm  the  breach-battery  at  most  with  only  four  twenty-four 
and  one  eighteen-pounder.^  The  sensible  loss,  moreover,  with 
which  the  attack  of  the  Kmety  division  on  the  intrenchments  in 
front  of  the  forcing-pump  had  been  repulsed,  had  at  once  created 
in  me  so  much  respect  for  the  strength  of  the  fortress  of  Ofen,  that 
the  sucessful  result  of  a  mere  escalade  by  itself  seemed  now  to  be 
far  more  improbable. 

The  formation  of  the  battery  on  the  Spitzbergel  was  conse- 
quently energetically  undertaken  without  further  deliberation; 
and  that  from  the  time  of  beginning  it  till  the  first  breach-shot 
more  than  a  week  elapsed,  was  owing  neither  to  the  enemy, 
who,  as  has  been  said,  did  extremely  little  to  delay  its  construc- 
tion, nor  to  the  circumstance  that  we  were  obliged  to  seek  for  all 
the  materials  needed  for  it,  nor  to  our  mistakes  during  its  erec- 
tion, but  solely  and  exclusively  to  the  narrow-mindedness  of  Gen- 
eral Count  Guyon,  the  then  commander  of  the  fortress  of  Komorn. 

This  showed  itself  in  his  refusing  at  first  to  deliver  up  the 
above-mentioned  five  battering-guns,  and  complaining  to  Kossuth 
that  I  intended  to  exhaust  the  means  for  the  defense  of  the  for- 
tress intrusted  to  him. 

Fortunately  Kossuth's  conviction  of  the  necessity  for  taking  Ofen 
coincided  with  my  own,  although — as  I  thought  I  afterward  per- 
ceived— for  quite  different  reasons ;  and  thus  General  Guyon  had 
at  last  to  submit  to  supply  our  most  urgent  want  of  besieging  artil- 
lery out  of  the  stores  of  the  fortress  of  Komorn.  He  did  this,  how- 
ever, tardily  enough  to  delay  for  several  days  the  armament  of 
the  breach-battery,  which  was  at  last  completed. 

Foreseeing  this  opposition  to  me  on  the  part  of  Guyon,  1  had  in- 
tentionally at  first  asked  only  for  the  delivery  of  the  said  captured 
guns,  because  they  did  not  belong  to  the  armament  of  the  fortress 
of  Komorn,  and  consequently  Guyon  could  by  no  means  find  in 
my  demand  any  valid  reason  for  refusing  to  comply  with  it. 

I  was  obliged  to  observe  this  precaution,  in  consequence  of  being 

^  These  were  the  same  five  undamaged  pieces  of  the  battery  which  we 
had  taken  from  the  Austrian  blockading-corps  in  the  sudden  attack  on  the 
trench  before  Komorn  (on  the  26th  of  April)  ;  the  sixth  piece — an  eighteen- 
pounder — was  already  spiked  when  it  fell  into  our  hands. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  333 

at  first  uncertain  whether  Kossuth  was  disposed  for  or  against 
the  regular  siege  of  Ofen.  But  when  I  thought  I  could  infer  with 
certainty,  from  Gruyon's  compliance,  which  at  last  took  place,  that 
Kossuth  had  this  time  taken  a  decided  part  for  me,  or,  more  cor- 
rectly, for  the  furtherance  of  my  undertaking  against  Ofen,  much 
time  as  it  would  cost,  I  then  immediately  raised  my  demands  on 
Guyon  somewhat  higher,  and  claimed  besides  the  equipment  for 
a  breach- battery,  the  delivery  also  of  four  mortars,  I  believe  thirty- 
pounders.  These,  however,  I  did  not  receive  till  near  the  end  of 
the  siege. 

Besides  the  breach-battery,  adjoining  it  on  the  right  a  dis- 
mounting-battery  *  of  from  twelve  to  sixteen  gun-stands  had  been 
thrown  up ;  for  the  armament  of  which,  however,  only  six- 
pounders  could  be  employed,  because  we  had  at  our  disposal  no 
other  twelve-pounder  batteries  than  the  two  posted  on  the  Blocks- 
berg  and  the  little  Schwabenberg. 

Opposite  these  approaches,  which  were  in  fact  not  of  very  great 
consequence,  the  enemy  thought  he  had  done  enough,  when  he 
armed  the  Weissenburg  rondel  with  cannon,  and  planted  besides 
four  pieces  of  the  largest  calibre  (if  I  remember  right,  they  were 
four-and-twenty-pounders),  without  any  protection,  on  the  ram- 
part between  the  Weissenburg  rondel  and  the  one  situated  at  the 
northern  salient  angle,  about  a  hundred  paces  distant  from  the 
former,  and  disturbed  our  workmen  from  time  to  time  by  separate 
shots. 

The  only  effect  of  these  measures  upon  us,  however,  was,  that 
we  drew  back  the  first  corps  (Nagy-Sandor),  which  was  encamp- 
ing westward  from  the  Spitzbergel,  just  in  the  line  of  these  shots,  to 
the  ground  lying  on  the  Fleischhauer  road,  which  was  protected 
against  the  fire  of  the  fortress  by  the  western  continuation  of  the 
Blocksberg. 

In  like  manner  I  had  been  obliged  by  the  fire  from  the  north- 
ern rondel  of  the  Weissenburg  front,  on  the  first  day  of  the  siege 

*  This  dismounting-battery  properly  originated,  so  to  say,  against  our 
will.  It  was  primarily  intended  for  a  breach-battery.  But  when  almost 
completed,  the  place  on  which  it  had  been  planted,  as  well  as  its  whole 
construction,  turned  out  to  be  not  calculated  for  a  breach-battery.  The 
erection  of  a  new  breach-battery  was  now — after  the  loss  of  several  days 
— undertaken,  close  to  the  left  of  the  former,  which  was  made  use  of 
afterward  as  a  dismounting-battery,  having  been  extended  on  the  right 
several  gun-stands. 


334  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

to  draw  back  with  my  head-quarters  from  the  suburbs  of  Christ- 
inenstadt.  I  removed  them  first  to  the  entrance  of  the  Auwinkel,=^ 
then  to  the  great  Schwabenberg. 

During  the  whole  time  of  constructing  our  batteries  we  had 
confined  our  fire  to  indispensable  replies  to  that  of  the  enemy. 
By  this  we  intended,  on  the  one  hand,  as  much  as  possible  to 
spare  our  ammunition,  which  in  the  mean  time  had  been  a  little 
augmented,  and  to  reserve  it  for  the  energetic  defense  of  the 
breach-battery ;  on  the  other  hand,  to  confirm  the  enemy  in  the 
remarkable  lukewarmness  with  which  he  carried  on  the  defense 
of  the  Weissenburg  front,  which  was  menaced  by  us,  and  was 
notoriously  his  weakest  side. 

On  the  ninth  or  tenth  day  of  the  siege  (I  can  not  indicate  the 
day  with  certainty)  the  breach-battery  began  to  play. 

The  first  breach-shot  was  at  the  same  time  the  signal  for  all 
the  other  batteries  to  open  their  fire  as  briskly  as  possible  on  the 
opposite  ramparts  of  the  fortress.  Especially  the  howitzer  bat- 
teries were  to  play  upon  the  Vienna  front;  the  twelve-pounder 
batteries  upon  the  four  twenty-four-pounders  planted  without  pro- 
tection on  the  rampart  of  the  Weissenburg  front ;  and  the  six- 
pounders  of  the  dismounting-battery,  thrown  up  to  the  right  of 
the  breach-battery,  upon  the  enemy's  guns  on  the  Weissenburg 
rondel. 

The  unexpectedly  vehement  attack  of  artillery  seemed  to  make 
a  powerful  impression  on  the  defender ;  for  with  evident  haste 
he  drew  back  the  four  twenty- four-pounders  from  the  rampart 
into  the  interior  of  the  fortress,  behind  the  outermost  row  of 
houses,  and  allowed  our  breach-battery  to  play  almost  entirely 
undisturbed  during  the  whole  day.  It  is  also  possible  that,  on 
account  of  its  great  distance,  he  believed  he  had  not  much  to 
fear  for  his  rampart  from  it. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  the  gaps,  any  thing  but  inconsiderable, 
which  our  breach-battery  had  made  in  the  stone-work,  in  spite 
of  the  great  distance,  by  the  evening  of  the  first  day  were  suffi- 
cient to  rouse  the  defender  to  increased  activity,  and  on  the  next 
morning  his  four  twenty-four-pounders,  protected  by  traverses 
against  the  fire  of  our  twelve-pounder  battery,  stood  again  on 
the  rampart ;  at  the  same  time,  on  several  points  of  the  latter, 
the  digging  of  a  ditch  (which  doubtless  was  intended  to  compen- 
*  A  pleasure-ground. — Transl. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  335 

sate  for  the  want  of  a  sheltered  rampart-walk)  had  been  begun, 
and  the  earth- works  behind  the  breach,  which  had  likewise  been 
commenced  during  the  night,  and  vigorously  continued  during 
the  day,  plainly  showed  the  intention  of  isolating  this  breach 
from  the  inner  space  of  the  fortress  by  a  kind  of  intrenchment. 

On  this  and  the  following  days  the  defender  no  longer  looked 
idly  on,  as  during  the  course  of  the  preceding  day,  while  our 
breach-battery  continued,  its  effective  brisk  fire.  On  the  con- 
trary, he  attacked  it  with  a  treble  cross-fire  from  three  points — 
to  the  south  of  the  breach,  from  the  Weissenburg  rondel,  and 
from  the  traverses ;  while  from  the  interior  of  the  fortress  he 
threw  bombs  against  it. 

In  spite  of  all  this,  by  the  end  of  the  following  day  (the  third 
of  the  assault  by  the  battery),  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  the  breach 
appeared  to  us  to  be  so  far  advanced,  that  we  believed  it  already 
practicable. 

Major-general  Hentzi  had  meanwhile  been  exerting  himself 
to  fulfill  his  threats  in  a  terrific  manner.  For  Pesth,  as  on  the 
first  day  of  the  siege,  so  also  on  some  of  the  following  ones,  was 
bombarded  with  increasing  vehemence  ;  and  my  precipitancy  in 
ordering  the  general  storm  in  the  night  of  the  17th  or  18th  of 
May — without  having  previously  thoroughly  convinced  myself 
that  the  breach  was  practicable — had  its  origin  in  my  indigna- 
tion at  these  bombardments,  which  were  altogether  unjustifiable 
in  whatever  light  regarded. 

The  dispositions  for  this  storm  indicated  as  objects  of  attack — 
for  the  second  army  corps,  the  park  of  the  castle  and  the  castle- 
gate  with  its  nearest  environs  ;  for  the  first  corps,  the  breach ; 
for  the  third  corps,  the  northern  rondel  with  its  vicinity  on  the 
salient  angle  of  the  Vienna  and  Weissenburg  fronts  ;  and  for  the 
Kmety  division,  the  intrenchments  before  the  forcing-pump. 

The  attack  commenced  shortly  after  midnight,  was  unsuccess- 
ful on  all  points,  and  was  discontinued  before  daybreak. 

The  storming-columns  of  the  first  corps  had  encountered  an 
obstacle  in  the  overhanging  remains  of  still  undemolished  stone- 
work at  the  upperm,ost  edge  of  the  breach,  insurmountable  with- 
out ladders.  The  imperfection  of  the  breach  being  masked  by 
the  apex  of  the  loose  heap  of  debris,  which  gave  way  under  the 
feet  of  the  assailants,  had  escaped  our  previous  observation — 
confined  to  a  mere  glance.     The   attempt  at  escalade  of  the 


336  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

third  corps  had  been  rendered  impracticable  by  the  insufficient 
length  of  their  ladders ;  that  of  the  second  corps,  in  whose  ob- 
jects of  attack  this  circumstance  was  not  prominent,  was  de- 
feated by  the  valor  of  that  part  of  the  garrison  by  which  the 
park  of  the  castle  and  its  vicinity  were  defended.  Finally,  the 
attack  of  the  Kmety  division  failed  through  the  impossibility  of 
advancing  against  the  intrenchments  along  their  approaches, 
upon  which  projectiles  of  all  kinds  were  ^Jaowered  down  from  the 
ramparts  of  the  Pesth  front. 

The  defensive  activity  of  the  enemy,  suddenly  so  vividly  ex- 
cited by  the  effective  fire  of  our  breach-battery,  showed  itself 
after  this  storming  in  a  still  higher  degree  of  development  than 
before  it.  The  earth-works  on  the  rampart  extending  from  the 
Weissenburg  to  the  northern  rondel,  as  well  as  those  behind  the  ' 
breach,  were  most  zealously  continued,  and,  besides,  the  strength- 
ening of  the  environs  of  the  castle-gate  energetically  commenced. 
For  he  hastened  to  demolish  soraie  buildings  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
castle-gate,  which  had  favored  the  escalade  attempted  by  the  r 
troops  of  the  second  corps,  and  prepared  others  for  defense.  \] 

The  more  reason  had  Ave — opposed  to  an  enemy  who  appeared  i 
resolved  to  dare  the  worst,  and  taught  by  the  bitter  consequence  ^ 
of  my  precipitancy,  the  failure  of  our  first  storming — to  do  all  in 
our  power  that  our  next  effort  for  the  final  fall  of  the  fortress 
might  not  again  be  unsuccessful. 

In  the  attempt  of  the  third  corps  to  escalade  the  rampart  of 
the  fortress  near  the  salient  angle  of  the  Vienna  and  Weissenburg 
front,  it  has  been  mentioned  that  the  length  of  the  ladders  they 
possessed  had  proved  to  be  insufficient.  That  the  next  escalade 
of  the  third  corps  might  not  fail  again  from  this  cause,  longer 
ladders  were  sought  for  ;  and  instead  of  the  vicinity  of  the  salient 
angle,  where  the  rampart  of  the  fortress  was  almost  highest,  the 
part  of  the  Vienna  front  situated  nearest  to  the  gate  of  that  name 
was  fixed  as  the  object  of  attack  for  the  third  corps. 

At  the  first  storming,  the  breach  was  still  impracticable.  The 
breach-battery  had  consequently  immediately  afterward  to  con- 
tinue its  attacks  vigorously  ;  and  in  order  to  be  quite  sure  of  suc- 
cess, it  was  arranged  that  the  troops  of  the  first  army  corps,  when 
they  next  stormed  at  the  breach,  should,  like  those  appointed  for 
the  escalade  exclusively,  be  provided  with  ladders. 

In  the  first  stomiing  our  troops  had  found  the  approach  to  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  337 

breach  impeded  by  occasional  high  and  strong  fences  of  all  kinds, 
as  walls,  iron  gratings,  planks,  &c. ;  these  had  first  of  all  to  be 
removed  out  of  their  way,  at  a  great  cost  of  time  and  strength. 
From  the  loud  noise  unavoidable  in  such  operations,  the  enemy 
could  guess  our  intention  long  before  the  arrival  of  our  storming- 
column  at  the  foot  of  the  breach.  Instead  of  the  defender,  the 
assailant  consequently  was  rather  the  surprised ;  for  the  former 
began  the  combat  before  the  latter  was  in  a  condition  to  attack 
him.  The  storming  had  not  yet  commenced,  and  already  the 
troops  of  the  first  corps  were  exhausted  by  their  efforts  during  the 
advance  on  the  difficult  ground,  and  shaken  by  the  vehement 
fire  of  the  too-soon  alarmed  enemy.  Before  the  next  escalade 
all  hindrances  had  therefore  to  be  completely  removed  from  the 
approach  to  the  breach. 

Till  now  the  garrison,  especially  in  the  interior  of  the  fortress, 
had  been  only  occasionally  molested  by  our  projectiles  ;  they  had 
enough  of  the  necessary  rest  to  remain,  with  a  simultaneous 
abundance  of  victuals,  in  perfectly  good  humor.  Undoubtedly  it 
would  be  of  very  great  advantage  to  us  during  the  next  storm, 
if  they  could  meanwhile  be  brought  down  a  little.  We  thought 
to  attain  this  object  most  certainly  by  bombarding  from  this  time 
the  inner  part  of  the  fortress  as  briskly  as  the  scantiness  of  our 
means  permitted  (we  had  meanwhile  obtained  from  the  fortress 
of  Komorn  the  above-mentioned  four  mortars,  and  had  planted 
them  partly  on  the  Blocksberg,  partly  in  the  Vienna  suburb),  and 
at  the  same  time  cannonading  it  with  the  twelve-pounder  and 
howitzer  batteries,  in  order  to  set  fire  to  those  buildings  especially 
which  were  pointed  out  to  us  by  scouts  as  magazines  and  bar- 
racks. 

By  the  first  storming,  it  will  be  seen — if  the  details  just  given 
be  duly  considered — that  the  garrison  could  not  by  any  means 
be  taken  by  surprise.  But  the  less  unexpected  an  attack,  the 
more  doubtful  its  success,  other  circumstances  being  equal.  It 
was  consequently  of  the  first  importance  to  insure  to  the  next 
storming,  by  some  means,  the  advantage  of  a  surprise. 

To  this  end,  immediately  on  the  approach  of  the  first  night 
after  the  miscarried  assault,  noisy  feigned  attacks  were  made  on 
the  whole  circuit  of  the  fortress,  except  on  the  Pesth  front  which 
was  inaccessible  to  us,  and  continued  uninterruptedly  till  about 
two  in  the  morning  ;  at  this  hour,  however,  the  fire  of  musketry 

P 


338  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

and  that  from  the  batteries  completely  ceased,  and  recommenced 
only  with  bright  daylight.  The  repetition  of  this  manosuvre 
during  the  two  or  three  following  nights  was  intended,  on  the 
one  hand,  to  frustrate  the  nocturnal  undertakings  of  the  enemy, 
directed  perhaps  to  rendering  the  breach  or  the  approach  to  it 
impracticable ;  on  the  other  hand,  to  accustom  him  to  believe 
that  the  second  hour  after  midnight  was  the  fixed  time,  after 
which  till  the  next  night  set  in,  he  had  no  longer  to  fear  any 
further  molestation. 

The  last  repetition  of  these  feigned  attacks  took  place  in  the 
night  between  the  20th  and  21st  of  May. 

With  the  second  hour  after  midnight  our  brisk  nocturnal  har- 
assing fire  suddenly  ceased  this  time  also,  and  immediately  the 
preparations  for  the  real  storm  noiselessly  began. 

Masked  by  the  darkness  of  the  night,  the  columns  approached 
their  objects  of  attack,  awaiting  the  signal  for  the  onset. 

At  the  stroke  of  three  in  the  morning  all  the  batteries  together 
sent  forth  a  discharge  ;  then  they  were  silent  again.  This  was 
the  signal  for  the  general  storming. 

The  darkness,  which  still  continued  for  some  time,  rendered  it 
impossible  at  first  to  observe  distinctly  what  was  taking  place  at 
the  breach,  although  the  situation  of  the  head-quarters  was  fa- 
vorable for  this  purpose.  But  the  flashing  of  the  divers  discharges 
of  cannons  and  muskets  from  the  Weissenburg  rondel,  the  short 
luminous  curves  of  the  hand-grenades  thrown  from  it  against  the 
near  breach,  and  the  brisk  fire  of  tirailleurs  maintained  on  our 
part  by  a  dense  chain  of  sharp-shooters  deployed  in  the  rear  of 
the  real  storming-columns  against  the  defenders,  in  order  to  facili- 
tate the  assault — meanwhile  gave  us  reason  to  believe  that  our 
troops  were  already  on  the  breach. 

Soon  afterward,  in  the  twilight,  we  could  perceive  that  the 
masses  repeatedly  stormed  up  the  breach,  but  were  nevertheless 
as  often  driven  back  again  by  the  fierce  fire  from  the  "Weissenburg 
rondel.  At  almost  every  new  assault,  however,  some  of  them 
gained  the  rampart.  But  the  next  moment  these  also  were  no 
longer  any  where  to  be  seen ;  the  balls  of  the  defenders  might 
have  struck  them  down. 

The  longer  we  observed  these  unsuccessful  efforts,  the  clearer 
became  the  conviction  in  us,  that  our  tirailleur  fire,  spite  of  its 
briskness,  was  far  from  sufficient  to  disconcert,  to  the  degree  re- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  339 

quired  for  the  success  of  the  storming,  the  most  obstinate  defend- 
ers of  the  breach,  the  forces  of  the  Weissenburg  rondel.  Here  it 
was  necessary  to  help  with  artillery.  The  breach-battery,  and 
the  dismounting  one  to  the  right  of  it,  received  orders  to  open 
their  fire  against  the  Weissenburg  rondel,  but  in  such  a  manner, 
that  the  projectiles  might  pass  over  it  as  close  as  possible.  We 
promised  ourselves  from  the  imposing  noise  of  the  solid  bullets 
rushing  in  quick  succession  over  the  heads  of  the  men  of  the 
Weissenburg  rondel,  a  far  more  favorable  success  for  the  assail- 
ants than  from  the  musketry  of  our  sharp-shooters,  murderous 
though  it  was. 

In  consequence  of  the  considerable  distance  of  the  breach-bat- 
tery from  the  head-quarters,  a  good  while  elapsed  before  this 
order  could  be  carried  into  effect ;  and  we  could  distinctly  re- 
mark in  the  meanwhile,  that  the  continued  attempts  at  storming, 
undertaken  time  after  time  with  evidently  less  strength,  grew 
ever  more  unsuccessful. 

But  as  soon  as  these  batteries  began  to  play,  the  sinking  courage 
of  our  troops  seemed  suddenly  to  revive.  The  next  assault, 
essayed  with  visibly  greater  energy,  brought  the  larger  half  of 
the  then  storming  party  on  to  the  rampart.  The  Weissenburg 
rondel  now  lay  to  the  left  behind  them ;  they  turned  to  the  right 
and  very  soon  disappeared  in  the  still-impenetrable  shade  of  the 
dark  walls  of  some  half-finished  houses  situated  not  far  from  the 
breach. 

Painful  uncertainty  seized  us  as  to  the  fate  of  these  brave  fel- 
lows. 

A  second  attempt  to  storm,  with  almost  as  favorable  and  enig- 
matical an  issue,  and  even  a  third,  succeeded  the  first  at  short 
intervals.  After  the  last,  however,  an  inexplicable  standstill 
suddenly  took  place.  The  breach  was  no  longer  stepped  upon — 
and  nevertheless,  as  nearly  as  we  could  calculate,  scarcely  more 
than  half  a  battalion  could  have  reached  the  rampart.  It  seemed 
as  if  the  combat,  just  at  the  moment  when  it  began  to  take  a 
more  favorable  turn  for  the  assailants,  had  been  basely  given  up 
by  them.  Anxiously  we  endeavored  to  discover,  in  the  proximity 
of  the  breach,  still  but  very  faintly  illumined,  some  particular 
cause  for  this  sorrowful  change  of  afiairs. 

The  fire  from  the  Weissenburg  rondel — thanks  to  the  activity 
of  our  breach  and  dismounting-batteries — had  rather  slackened 


340  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

than  increased,  though  it  still  continued  pretty  uninterruptedly. 
But  otherwise  not  one  of  the  garrison  was  visible  on  the  rampart 
next  the  breach  ;  only  at  some  distance  south  of  it,  we  thought 
we  remarked  a  hostile  troop,  which  seemed  to  assemble  just  then 
on  the  rampart,  in  order  to  advance  directly  to  the  breach  and 
again  occupy  its  apparently  abandoned  proximity.  Yet,  though 
we  watched  it  a  long  time,  we  could  not  perceive  that  it  gained 
ground  toward  the  breach.  At  first  we  took  this  for  a  favorable 
sign,  supposing  that  those  of  our  troops  who  had  previously 
mounted  the  breach  had  not  succumbed,  and  were  now  prevent- 
ing this  troop  from  advancing  on  the  rampart  toward  the  breach. 
But  along  the  whole  extent  of  the  rampart  as  far  as  the  breach 
not  a  single  shot  had  been  fired ;  and  judging  from  the  immobility 
of  this  troop,  attacks  with  the  bayonet  were  out  of  the  question. 

The  increasing  daylight  at  last  explained  all  contradictions. 
That  troop  on  the  rampart  was  assembled  round  the  tricolor  ban- 
ner of  a  Honved  battalion  I  It  consisted  in  part  of  those  brave 
fellows  who  had  previously  mounted  the  breach,  and  had  there 
found  a  tenable  spot ;  in  part  of  those  who  had  preferred  to 
escalade  by  means  of  ladders  the  "  terraced  enclosure,"  rather 
than  make  further  attempts  to  gain  the  rampart  by  the  breach. 
But  the  escalade — rendered  difficult  by  the  fire  of  the  Weissen- 
burg  rondel  also,  though,  on  account  of  the  greater  distance,  in 
a  less  degree  than  mounting  the  breach,  and  moreover  confined 
at  the  uppermost  w^all  to  a  single  ladder — furnished  only  a  very 
feeble  afflux  of  fresh  forces  for  the  reinforcement  of  that  isolated 
troop  on  the  rampart. 

The  apprehension  of  seeing  these  give  way  before  the  desperate 
attacks  of  the  garrison,  if  the  escalade  on  the  Vienna  front  and 
the  storm  on  the  intrenchments  before  the  forcing-pump  should 
now  be  suddenly  abandoned,  as  it  was  already  day,  and  these 
undertakings  had  not  yet  succeeded — induced  me  speedily  to  send 
two  officers  from  the  head-quarters  to  the  third  corps  and  the 
Kmety  division,  to  convey  to  them  the  encouraging  news  of  the 
success  of  the  first  corps,  and  communicate  to  them  at  the  same 
time  a  strict  order  for  the  increasingly  energetic  continuance  of 
their  attacks. 

This  measure,  however,  was  soon  seen  to  be  superfluous.  The 
two  officers  could  scarcely  have  got  half  way  from  the  head- 
quarters to  the  Vienna  suburb,  when  we  saw  the  first  escaladers 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  341 

of  the  third  corps  on  the  rampart  of  the  Vienna  front,  advancing 
toward  the  angle  formed  by  it  and  the  "Weissenburg  front ;  the 
Croats,  on  the  contrary,  who  had  defended  this  point,  retreating 
into  the  interior  of  the  fortress. 

Soon  afterward,  the  sign  of  submission — an  off-hand  white 
banner — waved  from  one  of  those  traverses  on  the  "Weissenburg 
rampart,  which  had  been  thrown  up  to  protect  the  four  twenty- 
four-pounders  planted  there  against  our  breach-battery. 

But  the  waving  of  this  banner  did  not  in  the  least  prevent  the 
defenders  of  the  Weissenburg  rondel  from  continuing  their  fatal 
fire  against  the  escaladers  of  the  first  corps  on  the  terraced  in- 
closure,  as  briskly  as  was  practicable,  considering  the  activity  of 
our  tirailleurs  and  batteries  directed  against  them ;  and  so  long 
as  this  lasted,  we  had  of  course  to  take  no  notice  at  all  of  this 
sign  of  submission  ;  the  lesg  so,  as  it  had  accidentally  escaped  our 
observation  by  whom  the  white  banner  had  been  set  up.  The 
anonymous  "  entreaty  for  pardon"  might  have  originated  only 
from  a  peaceful  citizen  of  Ofen,  whose  house  chanced  to  be  sit- 
uated in  one  and  the  same  direction  with  the  Weissenburg  rondel 
and  our  breach-battery,  by  the  bullets  from  which  it  was  perhaps 
being  roughly  handled. 

After  a  while,  however,  one  of  the  garrison  suddenly  ap- 
proached the  traverses,  seized  the  banner,  and  bore  it  with  un- 
steady steps  to  the  Weissenburg  rondel. 

Arrived  there,  he  planted  it  on  the  parapet. 

This  seemed  to  some  among  the  defenders  of  this  point  a  wel- 
come pretext  for  desisting  from  further  resistance.  The  greater 
part  continued  to  fire.  Moreover,  a  few  moments  later,  an  officer 
appeared  on  the  rondel,  approached  the  parapet,  tore  down  the 
sign  of  submission,  and  threw  it  on  the  ground.  But  scarcely 
had  he  retired,  when  the  banner  waved  anew  over  the  parapet. 
And  now  the.  idea  of  submission  seemed  to  have  the  majority  of 
the  defenders  in  its  favor ;  for  only  some  of  them  still  fired  oc- 
casionally. These  also  at  last  laid  down  their  arms.  Our  bat- 
teries and  tirailleurs  ceased  their  fire ;  and  while  the  latter 
mounted  the  Weissenburg  rondel  by  means  of  ladders,  the  major- 
ity of  the  battalion  of  the  first  corps  had  already  forced  their  way 
from  the  point  where  they  had  gathered  on  the  rampart,  south 
of  the  breach,  into  the  interior  of  the  town,  and  the  last  desperate 
combat  had  now  commenced  in  the  streets.     This,  however,  we 


342  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

were  prevented  from  observing  by  the  range  of  houses  along  the 
rampart  of  the  Weissenburg  front :  we  saw  only  the  smoke  of  the 
enemy's  guns  spreading  over  the  roofs. 

Almost  simultaneously  a  cloud  of  powder-smoke  of  uncommon 
extent  rose  on  the  other  side  of  the  fortress.  This  had  been 
aimed  at  the  chain-bridge  I  But  the  irrational  intention  had 
been  frustrated  by  the  injudicious  nature  of  the  mine,  which  was 
designed  to  blow  in  pieces  the  gigantic  chains  of  the  bridge. 

Half  an  hour  afterward  I  received  General  Nagy-Sandor's  re- 
port, that  the  fortress  together  with  the  garrison — Major-general 
Hentzi  mortally  wounded — was  completely  in  our  power. 


CHAPTER   LII. 

About  noon  of  the  4th  of  May,  Ofen  was  invested  by  us,  and 
not  till  the  morning  of  the  21st  did  we  gain  possession  of  the 
place ;  we  had  consequently  employed  almost  seventeen  entire 
days  in  its  conquest. 

The  chief  causes  of  this  loss  of  time,  by  no  means  unimportant 
to  us,  were,  next  to  the  firmness  of  the  hostile  garrison,  the  want 
of  all  preparation  for  the  operations  of  a  siege,  which  had  un- 
expectedly proved  necessary ;  our  mistakes  during  the  siege ;  our 
deficiency  of  besieging-artillery  ;  and  moreover  the  unseasonable 
scruples — to  choose  the  mildest  expression — of  the  commander 
of  the  fortress  of  Komorn,  Count  Guyon. 

It  can  not  be  denied,  that  the  fortress  of  Ofen,  from  the  method 
of  defense  adopted  by  Major-general  Hentzi,  must  have  been  in 
our  possession  at  furthest  within  eight  days,  if,  instead  of  the 
preconceived  opinion  of  being  able  to  conquer  it  by  mere  attacks 
with  infantry  and  howitzers,  I  had  at  once  brought  with  me  the 
besieging-park  from  Komorn,  had  prepared  beforehand  the  requi- 
sites for  the  construction  of  batteries,  and  with  more  circumspec- 
tion and  equal  energy  had  set  about  the  construction  of  the  batter- 
ies themselves.  For  the  method  in  which  Major-general  Hentzi 
conducted  the  defense  seemed  to  be  based  on  the  peculiar  illusion, 
that  the  longer  maintenance  of  a  besieged  strong  place  depended 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  343 

not  so  much  on  the  energetic  impediments  thrown  in  the  way  of 
the  besiegers'  operations,  as  on  the  amount  of  devastation  com 
mitted  on  some  point  beyond  the  offensive  range. 

Instead  of  hindering,  at  any  sacrifice,  the  construction  of  our 
batteries,  without  the  completion  of  which  we  should  have  been 
confined  exclusively  to  the  escalade — certainly  very  precarious, 
considering  the  valor  of  the  garrison — Major-general  Hentzi  used 
exclusively  for  the  r^eated  bombardments  of  Pesth  those  colos- 
sal means,  of  the  possession  of  which  he  had  with  good  reason 
boasted  in  his  reply  to  my  summons  to  surrender. 

While  on  our  part  the  intrenchments  at  the  Spitzbergel  were 
carried  on  uninterruptedly  under  his  very  eyes,  though  with  evi- 
dent helplessness,  and  one  half  of  the  guns  employed  in  those 
bombardments  would  have  suflficed  to  frustrate  the  erection  of 
the  breach-battery  ;  Major-general  Hentzi  was,  above  all,  solicit- 
ous for  the  demolition  of  the  deserted  House  of  Representatives, 
and  amused  himself,  by  the  way,  in  changing  into  ruins  and 
ashes  some  dozens  of  houses  happening  to  belong  to  thoroughly 
excellently-disposed  black-and-yellow  Pesth  citizens  ;  till,  at  last, 
the  cannibal  personal  gratification  arising  from  the  further  repe- 
tition of  similar  experiments  was  embittered  to  him  by  the  thun 
dering  memento  mori  of  our  breach-battery,  which  had  mean- 
while been  completed. 

Not  till  his  foot  was  already  excoriated,  did  Major-general 
Hentzi  seem  to  observe  where  the  shoe  really  pinched  him. 

From  this  time,  it  is  true,  we  see  him  do  every  thing  in  his 
power  subsequently  to  raze  the  parapets,  the  construction  of 
which  he  had  taken  en  bagatelle;  subsequently  to  silence  the 
guns,  the  planting  of  which  in  the  batteries  he  had  not  even, 
attempted  to  prevent ;  subsequently  we  see  him  undertake,  with 
surprising  energy,  and  unceasingly  continue  the  construction  of 
defensive  works,  which  he  ought  to  have  begun  on  the  first  day 
of  the  siege. 

But  these  gigantic  efforts  had  only  the  usual  result  of  all  "  sub- 
sequents.''  They  came  too  late.  Those  days  on  which  they 
ought  to  have  been  made,  Major-general  Hentzi  thought  he  must 
devote  exclusively  to  the  bombardment  of  Pesth. 

And  now  that  they  were  past,  that  is,  when  our  twenty-four- 
pounders  were  already  in  activity,  he  could  no  longer  prevent 
us  from  effecting  a  breach  ;  nay,  even  the  most  desperate  resist- 


344  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

ance  of  the  garrison  could  not  then  retard  the  fall  of  the  fortress, 
which,  considering  our  want  of  means  and  our  helplessness 
during  the  siege,  might  still  be  said  to  be  premature. 

The  above-described  defense  of  Ofen  was  enfeebled,  in  spite  of 
all  its  valor,  by  the  prevalence  of  a  destructive  rage,  ascribable 
only  to  political  fanaticism,  but  just  as  foolish  as  absolutely  de- 
testable. 

The  bombardments  of  Pesth  were,  I  repeat  it,  by  no  means 
justifiable  in  any  point  of  view.  Not  politically ;  because  the 
Pesth  "landlords,"  as  has  been  said,  were  neither  Kossuthians 
nor  republicans.  And  just  as  little  strategically  :  for  these  bom- 
bardments (apart  from  what  has  already  been  said  against  them) 
did  not  even  accomplish  their  object  as  repressive  measures ;  as 
such  they  should  have  induced  us  to  give  up  the  siege  immedi- 
ately, and  march  off  straightway. 

This,  however,  by  no  means  took  place  ;  and  with  a  calm 
estimate  of  the  then  state  of  the  specifically-Austrian  cause  in 
Hungary,  might  have  been  foreseen  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
(even  if  no  importance  at  all  was  attached  to  the  categorical  tone 
of  my  summons  to  surrender)  with  just  as  little  difficulty  as  the 
dangerous  exasperation,  which,  in  consequence  of  these  devasta- 
tions of  the  city  of  Pesth,  must  seize  upon  our  ranks  against  their 
originators. 

Considering  all  this  beforehand,  I  had  asked  Major-general 
Hentzi  to  spare  the  city  of  Pesth  and  the  chain-bridge,  under  the 
assurance  that  he  had  no  attack  whatever  to  apprehend  from  the 
left  bank  of  the  Danube.  I  had  simultaneously  guaranteed  to 
him  and  to  his  troops,  even  if  they  should  defend  themselves  to 
the  last,  a  humane  treatment,  provided  these  objects,  which  were 
innoxious,  to  the  garrison,  were  spared. 

The  bombardments  of  Pesth  showed  clearly  enough  that  no 
regard  was  paid  to  humane  considerations ;  and  I  immediately 
issued  an  express  proliihition  to  all  the  divisions  of  the  besieging 
army  against  giving  quarter  to  the  garrison.  But  on  the  cap- 
ture of  its  commander  I  set  an  especial  price  :  for  I  intended  to 
make  an  example  of  him,  as  a  warning  to  those  who  have  an 
itching  for  purposelessly  augmenting  the  horrors  of  war. 

Major-general  Hentzi  fell  mortally  wounded  into  my  power ; 
with  the  dying  man  a  higher  power  was  already  reckoning. 

The  garrison  was  not  put  to  the  sword.    Let  it  be  thankful  to 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  345 

those  officers  who,  in  part,  have  since  expired  on  the  scaffold,  in 
part  are  languishing  in  the  state-prisons  of  Austria ;  let  it  hold 
the  memory  of  its  noble-minded  enemies  in  honor  ! 


CHAPTER  LIII. 

About  the  middle  of  the  month  of  April,  1849,  as  is  known 
from  what  precedes,  while  the  main  body  of  our  principal  army 
was  on  its  march  from  Waizen  toward  Levencz,  an  expeditionary 
column,  composed  of  six  companies  of  infantry,  one  squadron  of 
hussars,  and  two  six-pounders,  under  the  command  of  the  Hon- 
ved  Major  Armin  Gorgei,  was  detached  into  the  district  of  the 
mountain-towns  to  purge  them  from  the  Austrian  garrisons  ;  and 
thus  protect  the  rear  of  the  main  body  of  our  army  during  its 
further  advance  against  Komorn. 

On  the  18th  of  April,  Major  Gorgei  began  the  fulfillment  of 
his  mission  by  taking  Schemnitz  by  storm.  The  hostile  soldiers, 
who  on  this  occasion  became  our  prisoners,  stated  that  the 
strength  of  the  Austrian  column,  distributed  in  the  district  of 
the  mountain-towns,  consisted  of  ten  companies  of  infantry  and 
two  pieces  of  artillery. 

The  commander  of  these  troops  (Major  Trenk)  stood  on  that 
day  with  a  part  of  them  in  Neusohl. 

At  the  first  news  of  the  expulsion  of  his  troops  from  Schem- 
nitz, Major  Trenk  evacuated  the  district  of  the  mountain-towns 
without  further  opposition,  and  concentrated  his  forces  near 
Szent-Marton,  in  the  Turocz  comitate,  which  it  bounds  on  the 
north. 

Major  Gorgei  pressed  forward  on  the  shortest  route  (by  Krem- 
nitz)  toward  Szent-Marton.  Simultaneous  reconnoiterings  on  the 
part  of  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  columns  led  to  a  conflict  at 
Pribocz  in  the  night  between  the  22d  and  the  23d.  The  Hun- 
garian advanced  troops  were  victorious  ;  and  Major  Trenk  now 
retreated  through  the  Sztrecsen  defile,  and  across  the  Waag  as 
far  as  Varin  on  the  right  bank  of  that  river. 

At  the  same  time  the  Sclavonian  free-corps  were  roving  about 


346  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

in  the  Liptau  comitate.  They  had  been  expelled  from  Eperjes 
in  the  second  half  of  the  month  of  March  by  the  expeditionary 
column  which  had  been  detached  from  the  seventh  army  corps, 
then  acting  independently,  and  sent  from  Miskolcz  against  them. 
This  is  the  expeditionary  column  which  subsequently  surprised 
the  Austrian  Colonel  Almasy  in  Lossoncz.  These  free-troops 
now  intended  undoubtedly  to  join  the  Austrian  Major  Trenk  in 
Varin,  by  Also-Kubin,  Parnicza,  and  Tcrhova. 

But  a  company  of  Major  Gorgei's  expeditionary  column — 
which  had,  in  the  mean  time,  crossed  the  Waag  at  Szucsan — 
overtook  and  attacked  them  on  the  28th,  not  far  from  Also- 
Kubin,  made  about  160  of  them  prisoners,  and  put  the  remainder 
to  flight  toward  Tverdossin.  The  captured  free-troopers  were 
disarmed  and  sent  away  to  their  homes. 

Major  Gbrgei  now  hastened  against  Major  Trenk  in  Varin  by 
the  same  route  as  that  on  which  he  had  perhaps  expected  to  be 
joined  by  the  Sclavonian  free-corps.  The  attack  on  Varin  took 
place  on  the  1st  of  May.  Major  Trenk  was  defeated,  and  on  the 
2d  was  pursued,  by  Budetin,  as  far  as  Kadolya,  on  the  road  to 
Jablunka. 

Before  it  was  possible  to  overtake  him,  Major  Gorgei  received 
news  that  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vogel,  coming  from  the  Zips, 
with  from  6000  to  7000  men  and  eighteen  guns,  had  broken  into 
the  Liptau. 

Ifi  consequence  of  this  information,  the  further  pursuit  of 
Major  Trenk  was  abandoned ;  and  by  the  4th  of  May  our  expe- 
ditionary column  was  already  in  Szent-Miklos  in  the  Liptau, 
partly  to  impede  the  advance  of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vogel  as 
much  as  possible ;  partly,  in  the  last  extremity,  to  protect  the 
road  from  Rosenberg  to  Neusohl. 

To  retard  the  westward  advance  of  these  hostile  forces  in  the 
valley  of  the  Waag,  seemed  to  be  demanded  by  the  natural  sup- 
position, that  Lieutenant-general  Dembinski — who,  it  is  known, 
had  been  intrusted,  soon  after  his  removal  from  the  chief  com- 
mand, with  the  charge  of  an  army  corps,  newly  formed  in 
Eperjes  and  Kaschau,  and  had  occupied  the  Zips  before  the 
irruption  into  it  of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vogel — was  now  pur- 
suing the  latter.  This  supposition  was,  however,  any  thing  but 
natural  in  the  case  of  Dembinski.  As  far  as  my  knowledge  of 
him  went,  Dembinski,  as  soon  as  he  scented  the  enemy  a-head. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  347 

had  always  without  exception  moved  back.  So  also  this  time. 
Instead  of  pursuing  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vogel,  Dembinski  bar- 
ricaded himself  in  the  Saros  comitate  against  that  of  Zips  ;  while 
Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vogel  left  the  latter  in  an  opposite  direction, 
probably  for  the  purpose  of  reaching  on  the  shortest  line  the  left 
wing  of  the  Austrian  main  army  on  the  central  Waag. 

This  shortest  line  led,  indeed,  through  the  district  of  the  moun- 
tain-towns. Our  expeditionary  column,  which  had  destroyed  the 
bridges  over  the  Waag  between  Szent-Miklos  and  Rosenberg,  and 
occupied  the  defile  at  the  latter  place,  was  nevertheless  sufficient 
to  determine  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vogel,  by  turning  northward 
from  Szent-Miklos,  to  pass  the  territory  between  the  rivers  Waag 
and  Arva  on  mountain-ways  practicable  only  with  extreme  diffi- 
culty, and  to  accomplish  his  strategic  task  on  the  road  from 
Also-Kubin  by  Varin,  Silein  (Zsolna,)  and  Trencsin ;  w^hile  our 
expeditionary  column,  flanking  his  left,  continually  protected  tho 
district  of  the  mountain-towns. 

Meanwhile  we  perceived  the  disproportion  between  the  great 
extent  of  the  district  to  be  protected  and  the  small  strength  of 
the  expeditionary  column  ;  and  from  the  camp  of  Ofen  six  com- 
panies of  infantry,  half  a  squadron  of  hussars,  and  two  three- 
pounders,  were  sent  to  ij  as  a  reinforcement. 

When  this  reinforcement  reached  the  expeditionary  column, 
Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vogel  had  already  effected  his  junction  with 
the  Austrian  main  army. 

To  form  the  extreme  left  wing  of  the  latter  seemed  at  the 
same  time  to  have  been  assigned  to  the  independent  brigade  of 
Major-general  Barko,  which,  coming  from  Silesia,  broke  into 
Hungary  through  the  Jablunka  defile,  and  advanced  toward 
Silein  on  the  Waag. 

At  the  time  of  the  fall  of  Ofen  our  now  reinforced  expedition- 
ary column  was  just  about  assuming  the  offensive  against  this 
hostile  brigade ;  while  the  other  expeditionary  column  from  tho 
seventh  army  corps,  which,  as  is  known,  had  shortly  before  the 
relief  of  Komorn  been  detached  to  Verebely,  had  advanced  from 
this  point  as  far  as  Neutra,  for  the  purpose  of  occupying  the 
hostile  forces  distributed  on  the  central  Waag,  and  thereby  favor- 
ing the  undertakings  of  Major  Gorgei  against  the  Barko  brigade. 

Poltenberg  had  stood  with  his  two  army  divisions  of  the 
seventh  corps  in  and  before  Raab  since  the  beginning  of  May, 


348  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

but  little  disturbed  by  the  Austriaiia ;  and  a  part  of  the  garrison 
of  Komorn  at  the  same  height  in  the  great  Schiitt. 

Kossuth's  previous  assurances  (at  the  beginning  of  April,  in 
Godollo),  that  Lieutenant-general  Bern  would  cross  the  Danube 
at  Baja  with  16,000  men  in  the  second  half  of  April,  had  not 
been  confirmed.  Even  in  May,  Bern  was  only  at  Temesvar ; 
and  the  Ban  Baron  Jellachich  consequently  reached  the  right 
bank  of  the  Drau  without  molestation. 

While  I  purposed  resuming  the  offensive  against  the  Aus- 
trian main  army  immediately  after  the  fall  of  Ofen,  a  plan  of 
operations  was  drawn  up  by  my  substitute  in  the  war-ministry, 
General  Klapka,  the  fundamental  idea  of  which  for  the  war-op- 
erations was,  that  we  should  observantly  await  the  irruption  of 
a  Russian  army  into  Hungary,  now  thought  probable  even  by 
the  provisional  government ;  and  moreover  having  as  its  inten- 
tion to  subordinate  all  the  leaders  of  Hungarian  troops  in  Hun- 
gaiy  and  Transylvania  to  the  control  of  the  ministry  of  war. 
This  plan  owed  it  to  the  latter  intention,  and  not  to  its  idea  for 
the  war-operations,  that  I  did  not  reject  it  at  the  outset,  but  only 
afterward  practically  disavowed  its  fundamental  idea  of  opera- 
tions by  my  disposal  of  the  troops,  which  was  intended  to  render 
possible  the  renewal  of  the  offensive  against  the  Austrian  main 
army  before  the  invasion  of  the  Russians. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Ofen,  accordingly,  the  first, 
second,  and  third  army  corps  were  directed  from  the  camp  at 
Ofen,  by  Gran,  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  toward  the  lower 
Waag  ;  but  on  the  right  bank  only  the  Kmety  division,  by  Stuhl- 
weissenburg,  toward  the  territory  situated  between  the  Flatten 
and  the  Neusiedel  lakes. 


CHAPTER   LIY. 

During  the  siege  of  Ofen,  and  shortly  before  the  failure  of  the 
first  general  assaults— about  the  middle  of  the  month  of  May — 
General  Klapka,  leaving  Debreczin  for  some  days,  suddenly  ar- 
rived at  my  head- quarters  pn  the  great  Schwabenberg ;  partly  that 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  349 

he  might  convince  himself  personally  of  the  progress  of  the  siege  ; 
partly  that  he  might  communicate  to  me  the  most  important 
points  of  what  he  had  at  present  learned,  during  the  short  time 
of  his  occupation  as  war-minister,  about  certain  circumstances 
which  had  remained  unknown  to  us  who  were  with  the  army. 
These  were,  the  relation  in  which  the  most  important  war-sup- 
plies and  the  resources  of  the  country  stood  to  the  development 
of  greater  forces  in  the  field,  generally  recognized  as  indispensa- 
ble,— that  of  the  war-ministry  to  Kossuth, — of  Kossuth  to  the 
Diet. 

The  resources  of  the  country  General  Klapka  described  as  in- 
sufficient for  energetically  carrying  on  the  war  even  for  half  a 
year  longer.  Apart  from  the  financial  difficulty,  which  was 
moreover  no  secret  to  the  army,  Klapka  pointed  especially  to  the 
circumstance,  that  the  supplies  of  gunpowder  and  of  saltpetre 
were  not  enough  for  even  the  comple'te  equipment  of  the  fortresses 
which  were  in  our  power  ;  and  that  the  manufactories  of  arms 
furnished  but  a  small  part  of  what  the  government  had  publicly 
announced  they  were  capable  of  producing. 

General  Klapka  on  that  occasion  declared  undisguisedly  his 
sorrowful  conviction,  that  the  salvation  of  Hungary  was  impos- 
sible without  foreign  assistance,  and  that  this  would  be  probable 
only  if  we  succeeded  in  resisting  the  combined  attacks  of  the  Aus- 
trians  and  Russians — of  the  intervention  of  the  latter  he  doubted 
just  as  little  as  myself — until  the  end  of  next  autumn  ;  because 
in  consequence  of  the  prevailing  peculiarities  of  this  season  of 
the  year  in  by  far  the  greater  part  of  Hungary,  a  suspension  of 
operations  on  the  part  of  the  hostile  armies  would  be  unavoid- 
able, and  the  continuance  of  the  resistance  until  the  next  spring 
be  facilitated  to  us,  and  thereby  the  necessary  time  be  secured 
to  induce  foreign  countries  to  take  part  with  Hungary. 

The  principal  condition — Klapka  thought  further — ^for  a  resist- 
ance as  successful  as  these  conjectures  presupposed  it  to  be,  was, 
above  all  things,  union  in  the  conduct  of  the  operations  of  all 
parts  of  the  national  army,  isolated  from  each  other.  Recogniz- 
ing this,  he  had  directed  his  activity  hitherto,  as  my  substitute 
in  the  war-ministry,  especially  to  the  attainment  of  this  indis- 
pensable unity. 

Unfortunately  he  had  encountered  herein  almost  insuperable 
difficulties. 


350  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

These  consisted  partly  in  the  circumstance  that  the  majority 
of  the  independent  commanders  of  troops  in  their  operations  had 
been  accustomed  to  take  not  the  slightest  notice  of  the  general 
purpose,  and  completely  to  ignore  the  decrees  of  the  war-ministry  ; 
and  partly  in  Kossuth's  habit,  without  the  knowledge  of  the  war- 
minister,  of  constantly  exercising  on  the  operations  of  some  of  the 
independent  leaders  a  direct  influence,  almost  always  as  injuri- 
ous to  the  progress  of  our  cause  in  the  field  as  it  was  partial, 
whereby  these  leaders  were  of  course  encouraged  in  their  disobe- 
dience to  the  war-minister. 

On  this  occasion  General  Klapka  spoke  very  unfavorably  of 
Kossuth  generally.  "With  lively  indignation  he  blamed,  among 
other  things,  especially  the  intention  of  Kossuth,  and  of  those 
who  sided  with  him,  to  exterminate  completely  the  Serbians 
(^.  e.  the  Schokazen  and  E-aizen)  in  the  Banat  and  the  Bacska, 
and,  without  more  ado,  colonize  the  districts  thus  depopulated 
with  Hon ved  battalions.  -- 

Finally,  the  new  law  of  the  kingdom  of  the  14th  of  April,  and 
especially  the  manner  in  which  it  had  been  originated,  Klapka 
condemned  most  unsparingly.  He  described  the  real  creators  of 
this  law,  in  expressions  by  no  means  honorable  to  them,  as  men 
who  had  never  made  any  sacrifice  for  the  good  of  the  countr}% 
and  who  in  general  had  scarcely  any  thing  to  lose.  While  those 
who  were  in  all  respects  the  most  estimable  patriots — assever- 
ated Klapka — men  who  had  already  really  made  the  most  im- 
portant sacrifices  for  the  salvation  of  Hungary,  and  among  these 
a  very  considerable  part  of  the  representatives,  were  without  ex- 
ception decided  adversaries  of  this  law. 

Two  or  three  weeks  previous  to  the  time  at  which  this  confer- 
ence between  General  Klapka  and  myself  took  place  in  the  camp 
before  Ofen,  a  private  letter  from  the  then  government  commis- 
sary (afterward  minister  of  communication)  Ladislaus  Csanyi, 
had  reached  me  in  Komorn  (before  the  complete  relief  of  this  for- 
tress), wherein  he  declared  to  m»,  that  he  could  countenance  the 
separation  of  Hungary  from  Austria  only  because  Kossuth  had 
assured  him  by  letter  that  it  had  my  entire  approval. 

Now  as  Kossuth,  when  he  wrote  in  the  sense  just  indicated  to 
the  government  commissary  Ladislaus  Csanyi,  could  not  possibly 
have  forgotten  my  decided  disapprobation  of  his  intention  (com- 
municated to  me,  as  is  known,  in  Godollo,  after  the  battle  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  351 

Isaszeg)  to  venture  on  a  politically  offensive  step  against  Austria, 
and  consequently  could  not  feel  himself  justified  even  in  assuming 
my  sympathy  for  the  decision  of  the  Diet  of  the  14th  of  April ; — 
it  may  be  conceived,  that  by  Csanyi's  letter  alone  I  must  have 
been  rendered  suspicious  of  the  imrity  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  decision  of  the  14th  of  April  had  been  obtained. 

The  above-mentioned  communications  of  Klapka,  as  to  the  ex- 
istence of  a  numerous  weighty  party  in  the  Diet,  which,  though 
not  approving  of  the  law  of  the  14th  of  April,  had  nevertheless 
voted  for  it,  now  confirmed  the  suspicion  which  had  been  awak- 
ened in  me  by  Csanyi's  letter;  while,  again,  the  credibility  of 
these  communications  (from  my  entire  confidence  in  Csanyi's 
strict  probity  and  love  of  truth,  the  result  of  my  personal  convic- 
tion,) found  a  strong  support  in  this  letter. 

I  consequently  declared  that  I  perfectly  agreed  with  the  pro- 
posal, which  Klapka  made  to  me  in  the  course  of  our  conference, 
to  open  the  way  to  a  reciprocal  approximation  between  the  ad- 
versaries of  the  new  Hungarian  law  and  the  army  ;  and  learned 
with  thankful  acknowledgment,  from  Klapka' s  further  commu- 
nications, that  during  his  short  stay  in  Debreczin  he  had  already 
taken  the  initiative  to  such  an  approximation,  and  had  assured 
the  most  eminent  persons  of  the  said  party  (the  so-called  "  peace- 
party")  not  only  of  my  personal  sympathy,  but  moreover  of  that 
of  the  whole  main  army  for  them  (the  adversaries  of  the  new 
law).  Nay,  I  most  urgently  exhorted  Klapka  to  continue  his 
activity  in  this  direction  immediately  after  his  return  to  Debrec- 
zin ; — and  this  after  he  had  shown  me  the  contradiction  between 
the  aversion  of  the  peace-party  to  the  new  law,  and  their  co-op- 
eration in  the  decision  of  the  1 4th  of  April,  by  revealing  to  me 
that  the  members  of  the  Diet  belonging  to  the  peace-party  had 
been  shaken  in  their  resolute  opposition  to  the  proposed  declara- 
tion of  independence,  partly  by  Kossuth's  assertion,  that  the  army 
so  eagerly  desired  the  separation  of  Hungary  from  Austria,  that 
the  proclamation  of  it,  should  the  Diet  delay  any  longer,  was  to 
be  apprehended  from  the  army ;  partly  by  the  intimidating  de- 
meanor of  the  population  of  Debreczin,  fanaticized  by  Kossuth 
and  his  agents  for  the  idea  of  the  total  defection  from  Austria. 

I  had  hitherto  considered  the  new  Hungarian  law  of  the  14th 
of  April — in  my  ignorance  of  the  circumstances  under  which  it 
saw  the  light — to  have  been  the  result  of  a  resolution  of  the 


352  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

•whole  Diet,  which,  though  inconsiderate,  or  originating  in  decep- 
tion, was  nevertheless  a  voluntary  one.  And  because  such  a 
resolution  could  by  no  means  be  made  to  harmonize  with  those 
communications  which  Kossuth  (in  the  beginning  of  March,  1849 
in  Tiszafiired)  had  made  to  me  upon  the  unceasing  demand  of 
the  very  same  Diet  for  unconditional  submission  to  the  power  of 
Prince  Windischgratz,  without  at  the  same  time  assuming  the 
existence  of  some  contrary  sudden  impulse  ;  I  had  hitherto  sup- 
posed that  the  exasperation,  which  had  seized  the  collective  body 
of  the  Hungarian  representatives  at  the  Olmiitz  stroke  of  policy, 
had  been  so  extremely  intense,  as — in  conjunction  with  the  na- 
tional arrogance,  which  had  perhaps  been  inflamed  by  the  sur- 
prisingly favorable  progress  of  the  April  campaign — to  have  suf- 
ficed to  call  into  existence  the  law  of  the  1 4th  of  April. 

But  with  this  supposition,  I  could  not  deny  that  the  law,  in 
spite  of  all  the  irrationality  contained  in  it,  had  a  nimbus  of  the 
national  will ;  and  however  injurious  in  its  consequences  (more 
to  Hungary  than  to  Austria)  this  law  might  appear  to  me,  the 
secretly  hostile  position  which  I  took  up  against  it  was  rendered 
very  painful  to  me  by  the  idea,  that  with  the  Diet,  the  whole 
nation,  as  it  were,  was  opposed  to  me. 

Only  in  consequence  of  Klapka's  intimation  of  the  manner  in 
which  this  law  originated  (the  first  intimation  moreover  which  I 
had  received  of  it),  I  began  to  feel  my  hostile  position  to  it  be- 
coming by  degrees  more  bearable,  in  the  same  measure  as  my 
conviction  increased  that  the  law  of  the  14th  of  April  had  not 
been  desired  by  the  nation,  but  was  the*handiwork  of  Kossuth, 
and  forced  upon  it  by  him. 

The  sensible  loss  of  seventeen  days  before  Ofen ;  the  supposition 
unfortunately  only  too  well  founded,  that  the  Austrian s  might 
have  meanwhile  pretty  well  recovered  from  the  stunning  blows 
of  the  April  campaign,  and  that  they  might,  moreover,  have  con- 
siderably strengthened  their  main  army  in  Hungary  by  drafting 
thither  all  their  forces  not  required  elsewhere ;  the  statements  of 
Klapka  as  to  our  insufficiency  in  the  most  essential  war-supplies ; 
— all  this  was  certainly  very  unfavorable  to  the  possibility  of 
realizing  my  idea,  namely,  to  urge  the  provisional  governments 
on  this  and  the  other  side  the  Lajtha  to  a  compromise,  based  on 
the  constitution  sanctioned  in  the  year  1848,  before  the  Russian 
intervention  should  actually  begui. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  353 

But  nevertheless  I  was  forced  to  recognize  in  the  serious  at- 
tempt to  carry  out  this  idea — considering  my  grave  doubts  of  the 
existence  of  an  energetic  European  sympathy  for  Hungary's  in- 
dependence as  a  state — the  only  beam  which  might  perhaps  be 
still  strong  enough  to  reward  the  last  convulsive  clinging  to  it  of 
the  submerging. 

And  if  I  had  not  been  deterred  from  the  thought  of  an  armed 
opposition  to  the  new  Hungarian  law,  at  a  time  when  I  could 
not  but  believe  that  in  such  a  step  I  should  have  the  whole 
nation  against  me  ;  then,  I  should  suppose,  it  can  not  be  neces- 
sary to  detail  the  reasons  which  led  me  to  persist  in  this  thought, 
after  Klapka's  accounts  had  proved  beyond  doubt  the  existence  of 
a  numerous  party  in  the  country  of  the  same  political  opinions  as 
myself — a  party  which  contained  the  majority  of  those  who  were 
acknowledged  to  be  the  most  disinterested  patriots. 

A  few  days  after  the  taking  of  Ofen,  a  deputation  from  the 
Diet  appeared  in  Pesth  for  the  purpose  of  rewarding  me,  in  the 
name  of  the  Diet  and  of  the  Government,  for  my  services  in  the 
army  of  the  fatherland,  with  the  order  of  the  first  class  of  mili- 
tary merit,  and  the  rank  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant. 

I  felt  a  repugnance  to  accept  rewards  from  that  party,  the 
political  acts  of  which  I  could  not  fail  to  perceive  were  injurious 
to  the  nation.  But  in  order  to  mask  as  much  as  possible  the  real 
significance  of  my  refusal,  I  began  by  stating  it  to  the  deputation 
of  the  Diet,  and  adduced  as  motives  for  my  conduct,  partly  the 
statutes  of  the  order  of  military  merit,  according  to  which  the 
first  class  of  these  distinctions  did  not  at  all  appertain  to  me ; 
partly  the  incompatibility  of  the  dignity  of  field-marshal  lieutenant 
with  the  republican  programme  of  government  of  the  ministerial 
president  Bartholomaus  von  Szemere. 

In  consequence  of  this,  all  official  intercourse  between  me  and 
the  deputies  ceased.  I  was,  however,  honored  by  their  leaders 
with  a  private  visit ;  and  on  this  occasion  became  unexpectedly 
acquainted  with  two  decided  opponents  to  the  new  law. 

These  had  probably  perceived,  in  my  refusal  to  accept  the 
above-mentioned  rewards,  a  confirmation  of  what  had  been  told 
them  by  Klapka  during  his  presence  in  Debreczin  relative  to  my 
disapproval  of  the  decree  of  the  Diet  of  the  14th  of  April,  and  had 
thereby  felt  themselves  encouraged  to  meet  me  with  confidence. 

They  quite  undisguisedly  expressed  their  joy  at  the  false  posi- 


354  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

tion  in  which  I  had  placed  the  Government  by  my  unexpected 
refusal  of  the  distinctions  intended  for  me  ;  confirmed  and  com- 
pleted Klapka's  former  evidences  of  Kossuth's  intrigues,  by  means 
of  which  he  had  brought  about  the  declaration  of  independence ; 
and  finally  cautioned  me  against  accepting  the  portfolio  of  war- 
minister,  or,  more  correctly,  they  earnestly  besought  me  not  to 
leave  the  army. 

Only  so  long  as  I  actually  stood  at  the  head  of  the  army — said 
they — could  I  reckon  on  its  obedience,  on  its  unreserved  confi- 
dence— would  my  word  have  weight  in  the  balance  of  public  opin- 
ion— would  it  maintain  its  influence  even  with  that  large  part  of 
the  nation  which  my  personal  enemies  had  set  against  me.  This 
was  just  as  little  a  secret  to  the  leaders  of  the  14th  of  April  party 
— the  men  of  the  Government — as  was  the  danger  by  which 
their  policy  would  be  menaced  if  I  took  part  against  them.  This 
was  also  the  reason  why  the  Government  feared  to  transfer  to  mo 
definitively  the  chief  command  of  the  army ;  why  it  wished  to 
remove  me  from  the  theatre  of  war  ;  and  only  that  it  might  ap- 
pear justified  before  the  army  in  doing  so,  had  it  ofiered  me  the 
minister's  portfolio. 

I  hereupon  gave  the  two  leaders  of  the  deputation  from  the 
Diet  the  tranquilizing  assurance  that  other  additional  circum- 
stances obliged  me  still  to  retain  the  chief  command. 

I  did  not,  however,  communicate  to  them  my  previous  determ- 
ination to  compel  the  Diet  in  due  time  by  force  of  arms  to  amiul 
the  law  of  the  14th  of  April,  because  I  had  given  up  all  thoughts 
of  the  execution  of  this  determination  as  soon  as  the  discovery  of  a 
weighty  party  in  the  Diet  of  the  same  political  opinions  as  myself, 
led  me  to  suppose  it  now  possible  to  strive  for  the  same  object— 
which  at  first  had  seemed  to  me  to  be  attainable  only  by  the  bayo- 
net— with  the  observance  at  the  same  time  of  the  constitutional 
forms,  which  had  obtained  in  Hungary  such  general  authority. 

Moreover,  the  way  in  which  this  was  forthwith  to  be  attempted 
had  not  been  at  all  discussed  during  the  above-mentioned  private 
visit,  which  the  leaders  of  the  deputation  from  the  Diet  paid  me. 
I  knew  then  that  I  should  be  at  Debreczin  in  the  course  of  a  few 
days,  and  preferred  to  await  the  opportunity  which  would  proba- 
bly be  offered  to  me  there,  of  declaring  openly  before  a  larger  num- 
ber of  members  of  the  peace-party  my  views  in  relation  to  the 
present  situation  of  Hungary.  ^'^   V  ' 


CHAPTER  LY. 

General  Aulich  immediately  after  the  taking  of  Ofen,  in 
consequence  of  an  obstinate  inward  complaint,  had  applied  for 
his  dismissal  into  retirement. 

General  Damjanics  was  miserably  laid  up  with  his  shattered  leg. 

All  the  other  coryphaei  pf  the  army,  except  General  Klapka,  had 
been  far  too  little  tried  as  independent  leaders  to  be  confidently 
intrusted  with  the  chief  conunand.  General  Klapka,  however, 
I  could  by  no  means  wish  at  the  head  of  the  army,  with  my  in- 
tention of  resuming  most  energetically  the  offensive  against  the 
Austrians  before  the  Russians  should  prevent  us  from  doing  so, 
after  he  had  so  decidedly  declared  himself  for  observing  the  de- 
fensive, in  the  general  plan  of  operations  projected  by  him,  and 
approved  by  the  council  of  ministers  in  Debreczin. 

Under  these  circumstances  I  was  constrained  to  retain  the  chief 
command  of  the  army. 

Not  mistaking  the  weighty  influence  of  the  war-ministry  upon 
the  services  and  the  political  disposition  of  the  army,  I  was,  how- 
ever, already  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  obstructing  for  ever  the 
way  in  which  Kossuth  and  those  about  him  had  hitherto  known 
how  to  gain  this  influence ;  and  unfortunately  General  Klapka, 
during  the  short  time  he  had  acted  as  my  substitute  in  Debreczin, 
had  justified  in  a  very  deplorable  manner  my  apprehension  that 
he  might  scarcely  be  equal  to  this  task,  on  account  of  his  being 
of  too  yielding  a  nature. 

For  I  was  one  day  surprised  by  the  appointment  of  a  sister  of 
the  Governor  of  Hungary  as  foster-mother-in-chief  of  the  sick  of 
the  country ;  and  moreover  by  a  war-ministerial  decree,  signed 
by  Klapka  himself,  which  subordinated  the  authorities  of  all  hos- 
pitals in  the  country,  in  all  their  administrative  relations,  to  the 
immediate  rule  of  the  said  foster-mother-in-chief  of  the  sick  of  the 
country. 

The  aptitude  of  the  fair  sex  for  nursing  the  sick  has  hitherto, 
I  should  think,  been  denied  by  nobody ;  but  "  to  nurse  the  sick" 
and  "  to  organize  and  conduct  the  nursing  of  the  sick  of  a  whole 


356  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

country,  especially  of  an  army  during  war,"  are  certainly  two 
different  things.  This  could  not  have  been  unknown  to  General 
Klapka ;  but  his  moral  strength,  as  above  indicated,  might  have 
been  insufficient  to  oppose,  with  the  regard  due  to  the  fair  sex, 
yet  still  with  manly  firmness,  the  administrative  inclinations  of 
a  lady,  which  even  with  the  best  intentions  were  at  any  rate 
inopportune. 

In  consequence  of  this  the  war-ministry  under  Klapka  had  lost 
more  of  its  independence  in  a  few  days  than  under  Meszaros  in 
months.  It  would  indeed  have  been  unjustifiable  to  intrust  it 
any  longer  to  a  guidance,  the  weakness  of  which  completely 
opened  the  door  to  the  remarkable  passion  of  Kossuth  and  those 
about  him  of  both  sexes  for  dabbling  in  the  most  important  affairs 
of  war,  constantly  with  as  much  want  of  common  sense  as  with 
excessive  vanity.  Klapka  himself  seemed  to  know  this ;  for 
shortly  after  the  fall  of  Ofen  he  declared  that  he  found  he  was 
not  at  all  in  his  element  as  war-minister,  and  wished  to  return  to 
the  active  army. 

As  this  moment,  however,  I  knew  of  no  disposable  person 
whatever,  to  whom  I  could  more  satisfactorily  have  transferred 
my  duties  as  war-minister  than  to  General  Klapka  ;  and  I  was 
thus  obliged  for  the  present  to  take  upon  myself  personally  the 
war-ministry  also,  at  least  until  I  should  see  the  possibility  of 
confiding  the  principal  direction  of  it  to  a  substitute  on  whom  I 
could  rely. 

Accordingly  I  went  to  Debreczin  in  the  beginning  of  June,  my 
personal  presence  with  the  army  not  being  indispensable  for  the 
next  few  days  in  the  present  condition  of  affairs  on  the  theatre 
of  war. 

The  main  army  had  lost  in  Generals  Damjanics  and  Aulich 
its  two  best  leaders. 

After  the  taking  of  Ofen  it  was  literally  an  orphan.  At  least 
I  considered  it  so. 

Neither  Klapka's  talents  as  a  general,  though  extraordinary, 
nor  my  own  efforts,  appeared  to  me  sufficient  to  make  up  for 
the  heavy  loss  which  the  army  had  sustained  in  those  two  per- 
sons. 

But  to  the  new  commanders  of  corps.  Generals  Nagy-Sandor 
and  Knezich,  to  Colonel  Poltenberg,  as  well  as  to  Aulich's  suc- 
cessor in  the  command  of  the  second  army  corps,  Colonel  Asboth, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  357 

no  opportunity  had  hitherto  been  afforded  for  trying  their  inde- 
pendent action  before  the  enemy — either  in  critical  moments  on 
the  field  of  battle,  as  in  the  case  of  Damjanics  at  Isaszeg  and 
Nagy-Sarlo ;  or  in  accomplishing  a  strategic  task  alike  perilous 
and  decisively  important,  as  was  that  of  Aulich  during  the  April 
campaign  before  Pesth. 

And  there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  offensive  cam- 
paign against  the  Austrians,  which  I  seriously  intended,  in  spite 
of  Klapka's  plan  of  defensive  operations,  would  be  less  fertile  in 
similar  critical  moments  and  situations. 

I  was  therefore  obliged  to  decide  either  to  open  this  campaign 
with  the  main  body  of  the  principal  army  concentrated  under  my 
personal  command  on  a  single  line  of  operation,  and  to  face  at 
random  its  later  critical  phases  with  commanders  of  army  corps 
as  yet  untried ;  or  to  break  up  the  main  body  of  the  army  corps, 
and  attempt  the  opening  of  the  campaign  with  distinct  indepen- 
dent army  corps  on  several  lines  of  operation,  for  the  purpose  of 
discovering,  at  the  very  commencement  of  the  campaign,  those 
among  the  new  commanders  of  army  corps  who  might  be  quali- 
fied to  compensate  for  Generals  Damjanics  and  Aulich. 

In  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the  chief  of  the  general 
staff  I  chose  the  latter  expedient. 

According  to  this,  our  offensive  against  the  Austrians — as  we 
shall  see  afterward — was  to  begin  with  a  combined  attack  of  the 
independently-operating  first,  second,  and  third  army  corps  on 
the  hostile  position  at  the  Waag ;  and  the  reunion  of  these  army 
corps,  under  my  personal  command,  was  not  to  take  place  till 
after  the  successful  crossing  of  that  river. 

The  seventh  army  corps,  under  Poltenberg  and  Kmety,  had 
meanwhile  to  demonstrate  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube. 

My  task  as  commander-in-chief  was  consequently  limited, 
during  the  first  development  of  these  offensive  operations,  to 
merely  keeping  an  eye  upon  their  unity. 

I  intrusted  the  fulfillment  of  this  task  to  the  chief  of  the  gen- 
eral staff 

This  convenient  measure  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  mobile 
central  office  of  operations  for  all  Hungary,  and  to  an  attempt  at 
realizing  my  twofold  intention — of  bringing  unity  into  the  opera- 
tions of  all  the  national  armies,  and  of  putting  an  end  to  Kos- 
suth's injurious  influence  on  the  progress  of  those  operations. 


358  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

This  plan  also  enabled  me  to  devote  my  personal  exertions, 
during  some  days,  exclusively  to  the  management  of  the  affairs 
of  the  war-ministry,  without  having  to  fear  that  any  thing  would 
thereby  be  neglected  in  the  sphere  of  the  operations  of  the  main 
army  ;  for,  on  the  one  hand,  the  supposition  was  highly  probable, 
that  the  Austrians — disconcerted  by  the  defeats  they  had  suffered 
during  the  April  campaign — scarcely  thought  of  daring  an  offen- 
sive step  against  us  before  the  invasion  of  the  Russians  en  gros  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  be  able  to  commence  the  attack 
on  the  hostile  position  on  the  Waag  with  energy,  the  enemy's 
advanced  troops  had  previously  to  be  driven  back  from  the  left 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag,  and  then  the  preparations,  always 
lengthy,  rendered  necessary  by  our  great  want  of  the  equipments 
for  bridges,  were  to  be  made,  which  should  render  the  intended 
crossing  of  the  Waag  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  possible  by  us. 
Both  tasks,  in  my  opinion,  could  scarcely  be  accomplished  before 
the  time  when  I  intended  to  return  from  Debreczin.  In  case, 
however,  during  my  absence  of  several  days  from  the  army,  any 
unforeseen  circumstances  should  occur  on  the  theatre  of  war,  the 
chief  of  the  general  staff  was  empowered  to  issue,  according  to 
his  own  judgment,  to  the  separate  army  corps  such  especial  dis- 
positions as  in  consequence  of  these  circumstances  were  necessary 
to  be  instantly  taken ;  all  commanders  of  corps,  divisions,  and 
columns  of  the  main  army  having  been  ordered  to  regard  equally 
as  my  own  the  official  signature  of  the  chief  of  the  general  staff, 
who  at  the  same  time  was  chief  of  the  mobile  central  office  of 
operations. 


CHAPTER  LVI. 

I  HAD  not  been  deceived  in  mj* expectation,  that  I  should  find 
an  opportunity  in  Debreczin  of  expressing  before  several  members 
of  the  peace-party  my  views  on  the  consequences  of  the  declara- 
tion of  independence,  as  well  as  on  the  measures  which  should 
be  taken  without  delay  by  all  of  us  who  did  not  agree  to  the 
separation  of  Hungary  from  Austria,  whether  on  principle,  oi 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  359 

merely  on  account  of  its  results — in  order  to  restore  the  constitu- 
tion of  1848. 

Scarcely  had  I  arrived  in  Debreczin,  when  I  received  from  one 
of  the  two  representatives  who  in  Ofen,  a  few  days  before,  had 
warned  me  against  accepting  the  portfolio  of  war,  a  pressing  in- 
vitation to  a  confidential  meeting  with  several  who  shared  his 
political  opinions. 

This  meeting  accordingly  took  place  on  the  very  first  evening 
after  my  arrival  in  Debreczin. 

I  was  introduced  by  the  representative  alluded  to  into  an  as- 
sembly of  from  fifteen  to  twenty  persons,  who  for  the  most  part 
were  unknown  to  me.  Among  those  present  with  whom  I  had 
previously  come  in  contact  was  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Mes- 
zaros. 

The  majority  of  those  present  wished  me  to  inform  them,  in 
the  first  place,  what  foundation  there  was  for  the  intelligence, 
first  brought  to  Debreczin  by  General  Klapka,  of  the  prevalent 
antipathy  in  the  ranks  of  the  main  army  to  the  declaration  of 
independence. 

Now  this  intelligence,  when  originally  brought  to  Debreczin 
by  General  Klapka  (in  the  beginning  of  May),  was  in  so  far  really 
untenable  as  that  the  discontent  with  the  declaration  of  indepen- 
dence had  not  then  been  predominantly  observable  in  the  tvhole 
of  the  main  army,  but  only  in  a  smaller  part  of  it — the  seventh 
army  corps. 

But  since  then — especially  during  the  unwelcome  leisure  at 
the  siege  of  Ofen — the  ofiScers  who  had  previously  been  in  the 
Austrian  service,  and  who  were  naturally  enemies  to  the  declara- 
tion of  independence,  had  been  so  successful  in  their  propagand- 
ism  against  it  in  the  other  army  corps  also,  that  now,  in  the  be- 
ginning of  June,  I  could,  without  the  slightest  departure  from 
truth,  most  decidedly  corroborate  Klapka' s  accounts — at  all 
events  anticipated  in  the  beginning  of  May — of  the  prevalence 
in  the  ranks  of  the  main  army  of  sentiments  opposed  to  the 
declaration  of  independence. 

With  equal  decision  I  declared  Kossuth's  assertion,  that  the 
stroke  of  policy  of  the  14th  of  April  had  been  desired  by  the 
army,  to  be  untrue. 

I  ventured  to  declare  this,  not  merely  from  the  fact,  that  Kos- 
suth, when  he  at  first  made  known  in  Godollo  his  longing  for  a 


360  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

political  demonstration  against  the  Olmiitz  octroyed  constitution, 
was  earnestly  advised  by  me  not  to  indulge  this  desire  ;  I  asserted 
it  on  the  well-grounded  supposition  that  Kossuth  had  received  no 
answer  to  his  inquiries  touching  the  seasonableness  of  making 
such  a  demonstration  from  any  of  the  commanders  of  army  corps 
then  present  in  Godollo,  which  could  have  authorized  him  to 
conclude  that  the  army  wished,  nay,  positively  demanded,  the 
separation  of  Hungary  from  Austria. 

Not  from  Damjanics ;  because  an  expression  which  he  made 
use  of  in  my  presence  on  the  20th  April  (the  day  after  the  battle 
of  Nagy-Sarlo) — "  he  should  really  like  to  know  how  far  the  in- 
dependent Debrecziners  would  have  run,  had  the  Austrians, 
instead  of  us,  been  victorious  the  day  before  !" — showed  no  par- 
ticularly friendly  feeling  for  the  14th  of  April. 

Not  from  Klapka ;  because  he  actually — as  was  again  con- 
firmed to  me  just  now — had  in  set  terms  reproached  some  rep- 
resentatives on  account  of  the  14th  of  April,  even  supporting  his 
reproaches  by  vivid  descriptions  of  the  antipathy  prevailing  in  the 
army  to  the  declaration  of  independence. 

Finally,  not  from  Aulich,  or  the  then  commander  of  the  sev- 
enth army  corps ;  because  probably  Kossuth  had  thought  it  super- 
fluous to  hear  repeated  twice  over  nearly  the  same  answer  as  I 
had  given  him.  For  these  two  were  under  me  while  I  was  com- 
mander of  the  former  corps  d'armee  "of  the  upper  Danube,"  and 
in  Kaschau  took  part  in  the  known  demonstration  in  my  favor 
against  Dembinski's  being  commander-in-chief.  Now  these  an- 
tecedents could  hardly  have  been  unknown  to  Kossuth,  and  had 
most  probably  decided  him  not  to  ask  the  opinion  of  the  two  last- 
named  commanders  of  army  corps  about  the  opportuneness  of  his 
longed-for  demonstration,  which  was  alike  hostile  to  our  constitu- 
tion of  1 848  and  to  that  of  the  Olmiitz  octroyed. 

It  may  still  be  objected,  that  Kossuth  may  have  derived  his 
conviction  of  the  sympathy  felt  for  his  personal  policy  in  the 
Hungarian  army,  concentrated  in  Godollo  after  the  battle  at 
Isaszeg,  not  from  its  leaders,  but  from  the  ranks  of  the  different 
corps. 

Indeed,  it  seems  very  likely  that  Kossuth,  with  sufficient  lei- 
sure, might  have  succeeded  in  persuading  the  troops  in  Godollo 
to  noisy  manifestations  of  lively  sympathy  for  something  similar 
to  the  14th  of  April;  just  as  he  had  once  been  successful,  in  the 


K^ 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  361 

camp  at  Parendorf,  in  agitating  Moga's  army,  which  was  totally 
disinclined  to  carry  offensive  operations  across  the  Lajtha,  within 
a  few  days  to  diametrically  opposite  sentiments.  The  wish,  re- 
peatedly expressed  by  Kossuth,  especially  in  Godollo,  to  pay 
familiar  visits  to  the  various  army  corps  in  their  quarters,  also 
clearly  betrayed  that  he  was  preparing  a  second  edition  of  the 
camp-speeches  which  were  so  successful  in  Parendorf 

But  perhaps  the  anticipation  of  finding  in  Grodollo,  instead  of 
the  national  guards  and  volunteers  of  the  Parendorf  camp,  an 
audience  that  had  already  smelt  powder,  and  the  modest  doubt 
of  the  success  of  his  oratorical  efforts  before  an  audience  of  that 
kind,  or — what  is  much  more  probable — the  fear  of  my  contre- 
coup  had  frightened  him  from  his  intention  ;  suffice  it  to  say, 
the  confidential  visits  to  the  camp  did  not  take  place,  and  Kossuth 
restricted  himself  in  Godollo  solely  to  witnessing  the  third  army 
corps  defile  before  him  on  its  march  against  Waizen  (on  the  8th 
or  9th  of  April). 

There  was,  it  is  true,  on  this  occasion  an  animated  shout  of 
"Long  live  Kossuth,  the  saviour  of  his  country  I"  which  re- 
peatedly greeted  him  from  the  ranks  of  the  troops  as  they  passed. 
Yet  rightly  considered,  this  very  shout  ought,  as  its  consequence, 
to  have  made  him  feel  disgust  at  any  further  thought  of  the  coup 
d'etat  of  the  14th  of  April,  doubtless  at  that  time  already  planned, 
and  should  have  determined  him  to  sacrifice  his  personal  policy 
for  the  salvation  of  the  fatherland. 

But  scarcely  any  of  these  details  were  mentioned  at  my  meet- 
ing with  the  members  of  the  peace-party.  The  assembly  showed 
that  it  had  confidence  in  me  ;  it  seemed  to  place  implicit  faith  in 
my  simple  assurance  that  the  Diet  had  been  mystified  by  Kossuth  : 
it  asked  no  proof  of  it. 

I  now  advised  the  immediate  abolition  of  the  law  of  the  14th 
of  April,  in  order  to  save  Hungary  from  the  Russian  invasion,  and 
consequently  from  certain  destruction  ;  but  received  for  answer 
the  comfortless  news,  that  the  Diet  had  already  adjourned,  and 
would  not  meet  again  in  Pesth  till  the  beginning  of  July. 

Some  of  those  present  accompanied  this  information — perhaps 
unintentionally — by  casual  remarks,  from  which  I  thought  I  must 
infer  that  it  would  not  be  unwelcome  to  the  peace-party,  if  in  the 
meantime,  the  abolition  of  this  law  were  to  proceed  from  the  array. 

At  a  time  when  every  conjuncture  seemed  to  guarantee  to  its 

a 


362  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

realization  eminently  successful  results,  I  had  formed  in  my  own 
niind  tlie  idea  of  the  abolition,  by  means  of  a  military  coup  d'etat, 
of  the  Diet's  resolution  of  the  14th  of  April, 

This  was.  as  is  known,  immediately  after  the  complete  relief 
of  Komorn,  and  before  the  setting  out  of  the  main  body  of  our 
principal  army  against  Ofen,  when  the  Austrian  army  was  in 
full  retreat ;  and  the  probability  was  undeniable,  after  a  speedy 
reduction  of  the  garrison  of  Ofen,  of  prosecuting  the  victory  of  the 
tri- color  banner  over  the  black-and-yellow  flag  as  far  as  the 
Lajtha. 

To  the  fortunate  issue  of  the  April  campaign,  as  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  main  army,  I  was  at  that  time  indebted  for  an 
authority,  the  weight  of  which  would  have  sufficed  to  counter- 
balance any  political  views  opposed  to  mine  prevailing  in  the 
country.  After  an  equally  fortunate  May  campaign,  as  far  as  the 
western  boundaries  of  Hungary,  I  might  have  reckoned  with  per- 
fect certainty  on  dispersing  the  whole  of  the  party  of  the  14th  of 
April  by  the  simple  proclamation  :  "  The  declaration  of  inde- 
pendence is  invahd  !  The  constitution  of  1848  forever  I" — if  the 
army  stood  by  me, 

I  leave  it  to  the  judgment  of  each  individual  to  decide  whether 
the  main  army  would  have  stood  by  me  or  not. 

Suffice  it  for  me  to  affirm  that,  under  the  just-mentioned  favor- 
able conjunctures,  I  was  firmly  resolved,  at  my  own  risk,  to  dare 
the  finishing  stroke  at  the  Diet's  resolution  of  the  14th  of  April. 
But  the  victorious  advance  of  our  main  army  as  far  as  the 
Lajtha  appeared  to  me  the  indispensable  condition. 

For  the  main  army,  in  my  opinion,  needed  this  new  confirma- 
tion of  the  renown  of  its  arms,  that  its  nimbus  might  secure  to 
the  said  proclamation  such  a  reception  in  the  country  as  was 
necessary  to  frustrate  every  armed  faction  favorable  to  the  dec- 
laration of  independence. 

The  loss  of  time  consequent  upon  the  regular  siege  of  Ofeii, 
which  had  unexpectedly  become  necessary  ;  the  credible  rumors 
of  a  considerable  reinforcement  of  the  Austrian  main  army  hav- 
ing meanwhile  taken  place,  and  the  threatening  proximity  of  the 
Russians  ;  Aulich's  unavoidable  retirement  from  the  theatre  of 
war ;  and  Klapka's  declared  partiality  for  the  defensive  ; — all 
this  made  the  accomplishment  of  that  "indispensable  condition" 
extremely  doubtful ;  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  discovery  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  363 

the  peace-party,  as  well  as  the  disclosure  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  Diet's  resolution  of  the  14th  of  April  originated,  allowed  me 
to  hope  that  it  might  perhaps  be  set  aside  even  in  a  regular  par- 
liamentary manner. 

In  consequence  of  this  I  relinquished  the  idea  of  the  military 
coup  d'etat  as  absurd. 

In  concert  with  the  peace-party,  however,  the  taking  up  again 
of  this  idea  seemed  to  me  any  thing  but  absurd  ; — after  that, 
through  the  unexpected  adjournment  of  the  Diet,  the  possibility 
of  getting  at  the  declaration  of  independence  in  a  parliamentary 
way  appeared  to  be  postponed  to  a  time  long  before  which  the 
Russians  could  already  be  in  the  country. 

But  as  conjunctures  had  become  meanwhile  far  more  unfavor- 
able, I  wished  that  the  peace-party  might  first  calmly  look  in  the 
face  all  the  dangerous  consequences  to  be  anticipated  from  the 
realization  of  such  an  idea,  before  it  declared  itself  in  favor  of  it. 

The  remarks  above  referred  to  as  cursorily  dropped  by  some 
members  of  the  peace-party  during  our  conference,  from  which, 
as  has  been  said,  I  thought  I  might  infer  the  sympathies  of  the 
peace-party  for  the  abolition  of  the  new  law  of  the  Diet  by  means 
of  a  military  counter-revolution,  consequently  induced  me  ujidis- 
guisedly  to  discuss  this  step,  together  with  its  immediate  proba- 
ble results. 

But  scarcely  had  I  begun  to  do  so,  when  the  assembly  inter- 
rupted me  with  vigorous  shouts  of,  "  No  military  revolution  I  ]^o 
government  of  the  sabre  !" 

This  was  the  7iegative  result  of  my  meeting  with  the  men  of 
the  peace-party.     I  had  expected  a  positive  one,  but  in  vain. 

I  entered  the  assembly  full  of  joyous  hopes.  I  left  it  unde- 
ceived. 

I  had  confidently  reckoned  on  finding  the  peace-party,  though 
it  had  been  obliged  to  yield  by  a  bold  stratagem  of  Kossuth's,  still 
ready  for  action,  and  determined  on  a  desperate  counter-stroke. 
I  found  it  entirely  beaten  out  of  the  field,  for  the  moment  unfit 
for  the  contest,  and  apparently,  even  with  reference  to  the  later 
renewal  of  the  struggle,  without  a  firm  resolve,  without  a  definite 
plan.  To  me  at  least  it  had  communicated  neither.  Possibly 
it  may  have  omitted  this  only  through  excessive  caution.  This 
reserve,  however,  constrained  me  to  suppose  that  the  peace-party 
felt  itself  altogether  too  weak  to  resist  successfully,  either  i7i  par- 


364  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

liament  or  out  of  it,  its  political  opponents — the  men  of  the  14th 
of  April. 

And  so  I  could  no  longer  remain  in  uncertainty  as  to  the 
direction  I  had  to  give  to  my  premeditated  hostile  activity  against 
the  continued  existence  of  the  new  law  of  the  Diet. 

hi  parliament  the  peace-party  had  to  be  strengthened  by  the 
addition  of  new  forces.  To  this  end,  the  officers  serving  in  the 
main  army  who  had  parliamentary  qualifications,  and  on  whose 
political  sentiments  I  could  rely,  were  urged  to  solicit  most  zeal- 
ously their  election  as  representatives  for  any  places  accidentally 
vacant. 

Out  of  parliament  I  had  to  endeavor  to  deprive  the  party  of 
the  14th  of  April  of  its  most  influential  supporters.  These  were 
the  leaders  of  the  national  forces  isolated  from  the  main  army  : 
Bem,  Moritz  Perczel,  Dembinski,  and  besides,  Count  Guyon, 
commander  of  the  fortress  of  Komorn. 

These  had  to  be  removed  from  their  posts,  and  the  vacant 
commands  intrusted  to  men  from  whom  at  the  decisive  moment 
I  had  no  reason  to  fear  opposition  in  support  of  the  declaration 
of  independence. 

I 'Could  accomplish  this,  however,  only  as  acting  minister-of- 
war.  The  conviction  of  this  fully  determined  me  to  overcome 
the  moral  aversion  I  felt  to  taking  the  oath  to  a  law,  the  over- 
throw of  which,  even  in  the  most  favorable  case,  seemed  indis- 
pensable to  the  salvation  of  the  great  cause  of  Hungary. 


CHAPTER  LYIL 

The  political  relationship  between  Kossuth's  views  relative  to 
the  conditions  on  which  the  stability  of  the  liberty  of  Hungary 
depended  (see  Chapter  XXXIV.)  and  the  coup  d' etat  oi  the  14th 
of  April  was  not  to  be  mistaken. 

These  views  Kossuth  had  communicated  to  me  in  the  begin- 
ning of  March,  1849  ;  at  a  time  when  the  octroyed  constitution 
of  Olmiitz  could  not  yet  be  known  of  by  us. 

In  the  face  of  this  fact,  the  assumption  that  the  coitp  cVetat  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  365 

Olmiitz  had  been  needed  in  order  to  call  into  existence  that  of 
Debreczin  seemed  untenable. 

Kossuth  might  go  on  calling  the  latter  a  constrai7ied  demon- 
stration against  the  former ;  I  nevertheless  remained  convinced, 
that  in  Kossuth  the  embryo  of  the  declaration  of  independence 
was  already  in  a  far-advanced  state  of  development — only  inter- 
rupted by  Dembinski's  unlucky  debut  as  commander-in-chief — 
when  the  octroyed  constitution  of  Olmiitz  came  into  the  world. 
I  remained  convinced  of  this,  because  those  expressions  of  Kos- 
suth in  Tiszafiired  (in  the  beginning  of  March,  directly  after 
Dembinski's  removal)  as  to  the  necessity  of  making  Poland  free, 
that  Hungary  might  remain  and  that  Europe  might  become  so, 
had  been  too  surprising  to  me  at  the  time  for  them  to  have 
slipped  from  my  memory. 

It  is  known  that  these  expressions  had  been  called  forth  by 
my  endeavor  seriously  to  warn  Kossuth  against  any  departure 
from  the  legal  basis  of  our  combat  in  self-defense. 

As  distinctive  marks  of  Kossuth's  political  tendencies,  they 
were  even  then  sufficient  to  force  me  into  the  most  decided  oppo- 
sition to  him  ;  but  they  seemed  to  sink  down  almost  to  the  sig- 
nificance of  an  inoperative  private  opinion,  when  Kossuth  directly 
after  assured  me  that  he  held  it  to  be  the  most  sacred  duty  of 
all  who  meant  honorably  by  the  country  to  venture  on  no  step, 
the  consequences  of  which  might  increase  the  power  of  the  com- 
mon enemy  of  us  all. 

On  this  protestation  I  suppressed  all  apprehension  that  Kossuth 
could  allow  himself  to  be  seduced  by  his  private  political  views 
into  any  step  hostile  to  the  existing  constitution. 

This  protestation  of  Kossuth's,  however,  was  not  sincerely 
meant ;  it  belonged  only  to  the  category  of  those  well-known 
means  by  which  he  knew  how  to  prevent  any  reciprocal  ap- 
proach between  the  army  and  the  peace-party,  and  subsequently 
tp  execute  his  coujj  d'etat — means,  the  frequent  employment  of 
which  especially  characterized  Kossuth's  tactics  with  regard  to 
his  political  adversaries. 

The  couj)  d'etat  of  the  14th  of  April  showed  me,  unfortunately 
too  late,  that  where  I  had  hitherto  confided,  there  the  most 
decided  distrust  would  have  been  fitter. 

At  the  same  time  I  perceived  that  the  result  of  this  coup  d'etat 
was  so  palpably  injurious  to  the  just  cause  of  Hungary,  that  I 


366  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

could  not  but  accuse  the  man  who  had  introduced  it,  either  of 
over-haste  or  of  an  inordinate  striving  after  the  attainment  of 
predominating  personal  objects. 

The  accusation  of  over-haste  appeared  to  me  to  be  deprived 
of  its  force  by  the  circumstance  already  mentioned,  namely,  that 
Kossuth,  six  weeks  before  the  14th  of  April,  was  already  work- 
ing at  the  political  fundamental  idea  of  this  coup  d'etat ;  with- 
out taking  into  account  the  conference  which  he  had  with  me  in 
Godollo  (a  week  before  the  14th  of  April)  about  its  opportune- 
ness, or  the  motives  which  induced  me  decidedly  to  dissuade  him 
on  that  occasion  from  any  such  step. 

The  other  accusation,  on  the  contrary,  has  first  to  be  weak- 
ened.    Until  now,  as  far  as  I  know,  this  has  not  yet  been  done. 

Hereby,  I  should  think,  is  sufficiently  explained  the  essential 
difierence  in  the  personal  relation  between  Kossuth  and  myself 
after  and  before  the  14th  of  April. 

Before  that  day  I  submitted  my  will  with  full  confidence  to 
Kossuth's  influence. 

The  tactics  of  which  Kossuth  had  hitherto  made  use  against 
the  peace-party  and  myself  forced  me  to  adopt  the  same  tactics 
against  him. 

My  entering  the  ministry  was  the  first  employment  of  these 
tactics. 

That  Kossuth  did  not  trust  me — in  this  I  could  not  possibly  be 
deceived.  It  is  a  philosophical  necessity  to  mistrust  him  whose 
confidence  w^e  have  abused. 

He  mistook,  however,  the  real  motives  of  the  counter-stroke 
which  he  feared  from  me. 

His  supposition,  that  I  opposed  his  policy  only  from  personal 
rivalry,  was  my  most  powerful  defensive  and  ofiensive  ally 
against  him. 

He  doubtless  supposed,  that  only  my  personal  vanity  (the 
author  of  the  proclamation  of  Waizen)  had  been  wounded  by  his 
cmip  cVetat. 

He  believed  at  the  same  time  that  by  appointing  me  war- 
minister,  he  had  hit  upon  the  real  soothing  balm  for  the  sensitive 
wound  ;  and  when  I  had  actually  accepted  the  portfolio  of  war, 
he  falsely  imagined  that  the  wound  was  already  in  a  fair  way  of 
being  radically  healed — that  my  opposition  to  the  declaration  of 
independence  was  completely  removed. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  367 

How  Kossuth  reconciled  with  this  illusion  jny  refusal  to  accept 
the  distinctions  intended  for  me  in  consequence  of  the  taking  of 
Ofen,  remains,  however,  inexplicable.  But  that  he  nevertheless 
did  labor  under  such  an  illusion  can  not  be  denied,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  he  suffered  the  union  of  the  powers  of  war-minister 
and  of  the  chief  command  of  the  main  army  in  my  person — a 
union  in  the  highest  degree  dangerous  to  his  policy — till  the 
moment  when  1  myself  perceived  the  necessity  of  delivering  him 
from  the  bonds  of  that  illusion. 


CHAPTER  LVIII. 

Immediately  after  the  relief  of  Komorn,  I  had  proposed  to 
Kossuth  to  remove  the  seat  of  government  into  that  fortress. 
He  answered,  that  the  government  could  not  expose  itself  to  the 
risk  of  being  blockaded  by  the  enemy  ;  it  must  always  secure  the 
possibility  of  exerting  a  direct  influence  on  the  parts  of  the  coun- 
try not  yet  occupied  by  the  enemy's  arms. 

On  my  arrival  in  Debreczin,  after  the  taking  of  Ofen,  I  now 
learned  that  the  seat  of  government  was  about  to  be  transferred 
to  Pesth.  I  endeavored  in  vain  to  show  Kossuth  that  circum- 
stances were  all  against  it ;  that  the  government,  now  that  the 
demolition  of  the  fortifications  of  Ofen  was  commenced,  would  be 
exposed  to  danger  from  the  enemy  in  the  capitals  not  less  than 
in  Debreczin. 

The  removal  of  the  government  to  Pesth — Kossuth  maintained 
on  the  contrary — was  indispensable,  principally  because  the  cap- 
itals figure  in  the  national  traditions  as  the  seat  of  the  real  rulers 
of  Hungary.  The  inhabitants  between  Pesth  and  Debreczin  had 
very  strikingly  shown  to  the  government  when  fleeing  last  win- 
ter behind  the  Theiss,  that  with  the  traditional  residence  it  had 
given  up  its  right  to  their  homage.  The  triumphal  procession 
from  Debreczin  back  to  the  capitals  was  intended  to  renew  in  the 
people  this  homage,  which  it  had  at  that  time  refused  to  the 
government.  The  Hungarian  was  fond  of  pomp,  and  believed 
there  was  power  only  where  he  met  with  ]i07n]i.     He  (Kossuth), 


368  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

in  the  consciousness  of  the  victory  they  had  gained,  would  every 
where  harangue  the  people,  and  animate  it  to  further  glorious 
combats  for  its  independence  from  Austria.  Moreover — he  re- 
marked in  conclusion — all  the  ministries  had  already  packed  up, 
and  the  most  of  them  were  by  this  time  on  their  way  thither. 
The  Diet  was  adjourned,  and  summoned  to  Pesth  for  the  begin- 
ning of  July.  A  sudden  change  of  these  measures  would  make 
the  triumphant  conquerors  suspected  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  as 
fugitives  again,  would  depress  the  public  feeling,  nay  would  soon 
spread  terror  and  confusion  throughout  the  country.  He  could  not 
take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  the  consequences  of  all  this. 

The  ministries — that  of  war  likewise — were  in  fact  already 
occupied  with  their  transferrence  to  the  capitals  when  I  arrived 
at  Debreczin ;  and  this  circumstance  alone  convinced  me  of  the 
uselessness  of  offering  any  further  opposition  to  Kossuth's  ardent 
longing  for  the  solemn  entrance  into  Pesth. 

At  the  same  time  I  was  forced  to  suppose  it  was  solely  out  of 
eager  desire  for  the  satisfaction  of  this  longing,  that  Kossuth  had 
been  so  strongly  bent  upon  the  taking  of  Ofen,  as  even  to  side 
with  me  against  Guyon,  in  order  to  render  the  regular  siege  of 
that  place  possible. 

My  intention  of  removing  Generals  Bem,  Perczel,  and  Dem- 
binski  from  the  army,  seemed  to  be  practicable — without  rous- 
ing Kossuth's  suspicions  against  me — only  with  his  personal  as- 
sent and  co-operation.  In  order  to  secure  this,  he  had  to  be  con- 
vinced of  the  indispensable  necessity  for  bringing  these  command- 
ers of  troops  again  under  the  authority  of  the  ministry  of  war. 

He  seemed  to  enter  into  my  views  ;  but  strove  in  many  ways 
against  their  consequences.  Whether  merely  out  of  mistrust  of 
me,  or  from  dread  of  those  persons,  could  not  be  known  with  cer- 
tainty. Probably  both  reasons  lay  at  the  bottom  of  the  difficul- 
ties which  Kossuth  raised  against  the  energetic  coercion  of  these 
generals,  especially  of  Bem. 

It  is  true  he  himself  complained  of  the  latter's  dissipation  of 
money,  of  his  disturbing  encroachments  on  the  administration  of 
the  country,  the  arbitrary  reduction  in  the  price  of  salt  in  the 
country  of  the  Szekler,  the  forcible  transferrence  of  families  of 
Hungarian  peasants  into  Wallachian  places  (after  their  original 
inhabitants  had  been  driven  out) — measures  such  as  were  not 
even  permitted  to  him  (Kossuth)  without  the  previous  consent  of 


I 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  369 

the  Diet,  and  which  betrayed  clearly  enough  Bern's  inclination  to 
play  the  sovereign  in  Transylvania.  In  spite  of  this — Kossuth 
thought — he  vi^as  obliged  seriously  to  dissuade  from  any  energetic 
steps  against  Bern,  because  he  had  threatened  to  resign  the  chief 
command  of  the  army  in  Transylvania  the  moment  any  of  his 
measures  were  disavowed  ;  but  that  to  him  Bem's  remaining  at 
his  post  seemed  to  be  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  Tran- 
sylvania. 

I  saw  that,  with  these  views  of  Kossuth's  about  Bern,  I  ran  the 
risk  of  falling  into  open  conflict  with  him,  if  I  insisted  on  the  ap- 
plication of  stringent  measures  against  Bem.  The  necessity  for 
giving  way  to  Kossuth  in  this  case,  in  order  the  more  certainly 
to  gain  him  for  the  steps  I  intended  to  take  against  Perczel  and 
Dembinski,  appeared  tome  indispensable.  I  accordingly  promised 
Kossuth  to  leave  to  him  alone  the  regulation  of  all  those  admin- 
istrative affairs  in  which  contests  were  to  be  feared  between  the 
war-ministry  and  Bem,  and  contented  myself  for  the  present  with 
frustrating  his  intention  of  transferring  to  Field-marshal  Lieut. 
Bem,  besides  the  chief  command  over  the  army  in  Transylvania, 
also  that  over  the  troops  of  Generals  Count  Vecsey  and  Perczel, 
which  were  separately  operating  in  the  Banat  and  the  Bacska. 

The  possibility  of  so  frustrating  this  intention  of  Kossuth's,  as 
that  he  not  only  did  not  guess  the  real  tendency  of  the  measure, 
but  moreover  must  have  felt  himself  obliged  to  me,  was  presented 
by  the  following  circumstances. 

Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vetter,  stiJl  the  really  appointed  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  main  army,  had,  as  is  known,  fallen  seri- 
ously ill  just  before  the  commencement  of  the  April  campaign ; 
but  in  the  course  of  the  campaign — during  the  first  half  of  the 
month  of  April — he  felt  his  health  already  sufficiently  re-estab- 
lished to  enable  him  to  resume  the  command  of  the  main  army. 
He  also  prepared  without  delay  for  so  doing,  and  informed  Kos- 
suth of  it ;  who  had,  however,  in  the  mean  time  entertained  the 
apprehension,  that  a  sudden  change  in  the  chief  command  of  the 
army  might  disturb  the  successful  progress  of  the  campaign,  and 
used  various  means  to  hinder  Vetter's  departure  for  the  main 
army,  until  the  siege  of  Ofen.  During  it  Vetter  at  last,  it  is  true, 
arrived  in  the  sphere  of  the  main  army  ;  he  did  not,  however, 
avail  himself  of  his  rights  as  its  commander-in-chief,  but  staid, 
as  I  heard,  by  turns  in  Pesth  and  in  Godollo.     Not  till  after  the 


370  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

fall  of  Ofen  did  a  reciprocal  explanation — an  oral  one — take 
place  between  him  and  me.  He  declared,  that  now  that  the 
main  army  had  become  accustomed  to  consider  me  as  its  com- 
mander-in-chief, he  no  longer  thought  of  pressing  his  claims  to 
this  post,  but  said  that  he  demanded  from  me,  the  future  minister 
of  war,  a  compensation  for  the  injury  which  had  been  done  to 
his  public  honor  by  Kossuth's  intriguing  against  his  re-entering 
on  the  active  duties  of  commander-in-chief — that  is,  bis  appoint- 
ment to  a  post  corresponding  to  the  rank  with  which  he  had 
been  invested. 

This  request  of  Tetter's  seemed  to  me  not  only  very  reasonable, 
it  was  besides  most  agreeable  to  me,  in  order  that  I  might  profit 
by  the  embarrassment  into  which  Kossuth  had  brought  himself 
with  respect  to  Vetter,  and  give  him  the  means  of  reconciling 
him — justly  exasperated  at  having  been,  to  say  the  least,  unde- 
servedly slighted — by  nominating  him  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army  in  the  Bacska  and  the  Banat. 

Kossuth  signed  the  decree  for  Tetter's  nomination  most  will- 
ingly. He  seemed  in  fact  to  have  no  presentiment  of  the  real 
extent  of  my  proposal  ;  it  appeared  rather  as  if  he  felt  himself 
greatly  obliged  to  me  for  the  excellent  opportunity  I  had  afforded 
him  of  repairing  the  wrong  he  had  done  to  Vetter. 

Simultaneously  with  this  affair  I  pursued  the  strict  submission 
of  Generals  Perczel  and  Dembinski  to  my  orders  as  war-minister. 
The  strong  aversion  of  both  of  them  to  recognize  a  superior 
military  authority,  added  to  the  any  thing  but  friendly  personal 
relations  in  which  both  stood  to  me,  led  me  confidently  to  antici- 
pate that  the  consequential  execution  of  these  measures  would  of 
itself  be  sufficient  soon  to  render  insupportable  to  them  the  fur- 
ther remaining  at  their  posts.  Nevertheless  both  showed  more 
tenacity  than  I  had  expected.  Both  must  be  removed.  Kossuth 
seemed  fortunately  to  be  much  less  convinced  that  they  were  in- 
dispensable in  the  field  than  he  was  in  the  case  of  Field-marshal 
Lieut.  Bem. 

In  the  removal  of  Guyou  from  the  command  of  the  fortress 
of  Komorn  I  had  far  less  difficulty.  For  it  so  happened  that 
Klapka  in  person  asked  this  post' for  himself  in  conjunction  with 
the  chief  command  over  three  army  corps,  and  seemed  also  to 
be  quite  equal  to  it ;  while  Guyon's  well-nigh  proverbial  small 
stock  of  military  knowledge  stood  in  a  tragi-comical  disproportion 


UHIv 
MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTTNGAR^K^  C, ,  ,-,371 

to  the  duties  devolving  on  the  commander  of  a  fortress.  Accord- 
ingly, almost  as  a  matter  of  course,  the  command  of  the  fortress 
of  Komorn  was  taken  from  Count  Guyon,  and  intrusted  to  Gen- 
eral Klapka;  while  Guyon  was  appointed  commander  of  the 
corps  of  reserve  which  was  just  about  being  raised. 

Kossuth  had  nothing  to  object  to  this  change  in  the  command 
of  the  fortress  of  Komorn  ;  the  more  warmly,  on  the  other  hand, 
did  he  declaim  against  Guyon's  being  placed  with  the  reserve. 
It  was  unjustifiable — he  said — to  employ  the  brave  lion-hearted 
general  in  the  reserve,  when  his  place  should  be  in  the  foremost 
line  of  the  army  ;  unjustifiable  certainly  to  derive  no  advantage 
from  powers  like  Guyon's  just  at  the  moment  when  the  danger 
of  the  country  appeared  to  be  increasing  threefold. 

Nevertheless  Guyon — the  zealous  repeater  of  Kossuth's  polit- 
ical confession  of  faith  of  the  14th  of  April — remained  with  the 
reserve.  Even  had  his  political  opinion  been  the  reverse  of  what 
it  was,  he  would  not  have  escaped  the  reserve ;  for  it  seemed  to 
me  dangerous  to  intrust  an  ifidependent  command,  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy  to  a  general  who,  as  experience  showed,  had  his 
heart  indeed  in  the  right  place,  but  not  his  head. 

While  I  was  endeavoring,  in  the  manner  above  described,  to 
purge  the  army  from  those  partisans  of  the  14th  of  April  who 
were  at  that  time  known  to  me,  and  were,  as  I  believed,  not  to 
be  too  lightly  regarded,  I  was  surprised  by  the  news  of  an  event 
which  deeply  moved  the  army,  nay  the  whole  nation. 

The  Austrian  Master  of  the  Ordnance,  Baron  Haynau,  the 
successor  of  Baron  Welden  in  the  chief  command  of  the  hostile 
army,  announced  to  us  the  beginning  of  his  activity  in  his  new 
sphere  by  some  executions.  Two  Hungarian  officers,  Ladislaus 
Baron  Mednyanszky  and  Philip  Gruber,  prisoners,  also  fell  a  sac- 
rifice to  it. 


CHAPTEE  LIX. 

Ladislaus  Baron  Mednyanszky  and  Philip  Gruber  had  be- 
longed to  the  garrison  of  the  fort  of  Leopoldstadt,  on  the  A¥aag. 
The  fort,   after  a  short  bombardment,  was  surrendered  in  the 


372  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY. 

beginning  of  February,  1849,  to  the  besieging  Field-marshal 
Lieutenant  Simuriich.  Mednyanszky  and  Gruber — as  I  after- 
ward learned — are  said  to  have  been  the  only  men  who  declared 
themselves  against  this  act.  For  this  reason,  after  being  made 
prisoners,  their  lot  was  a  much  harder  one  than  that  of  their 
comrades.     A  court-martial  sentenced  both  to  death. 

This  happened  while  Prince  Windischgratz  held  the  chief  com- 
mand in  Hungary.  But  neither  he  nor  his  immediate  successor, 
Baron  Welden,  had  this  sentence  carried  into  effect. 

Only  Baron  Haynau  did  this.  Mednyanszky  and  Gruber  were 
hanged  at  Presburg  in  the  fifth  month  of  their  captivity ;  after 
the  rumors  about  their  sentence  being  commuted  to  several  years' 
imprisonment  in  a  fortress  had  gained  credit,  and  were  rendered 
probable  on  many  accounts,  but  chiefly  by  the  unusual  delay  in 
the  execution  of  the  sentence. 

These  executions  appeared  to  be  not  sufficiently  justified  by 
that  act  alone  which  was  imputed  to  the  condemned  as  a  crime, 
after  pardon  had  previously  been  granted  to  so  many  Hungarian 
officers  taken  with  arms  in  their  hands,  who  had  formerly  been 
in  the  Austrian  service.  They  were  intelligible  at  all,  only  if 
we  either  assume  that  Baron  Haynau  has  inherently  a  peculiar 
predilection  for  such  proceedings,  and  that  these  executions  con- 
sequently stand  in  immediate  connection  with  himself,  and  would 
not  have  taken  place  under  another  commander-in-chief;  or  if  we 
admit  that  they  must  be  considered  as  repressive  measures  on 
the  part  of  the  Austrian  government  against  the  decision  of  the 
Hungarian  Diet  of  the  14th  of  April.  In  the  latter  case,  it  had 
evidently  the  appearance  as  if  Mednyanszky  and  Gruber,  though 
made  prisoners  by  the  Austrians  in  the  beginning  of  February, 
had  nevertheless  been  executed  as  accomplices  of  those  men  who 
full  ten  weeks  later  put  the  royal  imperial  dynasty  of  Habsburg- 
Lorraine  under  the  Hungarian  imperial  ban. 

The  exasperation  against  Austria  reached,  in  consequence  of 
these  executions,  the  culminating  point. 

I  had — as  is  known — ^before  the  14th  of  April,  in  a  letter  to 
Prince  Windischgratz,  threatened  that  for  every  captive  Hungarian 
officer  put  to  death  three  Austrian  officers  should  be  sacrificed. 

Kossuth  in  the  name  of  the  nation,  and  Klapka  in  the  name 
pf  the  array,  fipw  dem9<nded  of  me  that  I  should  without  delay 
execute  this  rnenace. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  373 

If  I  did,  I  must  in  future  and  forever  abandon  my  endeavors 
to  thwart  the  Russian  invasion  by  the  abolition  of  the  Debreczin 
declaration  of  independence  and  the  tentative  preparation  lor  an 
agreement  with  Austria.  But  every  higher  motive  to  induce  me 
to  do  this  was  wanting ;  since  I  had  become  convinced  that  the 
declaration  of  independence  had  no  more  in  common  with  the 
will  of  the  Hungarian  nation,  than  a  private  pleasure  of  Kos- 
suth's had  with  its  w^elfare. 

I  consequently  refused  to  execute  this  threat,  and  continued 
undisturbed  my  endeavors  in  the  direction  indicated,  even  when 
— on  account  of  the  general  exasperation  at  the  first-fruits  of 
Baron  Haynau's  doings  in  Hungary,  as  well  as  on  account  of  the 
feeling  of  invincibility  probably  as  general — there  were  indeed 
scarcely  more  than  timid  sympathies  to  be  expected  for  the  idea 
of  a  return  to  the  constitution  of  the  year  1848,  connected  as  it 
was  prospectively  with  considerable  sacrifices. 

I  prosecuted  my  purpose  of  dismissing  Dembinski  and  Perczel 
from  the  active  army,  as  w^ell  as  the  restriction  of  Bem  to  his 
forces  in  Transylvania,  as  zealously  as  this  could  be  done  without 
betraying  too  early  the  real  tendency  of  these  measures. 

I  caused  such  of  the  officers  of  the  army  as  had  parliamentary 
qualifications,  and  were  opposed  to  the  party  of  the  14th  of 
April,  to  be  repeatedly  urged  to  solicit  their  election  to  the  Diet. 

I  persevered  also  in  my  resolution  to  commence  the  offensive 
against  the  Austrian  army  :  for  the  abolition  of  the  law  of  inde- 
pendence had  not  to  resemble  a  victory  which  fear  had  gained 
over  the  giddiness  of  national  arrogance,  become  superlative 
under  Kossuth's  infatuating  influence  ;  it  had  rather  to  bear  the 
stamp  of  a  voluntary  manly  act.  Not  under  the  incubus  of 
apprehension  for  its  own  skin,  but,  on  the  contrary,  after  a  calm 
estimate  of  those  dangers  which,  in  consequence  of  its  own  acts, 
threatened  the  life  of  the  nation,  and  after  a  conscientious  con- 
viction that  it  was  its  duty  to  leave  no  means  of  salvation  untried. 
— had  the  Diet  to  declare  that  very  law,  with  which  it  would 
perhaps  have  been  most  pleased,  to  be  what  it  really  was — 
incompatible  with  the  true  interests  of  the  nation  ;  then  volun- 
tarily to  come  back  within  the  bounds  of  the  rehabilitated  consti- 
tution, and,  however  difficult  this  might  be,  with  great  and 
dignified  self-abnegation  offer  to  the  Vienna  government  a  peace- 
able arrangement,  just  at  the  moment  of  general  confidence  in 


374  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

victory,  and  in  spite  of  the  public  arrogance ;  but  above  all,  to 
make  the  national  cause.,  led  back  in  this  manner  on  the  ground 
of  justice  and  equity,  its  persmial  one,  if  the  answer  of  the 
Vienna  government  should  be  the  signal  for  the  last  combat  for 
life  and  death. 

I  should,  it  is  true,  have  had  to  disavow  all  my  experiences  of 
the  year  1849,  in  order  to  give  myself  up  to  the  deception,  that 
the  majority  of  the  representatives  were  competent,  of  their  own 
free  impulse,  to  accomplish  what,  as  above  mentioned,  I  expected 
from  them  :  but  I  rested  my  hope  on  the  peace-party,  and  on 
the  effects  of  those  measures,  by  the  use  of  which  I  intended  to 
enable  this  party  to  gain  the  victory  in  parliament. 

Some  of  these  measures — the  purging  of  the  army  as  much  as 
possible  from  those  leaders  who  belonged  to  the  party  of  the  14th 
of  April ;  the  strengthening  of  the  peace-party  in  the  Diet ;  the 
preparations  for  the  offensive — were  already  in  progress  at  the 
time  when  the  executions  of  Mednyanszky  and  Gruber  became 
known,  and  by  the  intense  exasperation  which  they  roused 
against  Haynau  and  the  Austrian  government  seemed  to  render 
fruitless  all  my  endeavors. 

It  did  not  seem  advisable  to  me  to  employ  the  other  measures 
until  after  the  Diet  had  recommenced  its  sittings.  Not  till  then 
did  I  think  I  should  come  forward  openly  with  my  intentions 
against  the  party  of  the  14th  of  April,  and  avow  myself  undis- 
guisedly  an  adherent  of  the  peace-party ;  not  till  then  did  I  hope 
to  intimate,  nor  without  success,  to  the  Diet  as  well  as  to  the 
Government,  in  the  name  of  the  army,  that,  with  the  same  fidelity 
as  hitherto,  it  would  assuredly  fulfil  its  duty,  by  defending  to  the 
last  the  positive  rights  of  the  nation  ;  but  that  it  felt  not  the  least 
inclination  to  answer  for  the  declaration  of  independence,  deceit- 
fully represented  as  having  been  demanded  by  it. 

Thus  it  happened  that,  during  my  proceedings  as  war-minis- 
ter, I  concealed  even  from  the  peace-party  what  I  intended  to 
undertake  against  its  political  adversaries.  Thus  it  happened 
that  probably  Kossuth  and  Szemere  erroneously  believed  they  had 
made  in  me  an  assured  acquisition — the  former  for  his  14th  of 
April,  the  latter  for  his  republic. 

Szemere  had  perhaps  taken  the  remark  with  which  I  had  re- 
fused the  rank  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  (namely,  that  this 
dignity,  so  far  as  I  knew,  was  not  indigenous  in  republics),  as  a 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  375 

republican  confession  of  faith.  From  this  circumstance  I  also 
explained  to  myself,  how  it  happened  that  I  was  elected  deputy 
without  having  solicited  it,  and  this  by  a  district  in  which,  to  my 
knowledge,  Szemere's  name  Avas  very  popular — mine  not  at  all 
so.  At  least  Szemere  afterward  gave  me  clearly  enough  to  un- 
derstand, that  I  owed  this  surprise  exclusively  to  his  interference 
in  my  behalf  with  his  electors. 

Besides,  since  my  entrance  into  the  ministry,  Szemere  had 
endeavored  in  a  variety  of  ways  to  gain  me  over  to  a  personal 
coalition  with  himself  against  Kossuth. 

I,  however,  aflected  not  to  understand  him. 

I  pursued  the  same  course  with  Kossuth,  so  long  as  his  desire 
for  the  chief  command  over  the  whole  of  the  active  national 
forces  in  Hungary  and  Transylvania  made  itself  known  only  in 
modest  allusions. 

Kossuth  at  last  thought  he  must  speak  more  plainly ;  he  did 
so,  and  was  by  me  for  a  while  encouraged  in  his  hopes. 

One  consequence  of  this  probably  was,  that  he  soon  urgently 
pressed  me  to  propose  to  him  in  my  stead  a  commander-in-chief 
of  the  main  army,  as  I  had  quite  enough  to  do  with  fulfilling  the 
duties  of  war-minister  alone.  This  remark  was  incontrovertible ; 
but  I  could  not  find  the  right  man,  that  is,  who  would  have  been 
the  right  man  for  Kossuth.  I  proposed  Klapka,  whom  I  believed 
— as  will  be  seen  in  Chapter  LXI. — I  had  meanwhile  gained  for 
the  offensive.  Kossuth  declared  that  he  did  not  agree  in  this 
choice.     A  better  I  could  not  then  hit  upon. 

Then,  again,  Kossuth  wished  that  I  should  devote  myself  per- 
sonally to  the  conduct  of  the  war-operations  exclusively,  and  as 
war-minister  be  represented  by  a  substitute.  This  request  was 
agreeable  to  me.  My  substitute  in  the  war-ministry  was  con- 
firmed without  hesitation. 

I  had  previously  fixed  the  complement  of  the  separate  army 
corps  at  ten  battalions  of  infantry,  sixteen  squadrons  of  cavalry, 
and  five  batteries — in  all  about  8000  infantry,  2000  cavalry,  and 
forty  pieces  of  artillery. 

The  army  corps  was  distributed  into  three  divisions  :  two  di- 
visions of  infantry,  each  consisting  of  five  battalions  and  a  battery 
of  foot- artillery  ;  and  one  division  of  cavalry,  composed  of  the 
whole  cavalry  of  the  army  corps  and  a  battery  of  horse-artillery. 

One  twelve-pounder  battery  and  one  of  horse-artillery  formed 


376  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  reserve  of  artillery,  the  employment  of  "which  in  the  field 
of  battle  belonged  exclusively  to  the  commander  of  the  army 
corps. 

The  division  had  to  represent  as  it  were  the  operative  i7tdivid- 
ual  of  the  army.  Detachments  of  a  considerable  part  of  a  division 
made  by  way  of  exception  received  the  temporary  appellation  of 
**  column." 

Two  or  more  army  corps  united  under  one  chief  command  con- 
stituted an  army. 

One  consequence  of  these  definitions  was,  the  final  separation 
of  the  Kmety  army  division  from  the  seventh  army  corps.  The 
latter  was  organized,  according  to  the  new  scheme,  of  those  two- 
thirds  of  its  original  complement  which  had  hitherto  been  united 
under  Poltenberg.  At  the  same  time  the  former  Kmety  army 
division  was  classified  beforehand  as  an  army  corps,  which  was 
afterward  to  be  completed.  Poltenberg  and  Kmety  were  made 
generals. 

During  my  personal  participation  in  governmental  affairs, 
Csanyi,  the  minister  of  communication,  proposed  in  the  ministerial 
council,  by  a  general  amnesty  to  put  a  speedy  end  to  the  labors 
— in  many  respects  injurious — of  the  criminal  courts  of  justice 
{vHztorvenyszekek),  which  had  been  instituted  for  the  vigorous 
punishment  of  treasonable  crimes  against  the  country.  Also  that 
the  fugitives  guilty  of  treason  to  the  country,  as  well  as  the  Hun- 
garian subjects  who  were  still  serving  in  the  hostile  ranks,  should 
be  included  in  this  amnesty,  if  they  returned  within  a  specified 
time  to  the  reoccupied  parts  of  the  country. 

Inconsiderately  I  had  beforehand  promised  the  proposer  my  vote 
in  the  council  of  ministers. 

The  deliberation,  however,  did  not  come  to  an  end  during  the 
first  session.  I  therefore  gained  time  maturely  to  consider  all  the 
consequences  of  the  proposed  amnesty ;  and  now  declared  myself 
against  the  amnesty,  and  only /or  the  abolition  of  the  criminal 
courts  of  justice. 

I  voted  against  the  amnesty,  because  the  government  had  not 
the  means  of  giving  validity  to  the  act  of  grace.  The  pardoned 
persons  would  have  come  back  ;  and  the  first-met  troop  of  peas- 
ants (not  to  mention  the  amiable  guerrillas) — having  just  been 
rendered  fanatic  against  those  who  were  pardoned  by  the  agents 
of  the  very  government  from  which  the  amnesty  proceeded — 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  377 

would  doubtless  have  felt  themselves  called  upon,  in  spite  of  the 
amnesty,  after  as  before  it,  to  execute  the  summary  penal  pro- 
ceeding of  Lynch-law  against  the  innocent  returning  persons. 

The  proposal  of  the  amnesty  failed. 

Although  it  had  been  my  well-considered  determination  not  to 
make  known  the  hostile  sentiments  with  which  I  was  filled  against 
the  existence  of  the  law  of  the  14th  of  April  until  the  next  meet- 
ing of  parliament ;  nevertheless  I  gave  way  before  that  time  to 
the  increasing  power  of  my  exasperation  at  the  manner  in  which 
Kossuth  had  called  into  being  that  law  for  the  prospective  de- 
struction of  Hungary. 

Shortly  before  the  commencement  of  the  next  offensive  against 
the  Austrian  main  army,  there  was  added  to  those  obstacles 
which — as  we  shall  see  afterward — had  retarded  it  so  long,  a  fail- 
ure of  the  most  indispensable  supplies  of  money,  which  became 
more  felt  every  day. 

My  patience  now  gave  way.  In  an  official  letter  to  Kossuth, 
in  which  I  threw  light  on  the  disproportion  between  the  consider- 
able financial  wants  of  the  army  and  the  insignificant  means  for 
meeting  them,  the  declaration  of  independence  received  a  well- 
deserved  epithet — of  course  not  an  honorable  one. 

I  meant  the  contents  of  this  letter  to  come  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  assembled  council  of  ministers ;  and  convinced  as  I  was  be- 
forehand that  Kossuth  intended  and  was  capable  of  either  sup- 
pressing it,  or  of  paralyzing  its  effect  in  some  manner,  I  had  at 
the  same  time  a  duplicate  of  it  transmitted  direct  to  the  minister 
of  finance.  Moreover  I  was  careful  not  to  fail  of  attending  the 
sitting  of  the  ministerial  council  at  which  it  should  be  brought 
forward  for  discussion. 

Kossuth  received  the  ominous  dispatch,  and,  as  I  had  foreseen, 
would  have  gladly  avoided  communicating  its  contents  to  the 
ministerial  council.  That  the  minister  of  finance  had  a  duplicate 
already  in  his  hands,  Kossuth  did  not  know,  when  he  invited  me, 
immediately  before  the  beginning  of  the  approaching  sitting,  to 
follow  him  for  the  purpose  of  a  private  conference  into  his  own 
apartment,  which  was  separated  from  the  consultation-room  only 
by  an  ante-chamber. 

Here  he  called  me  to  account  for  the  expression  used  in  my 
official  letter  censuring  the  law  of  independence.  I  justified  it, 
by  asserting  that  neither  the  nation  nor  its  representatives,  and 


378  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

least  of  all  the  army,  for  whose  sake  peculiarly  the  law  had  been 
proposed,  had  wished  for  it. 

To  weaken  this  assertion,  Kossuth  pointed  to  the  addresses  of 
homage  which  had  flowed  in  on  him  since  the  14th  of  April  from 
all  reoccupied  parts  of  the  country.  With  respect  to  this,  I  beg- 
ged him  to  explain  to  me,  what  authorized  him  to  estimate  the 
worth  of  these  addresses  of  homage  higher  than  those  which  a 
few  months  previously  Prince  Windischgratz  had  collected  up  and 
down  the  very  same  parts  of  the  country. 

Kossuth  failed  to  give  me  any  explanation. 

That  the  law  of  independence  had  Twt  been  desired  by  the 
army,  he  did  not  venture  moreover  even  to  attempt  to  deny  in  this 
tete-a-tete.  However,  he  did  all  he  possibly  could  to  induce  me 
to  retract  and  destroy  the  unpleasant  official  dispatch :  I  should 
consider,  that  my  official  attack  upon  the  present  law  placed  the 
existence  of  the  ministry  in  question  ;  and  so  forth.  Not  till  I 
had  assured  him  that  the  minister  of  finance  would  doubtless  im- 
mediately lay  before  the  council  of  ministers  a  duplicate  of  this 
dispatch,  did  Kossuth  break  off  the  conference,  and  we  returned 
to  the  consultation-room. 

The  minister  of  finance  had  in  fact  the  said  duplicate  ready, 
and  now  handed  it  over  to  Kossuth,  with  the  surly  remark,  that 
only  a  part  of  its  contents  concerned  himself. 

The  document  was  forthwith  communicated  in  all  its  extent  to 
the  assembled  ministers,  and  my  not  flattering  opinion  as  to  the 
opportuneness  of  the  declaration  of  independence  was  silently  ac- 
cepted by  those  present  as  a  thing  self-evident. 

The  ministry  found  nothing  in  my  attack  on  the  existing  law 
of  state,  which,  as  Kossuth  had  feared,  jeopardized  its  existence; 
but  Kossuth  might  perhaps  have  been  induced  by  it  to  take  care 
that  the  financial  wants  of  the  main  army,  at  least  during  the 
course  of  the  next  few  weeks  were  not — more  consueto — less  at- 
tended to  than  those  of  some  government  commissaries,  political 
agents,  and  other  such. 

And  to  obtain  this  was  properly  the  primary  object  of  my  so 
sudden  and  unceremonious  rising  against  Kossuth. 


CHAPTER  LX. 

The  events  which  had  occurred  on  the  theatre  of  war  of  onr 
main  army  from  the  taking  of  Ofen  till  the  middle  of  June  were 
in  substance  the  following  : 

The  expeditionary  column  of  Major  Armin  Gorgei,  at  the  time 
of  the  taking  of  Ofen  just  about  marching  toward  Silein  on  the 
Waag  against  the  Austrian  brigade  of  Major-general  Barko,  which 
had  broken  in  through  the  defile  of  Jablunka,  was — as  the  report 
stated — prevented  from  executing  the  intended  expedition  by  the 
simultaneous  advance  (from  Freystadl  to  Nyitra-Zsambokret)  of 
a  part  of  the  hostile  troops  under  Major-general  Herzinger. 

About  this  time  the  first  Russian  divisions,  approaching  from 
Neumarkt  (in  Gallicia),  made  their  appearance  in  the  Arva  com- 
itate. These  were  the  advanced  troops  of  the  Russian  corps  un- 
der Major-general  Saas. 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  protection  of  the  mountain-towns, 
which  had  hereby  been  rendered  uncommonly  difficult,  the  strength 
of  Armin  Gorgei's  expeditionary  column  was  increased  by  de- 
grees to  almost  3500  men  and  six  pieces  of  artillery. 

Major  Gorgei  discontinued  his  incursions,  and  occupied  only 
the  direct  approaches  into  the  district  of  the  mountain-towns,  at 
Sztrecsen,  Kralovjan,  Hermanecz,  on  the  Sturecz,  at  Heiligen- 
kreuz  and  Zsarnocz  ;  his  reserve,  however,  encamped  at  Perk,  to 
the  north  of  Kremnitz. 

The  other  expeditionary  column  of  the  seventh  army  corps, 
which  has  been  several  times  mentioned,  observed  meanwhile 
the  main  road  between  Freystadl  (Galgocz)  and  Neutra,  sup- 
ported afterward  the  operations  of  the  first  army  corps  by  demon- 
strations against  Freystad],  and  at  the  same  time  kept  up,  as  weli 
was  as  possible,  considering  the  great  distance,  the  communication 
of  Major  Gorgei's  expeditionary  column  with  the  main  army. 

The  first  army  corps  (General  Nagy-Sandor),  which  had  ar- 
rived from  the  camp  at  Ofen  by  Gran,  Hull,  and  Komjati  in 
Urmcny,  in  conjunction  with  the  expeditionary  column  of  the 


380  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

seventh  corps,  had  undertaken  a  forcible  reconnoitering  of  the 
passage  across  the  Waag  at  Freystadl  and  Schintau  (Sempte), 
which  was  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

The  enemy  evacuated  the  last-mentioned  place  together  with 
the  half-completed  tete-de-joont,  and  retreated  to  the  right  bank 
of  the  Waag,  destroying  the  bridge  behind  him.  At  Freystadl, 
however,  he  maintained  himself  He  reoccupied  also — after  Nagy- 
Sandor's  march  back  into  his  former  position  at  Mocsonok  and 
Urmeny — the  point  of  Schintau,  and  completed  the  construction, 
of  his  interrupted  fortifictition. 

During  the  following  days  till  the  middle  of  June,  the  opera- 
tions of  the  first  corps— as  far  as  I  remember — were  confined  to. 
observing  the  course  of  the  Waag  from  Schintau  to  Tarnocz. 

The  second  corps  (Colonel  Asboth)  and  the  third  (General 
Knezich)  had  advanced  from  the  camp  at  Ofen  as  far  as  Neu- 
hausel.  The  advanced  troops  of  the  latter  occupied  Tardosked, 
those  of  the  former  T6t-Megyer.  Those  of  the  third  corps  had  to 
observe  the  Waag  from  Tarnocz  to  Farkasd,  the  others  from  Far- 
kasd  to  Szemo.  The  main  body  of  both  army  corps  remained 
together  in  Neuhausel, 

After  the  reconnoitering  of  the  points  of  Freystadl  and  Schintau, 
undertaken  by  the  first  corps  and  the  expeditionary  column  of  the 
seventh  corps,  however,  the  second  corps  marched  from  Neu- 
liausel  by  Guta  to  Aszod,  threw  a  floating  bridge  across  the 
Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Danube  (below  the  mouth  of  the  brook 
Feketeviz),  and  took  charge  of  its  defense  against  the  hostile 
division  posted  at  Szerdahely  in  the  Great  Schiitt  ;  while  the 
third  corps  by  itself  had  to  observe  the  whole  course  of  the  Waag 
from  Tarnocz  as  far  as  Szemo. 

One  part  of  the  eighth  army  corps  occupied  Koraorn,  the  other 
the  line  between  Aszod  and  Szap  on  the  Danube 

The  seventh  army  corps  maintained  itself  at  Raab. 

The  Kmety  division  had  been  disposed  in  the  first  half  of  June 
from  Veszprem  by  Papa  to  Tet,  in  order  to  form  the  extreme  left 
wing  of  the  position  of  the  seventh  army  corps  on  the  Raab. 

From  this  point  General  Kmety  attempted  to  surprise  the 
Austrian  column  under  the  command  of  Major-general  Weiss, 
which  had  advanced  by  itself  on  the  road  from  Q^ldenburg  to 
Raab.  This  led  to  a  bloody  conflict  at  Csorna  on  the  13th  of 
June.     General  Kmety  conquered — the  hostile  commander  re- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  381 

maiiied  oil  the  field  of  battle — his  defeated  troops  retreated  toward 
Bosarkany. 

General  Kmety,  by  disposing  one  of  his  attacking  columns 
on  the  proper  line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy  (the  road  from  Csoma 
to  Kapuvar),  had  intentionally  forced  him  to  the  sideward  retreat 
toward  Bosarkany,  on  the  supposition  that  the  way  thither  was 
already  occupied  by  a  column  of  the  seventh  array  corps.  A 
similar  column  had  in  fact  been  directed  by  General  Klapka,  who 
acted  in  concert  with  General  Kmety,  to  the  territory  between 
Bosarkany  and  Csorna ;  it  arrived,  however,  too  late.  The  enemy, 
pursued  from  Csorna,  retreated  consequently  unimpeded  as  far  as 
Bosarkany,  evacuated  finally  this  place  likewise,  retreated  across 
the  Rabnitz,  destroyed  the  bridges,  and  thus  escaped  further 
pursuit. 

General  Kmety  thereupon  led  his  troops  back  to  their  original 
position  on  the  river  Raab,  which  he  had  to  defend  on  the  line 
from  Raba-Szent-Mihaly  to  Marczalto. 

The  forces  belonging  to  our  main  army  in  the  middle  of  June 
(consisting,  the  garrison  of  Komorn  included,  of  from  50,000  to 
55,000  men)  were  consequently  distributed  on  a  line,  which  ex- 
tended in  length  more  than  thirty  (German)  miles,  from  Rosen- 
berg in  the  Liptau,  at  first  between  the  rivers  Waag  and  Gran, 
then,  crossing  the  little  river  Neutra,  between  it  and  the  "Waag 
to  the  mouth  of  the  latter  in  the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Dan- 
ube, further  a  short  distance  along  this  branch  upward  as  far  as 
Aszod,  and  from  thence,  in  the  direction  toward  Raab,  across  the 
Great  and  the  Wieselburg  Danube,  and  finally  along  the  little 
river  Raab  as  far  as  Marczalto. 

Opposite  this  line  extended  the  position  of  the  Austrian  main 
army  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  from  Silein  on  the  Waag 
along  this  river  in  a  southern  direction  as  far  as  Zsigard,  and 
from  thence  in  a  southwestern  direction  over  the  Great  Schiitt  to 
the  Great  Danube  at  Bos.  On  the  right  bank  of  this  river  the 
Austrian  advanced  troops  in  the  Little  Schiitt  and  on  the  terri- 
tory between  the  "Weiselburg  Danube  and  the  Rabnitz,  were 
moved  forward  to  beyond  the  height  of  Hochstrass  against  the 
position  of  our  seventh  army  corps ;  those  of  the  extreme  right 
wing  of  the  hostile  main  army  crossed  and  somewhat  avoided  the 
road  from  Oldenburg  to  Raab  at  the  height  of  Kapuvar. 

All  the  passages  over  the  river  Waag  in  the  range  of  this  posi- 


382  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

tion  were  in  the  enemy's  power.  Those  at  Freystadi  and  Schin- 
tau  were  rendered  still  more  tenable  by  means  of  temporary 
fortifications. 

According  to  the  reports  of  our  scouts,  the  reserves  of  the 
^enemy — already  reinforced  by  a  Russian  army  corps,  which  was 
said  to  be  16,000  strong — stood  at  Presburg,  which  had  been 
made  tenable  ; — the  concentration  of  a  particular  Austrian  corps 
on  the  Styrian  frontier  was  in  full  progress,  and  moreover  the 
extreme  right  wing  of  the  Austrian  main  army  (to  the  south  of 
the  Neusiedel  lake  and  the  Hansag)  had  been  considerably 
strengthened  ; — the  forces  of  the  Russian  Major-general  Sass, 
stationed  in  the  Arva,  numbered  from  10,000  to  12,000  men  ; — 
and  besides  very  considerable  Russian  forces  were  concentrating 
themselves  in  Gallicia  at  Dukla  and  Neumarkt. 

The  protection  of  the  passages  over  the  Waag  at  Freystadi  and 
Schintau  by  temporary  fortifications  showed  the  intention  of  the 
Austrians  to  debouch  on  both  points  with  a  part  of  the  army, 
after  the  Russian  army  corps,  breaking  into  Hungary  across  its 
northern  frontiers,  should  have  begun  to  descend  into  the  interior 
of  the  country,  and  thus  to  form  during  the  advance  of  the  Rus- 
sian army  for  a  certain  time  its  extreme  right  wing,  as  it  were. 

Considering  as  two  separate  series  of  operations,  on  the  one 
hand  the  conquest  of  Transylvania  by  the  allied  troops,  which,  as 
I  supposed,  were  exclusively  destined  for  this  purpose  ;  on  the 
other,  the  relief  of  Temesvar  and  Arad  by  the  Austrian  southern 
army, — the  ideas  which  I  formed  beforehand  relative  to  the  plan 
of  operations  of  the  combined  armies  in  upper  Hungary  were  as 
follows  : 

On  the  part  of  the  Russians  : 

Their  invasion  and  advance  on  two  principal  lines  of  opera- 
tion ;  the  one  (a  western)  from  Neumarkt  in  Gallicia  through 
the  Arva,  Turocz,  the  district  of  the  mountain-towns,  Ipolysag, 
"Waizen,  direct  to  Pesth ; — the  other  (an  eastern)  from  Dukla  to 
Kaschau,  and  from  thence  according  to  the  retrograde  movements 
of  our  northern  army. 

On  the  part  of  the  Austrians  : 

With  the  portion  of  the  army  debouching  at  Freystadi  and 
Schintau — flank-movement  with  the  Russian  western  army  as 
far  as  the  Danube,  then  investment  of  Komorn  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Danube,  between  it  and  the  Waag,  in  order  to  protect  this 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  383 

investment,  as  well  as  the  basis  of  the  Russian  operations,  against 
a  repellent  attack  on  our  part  from  Gran.  The  other  greater 
part  of  the  Austrian  army  to  maintain  itself  in  the  Great  Schiitt 
and  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  until  our  main  army,  by 
the  movements  of  the  Russian  western  army,  shall  either  be 
obliged  to  give  way  on  the  southern  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  or 
be  confined  exclusively  to  the  right  one.  The  corps  concentrated 
on  the  frontiers  of  Styria  at  Fiirstenfeld  to  advance  simultaneously 
by  Stuhlweissenburg  toward  the  capitals ;  that  in  the  first  of  the 
cases  just  indicated,  the  movement  of  our  main  army  might  not 
remain  undiscovered  ;  and  in  the  latter,  the  crossing  of  the  Dan- 
ube at  the  capitals  by  the  Russian  western  army  might  be  facil- 
itated; and  moreover  an  offensive,  if  intended  by  us,  against 
Vienna  and  Wiener-Neustadt,  be  frustrated  in  its  execution. 

I  was  in  fact  very  uncertain  as  to  the  strength  of  the  two  ex- 
pected Russian  armies ;  but  after  the  reports  of  scouts  which 
have  been  mentioned,  I  found  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Russia 
would  interfere  with  half  measures. 

I  knew  still  less  about  the  time  at  which  the  Russian  invasion 
en  gros  was  really  to  be  expected.  The  appearance,  indeed,  of 
the  Russian  advanced  troops  in  the  Arva  showed  that  this  mo- 
ment could  scarcely  be  far  off;  it  even  seemed  not  improbable 
that  the  Russian  armies  would  make  their  irruption  before  the 
re-assembling  of  the  Hungarian  Diet.  But  as  I  was  without  any 
certain  intelligence  upon  the  subject,  I  could  not  positively  con- 
tradict the  possibility  of  a  still  longer  delay  ;  and  my  conviction 
that  Hungary  was  absolutely  lost,  as  soon  as  Russia  seriously 
interfered  for  its  subjugation,  determined  me  not  to  desist  from 
the  last  attempt  in  my  power  for  saving  it — that  is,  i'rom  those 
endeavors  which  had  in  view  the  abolition  of  the  Debreczin  law 
of  independence  of  the  14th  of  April,  with  the  intention  of  depriv- 
ing the  Russian  intervention  of  its  title  of  right,  and  thereby,  if 
possible,  of  still  preventing  it  from  taking  place — so  long  as  the 
continued  delay  of  the  Russian  armies  left  me  even  the  least  ray 
of  hope  for  a  favorable  result  from  these  endeavors. 

How  the  offensive  against  the  Austrian  army  was  connected 
with  these  endeavors,  I  have  indicated  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

It  remains  now  only  to  explain  why  this  offensive  was  not  be- 
gun till  the  middle  of  June — why  not  immediately  after  the 
taking  of  Ofen. 


384  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAB.Y. 

The  clothing  of  the  army  had  suffered  very  much  during  the 
April  campaign ;  the  foot-gear  especially  was  in  a  state  which 
gave  reason  to  fear  that  after  some  forced  marches,  which  not 
seldom  appear,  necessary  in  operations  on  the  open  field,  the 
number  of  battalions  fit  for  service  would  be  exceeded  by  the  un- 
fit. In  Komorn  (before  the  march  against  Ofen)  the  complaints 
of  the  commanders  upon  the  defective  condition  of  the  clothing 
of  the  men  had  become  so  loud,  that  the  serious  doubts  excited 
by  this  circumstance  alone,  whether  we  should  continue  the  oper- 
ations against  the  retreating  Austrian  main  army,  could  have 
been  suppressed  only  by  a  full  appreciation  of  the  enterprising 
spirit  which  animated  the  troops.  This  good  disposition,  it  is 
true,  had  not  deteriorated  during  the  siege  of  Ofen,  but  certainly 
the  foot-gear  had.  The  few  days'  marching  from  the  camp  at 
Ofen  into  the  new  positions  well-nigh  finished  it.  The. besieging 
operations  during  the  seventeen  days  spent  before  Ofen  had,  it  is 
true,  left  us  time  enough  to  remedy  this  defect ;  but  the  neces- 
sary means  were  not  at  our  command.  Kossuth  had  done  much, 
surprisingly  much,  during  the  winter  for  the  present  supply  of 
the  wants  of  the  army  ;  but  for  their  regular  clothing  no  provi- 
sion had  yet  been  made.  The  government  commissary,  whom 
Kossuth  had  charged  with  procuring  the  needful  supplies  of 
clothing  and  equipment  for  the  army,  and  who  was  under  his 
own  superintendence,  promised  much — did  little — did  least  of  all 
during  the  siege  of  Ofen.  For  this  Kossuth  himself  was  most  to 
blame  ;  for,  just  because  he  had  taken  upon  himself  to  control 
the  production  of  the  clothing  and  equipment,  but  had  somewhat 
too  prematurely  speculated  on  the  entrance  into  Pesth— the  shoe- 
makers and  tailors  working  for  the  army  had  to  begin  in  spe  this 
ovation  from  Debreczin  to  Pesth  in  the  beginning  of  May,  and 
the  work  of  these  good  people  sufiered  thereby  a  very  constant 
interruption ;  the  consequence  of  which  was,  that  the  army  re- 
mained for  weeks  so  defectively  clothed,  that  it  could  not  possibly 
answer  the  demands  which  would  be  made  on  it  during  the  en- 
suing offensive  operations. 

The  army  had  moreover  suffered  sensible  losses  numerically 
during  the  April  campaign  and  before  Ofen.  Compensation  for 
these  losses  appeared  the  more  urgently  necessary,  as  we  must 
certairdy  expect  to  find  the  hostile  army  considerably  increased. 

Filling-up  the  gaps  in   an  army  on  service  with  quite  raw 


'^ 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  385 

recruits — the  constant  fate  of  our  main  army — is  well  known  not 
to  be  one  of  the  most  promising  preparations  for  an  offensive. 
Nevertheless  the  circumstances  were  of  such  kind  that  it  ap- 
peared by  no  means  possible  to  defer  any  longer  making  good  the 
complement  of  men  in  many  cases.  And  moreover  since  Szemere 
(as  minister  of  the  interior)  had  officially  assured  me  that  from 
10,000  to  12,000  recruits  had  already  been  levied  as  a  compen- 
sation for  the  losses  of  the  army,  and  an  equal  number  for  the 
reserve  corps  about  to  be  formed,  who  were  awaiting  their  desti- 
nation ;  while  Kossuth,  on  the  other  hand,  spoke  of  the  complete 
clothing,  equiping,  and  arming  of  these  men  as  of  a  thing  done  ; 
I  thought  I  had  better  not  begin  the  offensive  operations  until 
the  ranks  of  the  army  were  filled  up — which,  according  to  the 
official  assurances  of  these  gentlemen,  could  be  done  within  a 
few  days.  Nay,  1  hoped  even  to  be  able  to  bring  the  reserve 
corps  also  into  the  district  of  the  operations  of  the  army  before 
the  opening  of  the  campaign. 

In  order  to  begin  and  speed  the  formation  of  these  corps  as 
judiciously  as  possible,  the  caches  for  their  battalions — composed 
of  the  more  distinguished  officers,  sub-officers,  and  privates  of 
the  main  army — were  immediately  sent  to  the  stations  for  their 
formation. 

By  the  middle  of  June,  however,  scarcely  half  the  promised 
recruits  for  the  main  army  were  on  the  spot ;  and  the  formation 
of  the  reserve  corps  was  in  a  far  worse  plight,  for  the  already- 
raised  recruits  were  not — as  Szemere  had  affirmed — awaiting 
their  destination,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  cadres  of  the  battal- 
ions had  to  await  the  results  of  the  levy  only  just  set  on  foot ; 
while  of  the  supplies  necessary  for  clothing,  arming,  and  equip- 
ing these  men,  no  traces  were  to  be  seen  till  about  the  middle 
of  June. 

Not  less  baseless  than  the  official  assurances  of  Szemere  and 
Kossuth  respecting  it,  had  the  latter's  stereotyped  asseveration, 
constantly  recurring  since  the  beginning  of  April,  proved  to  be, 
according  to  which  the  main  army  was  to  be  recruited  by  from 
12,000  to  16,000  men,  who,  as  it  was  said,  were  unnecessary  to 
Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Bem. 

I  saw  at  last — too  late  unfortunately — that  I  had  acted  im- 
prudently in  delaying  the  long-intended  offensive  even  for  a  single 
day,  from  relying  on  Kossuth's  and  Szemere's  promises. 

R 


386  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  unsuccessful  efforts  to  be  described  in  the  next  chapters, 
as  fully  as  my  defective  recollections  allow  me,  which  were  made 
by  the  main  body  of  our  army  for  the  purpose  of  dislodging  the 
enemy  from  his  position  on  the  Waag,  were  the  beginning  in 
earnest  of  this  offensive. 

But  in  case  the  political  object,  for  the  furtherance  of  which, 
as  is  known,  this  offensive  was  intended,  should  prove  unattain- 
able ;  that  is,  either  if  Austria,  by  the  return  of  the  Hungarian 
Diet  from  the  law  of  independence  to  the  constitution  of  1848, 
should  no  longer  allow  to  be  contested  its  rightful  title  to  the  aid 
of  Russia  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  octroyed  constitution — or  if 
the  invasion  of  the  Russian  army  should  commence  even  before 
the  assembling  of  the  Diet ;  in  this  case,  according  to  the  ideas 
which  I  had  formed,  as  above  pointed  out,  of  the  plan  of  opera- 
tions of  the  combined  armies,  the  same  lines  on  which  the  divers 
parts  of  our  main  army  had  advanced  were  also  assigned  to  them 
lor  the  retreat. 

The  expeditionary  column  of  Major  Gorgei  had  accordingly  to 
retreat  first  to  Waizen,  and  afterward,  according  to  circum- 
stances, to  Pesth  or  Grran ;  the  other  expeditionary  column  (of 
1  he  seventh  array  corps)  by  Neutra  and  Yerebely  into  the  valley 
of  the  lower  Gran  ;  the  main  body  of  the  army  (the  first,  second, 
and  third  corps)  to  Gran ;  the  mobile  part  of  the  eighth  army 
corps  from  its  position  in  the  Great  Schiitt,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
to  Komom ;  the  seventh  army  corps  into  the  fortified  camp  op- 
posite Komorn ;  General  Kmety,  finally,  on  the  Stuhlweissen- 
burg  road  toward  the  capitals. 

The  last  combat  for  Hungary — so  I  thought — was  to  be  fought 
on  the  right  bank  ;  and  in  order  to  give  it  more  enduring  import- 
ance, a  manufactory  of  arms  and  a  powder-mill  were  to  be  set 
up  in  Komorn. 

Opposite  Gran,  to  secure  the  possibility  of  favorable  events, 
the  establishment  of  a  tete-de-pmit  had  been  undertaken,  and  on 
the  bank  of  the  Gran  itself  the  construction  of  bank-batteries. 
Previously  the  erection  of  similar  batteries  on  the  points  most 
favorable  for  crossing  the  Danube  below  Gran,  as  well  as  a  for- 
tified camp  on  the  Tihany  peninsula  on  the  northwestern  bank 
of  the  Flatten  lake,  had  been  proposed. 

The  idea  of  this  latter  means  of  defense  had  been  formed 
during  the  siege  of  Ofen — not  by  me,  but  by  the  government  in 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  387 

Debreczin.  Thus  it  seemed  as  if  Kossuth  was  originally  not 
averse  to  the  idea  of  fighting  the  last  desperate  battle  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Danube,  and  not  in  Transylvania,  as  was  in 
prospect  immediately  before  the  April  campaign. 

I  hoped  to  win  him  over  completely  for  the  carrying  out  of 
this  idea. 


CHAPTER  LXL 

On  the  16th  of  June  Colonel  Asboth,  commander  of  the  second 
army  corps,  had  to  cross  with  a  part  of  it  the  Neuhausel  branch 
of  the  Danube  at  Aszod,  and  to  drive  the  enemy  back  upward  to 
the  territory  between  the  brook  Feketcviz  and  the  river  Waag,  in 
order  to  secure  the  crossing  of  the  third  army  corps  over  the 
Waag,  to  be  effected  at  Negyed. 

The  advance  took  place ;  the  hostile  forces,  which  occupied 
Kiralyrev  and  Zsigard,  were  dislodged  from  both  these  places, 
obliged  to  retreat  toward  Pered,  and  lost  thereby — according  to 
Asboth's  report — three  guns.  Colonel  Asboth  joined,  by  Farkasd 
and  Negyed,  the  third  army  corps,  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the 
"Waag. 

But  the  enemy  was  reinforced,  and  made  an  energetic  counter- 
attack. The  consequence  of  this  was,  that  Colonel  Asboth  in 
his  turn  evacuated  Zsigard  and  Kiralyrev.  Those  of  his  forces 
which  had  been  disposed  to  Farkasd  hastened  meanwhile  to 
strengthen  the  hard-pressed  right  wing  of  our  position  in  Zsigard, 
but  found  the  village  already  in  the  enemy's  power,  and  them- 
selves separated  from  their  main  body  retreating  to  Aszod — a 
junction  with  it  on  the  left  being  hindered  by  the  marshes  of  the 
Holtvag — and  were  obliged  to  draw  back  again  to  Farkasd  ; 
while  Colonel  Asboth,  after  having  lost,  besides  the  three  cap- 
tured guns,  three  also  of  his  own,  gave  up  the  further  contest, 
and  led  his  troops  back  into  their  former  position  on  the  Neu- 
hausel  branch  of  the  Danube. 

While  this  was  taking  place  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag, 
General  Knezich  stood  with  the  main  body  of  the  third  army 


388  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

corps  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  opposite  Farkasd  and  Negyed. 
His  sub-commanders  urged  him  to  cross  the  river  with  the  boats 
which  were  at  hand,  and  assist  Colonel  Asboth.  He  refused  this 
request,  however,  declaring  that  he  had  received  no  express 
orders  to  do  so. 

The  separate  parts  of  the  second  army  corps  in  Farkasd  con- 
sequently remained  exposed  alone  to  the  hostile  attacks.  The 
enemy,  however,  did  not  molest  them,  probably  supposing  them 
to  be  the  tete  of  the  third  army  corps,  which  had  already  crossed 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag. 

On  the  same  day  General  Nagy-Sandor,  with  the  first  corps, 
had  to  attack  at  Schintau,  in  order  to  attract  the  hostile  forces 
to  this  point,  and  hinder  as  far  as  possible  the  reinforcement  of 
the  right  wing  of  the  hostile  position  on  the  Waag.  In  this 
service  he  lost  four  of  the  guns  of  his  twelve-pounder  battery. 

My  expectations  of  finding  in  one  of  the  three  commanders  of 
army  corps,  Knezich,  Nagy-Sandor,  and  Asboth,  a  compensation 
for  Generals  Damjanics  and  Aulich,  were  much  lowered  in  con- 
sequence of  the  experiences  of  the  16th. 

I  now  resolved  to  have  the  attempt  at  crossing  repeated  on  the 
20th  of  June  by  the  whole  of  the  second  army  corps.  That  it 
might  not  founder  again,  however,  through  General  Knezich's 
want  of  independence,  I  intended  personally  to  take  part  in  this 
operation . 

The  dispositions  for  it  had  already  been  issued,  when  I  received 
a  letter  from  General  Klapka,  in  which  he  dissuaded  me  from 
continuing  the  offensive,  and  renewed  his  original  proposal  to  ob- 
serve the  defensive.  This  requirement  on  the  part  of  General 
Klapka  came  on  me  very  unexpectedly. 

After  my  return  from  Debreczin,  where  I  staid  only  a  few 
days — while  Kossuth  celebrated  in  Pesth  his  well-known  entry 
as  governor  of  the  country,  I  had  proceeded  to  Raab,  in  company 
with  the  chief  of  the  central  office  of  operations,  in  order  to  gain 
Klapka  for  the  offensive  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube. 

I  nevertheless  did  not  think  it  advisable  to  communicate  to 
General  Klapka  the  ultimate  political  object  on  which  my  de- 
termination to  assume  the  offensive  at  any  price  was  really 
founded  ;  because,  from  his  views  about  its  being  still  possible 
for  Hungary  to  maintain  itself  on  the  basis  of  the  declaration  of 
independence,  I  concluded  that  he  might  not  agree  even  in  prin- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IK  HUNGARY.  389 

ciple  with  my  endeavors  directed  against  the  existence  of  the 
law  of  independence :  for  he  believed  in  some  intervention  or 
other  in  favor  of  Hungary  against  Austria  and  Russia ;  while  / 
considered  the  confession  of  this  belief  even  then  as  the  sign  by 
which  the  adherents  of  the  party  of  the  14th  of  April  might  be 
recognized  with  certainty. 

But  I. thought  I  ought  to  keep  secret  from  General  Klapka 
not  only  the  political  idea  which  lay  at  the  bottom  of  my  urging 
to  the  offensive,  but  also  the  intention  which  determined  me 
even  to  begin  it  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube. 

This  intention  was — as  has  been  already  mentioned — to  give 
the  new  commanders  of  army  corps,  Knezich,  Nagy-Sandor,  and 
Asboth,  as  soon  as  possible  an  opportunity  of  showing  their 
capabilities  as  well  as  their  moral  independence  in  front  of  the 
enemy.  But,  as  is  known,  this  intention  was  formed  in  me  from 
having  felt  the  necessity  of  finding  a  compensation  for  Generals 
Damjanics  and  Aulich.  if  the  future  performances  of  the  main 
army  were  not  to  be  far  behind  its  exploits  hitherto  ;  since  neither 
Klapka's  talents  as  a  general,  although  extraordinary,  nor  my 
own  efforts,  had  seemed  to  me  to  be  sufficient  to  render  this  com- 
pensation unnecessary. 

In  order  to  be  able  to  speak  with  Klapka  about  all,  this  sans 
fagon,  I  ought  to  have  been  convinced  that  he  would  not  be 
offended  by  it.  But  I  was  far  from  such  a  conviction,  having 
not  yet  forgotten  the  disagreeable  personal  controversies  that  took 
place  between  him  and  Damjanics  during  the  April  campaign. 

Moreover,  during  the  conference  in  question  with  Klapka  at 
Raab,  not  the  least  occasion  occurred  for  disclosing  to  him  the 
peculiar  motives  of  my  determination  for  the  offensive  in  general, 
and  for  its  being  commenced  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  in 
particular. 

For  after  the  chief  of  the  central  office  of  operations  had  briefly 
developed  to  General  Klapka,  in  my  presence,  the  outlines  of  this 
offensive— namely,  first  to  gain  the  line  of  the  Waag ;  to  regu- 
late our  further  movements  by  those  of  the  enemy,  but  at  all 
events  to  aim  at  Presburg  as  the  final  object  of  our  operations, 
and  in  case  the  enemy  should — to  protect  that  place — throw  a 
considerable  part  of  his  forces  from  the  right  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  Danube,  to  attempt  on  the  right  bank  to  reach  Wieselburg 
and  Hungarian  Altenburg  with  the  seventh  army  corps — Klapka 


390  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

at  once  declared,  although  about  a  fortnight  previously  the  de- 
fensive had  been  proposed  by  himself,  that  he  nevertheless  agreed 
in  the  execution  of  this  plan  of  offensive  operations. 

I  had  no  reason  to  ascribe  this  agreement  to  any  other  cause 
than  the  accordance  of  our  opinions  on  the  purely  strategic  part 
of  the  matter  in  question. 

And  hence  it  was  that  Klapka's  letter,  in  which  he  advised 
me,  after  the  unsuccessful  undertakings  of  the  16th  of  June,  to 
give  up  the  offensive,  came  on  me  really  unexpectedly :  the  more 
unexpectedly,  as  this  letter  did  not  contain  a  single  well-founded 
objection  either  to  the  plan  of  operations  itself  or  to  the  manner 
of  its  execution ;  but  merely  recommended  the  abandonment  of 
the  offensive  in  general,  and  the  adoption  of  his  plan  of  defensive 
operations,  which  had  been  laid  aside. 

In  reading  this  letter  I  could  not  help  supposing  that  its  con- 
tents had  been  occasioned  by  some  personal  misunderstanding 
between  Klapka  and  the  chief  of  the  central  office  of  operations ; 
and  I  requested  the  latter  not  to  conceal  it  from  me,  if  such  were 
the  case.  He,  however,  assured  me,  he  could  not  remember 
having  given  General  Klapka  any  cause  of  discontent  with  him ; , 
unless  it  were  that  Klapka  had  been  wounded  by  the  adherence 
of  the  central  office  of  operations  to  my  drder  to  consider  the 
Kmety  division  as  an  independently-operative  part  of  the  army, 
while  General  Klapka  claimed  the  chief  command  over  it. 

It  is  true  General  Klapka  had  in  some  measure  a  right  to  it ; 
for,  according  to  his  plan  of  defensive  operations,  accepted  by  the 
council  of  ministers  in  Debreczin,  and  in  consequence  of  his 
nomination  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  fortress  of  Komorn  as 
well  as  of  the  fortified  camp  and  of  the  forces  concentrated  round 
Komorn  and  at  Raab,  three  army  corps  were  to  be  united  under 
his  chief  command,  namely,  besides  the  eighth  army  corps  in 
Komorn,  and  the  seventh  at  Raab,  another,  one  of  those  three 
which — silently  rejecting  his  plan  of  defensive  operations — I  had 
destined  for  the  attack  on  the  hostile  position  on  the  Waag. 

la  desiring  the  subordination  of  the  Kmety  division  under  his 
chief  command.  General  Klapka  consequently  demanded  only  a 
compensation,  and  that  an  insufficient  one,  for  the  army  corps 
withheld  from  him. 

That  this  indemnification  had  not  been  adjudged  him  by  the 
chief  of  the  central  office  of  operations — who  acted  according  to 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  391 

my  positive  order  to  let  the  Kmety  division  operate  independently 
— might  doubtless  have  made  him  feel  sore.  However,  in  all 
sincerity,  I  could  not  discover  the  logical  connection  between  the 
certainly  possible  anger  thereat,  and  the  rejection  of  the  idea 
about  the  offensive,  which  Klapka  had  unconditionally  concurred 
in  twelve  or  fourteen  days  before,  as  well  as  the  taking  up  again 
the  defensive  idea,  which  ten  or  twelve  days  ago  he  had  uncon- 
ditionally abandoned ;  or,  more  correctly,  I  believed  the  possibly 
actual  existence  of  a  connection,  even  though  illogical,  ought  not 
to  be  assumed. 

The  circumstance,  however,  that  General  Klapka  had  so 
urgently  advised  me  not  before,  but  only  immediately  after  the 
unsuccessful  first  attempt  to  gain  the  line  of  the  Waag,  to  aban- 
don the  offensive,  and,  as  a  natural  consequence,  to  resume  the 
plan  of  defensive  operations — this  circumstance  recalled  to  my 
mind  Klapka' s  undeniable  peculiarity  of  being  easily  induced, 
by  the  difficulties  of  execution,  to  abandon  resolutions  formed. 

It  seemed  to  me  as  if  the  honor  of  having  turned  off  Klapka's 
sympathies  from  the  offensive  back  again  to  the  defensive  was 
due  exclusively  to  the  unfavorable  results  of  the  16th  of  June. 

After  that  day  Klapka  appeared  to  be  convinced  that  it 
would  not  be  possible  to  force  the  line  of  the  Waag ;  I  was  not 
yet. 

Had  Klapka  supported  his  conviction  by  the  application  to  the 
case  in  question  of  the  maxims  and  dogmas  of  tactics  and  strategy, 
he  might  perhaps  have  succeeded  in  inducing  me  to  attempt  the 
forcing  of  the  line  of  the  Waag — in  another  manner. 

In  wholly  dissuading  me  from  the  offensive  he  would  by  no 
means  have  been  successful  under  the  then  existing  conjunctures. 

As  has  been  explained  in  the  preceding  chapter,  only  the  com- 
mencement of  the  Russian  intervention  en  gros  could  determine 
me  to  adopt  this  course. 

This  intervention  had,  indeed,  commenced  before  the  20th  of 
June,  by  the  invasion  of  the  Russian  main  army,  from  Dukla 
across  the  northern  frontiers  of  Hungary,  and  actually  in  the 
most  imposing  manner  ;  on  which  day — as  will  subsequently  be . 
seen — the  attack  on  the  Austrian  position  on  the  Waag,  which 
miscarried  on  the  part  of  the  Hungarians  on  the  16th,  was  re- 
peated. I  did  not  receive  the  first  news  of  this  invasion,  how- 
ever, till  after  the  21  st  of  June. 


392  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Thus  is  explained  how  it  happened  that  I  did  not  even  on  the 
20th  of  June  give  up  the  intended  offensive  against  the  Austrians, 
although  the  Russian  main  army  already  menaced  Kaschau  ; 
that  my  efforts  against  the  law  of  independence  of  the  14th  of 
April,  1849,  and /or  the  constitution  of  1848,  were  thereby  de- 
stroyed, and  simultaneously  with  these  efforts  the  hitherto  special 
motives  for  this  offensive  bearing  ;  and  that  Hungary — according 
to  my  conviction — began  to  agonize. 


CHAPTER  LXII. 

Farkasd  and  Negyed,  situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag, 
had  been  ours  since  the  16th  of  June,  and  were  occupied  by  de- 
tachments of  the  second  army  corps.  This  circumstance  ren- 
dered possible  the  undisturbed  formation  of  a  bridge  over  the 
Waag  at  Negyed  ;  and  consequently  on  the  20th  of  June  the 
third  army  corps  could  cross  the  river  without  hindrance,  and 
take  a  direct  part  in  the  decisive  attack,  intended  to  be  made 
this  day  on  the  right  wing  of  the  hostile  position  on  the  "Waag. 

The  dispositions  for  this  attack  were  briefly  as  follows  : 

For  the  second  army  corps  (Colonel  Asboth)  in  the  camp  at 
Aszod :  to  cross  the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Danube  at  Aszod, 
and  advance  against  Kiralyrev  and  Zsigard,  while  the  detach- 
ments of  this  corps  which  were  in  Farkasd  and  Negyed  advance 
simultaneously  against  Zsigard. 

For  the  third  corps  (General  Knezich)  in  the  camp  at  Tar- 
dosked :  to  cross  the  Waag  at  Negyed,  and  follow  the  detach- 
ments of  the  second  corps  which  are  advancing  from  Farkasd 
against  Zsigard. 

For  the  first  corps  (General  Nagy-Sandor)  in  Mocsonok  :  to 
make  demonstrations  against  Schintau  and  the  adjoining  part  of 
the  Waag ;  should  circumstances  be  favorable,  to  attack  in  earnest, 
and  attempt  to  gain  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag. 

For  the  expeditionary  column  of  the  seventh  army  corps  on  the 
main  road  to  Neutra  :  to  make  demonstrations  against  Freystadl. 

General  Klapka  received  orders,  with  a  part  of  the  eighth  corps 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  393 

to  undertake  the  protection  of  the  bridge  at  Aszod  against  the 
enemy  posted  in  Vasarut,  to  secure  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  sec- 
ond corps. 

Very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  20th  Colonel  Asboth  began 
with  the  troops  of  his  corps  which  were  in  the  camp  at  Aszod 
the  crossing  of  the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Danube.  When  I 
arrived  at  the  bridge  of  Aszod,  the  passage  over  the  river  was 
already  effected,  and  the  advance  of  the  second  corps  against 
Kiralyrev  and  Zsigard  in  progress.  Satisfied  for  the  present  of 
the  right  execution  of  the  dispositions,  I  here  awaited  General 
Klapka,  who  had  likewise  to  arrive  at  the  bridge  of  Aszod  in  the 
course  of  the  same  morning . 

I  had  neglected,  as  unimportant,  to  send  a  written  answer  to 
his  letter  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter ;  but  nevertheless, 
in  order  to  obviate  suspicions,  I  thought  it  advisable  to  make 
use  of  the  favorable  opportunity  which  was  just  about  ofiering 
itself  for  a  verbal  answer.  My  verbal  answer  to  Klapka  had, 
however,  to  be  confined  to  the  simple  remark,  that  the  disposi- 
tions for  the  offensive  undertaking  that  was  just  beginning  had 
already  been  sent  to  the  divers  army  corps  when  I  received  his 
letter.  From  the  preceding  chapter  it  must  be  sufficiently  evi- 
dent why  I  considered  a  fuller  discussion  of  the  contents  of  this 
letter  as  by  no  means  advisable. 

Consequently  after  I  had  by  the  above-mentioned  remark,  ad- 
duced in  the  form  of  an  excuse,  removed  from  General  Klapka 
all  ground  for  undefined  suspicions,  I  quickly  turned  the  con- 
versation to  the  approaching  events  of  the  day ;  and  it  was  agreed 
between  us,  that  the  principal  attack  just  beginning  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Waag  should  be  seconded  by  simultaneous  offensive" 
movements  in  the  Great  Schiitt,  namely  against  the  enemy  at 
Vasarut.  Finally  General  Klapka  pledged  himself  to  take  the 
conduct  of  these  offensive  movements  in  person. 

In  the  meantime  the  second  army  corps  had  encountered  the 
enemy  at  Zsigard ;  the  conflict  appeared  not  to  be  without  im- 
portance, and  I  hastened  to  take  part  in  it. 

To  the  north  of  Kiralyrev  and  Zsigard  I  found  the  second  army 
corps  alone  in  combat  with  two  hostile  divisions,  one  of  which 
defended  Pered,  the  other  deployed  in  front  of  Also-Szelly.     Be 
tween  them  gaped  a  large  interval :  at  least  no  position  of  troops 
could  be  seen  on  this  line  to  form  as  it  were  the  hostile  centre. 


394  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

In  like  manner  Colonel  Asboth  had  also  distributed  his  forces 
chiefly  on  the  wings. 

Taking  my  route  to  the  bridge  of  Aszod  by  Kiralyrev,  I  ar- 
rived first  at  the  left  wing  of  our  line  of  battle.  This  whig — 
leaning  to  the  left  on  the  marshy  brook  Dudvag — was  pressing 
its  adversary  back  with  all  its  might  toward  Also-Szelly. 

Our  right  wing,  however,  seemed  to  have  met  at  Pered  a  far 
more  obstinate  resistance. 

During  my  ride  toward  this  wing  my  attention  was  especially 
occupied  by  three  Honved  battalions.  They  seemed  to  have  to 
form  with  one  battery  and  one  squadron  of  hussars  the  centre  of 
our  line  of  battle.  But  I  found  two  of  them  in  complete  disorder, 
taking  to  flight ;  and  the  third  just  about  following  the  bad 
example  of  the  other  two.  These  battalions  had  been  ordered  to 
support,  by  their  advance  against  the  southern  and  southwestern 
skirts  of  Pered,  the  attack  of  the  right  wing  on  its  eastern  circuit. 
But  they  had  allowed  themselves  to  be  shaken  to  such  a  degree  by 
the  fire  of  the  hostile  batteries  posted  to  the  west  of  Pered,  that 
they  were  brought  into  the  state  of  disorder  in  which  I  found  them. 
Here  immediate  redress  appeared  most  urgently  demanded.  One 
part  of  my  escort  surrounded  the  wavering  battalion,  to  prevent, 
in  the  first  instance,  its  entire  dispersion  ;  while  another  part, 
with  the  assistance  of  some  hussars,  was  charged  to  put  a  stop 
to  the  flight  of  the  two  battalions  which  were  already  in  disorder. 
The  uninterrupted  fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries  rendered  the  ac- 
complishment of  these  two  objects  very  difficult.  In  order  to 
make  it  possible,  however,  the  most  severe  measures  had  to  he 
employed  against  the  disobedient  battalions. 

"While  this  was  in  progress,  Colonel  Asboth  suddenly  arrived 
in  haste  from  the  extreme  right  wing,  consoled  the  deserting 
troops  with  the  prospect  of  being  supported  by  the  third  army 
corps  just  advancing  from  Farkasd,  and  invited  them  to  secure 
themselves  in  a  natural  ditch  situated  still  further  back.  Of 
course  the  effect  of  the  coercive  measures,  which  up  to  this  mo- 
ment had  not  been  unsuccessfully  employed,  was  instantly  par- 
alyzed by  this  invitation.  My  followers  had  to  redouble  their 
efforts  to  restore  order  in  the  battalions,  which  were  confirmed 
in  their  want  of  courage  by  the  commander  of  their  corps,  and 
finally  to  lead  them  forward  to  storm  on  the  southern  and  south- 
western skirts  of  Pered^ 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  395 

The  right  wing,  in  spite  of  the  spiritless  conduct  of  the  battal- 
ions of  the  centre,  had  meanwhile  continued  with  increasing 
energy  its  attacks  on  the  eastern  circuit  of  this  place,  and  had  al- 
ready obtained  a  firm  footing  in  the  interior  of  the  village.  Sup- 
ported by  the  final  advance  of  these  battalions,  it  now  succeeded 
— before  the  arrival  of  the  third  army  corps  on  the  field — in 
completely  driving  the  enemy  out  of  Pered.  The  village  of  Also- 
Szelly  had  been  taken  earlier  and  with  less  effort  by  our  left 
wing. 

After  the  loss  of  these  two  points  the  enemy  renounced  any 
further  opposition,  and  retreated  from  Pered  by  Deaki,  from  Also- 
Szelly  by  Felso-Szelly  toward  Dioszeg.  Near  the  close  of  the 
contest  he  might  also  have  been  shaken  by  the  emerging  of  the 
head  of  the  column  of  the  third  army  corps  in  front  of  Zsigard. 

This  cohimn  was,  however,  not  the  whole  of  the  third  corps, 
but  only  about  three-fifths  of  it,  the  remainder  of  it  having  been 
disposed  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag  up  toward  Sellye,  for  the 
purpose  of  endeavoring  to  cross  the  river  somewhere  thereabouts. 
But  it  was  found  to  be  impossible  to  do  so  in  this  direction. 

These  two-fifths  of  the  third  corps  had  consequently  to  march 
back  again  as  far  as  Negyed,  in  order  to  join  us ;  and  as  I  thought 
it  not  advisable  to  undertake  without  them  the  further  advance 
against  Dioszeg,  and  as  their  arrival  at  Pered,  on  account  of  the 
great  circuit  they  had  to  make,  seemed  scarcely  possible  before 
nightfall,  the  continued  pursuit  of  the  enemy  was  stopped,  and 
troops  for  safety  only  were  advanced  as  far  as  Deaki  and  Felso- 
Szelly  and  Sellye  on  the  Waag  was  observed  by  means  of  patrols, 
while  a  part  of  the  second  corps  occupied  Also-Szelly  and  Kiralyrev, 
a  part  of  the  troops  present  of  the  third  corps  Hetmeiiy,  and  the 
main  bodies  of  both  army  corps  encamped  at  Pered. 

General  Knezich  had,  in  spite  of  the  advice  of  the  commanders 
of  his  division — as  is  known- — hesitated  to  support  Colonel  Asboth 
during  the  engagement  on  the  16th  of  June,  merely  on  the  ground 
that  he  had  not  received  express  orders  to  render  this  assistance 
from  the  central  office  of  operations.  For  a  similar  though  ut- 
terly untenable  reason,  the  third  army  corps  in  the  course  of  this 
day  (the  20th  of  June)  likewise  arrived  too  late  on  the  battle- 
field. 

It  was  known  to  General  Knezich  that  on  this  day  I  intended 
to  undertake  in  person  the  conduct  of  the  operations.     He  con- 


396  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

sequently  thought  he  should  receive  from  me  on  this  occasion  a 
quite  special  order  of  march ;  but  as  I  had  no  suspicion  of  this 
settled  idea,  and  consequently  did  not  believe  it  necessary  to  send 
an  especial  order  of  march  to  the  third  corps,  General  Knezich 
was  determined  to  let  his  corps  from  beyond  the  Waag  again  look 
on  inactively  at  the  combat,  until  at  last  his  sub-commanders 
morally  forced  him  to  advance.  With  all  this,  he  marched  only 
a  part  of  his  forces  over  the  standing  bridge  at  Negyed — as  has 
been  mentioned — to  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag  ;  the  considera- 
ble remainder  of  them  had — so  he  seemed  to  suppose — to  effect 
the  passage  of  the  river  at  a  spot  where  the  necessary  means  for 
doing  so  did  not  exist. 

This  last  circumstance  could  not  have  been  unknown  to  Gen- 
eral Knezich.  As,  however,  in  the  dispositions  for  attack  for  the 
20th  of  June — probably  for  the  sake  of  brevity — the  details  of 
the  dispositions  for  the  16th  were  referred  to,  and  in  these  the 
detaching  of  a  part  of  the  third  army  corps  to  the  Waag,  opposite 
Sellye,  as  a  demonstration,  was  ordered  ;  General  Knezich  might 
have  supposed  that  he  had  to  repeat  the  same  detaching  for  the 
purpose  of  the  real  crossing  over  the  Waag,  ordered  for  the  20th 
of  June. 

That  General  Knezich  could  have  supposed  this,  fnlly  convinced 
me  of  the  insufficiency  of  his  self-reliance  to  answer  those  claims 
which  must  be  made  upon  an  independent  leader  of  an  army 
corps. 

General  Knezich,  as  chief  of  a  division,  under  the  command 
of  General  Damjanics,  had  performed  many  a  distinguished  ser- 
vice. Nevertheless,  and  just  on  account  of  his  want  of  inde- 
pendence, he  was  not  in  his  place  as  an  independent  commander 
of  an  army  corps. 

That  in  which  General  Knezich  was  so  sadly  deficient  seemed 
to  have  been  richly  bestowed  on  Colonel  Asboth,  namely,  self- 
confidence  ;  but  he  was  wanting  in  that  certain  tact,  by  which 
the  commander  perceives  on  the  battle-field  how  far  he  may 
allow  his  self-confidence  to  carry  him,  without  burdening  his 
troops  with  more  than,  from  the  state  of  their  discipline,  they 
are  able  to  perform. 

Of  all  the  Hungarian  leaders  Aulich  alone  possessed  this  tact 
in  a  rare  degree.  As  commander  of  the  same  army  corps  of 
which  Colonel  Asboth  was  now  the  chief,  Aulich  had  splendidly 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  397 

evinced  this  tact  by  his  demonstrations  during  the  April  cam- 
paign against  the  Austrian  main  army  concentrated  before  Pesth. 

(Colonel  Asboth  was  serving  then  in  the  second  corps,  and 
assisted  in  those  demonstrations  under  Aulich's  guid^ance.) 

This  tact  can  hardly  be  taught ;  but  may  be  learned  by  ob- 
servation. Colonel  Asboth  nevertheless  had  not  caught  it  from 
General  Aulich. 

Full  of  personal  courage,  and  animated — as  I  have  mentioned 
— ^by  unbounded  self-confidence,  Colonel  Asboth  led  his  corps  as 
he  might  have  been  justified  in  doing  if  the  last  of  its  Honveds 
had  possessed  at  least  as  much  personal  valor  and  not  less  self- 
confidence  than  his  commander. 

That  the  troops  thereby  lost  their  steadiness  is  easily  conceiv- 
able ;  and  also  that  Colonel  Asboth  w^as  least  of  all  the  man 
to  restore  it :  of  this  he  had  just  given  me  a  proof  in  the  last 
conflict. 

He  orders  some  battalions  to  advance  in  the  most  effective 
range  of  the  well-sustained  fire  of  hostile  artillery.  The  battal- 
ions run  away.  Colonel  Asboth  points  out  to  the  runaways  a 
place  of  refuge  situated  still  further  back. 

According  to  my  views,  this  is  the  method  of  systematically 
teaching  his  troops  to  take  to  their  heels. 

The  commander  should  either  avoid  advancing  troops  in  the 
vehement  fire  of  artillery,  if  they  are  not  qualified  for  the  exper- 
iment ;  or  at  the  same  time  take  appropriate  measures  for  re- 
maining master  of  the  doubtful  troops. 

To  spare  a  battalion  (to  post  it  as  much  protected  as  possible) 
which  has  to  remain  passive  in  the  fire  is  the  bounden  duty  of  a 
commander.  But  a  battalion  which,  under  similar  circum- 
stances, is  destined  to  activity,  must  not  be  spared.  If  it  spare 
itself  (perhaps  by  running  away),  measures  must  be  taken  of  such 
a  kind  as  will  bring  it  forthwith  out  of  the  rain  under  the  spout. 

The  proper  measures  for  this  purpose,  it  is  true,  are  neither 
soothing  nor  fondling.  But  at  least  they  are  not  more  inhuman 
than  subsequent  decimation,  and  do  not,  like  it,  hobble  after  the 
crime  as  a  punishment,  but  mostly  stifle  it — if  employed  a  tempo 
— in  its  rise,  and  are  consequently  more  practical,  in  cases  where 
their  instant  application  is  really  necessitated  and  at  the  same 
time  possible. 

If  troops  are  ordered  to  advance  unprotected  in  the  range  of 


398  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

an  uncommonly  vigorous  fire  from  a  numerous  hostile  artillery, 
something  of  higher  importance  than  the  existence  of  the  exposed 
troops  must  be  the  motive. 

If  this  be  not  the  case,  then  away  with  the  commander  who 
uselessly  sacrifices  his  troops.  But  even  if  really  exposed  with- 
out a  motive,  they  must  not  run  away  with  impunity. 

In  what  precedes  I  have  pointed  out  that  moment  of  the  bat- 
tle in  which  Asboth's  right  wing  had  met  with  an  obstinate  re- 
sistance at  Pered,  while  the  left  wing  continually  pressed  the 
enemy  back  toward  Also-Szelly,  and  took,  after  a  short  delay, 
this  place  likewise.  At  the  same  time  the  arrival  of  the  third 
corps  was  soon  to  be  expected.  This  was  known  to  Colonel  As- 
both  ;  of  the  indicated  position  of  affairs  in  the  range  of  the  bat- 
tle a  single  glance  might  inform  him. 

Let  us  now  see  what  Colonel  Asboth  undertakes  as  independ- 
ent leader  of  the  combat. 

He  orders  Pered  to  be  forced. 

This  was,  at  all  events,  the  last  thing  he  ought  to  have  done  ; 
because  the  forcing  of  a  position  is  in  general  to  be  undertaken 
only  when  no  other  means  of  becoming  master  of  it  remains.      : 

In  the  circumstances  above  mentioned  the  employment  of  this 
means  was  not  in  the  least  necessary ;  for  Asboth's  left  wing 
menaced  already  the  natural  line  of  retreat  of  the  hostile  army 
corps  at  Pered,  which  consequently,  even  without  being  forced, 
could  not  hold  out  much  longer.  Moreover  the  column  of  the 
third  corps  was  already  approaching.  To  turn  Pered  on  the  east, 
executed  by  the  column  of  the  third  army  corps,  would  have  been 
far  more  dangerous  to  the  enemy  than  forcing  it,  and  besides 
could  have  been  done  at  much  less  sacrifice. 

Forcing  is  well  known  to  be  the  highest  price  paid  on  the 
theatre  of  war  for  a  place. 

An  independent  commander  who  unnecessarily  has  recourse  to 
forcing  is  a  squanderer.  Squanderers  must  be  placed  under 
guardianship. 

In  justification  of  Asboth,  it  might  perhaps  be  supposed  that, 
with  a  lively  recollection  of  his  disaster  on  the  16th,  and  fearing 
the  approach  of  hostile  reinforcements,  as  well  as  a  repetition  of 
delay  on  the  part  of  General  Knezich,  he  had  wished,  before  the 
arrival  of  these  reinforcements,  speedily  to  establish  himself  in 
Pered,  in  order  to  maintain  himself  more  easily  against  the  hos- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  399 

tile  superior  forces,  in  case  General  Knezich  should  still  continue 
to  delay. 

This  supposition,  however,  was  opposed  by  the  following  con- 
sideration. 

If  Colonel  Asboth  had  really  apprehended  the  approach  of 
hostile  reinforcements,  he  ought  not,  after  all,  to  have  advanced 
beyond  the  line  of  Zsigard  and  Kiralyrev,  but  have  contented 
himself  with  maintaining  these  two  points.  For  here  he  stood 
almost  an  hour's  march  nearer  to  General  Knezich ;  while  the 
enemy  was  just  as  much  further  from  his  succors  than  in  Pered 
and  Also-Szelly. 

The  forcing  of  Pered  was  consequently  in  no  way  to  be  justified. 

This,  however,  only  called  in  question  Asboth's  capability  as 
an  independent  leader  of  a  hostile  undertaking  of  greater  im- 
portance. 

But  his  procedure  with  the  fugitive  battalions,  namely,  the 
facts,  that  he  had  encouraged  them  to  run  still  further,  and  then 
to  end  by  hiding  themselves,  instead  of  bringing  them  to  their 
senses  by  the  most  rigorous  severity  ;  that  moreover  he  had  given 
them  at  the  same  time  the  consoling  assurance,  that  the  brave 
third  army  corps  would  finish  with  the  enemy,  instead  of  urging 
them  rather  not  to  allow  it  to  dispute  with  thei;n  the  honor  of  the 
victory  ; — these  facts  led  me  finally  to  perceive  that  Colonel  As- 
both had  not  even  the  ability  to  maintain  in  the  second  army 
corps  that  discipline  and  that  spirit,  which  it  owed  to  the  per- 
sonal influence  of  General  Aulich. 

I  have  thought  it  necessary  to  enter  into  all  these  details  to 
show  the  motives  which  induced  me  to  remove  General  Knezich 
and  Colonel  Asboth  in  the  course  of  the  20th  of  June  from  their 
charges  as  commanders  of  corps. 

The  command  of  the  third  corps  was  intrusted  to  Colonel 
(soon  afterwards  General)  Count  Leiningen  ;  that  of  the  second 
corps  to  Colonel  Kaszonyi. 

At  the  same  time  the  commanders  of  the  infantry  divisions  of 
the  second  corps  requested  to  be  exempted  from  further  service, 
on  account  of  shattered  health.  The  chief  of  the  general  staff'  of 
the  corps  had  already  done  the  same.  Consequently  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  20th  of  June  the  four  most  important  charges  of  the 
second  corps  were  transferred  to  new  hands  ; — certainly  not  a  de- 
sirable circumstance  immediately  before  a  decisive  conflict. 


400  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  I  had  judged  it  necessary  to  await 
at  Pered  the  arrival  of  the  smaller  half  of  the  third  army  corps, 
which  had  been  detached  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Waag.  The 
further  advance  was  not  to  begin  till  very  early  next  day  (the 
21st  of  June),  and  simultaneously  with  it  the  forcing  of  the  pas- 
sage over  the  Waag  at  Schintau  by  the  first  corps.  The  com- 
mander of  the  latter  (General  Nagy-Sandor)  received  an  order  to 
this  effect  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  20th  by  two  orderly  of- 
ficers, who  started  as  couriers  for  the  camp  of  the  first  corps  di- 
rectly after  the  taking  by  storm  of  Pered,  which  was  about  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon ;  with  it  finished  the  day's  battle. 

Before  nightfall  (between  the  20th  and  21st  of  June),  how- 
ever, I  received  two  reports,  in  consequence  of  which  my  reso- 
lution to  advance  the  next  morning  aggressively  underwent  an 
important  change. 

These  reports  were :  one  from  General  Klapka,  that  he  had  in 
the  mean  time  been  defeated  by  the  Austrians  at  Nyarasd  in  the 
Great  Schiitt ;  and  another  from  scouts,  that  the  Russian  army 
corps,  previously  stationed  en  reserve  at  Presburg,  had  arrived  at 
Dioszeg  during  the  forenoon,  and  was  already  marching  against 
us. 

Simultaneously  a  report  arrived  from  the  outposts,  that  the 
enemy  had  strongly  garrisoned  Sellye  on  the  Waag.  There  was 
consequently  no  doubt  that  he  would  himself  attack  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  (21st  of  June).  He  could  now  do  so  with  the  prob- 
able prospect  of  a  favorable  result ;  for  after  the  accession  of  the 
"Russian  corps  to  those  troops  which  had  been  opposed  to  our  sec- 
ond corps  during  the  day,  he  was  numerically  superior  to  us  ;  and 
these  troops  formed  besides,  according  to  the  reports  of  all  our 
scouts,  only  the  smaller  part  of  the  Austrian  forces  on  the 
Waag — the  greater  stood  at  Schintau,  Szered,  and  Freystadl. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  seemed  to  me  more  advisable  not 
to  advance  next  morning,  but  await  the  hostile  attack  at  Pered 
without  moving,  and  to  pursue  the  offensive  only  in  case  we 
either  remained  unattacked  till  noon  of  the  21st,  or,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  victorious.  I  was  urged  to  this  change  in  my  former 
resolution  by  the  following  view  of  our  present  situation. 

General  Klapka  was  forced  to  remain  on  the  defensive  in  con- 
sequence of  the  unfortunate  issue  of  the  battle  at  Nyarasd ; 
while  his  adversary  in  the  Great  Schiitt,  on  the  contrary,  had 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  401 

his  hands  free,  and  was  crossing  with  the  greater  part  of  his 
forces  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Danube, 
to  reach  Kiralyrev  in  the  rear  of  our  two  corps  united  at  Pered. 
The  danger  these  corps  ran  of  thus  losing  their  retreat  to  Aszod 
and  Negyed  must  become  the  more  imminent  the  further  from 
these  points  of  retreat  they  were  engaged  in  serious  conflict  with 
the  enemy,  who  stood  directly  opposite  them  and  was  numer- 
ically superior. 

In  our  position  at  Pered  this  danger  was  as  yet  inconsiderable, 
because  Kiralyrev  and  Pered  are  situated  within  the  extreme 
battle-range  of  a  force  of  from  15,000  to  16,000  men  and  80 
guns — about  the  amount  of  the  total  strength  of  the  second  and 
third  corps. 

With  such  a  force  it  was  still  possible  without  especial  diffi- 
culty, simultaneously,  on  the  one  hand,  at  Pered,  to  restrain  the 
too  speedy  southern  advance  of  even  a  superior  enemy  ;  and  on  the 
other  hand,  at  Kiralyrev,  to  get  rid  of  a  troublesome  adversary. 
Nay,  even  if  this  were  not  admitted,  the  common  retreat  by  Neg- 
yed remained  nevertheless  secured  to  the  two  corps  united  at 
Pered,  since  Zsigard  (the  central  point  of  this  line  of  retreat)  is  al- 
most at  an  equal  distance  from  Pered  and  Kiralyrev ;  and  as  the 
enemy  during  his  advance  from  Kiralyrev  to  Zsigard,  had  to  ob- 
serve precautionary  measures  requiring  much  time,  but  which 
were  unnecessary  to  our  army  corps  on  their  march  from  Pered 
back  to  Zsigard. 

I  repeat  then,  that  the  common  retreat— ^if,  in  the  worst  but 
also  most  improbable  case,  necessitated  for  the  two  army  corps 
united  at  Pered — by  Zsigard,  Farkasd,  and  Negyed,  was  strategic- 
ally secured  to  them  already  by  the  circumstance  that,  by  advanc- 
ing beyond  Pered,  they  were  not  exposed  to  a  doubtful  conflict. 
And  if  I  moreover  mention,  that  this  line  of  retreat — though  term- 
inating in  a  passage  over  the  river — appeared  to  me  even  tactically 
not  an  unfavorable  one,  from  its  being  unassailable  in  flank,  and 
the  not  despicable  points  of  support,  Farkasd  and  Negyed,  being 
situated  on  it — I  do  so  merely  that  I  may  give  complete  the  series 
of  considerations  by  which,  on  the  20th  of  June,  I  arrived  at  the 
conviction,  that  the  situation  of  the  second  and  third  corps  at 
Pered  was  not  more  dangerous  than  in  general  is  that  of  any 
force  which  is  about  to  engage  in  a  serious  conflict  with  an 
enemy  numerically  superior. 


402  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

This  conviction,  however,  could  not  of  course  suffice  by  itself 
to  determine  me  to  bring  on  a  conflict,  which,  although  it  ap- 
peared to  have  no  extraordinarily  unfavorable  probabilities  against 
it,  seemed  to  have  as  few  especially  favorable  ones  for  it.  This 
conviction  could  in  any  case  exercise  only  a  passive  influence  on 
the  resolution  to  accept  or  to  ofler  battle.  It  kept  aloof  at  most 
the  motives  dissuading  from  such  a  resolution ;  it  could  not  ofler 
any  i?iciting  thereto.  And  consequently  it  still  remains  to  be 
explained  from  what  motives  I  came  to  the  determination  so  un- 
reservedly to  accept  or  to  offer  battle  on  the  21st  of  June. 

These  motives  were  : 

The  apprehension  of  forfeiting  the  confidence  of  the  array,  if, 
after  the  advantages  obtained  over  the  enemy  on  the  20th  of  June 
by  the  second  corps  alone,  I  should  give  up  again,  on  the  follow- 
ing day,  with  the  second  and  third  corps,  without  a  previous 
contest,  the  scarcely  gained  right  bank  of  the  Waag  ; — 

The  hope  that  the  energetic  attempts  to  cross  the  Waag  en- 
joined on  General  Nagy-Sandor  would  not  be  without  a  favorable 
influence  on  the  events  of  the  next  day  ; — and  moreover 

The  necessity  of  learning  something  positive  about  the  qualita- 
tive importance  of  the  Russian  intervention,  even  should  it  only 
have  the  efl^ect  of  preventing  the  wide-spread  rumors  that  the  Rus- 
sian troops  who  had  already  entered  Hungary  were  merely  disguised 
Slowaks,  Russniaks,  Wasserpolaks,  Hannaks,  and  such  like,  from 
obtaining  belief  in  the  army,  and  completely  destroying  its  manly 
spirit,  already  seriously  endangered  by  the  stories  about  the  im- 
pending interventions  yor  Hungary. 

With  reference  to  the  favorable  influence  of  Nagy-Sandor's 
attempts  to  cross  the  Waag  on  the  events  of  the  next  day,  I  had 
resolved  on  the  following  combinations  : 

Either  the  energetic  attacks  of  General  Nagy-Sandor  might 
shake  the  enemy's  intention  of  attacking  us  on  the  next  morning 
at  Pered.  In  this  case  likewise  no  advance  toward  our  line  of' 
retreat  was  to  be  feared  from  the  Great  Schiitt,  in  spite  of 
Klapka's  defensive  bearing,  and  consequently  nothing  would  pre- 
vent us  from  continuing  our  oflensive. 

Or  Nagy-Sandor's  attempt  to  cross  the  Waag,  in  the  rear  of 
the  enemy  engaged  in  combat  with  us  at  Pered,  would  succeed ; 
and  then  the  moment  was  come  for  the  second  and  third  corps 
to  exchange  unreservedly  the  defensive  for  the  offensive,  because 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  403 

all  care  about  their  lines  of  retreat  to  Aszod  and  Negyed  would 
seem  to  be  rendered  superfluous  by  the  prospect,  after  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy  was  forced  back,  of  being  able  to  effect  a 
junction  with  Nagy-Sandor,  and  thus,  if  necessary,  to  make  use 
of  his  passage  of  the  Waag  as  the  common  point  of  retreat  for  all 
the  three  army  corps. 

My  dispositions  for  the  21st  were  accordingly  as  follow : 

The  second  corps  to  take  up  its  position  between  Pered  and  the 
little  river  Dudvag;  the  third  corps  between  Pered  and  the 
Waag.  The  former  to  advance  two  battalions  with  two  guns, 
and  also  some  cavalry  for  the  performance  of  the  orderly  and 
patroling  service,  as  far  as  Also-Szelly.  This  column  to  evacuate 
the  said  place  only  on  the  approach  of  a  superior  hostile  force, 
and  then  without  an  obstinate  resistance.  Should  this  happen, 
it  is  to  retreat  as  far  as  Kiralyrev,  occupy  it,  and  charge  itself 
besides  from  that  time  with  the  protection  of  the  flank  of  the 
second  corps,  following  it  on  its  left  in  echelons  in  case  of  an 
advance. 

The  third  corps  to  occupy  the  Puszta  Hetmeny  with  a  small 
number  of  troops,  in  order  to  secure  its  right  flank  against  a 
surprise  by  being  turned.  The  task  devolving  on  the  latter  to 
be,  the  observance,  during  the  whole  day,  of  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  on  the  bank  of  the  Waag.  It  has  to  follow  the  move- 
ments of  the  army  in  flank,  without  leaving  the  bank  of  the 
river. 

The  village  of  Pered,  divided  from  north  to  south  into  two 
almost  equal  halves  by  a  principal  street,  with  its  eastern  half 
to  serve  as  point  of  support  to  the  left  wing  of  the  third  corps, 
with  the  western  one  to  the  right  wing  of  the  second  corps,  and 
according  to  this  arrangement  to  be  occupied  by  divisions  of  both 
corps.  The  whole  cavalry  with  its  batteries  to  undertake  the 
protection  of  the  open  ground  between  Pered  and  the  little  river 
Dudvag.  The  point  of  retreat  of  the  second  corps  to  be  the 
bridge  at  Aszod,  that  of  the  third  corps  the  one  at  Negyed. 

The  second  and  third  corps,  in  the  position  at  Pered  indicated 
in  these  dispositions,  were  attacked  in  the  forenoon  of  the  21st 
of  June  by  Russian  and  Austrian  troops. 

Our  outposts  in  Felso-Szelly,  and  those  in  Deaki  and  Also- 
Szelly,  had  been  obliged — the  former  before,  the  latter  soon  after 
daybreak — to  retreat  to  Pered,  on  account  of  the  approach  of  con- 


404  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Biderable  hostile  forces  from  the  north  and  northwest  against 
those  points. 

The  two  Honved  battalions  and  two  guns  of  the  second  corps, 
disposed  at  Also-Szelly,  retreated  to  Kiralyrev,  according  to  the 
above-mentioned  arrangement,  and  occupied  this  place,  in  which 
there  had  been  till  then  only  an  insignificant  post.  Two  strong 
hostile  columns,  composed  of  three  kinds  of  arms,  followed  them 
after  a  considerable  time,  at  short  intervals  from  each  other. 

This  was  the  hostile  right  wing.  The  centre  simultaneously 
deployed  before  Deald,  the  left  wing  did  the  same  to  the  east  of 
it,  and  in  almost  immediate  communication  with  the  centre ; 
while  his  right  wing  was  isolated  by  an  interval  of  at  least  a 
quarter  of  a  mile,  and  seemed  about  to  turn  the  left  wing  of  (mr 
line  of  battle. 

But  this  manoeuvre,  which,  by  the  way,  was  not  an  unexpected 
one,  having  been  already  originally  provided  against  by  our  cav- 
alry being  placed  to  the  left  in  echelons,  as  well  as  by  occupying 
Kiralyrev ;  the  said  movement  of  the  hostile  right  wing  could  be 
left  unheeded  for  the  present,  and  we  awaited  the  attack,  with- 
out changing  our  position  in  the  least. 

This  attack  commenced  with  a  brisk  fire  of  artillery  from  the 
hostile  centre  and  left  wing,  while  only  the  foremost  of  the  two 
columns  of  the  right  wing  marched  direct  against  Kiralyrev, 
but  the  hindmost  halted  in  the  prolongation  of  our  deployed 
left  wing,  at  about  two  gun-ranges  distant  from  it. 

The  infantry  divisions  of  the  second  corps  (to  the  left)  answer- 
ed the  hostile  cannonade  without  moving,  those  of  the  third  corps 
(to  the  right)  while  advancing.  By  this  manoeuvre  it  was  in- 
tended partially  to  divert  from  the  second  corps  the  very  galling 
fire  of  the  hostile  centre. 

It  seemed,  however,  as  if  this  measure  would  not  be  success- 
ful ;  for  while  the  divisions  of  the  third  corps  resolutely  advanced, 
those  of  the  second  corps  were  soon  shaken,  began  at  last  even  to 
give  way,  and  slackened  their  fire  in  the  same  degree  as  that  of 
the  hostile  centre  increased  in  vigor. 

In  the  centre  of  the  enemy  an  advancing  might  be  remarked, 
which  was  not  the  case  with  his  left  wing. 

From  what  precedes,  it  is  evident  that  both  lines  of  battle 
came  by  degrees  into  a  fronting  direction,  oblique  to  their  original 
one,  both  right  wings  being  advanced  ;  so  that  the  enemy's  line 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  405 

of  battle  gained  more  and  more  a  direction  which  formed  a  right 
angle  with  his  natural  line  of  retreat  toward  Dioszeg ;  while  our 
line  threatened  ultimately  to  fall  into  the  direction  of  our  points 
of  retreat,  which  would  soon  be  attainable  only  by  a  flank-march 
to  the  left. 

This  derangement  of  the  lines  of  battle  from  their  original 
principal  direction — from  east  to  west  into  that  from  northeast 
to  southwest — was  now  the  most  unfavorable  change  for  us  ;  and 
it  was  necessary  either  to  order  the  infantry  divisions  of  the  third 
corps  to  draw  back,  or  to  render  possible  the  re-advance  of  those 
of  the  second  corps.  I  was  determined  to  try  first  the  latter 
means. 

A  part  of  the  cavalry  division  of  the  third  corps  was  to  fall 
upon  the  cavalry  attached  to  the  right  wing  of  the  hostile  centre, 
the  larger  remainder  to  follow  with  the  battery  as  a  support ; 
while  the  cavalry  division  of  the  second  corps  (in  the  array,  to 
the  left  of  that  of  the  third  corps)  was  simultaneously  to  direct 
its  attacks  against  the  column  of  the  extreme  right  hostile  wing, 
which,  as  just  mentioned,  menaced  our  left. 

By  the  first  of  these  cavalry  attacks  I  hoped  to  oblige  the  hos- 
tile centre  to  a  retrograde  movement,  and  thus  to  disengage  the 
infantry  divisions  of  the  second  corps  ;  by  the  second,  to  render 
possible  the  total  isolation  of  the  hostile  column  which  had 
pushed  forward  as  far  as  Kiralyrev. 

The  orders  for  this  advance  were  scarcely  issued  to  the  two 
cavalry  divisions,  when  I  received  a  report  that  Kiralyrev  was 
in  the  possession  of  the  enemy  I 

Soon  after  the  attack  of  the  foremost  column  of  the  hostile  ex- 
treme right  wing  began  in  earnest  on  this  village,  not  being  suffi- 
ciently convinced  that  the  staff-officer  of  the  second  corps  who 
commanded  there  was  to  be  relied  upon,  I  had  sent  my  adjutant, 
a  captain  of  cavalry,  Charles  Kempelen,  to  the  menaced  spot,  and 
charged  him  to  take  the  command  of  the  troops  of  occupation, 
and  maintain  the  village  at  whatever  cost. 

Kempelen  now  reported  to  me,  that  he  had  found  Kiralyrev 
already  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  our  two  battalions,  with 
their  guns,  on  the  retreat  toward  the  bridge  at  Aszod.  He  had 
succeeded  in  overtaking,  stopping,  and  leading  them  again  to  the 
storm  against  Kiralyrev  ;  but  he  nevertheless  despaired  of  regain 
ing  the  place,  unless  a  strong  reinforcement  was  sent  to  him. 


406  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  required  reinforcement,  consisting  of  two  battalions  and 
two  guns,  under  the  command  of  the  brave  Major  Rakovszki  (one 
of  the  two  commanders  of  infantry  divisions  of  the  second  corps 
nominated  on  the  preceding  evening),  started  without  delay  from 
the  line  of  battle  at  Pered  for  Kiralyrev  ;  it  being  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  come  as  soon  as  possible  into  possession  of  this  point. 

After  this  diminution  of  our  forces  opposed  to  the  central  point 
of  the  hostile  battle-array,  the  execution  of  the  two  attacks  of 
cavalry  just  ordered  appeared  to  be  still  more  pressingly  neces- 
sary. ^ 

On  the  news  that  Kiralyrev  was  lost,  I  changed  nevertheless 
my  original  determination  to  lead  in  person  the  attack  of  the 
cavalry  division  of  the  third  corps  on  the  right  wing  of  the  hos- 
tile centre  ;  charged  the  commander  of  the  cavalry  division  of 
the  third  corps  with  the  accomplishment  of  this  task  ;  and  hast- 
ened to  Kiralyrev,  before  the  advancing  column  under  Major 
Kakovszki,  in  order  to  see  with  my  own  eyes  whether  and  how 
far  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  second  corps  was  endangered  by  the 
enemy  maintaining  himself  there. 

On  the  preceding  evening  General  Klapka  had  asked  for  a 
squadron  of  one  of  the  old  regiments  of  hussars,  and  offered  in 
compensation  two  squadrons  of  the  newly-formed  regiment  of 
*'  Karolyi"  hussars.  These  had  just  arrived  at  Kiralyrev,  when 
I  was  reconnoitering  the  enemy.  I  found  him  on  the  defensive  ; 
opposed  to  his  reserves  posted  on  the  north  of  Kiralyrev  the  two 
squadrons  of  Karolyi  hussars  ;  and  hastened  back  to  Pered,  after 
having  finally  convinced  myself  that  no  hostile  advance  was  to  be 
apprehended  from  the  Great  Schiitt. 

Large  clouds  of  dust  suddenly  rose  and  rapidly  advanced  from 
Pered  toward  Zsigard  :  they  seemed  to  indicate  the  flight  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  third  corps. 

I  could  now,  for  the  present,  no  longer  hope  to  render  possible 
the  advance  of  the  infantry  under  Kaszonyi  (second  corps) ;  I 
had,  on  the  contrary,  speedily  to  resolve  to  order  that  under 
Leiningen  (third  corps)  back  as  far  as  Pered.  But  Pered  had  to 
be  maintained  with  concentrated  forces  until  the  news  of  Nagy- 
Sandor's  successful  crossing  of  the  Waag  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy 
had  reached  the  battle-field,  as  a  moral  succor. 

The  cavalry  division  of  the  second  corps  had  just  commenced 
its  attack  on  the  hostile  turning-column  on  our  left :  it  might 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  407" 

succeed — that  of  the  third  corps  be  inspired  with  new  courage — 
Kiralyrev  be  retaken  from  the  enemy. 

None  of  these  preliminary  suppositions — these  indispensable 
conditions  for  maintaining:  ourselves  at  the  height  of  Pered — ^lay 
beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  most  common  fluctuations  of  the 
fortune  of  war  ;  none  of  these  suppositions  had  in  itself  any  par- 
ticular improbability. 

Consequently,  while  Colonel  Leiningen  retreated  fighting  to- 
ward Pered,  I  hastened  to  assist  Colonel  Kaszonyi  in  animating 
to  a  manly  perseverance  his  division,  which  had  already  been 
pressed  back  to  this  place. 

But  when  I  -arrived  at  Pered,  I  found  the  position  I  had  hoped 
to  maintain  already  abandoned  by  the  infantry  and  batteries 
under  Kaszonyi,  which  I  had  supposed  still  holding  out,  and  the 
cavalry  division  of  the  third  corps,  which  I  thought  was  in  flight, 
alone  still  stood  its  ground.  It  had,  indeed,  not  succeeded  in 
overthrowing  the  right  wing  of  the  hostile  centre  ;  but  not  this 
cavalry  division,  but  the  greater  part  of  the  entire  artillery  of 
the  second  corps,  and  moreover  two  of  its  battalions,  had  here- 
upon suddenly  taken  to  flight,  and  raised  those  clouds  of  dust 
which  so  rapidly  advanced  toward  Zsigard.  Four  Honved  bat- 
talions— the  remainder  of  the  infantry  of  the  second  coi-ps  sta- 
tioned before  Pered — obstructed  by  Colonel  Kaszonyi  on  their 
onward  senseless  flight,  just  at  the  moment  of  my  arrival  at  Pered 
began  to  rally  themselves  in  the  rear  of  the  cavalry  division  of 
the  third  corps,  which  was  again  ready  to  attack. 

The  western  half  of  Pered  and  the  small  wood  adjoining  it  on 
the  north  was  consequently  completely  abandoned  by  us ;  the 
advance  of  the  hostile  centre  was  resolute  and  vigorous  ;  the 
attempt  to  urge  Kaszonyi's  four  battalions  again  forward,  and 
with  them  alone  reoccupy  the  quitted  points  of  support,  would 
be  evidently,  considering  the  ever  uncertain  conduct  of  these 
troops,  unavailing  ;  and,  according  to  my  judgment,  under  these 
circumstances,  it  was  useless  to  think  for  a  moment  of  further 
maintaining  the  battle  at  the  height  of  Pered ;  on  the  contrary, 
the  retreat  of  the  Leiningen  infantry  divisions  as  far  as  gun-range 
heliind  Pered  was  now  necessitated. 

These  divisions  had  meanwhile  retreated  into  the  woods  to  the 
northeast  and  east  of  Pered,  and  occupied  them.  An  attack  with 
the  bayonet  by  the  hostile  centre  on  the  northeast  of  the  wood 


408  Mr  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

had  just  been  repulsed,  when  Colonel  Leiningen  received  my 
order  to  evacuate  Pered.  His  cavalry  division,  which,  as  has  been 
mentioned,  still  continued  standing  to  the  west  of  Pered,  sup- 
ported by  the  now  reorganized  four  battalions  of  the  second  corps, 
was  charged,  in  order  to  protect  this  retreat,  to  prevent  the  too 
speedy  pressing  forward  of  the  cavalry  of  the  right  wing  of  the 
hostile  centre  ;  the  cavalry  of  the  second  corps,  however,  to  re- 
new their  attacks  on  the  repeatedly-mentioned  turning-column  of 
the  extreme  right  wing — which  had  hitherto  been  ineffectual, 
from  the  uncommonly  firm  resistance  of  some  Russian  battalions 
— and  thus  hinder  the  cavalry  division  of  the  third  corps,  and 
the  four  battalions  of  the  second  which  supported  it,  from  being 
menaced  on  the  left,  and  embarrassed  in  the  execution  of  their  task. 

Colonel  Leiningen  began  his  retreat  fighting,  during  it  main- 
tained his  troops  in  exemplary  order,  drew  on  his  cavalry  divi- 
sion, and  had  his  corps  just  marched  up  to  gun-range  south  of 
Pered,  when  I  rejoined  him  again,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging 
with  him  the  following  dispositions  for  the  later  part  of  the  day  : 

"  The  third  corps  to  observe  the  defensive,  and  in  the  worst 
case  fall  back  as  far  as  Zsigard ;  but  there  to  take  up  the  artil- 
lery and  infantry  of  the  second  corps,  which  had  been  sent 
thither  from  the  position  before  Pered — from  want  of  ammuni- 
tion, as  was  subsequently  reported  to  me — and  maintain  itself 
firmly  until  the  retaking  of  Kiralyrev. 

"  Colonel  Kaszonyi  at  the  same  time  to  unite  the  four  battal- 
ions of  the  second  corps  led  back  from  Pered  with  its  cavalry 
division ;  protect  with  these  forces  the  third  corps  against  being 
turned  in  its  left,  and  also  keep  up  the  communication  with 
Kiralyrev. 

"  As  soon  as  Kiralyrev  becomes  ours  again,  the  third  corps — 
reinforced  by  the  above-mentioned  artillery  and  infantry  of  the 
second  corps — to  assume  the  offensive  from  Zsigard,  and  the  re- 
mainder of  the  latter  corps  from  Kiralyrev." 

I  had  not  yet  given  up  all  hopes  that  the  news  of  General 
Nagy-Sandor's  successful  passage  over  the  Waag  would  soon 
arrive ! 

The  urgent  necessity  for  accelerating  as  much  as  possible  the 
dislodgment  of  the  enemy  from  Kiralyrev  impelled  me  again  to 
that  point  of  the  battle-field. 

It  is  known  that  we  had  already  four  battalions  and  four  guns 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HL'NGARY  409 

concentrated  before  Kiralyrev  under  tlie  command  of  Major  Ra- 
kovszki. 

But  however  energetically  Major  Rakovszki,  as  well  as  Cap- 
tains Kempelen  and  Nedbal  (the  commander  of  one  of  the  bat- 
talions present),  animated  the  troops  to  the  combat,  the  majority 
of  the  men,  nay  even  officers,  favored  by  the  high  corn  bounding 
the  village  on  the  south,  had  unobserved  withdrawn  from  the 
fight ;  and  of  the  four  battalions  I  found  scarcely  one-third  in  a 
condition  fit  for  action. 

The  further  attacks  on  Kiralyrev,  undertaken  with  such  small 
forces,  threatened,  like  the  previous  ones,  to  be  unsuccessful.  A 
considerable  reinforcement  of  the  storming-columns  appeared, 
above  all  things,  to  be  necessary.  In  order  to  render  this  possi- 
ble, however,  a  regular  chase  had  first  to  be  made  after  the  sol- 
diers, who,  dreading  the  fire,  remained  hidden  in  the  high  corn. 
All  other  efforts  to  force  the  demoralized  troops  to  obedience  had 
been  unavailing ;  but  this  last  and  extreme  attempt  had  the  de- 
sired effect. 

Major  Rakovszki  and  Captain  Kempelen  could  soon  with  more 
considerable  forces  renew  the  storming  against  the  southern  and 
southeastern  part  of  Kiralyrev,  while  Captain  Nedbal  with  the 
last  remains  of  his  battalion  penetrated  from  the  west  into  the 
interior  of  the  village.  Now  began  a  continuous  vigorous  con- 
test of  tirailleurs  and  artillery.  The  merit  of  having  decided  it 
victoriously  for  our  arms  is  mainly  due  to  those  three  officers. 

Kiralyrev  was  ours !  An  orderly  officer  hastened  to  Zsigard, 
as  had  been  preconcerted,  with  an  order  for  the  third  corps  to 
advance.  Major  Bakovszki  in  the  mean  time  pursued  the  enemy 
dislodged  from  Kiralyrev,  drove  part  of  his  troops  over  the  Dud- 
vag,  and  put  the  remainder  to  flight  toward  Also-Szelly  ;  Colonel 
Kaszonyi  with  the  four  battalions  and  the  cavalry  division  united 
under  his  personal  command,  who  shortly  before,  in  consequence 
of  an  unsuccessful  attack  of  the  latter,  had  retreated  as  far  as  to 
the  height  of  Kiralyrev,  was  just  about  again  leading  his  troops 
to  the  attack  against  the  right  wing  of  the  hostile  line  of  battle, 
already  deployed  to  the  south  of  Pered  and  now  advancing  against 
Kiralyrev — when  I  received  a  written  report  from  Colonel  Lein- 
ingen,  that  he  was  turned  on  the  right  by  a  strong  party  of  the 
enemy,  was  thereby  obhged  to  evacuate  his  position  at  Zsigard, 
and  was  forthwith  commencing  his  retreat  toward  Farkasd. 

S 


410  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

This  report  finally  convinced  me  of  the  absolute  necessity  of 
giving  up  the  day  as  lost,  and  with  it  the  right  bank  of  the 
Waag. 

My  order  for  the  third  army  corps  to  advance,  which  this  re- 
port had  crossed,  was  now  directly  coimtermanded  ;  and  Colonel 
Leiningen  was  charged  to  continue  his  retreat  as  far  as  the  oppo- 
site bank  of  the  Waag. 

Colonel  Kaszonyi  had  meanwhile  attacked  with  the  battery 
of  his  cavalry  division  the  hostile  forces  just  mentioned  as  ap- 
proaching in  the  direction  from  Pered  against  Kiralyrev.  I  had 
the  fire  continued,  however,  only  till  the  return  of  Major  Rakovszki 
from  the  pursuit  of  the  hostile  troops  dislodged  from  Kiralyrev. 
Immediately  after  he  arrived,  the  second  corps  began  its  retreat 
toward  Aszod,  which  it  accomplished  without  being  disturbed 
during  it  by  the  enemy. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  enemy  concentrated  in  the  Great  Schiitt 
at  Vasarut  before  nightfall  made  an  attack  on  the  position  of 
General  Klapka  at  Aszod,  evidently  with  the  intention  of  gain- 
ing the  point  of  retreat  for  our  second  corps,  the  bridge  there  over 
the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Danube,  and  by  destroying  it  isolate 
the  second  coi-ps  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Waag. 

But  this  attack  was  not  begun  till  after  the  second  corps  had 
in  part  crossed  the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Danube.  The  as- 
sailant confined  his  ofiensive  activity  to  a  cannonade,  opened  in 
the  evening  twilight,  and  briskly  continued  till  darkest  night, 
but  Avhich  of  course  was  not  very  dangerous. 

Thanks  to  the  firmness  with  which  General  Klapka  resisted 
the  enemy,  the  second  corps  uninterruptedly  executed  its  retreat 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Danube,  and 
dismantled  the  bridge  it  had  crossed. 

A  part  of  the  cavalry  and  artillery  of  the  corps  was  immedi- 
ately dispatched  to  Aszod,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  Klapka; 
with  the  remainder  of  them  and  the  infantry  the  line  of  battle 
was  elongated  on  the  right  from  Aszod  to  the  river,  a  little  above 
the  bridge. 

Our  troops — those  under  General  Klapka  as  well  as  those 
under  Colonel  Kaszonyi — maintained  their  position.  The  enemy, 
convinced  at  last  that  his  attacks  were  ineffectual,  withdrew 
again  toward  Yasarut  without  having  accomplished  his  purpose. . 

Aszod  was  now  no  longer  of  any  strategic  importance  to  us, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  411 

after  our  offensive  had  been  crippled  by  the  decisive  victory  which 
the  enemy  had  gained  during  the  course  of  the  day  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Waag. 

General  Klapka  and  myself  therefore  agreed  then  and  there 
on  the  evacuation  of  Aszod  also  ;  which  was  effected  by  the 
troops  of  the  eighth  corps  (under  Klapka)  during  the  same  night, 
by  retreating  sideways  toward  Apaczaszakallos  on  the  road  from 
Vasarut  to  Komorn  ;  by  the  second  corps,  however,  not  till  the 
following  morning  (22d  of  June),  by  retreating  as  far  as  Guta. 

The  second  corps  left  behind  it  near  Aszod  only  an  outpost  to 
observe  the  enemy. 

I  hastened  in  person  on  to  Guta,  with  the  intention  of  over- 
taking early  in  the  morning  of  the  22d  the  third  corps  at  T6t- 
Megyer  on  the  circuit  by  Naszvad  and  Neuhausel. 

But  in  Guta  I  received  the  surprising  information,  that  the 
part  of  the  artillery  and  infantry  of  the  second  corps,  which  on 
the  preceding  day,  as  is  known,  had  taken  to  flight  from  the 
line  of  battle  before  Pered  toward  Zsigard,  had  arrived  during 
the  night  at  the  bank  of  the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the  Danube, 
opposite  Guta.  The  order  directing  these  troops  to  join  in  Zsi- 
gard the  third  corps,  had  not  been  able  to  overtake  them  on  ac- 
count of  the  uncommon  speed  of  their  uninterrupted  further  flight 
from  Zsigard,  by  Farkasd  and  Negyed. 

The  bridge  over  the  Waag  at  Negyed  was  overlooked  by  them 
in  their  haste  ;  and  thus  they  came  at  last  into  the  desperate 
condition  of  being  hindered  from  continuing  their  flight,  on  the 
left  by  the  Waag,  on  the  right  by  the  Neuhausel  branch  of  the 
Danube,  and  in  front  by  the  confluence  of  both,  while  they  had 
to  suppose  that  the  pursuing  enemy  was  in  their  rear.  The  lat- 
ter, however,  evidently  had  no  suspicion  of  all  this,  otherwise  he 
would  undoubtedly  have  attempted  the  destruction  of  these 
troops.  Their  transport  by  boats  over  the  Neuhausel  branch  of 
the  Danube  to  the  Guta  bank  could  not  be  begun  till  daybieak 
of  the  22d,  and  lasted,  on  account  of  the  small  capacity  of  the 
boats  at  hand,  until  late  in  the  forenoon.  When  it  was  fairiy  in 
progress,  I  left  Guta  again,  to  continue  speedily  my  route  to  Tot- 
Megyer. 

The  second  corps,  as  is  known,  had  not  been  pursued  on  its 
retreat  from  Kiralyrev  to  Aszod  ;  and  this  circumstance — added 
to  the  uncertainty  in  which  I  was  as  to  what  had  further  hap- 


412  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

pened  to  the  third  army  corps — created  in  me  the  uncomfortable 
apprehension  that  the  enemy  had  immediately  improved  his 
victory  by  crossing  the  lower  Waag  on  the  offensive. 

If  this  was  the  case,  then  what  I  judged  to  be  at  that  moment 
our  greatest  danger,  namely,  the  separation  of  the  first  corps 
(General  Nagy-Sandor)  and  the  two  northern  expeditionary  col- 
umns from  the  rest  of  our  main  army,  could  be  prevented  only 
by  the  most  resolute  resistance  of  the  third  army  corps,  and  a 
forced  retreat  simultaneously  executed  by  the  columns  threatened 
with  isolation. 

Arrived  at  T6t-Megyer  early  in  the  forenoon,  I  found,  however, 
that  what  I  feared  had  not  taken  place. 

The  enemy  had  in  fact  on  the  preceding  evening  thrown  him- 
self with  the  far  greater  part  of  his  forces  upon  the  third  corps 
alone,  had  pressed  it  back  at  Farkasd,  and  even  taken  this  point; 
but  thereupon  had  suddenly  stopped  his  advance,  no  further  dis- 
turbed the  retreat  of  the  third  corps  across  the  Waag,  only  this 
morning  (22d  of  June)  occupied  the  village  of  Negyed,  and  showed 
no  signs  of  attempting  to  cross  the  lower  Waag. 

But  during  my  stay  of  several  hours  in  T6t-Megyer,  a  report 
arrived  from  the  outposts  stationed  along  the  Waag  by  the  third 
corps,  that  the  principal  force  of  the  enemy  was  marching  up  the 
Waag ;  and  I  was  thereby  again  confirmed  in  my  former  suppo- 
sition of  an  offensive  movement  to  be  expected  at  Freystadl  and 
Schintau  by  a  great  part  of  the  Austrian  army,  simultaneously 
with  the  invasion  of  the  Russians  en  gros. 

The  enemy  had  indeed  evacuated  on  the  21st  of  June  the  left 
bank  of  the  Waag  at  Schintau,  and  was  forced  to  confine  him- 
self to  the  defense  of  the  right  bank  :  but  this  might  have  been 
merely  a  consequence  of  the  necessitated  greater  concentration 
of  his  forces  for  an  attack  on  our  second  and  third  corps  at  Pcred ; 
while  the  total  failure  of  General  Nagy-Sandor's  attempts — pre- 
tended to  have  been  energetic — at  crossing  the  Waag,  under- 
taken on  the  same  day,  left  no  doubt  that  the  enemy  had  at  his 
disposal,  besides  the  superior  strength  with  which  he  had  attack- 
ed our  two  corps  at  Pered,  considerable  forces  opposite  Schintau 
and  at  Freystadl,  which,  added  to  those  developed  at  Pered,  made 
him  appear  to  be  in  any  case  strong  enough  on  the  Waag  to  cross  it 
even  by  himself  with  a  good  prospect  of  success,  without  having 
previously  to  await  the  advance  of  the  Russian,  western  army. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  413 

supposed  by  us  to  be  behind  the  corps  which  had  broken  into 
the  Arva. 

By  the  unfortunate  issue  of  the  battle  at  Pered,  and  its  serious 
consequences — the  loss  of  the  laboriously  prepared  passages  across 
the  river — suddenly  reduced  to  the  defensive,  I  therefore  saw  the 
combination  indicated  of  the  greater  part  of  our  main  army  op- 
posite the  line  on  which,  according  to  the  data  before  us  respect- 
ing the  distribution  of  the  hostile  forces,  their  most  important 
concentration  was  to  be  expected. 

Accordingly  the  second  corps  had  to  march  from  Guta  to  Neu- 
hausel. 

I  returned  in  the  course  of  the  22d  of  June  from  T6t-Megyer 
to  Guta,  to  make  arrangements  for  this  movement  without  delay. 
Its  execution,  however,  considering  the  isolated  condition  in  which 
I  found  the  second  corps,  appeared  to  me  for  the  present  im- 


The  numerical  strength  of  this  corps  had  been  reduced,  by  the 
losses  it  had  sustained  during  the  last  two  days,  to  5000  men. 
These  losses  amounted — as  well  as  I  can  remember — to  nearly 
3000  men,  besides  some  guns. 

Now  the  short  duration  of  the  engagements  at  Pered  and  Also- 
Szelly  on  the  20th  of  June — which,  truly,  had  been  sustained  by 
the  second  corps  alone — appeared  out  of  all  proportion  with  these 
losses;  and  in  the  battle  at  Pered  on  the  21st  of  June  the  second 
army  corps — its  cavalry  division  and  about  three  battalions  ex- 
cepted— had  throughout  not  done  its  duty  so  conscientiously  as 
the  entire  third  corps,  which  nevertheless  showed  no  loss  of  guns, 
and  hardly  more  than  500  men. 

On  my  return  from  T6t-Megyer  to  Guta,  I  had  met  near  the' 
latter  place  troops  of  runaways  of  the  second  corps. 

This  circumstance  now  revealed  to  me  the  real  source  of  the 
uncommon  losses  of  the  second  corps.  I  had  moreover  reason  to 
apprehend  a  still  further  diminution  in  its  numbers,  if  I  made 
the  second  corps  immediately  march  again. 

Several  days'  rest  seemed  to  me  to  be  indispensably  necessary 
for  the  preservation  of  what  remained  of  it. 

The  second  corps  consequently  continued  until  further  orders 
in  the  camp  at  Guta ;  while  the  third  corps  meanwhile  took  up 
its  former  position  on  the  Waag. 


CHAPTEE  LXIII. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  at  Aszod,  in  the  night  between 
the  21st  and  22d  of  June,  I  received — while  still  in  Aszod — the 
first  reports,  that  several  E-ussian  corps  had  broken  into  Hungary 
from  Dukla  across  the  northern  frontier. 

My  apprehension,  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  that 
the  enemy  had  neglected  the  pursuit  of  the  second  corps  from 
Kiralyrev  as  far  as  Aszod,  merely  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  his 
victory  more  completely  profitable  by  forthwith  crossing  the 
lower  Waag,  was  only  still  more  increased  by  these  reports. 

It  is  well  known  that  I  believed  I  saw  as  the  most  dangerous 
consequence  of  the  apprehended  crossing  of  the  river  the  separa- 
tion of  those  parts  of  our  main  army  from  the  rest  of  it  which 
were  disposed  to  the  north  of  the  third  corps. 

So  long  as  this  danger  existed,  I  could  not  leave  the  theatre 
of  war  ;  for  not  having  previously  thought  of  the  possibility  of  it, 
I  had  neglected  to  issue,  by  way  of  precaution,  to  the  leaders  of 
the  independent  corps  the  orders  necessary  for  averting  it. 

As,  however,  the  enemy  had  not  crossed  the  lower  Waag,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  in  the  course  of  the  22d  of  June  moved  his  main 
column  down  the  river — a  movement  by  which,' again,  my  origi- 
nal supposition  of  an  offensive  intended  on  his  part  at  Freystadl 
and  Schintau  gained  probability  ;  and  as  the  defensive  manceu- 
vres  of  the  divers  corps  for  this  purpose  were  partly  self-evident, 
partly  had  already  been  indicated  ;  my  personal  presence  on  the 
theatre  of  war,  as  commander-in-chief,  seemed  also  less  indispens- 
able for  the  next  few  days ;  while  the  very  consequences  of  the 
dismal  reports  I  had  received  in  Aszod,  about  the  now  serious 
commencement  of  the  Russian  invasion  en  gros,  imperatively 
obliged  me  to  hasten  to  the  capitals. 

These  reports,  on  a  closer  consideration — as  nothing  was  heard 
of  a  simultaneous  advance  of  Russians  from  the  Arva  toward  the 
mountain-towns — led  me  to  the  supposition,  that  the  operations 
of  the  Russian  main  force  were  to  be  commenced  only  on  the  line 
from  Dukla  by  Kaschau. 


.MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  415 

In  this  case — with  my  determination  to  transfer  the  scene  of 
the  last  combat  for  Hungary  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube — 
the  evacuation  of  the  left  without  delay  was  necessitated,  in  spite 
of  the  Austrian  offensive  expected  from  the  Waag. 

But  at  all  events  these  reports  still  needed  confirmation.  In 
the  capitals,  where  all  news,  from  the  districts  of  the  operations 
of  those  parts  of  the  Hungarian  forces  which  did  not  belong  to 
the  main  army,  arrived  first,  I  hoped  most  speedily  to  be  relieved 
from  the  painful  incertitude  to  which  I  had  been  exposed  by 
those  rumors.  I  had  also  immediately  to  endeavor  to  get  Kos- 
suth's consent  to  confining  the  last  battles  to  the  right  bank  of 
the  Danube — if  the  irruption  of  the  Russian  main  army  into 
Upper  Hungary  had  really  taken  place. 

Early  on  the  23d  of  June  I  left  Guta  to  return  to  Ofen-Pesth  ; 
but  being  delayed  at  Dotis  (then  the  seat  of  the  central  office  of 
operations)  by  the  settlement  of  some  business  relating  to  tb.e 
service  which  could  not  be  deferred  any  longer,  I  did  not  arrive 
at  the  capitals  till  the  24th. 

On  the  26th — according  to  General  Vysocki's  account  of  the 
first  important  battle  which  he  had  fought  against  the  Russians 
between  Eperjes  and  Kaschau  with  our  northern  army,  and  in 
consequence  of  which  the  latter  was  obliged  in  future  to  retreat 
without  opposition  toward  Miskolcz — no  doubt  any  longer  existed 
that  the  combined  Russian  main  forces  (assumed  to  be  from 
60,000  to  70,000  men  strong)  were  advancing  irresistibly  on  the 
line  from  Dukla  by  Kaschau  into  the  interior  of  the  country. 
Simultaneously  there  had  arrived  from  Transylvania  reports  of 
successive  irruptions  of  considerable  Russian  corps  from  the 
northern  and  southern  confines  of  the  country. 

The  inroad  of  the  Russian  main  army  into  Hungary  at  once 
deprived  of  any  practical  significance  all  my  efforts  for  the  re- 
habilitation of  the  constitution  of  the  year  1848,  and  against  the 
further  continuance  of  the  law  of  independence  of  the  14th  of 
April,  1849. 

The  counter-revolution,  no  matter  whether  proceeding  from 
the  army  or  from  the  Diet,  in  the  face  of  the  extent  of  country 
already  abandoned,  and  almost  without  drawing  a  blade,  before 
the  Russian  main  army,  could  no  longer  elevate  itself  above  the 
moral  level  of  a  f weed  rejoentaotce — as  I  had  endeavored  to  render 
possible  by  means  of  the  late  unsuccessful  offensive  against  the 


416  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Austrians — not  to  speak  of  the  want  of  success — evident  under 
the  conjunctures  mentioned — of  this  "last  means  of  salvation." 

From  this  time  there  was  but  one  means  left  of  salvation  to 
Hungary — to  vanquish  the  allied  armies  of  invasion  I 
Was  Hungary  of  itself  equal  to  this  task  ? 
My  conviction  as  a  soldier  unhesitatingly  denied  it ;  and  the 
question  "by  what  means  Hungaiy  could  yet  be  saved,"  I  con- 
sidered already  to  be  a  useless  one.  As  it  had  long  been  indeed ! 
And  that  I  had  perceived  this  only  now  ;  that,  although  smiling 
at  the  credulity  of  those  who  confidently  expected  help  from 
abroad,  I  had  myself  hitherto  indulged  in  suppositions  not  less 
improbable,  nay  had  allowed  myself  to  be  embarrassed  by  their 
influence  even  in  my  strategic  activity  as  leader  of  the  main 
army ; — -just  therein  lay  the  principal  cause  of  the  undeniable 
imperfection  of  my  public  conduct  after  the  14th  of  April,  1849. 

I  ought  long  ago  to  have  perceived  that,  from  the  moment  when 
the  Austrian  army  began  to  console  itself  wdth  the  prospect  ol 
Russian  aid,  there  was  but  one  question  for  the  champions  of  the 
constitutional  rights  of  Hungary  to  solve — namely  the  question 
of  despair,  how  the  deadly  enemy  could  most  eflectively  be  met 
by  our  last  convulsive  effort. 

I  ought  long  ago  to  have  directed  all  my  thoughts  and  en- 
deavors exclusively  to  the  solution  of  this  one  question,  indifixjrent 
whether  the  constitution  of  the  year  1848,  or  the  law  of  inde- 
pendence on  the  14th  of  April,  1849,  was  the  banner  under 
which  the  last  strokes  against  the  original  enemy  of  Hungary 
should  be  struck. 

Painfully  I  felt  the  loss  of  the  months  which  had  passed  un- 
improved. 

I  now  reckoned  the  existence  of  Hungary  only  by  weeks. 

These  at  least  must  not  pass  unimproved.  Even  weeks  suf- 
ficed for  the  accomplishment  of  a  last  desperate  resolve. 

On  the  evening  of  the  26th  of  June,  Kossuth  summoned  the 
ministers  to  deliberate  on  what  was  now  to  be  done. 

This  was  the  last  ministerial  council  at  which  I  took  part  as 
minister  of  war. 

The  sitting  was  commenced  by  producing  the  reports  which 
had  arrived  from  Transylvania  and  Upper  Hungary  relative  to 
the  unexpectedly  rapid  progress  of  the  Russian  arms.  The  entire 
contents  of  these  were  communicated  to  the  assembly.     Here- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  417 

upon  Kossuth  asked  what  the  government  should  now  do — and 
looked  first  to  7ne  for  an  answer. 

"Above  all" — thus  ran  my  proposal — "let  the  government  no 
longer  delay  to  reveal  to  the  people  the  whole  extent  of  the 
danger  impending  over  Hungary,  were  it  only  that  it  may  not 
be  surprised  by  the  ignominious  fate  of  subjugation  during  the 
transport  of  a  premature  confidence  of  victory. 

"  Simultaneously,  however,  let  the  government  prepare  to  an- 
swer personally  for  the  principle  which  it  has  hitherto  advocated ! 
Let  it  give,  to  the  last  contest  for  Hungary's  independence,  by  its 
direct  participation  in  it,  the  true  significance  of  a  national  self- 
defense  for  its  very  existence  !  Let  it  declare  itself  ambulant, 
and  join  the  main  army,  to  stand  or  fall  with  it. 

"  Further,  let  it  be  convinced  of  the  impossibility  of  conquering 
the  united  Russian  and  Austrian  armies  with  its  present  means  ; 
and  let  it  begin  immediately  to  concentrate  its  whole  force  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Danube  for  a  last  stroke  against  Austria  :  the 
advance  of  the  Russian  army,  on  the  other  hand,  let  it  try  to 
retard  only  by  endeavoring  to  enter  into  peaceable  negotiations. 

*'  Should  the  latter  fail,  let  the  abandoned  parts  of  the  country 
remain  occupied  by  the  Russians. 

*'  If  Hungary  sinks  under  the  united  attacks  of  Russia  and 
Austria,  it  is  in  the  end  indifferent  to  which  of  the  two  it  first 
falls  a  prey :  but  it  is  not  indifi^erent  which  of  the  two  our  last 
desperate  counter-stroke  descends  upon. 

"  The  rights  of  the  nation  were  originally  assailed  by  Austria, 
not  by  Russia. 

"  Let  the  government  ponder  this  ;  and  from  this  time  aim 
stroke  after  stroke  at  Austria  alone,  so  long  as  the  distance  of  the 
Russians  makes  it  still  possible  !" 

"When  I  had  finished,  Kossuth  resumed. 

He  assented  unreservedly  to  the  first  point  of  my  proposal, 
namely,  no  longer  to  conceal  from  the  nation  the  danger  in  which 
Hungary  was  involved.  The  nation,  he  said,  had  hitherto  at 
most  evinced  only  a  cheap  enthusiasm — had  done  little  or  no- 
thing for  its  deliverance.  Now  let  it  choose  between  slavery  and 
manly  resistance. 

I  could  not  comprehend  what  Kossuth  was  aiming  at  in  these 
surprising  attacks  on  the  nation. 

La  my  opinion  it  had  hardly  done  less  than  any  other  people 


418  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY. 

on  earth  would  have  done  under  similar  circumstances.  But 
least  of  all  did  it  become  Kossuth  to  complain  of  the  nation,  or 
"the  people,"  as  he  used  to  express  himself  Although  as  a 
whole  it  deserved  the  blame  of  always  having  dreamt  more  of  its 
invincibility  than  it  had  done  to  confirm  it,  nevertheless  Kossuth 
had  no  right  to  pronounce  this  blame.  For  it  was  he  himself 
who  had  made  the  people  believe  that  it  had  but  to  straighten 
its  scythes  and  troop  together  planless,  in  order  to  annihilate  the 
enemy. 

With  regard  to  the  Russians  indeed,  the  people  let  even  the 
scythes  rest.  But  h«re  also  Kossuth  could  not  reproach  it :  for 
he  himself  had  officially  recommended  the  exercise  of  fasting  and 
praying  as  an  especial  preservative  against  the  Russians,  and  had 
conjured  up  by  this  governmental  measure  the  discouraging  illu- 
sion, that  the  Russians  were  something  similar  to  pestilence  and 
famine,  against  which  nothing  could  be  effected  by  defensive 
weapons. 

I  was  consequently,  as  I  have  said,  in  the  dark  as  to  the  object 
which  Kossuth  had  in  view — considering  the  unexampled  sub- 
mission of  the  nation  to  his  will — in  his  unexpected  attacks  upon 
it.  It  appeared  as  if  he  had  begun  to  speak  for  ray  proposal ; 
which,  however,  contained  only  the  three  following  demands  : 

1.  The  enlightenment  of  the  nation  as  to  the  true  state  of  the 
affairs  of  Hungary ; 

2.  The  'personal  responsibility  of  Kossuth  and  the  ministers  for 
the  principle  of  the  deliverance  of  the  people ; 

^  3.  A  last  desperate  stroke  at  Austria. 

V'What  was  the  object  of  Kossuth's  attacks  upon  the  nation,  in 
the  face  of  these  three  demands  ? 

Did  he  feel,  perhaps,  merely  an  urgent  necessity  for  relieving 
his  oppressed  heart  in  some  way  ?     Or, 

"Were  these  attacks  intended  to  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
nation  did  not  deserve  Kossuth  to  be  personally  responsible  for  its 
cause  ? 

I  feared  the  latter — I  do  not  deny  it.  My  still-fresh  recollec- 
tion of  Kossuth's  winter  journey  from  Pesth  to  behind  the  Theiss 
justified  me  in  this. 

My  determination  was  taken,  in  case  Kossuth  should  betray  a 
longing  for  a  similar  summer  journey — and  I  awaited  ouietly  the 
fate  of  my  proposal. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  419 

Kossuth  seemed  to  be  about  to  attack  with  all  the  weapons  of 
his  oratory  the  nation,  which  had  so  suddenly  fallen  into  disre- 
pute with  him.  He  was  just  beginning  with  a  not  flattering 
apostrophe  on  it — when  suddenly  his  valet  entered  with  two 
good-sized  bottles  of  beer,  and  apparently  undecided  which  of  the 
ministerial  gentlemen  he  should  first  serve. 

"  What  means  this  I"  exclaimed  Kossuth,  stopping  short  in  his 
severe  remarks  on  the  people,  and  angrily  ordering  the  bewildered 
Ganymede  out  of  the  room. 

I  had  unintentionally  been  the  cause  of  this  disturbing  inter- 
mezzo ;  for  just  before  the  session  of  the  ministerial  council  began, 
I  had  complained  in  the  ante-chamber  of  extreme  thirst.  I  cer- 
tainly did  not  thereby  intend  that  the  drink  should  be  served  to 
me  during  the  conference,  and  moreover  in  such  an  immoderate 
quantity.  Nevertheless  I  thought  I  ought  to  take  the  blame  of 
the  annoying  interruption  on  myself. 

Kossuth,  in  consequence  of  my  self-accusation,  showed  himself 
speedily  appeased.  He  might,  moreover,  have  felt  himself,  as  re- 
garded the  ministers  assembled  in  his  dwelling,  bound  to  fulfill 
the  duties  of  a  host  toward  his  guests  :  and  forthwith  had  more 
generous  liquor,  together  with  a  corresponding  luncheon,  brought  in. 

The  serious,  taciturn  council  of  ministers  was  speedily  meta- 
morphosed into  a  lively  improvised  soiree  of  men.  The  gloomy 
disposition  of  the  former  was  suddenly  changed  into  the  cheerful, 
almost  frivolous  one  of  the  latter.  Kossuth  did  not  resume  his 
tirade  against  the  people,  but  declared  without  more  ado  that  he 
agreed  in  all  points  with  my  proposal.  Several  of  the  ministers 
did  the  same  after  him.  My  proposal  was  not  rejected — and  yet 
I  lacked  the  inward  conviction  that  Kossuth  and  the  majority  of 
the  ministers  were  in  earnest  in  the  adoption  of  it,  not  to  speak 
of  its  resolute  execution. 

I  lacked  this  inward  conviction,  because — in  the  face  of  the 
frivolity  with  which  the  majority  of  the  speakers  had  discussed  a 
question  on  which  depended  the  only  thing  that  still  remained  to 
be  saved,  the  honor  of  the  nation — I  could  not  get  rid  of  the 
suspicion,  that  I  owed  the  favorable  result  of  the  deliberation  in 
respect  of  my  proposal,  mainly  to  the  officiousness  of  the  above- 
mentioned  valet  and  its  inspiring  consequences. 

When  I.  left  the  capitals  next  day — never  again  to  set  foot  in 
them — the  presentiment  accompanied  me,  that  Kossuth  and  the 


420  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

majority  of  the  ministers  would  deny  by  their  actions,  what  they 
had  promised  me  in  the  evening  conference  of  the  26th  of  June. 

At  all  events  I  was  resolved  to  concentrate  the  main  army  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  and  strike  the  intended  last  stroke 
at  the  Austrians,  should  it  even  be  with  the  latter  alone. 

The  Austrians,  however,  had  meanwhile  concentrated  them- 
selves on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  ;  and  when  I  arrived  on 
the  27th  of  June  at  the  central  office  of  operations  in  Dotis,  I 
found  the  concentration  of  our  main  army  on  the  Danube  right 
bank,  which  I  had  resolved  upon  offensively,  already  in  process 
as  a  necessitated  defensive  measure.  Nay,  even  as  a  defensive 
measure  it  appeared  to  have  been  taken  rather  late  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  line  of  the  Raab. 

The  movement  of  the  Austrians  from  the  left  to  the  right  bank 
of  the  Danube  had  not,  so  far  as  I  know,  been  foreseen  either  by 
me  or  by  any  body  else  in  the  Hungarian  camp  :  but  that  this 
was  the  case  became  evident — from  the  information  of  scouts  and 
the  reports  of  the  commanders  detached  on  the  Waag  and  the 
Great  Schiitt — only  after  it  had  been  executed,  and  that  the 
Austrians  were  already  advancing  to  attack  Poltenberg  and 
Kmety's  positions  on  the  Raab. 

The  latter  was  concentrated  at  Marczalto,  from  four  to  five 
(German)  miles  south  of  Raab.  It  is  known  that,  in  case  of 
being  attacked  and  defeated,  the  capitals  had  been  indicated  as 
his  place  of  retreat.  But  a  change  ought  to  have  been  made  in 
this  arrangement  in  consequence  of  my  last  resolutions,  and 
General  Kmety,  even  in  the  worst  case,  ought  to  have  remained 
united  with  General  Poltenberg. 

However,  in  the  evening  of  the  27th  a  report  arrived  at  Dotis, 
that  an  Austrian  corps  had  crossed  the  river  Raab  between  Raab 
and  Marczalto  in  the  course  of  the  day,  and  advanced  as  far  as 
the  line  of  communication  between  the  Kmety  division  and  the 
seventh  corps.  The  Kmety  division  seemed  thereby  to  be  already 
separated  from  the  seventh  corps  ;  the  position  of  the  latter  before 
and  near  Raab  to  be  turned  on  the  left ;  and  a  direct  concen- 
trated attack  on  it  was  to  be  expected  on  the  following  day. 

Early  on  the  28th  I  left  Dotis  for  Raab.  "When  I  arrived  there, 
I  found  the  position  of  the  seventh  corps  to  the  west  of  Raab 
already  vigorously  attacked.  General  Poltenberg  had  even  aban- 
doned his  first  position — an  hour's  distance  from  Raab  a  cheval 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  421 

of  the  Wieselburg  main  road  and  the  little  river  Rabnitz — and 
retreated  into  the  second,  about  half  the  distance  nearer  to  Raab ; 
because  here,  from  its  being  less  extensive,  it  vras  in  General 
Poltenberg's  power  to  resist  more  energetically  the  hostile  attacks 
with  those  forces  which  remained  to  him  for  the  direct  defense  of 
Raab,  after  he  had  perceived  the  necessity  of  disposing  a  great 
part  of  his  troops  on  the  Papa  road. 

For  already,  in  the  night  between  the  26th  and  27th  of  June, 
General  Poltenberg — on  the  first  news  that  the  communication 
between  his  corps  in  Raab  and  the  Kmety  division  in  Marczalto 
was  endangered  by  an  apprehended  crossing  over  the  river  Raab 
at  Moriczhida — had  marched  two  battalions,  four  squadrons,  and 
a  battery  to  Tet  to  preserve  it. 

This  column  reached  Tet  about  noon  of  the  27th  of  June,  but 
found  there  two  companies  of  the  tenth  Honved  battalion  be- 
longing to  the  Kmety  division.  These  troops,  having  formed  the 
protection  of  the  extreme  right  flank  of  the  division,  had  been 
separated  from  it  by  a  hostile  column,  which,  advancing  from 
(Edenburg,  on  the  morning  of  that  day  had  already  effected  its 
passage  at  Moriczhida.  They  were  just  now  retreating  to  Raab, 
in  order  to  join  the  seventh  corps. 

The  declarations  of  the  officers  of  these  two  companies  respect- 
ing the  strength  of  the  enemy,  and  the  assurance  that,  immedi- 
iitely  after  crossing  the  river,  he  had  taken  the  direction  toward 
Tet — caused  the  commander  of  the  column  of  the  seventh  corps 
at  once  to  march  back  again  as  far  as  Szemere. 

In  consequence  of  this  information,  General  Poltenberg  now 
dispatched  to  Szemere,  in  the  night  between  the  27th  and  28th 
of  June,  one  of  the  commanders  of  his  infantry  divisions,  with 
the  remainder  of  the  division  to  which  the  two  battalions  already 
there  belonged,  reinforced  by  some  squadrons.  Considering  the 
offensive  movements  of  the  enemy,  which  were  meanwhile  re- 
marked on  the  Wieselburg  main  road,  and  menaced  the  front  of 
Poltenberg's  position  before  Raab,  it  did  not  seem  advisable  to 
send  thither  more  considerable  forces. 

Poltenberg's  whole  force — consisting  of  the  seventh  corps,  and 
a  column  of  the  eighth  corps  several  days  previously  sent  to  Raab 
by  General  Klapka,  in  all  about  11,000  men  and  forty  guns — 
was  consequently  early  on  the  28th  distributed  on  two  points, 
nearly  two  miles  and  a  half  distant  from  each  other. 


422  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Namely,  about  two-thirds  (the  right  wing),  under  Poltenberg's 
personal  command,  stood  a  cheval  of  the  Wieselburg  main  road 
and  the  Rabnitz,  for  the  defense  of  the  town  against  the  western 
(principal)  attack  of  the  enemy  ;  the  remainder  (the  left  wing), 
led  by  the  above  mentioned  commander  of  an  infantry  division  of 
the  seventh  corps,  stood  at  Szemere,  and  was  charged — for  the 
purpose  of  re-establishing  the  communication  with  the  Kmety 
division — to  attack  the  hostile  corps  which  had  arrived  on  the 
preceding  evening  at  Tet,  and  if  possible  drive  it  from  the  Papa 
road  and  back  across  the  Raab. 

The  hostile  corps,  however,  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  antici- 
pated the  attack  of  our  left  wing.  Almost  simultaneously  its 
commander  received  from  the  post  of  intelligence  appointed  to 
observe  the  line  of  the  river  between  Raab  and  the  height  of 
Szemere  a  report  that  a  hostile  column,  which  had  crossed  the 
Raab  at  Babot,  was  advancing  in  the  direction  of  Menfo.  The 
commander  of  the  left  wing  consequently  saw  himself  obliged  to 
lead  his  troops  from  Szemere  back  to  Menfo,  in  order  to  prevent 
being  himself  separated  from  Raab.  Still  he  was  obliged  to 
fight  for  some  time  during  his  retreat,  as  he  was  already  attacked 
by  the  enemy  coming  from  Tet,  and  was  now  hotly  pursued  part 
of  his  way.  In  Menfo  he  intended  to  offer  a  more  resolute  re- 
sistance. 

General  Poltenberg  was  already  aware  of  all  these  unfavorable 
events,  when  I  arrived  at  Raab  and  spoke  with  him.  He  never- 
theless still  entertained  a  hope  that  his  left  wing  would  be  able 
at  Menfo  to  put  a  stop  to  the  further  advance  of  the  enemy, 
yntil  the  succor  which  was  expected  from  Komorn  should  arrive 
on  the  battle-field. 

I  had,  however,  become  convinced  that  this  succor,  consisting 
of  the  second  army  corps  and  a  small  part  of  the  eighth,  would 
at  most  be  able  to  reach  Gonyo  in  the  course  of  the  day,  and 
could  consequently  think  of  a  further  holding  of  Raab  only  in 
case  of  an  uncommonly  favorable  success  to  our  arms  at  Menfo. 
I  accordingly  left  to  Poltenberg  the  further  defense  of  Eaab, 
and  hastened  to  undertake  personally  the  conduct  of  the  battle  at 
Menfo.  But  while  on  my  way  thither  I  met  a  hussar  with  a  writ- 
ten report  from  the  commander  of  the  left  wing,  that  the  unfor- 
tunate issue  of  a  short  engagement  at  Menfo  had  obliged  him  to 
enter  on  his  retreat  toward  Szabadhegy.     Under  these  circum- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  423 

stances,  the  town  of  Raab  with  its  suburbs — even  irrespective  of 
the  superior  force  with  which  the  enemy  had  meanwhile  com- 
menced his  attacks  on  it — could  no  longer  be  maintained  ;  be- 
cause through  the  retreat  of  the  left  wing  from  Menfo  to  Szabad- 
hegy,  Poltenberg  with  the  right  wing  before  Raab,  by  staying 
longer  there,  risked  the  loss  of  his  line  of  retreat. 

He  accordingly  received  my  order  to  evacuate  Raab  without 
delay,  and  lead  his  troops  back  as  far  as  behind  the  Pigeon,  an  inn 
so  named  on  the  Komorn  road. 

While  he  executed  this  order  with  the  right  wing,  the  left  was 
directed  from  Szabadhegy  to  Hecse. 

From  the  latter  point  and  the  Pigeon  inn  I  ordered  the  retreat 
in  the  direction  of  Acs  in  two  columns,  for  the  present  as  far  as 
to  the  height  of  Gonyo. 

General  Klapka,  who  meanwhile  had  arrived  from  Komorn,  led 
the  left  wing  by  Szent-Ivan  to  Szent-Janos;  General  Poltenberg 
the  infantry  and  artillery  of  the  right  wing  to  Gonyo  ;  while  with 
the  greatest  part  of  the  cavalry  and  a  battery  I  took  charge  of 
the  protection  of  the  retreat. 

The  enemy  pursued  us  as  far  as  about  the  height  of  the  east- 
ern point  of  the  Little  Schiitt. 

The  extraordinary  numerical  superiority  which  the  Austrians 
had  displayed  during  the  course  of  the  day  caused  me  to  determ- 
ine to  avoid  as  much  as  possible  any  decisive  conflict  until  the 
concentration  of  our  main  army  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube 
was  completely  effected ;  in  the  worst  case — that  is,  if  the  Aus- 
trians, improving  their  victory,  should  advance  without  delay — 
to  retreat  with  all  the  disposable  troops  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Danube  into  the  fortified  camp  opposite  Komorn ;  to  confine  myself 
to  maintaining  it ;  and  not  till  the  last  division  of  the  main  army 
had  come  from  the  left  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  to  put 
forth  our  whole  strength  in  a  counter-stroke  against  the  Austrians. 

Accordingly,  before  daybreak  on  the  29th  of  June  the  seventh 
and  second  corps  (the  latter,  if  T  mistake  not,  had  with  great  dif- 
ficulty reached  Gonyo  in  the  course  of  the  28th,  together  with  the 
columns  of  the  eighth  corps,  left  their  bivouacs  at  Gonyo  and  Szent- 
Janos,  and  continued  their  retreat  as  far  as  Acst ;  and  on  the  30th 
— having  left  outposts  at  Acs — arrived  at  the  fortified  camp. 

A  detachment  of  cavalry  was  sent  to  Nagy-Igmand  to  observe 
the  enemy  on  the  Fleischhauer  road,  and  obtain   intelligence 


^ 


424  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

about  the  Kmety  division,  to  which,  on  the  evening  of  the  28th, 
had  gent  an  order  from  Raab  by  Szent-Marton  to  retreat  to  Komorn 
by  Roman  and  Kis-Ber. 

This  detachment  of  cavalry,  however,  by  the  approach  of  a 
hostile  corps  had  been  forced  in  the  course  of  the  30th  of  June 
to  leave  Nagy-Igmand  ;  whereupon  it  retreated  toward  the  forti- 
fied camp. 

The  advanced  troops  of  different  corps  at  Acs  had  been  order- 
ed to  evacuate  this  point  and  the  line  of  the  brook  Czonczo  only 
in  the  face  of  a  superior  enemy  ;  and  in  this  case  to  occupy  that 
spur  of  the  forest  of  Acs  which  lies  between  Acs  and  the  fortified 
camp,  and  extends  to  the  south  toM^ard  Puszta-Harkaly. 

Now  this  was  not  done  by  the  commander  of  these  advanced 
troops. 

For  as,  on  the  30th  of  June,  the  approach  of  strong  hostile 
columns  toward  Acs,  simultaneously  with  the  advance  against 
Nagy-Igmand,  had  obliged  him  to  abandon  the  Czonczo  line,  he 
also  evacuated  immediately  the  spur  of  the  Acs  forest,  and  hast- 
ened— without  sending  us  previous  intelligence — to  reach  the  in- 
terior of  the  fortified  camp,  because  he  had  taken  the  detach- 
ment of  cavalry  which  was  retreating  at  the  same  time  from 
Nagy-Igmand  toward  Komorn  for  a  hostile  one,  and  feared  being 
intercepted  by  it. 

The  enemy  coming  from  Acs  followed  him  closely,  and  thus 
cam.e  into  possession  of  the  forest-spur  without  striking  a  blow. 

It  was  important  now  to  regain  it,  in  which  we  succeeded 
without  much  difficulty,  the  enemy  offering  no  great  resistance, 
but  after  a  short  contest  with  artillery  again  returning  to  Acs. 

Our  advanced  troops  occupied  the  forest-spur,  leaning  to  the 
right  on  the  Danube,  to  the  left — surrounding  in  a  wide  circuit 
the  fortified  camp — on  the  little  town  of  0-Sz6ny. 


CHAPTER  LXIV. 

•'  Stroke  upon  stroke  at  Austria  alone  I"  This  was — I  re- 
peat it — after  the  invasion  of  the  Russians  en  gros,  the  sole,  last 
task  for  all  parties  in  Hungary  :  the  possibility  or  the  im;possi- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY  425 

hility  of  a  victorious  issue  of  the  combat  was  the  only  point  that 
admitted  of  discussion. 

In  the  first  instance,  Kossuth  had  to  avenge  his  declaration  of 
independence,  Szemere  his  republic,  and  the  unfortunate  defenders 
of  the  constitution  of  the  year  1848  their  constitution,  and  this 
less  on  Russia  than  on  Austria. 

In  the  next,  the  plan  which  would  most  surely  effect  this  ob- 
ject would  be,  to  destroy  first  of  all  the  hostile  army  that  stood 
nearest  to  the  centre-point  of  our  collective  forces — consequently 
the  Austrian — and  not  till  we  had  succeeded  in  this  to  fall  on 
the  Russians  for  the  same  purpose. 

This  plan — considering  the  position  of  the  hostile  main  army, 
and  the  probable  advance  of  the  Russians  during  our  operations 
against  the  Austrians — had  but  the  one  disadvantage,  that  it  en- 
dangered the  line  of  retreat  to  the  neutral  territory  of  Turkey. 

But  Kossuth — without  whose  assent  the  energetic  execution  of 
this  plan  remained  indeed  only  a  pious  wish — of  his  own  free 
conviction  had  already,  on  the  14th  of  April,  1849,  destroyed  the 
bridge  behind  the  whole  nation,  and  thereby  justified  the  expect- 
ation, which  was  but  an  honorable  one  to  him,  that  he  himself 
no  longer  set  any  particular  value  on  the  said  line  of  retreat. 

The  proposal  which  I  made  in  the  ministerial  council  on  the 
26th  of  June  was  consequently  in  some  measure  a  compromise, 
offered  by  me — who  believed  the  salvation  of  Hungary  to  be  im- 
possible— in  the  name  of  the  defenders  of  the  constitution  of  1848 
to  the  founder  of  independent  Hungary  with  an  undefined  form 
of  government  [Kossuth),  and  to  the  discoverer  of  the  republican 
element  in  Hungary  {Szemere),  who  both  still  maintained  their 
belief  in  the  possibility  of  the  salvation  of  the  fatherland. 

The  compromise  was  accepted ;  however,  as  is  known,  under 
extraordinary  influences,  and  in  a  manner  not  calculated  to  inspire 
me  with  confidence  in  the  sincerity  of  those  who  accepted  it. 

And  if  on  the  26th  of  June — on  which  day  Kossuth  and  Sze^ 
mere  could  scarcely  have  a  presentiment  of  the  offensive  threaten- 
ing us  on  the  Danube  right  bank  on  the  part  of  the  Austrians — 
it  already  seemed  as  if  these  gentlemen  were  7iot  in  earnest  re- 
specting the  execution  of  my  proposals — on  the  29th  I  could 
unfortunately  be  quite  sure  of  it. 

For,  after  the  events  of  the  action  on  the  28th,  related  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  the  government  ought  immediately  to  have  re- 


426  MI  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

moved  from  Pesth  to  Komorn.  However,  the  request  to  allow 
himself,  if  necessary,  even  to  be  shut  up  in  Komorn  had,  as  is 
well  known,  been  very  positively  rejected  by  Kossuth  at  the  end 
of  April ;  and  at  the  end  of  June,  in  the  face  of  far  more  critical 
circumstances,  truly  a  not  more  favorable  reception  awaited  the 
same  request. 

The  state  of  affairs  seemed  consequently  to  be  almost  the  same 
as  if  my  proposal,  made  in  the  ministerial  council  on  the  26th  of 
June,  had  been  forthwith  rejected ;  in  which  case — as  has  been 
mentioned — I  had  already,  by  way  of  precaution,  come  to  the 
fixed  determination  to  attempt  with  the  main  army  alone  the 
performance  of  the  one  duty  which  in  my  opinion,  was  common 
to  all  parties  in  Hungary. 

A  perception  of  the  duty  of  defending  Hungary's  last  honor — 
of  preventing  its  fall  from  being  completely  inglorious,  led  me  to 
this  resolution. 

Considering  the  perplexity  which  had  so  suddenly  manifested 
itself  with  regard  to  the  question  of  the  defense  of  the  country,  on 
the  invasion  of  the  Russians  en  gros,  the  danger  of  an  inglorious 
fall  really  existed.  But  this  danger,  in  my  opinion,  and  judged 
from  a  national-military  point  of  view,  lay  principally  in  the 
great  probability  of  an  uninterrupted  victorious  continuance  of 
the  just-commenced  offensive  of  the  Austrians ;  in  case  no  ad- 
vantage should  be  taken  of  the  favorable  opportunity  offered  at 
Komorn  of  forcing  the  defensive  mice  more  upon  them,  before  the 
Russians  could  prevent  it. 

My  firm  resolve  to  remain  even  with  the  main  army  alone  at 
Komorn,  was  consequently,  it  is  true,  not  founded  on  the  hope  of 
thereby  preventing  the  fall  of  Hungary,  but  nevertheless  on  the 
twofold  conviction  : 

That  the  main  army,  mindful  of  its  duty  to  the  country,  for 
the  rights  of  which  it  had  become  surety,  was  bound  by  its  own 
honor  to  yield  to  the  Austrians  only  after  the  most  desperate  re- 
sistance ; — and 

That  our  offensive  retaliation  on  the  Austrians  could  not  make 
itself  so  powerfully  felt  on  any  other  point  of  the  country  as  at 
Komorn. 

Even  on  the  29th  of  June,  however,  I  was  not  actually  con- 
vinced of  the  impossibility  of  succeeding  in  uniting  the  troops  of 
General  Vysocki,  which  were  retreating  before  the  Russians,  with 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  427 

the  main  army  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube ;  or^  more  cor- 
rectly, of  inducing  Kossuth  to  come  himself  to  Komorn  ;  for  unless 
r succeeded  in  this,  the  former  project,  as  may  be  conceived, 
would  likewise  be  impracticable. 

I  had  indeed  no  favorable  result  to  expect  from  a  renewed 
written  detail  of  the  reasons  for  my  proposal  made  in  the  minis- 
terial council  on  the  26th  of  June,  considering  that  Kossuth  had 
so  decidedly  declared  his  antipathy  to  the  chance  of  being  shut 
up  in  Komorn  by  the  enemy  ;  nevertheless  I  still  hoped  that 
Kossuth's  sense  of  honor  would  react,  and  decide  him  to  join  the 
main  army,  if  I — assuming  as  self-evident  my  determination  that 
the  final  decision  should  take  place  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Danube,  as  well  as  his  refusal  to  share  the  fate  of  the  main  army 
— were  openly  to  recommend  to  him  the  salvation  of  his  own 
person  by  flight. 

This  I  accordingly  did.  At  the  conclusion  of  my  short  report 
on  the  loss  of  the  line  of  the  Raab,  and  the  insufficiency  of  the 
forces  then  at  our  disposal  for  the  direct  protection  of  the  capitals, 
I  advised  Kossuth  at  once  to  transfer  the  government — if  Komorn 
did  not  suit  it — from  Pesth  to  Grosswardein  ;  on  which  occasion 
I  did  -not  leave  him  in  the  dark  either  as  to  the  determination  I 
have  expressed,  nor  as  to  the  resignation  with  which  I  intended 
to  persevere  in  it. 

Kossuth,,  however,  did  not  come  to  Komorn;  only  his  bitter 
complaint  reached  it,  that  I  could  not  find  a  less  insecure  abode 
for  him  than  the  city  of  Grosswardein,  which  might  be  taken 
within  a  few  days  and  without  impediment  by  the  Russians 
posted  on  the  Upper  Theiss. 

In  this  Kossuth  was  certainly  right ;  but  I  confess  that  this 
complaint,  equally  naive  as  well-founded,  was  the  last  thing  I 
should  have  expected.  And  the  sad  consequences  of  this  sorrow- 
ful surprise  perplexed  or  enlightened  (the  choice  between  these 
two  expressions  I  leave  to  the  reader)  my  judgment  in  such  a 
manner,  that  harmonious  co-operation  with  Kossuth  appeared  to 
me  even  in  the  last  stages  of  our  public  action  to  be  just  as  im- 
possible as  it  would  be  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  two  men,  one  of 
whom  was  ready  to  answer  personally  at  any  time  and  under  all 
circumstances  for  his  actions  and  any  of  their  results,  while  the 
other  endeavored  in  every  way  to  escape  the  inconvenient  conse- 
quences of  his  deeds. 


428  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HTJNG-AHY. 

The  following  event  also  contributed  essentially  to  that  enlight- 
ening or  perplexing  of  my  judgment. 

On  the  29th  of  June,  while  my  letter  to  Kossuth  above  men- 
tioned was  already  on  its  way  to  the  capitals,  and  I  was  in  Acs 
taking  the  necessary  measures  for  the  further  retreat  into  the 
fortified  camp,  two  civilian  officials  suddenly  arrived  there  for  the 
purpose  of  burning  down  the  village  in  virtue  of  their  office. 
They  declared  they  had  been  charged  to  do  so  by  some  govern- 
ment commissary,  and  moreover  referred  to  a  decree  of  the  gov- 
ernment, which  had  hitherto  remained  unknown  to  me,  according 
to  which  a  similar  fate  awaited  all  the  habitations  in  the  country, 
so  soon  as  they  had  to  be  evacuated  by  our  troops  when  retreat- 
ing before  the  enemy. 

Something  similar,  though  more  limited  in  its  extent,  had 
already  happened  in  December,  1848. 

The  reader  is  aware  that  at  the  beginning  of  our  retreat  from 
the  Lajtha  toward  the  capitals,  all  the  stores  of  hay  and  corn 
between  Wieselburg  and  Raab  lying  nearest  to  the  main  road 
were  destroyed  by  fire.  « 

These  devastations  commenced  experimentally  (as  we  have 
seen,  they  were  not  continued  further  than  to  Raab)  were  perhaps 
excusable,  on  the  one  hand  by  the  intention  to  delay  the  advance 
of  the  enemy  ;  on  the  other  by  the  illusion,  which  had  gained  the 
ascendency,  that  the  rural  population  were  determined  for  ever 
to  bid  farewell  to  their  habitations  on  the  approach  of  the  Aus- 
trians,  or  in  other  words,  that  we  stood  at  the  opening  of  a  new 
age  of  the  migration  of  tribes. 

It  is  notorious,  however,  that  the  people  evinced  very  little 
disposition  for  migration ;  and  on  this  account  it  appeared  to 
be  unjustifiable  to  persist  in  carrying  out  the  plan  of  devas- 
tation, erroneously  introduced  to  further  the  defense  of  the  coun- 
try. 

Of  this  Kossuth  himself  had  been  undoubtedly  convinced  in 
December,  1848  ;  otherwise  he  would  probably  have  steadily  con- 
tinued the  work  of  destruction,  without  paying  much  attention  to 
my  remonstrances.  The  little  national  desire  for  migrating  that 
existed  among  his  fellow-citizens  was  from  that  time  consequently 
no  secret  to  him;  and  within  the  six  months  that  had  since 
elapsed,  the  views  of  the  country  people  with  reference  to  the 
value  of  their  immovable  property  could  scarcely  have  been  suf- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  429 

ficiently  changed  to  justify  the  conflagration-decree  of  the  provis- 
ional Governor  of  Hungary. 

I  could  therefore  neither  bring  this  decree  into  a  causal  con- 
nection with  the  friendliness  of  his  manner  of  thinking  and  act- 
ing toward  the  people,  so  wearisomely-often  asseverated,  nor 
with  his  belief  in  the  possibility  of  saving  Hungary. 

But  even  apart  from  this  circumstance,  I  could  not  discover 
either  the.  particular  beneficial  result  to  be  attained  by  this  decree 
and  its  consequences,  nor  in  general  any  one  that  would  have 
been  sufficient  to  justify  such  a  means. 

My  conviction  of  the  moral  impossibility  of  a  further  agreement 
between  myself  and  Kossuth  was  consequently  to  my  own  mind 
indisputable,  and  it  urged  me  undisguised ly  to  declare  to  him  in 
a  letter  dated  from  Komorn,  the  30th  of  June,  that  the  object  of 
my  contests  up  to  this  time  had  not  been  to  further  the  interests 
of  the  government,  but  of  the  nation,  and  that  I  should  be  the 
first  to  lay  down  my  arms,  if  I  saw  that  this  object  would  thereby 
be  attained. 

Before,  however,  I  could  receive  Kossuth's  answer  to  this 
declaration,  I  was  surprised  by  the  official  oral  intelligence  from 
three  deputies  of  the  government  (the  minister  of  communication 
Csanyi,  General  Aulich,  and  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Kiss),  that  it 
had  been  decided  in  the  ministerial  council,  that  the  main  army 
should  move  back  as  speedily  as  possible  from  Komorn  to  Ofen. 
And  Csanyi — effectively  supported  by  Aulich,  still  more  effective- 
ly by  those  friendly  sentiments  which  I  entertained  toward  these 
two  men — succeeded  in  soon  changing  my  opinions  so  much,  that 
I  gave  up  the  resolution  I  had  already  formed  to  bring  about  the 
final  decision  at  Komorn;  nay  I  even  thought  I  was  bound  no 
longer  to  adhere  to  my  conviction  of  the  moral  impossibility  of  a 
further  co-operation  with  Kossuth. 

For  Csanyi  and  Aulich — thanks  to  the  very  noble  mode  of 
their  thinking  and  acting,  which  they  had  proved  in  many  ways 
— possessed  my  confidence  in  so  high  a  degree,  that  their  decided- 
ly espousing  the  side  of  the  government  was  felt  by  me  as  a  re- 
proach ;  and  it  now  suddenly  appeared  to  me  that  I  had  wronged 
Kossuth  when  I  supposed — although  supported  by  his  conflagra- 
tion-decree and  his  suspicious  delay  in  joining  the  main  army — 
that  he  had  in  view  besides  his  own  personal  safety  only  the  total 
devastation  of  Hungary — it  is  all  one  with  what  intention. 


430  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Accordingly  I  gave  to  the  deputies  of  the  government  my 
sincerely  intended  promise  to  carry  into  effect  the  resolution  of 
the  ministerial  council  as  speedily  as  possible. 

And  the  deputies  immediately  returned  to  Pesth. 

The  position  of  the  main  army  (the  Kmety  division  excepted, 
which,  it  is  known,  had  been  separated  from  it)  on  the  1st  of  • 
July,  1849,  was  as  follows  : 

The  second,  third,  and  seventh  corps  were  united  in  the  fortified 
camp  opposite  Komorn ;  the  first  corps  at  Neuhausel  and  the 
river  Neutra  upward ;  the  expeditionary  column  of  the  seventh 
army  corps  in  Verebely  and  Neutra;  while  the  expeditionary 
column  under  Major  Armin  Gorgei,  the  outposts  of  which  had 
meanwhile  been  pressed  back  from  the  upper  Waag  toward  the 
district  of  the  mountain-towns  by  detachments  of  the  Russian 
corps  occupying  the  Arva,  left  Perk  and  Neusohl  on  the  above- 
mentioned  day,  in  order  to  effect  without  delay,  conform  ably  vto 
the  last  received  dispositions,  its  retreat  to  Komorn. 

The  march  of  our  main  army  from  Komorn  to  Ofen  (to  say  the 
least,  a  daring  enterprise — though  perhaps  not  positively  hopeless 
— in  the  face  of  the  Austrian  army  posted  on  the  Czonczo),  in 
consequence  of  the  above-indicated  dislocations,  which  the  chief 
of  the  central  oflSce  of  operations  had  fully  communicated  in  my 
presence  to  the  deputies  of  the  government,  could  not  by  any 
means  be  commenced  before  the  3d  of  July,  and  even  then  only 
on  condition  that  the  two  expeditionary  columns  (together  amount- 
ing to  about  5000  men  and  ten  guns)  should  be  destined,  as  a  re- 
inforcement of  the  garrison  of  Komorn,  to  remain  separate  from 
the  main  army. 


CHAPTER  LXV. 

The  fortified  camp  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  opposite 
Komorn,  since  the  26th  of  April  (the  day  of  the  complete  relief 
of  Komorn)  had  been  restored,  nay,  partly  strengthened  by  new 
works. 

The  most  important  of  these  was  a  strong  redoubt,  erected  on 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  431 

the  sand-hill  which  rises  to  the  south  in  front  of  the  tete-de-pont 
of  the  Danube,  and  held  the  place  of  the  former  object  No.  8. 
,  (All  the  objects  in  the  fortified  curve  were  designated  by  the 
continuous  numbers  from  1  to  10,  commencing  from  the  right 
point  of  support  of  the  camp,  the  elevation  of  the  bank  above 
Uj-Szony — the  Monostor  or  Sandberg.) 

The  other  new  erections  consisted  of  some  earth- works  open  in 
the  gorge,  thrown  up  before  the  extreme  right  wing  of  the  camp 
(objects  1  and  2). 

Of  the  corps  united  since  the  30th  of  June  in  this  camp  (to- 
gether scarcely  25,000  men,  with  about  120  guns),  the  part  of 
the  eighth  corps  which  was  present  (four  battalions)  occupied 
the  objects  on  the  Monostor  Nos.  1,  2,  and  3,  as  well  as  the  open 
works  advanced  to  these  objects ;  the  seventh  corps,  under  Gen- 
eral Poltenberg,  the  objects  4,  5,  6,  and  7  ;  finally,  the  third  corps 
under  General  Leiningen,  the  objects  8,  9,  and  10,  besides  the 
tete-de-pont  and  the  little  town  of  0-Szony,  situated  down  the 
river  ;  while  the  second  corps,  under  Colonel  Kaszonyi,  remained 
en  reserve  in  the  interior  of  the  camp. 

The  Austrians,  reinforced — as  we  learned  from  a  Russian 
soldier  taken  prisoner  on  the  1st  of  July — by  the  Russian  corps 
which  had  been  opposed  to  us  in  the  engagement  at  Pered  on  the 
21st  of  June,  had  occupied  the  line  of  the  Czonczo  since  the  30th 
of  June. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July  they  advanced  toward 
our  camp. 

The  commanders  of  our  outposts  nevertheless  omitted  to  for- 
ward intelligence  of  it  to  the  head-quarters  (town  of  Komorn). 
They  probably  supposed  there  was  no  serious  intention  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy. 

Accordingly  General  Klapka  and  myself  were  informed  of  the 
menacing  movement  only  by  the  cannonade  commenced  in  con- 
sequence of  it  on  the  Monostor.  Meeting  on  the  way  into  the 
camp,  we  agreed  immediately  that  he  should  take  the  chief  con- 
duct of  the  impending  combat  on  the  left  wing  (within  the  range 
of  the  third  corps),  I  that  in  the  centre  and  on  the  right  wing 
(within  the  range  of  the  seventh  corps  and  of  the  troops  from  the 
Komorn  garrison). 

Urged  by  the  necessity  of  knowing  as  quickly  as  possible  from 
ocular  inspection  the  state  of  affairs  in  our  ranges,  we  rode  at 


432  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

first  together  between  the  objects  7  and  8  beyond  the  line  of  the 
camp,  and  parted  only  when  outside  of  it ;  General  Klapka  turn- 
ing to  the  left  toward  0-Szony,  I  to  the  right  toward  the  Mon- 
ostor. 

The  advance  from  Mocsa  and  Csem  of  extended  hostile  lines 
was  to  be  remarked.  They  were,  however,  still  far  out  of  gun- 
range  of  our  trenchers.  The  extreme  right  wing  of  the  enemy — 
pushed  forward  toward  0-Szony — menaced  this  point,  and  was  just 
then  attacked  by  a  part  of  the  cavalry  division  of  the  third  corps. 

But  the  battle  beginning  at  the  Monostor  appeared  to  be  far 
more  active  than  that  here. 

While  riding  in  a  wide  circuit  round  the  fortified  line,  1  now 
hastened  toward  the  Monostor,  and  saw  that  the  enemy  developed 
very  considerable  forces,  apparently  preparatory  to  a  direct  attack 
also  on  our  camp  before  Harkaly  and  the  southern  spur  of  the 
forest  on  the  river-bank,  which  extends  between  the  brook  Czon- 
cz6  and  the  vineyards  of  the  Monostor  along  the  Danube. 

Our  outposts  had  both  returned  from  Harkaly  and  the  southern 
forest-spur  into  the  interior  of  the  camp.  But  the  enemy  did  not 
seem  to  be  by  any  means  satisfied  with  this  result ;  and  however 
incredible  the  supposition  might  be,  that  he  intended  a  serious 
attack  on  our  fortified  camp,  the  impetuous  advance  of  his  ex- 
treme left  wing  from  the  forest  by  the  river-bank  against  our 
point  of  support  on  the  Monostor,  backed,  as  I  saw  it  was,  by  the 
simultaneous  advance  from  the  southern  forest-spur,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Harkaly,  Csem,  and  Mocsa,  seemed  nevertheless  to  justify 
this  supposition. 

Being  in  possession  of  an  uncommonly  strong  position,  as  ours 
was  in  the  fortified  camp,  and  in  the  face  of  an  unmistakable 
superiority  in  the  hostile  forces  developed  offensively  within  our 
horizon,  it  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  our  wisest  course  to  await 
in  a  purely  defensive  attitude  the  attack  which,  as  I  have  re- 
marked, seemed  already  energetically  begun  against  the  Monostor. 

The  offensive  measures,  however,  which  had  been  taken  on 
our  part  at  the  Monostor  before  my  arrival  there,  showed  that, 
during  my  absence,  a  contrary  opinion  with  regard  to  tactics  had 
probably  prevailed. 

In  order,  namely,  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  the  vineyards  and 
the  forest  by  the  river-bank,  the  greater  part  of  the  four  battal- 
ions of  the  Komorn  garrison  had  already  been  advanced  ;  and  to 


Mi^  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  433 

support  this  sally  energetically,  other  four  battalions  of  the  sev- 
enth corps  had  been  disposed,  partly  in  the  vineyards  themselves, 
partly  on  the  grcund  bounding  them  to  the  south,  between  the 
latter  and  the  main  road  to  Acs,  on  the  left  before  the  first  in- 
trenched line. 

This  instantaneous  ofiensive  demeanor  certainly  appeared  to 
be  justified  by  the  prospect  of  repelling  the  attack  of  the  extreme 
left  wing  of  the  enemy,  which  had  pressed  forward  alone,  before 
the  hostile  inner  left  wing  and  the  centre  could  have  advanced 
at  the  same  height  of  attack  against  the  objects  intrusted  to  the 
seventh  corps. 

But  the  employment  of  infantiy  alone,  without  the  co-operation 
of  the  other  tAVO  principal  arms,  especially  artillery,  was  not 
adapted  to  the  purpose  ;  and  the  disposition  of  the  battalions  of 
the  seventh  corps  in  the  free  and  open  ground  between  the  vine- 
yards and  the  main  road  to  Acs,  beyond  the  effective  reach  of  the 
artillery  of  the  camp,  and  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  advancing 
with  all  three  arms,  was  completely  disastrous  to  our  troops  only. 

When  I,  returning  by  the  main  road  to  Acs  into  the  camp, 
reached  the  Monostor,  the  injurious  consequences  of  the  isolated 
advance  of  these  eight  battalions  had  already  become  sensibly 
felt,  as  was  evident  from  a  report  of  my  younger  brother  to  the 
commander  of  his  corps,  General  Poltenberg,  which  had  arrived 
almost  simultaneously  with  myself  in  the  camp.  (The  battalion 
commanded  by  nly  brother  was  one  of  those  which  were  disposed 
on  the  open  ground  to  the  south  of  the  vineyards). 

On  the  part  of  the  enemy — thus  ran  the  report — a  rocket-bat- 
teiy  and  two  of  field-pieces  were  now  in  full  activity,  whereby 
the  battalions  on  the  open  ground  were  hard  pressed,  while  those 
in  the  vineyards  (our  extreme  right  wing)  had  already  been 
obhged  to  give  w^ay. 

On  hearing  this,  I  hastened  forward  into  the  vineyards,  intend- 
ing if  possible  to  renew  the  combat,  or  at  least  prevent  a  dis- 
banding. 

While  riding  with  this  intention  through  the  foremost  open 
earthworks,  I  found  them,  to  my  comfort,  already  sufficiently 
strongly  occupied  by  the  part  of  the  advanced  four  Komorn  bat- 
talions which  had  been  kept  back  en  reserve,  to  guarantee  their 
being  held  even  in  the  most  unfavorable  case,  that  is,  though  our 
storming  columns  should  be  completely  defeated. 

T 


434  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

At  about  half  gun-range  distance  from  this  intrenched  line  I 
encountered  a  wide-extended  troop  of  fugitives.  Their  number 
scarcely  amounted  to  half  a  battalion.  The  exertions  of  my  ever- 
brave  suite  speedily  put  a  stop  to  their  flight.  This  was  the 
easier,  as  the  hostile  batteries  posted  to  the  left  before  us  (on  the 
open  ground  to  the  south  of  the  vineyards)  had  just  directed  their 
fire  principally  against  the  earthworks  in  our  rear,  consequently 
cannonaded  but  slightly  the  line  on  which  we  threw  ourselves 
(my  suite  and  myself)  against  the  disbanded  troop  ;  there  was 
also  no  enemy  visible  in  front  of  us  at  this  moment.  Next  min- 
ute, however,  the  foremost  of  the  hostile  tirailleurs  emerged  from 
behind  the  nearest  elevation  of  the  undulating  ground,  from  150 
to  200  paces  before  us,  advancing  at  storming  speed  with  crossed 
bayonets.  We  were  in  vain  endeavoring  to  animate  the  troop — 
which  had  scarcely  been  brought  to  a  stand — to  a  counter-enter- 
prise similar  to  that  of  the  enemy.  After  a  few  seconds  they 
again  took  to  flight,  and  this  tiraie  could  not  be  stopped  ;  they  did 
not,  however,  take  the  former  direction  toward  the  intrench- 
ments,  but  laterally  to  the  Danube. 

The  Danube,  when  of  its  ordianary  depth,  leaves  at  the  foot  of 
tiie  high  and  steep  declivities  of  the  Monostor  a  way  along  its 
bank,  used  as  a  towing-path,  which  is  on  an  average  as  broad  as 
an  ordinary  road.  On  the  2d  of  July,  1849,  its  waters  did  not 
rise  uncommonly  high. 

The  Komorn  battalions — shaken  and  discouraged  by  the  brisk 
fire  of  artillery  and  the  resolute  attack  of  infantry  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy — when  fleeing  over  the  steep  declivities  of  the  Monos- 
tor down  to  the  towing-path  had  undeniably  made  a  very  fortu- 
nate choice  as  regarded  their  preservation  from  the  attacks  of 
the  enemy.  The  path  was  obliquely  commanded  by  a  battery, 
erected  on  the  upper  point  of  the  so-called  Kriegsinsel  ('island  of 
war'),  this  point  lying  between  the  Monostor  and  the  left  point 
of  support  of  the  opposite  outwork,  the  Palatinal  line ;  so  that 
an  advance  along  this  path  was  rendered  uncommonly  difficult 
to  the  enemy. 

The  greater  part  of  the  advanced  Komorn  battalions  was  al- 
ready in  security,  that  is,  on  the  towing-path,  when  I  arrived 
with  my  attendants  in  haste,  intending  to  renew  the  combat  in 
the  vineyards.  The  troop  which  had  been  interrupted  by  us  in 
its  speedy  retreat  to  the  intrenched  line  was  only  the  small 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  435 

remnant  of  these  battalions.  Its  suddenly  taking  the  direction 
toward  the  bank  of  the  Danube  betrayed  to  us  the  common  asylum 
of  the  rest. 

We  hastened  to  the  brink  of  the  declivity,  which  was  almost 
inaccessible  on  horseback,  and  a  single  glance  down  on  the  tow- 
ing-path deep  below  us  convinced  me  of  the  uselessness  of  any 
further  attempt  to  bring  back  the  disobedient  battalions  to  their 
duty  by  merely  summoning  them. 

Thronged  close  together  between  the  Danube  and  the  declivity, 
they  fled  unobstructed  down  the  stream. 

The  vineyards  situated  in  front  of  the  first  intrenched  line  were 
consequently  completely  evacuated  by  us,  and  this  intrenched 
line  itself  was  menaced  in  a  direct  manner  by  the  assault  of  the 
hostile  storming-columns  of  infantry. 

But  knowing  that  this  line  was  strongly  manned,  I  believed  it 
to  be  sufficiently  secured,  even  without  my  personal  co-operation, 
at  least  until  I  should  have  succeeded  in  putting  a  stop  to  the 
above-mentioned  flight,  the  pernicious  influence  of  which  upon 
the  behavior  of  our  troops  generally  I  feared  above  all. 

It  might  be  foreseen  that  this  could  only  be  successfully  ac- 
complished while  the  fleeing  masses  were  still  in  the  defile  formed 
by  the  Danube  and  the  steep  declivities  of  the  Monostor,  Thither 
I  now  hastened  in  advance  of  the  fugitives — taking  my  way  over 
the  Monostor  across  the  two  intrenched  lines — had  very  speedily 
two  pieces  of  artillery  planted  in  the  prolongation  of  the  defile, 
and  then  returned  again  to  the  Monostor. 

Not  far  from  object  No.  1,  and  a  little  behind  it,  the  brink  of 
the  declivity  projects  toward  the  Danube,  Here  I  was  visible  to 
the  fleeing  masses  in  the  defile,  as  well  as  to  the  commander  of 
the  two  guns  on  the  outlet  of  it,  who  awaited  my  signal  to 
fire. 

In  the  mean  time  the  battalions  of  the  seventh  corps — (among 
which  was  also  that  under  the  command  of  my  younger  brother), 
which  had  been  advanced,  like  those  of  Komorn,  but  to  the  left 
behind  them  along  the  southern  border  of  the  vineyards  and  on 
the  adjoining  open  ground — had  also  retreated  out  of  the  effective 
range  of  the  hostile  artillery,  passing  by  the  left  flank  of  the  first 
intrenched  line  in  the  direction  of  object  No.  3  of  the  second 
line  ; — while  I  erroneously  supposed  that  these  battalions,  flee- 
ing across  by  the  vineyards  of  the  Danube  had  saved  themselves 


436  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

at  the  same  time  with  those  of  Komorn  over  the  steep  declivities 
of  the  Monostor  down  to  the  towing-path. 

I  was  completely  confirmed  in  this  error  by  observing  a  Hon- 
ved  officer  on  horseback  joining  in  the  flight  of  these  battalions, 
whose  horse  happened  to  resemble  in  color  that  of  my  younger 
brother. 

In  consequence  of  this  error  I  felt  myself  much  shaken  in  my 
determination  to  drive  this  coward  troop  together  with  grape- 
shot,  and  resolved  once  more  to  entertain  the  hope  that  it  would 
perhaps  still  be  possible  to  succeed  without  making  use  of  this 
extreme  measure. 

But  all  repeated  attempts  to  obtain  this  by  exhortations  or 
menaces  having,  as  hitherto,  proved  unsuccessful ;  further,  the 
sudden  beginning  of  an  uncommonly  brisk  fire  of  musketry  on 
the  foremost  line  of  intrenchments  leaving  no  doubt  of  the  ener- 
getic earnestness  of  the  hostile  attack  on  the  Monostor ;  and 
finally,  having  to  expect  as  the  nearest  consequence  of  the  gen- 
eral concentrated  offensive  movement  of  the  enemy— observed 
by  myself — against  our  fortified  camp,  similar  attacks  on  all 
points  of  it,  and  that  the  certainty  of  opposing  them  every  where 
successfully  seemed  to  me  very  problematical  if  these  coward 
masses  were  allowed  to  disperse  themselves  in  the  interior  of  the 
camp,  and  recruit  from  among  the  rest  of  the  troops  partisans  for 
the  standard  of  the  hare ; — it  was,  in  the  view  of  the  perilous 
situation  in  which  the  army  must  be  placed  by  a  defense  of  the 
fortified  camp  deficient  in  valor,  the  command  of  an  iron  neces- 
sity to  become  master  at  any  price  of  these  refractory  masses. 

Resigned  to  what  was  unavoidable,  I  gave  the  signal  for  firing 
to  the  commander  of  the  two  guns  placed  at  the  outlet  of  the 
defile. 

Half  way  through  it  they  attempted  to  continue  their  flight. 
Deterred  by  the  effective  discharge  of  a  body  of  infantry  of  the 
reserve,  which  had  been  speedily  dispatched  thither,  they  now 
completely  ascended  the  declivity,  and  arrived  on  the  ground 
situated  directly  behind  objects  Nos.  1  and  2,  where  a  detach- 
ment of  hussars  was  ready  to  charge  them,  in  order  to  drive 
them  without  further  ceremony  again  forward  to  the  first  line 
of  intrenchments. 

1  already  believed  that  the  moment  of  greatest  danger  to  the 
army  from  the  flight  of  the  Kormorn  battalions  was  almost  past, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  437 

when  all  at  once  the  rest  of  these  battalions  (the  troops  occupy- 
ing the  first  line  of  intrenchments),  falling  back  en  debandade 
through  the  interval  between  objects  Nos.  1  and  2  into  the  in- 
terior of  the  camp,  abandoned  to  the  on-storming  enemy,  simul- 
taneously with  the  first  line  of  intrenchments,  the  objects  men- 
tioned on  the  second  line  likewise. 

The  detachment  of  hussars  in  fact  fell  immediately  on  both 
parties  of  the  Komorn  battalions,  drove  them  forward  again  to 
the  abandoned  objects,  and  thereby  forcibly  obtained  the  mo- 
mentary security  of  the  most  important  point  of  our  position. 
But  the  first  line  of  intrenchments  was  already  occupied  by  the 
enemy ;  and  the  recovery  of  it  by  storm  was  too  essential  and 
too  imperative  a  service  to  be  intrusted  to  the  dubious  valor  of 
those  battalions  which  had  just  now  been  obliged  to  be  com- 
pelled by  disgraceful  coercive  measures  to  the  most  necessary 
fulfillment  of  their  duty.  • 

I  consequently  charged  with  the  accomplishment  of  this  task 
the  48th  battalion,  ordered  to  advance  from  the  reserve  (the 
second  corps  at  Uj-Szony). 

Led  by  its  former  commander,  the  valiant  Major  E-akovszki 
(commander  of  an  infantry  division  of  the  second  corps),  the 
brave  battalion  executed  its  advance  in  the  hottest  fire  of  the 
enemy,  without  stopping,  to  about  100  paces  from  the  point  of 
attack.  The  enemy  did  not  hold  out  longer  in  the  earthworks 
which  he  had  shortly  before  taken  by  storm  ;  the  resolute  attack 
of  the  48th  battalion  was  now  changed  into  a  vigorous  pursuit ; 
and  as  the  lines  of  the  hostile  centre  and  right  wing,  which  were 
deployed  before  Csem  and  Mocsa,  had  meanwhile  not  attacked 
our  camp,  the  moment  seemed  not  unfavorable  for  reacting  with 
strength  and  energy  against  the  left  wing  of  the  enemy,  which 
had  advanced  singly. 

Accordingly,  while  the  48th  battalion  drove  before  it  in  the 
vineyards  the  enemy  just  dislodged  from  the  first  line  of  intrench- 
ments, Major  E-akovszki  dispatched  after  them  the  remaining 
battalions  of  his  division  ;  General  Poltenberg  debouched  with 
the  seventh  corps,  partly  on  the  main  road  to  Acs,  partly  to  the 
south  of  it ;  the  infantry  on  the  right  wing,  joining  the  Uakovszki 
division — the  cavalry  on  the  left  in  echelons  toward  Csem  and 
Mocsa — in  the  centre  the  batteries  of  the  infantry  divisions. 
The  hostile  column,  far  advanced  between  the  main  road  to 


438  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Acs  and  the  vineyards  at  the  Monostor,  now  quickly  turned  in 
toward  the  southern  spur  of  the  forest  at  the  river  bank.  Before 
the  open  ground  between  this  forest-spur  and  Harkaly,  the  main 
body  of  the  hostile  left  wing  (those  corps  which  menaced  our 
camp  from  Acs)  steadily  awaited  the  attack  of  Poltenberg's 
artillery. 

Here  an  active  conflict  of  artillery  now  commenced,  the  issue 
of  which  remained  doubtful  until  the  advance  of  our  infantry  in 
the  forest  at  the  river-bank  enabled  us  to  plant  two  guns  in  the 
left  prolongation  of  the  line  of  the  hostile  artillery,  whereby  it 
would  be  taken  in  file,  and  with  the  simultaneous  advance  of 
our  guns  be  forced  to  retreat. 

In  the  mean  time  the  lines  of  the  hostile  centre  and  right  wing, 
the  attacks  of  which  on  our  camp  I  feared  were  to  be  expected 
every  moment  during  the  critical  situation  at  the  Monostor,  had 
completely  withdrawn  from  our  view. 

This  circumstance — alike  favorable  and  in  itself  enigmatical 
to  us — put  it  in  our  power,  as  we  shall  see,  immediately  to  im- 
prove the  advantages  we  had  just  obtained. 

By  this  circumstance,  namely,  the  corps  of  the  reserve — the 
second  (instead  of  the  infantry  of  the  Rakovszki  division,  the 
four  Komorn  battalions  remained  behind  in  the  camp),  which 
had  hitherto  had  to  secure  the  objects  of  the  defense-line  of  the 
camp,  that  had  been  quitted  by  the  seventh  corps,  against  any 
attacks  of  the  hostile  centre  and  right  wing — relieved  from  this 
now  superfluous  precaution,  could  be  employed  on  the  open  field 
in  augmenting  our  tactic  superiority  opposite  to  the  hostile  left 
wing — at  least  in  part,  as  our  left  wing  under  General  Klapka 
must  nevertheless  not  be  denuded  of  his  reserve. 

General  Poltenberg  thus  received  a  considerable  reinforcement 
of  artillery,  and  at  the  same  time  an  order  to  continue  with  in- 
creased energy  his  attacks  on  the  already  visibly  shaken  left 
wing  of  the  enemy,  which  was  now  separated  by  a  great  distance 
from  the  other  corps. 

In  part  to  destroy  the  latter,  if  possible,  before  a  hostile  succor 
could  arrive  at  the  place  of  battle — was  the  primary  object  of 
this  effort ;  the  secondary  was — to  obtain  thereby  for  the  next 
few  days,  during  which,  as  is  known,  the  main  army  had  to 
enter  on  its  march  to  Ofen,  the  time  necessary  for  the  convenient 
execution  of  this  operation. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  439 

General  Poltenberg  hastened  to  execute  the  received  order,  first 
of  all  by  doubling  his  artillery  developed  in  the  foremost  line ; 
secured  it  against  attacks  of  the  hostile  horse  by  disposing  a  part 
of  the  cavalry  of  the  second  corps  in  the  second  line  ;  advanced, 
and  swiftly  frustrating  one  after  another  the  repeated  attempts 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy  from  point  to  point  to  make  a  stand,  he 
soon  arrived  on  the  open  ground  between  Harkaly  and  the  south- 
ern spur  of  the  forest  at  the  river-bank. 

Here  the  resistance  of  the  hostile  left  wing,  turned  on  its  left 
meanwhile  by  the  uninterrupted  advance  of  our  infantry — in  the 
forest  at  the  river-bank  and  the  northern  half  of  the  southern 
forest-spur — seemed  to  be  paralyzed  ;  for  its  columns  avoided 
further  combat,  and,  retreating  toward  Acs,  hastened  to  gain  the 
passages  across  the  brook  Czonczo. 

A  part  of  the  cavalry,  which,  ready  for  action  as  the  second 
line,  followed  our  front  of  artillery,  rushed  rapidly  forward  by 
Harkaly,  in  order  to  interrupt  the  junction  between  the  left  wing 
retreating  toward  Acs,  and  the  other  parts  of  the  hostile  army 
moved  back  in  the  direction  of  Igmand  and  Mocsa.  The  main 
body  of  Poltenberg's  cavalry,  however — till  then  disposed  in 
echelons  toward  Igmand,  for  the  protection  of  the  flank,  always 
at  gun-range  distance  to  the  left  in  the  rear — was  ordered  to 
pursue. 

But  the  distress  of  the  hostile  left  wing,  singly  exposed  for  sev- 
eral hours  to  our  attacks,  must  already  have  reached  its  turning 
point  I 

The  main  body  of  Poltenberg's  cavalry  could  not  undertake 
the  pursuit ;  for,  attacked  by  a  strong  column  of  cavalry,  which 
had  meanwhile  hastened  thither  on  the  road  from  Mocsa,  it  had 
now  quite  enough  to  do  to  oppose  the  impetuous  attacks  of  its 
assailants. 

General  Poltenberg  personally  commanded  in  the  obstinate 
cavalry  engagement,  and  left  the  conduct  of  the  principal  line 
developed  against  Acs  to  the  chief  of  the  artillery  of  our  main 
army. 

He,  solicitous  about  the  line  of  retreat  for  his  batteries  on  the 
left  wing  to  the  camp,  at  the  commencement  of  the  cavalry  con- 
test ceased  to  advance,  but  next  moment  was  ordered  immediately 
to  go  forward ;  for  from  our  left  wing  I  received  a  report,  that 
the  extreme  right  wing  of  the  Austrians^ — before  which  O-Szony 


440  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

had  been  evacuated  on  the  morning  of  the  day,  in  consequence  of 
a  very  unfortunate  cavalry  conflict  (the  third  corps  lost  in  it  one 
of  its  batteries) — was  making  a  resolute  resistance  to  the  attacks 
of  General  Klapka  directed  to  reconquering  this  point. 

But  the  possession  of  0-Szony  by  us  was  the  result  of  our  in- 
tention to  lead  the  main  army  from  Komorn  to  Ofen  ;  consequent- 
ly to  support  General  Klapka  in  his  endeavors  to  regain  this 
absolutely  indispensable  point  from  the  enemy  was  now  the  most 
important  duty  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  acting  under  my 
immediate  command. 

"With  the  then  position  of  our  army,  this  support,  however, 
could  not  be  furnished  in  a  direct  manner ;  nevertheless  it  could 
and  must  be  done  by  the  employment  of  all  our  forces  in  an  in- 
direct manner. 

General  Klapka,  without  previous  concert,  seemed  herein  to 
share  with  me  one  and  the  same  view.  At  least  this  was  indi- 
cated by  the  fact,  that — as  I  learnt  at  the  same  time — remarking 
the  movement  directed  against  the  right  wing  of  our  army  by 
that  column  of  hostile  cavalry  with  which  the  main  body  of 
Poltenberg's  cavalry  was  just  engaged,  and  perceiving  the  in- 
tention of  the  former  to  cripple  our  offensive  against  the  left 
wing  of  the  hostile  army  by  repeatedly  attacking  our  seventh 
corps  in  flank  and  rear — he  sent  immediately  a  part  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  third  corps  to  assist  General  Poltenberg,  while  he 
continued  energetically  himself  with  the  infantiy  divisions  of  the 
same  corps  the  attacks  on  0-Szony. 

By  means  of  this  succor,  which  it  was  necessary  should  arrive 
in  the  shortest  time  within  the  battle-range  of  the  main  body  of 
our  cavaliy,  Poltenberg  could  prospectively  be  in  a  position  to 
repulse  in  the  most  decided  manner  the  attacks  of  the  column  of 
the  hostile  cavalry,  nay  even  to  assume  the  oflensive  against 
it,  and  thus  protect  to  the  left  and  in  the  rear  the  further 
advance  of  our  principal  line  against  the  left  wing  of  the  Aus- 
trians. 

This  advance  (hitherto  a  mere  repressive  measure,  rendered 
possible  solely,  nay  even  openly  challenged,  by  the  enigmatical 
disappearing  of  the  parts  of  the  hostile  army  which  had  been 
developed  before  Csem  and  Mocsa)  was  now  destined  to  serve  for 
turning  oft'  the  hostile  forces  from  0-Szony ;  for  only  in  tliis 
manner,  it  appeared  to  me,  the  indirect  support  aftbrded  to  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  441 

left  wing  of  our  army  in  its  efTorts  to  reconquer  the  place  was 
possible  with  a  favorable  result. 

I  did  not,  however,  overlook  the  circumstance  that,  on  account 
of  the  uncommon  superiority  of  his  forces,  it  was  possible  for  the 
enemy  to  paralyze  simultaneously  the  advance  of  the  right  wing 
of  our  army  as  well  as  the  intentions  of  the  left  against  0-Szony. 
Consequently,  if  this  advance  was  to  answer  its  purpose,  energy 
must  make  up  for  what  it  wanted  in  material  strength  ;  it  must 
force  upon  the  enemy,  by  means  of  this  energy,  serious  apprehen- 
sions about  the  continuity  of  his  extended  position. 

If  it  made  upon  him  the  impression  of  an  attempt  to  break 
through,  then,  and  only  then,  the  further  task  of  our  right  wing 
had  to^  be  considered  as  fulfilled  ;  then  the  enemy  must  feel  him- 
self obliged  to  concentrate  his  whole  force  opposite  the  right  wing 
of  our  army  ;  then  ha  must  give  up  the  maintenance  of  0-Sz6ny. 

The  intended  range,  however,  of  my  next  following  tactic  dis- 
positions— according  to  my  own  observation  of  the  strength  of  the 
enemy  on  the  morning  of  that  day — need  not  really  go  any  further 
than  this.  The  thought  of  a  serious,  attempt  at  breaking  through, 
considering  the  great  numerical  inferiority  of  our  forces,  could  only 
originate  in,  and  at  the  same  time  be  justified  by,  the  supposition 
that  the  enigmatical  disappearance  of  the  parts  of  the  enemy's 
army  developed  before  Csem  and  Mocsa  was  the  commencement 
of  the  immediate  continuance  of  the  hostile  operations  against 
Ofen. 

But  this  supposition  I  already  found  to  be  inadmissible,  on  the 
ground  that  the  continuance  of  the  operations  against  Ofen,  so 
long  as  our  army  stood  before  Komorn,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Danube,  appeared  to  me  very  hazardous ;  and  hazardous,  nay 
desperate  enterprises — in  the  face  of  the  Russian  intervention — 
were  indicated  to  us  only,  not  to  the  Austrians. 

After  the  extraordinary  display  of  forces  which  the  enemy 
made  at  the  beginning  of  his  cavalry  attack  on  the  main  body  of 
our  horse,  this  supposition  must  be  altogether  left  out  of  the 
question;  for. 

The  obstinate  combat  brought  on  by  this  cavalry  attack  was 
still  undecided,  when  to  the  left  of  the  column  of  hostile  cavalry 
(between  it  and  Harkaly)  a  considerable  number  of  guns  suddenly 
began  to  cannonade  the  main  body  of  our  horse. 

General  Poltenberg  posted  to  the  right  of  the  battle-line  of  the 


442  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

main  body  of  his  cavalry  the  two  batteries  belonging  to  it,  by  the 
fire  of  which  we  were  enabled  to  maintain  ourselves  on  the  battle- 
field. 

But  now  the  enemy  attacked  with  a  no  less  considerable  num- 
ber of  guns  the  left  flank  also  of  our  principal  line  advancing 
against  Acs ;  while  almost  at  the  same  time  the  detachment  of 
hussars,  which  had  been  pushed  forward  beyond  Harkaly,  began 
to  retreat,  and  soon  afterward  the  inner  left  wing  likewise  of  the 
hostile  army  impeded  its  retreat  to  Acs,  already  commenced  with- 
out resistance,  and  renewed  the  combat  by  an  attack  of  artillery 
on  the  front  of  our  principal  line. 

I  considered  the  collective  force,  to  whose  energetic  interference 
the  hostile  left  wing  just  now  owed  its  disengagement,  to  be  no- 
thing more  than  the  centre  of  the  enemy ;  supposed  his  right 
wing  was  still  at  or  near  0-Szony  ;  and  that  I  must  consequently 
not  give  up  the  combat  yet,  in  spite  of  the  dangerous  situation  in 
which  the  right  wing  of  our  army  was  placed  by  the  concentric 
attacks  of  the  enemy,  nay  must  partly  even  continue  it  on  the 
offensive . 

The  battery  on  the  left  wing  of  the  principal  line  was  conse- 
quently drawn  back,  and  placed  so  as  to  form  a  hook  with  the 
front  of  the  latter,  and  almost  ranging  with  the  batteries  of  the 
main  body  of  the  cavalry.  It  had  to  act  against  the  attack 
directed  on  the  flank  of  our  principal  line.  Its  other  batteries 
ceased  at  the  same  time  to  advance  toward  Acs,  but  were  charged 
to  maintain  their  position.  Hereupon  the  two  batteries  of  the 
main  body  of  the  cavalry  were  ordered  to  advance  against  the 
retired  right  wing  of  the  artillery  line  of  the  hostile  centre,  in 
order  to  prepare  the  attack  of  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  on 
this  point. 

The  latter,  after  firmly  repulsing  the  repeated  attacks  of  the 
column  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  had  speedily  reformed  its  ranks 
and  been  considerably  reinforced  by  the  succor  from  the  third 
corps,  which  had  meanwhile  arrived.  General  Poltenberg  re- 
tained the  command  over  it,  and  on  my  order  now  advanced  to 
attack.  At  the  very  beginning,  his  left  wing,  being  within  the 
effective  reach  of  the  hostile  guns,  refused;  while  the  right, 
less  menaced,  uninterruptedly  continued  its  progress.  Thereby 
the  whole  line  fell  into  an  unintentional  change  of  direction  to 
the  left  (toward  Mocsa).     Poltenberg  tried  to  remedy  this  incon- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  443 

venience,  but  the  hostile  projectiles  frustrated  his  endeavors, 
and  the  left  wing  remained  further  behind. 

Cavalry  has  this  important  advantage  over  infantry,  that 
though  on  the  battle-field  it  can  not  easily  be  kept  to  the  fulfill- 
ment of  its  duty  by  coercive  measures  en  gros,  it  is,  generally 
speaking,  more  susceptible  of  impression  from  encouraging  ex- 
amples. 

Aware  of  this  by  experience,  I  hastened  to  the  left  wing  to 
harangue  it,  calling  upon  it  to  follow  me  closely — started  at  a 
quicker  pace — and  the  advance  immediately  regained  its  original 
direction. 

The  ofiScers  of  the  suite  then  present,  together  with  the  hussars 
assigned  to  them,  kept  next  to  me. 

At  first  my  eyes  were  directed  toward  Mocsa  (to  the  left). 
From  thence  I  expected  to  see  hasten  hither  the  right  wing  of 
the  Austrian  army. 

I  could  not  distinguish,  however,  on  the  horizon  in  this  direc- 
tion any  hostile  lines,  and  now  fixed  my  gaze  exclusively  on  our 
object  of  attack.  * 

This  was  the  white  line,  sharply  defined  on  the  extreme  right 
wing  of  the  hostile  centre,  in  which  I  thought  I  perceived  Aus- 
trian cavalry  on  white  horses. 

The  undulating  ground,  over  which  we  were  speedily  advanc- 
ing, made  it  alternately  disappear  and  emerge  again.  Arrived 
at  the  last  elevation  before  it,  we  now  beheld  unexpectedly  only 
the  rear  of  several  divisions  of  Austrian  light  horse  or  dragoons, 
at  the  distance  of  about  fifty  paces. 

Some  hussars  galloped  past  me  to  charge  the  fugitives. 

At  the  same  moment  one  of  my  near  companions  remarked 
that  our  fronts  had  remained  very  far  behind  us.  I  halted,  that 
they  might  come  up  with  me. 

Simultaneously  I  noticed  on  my  right  a  dark  hostile  front. 
The  sun  was  just  above  the  horizon.  This  front,  turned  toward 
me,  was  between  where  I  stood  and  the  setting  sun.  Dazzled 
by  his  rays,  I  could  with  difl&culty  distinguish,  in  spite  of  the 
short  distance,  only  the  kind  of  troops.     I  took  them  for  lancers. 

To  their  left  stood  the  battery  of  the  extreme  right  wing  of 
the  hostile  centre,  directing  its  uncommonly  brisk  fire  against 
our  advancing  fronts.  I  saw  that  they  would  be  endangered  in 
their  right  flank  by  the  lancers,  if  they  continued  to  advance  in 


444  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  same  direction.  They  were  then  still  far  enough  back  to 
avoid  this  danger  by  changing  the  direction  to  the  right.  This, 
however,  must  be  executed  without  delay ;  consequently  Pcilten- 
berg  had  to  be  immediately  informed  of  the  danger  which 
threatened  him.  But  this  was  hardly  practicable.  To  dispatch 
an  officer  to  General  Poltenberg,  or  even  myself  to  ride  to  him, 
seemed  to  me  inadvisable.  I  thought  that  at  this  critical  mo- 
ment I  ought  carefully  to  avoid  any  step  which  might  be  taken 
for  a  signal  to  turn  back  ;  and  as  my  voice  could  not  be  heard  at 
the  considerable  distance — especially  with  the  noise  made  by  the 
advance  and  almost  uninterrupted  thunder  of  the  near  hostile 
cannons — I  had  no  other  way  left  of  making  myself  understood 
by  General  Poltenberg  but  motioning  with  my  hat. 

While  I  was  endeavoring — my  gaze  sharply  directed  on  our 
advancing  fronts — ^to  perceive  from  their  movements  whether  my 
repeated  motioning  toward  the  point  which  menaced  danger  was 
understood,  I  suddenly  received  a  violent  blow  on  the  bare  head, 
and  felt  that  I  was  wounded. 

''  From  this  moment  I  stood  in  need  of  my  hat  as  a  compress  in 
the  absence  of  any  other  bandage.  Besides,  our  fronts  had 
meanwhile  approached  too  near  to  execute  now  the  desired 
change  of  direction,  and  making  signs  any  longer  seemed  just  as 
superfluous  as  my  previous  efforts  had  been  unsuccessful.  At 
last  the  vehement  fire  of  the  hostile  artillery  also  had  unfitted 
the  divisions  for  manceuvering. 

Alarmed  for  the  result  of  the  attack,  I  awaited  the  arrival  of 
the  foremost  divisions,  determined  that  there  the  disadvantage  of 
the  unfavorably  chosen  direction  for  attack  should  at  least  be 
lessened  as  much  as  possible  by  the  resoluteness  of  the  attack 
itself  Meanwhile  I  availed  myself  of  the  time  still  remaining 
until  the  arrival  of  the  first  divisions,  to  have  a  temporary  band- 
age applied  by  one  of  the  officers  of  my  suite  ;  and  remarked 
with  satisfaction,  that  the  battery  of  the  right  wing  of  the  hostile 
centre  had  taken  to  flight.  This  raised  for  the  moment  my 
drooping  hopes  of  a  favorable  result  to  the  attack. 

But  the  improvised  surgeon,  with  the  best  intentions,  could 
not  for  a  good  while  get  the  temporary  bandage  completed.  The 
attack  swiftly  rattled  past  me ;  and  when  at  last  I  was  again  in 
motion,  even  the  hussars  had  come  back. 

Some  officers,  with  rare  devotion,  assisted  me  to  check  the 


Jjy  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  445 

flight  in  its  origin.  In  fact  separate  groups  took  courage  and 
once  more  made  front  against  the  enemy,  but  were  always  car- 
ried away  again  by  the  dense  pressure  of  superior  numbers. 

While  I  had  been  engaged  with  the  bandaging  of  my  wound, 
I  had  not  been  able  to  observe  the  progress  of  the  combat  in  its 
most  decisive  moment ;  and  consequently  the  cause  of  the  flight 
remained  unknown  to  me,  until  at  last  completely  exhausted, 
and  desisting  from  farther  efforts  to  stop  the  flight,  I  turned  my 
attention  again  to  the  enemy,  and  remarked,  besides  the  in- 
creased cannonade  on  the  right  wing  of  the  hostile  centre  and 
the  pursuing  lancers,  an  attack  also  of  artillery  proceeding  from 
the  direction  of  Mocsa. 

This  latter  circumstance  caused  me  to  hope  that  the  right 
wing  of  the  Austrians  was  on  its  march  against  the  right  wing 
of  our  army,  consequently  that  they  had  already  relinquished  the 
maintenance  of  0-Szony. 

I  was  determined,  by  means  of  a  renewed  advance  of  the 
cavalry,  to  be  certified  of  this ;  and  desired  General  Poltenberg, 
whom  I  accidentally  met  during  the  debandade,  to  hasten  in 
advance  of  the  fleeing  hussars,  and  speedily  reorganize  them 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  hostile  artillery.  He  succeeded  in  this, 
still  within  reach  of  the  battery  pursuing  us  from  the  direction 
of  Mocsa. 

However,  morally  convinced  of  General  Klapka's  determination 
to  run  all  risks  for  the  retaking  of  0-Szony,  I  ascertained  for  cer- 
tain that  it  had  already  been  given  up  by  the  Austrians  from  the 
silence  of  the  thundering  of  artillery  on  the  left  wing  of  our  army. 

And  the  renewed  advance  of  the  main  body  of  our  artillery, 
which  I  had  intended,  did  not  take  place. 

Only  the  nearest  of  our  cavalry-batteries  was  ordered  against 
the  hostile  battery,  which,  as  it  seemed,  was  advancing  isolated 
from  the  direction  of  Mocsa. 

Next  moment,  however,  it  voluntarily  ceased  firing,  and  thus 
concluded  the  day's  hot  conflicts. 

Meantime  I  had  received  from  the  chief  of  the  artillery  of  our 
main  army,  who  had  throughout  been  intrusted  with  the  com- 
mand of  the  principal  line,  a  report  that  he  had  maintained  his 
position;  from  the  extreme  right  wing  however,  news  arrived 
that  our  infantry  had  advanced  in  the  forest  at  the  river-bank 
along  the  Danube  upward  as  far  as  the  brook  Czonczo. 


446  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

This  news  in  some  degree  consoled  me  for  the  bitter  recollec- 
tion of  the  disgraceful  behavior  of  the  Komorn  battalions  at  the 
Monostor,  on  the  morning  of  the  day. 

But  this  intelligence  caused  me  at  the  same  time  immediately 
to  dispatch  orders  for  a  retreat  to  the  infantry  divisions  posted  in 
the  forest  at  the  river-bank  and  in  ,the  southern  spur.  These, 
with  a  perseverance  worthy  of  being  particularly  mentioned,  had 
conquered  a  place,  the  maintenance  of  which  against  the  left 
wing  of  the  Austrians,  considering  the  position  of  their  centre  at 
that  moment,  would  prospectively  have  been  an  undertaking  as 
disastrous  as,  considering  our  predetermination  to  lead  the  army 
to  Ofen,  it  would  have  been  without  a  motive. 

For  securing  to  the  left  the  retreat  of  these  infantry  divisions, 
the  principal  line  and  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  remained  till 
it  was  quite  dark  in  the  same  position  as  both  had  occupied  im- 
mediately before  our  cavalry  attack. 

The  enemy,  however,  continued  quiet.  It  seemed  as  if  he 
considered  that  he  had  fulfilled  his  day's  task,  when,  by  sacri- 
ficing 0-Szoriy,  he  successfully  opposed  in  its  latter  period,  the 
counter-stroke  of  the  right  wing  of  our  army  against  his  left, 
which  he  had  challenged,  apparently  unintentionally,  by  his  own 
manoeuvres. 


CHAPTER   LXVI. 

After  returning  from  the  battle-field  to  my  lodgings,  I  re- 
mained, by  the  doctor's  orders,  during  three  whole  days  without 
the  least  knowledge  of  current  events,  nay  was  even  kept  aloof 
from  every  matter  connected  with  the  service,  and  did  not  learn 
till  the  evening  of  the  5th  of  July,  and  then  only  accidentally, 
the  causes  by  which  the  departure  of  our  main  army  from  Komorn 
to  Ofen  had  meanwhile  been  delayed. 

On  that  evening  an  officer  of  the  head -quarters  returned  from 
Pesth  to  Komorn,  and  expressed  a  desire  to  communicate  to  me 
orally  certain  private  news  which  I  was  impatiently  expecting. 
The  doctor  gave  his  consent  to  this ;  and  the  officer,  not  aware 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  447 

that  it  had  been  forbidden  to  any  one  to  speak  in  my  presence 
about  the  public  affairs  of  the  day,  incidentally  mentioned  some 
of  the  late  occurrences  at  Pesth  :  a  serenade  in  honor  of  Lieuten- 
ant-general Dembinski — the  substance  of  several  public  speeches 
delivered  on  the  occasion,  partly  to,  partly  by  the  individual  cel- 
ebrated, directed  against  me,  and  such. like.  As  a  natural  con- 
sequence of  these  communications,  it  was  no  longer  possible  to 
keep  secret  from  me  what  had  happened  at  the  main  army  since 
my  being  wounded. 

On  the  2d  of  July,  1849,  immediately  after  the  battle — so  I 
now  learnt — General  Klapka,  as  well  as  every  separate  com- 
mander of  corps  of  the  main  army,  received  a  government  dis- 
patch with  the  decree  of  the  governor  of  the  country,  Kossuth, 
dated  the  1st  of  July,  1849,  wherein  the  appointment  of  Field- 
marshal  Lieutenant  Meszaros  as  commander-in-chief  of  all  the 
troops  in  Hungary  was  announced,  and  the  army  called  upon  to 
render  obedience  to  him.  Simultaneously  Kossuth's  decree,  ad- 
dressed to  me  personally,  arrived  at  my  head-quarters,  by  virtue 
of  which  I  was  removed  from  the  army,  to  devote  myself  from 
that  time  exclusively  to  the  management  of  the  war-ministerial 
business. 

In  the  situation  of  the  m.ain  army  with  regard  to  discipline  as 
well  as  strategy  this  government  measure,  considered  in  itself, 
nevertheless,  made  not  the  least  change  :  for  Klapka  was  already, 
without  it,  in  consequence  of  my  sudden  unfitness  for  service,  as 
the  oldest  general  in  rank  of  the  main  army,  for  the  time  being, 
likewise  its  real  commander-in-chief;  and  as,  on  the  one  hand, 
he  had  been  informed  by  me  personally  of  the  decision  of  the 
ministerial  council  to  lead  the  main  army  without  delay  from 
Komorn  to  Ofen  ;  on  the  other  hand  had  received  no  counter-order 
from  the  commander-in-chief  Meszaros  ;  and  finally,  as  the  first 
army  corps  had  reached  Komorn  by  the  3d,  or  at  latest  the  4th 
of  July  ; — it  would  in  any  case  have  been  General  Klapka's  duty 
to  arrange  for  the  march  of  the  army  from  Komorn  to  Ofen  at 
the  latest  by  nightfall  between  the  4th  and  5th  of  July. 

My  recall  from  the  command  of  the  army,  and  the  nomination 
of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Meszaros  as  commander-in-chief  of  all 
the  Hungarian  troops,  appeared,  however — so  I  was  further  in- 
formed— to  the  commanders  of  corps  and  their,  officers  not  to  be 
sufficiently  justified  either  by  Kossuth's  plenitude  of  power,  or  by 


448  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  assent  of  the  ministerial  council,  but  least  of  all  by  the  well- 
known  services  as  general  of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Meszaros  ;  and 
General  Klapka  was  thereby  determined  for  the  present  to  delay 
the  departure  of  the  army,  but  at  the  same  time  summoned  the 
commanders  of  corps,  divisions,  and  bodies  of  troops,  nay  even 
deputies  of  the  officers  of  the  divers  bodies,  to  a  conference  upon 
the  government  measure. 

The  result  of  this  meeting  was — so  it  was  further  reported  to 
me — a  written  declaration,  in  the  name  of  the  army,  to  the  gov- 
ernor of  the  country,  Kossuth,  in  favor  of  my  still  continuing  at 
the  head  of  the  army  ;  and  the  appointment  by  the  assembly  of 
Generals  Klapka  and  Nagy-Sandor  to  present  this  document  to 
Kossuth  in  person. 

When  all  this  came  to  my  knowledge  on  the  evening  of  the 
5th  of  July,  Generals  Klapka  and  Nagy-Sandor  were  just  expected 
back  from  their  mission. 

They  soon  returned  with  the  government  decree,  which  en- 
joined on  me  as  a  duty  to  choose  between  withdrawing  from  the 
war-ministry,  or  quitting  the  chief  command  of  the  main  army. 

The  unequivocal  proofs  of  esteem  and  confidence  which  had 
just  been  given  me  by  the  generals,  staff  and  superior  officers  of 
the  main  army,  decided  me — on  the  supposition  that  I  should 
soon  again  be  fit  for  service — to  secure  to  myself  the  reversion  of 
the  chief  command  of  the  main  army,  that  is,  without  delay  to 
send  in  my  resignation  as  war-minister. 

At  the  same  time  I  learned  from  Klapka  that  the  government 
in  Pesth  had  resolved,  on  the  proposal  of  Dembinski,  whom  the 
commander-in-chief  Meszaros  had  made  his  alter  ego,  to  concen- 
trate the  whole  mobile  force  on  the  Maros  and  lower  Theiss,  and 
only  from  thence  to  attempt  the  reconquest  of  Hungary.  Should, 
however,  this  attempt  miscarry,  it  was  to  be  repeated  from  Tran- 
sylvania, after  a  retreat  had  been  efiected  thither,  with  still  more 
concentrated  strength. 

In  consequence  of  this  communication  I  directed  General  Klap- 
ka, the  commanders  of  corps,  and  the  chief  of  the  central  office 
of  operations,  to  assemble  at  my  quarters  on  the  following  day, 
in  order  to  advise  with  them  about  the  next  operations  of  the 
main  army. 

It  can  hardly  affect  the  formation  of  a  correct  judgment  upon 
the  result  of  this  consultation,  which  will  be  afterward  comrau- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  449 

nicated,  if  I  previously  state,  how,  since  the  moment  when  the 
government  deputies  (Csanyi,  Aulich,  and  Ernest  Kiss)  left  Ko- 
morn  with  my  promise  to  lead  the  army  with  all  possible  speed 
to  Ofen,  I  viewed  my  situation  in  general,  and  how  in  particular 
Field-marshal  Lieut.  Meszaros'  nomination  as  commander-in- 
chief  in  connection  with  my  simultaneous  recall  from  the  army. 

The  reader  is  aware  that  on  the  30th  of  June  I  had  declared 
by  letter  to  the  governor  of  the  country,  Kossuth,  that  I  was 
fighting  not  for  the  government,  but  for  the  nation,  and  that  I 
was  even  prepared  for  its  advantage  to  lay  down  my  arms  ;  or, 
in  other  terms,  that  I  had  refused  unconditional  obedience  to 
Kossuth. 

Now,  while  this  declaration  was  being  forwarded  from  Komorn 
to  Pesth,  the  just-mentioned  government  deputies  were  on  their 
way  from  Pesth  to  Komorn,  to  induce  me  to  yield  to  the  govern- 
ment. After  having  succeeded,  they  returned  immediately  to 
Pesth. 

In  the  mean  time,  however,  my  written  declaration  of  the  30th 
of  June  must  have  reached  the  governor  of  the  country,  Kossuth ; 
and  I  foresaw  that,  supported  by  it,  in  spite  of  my  later  verbal 
one,  which  Csanyi,  Aulich,  and  Ernest  Kiss  were  to  convey  to 
him,  he  would  risk  any  thing  in  order  to  remove  me  from  the 
main  army,  I  likewise  did  not  for  a  moment  doubt  of  his  suc- 
cess. The  sole  obstacle  he  might  have  to  encounter  in  attain- 
ing this  object  would  be  the  non-assent  of  the  ministerial  council. 
But  it  was  not  unknown  to  me,  that  among  my  colleagues  there 
was  only  one  who  possessed,  on  the  one  hand,  the  necessary  con- 
fidence in  me,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  courage  to  vote  against 
my  recall  from  the  army,  when  Kossuth  should  demand  it.  I 
had  consequently  to  be  prepared  for  being  removed  from  the 
chief  command,  in  spite  of  my  verbal  promise  to  march  the  main 
army  from  Komorn  to  Ofen,  and  felt  the  necessity  of  giving  a 
public  account  of  my  acts  for  Hungary  up  to  that  time. 

But  as  a  diversified  fate  prospectively  awaited  me  when  far 
from  the  army,  and  as,  I  confess,  I  did  not  expect  a  favorable 
one,  nay,  as  I  had  even  sufficient  reason  to  apprehend  that  the 
public  justification  of  what  I  had  hitherto  done  and  left  undone 
would  subsequently  be  scarcely  possible  for  me — I  availed  my- 
self of  the  time  still  left  me  during  the  liberty  of  my  person,  to 
put  this  justification  on  paper,  that  it  might  be  ready  in  case  of 


450  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

my  being  recalled — an  order  which  I  was  nevertheless  determined 
to  obey  at  any  risk. 

Very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July  I  began  to  draw 
up  the  justificatory  document  in  the  following  terms  : 

"  From  the  Minister  of  War  and  Commander-in-Chief  to  the  Council  of 
Ministers  at  Buda-Pesth.* 

"  Komorn,  July  2,  1849. 

"  During  the  advance  of  the  Hungarian  army  from  the  Theiss  to  the 
Danube,  nobody  in  Hungary  had  the  courage,  or  even  the  assurance,  to 
believe  in  a  fortunate  issue  of  this  campaign.  Nay,  after  the  battle  of 
Isaszeg,  the  affairs  of  Hungary,  independently  of  the  Eussian  invasion, 
were  still  in  so  critical  a  condition,  that  only  persons  richly  endowed  with 
a  happy  imagination  and  with  optimist  credulity  could  give  themselves  up 
to  the  visionary  illusion,  that  Hungary  was  saved,  and  could  now  freely 
act  for  itself. 

"  Vain  was  my  warning  voice,  not  to  become  elated  with  good  fortune, 
but  to  think  how  we  might  ourselves  be  strengthened,  and  not  to  provoke 
the  enemy  by  arrogance.  Vain  was  the  conviction,  which  I  then  expressed 
before  the  present  governor  of  the  country,  that  the  army,  although  the 
historical  devotion  of  the  Hungarians  to  their  king  had  suffered  a  sensible 
shock  through  the  octroyed  constitution,  was  nevertheless  fighting  mainly 
for  the  preservation  of  the  advantages  acquired  in  March,  1848.  In  vain 
I  adduced  in  proof,  that  if  King  Ferdinand  V.  of  Hungary,  even  immedi- 
ately after  a  victorious  battle,  suddenly  appeared  before  the  ranks  of  the 
champions  for  Hungarian  liberty,  confidently  demanding  from  them  pro- 
tection and  a  re-establishment  in  his  former  rights — the  greater  part  of  the 
Hungarian  army  at  once  and  unconditionally  doing  homage  to  the  king,  of 
their  own  free  impulse,  and  actuated  by  a  certain  sentiment  of  justice — the 
other  part,  the  so-called  republican  party,  at  all  events  the  smaller,  doing 
the  same  after  a  short  consideration,  would  make  his  cause  their  own.  Vain 
was  it  for  me  to  maintain  that,  although  more  profound  politicians  than 
myself  saw  Hungary's  future  prosperity  blooming  on  the  field  of  indepen- 
dence exclusively,  nay,  in  total  separation  from  the  house  of  Hapsburg- 
Lorraine,  this  separation  must  not  be  forced,  precipitate,  but  follow  as  a 
necessary  consequence  from  the  events  themselves,  and  be  in  some  measure 
demanded  by  them;  that,  in  a  word,  a  battle  won  was  the  best  declaration 
of  independence,  and  that  this,  proclaimed  in  the  name  of  the  nation,  would 
only  then  be  advisable  when  in  the  whole  domain  of  Hungary  an  enemy 
was  no  longer  to  be  found,  and  Austria  should  even  then  continue  obstinately 
to  refuse,  as  hitherto,  any  peaceable  arrangement.  It  was  in  vain  that  I 
represented  to  the  present  governor  of  the  country,  when  asked  my  opinion 
about  his  intended  motion  of  the  declaration  of  independence,  that  the  army 
still  contained  very  numerous  elements  which  were  kept  together  only  by 
the  oath  taken  to  the  constitution. 

*  This  document  is  communicated  in  its  original  composition,  with  all  the  faults  of 
style,  here  and  there  even  running  counter  to  logic,  of  a  hasty  rough-draft  drawn  up  amid 
disturbing  influences  ;  because  it  can  have  any  value  as  an  historical  document  only  as 
it  was  originally  written. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  451 

"In  spite  of  all  these  true  and  well-founded  representations,  the  14th 
of  April  nevertheless  saw  the  light.  At  the  commencement  I  had  only  one 
answer  to  it,  that  the  nation  was  thereby  inevitably  committed  to  a  strug- 
gle for  life  or  death,  after  it  had,  on  the  14th  of  Apiil,  destroyed  all  the 
bridges  behind  itself,  nay  had  even  rendered  impossible  any  negotiations 
with  Austria,  founded  on  the  advantages  acquired  in  March,  1848. 

''The  Sarlo  19th  of  April,  when  tli#  Hungarian  arras  were  victorious, 
seemed  to  have  given  the  consecration  of  life  to  the  Debreczin  14th  of 
April ; — from  all  parts  declarations  of  homage  streamed  into  the  columns 
of  the  Kdzlony^  as  so  many  magnanimous  resolutions  to  partake  in  the 
struggle  for  life  or  death.  Only  that  army  whose  victories  at  Hatvan, 
Bicske,  and  Isaszeg  seemed  to  have  called  forth  the  14th  of  April;  that 
army  whose  pre-supposed  sympathy  for  the  total  separation  from  Austria 
is  said  to  have  caused  the  ultimate  result  of  the  debate  which  preceded  the 
14th  of  April ;  that  army,  by  whose  desire — pretended  to  have  existed — 
to  originate,  by  means  of  its  own  dictatorial  authority,  something  similar 
to  the  1 4th  of  April,  the  still- irresolute  representatives  were  frightened,  and 
as  it  were  morally  forced  to  the  decision  of  the  14th  of  April — that  army 
was  silent.  From  it  no  document  of  homage  was  exhibited  in  the  columns 
of  the  Kozlony.  That  army  was  silent ;  for  it  could  not  approve  that  its 
mission  to  deliver  the  nation,  already  so  difficult,  should  be  rendered  still 
more  so  :  it  was  silent,  and  nevertheless  shed  its  blood  at  Komorn,  on  the 
ramparts  of  Ofen,  at  Raab,  Csorna,  in  the  mountain-towns,  on  this  and  the 
other  side  of  the  Waag,  and  in  the  Great  Schiitt,  with  a  devotedness  pe- 
culiar to  it,  for  the  cause  of  the  oppressed  people. 

"  Where,  on  the  contrary,  are  the  voters  and  authors  of  those  number- 
less documents  of  homage,  who  appeared  at  first  to  abash  the  army — whose 
examples  of  written  glowing  enthusiasm  for  the  combat  for  life  or  death 
were  represented  as  in  some  measure  a  reproach  to  the  still-silent  army  by 
the  present  governor  of  the  country,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  me — ^what  has 
become  of  these  resolute  combatants  for  life  or  death?  What  resistance 
did  the  enthusiastic  Debreczin,  the  cradle  of  the  14th  of  April,  make  to  a 
column  of  4000  Cossacks  ?  Did  it  imitate  the  noble  example  of  Erlau  after 
the  battle  at  Kapolna,  which,  without  assistance,  expelled  the  victorious 
enemy,  who  had  penetrated  into  it  ?  or  did  it  in  consequence  of  a  disastrous 
combat  become  a  second  Brescia  ? 

"  The  army,  with  that  sound  judgment  which  is  mostly  acquired  on  the 
field  of  battle,  has  considered  all  these  declarations  of  homage  as  nothing 
more  than  what  they  really  are — the  bending  of  a  feeble  reed  exposed  to 
the  wind  ;  and  therefore  all  these  documents  could  not  banish  from  this 
true  army  of  martyrs  the  gloomy  feeling  that  the  14th  of  April  was  pre- 
cipitate, nay  more  than  precipitate — the  arrogant  challenge  to  a  far  stronger 
enemy.     Therefore  the  army  was  silent,  and  myself  with  it " 

Here  the  thunder  of  the  artillery  from  the  hostile  attack  on 
our  intrenchments  at  the  Monostor  interrupted  me ;  and  in  con- 
sequence of  the  state  of  physical  suffering  in  which  I  returned 
from  the  battle-field,  the  justificatory  document,  of  which  the 
introduction  has  just  been  given,  remained  incomplete. 


452  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

The  communication  of  this  unfinished  original  rough-draft, 
and  the  cause  of  its  origin,  will  suffice  I  think  to  prove,  that  I 
did  not  give  way  to  the  illusion  that  Kossuth  would  he  induced 
to  consider  my  previous  written  declaration  of  the  30th  of  June 
as  superseded  hy  my  subsequent  promise  to  lead  the  main  army 
without  delay  from  Komorn  t»  Ofen.  Moreover,  I  most  decidedly 
did  not  give  this  promise  with  the  intention  of  diverting  from 
myself  the  consequences  of  that  written  declaration,  but  solely 
and  exclusively  in  the  hope,  awakened  by  Csanyi  and  Aulich's 
animated  assurances  that  there  lay  at  the  bottom  of  the  concen- 
tration of  the  Hungarian  forces  near  the  capitals  some  well-con- 
sidered resolution  taken  by  the  government  exclusively  for  the 
welfare  of  the  country-; — that  a  retreat  behind  the  Theiss  and 
Maros  was  the  real  object,  I  did  not  learn,  as  has  been  men- 
tioned, till  the  5th  of  July,  through  Klapka. 

I  did  not  misapprehend  the  situation  in  which  I  had  placed 
Kossuth  by  my  written  declaration  of  the  30th  of  June.  On  the 
contrary,  I  saw  that,  after  this  declaration,  there  remained  for 
him,  as  Governor  of  the  country,  only  one  of  two  things — either 
to  resign,  or  to  remove  me.  There  was  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  he  would  choose  the  former  :  I  expected  the  latter. 

However,  after  Csanyi  and  Aulich  had  so  warmly  espoused  the 
side  of  Kossuth,  I  could  as  little  expect  the  nomination  of  Field- 
marshal  Lieut.  Meszaros  for  commander-in-chief,  as,  after  the 
unfortunate  days  of  Pered  and  Raab,  I  could  have  anticipated 
the  determined  interference  of  the  main  army  in  favor  of  my 
continuing  at  its  head. 

This  behavior  of  the  main  army  might,  after  all,  have  sur- 
prised Kossuth  not  less  than  it  did  myself;  a  proof  of  which  is, 
the  extremely  false  position  in  which  he  put  himself  in  his  first 
fright  about  it,  when  a  few  days  after  my  categorical  recall  from 
the  army,  he  left  it  to  my  own  judgment  to  decide  whether  I 
would  continue  or  not  in  the  chief  command — of  course  only  over 
the  main  army. 

In  passing,  I  must  here  mention  a  circumstance,  the  investiga- 
tion of  which  seems  to  me  calculated  to  shed  a  ray  of  light  on 
the  darkness  of  the  history  of  those  days. 

Kossuth  officially  justified  my  recall  from  the  army  by  the 
necessity  of  putting  an  end  to  the  neglected  state  into  which  the 
war-ministry  had  fallen  during  my  sojourn  with  the  army  ;  Twn- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  453 

officially,  by  my  having  broken  my  word,  given  to  the  govern- 
ment deputies,  to  march  the  army  without  delay  from  Komorn 
to  Ofen. 

The  official  motive  deserves  no  attention  whatever  for  the  very 
reason  that  Kossuth  himself  deemed  moreover  a  non-official  one 
necessary. 

The  latter,  however,  was  alike  superfluous  and  incorrect. 

Superfluous,  because  my  written  declaration  of  the  30th  of 
June  fully  sufficed  to  justify  in  a  government  point  of  view  my 
recall  from  the  army  :  incorrect,  because  it  was  an  anachronism, 
and  so  of  itself  invalid;  for  my  recall  from  the  army,  and  the 
nomination  of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Meszaros  as  commander-in- 
chief,  dated  from  the  1st  of  July,  1849,  and  on  that  day — as  is 
evident  from  the  conclusion  of  Chapter  LXIV. — Kossuth  might 
indeed  arbitrarily  assume  that  I  would  break  my  promise  to  march 
the  army  as  speedily  as  possible  to  Ofen,  but  could  by  no  means 
assert  that  I  had  already  broken  it,  unless  this  assertion  should 
be  based  on  facts  which  on  the  1st  of  July  lay  still  concealed  in 
the  lap  of  the  future. 

Now,  however,  Kossuth — as  I  apprehend  the  matter — -justified 
my  recall  from  the  army  by  my  presumed  breach  of  promise,  and 
not  by  my  refractory  declaration,  because  the  latter  was  based  on 
the  injury  done  to  the  interests  of  the  nation. 

In  the  same  letter  of  the  30th  of  June,  in  which  I  had  made 
this  refractory  declaration,  I  mentioned  likewise  the  well-known 
conflagration-decree,  and  maintained  that  the  nation  now  no 
longer  knew  against  whom  it  had  to  defend  itself,  whether 
against  the  Russians,  the  Austrians,  or  against  the  Hungarians 
themselves. 

Thus  Kossuth  undeniably  feared  the  public  discussion  of  the 
various  reasons  for  my  refractory  declaration,  and  thought  it  con- 
sequently more  advisable  to  base  my  recall  from  the  army  on  a 
fictitious  motive,  instead  of  on  the  only  real  one. 

But  while  Kossuth  was  thus  endeavoring,  in  an  oflicial  and 
non-official  way,  to  prevent  the  logical  connection  between  his 
conflagration-decree  and  my  refusal  blindly  to  obey  him  from 
being  generally  known,  it  was  himself  who  conjured  up — espe- 
cially in  the  ranks  of  the  main  army — the  suspicion  against  him, 
that  he  had  removed  me  from  the  chief  command  merely  out  of 
rivalry,  if  not  even  out  of  personal  hatred.     Besides,  Kossuth  over- 


454  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

looked  the  iact,  that  the  appointment  of  Field-marshal  Lieut. 
Meszaros  as  commander-in-chief  was  equivalent  to  an  actual  con- 
firmation of  this  suspicion ;  and  that  by  this  choice  each  separate 
corps  of  the  main  army  must  feel  injured  in  the  person  of  its  im- 
mediate commander.  And  I  believe  I  shall  hardly  err  if  I  con- 
sider a  great  part  of  that  firmness  with  which  the  army  declared 
itself  against  my  being  recalled,  to  have  been  the  natural  conse- 
quence of  the  general  consternation  at  the  unlucky  choice  of  my 
successor.  This  consternation,  however,  Kossuth  might  certainly 
have  foreseen,  as  it  was  by  no  means  unknown  to  him  that  only 
one  was  in  still  worse  repute  with  the  army  as  a  general  than 
Field-marshal  Lieut.  Meszaros,  and  that  this  one  was  no  other 
than  his  (Meszaros')  alter  ego,  Lieut. -general  Dembinski. 

Let  us  synoptically  recapitulate,  from  the  details  hitherto  com- 
municated, the  most  essential  events  at  Komorn,  together  with 
their,  causes  and  objects,  in  order  to  facilitate  still  more  the  com- 
prehension of  those  which  follow. 

From  Kossuth's  decree,  to  reduce  to  ashes  all  places,  as  soon 
as  we  should  be  forced  to  evacuate  them  before  the  enemy,  and 
from  his  refusal  to  join  the  main  army  at  Komorn,  I  had  become 
convinced  that  he  was  incapable  of  perceiving  what  the  nation 
was  at  that  moment  in  want  of;  incapable,  even  if  he  had  per- 
ceived it,  of  striving  for  it  at  the  sacrifice  of  his  personal  in- 
terests. 

The  influence  of  this  conviction  upon  my  acts  is  well  known. 
I  renounced  all  connection  with  Kossuth  ;  declared  this  undis- 
guisedly  to  himself;  and  thus  took  a  step  which  must  necessarily 
lead  to  an  open  rupture  between  him  and  me,  consequently  pro- 
spectively to  my  defeat,  as  I  took  this  step  for  myself  alone,  with- 
out the  privity  of  any  part  of  the  main  army. 

I  had  no  made  party  behind  me.  Kossuth  alone  could  make 
a  party  for  me,  as  matters  stood.  And  he  did  so — not  perhaps 
by  my  removal  from  the  chief  command  of  the  army,  but  by 
transferring  it  to  the  duumvirate  Meszaros-Dembinski ;  a  meas- 
ure which  must  be  severely  blamed  even  by  his  warmest  par- 
tisans in  the  ranks  of  the  main  army. 

The  guarantee  which  Csanyi  and  Aulich — men  whom  I  highly 
esteemed — gave  for  Kossuth,  shook  my  conviction  of  his  moral 
weakness. 

I  saw  that  the  decisive  step  which  I  had  taken  against  him  in 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  455 

consequence  of  this  conviction — pernicious  to  me  alone,  if  Kossuth 
showed  himself  worthy  of  the  guarantee  of  these  honorable  men 
— had  been  precipitate  ;  but  I  could  not  undo  it. 

I  promised  to  march  the  army  to  Ofen,  and  was  determined  to 
do  so,  solely  on  the  ground  that  Csanyi  and  Aulich  had  shaken 
my  conviction  of  Kossuth's  moral  weakness. 

Kossuth  alone  could  confirm  again  wad.  forever  this  conviction. 
He  did  so — not  perhaps  by  my  removal  from  the  chief  command 
over  the  army,  but  by  transferring  it  to  the  duumyjrate  Meszaros- 
Dembinski  ;  a  measure  from  which,  in  my  opinion,  there  was 
not  the  least  probability  of  the  nation  deriving  advantage  :  not 
the  prospect  of  thereby  again  nailing  victory  to  the  tri-color  ban- 
ner— for  both  men  had  already  succeeded,  by  their  previous  serv- 
ices in  the  field,  in  placing  it  beyond  all  doubt,  that  they  were 
as  unfortunate  generals  as  they  were  personally  brave  soldiers  : 
not  the  probability  of  thereby  restoring  the  disturbed  unity  in  the 
chief  command — for  the  main  army,  moreover,  at  that  moment 
commanded  by  a  partisan  of  the  government,  General  Klapka, 
was  just  then  in  open  opposition  to  the  execution  of  this  measure. 

Nay,  I  was  not  even  able  to  justify  this  measure  by  the  sup- 
position that  Kossuth  firmly  believed  that  Hungary  was  saved, 
so  soon  as  he  Jmnself  should  exert  an  immediate  influence  on  the 
supreme  direction  of  the  war-operations — and  that  he  was  de- 
termined to  secure  for  himself,  at  any  price,  the  possibility  of 
exercising  such  an  influence  ;  for  if  this  was  really  his  belief  (no 
matter  whether  illusion  or  not  illusion),  he  ought  not  to  have 
delayed  a  moment,  but  have  hastened  in  person  to  Komom,  in 
order  to  secure  to  himself,  before  every  thing  else,  the  obedience 
of  the  main  army. 

Meszaros  and  Dembinski  consequently  were  indebted  for  the 
honor  of  being  played  as  last  trump,  with  the  motto  "  for  the 
salvation  of  the  country,"  neither  to  Kossuth's  belief  in  the  latter 
— for  Kossuth  had  positively  denied  this  belief  beforehand  by  his 
well-known  conflagration-decree  ;  nor  to  Kossuth's  anxious  care 
for  the  preservation  of  the  honor  of  the  national  arms — for  it  was 
riot  unknown  to  Kossuth  that  this  had  hitherto  been  the  most 
exposed  by  Meszaros  and  Dembinski ;  nor  to  Kossuth's  zealous 
striving  for  unity  in  the  army — unity  implies  confidence,  but  the 
main  army  had  already  with  sufficient  clearness  given  Kossuth 
to  uiulcrstand,  that  there  existed  in  its  ranks  not  a  vestige  of 


456  Mr  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

confidence  in  Meszaros  and  Dembinski ;  nor  in  general  to  any 
intention  whatever  of  Kossuth's  that  I  could  perceive,  v^^hich 
did  not  appear  favorable  directly  to  his  personal  interest — to 
that  of  the  nation,  on  the  contrary,  only  on  extravagant  sup- 
positions. 

To  this  comfortless  conclusion  I  was  moreover  unfortunately 
brought  by  my  consideration  of  the  real  worth  of  that  plan  of 
operations  which — communicated  to  me  by  Klapka,  as  is  known 
— projected  by  Dembinski,  and  accepted  by  Kossuth  and  the 
ministerial  council,  laid  down  as  the  next  step  the  concentration 
of  all  the  Hungarian  forces  at  the  Maros  and  lower  Theiss,  and 
at  the  same  time  leaving  behind  in  Komorn  about  20,000  men, 
in  order  then,  as  it  continued,  to  destroy  with  united  power  the 
Russians  and  Austrians  tour  a  tour  ;  or  if  this  should  not  succeed, 
to  gain,  in  the  further  retreat  to  Transylvania,  the  last  point  of 
the  final  reconquest  in  Hungary. 

This  plan  of  operations,  in  my  opinion,  contained  glaring  con- 
tradictions. 

Dembinski  intended  the  concentration  of  our  forces  opposite 
one  of  the  concentric  attacks  of  the  enemy ;  since  the  sum  total 
of  our  force  was  insufl[icient  effectively  to  encounter  all  of  them 
simultaneously. 

Concentric  attacks  are  hardly  ever  so  managed  as  that  corps 
of  equal  strength  advance  on  the  offensive  on  all  the  lines  of  opera- 
tions. The  reason  of  this  lies  first  of  all  in  the  essentially  differ- 
ent importance  of  the  converging  lines  of  offensive  operations ; 
which  difference,  again,  is  partly  permanent,  depending  on  un- 
changeable strategic  local  circumstances,  partly  merely  transient, 
contingent  on  the  plan  of  operations  of  the  assailant. 

The  first  duty  of  a  general  who  would  successfully  oppose  a 
numericall)'^  superior  concentric  offensive  is,  to  discover  the  prin- 
cipal attack,  and  next  to  oppose  it  with  all  his  might ;  while 
the  defensive,  opposed  to  the  secondary  attacks,  is  reduced  even, 
in  case  of  necessity,  to  mere  observing.  But  if  two  principal 
attacks  are  to  be  opposed,  each  of  which  singly,  combined  with 
the  secondary  attacks,  suflices  to  peril  the  victorious  issue  of  the 
defensive,  and  the  enemy  threatens  moreover  to  surround  com- 
pletely ;  then  the  only  choice  left  is  between  "  va-banque''  and 
"  suddenly  giving  up  the  defense  of  the  country,  to  gain  a  safe 
asylum  beyond  it." 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  457 

If  he  chooses  ''  va-banque,'^  then  one  of  the  two  principal 
attacks — and  this  commonly  that  which  is  furthest  removed  from 
the  centre-point  of  his  own  force — must  meanwhile  be  treated  as 
a  secondary  attack. 

If  he  prefers  "  gaining  an  asylum,"  then  both  principal  attacks 
are  to  be  avoided  betimes,  the  forces  to  be  concentrated  against  a 
secondary  attack,  which  will  be  repelled,  and  thereby  the  line 
of  retreat  to  a  neutral  territory  secured. 

In  the  first  case  all  may  be  won,  but  all  may  also  be  lost — 
except  military  honor  :  this  is  forever  secured  ;  and,  observe,  the 
honor  of  those  arms,  on  whose  sharpness  indeed  the  cause  of  a 
nation  exclusively  depends,  is  the  honor  of  the  nation  itself. 

In  the  other  case  there  is  nothing  more  to  lose ;  because  there 
every  thing  else,  military  honor  included — except  an  unendan- 
gered  retreat  from  the  theatre  of  war — had  already  been  exposed. 

To  unite  both  cases  is  strategically  as  well  as  morally  impossi- 
ble. 

Hungary  was  concentrically  attacked.  Secondary  attacks  were 
undertaken,  in  the  northeast  (Marmaros),  east  (Transylvania), 
south  (Banat  and  Bacska),  southwest  (the  Schiimeg  and  Zalad 
comitate),  and  in  the  north  (Arva).  Principal  attacks,  in  the 
west  (on  the  upper  Danube),  in  the  n^rth  (on  the  upper  Theiss). 

Each  of  the  two  principal  attacks  separately  considered — com- 
bined with  the  secondary  attacks  just  enumerated — certainly  suf- 
ficed to  make  very  doubtful  the  final  success  of  the  defense  of  the 
country;  the  danger  of  being  inclosed  on  all  sides  also  was  not 
to  be  mistaken ;  and  only  in  the  southeast  a  neutral  territory 
offered  a  safe  asylum,  but  on  the  way  thither  the  directions  of 
the  southern  and  eastern  secondary  attacks  crossed  each  other — 
the  hostile  fortress  of  Temesvar  stood  I 

Thus,  a  few  days  after  the  battle  of  P^red,  was  the  situation 
of  Hungary  viewed  by  me. 

I  consequently  now  saw  before  us  only  the  alternative  of  "  va- 
bmique"  or  "  retreat  into  Turkey ;"  chose  the  first,  and  brought 
forward  in  the  ministerial  council  of  the  26th  of  June  my  pro- 
posal to  seek  immediately  a  final  decision  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Danube,  in  a  desperate  attack  on  the  main  army  of  the 
Austrians  alone  ;  and  meanwhile  merely  to  observe  the  principal 
attack  of  the  Russians,  and  to  stay  it  in  its  further  advance  at 
most — if  possible — by  opening  negotiations. 

U 


458  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Nevertheless  Kossuth  might  consider  the  retreat  into  Turkey 
far  more  suitable  to  circumstances. 

And  the  protection  of  this  retreat  was  the  peculiar  and  sole 
value  of  Dembinski's  plan  of  operations. 

In  it  I  found  the  theory  above  shortly  developed — of  the  sudden 
giving  up  (in  the  operations)  of  the  defense  of  the  country,  to 
gain  a  safe  asylum  beyond  it — sentence  after  sentence  practically 
applied ;  for  the  concentration  of  the  whole  Hungarian  force 
(deducting  about  20,000  men  as  garrison  for  Komorn)  at  Szegedin, 
on  the  point  of  contact  of  the  lines  of  the  Maros  and  lower  Theiss, 
while  the  Russian  main  army  was  stationed  at  Miskolcz,  the 
Austrian  at  Komorn,  evidently  meant — to  avoid  betimes  both 
principal  attacks  :  and  that  Dembinski  would  succeed  by  this 
operation  in  repelling  the  southern  secondary  attack — that  mainly 
menacing  Szegedin,  consequently  his  line  of  retreat  into  Turkey 
— (the  Austrian  southern  ^my  under  Ban  Baron  Jellachich), 
and  thereby  secure  to  himself  and  his  patrons  a  passage  to  a 
neutral  territory,  of  this  I  did  not  for  a  moment  doubt. 

But  I  really  must  doubt  the  sincerity  of  the  assertion,  that  this 
concentration  on  the  Maros  and  lower  Theiss  was  only  the  strat- 
egic arrangement  for  the  destruction  of  both  hostile  main  armies; 
nay  even  that  the  further  retreat  to  Transylvania,  in  case  of  the 
M'orst,  was  7iothing  else  tlian  tJie  beginning  of  the  reconquest  of 
Hungary. 

For  if  Dembinski  was  in  earnest  about  the  ruin  of  the  hostile 
main  armies,  he  could  not  possibly  intend  to  begin  the  work  of 
destruction  simultaneously  against  both;  he  must  at  all  events 
be  content  to  destroy  them  separately,  one  after  the  other.  But 
then  he  could  not  overlook,  that  with  each  retrograde  step  toward 
Szegedin  he  made  the  accomplishment  of  this  task  progressively 
more  difficult ;  as  well  moreover  as  that  he  could  not  expect  any 
position  of  the  hostile  main  armies  to  be  more  favorable  than  that 
was  which  they  occupied  when  his  plan  of  operations  was  first 
projected — but  certainly  increasingly  more  unfavorable. 

For  at  that  time  the  Russian  army  was  posted  near  Miskolcz, 
the  Austrian  on  the  Czonczo  line,  consequently  separated  by  a 
distance  of  more  than  thirty  miles  and  the  Danube. 

General  Yysocki  retreating  before  the  Russian  main  army  with 
his  troops  could  reach  Komorn  by  means  of  forced  marches — 
leavins:  a  small  column  before  the  Russian  vanguard  to  observe 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  liUNGAUY.  459 

it — ere  the  main  body  of  the  Russians  crossed  the  Danube. 
Simultaneously  it  was  possible  also  for  the  Kmety  division  to 
rejoin  the  main  army  at  Komorn,  at  worst  by  Ofen ;  and  Lieut.- 
general  Dembinski  would  gain  consequently  at  Komorn,  the  local 
circumstances  being  very  favorable,  at  all  events  several  days' 
time  for  attacking  the  Austrian  army  with  force  and  probable 
success,  even  before  he  could  be  directly  assailed  by  the  Rus- 
sians. 

The  possibility  of  assuming,  under  equally  favorable  circum- 
stances, the  offensive  against  the  main  army  of  the  Austrians  or 
Russians,  according  to  Dembinski's  plan  of  operations,  could  not 
be  assumed,  either  at  a  later  period  or  in  another  quarter  of  the 
country — especially  at  Szegedin  or  on  the  way  thither  ;  because, 

1 .  The  strategic  position  of  both  hostile  main  armies  to  each 
other — as  has  already  been  pointed  out — with  each  new  day  and 
each  retrograde  step  of  Dembinski's  must  become  progressively 
more  unfavorable  for  his  offensive  intentions. 

2.  It  was  not  possible  for  Dembinski  to  concentrate  in  time 
with  an  offensive  intention  at  Szegedin,  or  on  the  way  thither,  a 
greater  number  of  troops  fit  for  action  than  at  Komorn. 

3.  Dembinski  immediately  after  leaving  Komorn  would  no- 
where find  those  favorable  local  circumstances,  partly  natural, 
partly  prepared,  which  favored  him  at  Komorn. 

Remark  upon  the  first  reason  :  the  two  hostile  main  armies 
were  stationed,  the  Austrians  on  the  Czonczo  line,  the  Russians 
near  Miskolcz,  at  an  almost  equal  distance  from  Szegedin,  the 
point  chosen  by  Dembinski — in  the  pretended  offensive  intention 
— for  the  concentration  of  the  Hungarian  forces.  Our  main 
army,  however,  was  encamped  at  and  north  of  Komorn,  con- 
sequently further  from  Szegedin  than  the  two  hostile  armies. 

The  larger  half  of  our  main  army,  ordered  to  the  last-mention- 
ed point,  might,  it  is  true,  by  forced  marches,  not  only  overcome 
the  disadvantage  of  the  greater  distance,  but  even  gain  on  the 
hostile  main  armies  an  advance  of  two  or  three  days  on  the 
march  to  Szegedin.  This,  however,  did  not  in  the  least  prevent 
the  marching  likewise  of  the  latter  from  Miskolcz  and  the 
Czonczo  line  simultaneously  toward  Szegedin,  and  coming  during 
the  two-thirds  of  this  operation  so  near  each  other,  that  Dem- 
binski could  execute  no  offensive  stroke  whatever  against  either 
of  the  two   hostile  armies  without  being  himself  immediately 


460  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

attacked  by  the  other  in  much  shorter  time  than  this  seemed 
possible  at  Komorn. 

On  the  second  reason :  the  Hungarian  forces  were  distributed 
in  the  country,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  in  the  beginning  of 
July,  1849,  in  the  following  manner  : 

a.  The  main  army  (together  with  the  garrison  of  Komorn,  but 
without  the  Kmety  division),  about  45,000  men,  at  and  north  of 
Komorn.  (The  Kmety  division,  separated  from  it,  about  5000 
men,  in  the  district  of  Stuhlweissenburg). 

h.  The  Vysocki  corps,  from  9000  to  10,000  men,  between 
Pesth  and  Miskolcz. 

c.  The  Kazinczy  division,  from  6000  to  7000  men,  in  the 
Marmaros. 

d.  The  corps  of  the  reserve,  proposed  to  reach  10,000  men, 
partly  still  in  its  training  stations,  partly  about  concentrating 
itself  on  the  line  between  Pesth  and  Szolnok,  partly  already 
employed  as  reinforcements  of  the  following  corps  d'armee  : 

e.  The  army  of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Vetter  in  the  Banat  and 
the  Bacska. 

/.  The  army  of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bem  in  Transylvania. 

g.  The  troops  in  garrison  at  Peterwardein,  Arad,  Munkacs, 
,Deva. 

The  latter,  as  well  as  those  20,000  men  whom  Dembinski 
ordered  to  be  left  from  the  main  army  in  Komorn,  as  a  matter  of 
course  can  not  be  included  in  the  concentration  at  Szegedin ;  so 
likewise  the  Kazinczy  division,  because  Dembinski  would  expose 
himself  to  the  danger  of  being  attacked  by  both  hostile  main 
armies  in  Szegedin  itself,  in  case  he  should  mean  to  delay  the 
intended  offensive  until  the  arrival  thither  of  the  Kazinczy 
division.  Finally,  the  armies  under  Bem  and  Vetter  also  were 
just  as  little  at  his  disposal  for  the  offensive  concentration  round 
Szegedin  as  the  troops  of  occupation  and  the  Kazinczy  division, 
because  Dembinski  in  his  plan  of  operations  had  already  assigned 
to  each  of  them  its  quite  distinct  duty. 

For  the  army  of  Bem  had  to  defend  Transylvania  ;  while  that 
of  Vetter  had  to  guard  the  lower  Danube  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Theiss  as  far  as  Orsova,  to  destroy  Ban  Jellachich,  to  relieve 
Peterwardein,  to  conquer  the  plateau  of  Titel,  and  to  take 
Temesvar,  for  which  purpose  it  was  in  fact,  as  was  reasonable,  to 
be  strengthened  by  a  part  of  the  main  army  (the  Kmety  division). 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  461 

and  moreover,  unless  I  mistake,  also  by  some  sections,  already 
equipped  for  service,  of  the  corps  of  reserve.  Consequently  Dem- 
binski  could  not  think  either  of  employing  the  army  under  Bern 
in  an  offensive  from  the  Maros  or  lower  Theiss  against  the 
Russian  or  the  Austrian  main  body ;  because  Transylvania,  as 
the  last  point  for  the  reconquest  of  Hungary,  was  to  be  maintain- 
ed at  any  cost,  in  case  the  destruction  of  both  hostile  main  armies 
from  the  lower  Theiss  and  Maros  should  not  prove  successful : 
nor  could  he  calculate  on  the  co-operation  of  that  under  Vetter 
until  the  taking  of  Temesvar  and  Titel  was  effected  ;  because  the 
capture  of  both  was  indispensable,  according  to  his  plan  of  opera- 
tions, to  secure  the  basis  of  this  offensive.  But  if  Dembinski 
assumed  that  Yetter  would  not  need  more  time  for  the  reconquest 
of  the  plateau  of  Titel  and  the  fortress  of  Temesvar,  than  he  did 
for  the  concentration  at  Szegedin  of  his  remaining  disposable 
forces,  and  the  two  hostile  main  armies  for  simultaneously  and 
directly  menacing  this  point  of  concentration,  he  must  have  been 
far  more  sanguine  than  even  Kossuth,  which  seemed  to  me,  by 
the  way,  hardly  possible. 

Consequently  there  remained  to  Dembinski — having  destined 
the  Kmety  division  for  a  reinforcement  of  the  army  under  Vetter, 
and  20,000  men  from  the  main  army,  according  to  his  own 
orders,  to  be  left  as  garrison  in  Komorn — for  the  offensive  con- 
centration at  Szegedin  only — 

About 

Of  the  main  army 25,000  men. 

The  Vysocki  corps 10,000     " 

The  corps  of  reserve 10,000     " 

Total 45,000     " 

while  he  could  assemble  at  Komorn,  as  I  have  already  incidentally 
shown — 

About 

Of  the  main  army  (together  with  the  Kmety  di- 
vision, but  after  deducting  the  original  garri- 
son of  Komorn) 42,000  men. 

The  Vysocki  corps 10,000     " 

Total 52,000     " 

therefore  about  7000  more  than  at  Szegedin. 

In  this  comparison  I  have  intentionally  included  the  corps  of 


462  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

reserve  with  its  full  number  for  the  concentration  at  Szegedin, 
because  I  am  not  quite  certain  whether  any  of  its  divisions  were 
really  already  employed  to  strengthen  the  army  under  Vetter.  I 
have  also  purposely  omitted  to  take  into  account,  in  the  con- 
centration at  Komorn,  the  possibility  of  an  at  least  partial  junc- 
tion of  the  corps  of  reserve  ;  because,  after  all,  I  am  not  bound, 
in  justification  of  my  opinions,  to  stretch  probability  to  its  extreme 
limits. 

I  must  nevertheless  remark,  that  the  reserve  corps  of  10,000 
men,  reckoned  among  the  forces  for  Szegedin,  would  indeed 
numerically  correspond  to  an  equal  number  of  troops  of  the  main 
army  appropriated  to  Komorn,  but  could  by  no  means  be  con- 
sidered equivalent  to  them  in  respect  to  their  usefulness,  and  the 
dependence  to  he  placed  on  them  in  the  battle-field;  because  the 
corps  of  reserve — the  cadres  excepted — consisted  of  quite  raw 
recruits,  and  moreover  was  still  in  process  of  equipment.  If  this 
be  taken  into  consideration,  the  assertion  can  hardly  appear  un- 
founded, that  the  force  of  52,000  men  for  the  concentration  at 
Komorn — in  comparison  with  the  total  force  of  45,000  men 
estimated  for  that  at  Szegedin — even  under  otherwise  equal 
strategic  and  tactic  conjunctures,  would  lead  us  to  expect  with 
certainty  services  in  the  field  very  far  exceeding  its  numerical 
majority  of  7000  men. 

But  if  Dembinski  intended  to  increase  his  offensive  army  about 
to  be  concentrated  at  Szegedin  by  summoning  the  militia,  and 
believed  that  in  this  way  he  should  make  up  not  only  for  its 
numerical  but  also  for  its  moral  inferiority,  presenting  a  striking 
contrast  to  the  forces  which  could  be  concentrated  at  Komorn — 
he  resembled  the  farmer  who,  to  obtain  a  more  abundant  harvest, 
should  exchange  his  fruitful  fields  for  a  much  larger  extent  of 
sterile  ground,  and  would  undoubtedly  afterward  be  amazed  at 
the  absurdity  of  his  speculation. 

On  the  third  reason  :  the  simple  remark  will  perhaps  be  suffi- 
cient, that  Komorn,  considering  the  then  position  of  the  theatre 
of  war,  was  with  regard  to  the  offensive — for  of  this  alone  can 
we  here  speak,  after  Dembinski  had  so  decidedly  announced  the 
offensive  tendency  of  his  plan  of  operations — strategically  as  well 
as  tactically  the  most  important  point  in  the  country ;  that 
Komorn,  with  its  fortified  camp,  secured  to  Dembinski  the  possi- 
bility of  recommencing  anew,  even  should  it  repeatedly  miscarry, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  463 

the  offensive,  so  long  as  his  war  materials  and  his  moral  strength 
sufficed ;  that  at  Komorn  a  victory  over  our  army  could  never 
react  further  than  to  the  actual  point  whence  the  offensive  had 
been  commenced ;  while  the  untenahleness  of  Szegedin  and  of 
the  locality  around  it  presented  no  possibility  whatever,  consider- 
ing the  offensive  intended  to  be  undertaken  from  thence,  of  meet- 
ing successfully  the  destructive  consequences  to  our  army  of  a 
hostile  victory. 

These  are  the  most  essential  of  the  considerations  which  led 
me  to  the  conclusion,  that  Dembinski  had  been  occupied  least  of 
all  with  stiaXegic-qfensive  ideas  when  he  projected  his  plan  of 
operations,  and  that  he  himself  was  as  far  as  possible  from  be- 
lieving in  the  sincerity  of  his  protestation  that  the  retreat  to 
Szegedin,  proposed  by  him,  was  founded  on  an  offensive  intention 
against  one  of  the  two  hostile  main  armies. 

Finally,  the  idea  of  continuing  the  retreat,  if  things  came  to 
the  worst,  as  far  as  Transylvania,  and  thence  to  begin  the  recon- 
quest  of  Hungary,  scarcely  deserved,  I  should  think,  a  serious 
consideration.  After  all,  this  idea,  as  well  as  that  of  destroying 
both  the  hostile  main  armies  in  succession  from  Szegedin,  seemed 
to  have  been  placed  so  strikingly  in  the  foreground  merely  to 
mask — as  already  intimated — its  only  practical  tendency,  namely, 
to  secure  the  line  of  retreat  to  a  neutral  territory.  Thus  I  could 
assign  to  the  plan  of  operations  in  question  no  higher  value  than 
what  was  proper  to  that  practical  tendency. 

It  is  true,  in  superficially  considering  our  strategic  situation, 
there  might  be  joined  to  the  idea  of  concentrating  our  collective 
forces  on  the  Maros  and  lower  Theiss  the  assumption  that  thereby 
a  tenable  defensive  position  would  be  gained,  and  with  it  the 
possibility  of  saving  Hungary  by  prolonging  the  contest.  But 
this  assumed,  in  my  opinion,  at  least  that  the  main  force  of  the 
Austrians  remained  near  Komorn,  in  spite  of  the  departure, 
which  could  not  be  concealed,  of  the  greater  part  of  our  main 
army ;  further,  that  the  fortress  of  Temesvar  and  the  plateau  of 
Titel  came  into  our  possession  before  the  arrival  of  those  parts  of 
our  main  army  at  Szegedin  which  were  designed  for  the  concen- 
tration ;  finally,  that  the  longed-for  intervention  from  abroad  in 
favor  of  Hungary  be  in  train.  And  the  very  precariousness  of 
these  suppositions — indispensable  nevertheless  to  this  assumption 
— was  another  confirmation  of  my  perception  that  the  practical 


464  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

value  of  Dembinski's  plan  of  operations  consisted  solely  in  securing 
the  departure  of  several  individuals,  fi'om  the  country  already 
given  up  as  lost,  to  a  safe  asylum. 

Consequently  Kossuth — in  spite  of  his  repeated  asseverations, 
how  willingly  he  would  die  for  his  country — that  this  was  not 
even  a  merit  on  his  part,  as  he  could  not  live  either  abroad  or  in 
Hungary,  if  it  should  fall  into  slavery — in  spite  of  these  and 
similar  asseverations,  by  accepting  Dembinski's  plan  of  opera- 
tions, as  well  as  by  his  conflagration-decree  and  his  fear  of  trans- 
ferring himself  to  Koraorn — had  now  suddenly  betrayed  his 
double  intention,  in  the  first  place  to  save  his  own  life,  and  next, 
from  a  secure  distance,  continually  to  incite  thousands  after 
thousands  of  his  fellow-citizens  to  death  and  destruction  for  a 
principle,  for  which  he  himself,  however,  felt  not  the  least  voca- 
tion to  die.  I,  on  the  contrary,  was  convinced,  and  am  still,  that 
not  to  flinch  from  dying  for  a  cause,  for  which  we  have  incited 
or  led  thousands  of  our  fellow-citizens  to  die,  is  the  highest  honor 
we  can  do  ourselves  here  below  ;  I  was  further  convinced,  and 
am  still,  that,  considering  the  situation  of  Hungary  at  that  time, 
it  was  a  benefit  which  the  heads  of  the  revolution  ought  to  have 
conferred  on  their  country,  a  proof  of  regard  which  they  owed  to 
the  honor  of  their  nation,  by  the  exposure  of  their  own  lives  to 
bring  the  contest  speedily  to  an  end  which.,  although  unfortu- 
nate, could  not  have  been  inglorious. 

Penetrated  with  this  conviction,  I  had  recommended  the 
government  to  transfer  the  scene  of  the  final  decision  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Danube ;  had  blamed  the  repeated  summoning  of 
the  militia,  nay  even,  as  far  as  my  personal  influence  extended, 
had  actually  prevented  it ;  and  finally — when  I  was  constrained 
to  see  that  Kossuth  was  morally  incapable  of  participating  in  my 
conviction  and  acting  in  conformity  with  it — had  undisguisedly 
declared  to  him,  that  my  purpose  was  to  remain  at  Komorn,  even 
with  the  main  army  alone. 

Thereupon,  as  is  known,  I  was  removed  from  the  chief  com- 
mand. 

The  surprisingly  energetic  espousal  of  my  side  by  the  main 
army,  however,  procured  for  me  again  the  necessary  power  of 
acting  according  to  that  declaration ;  and  I  was  already  firmly 
resolved  to  do  so,  when  General  Klapka,  the  commanders  of 
corps  of  the  main  army,  and  the  chief  of  the  central  ofiice  of 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  465 

operations,  assembled  at  my  quarters  for  the  appointed  council 
of  war. 

I  had  nevertheless  not  to  over-estimate  the  significance  of  this 
espousal  of  my  side  by  the  main  army ;  had  by  no  means  to 
jnistake  the  considerable  share,  which  possibly,  nay  most  proba- 
bly, the  general  exasperation  at  the  choice  of  the  new  command- 
er-in-chief, and  perhaps  also  the  more  lively  friendly  feeling 
awakened  toward  me  in  consequence  of  my  having  been  wounded, 
might  have  had  in  occasioning  this  espousal  of  my  side ;  had, 
finally,  not  to  overlook  the  still-existing  dangerous  rocks  on  which 
my  project  might  founder. 

These  rocks  were,  first  of  all,  the  evident  sympathy  of  the  two 
oldest  generals  of  the  main  army  (Klapka  and  Nagy-Sandor)  for 
the  measures  of  the  government,  especially  for  those  just  men- 
tioned ;  ana  the  not-insignificant  influence  which  both  these  men 
in  their  high  position  (especially  General  Klapka  as  my  substitute 
in  the  command)  could  exert  on  the  disposition  of  the  army. 

The  circumstance  most  unfavorable  to  my  project,  however, 
was,  that  the  consequences  of  my  wound  prevented  me  from  per- 
sonally fulfilling  the  duties  of  commander ;  for  thus  I  was  com- 
pletely deprived  of  the  uncommon  advantage  of  prevailing  upon 
the  main  army  as  a  body,  by  the  double  power  of  an  energetic 
personal  guidance  and  my  own  example,  to  separate  its  further 
destiny  from  that  of  Kossuth — as  I  was  convinced,  an  absolutely 
honorable  course — not  from  that  of  the  nation. 

Had  I  been  at  this  time  fit  for  service,  or  should  I  soon  again 
have  been,  I  would  certainly  not  have  held  a  military  council, 
but,  knowing  the  power  of  deeds,  would  have  acted.  I  would 
now  have  led  the  united  artny  according  to  my  original  project 
— little  heeding  the  sympathies  of  Generals  Klapka  and  Nagy- 
Sandor — straightway  to  attack  the  position  of  the  Austrians ; 
and  simply  by  doing  so  should  most  certainly  have  paralyzed 
any  influence  exerted  by  those  generals  on  the  disposition  of  the 
army  hostile  to  my  project ;  for  then,  in  order  to  agitate  for  the 
retreat,  consequently  against  the  attack,  they  must  necessarily 
occupy  an  ambiguous  position  as  soldiers,  and  would  soon  find 
occasion  bitterly  to  repent  that  they  had  not  remained  silent. 

But  as  I  was  now  obliged  to  leave  the  actual  conduct  of  the 
army  to  General  Klapka,  and  was  at  the  same  time  convinced  that 
he  would  the  more  certainly  avail  himself  of  the  authority  of  the 


466  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

superior  command  against  my  will,  as  he  might  perceive  in  the 
decreed  concentration  at  Szegedin  a  homage  paid  to  his  own  idea 
of  protracting  the  combat,  in  the  confident  expectation  of  a  saving 
counter-intervention  of  the  west  of  Europe — a  corresponding  reso- 
lution of  the  military  council  appeared  to  me  to  be  the  only 
nieans  of  gaining  General  Klapka  to  the  execution  of  my  project ; 
and  I  might  moreover  be  contented,  that  General  Klapka  had 
not  beforehand  positively  denied  the  competency  of  the  military 
council,  called  together  by  me,  to  come  to  any  conclusion  contrary 
to  the  express  superior  command. 

Next,  all  depended  on  succeeding  in  obtaining  such  a  resolution 
of  the  military  council. 

This,  however,  appeared  to  me  to  be  no  easy  matter ;  for  I 
certainly  was  sensible  that  it  would  be  quite  impossible  to  mask 
the  real  basis  of  my  intention  to  seek  with  the  m*n  army  the 
final  decision  at  Komorn — namely,  my  utter  despair  of  the  possi- 
bility of  a  material  salvation  of  the  originally  just  cause  of  Hun- 
gary— so  soon  as  I  disclosed  this  intention  itself,  in  the  form  of  a 
proposition  for  debate,  to  the  military  council.  And  since  I  was 
convinced  in  respect  of  only  two  members  of  this  assembly,  that 
they  had  already  felt  like  myself  not  merely  the  impossibility  of 
a  material  salvation  of  the  cause  of  the  nation,  but  also  the  in- 
ward command  to  strive  for  its  moral  salvation,  or — which  is 
just  the  same — for  the  preservation  of  its  military  honor  at  all 
costs,  I  could  not  but  see  that  the  faintest  ray  of  hope  kindled  in 
the  minds  of  the  other  members  of  the  military  council — perhaps 
by  Klapka' s  inevitable  pointing  at  the  great  probability  of  a 
speedy  saving  counter- intervention — might  shake  my  proposal  to 
its  base,  and  cause  it  to  be  rejectedf 

In  order  to  prevent  this,  I  thought  it  advisable  to  conceal  the 
real  tendency  of  my  proposal — immediately  to  begin  the  offensive 
against  the  Austrians. 

Accordingly,  hoping  by  this  manoeuvre  to  weaken  Klapka's 
expected  objections  beforehand,  I  supported  my  proposal  by  start- 
ing from  Klapka's  opinion,  founded  on  the  illusory  belief  of  a 
saving  counter-intervention,  that  the  combat  should  be  protracted 
as  much  as  possible. 

The  principal  materials  for  supporting  this  view  I  drew  direct 
from  Dembinski's  plan  of  operations  just  spoken  of. 

I  began  by  exposing  those  faults  of  it  which  chiefly  rendered  a 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  467 

prolonged  energetic  defensive  doubtful,  and  called  the  attention 
of  the  council  especially  to  Dembinski's  serious  strategic  mistake 
of  having  chosen  the  Banat  as  the  basis  of  his  future  operations  ; 
a  part  of  the  country,  in  which — considering  that  for  the  most 
part  the  disposition  of  its  inhabitants  was  hostile  to  us — ^but  small 
resources  for  an  energetic  continuance  of  the  combat  could  be 
found  ;  of  which  the  lines  of  defense  (Maros  and  lower  Theiss) 
facing  the  two  principal  hostile  attacks  are  broken  in  a  salient 
acute  angle  (at  Szegedin),  neither  tactically  strengthened  by  a 
tenable  place,  nor  even  strategically  easy  to  be  defended,  and  to 
the  left  without  support  so  long  as  the  plateau  of  Titel  was  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy ;  finally,  of  which  the  most  important 
point  (the  fortress  of  Temesvar)  was  likewise  still  occupied  by 
the  enemy. 

I  further  gave  it  as  my  opinion,  that,  considering  the  just-re- 
presented strategic  state  in  the  Banat,  it  was  useless  to  think  of 
a  lengthened  successful  resistance  ;  that  for  making  a  change  in 
this,  however,  scarcely  sufficient  time  would  be  gained,  if  the 
main  army  joined  in  the  general  retreat  to  Szegedin,  and,  as 
might  be  expected,  should  be  immediately  followed  by  both 
hostile  main  armies  ;  that  consequently  these  must  be  stopped  at 
any  cost  in  their  further  advance  to  the  south,  if  indeed  the 
necessary  time  was  to  be  secured  for  effecting  a  favorable  change 
in  our  precarious  strategic  situation  in  the  south,  and  thus  the 
desired  prolongation  of  the  combat  be  rendered  possible  ;  finally, 
that  the  main  army  by  means  of  its  strategic  position  was  able 
of  itself,  partly  in  a  direct,  partly  in  an  indirect  manner,  to  stop 
both  hostile  main  armies  in  their  further  advance  to  the  south  of 
the  country,  it  was  to  be  hoped,  long  enough  for  Temesvar  and 
the  plateau  of  Titel  to  be  conquered,  the  war-suppli^  distributed 
in  the  country  to  be  laid  up  behind  the  Maros  and  lower  Theiss, 
the  defense  of  the  rivers  in  their  whole  extent  to  be  regvilated  and 
strengthened  by  temporary  fortifications,  consequently  until  the 
most  indispensable  conditions  for  a  longer  resistance  were  fulfilled. 

Hereupon  I  proposed  that  the  main  army  should  remain  at 
Komorn,  and  immediately  assume  the  offensive  against  the  Aus- 
trians ;  since  by  doing  so,  the  main  body  of  the  Austrians  would 
be  directly,  and  that  of  the  Russians  indirectly,  kept  far  froru 
the  Maros  and  lower  Theiss. 

Lastly,  I  endeavored,  by  dwelling  upon  several  advantages, 


468  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

sometimes  even  improbable  ones,  of  a  successful  progress  of  this 
offensive,  to  render  my  proposal  plausible,  in  its  consequences 
doubtless  a  perilous  one,  even  to  those  members  of  the  council 
who  were  perhaps  still  looking  hopefully  to  the  future.  I  might, 
however,  have  gone  rather  too  far  therein,  and  thus  have  awaken- 
ed Klapka's  suspicion  of  the  sincerity  of  the  motives  by  which  I 
had  supported  my  proposal. 

However  this  may  be,  the  fact  is  that  General  Klapka  op- 
posed me,  and  moved  that  the  principal  part  of  the  main  army, 
which  had  been  designated  for  the  concentration  at  Szegedin, 
should  leave  Komorn  forthwith  for  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  ; 
because  only  by  concentrating  as  speedily  as  possible  all  our 
forces — said  Klapka — could  the  country  still  be  saved  ;  but  that 
the  result  of  my  proposal  would  be  the  separation  of  the  main 
army  from  the  government,  consequently  likewise  from  the  re- 
maining national  armies  united  with  it. 

The  probability  of  Klapka's  final  assertion  was  too  palpable 
not  to  make  me  fear  the  result  of  the  voting  on  my  proposal, 
especially  as  I  was  uncertain  what  might  be  the  extent  of  the 
hopes  entertained  by  the  majority  of  the  council. 

I  consequently  again  rose,  to  prove  that  by  my  proposal  the 
junction  of  the  main  army  with  the  government  and  with  the 
other  Hungarian  armies  was  by  no  means  rendered  impossible, 
because  after  having  broken  through  the  line  of  the  Austrians 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  no  hostile  obstacle  whatever 
could  any  longer  prevent  this  junction.  The  question  on  which 
the  council  had  to  decide  was  not  "junction  or  not  junction?" 
but  rather,  "  whether  the  desired  junction  should  be  attained  by 
flight  or  by  fight?" 

The  former  was  no  doubt  the  easier.  Whether  it  was  also 
the  more  honorable,  on  this  the  council  might  decide. 

This  turn  saved  my  proposal  to  assume  without  delay  the 
offensive  against  the  Austrians  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube. 
It  was  unanimously  accepted  by  the  military  council ;  with  the 
stipulation,  however,  carried  by  the  majority,  that  after  an  at- 
tempt to  break  through,  whether  successful  or  unsuccessful,  the 
junction  of  the  greater  part  of  the  main  army,  which  had  origin- 
ally been  ordered  for  the  retreat  to  Szegedin,  with  the  govern- 
ment and  the  other  national  forces  should  be  executed  as  the 
next  object  of  operations. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  469 

It  is  true  that  this  stipulation  rendered  impracticable  my  in- 
tention of  repeating  in  Komorn  once  and  again  the  attack  on  the 
position  of  the  Austrians,  should  it,  as  was  possible,  prove  un- 
successful ;  nevertheless  I  must  be  contented  to  have  obtained 
at  least  thus  much,  that  the  favorable  opportunity  would  not 
pass  by  altogether  unimproved,  which  was  offered  to  our  main 
army  for  an  energetic  counter-stroke  against  the  Austrians  near 
Komorn,  and  a  return  of  which,  according  to  the  then  strategic 
conjunctures,  was  very  doubtful. 

General  Klapka,  who,  with  the  amendment  of  the  majority, 
likewise  voted  for  my  proposal,  secured  to  himself  thereby  the  chief 
management  of  the  attack  on  the  main  army  of  the  Austrians, 
which  was  fixed  for  the  9th  of  July  by  the  same  military  council. 

So  much  the  more  did  it  surprise  me,  when,  in  the  course  of 
the  7th  of  July  (the  military  council  had  been  held  on  the  day 
previous),  the  first  army  corps  (Nagy-Sandoi^  suddenly  started 
from  Komorn  for  Batorkeszi,  followed  immediately  by  the  third 
and  seventh  army  corps,  to  execute,  in  spite  of  the  decision  of 
the  military  council  of  the  preceding  evening,  the  retreat  to 
Szegedin  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube. 

I  could  explain  this  to  myself  only  by  assuming,  either  that 
General  Klapka  and  the  commanders  of  corps  in  the  council  on 
the  previous  day  had  merely  pretended  to  vote  for  my  proposal —  " 
perhaps  out  of  consideration  toward  me,  to  save  me  a  mortifica- 
tion by  which  my  physical  suffering  might  be  increased — ^but 
had  secretly  adopted  General  Klapka's  proposal ;  or  by  attributing 
the  departure  of  the  first  army  corps  from  Komorn  to  an  intrigue 
of  Generals  Klapka  and  Nagy-Sandor  against  my  person. 

In  the  former  case  I  was  in  future  superfluous  at  the  head  of 
the  army ;  in  the  latter  the  intrigue  of  Generals  Klapka  and 
Nagy-Sandor  must  be  thwarted. 

These  considerations  determined  me  now  to  renounce  volun- 
tarily and  promptly  the  command  over  the  army. 

The  consequence  was,  that,  still  in  the  evening  of  the  7th  of 
July,  a  deputation,  consisting  of  officers  from  all  the  divisions  of 
the  army  present  in  Komorn,  waited  upon  me  to  request  me,  in 
the  name  of  the  main  army,  to  resume  the  command. 

I  thought  it  was  my  duty,  under  the  circumstances  just  de- 
scribed, to  explain  to  these  officers,  above  all,  my  position  in 
reference  to  the  government. 


470  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

I  disclosed  to  them  the  real  mysteries  of  the  discord  between 
myself  and  Kossuth.  I  called  their  attention  especially  to  the 
fact,  that  I  stood  at  that  moment  in  open  opposition  to  him,  be- 
cause I  saw  in  the  general  retreat  to  the  south,  ordered  by  him 
and  his  commanders-in-chief  of  the  army,  nothing  but  the  com- 
mencement of  a  disgraceful  flight  from  the  country  ;  while  I 
was  of  opinion,  that  the  main  army,  in  order  to  fulfill  honorably 
its  duty  to  the  country,  for  the  rights  of  which  it  had  become 
surety,  had  resolutely  to  attack  the  enemy  which  was  just  then 
posted  opposite  it,  and  not  avoid  him,  in  order  that  it  might  in 
good  time  be  able  to  participate  in  this  flight.  I  further  gave 
the  officers  to  understand,  that  their  requesting  me  again  to  take 
the  command  over  the  main  army  was  equivalent  to  approving  of 
my  open  opposition  to  the  government ;  that  though  they  (the 
deputies  of  the  army)  were  acting,  it  is  true,  hardly  against  their 
moral,  yet  probably  they  were  against  their  material  interests, 
as  I  had  already  bound  up  my  life  with  the  cause,  and  that  who- 
ever in  future  intrusted  himself  to  my  guidance  must  prepare 
himself  to  do  the  like  ;  finally,  that  on  account  of  the  debility  of 
my  physical  condition,  the  same  personal  services  as  I  was  for- 
merly able  to  perform  were  no  longer  to  be  expected  from  me. 
But  if  the  main  army — thus  I  concluded  my  declaration — in 
spite  of  all  this  desired  to  have  me  for  its  commander ;  would 
likewise  fulfill  the  stipulation,  which  I  made  to  it  in  this  case — 
namely,  leave  Komorn  only  after  a  courageous  attempt  to  defeat 
the  main  force  of  the  Austrians  ;  and  if  I  should  be  again  fit  for 
service  at  that  time  ; — then  I  would  deem  it  to  be  my  honorable 
duty  to  resume  anew  the  command  over  the  army. 

The  deputies  were  satisfied  with  this  declaration.  The  de- 
parture of  the  first  army  corps  to  Batorkeszi  proved  accordingly 
to  have  been  the  consequence  of  an  intrigue  of  Generals  Klapka 
and  Nagy-Sandor.  The  latter  had  immediately  to  lead  his  corps 
back  again  to  Komorn  ;  while  the  former  declared  himself  never- 
theless ready  to  execute  the  resolutions  of  the  military  council  of 
the  preceding  evening. 

On  the  9th,  however,  the  attack  on  the  position  of  the  Aus- 
trians of  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  fixed,  as  is  known,  for 
this  day,  was  not  executed — and  was  postponed  till  the  11th. 
As  a  reason  for  this  delay,  I  was  informed,  that  even  late  in  the 
morning  of  the  9th  of  July — consequently  several  hours  after  the 


MY"  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  471 

time  appointed  for  the  commencement  of  this  advance — the  troops 
were  not  yet  prepared  to  march ;  though  the  extraordinary  move- 
ment in  our  camp  had  already  been  remarked  and  signalled  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy.  That  the  10th  of  July  had  passed  over 
unimproved,  might  perhaps  be  explained  by  the  probable  inten- 
tion of  General  Klapka  first  to  abate  the  watchfulness  of  the  enemy, 
increased  in  consequence  of  what  he  had  observed  on  the  9th. 

At  last,  on  the  11th  of  July,  the  general  attack  of  the  Hun- 
garian main  army,  commanded  by  General  Klapka,  was  directed 
against  the  position  of  the  Austrians  circularly  surrounding  our 
fortified  camp  from  the  mouth  of  the  Czonczo  as  far  as  Almas. 

To  gain  the  Czonczo  from  its  mouth  to  Igmand  was  the  day's 
task. 

It  remained  unaccomplished ;  and  two  days  after  (13th  of  July) 
the  first,  third,  and  seventh  army  corps  (the  expeditionary  column 
of  the  latter  included),  with  the  expeditionary  column  under  Armin 
Gorgei  as  vanguard,  departed  from  Komorn  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  Danube,  in  order  to  execute,  now  under  my  personal  com- 
mand, as  the  next  object  of  our  operations — according  to  the  res- 
olution of  the  miUtary  council  of  the  6th — the  junction  with  the 
forces  which  were  concentrating  in  the  south  of  the  country ; — 
while  the  second  and  eighth  army  corps  remained  in  occupation 
of  Komorn  and  the  fortified  camp,  under  the  chief  command  of 
General  Klapka. 


CHAPTER  LXVIL 

The  forces  with  which  I  left  Komorn  on  the  13th  of  July,  for 
the  purpose  of  efiecting  a  junction,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube, 
with  those  concentrating  in  the  south  under  Field-marshal  Lieut. 
Meszaros,  consisted  of  the  first  army  corps  (Nagy-Sandor),  the 
third  (Count  Leiningen),  the  seventh  (Poltenberg),  and  the  col- 
umn under  Armin  Gorgei,  in  all,  as  well  as  I  can  remember, 
about  27,000  men. 

This  junction  we  were  to  endeavor  to  effect  first  of  all  by  means 
of  forced  marches  by  Waizen  and  Godollo, 


472  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

For  this  purpose  the  column  under  Armin  Gorgei  (as  vanguard) 
had  started  in  the  evening  of  the  12th  of  July  from  Komorn  to 
Batorkeszi.  It  w^as  followed,  in  the  night  between  the  12th  and 
13th  by  the  first  corps,  at  daybreak  of  the  13th  by  the  third  and 
seventh  corps. 

This  order  of  march  was  observed  unchanged  as  far  as  Waizen. 

The  train  set  out  from  Komorn  in  a  single  line,  by  Batorkeszi 
and  Kovesd  on  the  Gran,  as  far  as  Szobb  on  the  Eipel.  Thence, 
however,  only  Armin  Gorgei's  column  and  the  first  corps  (because 
they  constantly  marched  during  the  night)  took  the  shortest  route 
to  "Waizen  by  Zebegeny  and  Nagy-Maros  ;  while  the  third  and 
seventh  army  corps  turned  the  Maros  defile  on  a  mountain-road 
from  Szobb  by  Maria-Nostra. 

This  precautionary  measure  seemed  necessary,  because  the 
Austrians — whose  patrols,  in  the  course  of  the  previous  day,  had 
unceasingly  observed,  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  our 
march  between  Kovesd  and  Hellenba — during  the  night  might 
dispatch  some  guns  to  Visegrad,  and  thus  on  the  following  day 
very  sensibly  harass  our  march  through  the  Nagy-Maros  defile 
open  toward  the  stream. 

The  predetermined  halting  stations  were  :  for  the  13th,  Bator- 
keszi ;  for  the  14th,  Hellenba,  Damasd,  and  Szobb  ;  for  the  15th, 
"Waizen. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  of  July,  Armin  Gorgei's 
column  reached  the  height  of  "Waizen,  and  found  there  the  out- 
posts of  the  Russian  cavalry  regiment  of  Musulmen  and  Caucasian 
mountaineers,  which  occupied  the  town,  but  which,  after  a  short 
outpost  skirmish,  retreated  in  the  direction  of  Aszod. 

The  town  of  Waizen  is  situated  close  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Danube.  Its  extent  alongside  the  stream,  whose  course  is  here 
from  north  to  south,  may  be  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  and  is  in 
all  parts  very  narrow.  The  railroad  from  Pesth  to  Presburg  is 
here  laid  mostly  on  a  causeway  and  parallel  with  the  bank  of  the 
stream,  but  outside  the  town,  which  it  separates  from  the  hilly 
ground  bounding  it  on  the  east  (the  last  western  spurs  of  the 
Cserhat),  and  permits  the  communication  between  this  ground 
and  the  town  only  at  some  points.  Waizen  consequently  appears 
to  be  compressed  as  it  were  between  the  Danube  and  the  cause- 
way of  the  railroad.  Through  the  middle  of  the  town  length- 
ways the  main  road  from  Upper  Hungary  to  Pesth  leads,  which 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  473 

previously  joins  the  Verocze  high  road,  on  which  we  were  ad- 
vancing, and  then,  at  about  gun-range  before  reaching  Waizen, 
crosses  by  means  of  a  wooden  pile-bridge  a  deep  ditch,  which  is 
impracticable  for  cavalry  and  wagons  on  account  of  the  steepness 
of  its  banks. 

Armin  Gorgei's  column,  after  it  reached  the  main  road,  had 
forced  back,  as  mentioned,  the  hostile  outposts,  and  thereby  caused 
the  Russian  cavalry  regiment  to  evacuate  Waizen,  marched  with 
its  main  body  through  the  town,  while  its  vanguard  was  pursuing 
the  enemy,  and  took  up  a  position  further  to  the  south,  near 
Hetkapolna.  The  first  corps,  which  had  followed  it,  encamped 
in  its  rear. 

From  the  gently  undulating  ground  at  the  river-bank,  becom- 
ing wider  down  stream,  there  rises  an  eminence,  at  first  bare 
(seen  from  Waizen,  it  appears  conical),  at  the  distance  of  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  southeast  of  the  town,  between  Duka 
and  Szod,  the  continuation  of  which,  in  numerous  eastern  wind- 
ings, reaches  the  ridge  of  the  Cserhat.  On  the  northeast  of 
this  bare  eminence,  in  a  rather  narrow  valley,  lies  the  village  of 
Duka  on  the  brook  Gombas ;  southwest,  however,  and  more  in 
the  direction  of  the  Danube,  is  the  village  of  Szod.  Between  it 
and  the  eminence  the  ground  is  covered  with  vineyards.  We 
called  the  latter  simply  the  "  Szod  vineyards,"  and  the  bare 
eminence  "  the  Duka  mountain."  For  the  sake  of  brevity  I  re- 
tain these  appellations  in  what  follows. 

The  brook  Gombas  flows  in  a  straight  direction  from  Duka 
toward  Waizen  as  far  as  the  southeastern  outskirts  of  the  town. 
Thence  it  turns  to  the  left  between  Hetkapolna  and  Waizen 
toward  the  Danube.  Not  far  from  this  turning-point  it  is  crossed 
by  the  railway,  and  further  down,  shortly  before  it  falls  into  the 
Danube  (at  the  south  end  of  Waizen),  by  the  main  road.  Its  bed 
is  marshy,  and  at  that  time  could  be  crossed  on  foot  without 
danger  by  the  troops  only  in  two  or  at  most  three  narrow  parts, 
namely,  on  the  space  from  Duka  to  the  railway  bridge  near 
Waizen. 

The  ground  between  this  brook  and  the  Danube  (forming  the 
left  banks  of  both)  is  gently  undulating,  and  also  free  and  open. 
The  railway  alone  crosses  it ;  but  only  at  some  places  hinders 
the  movements  of  cavalry  and  artillery.  On  the  right  bank  of 
the  brook  Gombas,  on  the  contrary,  the  ground  soon  becomes  hilly. 


474  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Armin  Gorgei  had  occupied  the  Duka  mountain  with  his  van- 
guard returned  from  the  pursuit.  Thence  about  noon  of  the 
same  day  (15th  of  July)  the  advance  of  considerable  Russian 
forces  of  all  kinds  of  arms  was  remarked  in  the  southeast.  At 
the  first  news  of  it,  Armin  Gorgei  speedily  left  the  camp  at 
Hetkapolna  with  the  main  body  of  his  column,  advancing  across 
the  railway  toward  the  Duka  mountain  and  the  Szod  vineyards 
in  order  to  secure  to  himself  those  two  points  before  the  arrival 
of  the  Russians.  This,  however,  was  impossible,  the  advance  of 
the  enemy  having  been  discovered  much  too  late.  Consequently 
not  only  had  our  outposts  already  been  driven  from  the  Duka 
mountain  by  numerous  swarms  of  Cossacks,  but  even  the  col- 
umns of  the  enemy  had  broken  into  the  Szod  vineyards,  be- 
fore Armin  Gorgei  with  his  main  body  was  able  to  reach  the 
place.  Now  he  could  only  render  the  debouching  of  the  hostile 
columns  from  the  vineyards  in  some  measure  more  difficult,  but 
by  no  means  prevent  it.  In  a  short  time  he  had  opposed  to  him 
a  force  several  times  superior  to  that  of  his  column  (from  3000  to 
4000  men,  with  ten  guns),  which  at  first  pressed  him  back,  till 
on  his  right  General  Nagy-Sandor  with  the  first  corps,  leaning  to 
the  right  on  the  Danube,  advanced  on  the  line  of  battle,  and  re- 
established the  disturbed  balance  of  the  combat. 

Meanwhile  General  Leiningen  accelerated  the  approach  of  his 
troops.  About  three  in  the  afternoon  he  arrived  with  them  at 
the  height  of  Waizen,  turned  the  town  on  the  east,  hastened  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  brook  Gombas  at  gun-range  beyond  the 
prolongation  of  our  line  of  battle,  took  up  a  flanking  position 
against  the  hostile  right  wing,  and  by  the  brisk  fire  of  two 
batteries  paralyzed  the  further  attacks  on  Armin  Gorgei's  feeble 
column.    ' 

Hereupon  the  enemy  attempted  an  energetic  attack  with  cavalry 
on  our  first  corps.  The  first  regiment  of  hussars  (Kaiser),  ordered 
forward  by  General  Nagy-Sandor  to  a  counter-attack,  gave  way 
before  the  enemy's  superior  numbers ;  nevertheless  the  shock 
which  seemed  to  aim  at  dispersing  our  right  wing  relaxed, 
through  the  firm  perseverance  of  some  of  our  batteries. 

From  this  -moment  the  enemy  evidently  confined  himself,  in 
spite  of  the  brisk  action  of  our  artillery,  numerically  superior  to 
his,  to  maintaining  himself  on  the  open  ground  before  the  Duka 
mountain  and  the  Szod  vineyards,  which  he  had  conquered  by 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  475 

at  first  pressing  back  Armin  Gorgei's  isolated  column.  And  as 
our  day's  task,  on  account  of  our  troops  being  uncommonly  fatigued 
must  likewise  be  a  purely  defensive  one,  the  further  course  of  the 
combat,  which  continued  for  several  hours,  was  characterized  on 
both  sides  only  by  a  fire  of  artillery,  well  sustained  till  nightfall. 

Toward  evening  the  enemy  began  to  evacuate  the  field  by 
degrees,  drawing  off  his  right  wing  across  the  Duka  mountain, 
the  rest  of  his  line  of  battle  through  the  Szod  vineyards. 

Nevertheless  his  troops  for  security  occupied  these  grounds. 

Before  night  set  in  between  the  15th  and  16th  of  July,  Gen- 
eral Poltenberg  with  the  seventh  corps  and  the  army  train  like- 
wise reached  Waizen ;  but  was  directed  to  remain  en  reserve  in 
the  rear  of  it  (at  its  northern  extremity). 

The  resoluteness  with  which  the  enemy  had  attacked  our  posi- 
tion at  Waizen,  and  his  obstinate  perseverance,  in  the  effective  range 
of  our  superior  concentric  fire  of  artillery,  induced  me  to  suspect 
that  behind  the  corps  which  had  just  been  beaten  from  the  field, 
there  was  a  near  and  strong  reserve,  and  to  anticipate  on  the 
following  day  a  still  more  powerful  attack. 

I  could  consequently  choose  between  preventing  this  attack  by 
attempting  to  break  through  toward  Godollo,  or  awaiting  it  at 
Waizen,  and  thus  subordinate  the  beginning  of  the  attempt  to 
break  through  to  the  result  of  the  next  day's  combat. 

Considering  our  peculiar  circumstances — that  the  troops  were 
too  fatigued  to  commence  immediately  the  attempt  at  breaking 
through,  and  moreover  were  even  without  provisions  for  the  fol- 
lowing day  (the  16th) ;  further,  that  no  dependence  whatever 
could  be  placed  on  procuring  them  as  they  were  needed  during 
the  operation,  though  where  the  troops  then  were  they  might 
probably  be  supplied  for  at  least  one  day  in  advance,  in  the 
course  of  the  following  day,  by  means  of  the  contributions  already 
commenced  in  and  around  Waizen ; — considering  these  circum- 
stances, I  determined  to  await  in  the  position  maintained  before 
Waizen  the  hostile  attack  to  be  expected  on  the  morrow. 

But  when,  contrary  to  expectation,  up  to  early  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  16th  of  July  no  attack  had  taken  place ;  though 
the  advanced  hostile  troops  continued  to  occupy  the  Duka  moun- 
tain and  the  Szod  vineyards  ;  and  as  the  reports  of  scouts  agreed 
in  stating  that  the  camp  of  the  hostile  corps,  which  had  been 
opposed  to  us  on  the  preceding  evening,  and  had  since  been  con- 


476  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUy. 

siderably  reinforced  by  constant  arrivals  of  fresh  troops  on  the 
road  from  Azod,  was  stationed  near  Hartyan ;  I  thought  that,  at 
all  events  in  the  course  of  the  16th,  I  must  obtain  the  greatest 
possible  certainty  as  to  the  probability  of  our  intended  attempt  at 
breaking  through  being  successful — and  fixed  four  in  the  after- 
noon as  the  time  for  comraiencing  this  undertaking. 

This  was  to  consist  of  a  forced  reconnoitering  toward  Hartyan, 
executed  by  Armin  Gorgei's  column. 

However,  before  the  time  appointed,  an  advance  of  serried 
troops  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  took  place  on  the  Duka  mountain 
and  in  the  Szod  vineyards  ;  Duka  itself  was  likewise  occupied  by 
him ;  and  at  the  same  time  I  heard  from  a  trustworthy  source 
that  the  greater  part  of  the  Russian  main  army  was  already 
posted  directly  opposite  us,  between  Hartyan  and  Szod. 

The  forced  reconnoitering  which  had  been  commanded  was 
now  superfluous;  nay  it  must  on  no  account  be  executed,  be- 
cause it  might  easily  involve  us  in  a  general  engagement  with 
the  enemy,  and  thereby  indirectly  prevent  the  carrying  out  of 
the  determination,  to  which  I  had  suddenly  come  in  consequence 
of  the  information  I  had  received  relative  to  the  strength  of  the 
hostile  forces  concentrated  before  us. 

This  determination  was  nothing  else  than  at  once  to  give  up 
the  idea  of  breaking  through  toward  Godollo,  and  attempt  a 
junction  between  the  corps  under  my  command  and  our  southern 
forces  on  the  circuitous  route  by  Lossoncz,  Miskolcz,  and  Tokaj. 

I  chose  this  route,  because  it  was  scarcely  possible  for  the 
Russian  main  army,  which  was  at  that  moment  concentrated  in 
front  of  our  position,  to  obstruct  us  in  it.  The  Russians,  it  is 
true,  on  the  line  by  Gyongyos  were  only  twenty-one  (German) 
miles  from  Miskolcz,  while  we  were  twenty-five  on  that  by 
Lossoncz.  But  as  the  enemy  could  not  know  with  certainty  that 
Miskolcz  was  our  next  object  of  operations  until  he  had  pursued 
us  as  far  as  Vadkert,  he  could  not  possibly  reach  this  point  with 
his  main  forces  before  us.  For  between  Vadkert  and  Miskolcz 
there  exists  no  shorter  communication  than  by  Lossoncz,  if  we 
except  one  of  almost  equal  extent,  but  much  less  practicable — I 
mean  the  route  by  Romhany,  Berczel,  Pata,  and  Gyongyos. 

"With  all  this,  I  did  not  forget  that  it  was  possible  we  might 
find  the  road  by  Lossoncz  to  Miskolcz  occupied  by  the  Russian 
corps  which  in  the  beginning  of  the  month  had  penetrated  from 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  477 

the  upper  Waag  into  the  district  of  the  mountain-towns  ;  besides 
which,  it  did  not  seem  to  me  probable  that  we  should  encounter 
no  hostile  opposition  at  all :  but — according  to  the  information  I 
had  received  relative  to  the  total  strength  of  the  Russian  army 
of  intervention,  and  considering  the  strategic  position  of  the 
hostile  main  body — such  an  opposition  could  not  be  made  by  any 
force  sufficient  to  render  doubtful  the  success  of  our  new  attempt 
at  breaking  through. 

Only  the  combination — certainly  very  probable — of  such  an 
opposition  with  a  continuous  energetic  pursuit  from  Waizen 
might,  nay  must  be  destructive  to  us. 

But,  notwithstanding  this  probability,  I  could  not  prefer  the 
attempt  at  breaking  through  toward  GodoUo  to  that  toward 
Tokaj  ;  because,  even  assuming  an  equally  unfortunate  issue  to 
both  operations,  by  the  latter  the  greater  part  of  the  Russian 
army  of  intervention  would  be  kept  distant  from  the  southern 
theatre  of  war  far  longer  than  by  the  former,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  possibility  of  employing  the  southern  ioxce^  against  the  Aus- 
trians  alone  would  be  secured  to  Dembinski.  My  further  perse- 
vering in  the  attempt  to  break  through  toward  Godollo  would 
have  offered  to  the  Russian  commander-in-chief-— who,  according 
to  my  information,  had  at  his  disposal  then  and  there  a  force  at 
least  twice  mine — a  favorable  opportunity  to  defeat  me  so  com- 
pletely, that  for  the  total  destruction  of  my  troops  a  small  part 
of  his  main  body  sent  in  pursuit  would  suffice,  while  the  larger 
part  would  be  immediately  disposable  for  the  offensive  toward 
the  south.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  avoided  the  momentarily 
menacing  superior  attack  of  the  enemy,  by  means  of  a  rapid, 
organized  retreat  toward  Lossoncz,  for  the  purpose  of  afterward 
breaking  through  by  Miskolcz  and  Tokaj  ;  then  the  Russian  com- 
mander-in-chief could  scarcely  spare  sufficient  forces  for  the  unin- 
terrupted and  permanent  turning  of  his  operations  toward  the 
south,  in  case  his  purpose  was  (as  I  supposed)  to  destroy  my 
troops  on  this  side  the  Theiss;  for,  in  my  opinion,  he  could  hope 
to  effect  this  only  if  he,  not  regarding  for  the  present  the  south 
of  the  country,  should  send  his  main  body  close  after  us  from 
Waizen,  simultaneously  opposing  to  our  head  either  the  northern 
Russian  corps,  or  some  other  part  of  the  army — perhaps  lying  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Miskolcz — in  order  to  delay  us,  coiite  qui 
coute,  until  his  main  body  had  succeeded  in  overtaking  us. 


478  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

In  the  most  favorable  case,  we  could  escape  this  danger  only 
by  gaining  an  advance  over  the  pursuing  hostile  main  body,  which 
must  be  considerable  enough  to  secure  to  us  the  time  necessary 
for  overcoming  all  the  accumulated  obstacles  to  our  retreat  behind 
the  Theiss. 

Any  considerable  advance,  however  (whether  it  would  be  suf- 
ficient for  the  purpose  indicated  could  evidently  at  present  not 
be  known),  was  to  be  gained  from  our  position  before  Waizen  only 
by  means  of  a  nightly  retreat ;  because  as  the  enemy  surveyed 
from  the  Duka  mountain  not  only  our  entire  position,  but  even 
the  line  of  retreat  (the  main  road  from  Waizen  to  the  upper  com- 
itates), we  could  not  mask  our  retreat  in  the  day  time  in  any 
way. 

To  maintain  our  position  before  "Waizen  till  nightfall  was  con- 
sequently a  necessity  equally  unavoidable  and  embarrassing ; — 
embarrassing,  because  the  enemy  might  at  any  moment  attack 
us  with  uncommon  superiority,  and  thereby  prevent  me  from  ex- 
ecuting my  intention  of  deceiving  him,  by  retreating  during  the 
night. 

Fortunately,  however,  he  stopped  the  advance  which,  as  was 
mentioned,  he  had  begun  between  three  and  four  in  the  afternoon 
on  the  Duka  mountain  and  in  the  Szod  vineyards,  while  still  out 
of  the  reach  of  our  artillery,  and  afterward  remained  quiet. 

About  seven  in  the  evening  I  thought  we  had  then  no  further 
attack  to  fear  that  day  (the  16th  of  July),  and  sent  for  the  chief 
of  the  general  staff,  the  commanders  of  corps,  and  my  elder 
brother  Armin,  that  I  might  orally  communicate  to  them  my 
resolutions,  as  they  have  just  been  stated. 

After  this  had  been  done,  I  proposed  to  the  commanders  of 
corps  to  leave  it  to  chance  to  decide  which  of  the  three  army 
corps  should  cover  the  departure  of  the  others  from  the  position 
before  Waizen. 

This  proposal  was  accepted,  and  the  lot  fell  upon  General 
Leiningen,  who  with  his  corps  (the  third)  was  to  have  the  charge 
of  the  rear-guard  during  the  next  twenty-four  hours. 

Based  on  this  decision,  I  ordered  the  retreat  to  be  commenced 
with  the  twilight  in  the  following  order  :  at  the  head  the  seventh 
corps  (Poltenberg),  with  the  army  train ;  then  the  first  corps 
(Nagy-Sandor),  and  after  it  Armin  Gorgei's  column,  in  uninter- 
rupted succession ;  the  third  army  corps  (Count  Leiningen),  how- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  479 

ever,  as  rear-guard,  was  not  to  follow  till  after  midnight  (but 
still  before  daybreak  of  the  17th  of  July)  ;  further,  in  order  to 
prevent  the  enemy's  patrols  from  discovering  our  retreat  during 
the  night,  the  first  and  third  corps,  as  well  as  Armin  Gorgei's 
column,  had  to  leave  behind  them  on  their  departure  from  the 
position  the  outposts  (all  cavalry)  stationed  before  it,  with  an 
order  not  to  hasten  after  the  army  till  after  daybreak. 

I  fixed  an  hour  after  midnight  for  the  departure  of  the  third 
corps  (the  rear-guard),  because  by  then  the  other  parts  of  the 
army,  together  with  the  army  train,  could  have  passed  the  ser- 
pentine way  across  the  Waizen  mountain,  about  half  a  (German) 
mile  to  the  north  of  Waizen,  and  thus  have  got  far  enough  in 
advance  of  the  rear-guard,  always  assuming  that  the  movements 
of  the  troops  were  not  delayed  by  any  unforeseen  hindrance. 
This,  however,  without  my  having  had  any  presentiment  of  it, 
was  unfortunately  already  prepared,  at  the  very  time  when  I 
gave  the  just-mentioned  order  for  retreat  to  my  sub-commanders. 

My  departure  from  Komorn  had  as  its  immediate  consequence, 
that  all  the  politically  compromised  civilians  who  were  living  in  the 
neighborhood,  and  who  happened  to  have  greater  confidence  in 
my  lucky  star  than  in  that  of  General  Klapka,  joined  the  army 
— unfortunately  not  on  foot  or  on  horseback,  but  in  carriages. 
The  example  of  these  unfortunates  found  on  their  way  thither 
imitators  in  abundance,  and  this  to  such  a  degree  that  the  army 
by  the  14th  of  July  (the  day  after  its  departure  from  Komorn) 
was  burdened  with  the  unwelcome  appendage  of  several  thousand 
vehicles  of  various  capacity.  Considering  the  prospective  impos- 
sibility of  getting  rid  permanently  of  this  calamity,  there  remained 
no  other  means  for  securing  freedom  to  the  movements  of  the 
army  as  far  as  possible  than  forcibly  to  join  these  vehicles  with 
the  army  train  (which  could  be  dispensed  with  during  action) 
and  the  riding  sutlers  in  one  body,  and  to  include  in  the  calcula- 
tion of  operations  their  disposal,  regulated  by  circumstances,  on 
points  which,  as  secure  as  we  could  make  them,  lay  outside  the 
range  of  the  manoeuvres  of  the  army.  This  had  been  done  on 
the  15th  of  July.  The  command  of  this  body,  to  which  was 
added  an  escort  sufficient  to  maintain  order  on  the  road  and  in 
the  camp,  was  intrusted  to  a  superior  officer  of  the  general  staff, 
who  happened  not  to  be  indispensable  to  the  army.  On  the  15th 
of  July  he  received  directions  to  remain  with  the  train  till  further 


480  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

orders  at  Toronya,  about  two  miles  to  the  northeast  of  Waizen. 
Now  in  the  evening  of  the  16th — after  the  retreat  by  Lossoncz  had 
been  decided  upon — the  train  had  to  be  conducted  from  Toronya 
by  Nograd  to  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  army,  and  in  advance  of 
it  as  far  as  Vadkert.  In  the  course  of  the  16th,  however,  rumors 
had  reached  Toronya,  that  the  Russians  had  been  destroyed  on 
the  preceding  day  before  Waizen,  and — what  was  certainly  not 
improbable — that  Austrian  troops  had  crossed  at  Gran  from  the 
right  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube.  In  consequence  of  these 
reports  the  train  and  its  commander  left  Toronya  without  orders, 
to  save  themselves  from  the  dreaded  Austrians  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  army,  already  supposed  to  be  victoriously  advancing 
toward  Godolio  ;  and  by  the  time  the  order  to  lead  the  train  from 
Toronya  by  Nograd  to  Vadkert  was  about  being  sent  to  its  com- 
mander, the  thousand  upon  thousand  vehicles  were  again  in 
Waizen. 

This  indeed  was  a  circumstance  which  might  delay  our  retreat 
for  several  hours,  consequently  till  late  in  the  morning  of  the  fol- 
lowing day,  and,  considering  the  immediate  proximity  of  the 
hostile  army,  might  result  in  the  fatal  defeat  of  at  least  the  third 
corps.  In  view  of  our  critical  situation  before  Waizen,  I  was 
nevertheless  obliged  to  adhere  to  my  original  determination,  and 
commence  the  nightly  retreat,  even  at  the  risk  of  the  above- 
mentioned  danger. 

Accordingly  the  unexpected  news  of  the  presence  in  Waizen  of 
the  train  did  not  make  any  change  in  the  already  issued  orders 
for  retreat ;  but  it  put  an  end  to  the  consideration  which  had 
hitherto  been  shown  by  me  toward  the  unfortunate  fugitive  civil- 
ians, out  of  natural  compassion,  sometimes  even  at  the  expense 
of  my  duty  as  leader  of  the  army. 

From  the  preceding  description  of  the  situation  of  Waizen  and 
its  immediate  environs,  the  reader  knows  of  a  brook  there,  which, 
in  itself  insignificant,  but  having  high  and  steep  banks,  rises  in 
the  near  mountains,  and  flows  toward  the  Danube  at  about  gun- 
range  north  of  the  town.  This  local  impediment  consequently 
was  situated  directly  in  the  rear  of  the  army,  and  had  to  be 
crossed  during  its  retreat.  The  only  means  of  doing  this  was  the 
wooden  bridge,  over  which  runs  the  main  road  from  Waizen  to 
the  upper  comitates,  our  line  of  retreat.  This  obstacle,  it  is 
true,  might  also  be  avoided  ;  but  not  in  the  night-time  without 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY.  481 

inevitable  danger  to  the  order  of  the  retreat ;  because  there  was 
at  that  time  no  moonlight,  and  not  to  betray  our  nightly  manosu- 
vre  to  the  enemy,  we  were  obliged  to  dispense  with  any  lights 
For  a  second  bridge,  however,  we  had  no  materials  at  hand , 
besides,  the  time  that  remained  was  insufficient  for  the  construc- 
tion of  even  a  less  considerable  bridge  with  unprepared  materials, 
as  I  had  resolved  on  the  retreat  by  night  only  a  few  hours  before 
its  commencement,  and  had  not  previously  thought  of  the  neces- 
sity for  such  a  manoBuvre.  The  army,  indeed,  carried  with  it 
the  staple  of  a  bridge  of  four  supports  taken  from  the  Austrians ; 
but,  considering  the  probable  vehemence  of  the  enemy's  pursuit, 
it  could  not  be  employed  in  the  formation  of  a  bridge  without  the 
risk  of  losing  it ;  and,  taking  into  account  the  number  of  not  in- 
significant waters  by  which  our  new  line  of  operations  Avas  in- 
tersected, I  wished  to  preserve  to  the  army  its  sole  portable  bridge 
for  future  use  in  cases  possibly  still  more  critical.  Under  these 
circumstances  the  whole  army  must  consequently  pass  the  one 
bridge  in  the  retreat  from  its  present  position.  This  was,  after 
all,  connected  with  no  more  uncommon  difficulties  than  in  general 
any  nightly  retreat  on  a  single  road.  It  was  only  necessary  to  pre- 
vent interruption !  But  this  very  task — practicable  with  an  orderly 
mobile  force  relieved  of  all  superfluous  vehicles,  by  choosing  an 
order  of  march  whose  breadth  does  not  exceed  that  of  the  defile 
to  be  passed — with  the  presence  of  several  thousand  vehicled 
fugitives,  each  of  whom,  thinking  only  of  his  own  safety,  wished 
to  be  foremost,  where  the  strategic  instinct  common  to  all  led  him 
to  scent  the  greatest  security  against  danger  in  the  direction  taken 
by  the  troops  ; — with  the  presence  of  such  elements  and  in  such 
number,  namely,  to  prevent  all  interruption  during  the  retreat — 
seemed  to  me  absolutely  impossible  without  the  use  of  Draconic 
measures  against  the  unfortunate  fugitives. 

At  dawn  of  the  following  day  (the  17th  of  July)  1  was,  how- 
ever, alas,  already  conscious  that  this  feat  had  not  been  accom- 
plished, in  spite  of  all  the  Draconic  measures  I  had  not  failed  to 
aave  recourse  to  during  the  night. 

Hardly  had  the  seventh  corps,  on  the  evening  of  the  16th  of 
July,  begun  the  retreat  by  defiling  over  the  bridge,  when  the  herd 
of  vehicled  fugitives,  immediately  guessing  the  meaning  of  this 
manoeuvre,  likewise  began  to  move  from  their  encampments— 
partly  in  the  interior  of  the  town,  partly  north  of  it,  close  to  the 

X 


482  MY  LIPE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

seventh  corps — toward  the  saving  bridge.  Lines  of  hussars  kept 
ofTthe  lateral  pressure  on  the  main  road,  to  preserve  it  clear  for 
the  troops.  With  the  increasing  darkness  and  the  growing  desire 
of  the  alarmed  mass  to  get  for  safety  across  the  bridge,  the  duty 
of  these  lines  became  ever  more  difficult,  and  during  the  night 
they  were  repeatedly  broken  through  in  several  places.  At  each 
irruption,  in  a  twinkling  the  main  road  was  choked  up  with 
vehicles.  To  make  the  stream  flow  back  was  impossible.  It 
could  scarcely  be  dammed  up  again  along  the  main  road.  Those 
vehicles  of  every  description,  which,  in  consequence  of  such  irrup- 
tions, were  once  on  the  main  road,  in  order  to  prevent  a  still 
greater  delay  had  each  time  to  be  arranged  as  speedily  as  possible 
and  taken  into  the  marching  column  of  the  troops.  This  meas- 
ure, which  was  absolutely  unavoidable,  became  a  source  of  very 
frequent  and  lasting  interruption  ;  for  hardly  had  those  fugitives, 
whom  chance  favored  in  the  repeated  irruptions  through  the 
lines,  passed  over  the  bridge,  than  they  were  no  longer  in  any 
haste.  Relieved  from  the  torment  of  fear  for  their  own  skin, 
they  soon  found  the  sweetest  consolation  for  their  lately  endured 
sufferings  in  a  sound  sleep.  Their  animals  had  of  course  still 
less  reason  without  an  external  impulse,  to  refuse  rest  and  repose  ; 
and  even  to  the  troops  the  opportunity  of  snatching  a  short 
bivouac  on  the  road  was  not  always  unwelcome. 

The  seventh  corps,  the  army  train,  the  first  corps,  and  Armin 
Gorgei's  column,  were  to  have  passed  after  midnight  not  only 
the  bridge,  but  also  the  winding  road  across  the  Waizen  mount- 
ain. Instead  of  this,  however,  even  at  daybreak  (17th  of  July), 
besides  the  seventh  corps  only  a  small  part  of  the  army  train  and 
the  first  corps  had  passed  the  bridge.  The  greater  part  of  the 
army  train — closely  hemmed  in  by  the  fatal  private  equipages — 
could  not  even  be  got  in  motion  ;  while  the  rest  of  the  first  corps, 
followed  by  Armin  Gorgei's  column,  was  just  about  forcing  its 
way  through  the  crowd  of  vehicles  that  reached  far  back  into 
the  town. 

At  the  extreme  northern  end  of  Waizen  a  carriage-road 
branches  off  from  the  main  road  in  an  eastern  direction,  across 
the  railroad,  which  runs  close  along  the  latter,  on  which  likewise 
it  is  possible  to  reach  Retsag  and  Yadkert,  although  with  much 
more  difficulty  than  on  the  main  road  itself 

Besides  the  main  road  I  originallv  intended  to  make  use  also 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  483 

of  this  secondary  one  between  Waizen  and  Vadkert  for  accom- 
plishing the  nightly  retreat.  I  was,  however,  deterred  from 
doing  so  by  the  consideration,  that  from  the  divergence  at  first 
of  both  lines  the  army  would  be  divided  just  at  the  most  critical 
moment  of  the  retreat  into  two  columns  separated  several  miles 
from  each  other  and  by  impracticable  hilly  ground.  Sub- 
sequently, when  informed  of  the  presence,  alike  disastrous  and 
unexpected,  of  the  vehicled  civic  fugitives  in  Waizen,  I  thought 
1  could  employ  this  carriage-way  at  least  for  removing  these  un- 
fortunates out  of  the  range  of  the  manoeuvres  of  the  troops.  But 
even  this  could  not  well  be  done  ;  for  the  whole  mass  of  private 
vehicles,  in  order  to  gain  this  road,  would  have  had  to  cross  the 
main  road,  and  this — from  peculiar  local  circumstances — in  a 
single  column,  one  vehicle  at  a  time ;  by  which  the  retreat  of 
the  two-thirds  of  the  army  which  were  encamped  south  of  Wai- 
zen would  have  been  delayed  at  least  five  or  six  hours,  and  con- 
sequently it  would  have  been  impossible  to  effect  it  under  cover 
of  night.  So  that  this  secondary  road  had  to  be  left  the  whole 
night  without  advantage  being  tak%i  of  it.  But  now  the  multi- 
tude of  private  vehicles,  in  spite  of  all  counter-measures,  was 
already  in  unlimited  possession  of  the  main  road,  and  therefore 
the  use  of  this  secondary  one  had  become  imperative,  in  order 
more  quickly  to  remove  out  of  the  way  of  the  troops  advancing 
from  behind,  the  vehicles  densely  thronged  together  on  the  main 
road. 

The  strategic  instinct  of  the  vehicled  fugitive  civilians,  how- 
ever, strove  against  the  requirement  to  seek  for  safety  on  a  road 
along  which  no  troops  had  advanced  before  them.  The  fear  of 
being  thereby  separated  forever  from  the  protecting  proximity  of 
the  army — the  fixed  idea,  "only  he  who  passes  the  bridge  is 
saved  !"  caused  a  general  passive  resistance,  the  object  of  which 
was  the  maintaining  of  the  main  road,  and  the  tenacity  of  which 
scoffed  at  the  severest  measures  of  coercion. 

Consequently  the  situation  of  the  greater  part  of  our  army 
about  dawn  of  the  17th  of  July,  already  sketched  in  what  pre- 
cedes, given  synoptically  was  somewhat  as  follows  : 

One  half  of  the  first  corps,  closely  followed  by  Armin  Gorgei's 
column,  in  the  interior  of  the  town,  hindered  on  all  sides  by  a 
crowd  of  vehicles  literally  unbounded  not  only  from  continuing 
the  retreat,  but  also  in  its  movements  generally  ;   the  third  corps, 


484  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

on  the  contrary,  outside  the  town — one  half  on  the  causeway  of 
the  railroad  in  a  long  narrow  marching-column,  the  other  half 
descending  in  sections  along  the  brook  Gomhas  toward  the  rail- 
road. So  that  of  these  parts  of  the  army,  in  spite  of  the  threat- 
ening proximity  of  the  enemy,  only  the  latter  half  of  the  third 
corps  was  able  to  act ;  and  even  it  at  the  moment  was  not  in  a 
condition  to  do  any  thing  considerable  toward  the  protection  of 
the  columns  wedged  in  the  interior  of  the  town. 

Moreover,  General  Nagy-Sandor  before  his  departure  from  the 
position  south  of  Waizcn  had  drawn  in  his  out-posts,  and  thus 
rendered  a  surprise  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  possible. 

With  the  first  dawn  of  morning  some  Russian  cavalry  regi- 
ments rushed  on  to  Nag}''-Sandor's  former  position,  and,  not 
meeting  with  any  resistance,  reached,  unimpeded  and  unobserved 
by  us,  about  the  height  of  Hetkapolna.  Here  they  stood  already 
in  the  rear  of  the  advanced  troops  who — according  to  the  dispo- 
sitions— had  been  left  behind  in  front  of  his  evacuated  position 
by  Armin  Gorgei. 

The  latter  indeed  discovered  the  menacing  attack  time  enough 
to  prevent  a  surprise  of  their  main  body,  already  on  its  toilsome 
retreat  through  the  crowd  of  vehicles  in  the  interior  of  the  town. 
But  on  these  troops  themselves  the  sudden  emerging  of  the  enemy 
in  their  rear  had  made  the  discouraging  impression  of  a  success- 
ful surprise ;  and  to  the  bad  consequences  of  similar  impressions 
belonged,  among  other  things,  the  constant  disposition  of  the  sur- 
prised troops  to  see  spectres. 

Armin  Gorgei,  informed  of  the  hostile  advance,  without  hesi- 
tation led  the  main  body  of  his  column  from  the  interior  of  the 
town  against  the  enemy ;  made  good  his  position  near  Het- 
kapolna ;  disposed  his  falling-back  advanced  troops  as  a  protec- 
tion to  the  extreme  flank  on  the  left  toward  the  brook  Gombas  ; 
and — for  the  purpose  especially  of  apprising  the  third  corps  as 
speedily  as  possible — immediately  attacked  the  approaching  hos- 
tile masses  with  artillery.  He  succeeded  in  stopping  them  for 
some  time,  nay  even  in  pressing  them  back.  His  extreme  left 
wing,  however,  still  laboring  under  the  moral  after-pains  of  the 
late  surprise,  imagined  meanwhile  that  it  saw  in  the  men  of  the 
third  corps  on  the  other  side  the  brook  Gombas  the  enemy's  turn- 
ing troops,  and  in  consequence  took  to  flight  toward  the  southern 
principal  entrance  ofWaizen,  and  soon  carried  with  it  the  whole 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  485 

cavalry  and  artillery  of  the  column.  Armin  Gorgei,  unable  to 
stop  this  debandade,  and  himself  led  astray  by  the  erroneous  re- 
port of  his  left  wing,  drew  back  likewise  the  battalions,  already 
abandoned  by  the  cavalry  and  artillery — not  through  the  town, 
however,  but  close  to  the  bank  of  the  Danube. 

The  enemy  with  celerity  and  rare  valor  took  advantage  of  this 
sudden  falling  off  in  our  resistance ;  broke  into  the  town  itself 
before  the  cavalry  of  Armin  Gorgei's  column  recovered  from  its 
fright,  and  in  the  first  assault  captured  four  guns.  A  part  of  the 
infantry  of  the  column,  however,  had  soon  regained  its  courage, 
and  now  hastened  from  the  Danube  into  the  interior  of  the  town 
to  the  place  of  the  greatest  danger  ;  almost  simultaneously  a  bat- 
talion of  the  third  corps  appeared  on  the  menaced  point  from 
the  opposite  direction  (the  railroad)  ;  and  three  of  the  lost  pieces 
were  instantly  retaken  from  the  enemy  :  one  remained  in  his 
possession,  and  this  he  succeeded  in  securing,  although  immedi- 
ately driven  out  of  the  town,  and  obliged  by  the  third  corps  to 
continue  his  retreat  toward  Szod. 

For  General  Leiningen,  on  the  first  discharge  of  cannon  from 
Armin  Gorgei's  column,  had  one  half  of  his  corps  immediately 
advanced  again  on  the  right  bank  of  the  brook  Gombas  up  to- 
ward Duka,  while  he  himself  hastened  forward  with  the  other 
half  along  the  railroad  on  the  ground  situated  between  the  brook 
Gombas  and  the  Danube.  Informed  during  this  movement  of 
the  enemy's  presence  in  Waizen,  Count  Leiningen  dispatched  one 
battalion  (as  we  have  seen,  it  came  just  in  time  to  assist  in  re- 
capturing the  lost  guns)  into  the  interior  of  the  town,  while  two 
companies  were  detached  by  him  to  occupy  speedily  the  south- 
ern outlet,  with  the  intention  of  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  the  hos- 
tile cavalry  who  had  broken  into  Waizen.  The  town,  how- 
ever, had  already  been  evacuated  by  the  enemy  when  these  com- 
panies reached  their  destination.  And  not  till  noAV  did  it  be- 
come evident  that  the  enemy  could  scarcely  have  intended  a  se- 
rious continued  attack,  but  at  most  a  reconnoitering  of  our 
strength  and  position.  Only  to  the  accidental  circumstances, 
that  General  Nagy-Sandor,  when  leaving  his  position,  had 
drawn  in  his  outposts  in  a  manner  alike  inconsiderate  and  arbi- 
trary, and  that  the  cavalry  of  Armin  Gorgei's  column  had  takeir 
our  troops  for  the  enemy's,  was  this  advance  indebted  for  a  re- 
sult which  certainly  resembled  a  successful  surprise. 


486  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Moreover,  we  also  owed  to  the  just-related  conflict,  in  spite  of 
the  significant  loss  which  we  therein  suffered,  an  advantage 
which  in  our  then  situation  was  by  no  means  to  be  despised. 

I  have  before  mentioned  the  peculiar  obstinacy  with  which 
the  luckless  proprietors  of  the  private  vehicles  which  were  dense- 
ly thronged  together  at  the  northern  end  of  Waizen,  in  spite  of 
the  palpable  impossibility  of  getting  away  speedily  on  the  main 
road,  had  been  striving  against  the  intimation  that  they  were  to 
leave  it,  and  take  the  eastern  by-road  to  Vadkert.  An  end  was 
now  suddenly  put  to  this  opposition  by  the  cry  of  terror  :  "  The 
Cossacks  are  in  the  town  I"  and  still  more  by  the  brisk  discharge 
of  musketry  which  was  simultaneously  heard.  The  persevering 
cannonade  which  soon  afterward  began,  at  the  advance  of  the 
third  corps,  finally  aroused  likewise  those  fugitives  who  had  al- 
ready crossed  the  bridge  from  their  indolent  feeling  of  safety, 
and  stimulated  them  to  greater  speed.  In  consequence  of  these 
moral  influences  of  the  conflict  on  the  minds  of  the  civilians,  the 
departure  of  the  masses  of  vehicles  out  of  the  range  of  the  ma- 
noeuvres of  our  troops  was  accelerated  in  more  ways  than  one. 

And  while  General  Leiningen  with  one  half  of  the  brave  third 
corps  energetically  pursued  the  hostile  troops  of  surprise  on  the 
ground  between  the  brook  Gombas  and  the  Danube  to  near  the 
Szod  vineyards,  and  forced  the  enemy  by  this  resolute  demeanor, 
as  well  as  by  the  simultaneous  advance  of  the  other  half  of  his 
corps  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Gombas,  to  the  preparatory  develop- 
ment of  his  whole  force,  involving  a  new  loss  of  time  ;  and  while 
both  halves  of  the  third  corps  disputed  every  inch  of  ground  in 
giving  way  to  the  greatly  superior  enemy ; — ^the  whole  mass  of 
private  vehicles  was  successfully  removed  out  of  the  range  of  the 
troops,  nay  even  the  rest  of  the  army  train  was  set  in  motion. 
The  latter,  when  General  Leiningen  had  again  effected  his  re- 
treat as  far  as  at  the  height  of  Waizen,  was  already  advanced  be- 
yond the  windings  of  the  road  on  the  Waizen  mountain.  This 
remainder  of  the  army  train  was  closely  followed  by  the  rest  of 
the  first  corps  ;  while  Armin  Gorgei's  column,  designed  to  sup- 
port the  third  corps  when  drawing  back  fighting,  partly  on  the 
main  road  over  the  bridge,  partly  on  the  open  tract  of  ground  to 
the  east  of  it  and  of  the  railroad,  occupied  the  slopes  covered 
with  vineyards  projecting  southeast  of  the  Waizen  mountain,  for 
the  purpose  of  forming  here,  in  the  next  phase  of  combat,  the  ex- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY.  487 

treme  left  wing  of  the  rear-guard  position,  to  be  taken  up  by  one- 
half  of  the  third  corps  on  the  southern  declivity  of  the  Waizen 
mountain,  below  the  winding  road. 

The  enemy  advanced  one  part  of  his  forces  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Gombas  and  directly  east  of  the  railroad,  to  attack  the  po- 
sition of  Armin  Gorgei's  column  ;  with  his  main  force,  however, 
he  marched  simultaneously  through  the  town  of  Waizen,  and  de- 
bouched from  its  northern  outlet  at  the  moment  when  the  last 
sections  of  the  third  corps  were  passing  over  the  bridge.  The 
brisk  fire  of  artillery,  which  he  forthwith  directed  against  this 
point,  was  perhaps  intended  to  prevent  us  from  destroying  the 
bridge.  It  was,  however,  unsuccessful  :  the  bridge  was  burnt 
down ;  and  the  delay  thereby  caused  to  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
on  the  main  road  secured  to  the  half  of  the  third  corps,  which 
had  been  destined  for  the  rear-guard  position  on  the  "Waizen 
mountain,  the  time  necessary  for  marching  up. 

This  position,  whose  left  wing  was  formed  by  Armin  Gorgei's 
column,  which  had  previously  occupied  the  southeastern  project- 
ing declivities  of  the  Waizen  mountain,  was  now  maintained 
against  the  energetic  attacks  of  the  enemy  until  the  other  half  of 
the  third  corps  had  gained  an  advance  of  about  half  a  mile,  in 
order  to  obtain  the  time  needed  for  taking  up,  further  back,  but 
still  before  E-etsag,  a  second  rear-guard  position,  in  which  the 
troops  just  now  in  action  were  to  be  waited  for,  and  relieved 
from  the  rear-guard  service. 

To  continue  the  rear-guard  combat  on  the  Waizen  mountain 
beyond  the  point  of  time  indicated,  seemed  to  me  not  advisable, 
because  I  thought  I  must  apprehend  an  advance  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy  directly  against  Vadkert,  on  the  by-road  leaving 
Waizen  in  an  eastern  direction,  and  consequently,  with  a  longer 
remaining  on  the  Waizen  mountain,  the  endangering  of  the  fur- 
ther retreat  to  Lossoncz.  Vadkert  had  already  been  fixed,  ac- 
cording to  this  combination,  as  the  point  of  retreat  for  the  day. 

The  retreat  from  the  position  on  the  Waizen  mountain  was 
accordingly  opened  with  fighting,  after  about  an  hour's  combat 
by  Armin  Gorgei's  column,  which  was  far  advanced  in  position, 
and  for  this  very  reason  was  more  violently  attacked,  and  con- 
tinued in  like  manner  by  the  whole  rear-guard  as  far  back  as  to 
the  position  of  the  second  half  of  the  third  corps,  which  now,  en- 
tering on  the  rear-guard  service,  encountered  the  hotly  pursuing 


488  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY. 

enemy,  and  thereby  delayed  him  again  until  that  half  of  the 
third  corps  which  had  just  been  relieved,  together  with  Armin 
Gorgei's  column,  had  reached  Retsag. 

In  Retsag  I  charged  the  seventh  corps  (General  Pbltenberg) 
with  the  protection  of  the  further  retreat  as  far  as  Balassa-Gyar- 
mat,  and  determined  at  the  same  time  on  breaking  up  Armin 
Gorgei's  column,  w^th  the  intention  of  employing  its  contingent 
so  as  to  equalize,  as  far  as  possible,  the  striking  differences  in  the 
strength  of  the  three  army  corps. 

The  enemy  closely  followed  that  half  of  the  third  corps,  which 
had  long  resolutely  opposed  him  before  Retsag,  and  commenced 
his  next  attack  with  briskly  cannonading  the  place — evidently 
on  the  supposition  that  it  was  still  occupied  by  us.  The  natural 
consequence  was  that  Retsag  caught  fire  on  several  points. 

General  Poltenberg  with  the  seventh  army  corps  had  mean- 
while taken  up  a  tenable  position  on  the  heights  behind  Retsag, 
and  maintained  it  until  nightfall  in  spite  of  the  uncommonly 
violent  artillery  attacks  of  the  superior  enemy. 

Just  at  the  commencement  of  this  contest  our  main  body  start- 
ed from  Retsag  to  Vadkert.  When  darkness  had  put  an  end  to 
the  combat,  it  was  followed  by  General  Poltenberg  with  his 
corps  as  far  as  about  half  distance  between  the  two  places,  which 
here  begun  its  nightly  bivouac  in  compact  battle-array  a  cheval 
of  the  road.  The  main  body  encamped  the  same  night  (between 
the  17th  and  18th  of  July)  at  Vadkert. 

The  further  retreat  to  Balassa-Gyarmat  was  not  begun  till 
daybreak  of  the  18th.  At  the  same  time  General  Poltenberg 
evacuated  his  bivouac  (between  Vadkert  and  Retsag),  and  fol- 
lowed our  main  body  at  the  distance  of  about  half  a  mile  with- 
out interruption  or  being  overtaken  by  the  enemy,  till  he  had 
crossed  the  brook  Ijokos,  which,  flowing  from  Cserhat  to  the 
river  Eipel,  crosses  the  main  road  between  Vadkert  and  Balassa- 
Gyarmat,  nearer  to  the  former  place. 

On  the  commanding  right  bank  of  this  brook  General  Polten- 
berg had  his  corps  marched  up  in  an  advantageous  defensive 
position  in  order  to  await  the  pursuing  enemy,  and  delay  him 
some  time  ;  thereby  to  enable  our  main  body  again  to  get  further 
in  advance. 

From  the  moment  that  the  seventh  corps  had  been  drawn  up 
on  the  right  Bank  of  the  brook  Lokos  until  the  night  between  the 


MX   LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  489 

20th  and  21st  of  July,  I  took  not  the  least  part  in  the  conduct  of 
the  army.  Since  the  evening  of  the  16th  having  again  person- 
ally led  and  superintended  its  movements,  it  had  not  heen  possi- 
ble for  me  to  avoid  great  exertion  even  of  my  physical  strength. 
In  consequence  of  this  the  wound  in  my  head  got  worse  again. 
On  the  morning  of  the  18th  I  was  completely  unfit  for  service, 
and  remained  so  during  the  course  of  the  next  two  days. 


CHAPTER  LXYIII. 

In  this  state  of  unfitness  for  service,  into  which  I  had  fallen  on 
the  1 8th  of  July,  I  was  brought  the  same  day  as  far  as  Lossoncz, 
and  on  the  following  to  Rimaszombat.  Here  I  remained  from 
the  evening  of  the  19th  till  the  morning  of  the  21st.  An  unin- 
terrupted rest  of  twenty-four  hours  alleviated  my  physical  suffer- 
ing at  least  sufficiently  to  enable  me  in  part  again  to  fulfill  my 
duties  as  leader  of  the  army — in  so  far  as  this  was  possible  under 
such  extraordinary  circumstances  as  the  then  existing  ones,  and 
in  a  condition  which  still  continued  to  cripple  every  higher 
physical  as  well  as  moral  exertion. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  20th  I  received  the  first  report  of  the 
events  which  had  happened  in  the  army  since  the  morning  of  the 
18th.     They  were  in  substance  as  follow  : 

General  Poltenberg,  after  he  had  given  battle  to  the  pursuing 
enemy  in  the  forenoon  of  the  1 8th  with  the  seventh  corps  at  the 
brook  Lokos,  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  him,  and  had  thereupon 
retreated  fighting  as  far  as  Balassa-Gyarmat,  was  relieved  there 
from  the  rear-guard  service  by  General  Nagy-Sandor  with  the 
first  corps. 

Unlike  Generals  Leiningen  and  Poltenberg,  General  Nagy- 
Sandor  neglected  his  duty  as  leader  of  the  rear-guard.  Instead 
of  delaying  the  enemy  in  his  pursuit  as  often  and  as  long  as 
possible — even  at  the  cost  of  sensible  losses — and  thereby  securing 
to  the  main  body,  if  no  more,  at  least  the  time  indispensable  for 
feeding  the. horses  of  the  cavalry  and  the  train — he  commenced 
his  function  as  commander  of  the  rear-guard  with  a  precipitate 

X* 


490  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY 

retreat,  and  was  with  his  own  corps  (the  first)  always  literally  at 
the  heels  of  the  main  body  (the  third  and  seventh  corps). 

A.  F,  Ludany,  halfway  between  Balassa-Gyarmat  and  Los- 
soncz,  had  originally  been  destined  by  the  chief  of  the  general 
staff  as  a  resting-point  for  our  main  body.  But  as  it  had  not 
been  possible  to  find  out  on  the  whole  extent  from  Balassa- 
Gyarmat  to  A.  F.  Ludany  any  position  which  appeared  sufficient- 
ly tenable  to  General  JN"agy-Sandor  for  protecting  the  proposed 
bivouac  of  the  army  at  the  latter  place,  the  main  body — of 
course  closely  followed  by  General  Nagy-Sandor  with  the  first 
corps — had  to  retreat  during  the  day  more  than  half  a  mile 
further,  namely,  to  beyond  the  river  Eipel  at  Raros. 

On  account  of  the  too  great  exhaustion  of  the  troops  (the  dis- 
tance from  Waizen  to  R&ros,  which  had  been  made  within  two 
days,  amounts  to  ten  miles),  it  was  indispensably  necessary  to 
stay  here  for  the  night.  General  Nagy-Sandor,  with  the  first 
corps,  had  to  maintain  the  defile  of  the  bridge  at  R^ros,  easily 
defensible,  only  till  dawn  of  the  next  day  (19th  of  July),  while 
the  main  body  of  the  army  bivouacked  a  short  distance  further 
behind,  on  the  main  road. 

However,  a  false  alarm — such  as  happens  almost  every  night 
when  before  the  enemy — sufficed  to  impose  on  General  Nagy- 
Sandor  to  such  a  degree,  that  he  evacuated  the  position  at  Raros 
during  the  pitch-dark  night ;  thus  forcing  the  main  body  at  the 
same  time  again  to  commence  the  retreat. 

And  what  had  not  hitherto  been  effected  by  the  extraordinary 
hardships  of  the  last  two  days,  the  critical  situation  at  Waizen, 
the  repeatedly  unequal  combat  with  a  far  superior  enemy,  nay 
even  the  peculiarities  of  an  uninterrupted  retreat  in  the  face  of 
the  pursuing  foe,  absolutely  demoralizing  even  the  best  troops — 
namely,  the  loosening  of  the  bonds  of  discipline  in  the  third  and 
seventh  army  corps — General  Nagy-Sandor  now  accomplished 
within  the  shortest  time,  by  allowing  himself  to  be  so  miserably 
shaken  by  a  false  alarm  in  the  scrupulous  performance  of  the 
duty  intrusted  to  him  of  providing  for  our  security. 

The  darkness  of  the  night,  the  drowsiness  of  the  officers  and 
men,  exhausted  to  the  last  degree,  were  circumstances  in  which 
a  panic  terror — as  it  had  been  spread  throughout  the  camp  of  the 
main  army  by  General  Nagy-Sandor' s  senseless  flight  before  a 
phantom — could  hardly  fail  to  be  followed  by  the  complete  disso- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  491 

lution  of  the  third  and  seventh  corps,  consequently  of  two-thirds  of 
the  army ;  and  as  the  condition  of  the  first  corps  may  be  conceived 
not  to  have  been  remarkably  orderly,  the  army  in  fact  owed  its 
continued  existence  only  to  the  fortunate  accident,  that  the  enemy, 
who  had  energetically  continued  the  pursuit  with  superior  forces 
as  far  as  Balassa-Gyarmat,  had  suddenly  desisted  at  about  a  mile 
beyond  it ;  whereby,  on  the  following  day  (the  19th),  the  rallying 
at  Lossoncz  of  the  troops  dispersed  in  all  directions  was  possible. 
Our  losses  in  men  and  horses,  however,  far  exceeded  in  number 
the  victims  of  an  extraordinarily  hot  day's  battle. 

Moreover,  the  unavoidable  massy  appendage  to  the  army  of 
the  equipaged  fugitives  had  contributed  its  full  share  toward  in- 
creasing the  confusion  during  the  nightly  surprise  executed  with 
rare  success  by  General  Nagy-Sandor  on  our  own  main  body. 
In  order  to  get  them  out  of  the  way  of  the  army,  at  least  for  the 
next  decisive  days,  they  were  again  combined  into  a  train, 
separate  from  the  army  train,  and,  under  an  escort,  sent  on  a 
by-road,  which  flanked  on  the  north  the  further  line  of  operations. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  20th  of  July,  when  I  was  first  informed 
of  these  events  of  the  last  two  days,  the  seventh  army  corps  was 
at  Rimaszombat,  the  third  at  Osgyan,  and  the  first  as  rear-guard 
at  Apatfalva  behind  Lossoncz.  The  chief  of  the  general  staff 
had  thought  it  necessary  immediately  to  give  General  Nag}^- 
Sandor — who  had  hitherto  done  any  thing  rather  than  meet  the 
requirements  of  a  commander  of  the  rear-guard — an  opportunity 
in  this  service — in  case  the  pursuit  should  be  recommenced  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy — to  save  his  honor  by  accomplishing  at 
least  half  as  much  as  had  been  done  by  Generals  Leiningen  and 
Poltenberg  in  the  course  of  the  17th  and  18th  of  July. 

I  could  not  but  approve  of  this  measure  the  more,  as  the  above 
disposition  of  the  three  army  corps,  during  the  new  phase  on 
which  our  operation  had  entered  on  reaching  the  point  of  Los- 
soncz, seemed  to  me,  on  the  whole,  to  be  the  most  judicious. 

From  "Waizen  as  far  as  Lossoncz  our  operation  had  been  veiy 
simple  both  in  object  and  execution.  Our  only  aim  was  to  gain 
the  points  of  Balassa-Gyarmat  and  Lossoncz  if  possible  before  the 
arrival  there  of  the  northern  Russian  corps,  which  had  entered 
through  the  Arva.  And  the  means  recognized  as  indispensable 
for  the  successful  accomplishment  of  this  task  were,  as  we  have 
seen,  speed  in  the  retrograde  movement,  and  repeated  combats  by 


492  MY  LIFE  Ax\D  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  rear-guard  a  tout  risque,  for  the  purpose  of  impeding  as  much 
as  possible  the  pressing  on  behind  of  the  hostile  force,  destructive 
to  the  order  of  the  retreat. 

*  From  Lossoncz  onward,  however,  the  execution  of  our  opera- 
tion was  certainly  complicated,  though  the  final  object  was  not. 
It  had  as  hitherto  to  be  protected  in  the  rear,  while  at  the  same 
time  the  obstacles  in  front  of  it  must  be  removed. 

The  first  task,  perilous  as  it  had  been  during  the  retreat  from 
Balassa-Gyarmat,  now  seemed  suddenly  to  be  the  less  difficult 
of  the  two ;  after  that  the  supposition  respecting  the  hostile 
counter-operation,  which  I  had  entertained  while  in  Waizen  (that 
the  enemy  would  constantly  follow  us  closely  with  his  main  body), 
had  been  proved,  by  the  relaxation  in  his  pursuit,  which  had  be- 
come perceptible  by  the  evening  of  the  18th  of  July,  to  be  erro- 
neous ;  and  that  instead  of  this  supposition,  it  was  now  to  be 
assumed  that  the  enemy  had  divided  his  main  body  on  the  17th 
of  July,  (when  still  at  Waizen),  had  followed  us  with  one  half 
only  as  far  as  the  first  passage  across  the  Eipel  behind  Balassa- 
Gyarmat,  from  thence,  however,  had  turned  aside  by  Szecseny, 
Locz,  and  Paszto  to  Petervasara  (with  the  intention  of  prevent- 
ing a  possible  breaking  through  on  our  part  toward  the  south), 
while  he  had  immediately  directed  the  other  half  of  his  main 
body,  in  forced  marches,  on  the  Gyongyos  road  toward  Miskolcz, 
in  order  to  hinder  us  from  breaking  through  on  the  east. 

(The  energetic  pursuit  as  far  as  the  first  passage  of  the  Eipel 
behind  Balassa-Gyarmat,  near  Hugyag,  might  have  had  the 
tactical  object,  to  profit  as  much  as  possible  by  the  victory  at 
Waizen ;  and  at  the  same  time  the  twofold  strategic  one,  to 
render  impracticable  to  us,  on  the  one  hand,  a  return  to  Komorn, 
on  the  other — perhaps  assuming  the  probability  of  an  attempt  to 
break  through  in  a  southern  direction  by  Gyongyos  or  Hatvan — 
a  flank-march  to  the  left,  supposed  to  be  intended  on  our  part, 
by  Szecseny  and  Locz,  into  the  valley  of  the  Zagyva.) 

Consequently  the  sudden  relaxation  of  the  hostile  pursuit,  com- 
bined with  the  simultaneous  information  of  scouts,  that  the 
northern  Russian  corps  was  already  on  its  march  from  Altsohl 
toward  Lossoncz,  led  me  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  strategic  posi- 
tion which  the  enemy  was  now  striving  to  take  up,  and  which 
he  hoped  to  reach  in  good  time,  might  perhaps  be  the  follovdng : 

E-imaszombat — Northern  corps. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY,  493 

Petervdsara — That  part  of  the  main  body  of  the  army  which 
had  pursued  us  till  the  evening  of  the  18th. 

Miskolcz — The  rest  of  the  main  body. 

It  was  further  to  be  expected  that  the  enemy  would  secure  to 
himself,  whatever  it  cost,  the  possibility  of  reaching  the  point 
Miskolcz  with  the  remainder  of  his  army  before  us ;  that  he 
would  do  all  in  his  power  to  delay  our  march  to  the  same  point ; 
that  we  should  accordingly  encounter  opposition  probably  at  the 
first  important  river-passage — ^perhaps  at  the  Sajo,  between  Du- 
bicsany  and  Vadna. 

In  the  face  of  these  probabilities,  however,  I  could  by  no  means 
mistake  the  far  lligher  importance  of  the  task  of  the  van-guard 
than  of  the  rear-guard.  For  even  if  the  latter  completely  failed 
us — as  had  been  the  case  at  Raros — the  final  aim  of  our  opera- 
tion (the  eastern  breaking  through  by  Miskolcz  and  Tokaj)  could 
nevertheless  be  attained,  if  the  van-guard  performed  its  duty,  and 
prevent^  the  accumulation  of  an  equal  hostile  force  at  Miskolcz, 
by  gaining  this  point  betimes,  in  spite  of  all  opposing  efibrts  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy.  But  if  the  van-guard  refused,  then  the 
last  possibility  of  breaking  through  was  lost — even  if  the  rear- 
guard did  its  part  ever  so  gloriously. 

Consequently — mindful,  moreover,  of  the  rule  to  keep  the  best 
sub- commander  with  his  troops  en  reserve  for  the  moment  of  the 
final  decision — I  could  not  but  acknowledge  the  dispositions  given 
to  the  three  army  corps  by  the  chief  of  the  general  staff  during 
my  total  unfitness  for  service  to  be  most  excellently  adapted  for 
the  purpose.  General  Nagy-Sandor  was  the  least  capable  of  the 
commanders  of  corps,  and  at  the  same  time  the  least  to  be  relied 
upon :  to  him,  under  the  above-developed  conjunctures,  only  the 
rear-guard  of  the  arraBjr  could  be  intrusted.  The  performance 
of  the  duty  assigned  to  the  leader  of  the  van-guard  might  be  ex- 
pected from  General  Poltenberg  with  much  more  certainty  than 
from  General  Nagy-Skndor ;  while  General  Leiningen,  the  best 
of  all,  must  necessarily  remain  en  reserve  with  his  corps. 

For  the  21st  of  July  General  Poltenberg,  with  the  seventh 
corps,  was  accordingly  ordered  from  Rimaszombat  in  advance  to 
gain  the  passage  over  the  Sajo,  between  DubicsA.ny  and  Vadna ; 
General  Leiningen,  with  the  third  corps  en  reserve,  from  OsgyHn 
to  Putnok  ;  General  Nagy-Sandor,  with  the  first  corps,  as  a  pro- 
tection in  the  rear,  from  Apatfalva  to  Rimaszecs. 


CHAPTER  LXIX. 

In  the  night  between  the  20th  and  21st  of  July  two  Russian 
officers  appeared  in  Rimaszombat ;  a  captain  of  hussars,  Katla- 
row,  and  a  lieutenant  of  artillery,  Count  Riidiger. 

They  had  been  dispatched  on  the  evening  of  the  20th  as 
trumpets  by  the  Russian  Colonel  Chrulow,  at  first  only  to  the 
commander  of  our  rear-guard  at  Apatfalva.  (Jeneral  Nagy-San- 
dor,  however,  directed  them  to  me  personally,  and  directed  the 
chief  of  his  general  staff  to  escort  them  to  the  head-quarters. 

Wlien  before  me,  they  declared  that,  in  consequence  of  an 
ordeal  from  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Russian  army,  Field- 
marshal  Prince  Paszkiewicz,  they  had  been  charged  by  the  com- 
mander of  corps  and  general  of  cavalry,  Count  Riidiger,  and 
directly  by  the  commander  of  the  van-guard.  Colonel  Chrulow, 
to  summon  me,  in  the  name  of  his  majesty  the  Czar,  to  order 
my  troops  to  lay  down  their  arms,  to  disperse,  and  every  man  to 
return  to  his  own  home ; — unless  we  complied,  we  should  im- 
mediately be  attacked  by  the  Russian  army. 

I  asked  in  the  first  instance  to  see  the  credentials  of  the  trum- 
pets. 

They  possessed  nothing  of  the  kind,  and  asserted  that  they  had 
received  only  an  oral  commission. 

I  hereupon  remarked  that,  without  credentials,  it  was  impos- 
sible for  them  to  convince  me  of  the  authenticity  of  their  mission. 

They,  on  the  contrary,  opined  that  there  was  time  enough  for 
this ;  I  should  only,  for  the  present,  conclude  with  them  an 
armistice  of  forty-eight  hours  to  open  the  negotiations. 

The  mere  threat  of  an  attack  had  come  on  me  rather  unex- 
pectedly after  the  events  of  the  15th,  16th,  17th,  and  18th  of 
July,  and  had  led  me  forthwith  to  conjecture  that  the  summons 
to  lay  down  our  arms  was  but  the  mask  of  the  real  commission. 
The  sudden  proposal  of  an  armistice  of  forty-eight  hours  seemed 
to  confirm  this  conjecture ;  to  obtain  this  armistice  appeared  to 
be  the  real  object  of  the  negotiation ;  the  aim  of  the  armistice, 
however,  could  be  no  other  than  the  delay  of  our  retreat. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  495 

Hence  I  deduced  the  gratifying  conclusion  that  the  enemy 
already  despaired  of  gaining  time  enough  the  point  Miskolcz ; 
and  I  of  course  thought  of  any  thing  rather  than  of  accepting  the 
armistice. 

But  hoping  to  elicit  from  the  two  trumpets,  in  the  course  of  a 
more  prolonged  conference,  some  involuntary  revelation  relative 
to  the  position  of  the  hostile  army,  I  resolved  to  defer  as  long  as 
possible  a  positive  refusal  of  the  armistice. 

I  consequently  made  as  if  I  entered  into  the  idea  of  laying 
down  our  arms ;  nay,  in  order  to  render  the  deception  as  com- 
plete as  I  could,  and  to  induce  the  trumpets  to  speak  as  much  as 
possible,  I  even  requested  them  plainly  to  inform  me,  whether 
we  might  not  expect  any  positively  favorable  conditions  in  case 
of  laying  down  our  arms. 

Only  one  of  them,  Count  Riidiger,  spoke  German.  He  was 
generally  the  spokesman ;  and  after  a  short  dialogue  with  his 
comrade,  unintelhgible  to  me,  he  offered,  in  reply  to  my  question, 
the  two  following  conditions  : 

1 .  For  the  men  :  free  departure  to  their  homes,  where  they 
should  remain  exempt  from  any  constraint  to  further  military 
service. 

2.  For  the  generals  and  officers :  the  same,  and  an  unob- 
structed passing  over  into  the  imperial  Russian  service  with  such 
rank  as  they  held  in  the  Hungarian  army. 

I  explained  to  Count  Uiidiger,  that  the  army  required  above 
all  things  a  guarantee  for  the  future  of  the  country. 

Hereupon  he  thought  himself  justified  in  promising  also  the 
intercession  of  the  Czar  with  the  Emperor  of  Austria  for  the 
country. 

The  declarations  of  Count  Riidiger  were  laconic ;  moreover 
he  showed  himself  sparing  of  words.  The  comedy  began  to 
weary  me,  as  the  prospect  of  learning  any  thing  of  importance  as 
to  the  position  of  the  Russian  array  was  ever  more  and  more 
enveloped  in  clouds  by  the  taciturnity  of  the  count. 

Captain  Katlarow  was  evidently  far  more  communicative  than 
his  comrade  ;  he  spoke,  however,  only  Russian  and  French,  in 
the  latter  of  which  I  can  not  converse  without  extreme  diffi- 
culty. 

Nevertheless,  I  determined  to  try  my  luck  with  Captain  Katla- 
row, and  to  continue  the  further  conversation  with  him.     I 


4^6  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

found  a  suitable  opportunity  of  doing  so  by  requesting  Count 
Riidiger  to  write  down  the  stipulated  conditions. 

While  he  was  occupied  in  complying  with  my  request,  I  chose 
as  an  opening  to  the  conversation  with  Captain  Katlarow  the 
question,  whether  he  would  forward  a  letter'  from  me  to  Prince 
Paszkiewicz. 

"  Then  you  accept  the  armistice !"  Captain  Katlarow  inter- 
rupted me. 

After  this  interjection  I  no  longer  doubted  that  an  armistice 
was  the  only  object  of  the  trumpets.  ..  ^  ^^  .  • 

Captain  Katlarow  had  followed  me  on  to  the  slippery  ground, 
to  which  I  intended  to  allure  him,  more  quickly  than  I  had  ex- 
pected. I  hastened  to  tak6  advantage  of  this  favorable  circum- 
stance. '  *^ 

With  the  armistice,  I  answered,  we  are  all  in  good  time  ;  and- 
added — beating  about  the  bush — as  a  reason,  that  the  Russian 
army  was  just  now  executing  movements  which  obliged  me  for 
the  present  uninterruptedly  to  continue  the  retreat. 

"  But  it  will  not  be  possible  for  you  much  longer  to  continue 
your  route,"  replied  Captain  Katlarow  in  evident  haste  ;  "  for 
you  march  this  way,"  (he  accompanied  this  proof  by  drawings 
with  his  finger  on  the  table,)  "  and  here  arrives  Riidiger,  here 
Tschegodajew,  and  here  follows  Grabbe." 

The  drawings  with  his  finger  perfectly  corresponded,  on  the 
one  hand,  with  the  information  of  the  scouts,  that  the  northern 
Russian  corps  (Grabbe)  was  marching  from  the  mountain-towns 
against  Lossoncz  ;  on  the  other  hand,  with  our  supposition,  based 
on  their  intermitting  in  the  pursuit,  that  a  part  of  the  hostile 
main  body  (Riidiger),  having  turned  off  from  Balassa-Gyarmat 
to  the  south,  was  operating  against  us  by  Petervasara  ;  while 
the  remnant  of  the  main  body  (Tschegodajew)  was  attempting  to 
reach  Miskolcz  before  us. 

The  coincidence  of  the  finger-drawings  of  the  Russian  trumpet 
with  ray  conjectures  as  to  the  hostile  plan  of  operations  appeared 
to  me  to  be  more  than  accidental. 

I  could  not  possibly  expect  detailed  explanations  from  a  subor- 
dinate officer  of  the  hostile  army.  I  contented  myself,  therefore, 
with  what  I  had  learned ;  and  the  only  thing  I  still  thought 
desirable  was  to  delay  the  return  of  the  hostile  trumpets  to  their 
camp,  in  order  that  General  Nagy-Sandor,  who  had  to  evacuate 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  497 

his  rear-guard  position  at  Apatfalva  at  daybreak  on  the  21st  of 
July,  might  gain  an  advance  in  the  further  retreat.  This  was 
obtained  as  a  matter  of  course ;  the  trumpets  declaring  them- 
selves ready  to  take  a  letter  from  me  to  Field-marshal  Prince 
Paszkiewicz  (namely,  my  written  reply  to  the  summons  to  lay 
down  our  arms,  and  to  accept  an  armistice,)  and  I  needed  a  cer- 
tain time  to  draw  it  up. 

In  the  ministerial  council  of  the  26th  of  June,  I  had,  among 
other  things,  proposed  to  the  government,  that  while  the  Aus- 
trians  were  attacked  with  all  our  might,  it  should  enter  into 
negotiations  with  the  Russians,  were  it  only  to  compromise  them 
with  the  Austrians,  and  thereby,  for  our  advantage,  give  more 
foundation  to  the  want  of  agreement,  from  which — as  the  history 
of  war  shows — the  operations  of  allied  armies  generally  suffer. 

Personally,  however,  I  felt  no  inclination  to  take  the  initiative 
in  the  execution  of  this  proposal.  But  now,  as  the  Russians  had 
begun  to  negotiate,  I  certainly  thought  the  occasion  favorable  for 
realizing,  at  least  experimentally,  my  own  original  idea.  I.  ac- 
cordingly secured  to  myself  the  opportunity  of  a  further  exchange 
of  trumpets  between  our  army  and  that  of  the  Russians,  by 
requesting,  in  my  written  answer  to  Prince  Paszkiewicz,  a  delay 
of  forty-eight  hours  for  the  definitive  declaration  to  the  request  to 
lay  down  our  arms,  under  the  pretext  that  I  must  previously 
consult  the  army  itself,  whether  it  was  willing  to  lay  down  its 
arms  on  the  stipulated  conditions.  The  offered  armistice,  how- 
ever, I  declined,  on  the  feigned  reason  that  our  troops  were  not 
familiar  with  this  usage  of  war. 

The  reader  is  aware  that  I  had  believed  the  invitation  to  con- 
clude an  armistice  to  be  a  mere  stratagem,  the  object  of  which 
was  to  retard  our  retreat,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  a  Russian 
corps  to  prevent  us  from  pursuing  our  route  to  Tokaj. 

This  offer  of  an  armistice  was  certainly  a  stratagem ;  but  its 
final  object — as  was  subsequently  evident — a  much  more  in- 
significant one  than  that  supposed. 

The  Russian  Colonel  Chrulow  had  been  charged  with  three 
squadrons  of  mixed  cavalry  and  two  guns,  to  recommence  the 
pursuit  of  our  retreating  army,  interrupted  in  the  evening  of  the 
18th  of  July. 

With  this  feeble  column  Colonel  Chrulow  on  the  20th  of  July 
reached  Lossoncz,  and  found  himself  next  moment  directly  opposite 


498  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

to  a  Hungarian  corps  of  about  9000  men  and  forty  guns  (our 
first  corps  at  Apatfalva),  consequently  in  evident  danger  of  being 
destroyed,  since  he  was  distant  some  days'  march  from  every 
support. 

It  was  thiiS  danger  which.  Colonel  Chrulow  was  striving  to 
escape  by  negotiating. 

Colonel  Chrulow,  in  spite  of  the  isolated  situation  in  which  he 
found  himself,  with  his  small  forces  in  face  of  our  first  corps,  ran, 
after  all — of  which  he  could  certainly  have  no  presentiment — 
positively  not  the  least  danger ;  because  it  happened  by  chance, 
fortunately  for  him,  that  General  Nagy-Sandor  was  then  the 
commander  of  this  corps,  and  that  he — to  judge  by  his  conduct 
in  the  night  between  the  18th  and  19th  of  July  at  Raros,  where 
no  enemy  had  been  opposed  to  him — was  even  glad  not  to  be 
attacked  by  Colonel  Chrulow. 

After  the  Russian  trumpets,  with  my  written  answer,  the  sub- 
stance of  which  I  have  indicated  above,  had  left  the  head-quarters 
again,  in  the  course  of  the  night  between  the  20th  and  2 1  st  of 
July,  and  were  escorted  back  to  their  camp,  I  had  to  consider 
whether  I  should  communicate  or  not  to  the  army  the  negotia- 
tion into  which  I  had  entered  with  them. 

The  prospect  of  the  demoralizing  consequences,  which  must 
follow  the  scandal  of  a  general  discussion  about  the  expediency 
of  an  act  of  submission,  spoke  agai?ist  its  promulgation. 

It  was,  however,  impossible  to  prevent  it  from  becoming  gen- 
erally known  that  hostile  trumpets  had  appeared  at  the  head- 
quarters, and  this  was  the  first  time  such  a  thing  had  occurred. 
There  was  no  doubt  that  it  would  give  rise  in  the  ranks  of  the 
army  to  more  extravagant  conjectures  about  what  had  been  the 
real  object  of  the  hostile  trumpets,  the  deeper  the  genuine  truth 
of  the  matter  remained  enveloped  in  darkness. 

I  had  seriously  to  fear  that  my  silence  about  the  matter  in 
question  would  only  nourish  the  suspicion  that  I  was  in  treacher- 
ous communication  with  the  enemies  of  the  faiherland. 

This  suspicion  did  not  date  originally  from  the  days  of  July  at 
Komorn.  Its  first  source  was  likewise  neither  in  my  refusal  to 
take  reprisals  for  the  executions  at  Presburg  ;  nor  in  the  fact 
that  the  garrison  of  Ofen  had  not  been  put  to  the  sword  :  nor  in 
the  siege  of  Ofen,  and  the  simultaneous  interruption  of  the  ofien- 
sive  against  the  Austrian  main  army ;  nor  in  my  declared  en- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  499 

deavor  not  to  conduct  the  war  in  a  manner  contradictory  to  the 
character  of  the  nation ;  nor  in  the  removal  of  Dembinski  from 
his  office,  which  had  taken  place  at  Tiszafured  in  the  beginning 
of  March ;  nor  on  the  battle-field  at  Kapolna ;  nor,  finally,  in 
the  efforts — which  had  become  generally  known — of  the  Austrian 
Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz  to  induce  me  to  desert  the 
cause  of  Hungary.  The  fact  to  which  I  mainly  owed  the  sus- 
picion of  the  treacherous  or  at  least  self-interested  efforts  is  older 
than  all  the  just-enumerated  occurrences.  My  first  open  opposi- 
tion to  Kossuth's  policy,  by  means  of  the  proclamation  of  Waizen, 
communicated  in  Chapter  XV,  of  these  notes,  was  that  whereby  I 
had  challenged  the  hydra  of  calumny  against  me. 

It  was  not  unnatural  that  all  who  honored  in  Kossuth  the 
founder  of  an  independent  state,  Hungary  in  spe — above  all,  he 
himself — in  consequence  of  this  proclamation  became  my  bitter 
enemies.  And  as,  in  spite  of  the  power  which  they  had  over  my 
person,  they  wante^he  courage  to  take  open  revenge  on  me, 
they  attempted  to  do  so  insidiously,  by  causing  me  to  be  suspected 
in  the  manner  just  indicated  ;  wherein  they  were  of  course  not  in 
the  least  prevented  by  the  postulate  for  intentionally  rendering  any 
one  suspected — the  disfiguring  of  the  facts. 

Thus  at  first  it  was  not  denied  that  I  was  in  a  certain  degree 
accessible  to  the  proposals  of  Field-marshal  Prince  Windischgratz  ; 
then  a  version  about  the  battle  of  Kapolna  was  fabricated — of 
course  with  Dembinski's  personal  co-operation — according  to  which 
I  was  said  to  have  known  how,  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  so 
to  arrange  for  the  second  day  as  that  an  unfortunate  issue  was 
unavoidable.  A  not  less  successful  version  of  Dembinski's  retreat 
behind  the  Theiss,  and  his  being  rernoved  from  the  chief  command 
over  the  army,  again  pointed  me  out  and  my  presumed  intrigues 
as  the  principal  cause  of  the  circumstance,  that  the  abilities  of 
the  old  Pole  as  a  general  had  remained  untried,  that  he  himself 
for  the  present  could  not  become  commander-in-chief  of  the  army. 
Finally,  my  endeavor  to  conduct  the  war  in  such  a  manner  as — 
in  the  opinion  of  the  best  officers  of  the  army — was  calculated  to 
preserve  unsullied  the  honorable  character  of  the  nation  ;  the  in- 
terruption of  the  spring  campaign  by  the  investment  of  Ofen ;  the 
subsequent  pardon  of  the  Ofen  garrison;  the  refusal  to  take 
reprisals  for  those  executed  at  Presburg ;  and,  to  crown  all,  the 
days  of  July  at  Komorn,  with  the  certainly  frightful  demand 


500  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

that  the  government  should  in  their  own  persons  become  surety 
for  the  cause  of  the  nation ; — all  these  facts  were  one  after  an- 
other worked  up  in  the  same  manner  as  the  hattle  of  Kapolna 
and  Dembinski's  removal  had  been,  and  by  degrees  combined 
into  a  system  of  proofs  which  should  leave  not  the  least  doubt 
that  my  aim  was  assuredly  not  the  cause  of  the  fatherland,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  either  my  own  elevation  to  the  dictatorship,  or 
perhaps  only  an  accumulation  of  merits  in  the  eyes  of  the  Aus- 
trian rulers. 

In  this  "  either  ....  or"  lay  crowded  together  certainly  much 
evident  nonsense  :  nevertheless  it  had  already  found  belief  even 
among  a  part  of  those  troops  which  were  under  my  personal  com- 
mand. It  is  true  this  part  of  the  armiy  was  not  a  compact  one, 
and  mostly  consisted  only  of  such  individuals  or  separate  bodies 
of  troops  as  had  happened  at  some  time  or  other  to  be  so  unfortu- 
nate as  to  violate  their  duty  on  the  battle-field  immediately  under 
my  own  eyes.  The  distrust  of  me,  proclaimed  undisguisedly,  as 
ever,  by  this  small  part  of  the  army,  had  certainly  always  pro- 
duced with  the  greater  part  of  it  an  effect  diametrically  opposite 
to  the  intended  one.  But  the  reason  of  this  lay  simply  in  the 
circumstance,  that  no  single  one  of  all  the  calumnies  which  had 
hitherto  been  directed  against  my  person  could  be  supported  in 
the  version  given  of  it  by  any  fact  generally  known  to  the  army. 
And  I  was  by  no  means  unaware,  that  the  first  act  on  my  part, 
the  particulars  of  which  might  offer  the  slightest  ground  for  a 
positive  suspicion  of  the  purity  of  my  intentions,  would  immedi- 
ately furnish  the  most  gigantic  aid  to  the  mania  for  proselytizing 
among  the  parts  of  the  army  devoted  to  me.  To  keep  secret  the 
substance  of  the  conference  between  the  hostile  trumpets  and  me 
would  have  heen  such  an  act,  and  would  unquestionably  have 
been  accompanied  by  the  result  mentioned  ;  for  the  army  was  in 
a  critical,  nay  most  unfortunate  situation — and  misfortune  dis- 
poses the  mind  to  distrust. 

Under  these  circumstances  I  could  not  possibly  doubt  whether 
it  was  less  disadvantageous  to  conceal  or  to  make  known  the 
summons  addressed  to  me  by  the  hostile  trumpets.  Nay,  I  had 
already  rendered  it  absolutely  impossible  to  conceal  my  conference 
with  the  Russian  officers  :  for — convinced  of  the  necessity  of  care- 
fully avoiding  all  secret  contact  with  hostile  negotiators,  if  I  did 
not  wish  wantonly  to  risk  the  confidence  of  the  army — after  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  501 

trumpets  had  entered  ray  room,  I  intentionally  left  the  door  wide 
open,  that  the  subsequent  conversation  might  take  place  in  the 
presence  of  the  personnel  on  duty  assembled  without  selection  in 
the  adjoining  room,  and  that  consequently  not  the  smallest  matter 
could  be  discussed  between  me  and  the  hostile  officers  without 
witnesses. 

To  communicate  officially  to  the  army  the  conditions  under 
which — according  to  the  terms  of  the  Russian  trumpets — we 
were  immediately  to  lay  down  our  arms  was  moreover  not  merely 
advisable,  it  was  decidedly  commanded  by  duty ;  because  thereby 
any  exaggeration  in  the  rumors  of  the  pretended  advantages 
which  Russia  seemed  to  offer  in  return  for  our  submission  was 
rendered  impossible,  and  consequently  the  demoralizing  effect  of 
the  stipulated  conditions,  considering  their  evident  worthlessness, 
was  certainly  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

It  appeared  to  me  far  more  difficult  to  decide  in  wliat  form 
and  manner  the  negotiations  into  which  I  had  entered  with  the 
hostile  trumpets  should  be  communicated  to  the  army  ;  and  I 
saw  the  necessity  of  advising  about  it  with  Count  Leiningen  and 
several  of  the  highest  and  tried  staff'-officers  of  the  army. 

The  question  was,  whether  the  judgment  of  the  army  about 
the  expediency  of  laying  down  of  our  arms  should  be  anticipated, 
or  not,  in  the  official  publication  of  the  hostile  summons  to  this 
act ;  that  is,  whether  the  enemy's  summons  should  be  simply 
communicated  to  the  army  as  a  question  already  answered  by  a 
refusal,  or  laid  before  it  as  a  still  open  question  for  a  direct  answer. 

The  result  of  the  deliberation  was  a  decision  for  the  latter 
measure  ;  because  an  opportunity  seemed  thereby  to  be  afforded 
for  obtaining  certainty  respecting  the  spirit  of  the  first  corps — 
which  during  the  last  few  days  had  fallen  into  great  disrepute — 
calculated  either  to  tranquilize  us,  or  to  justify  its  dissolution. 
General  Nagy-Sandor,  by  his  dastardly  conduct  in  the  rear-guard 
service,  but  especially  by  his  fatal  abandonment  of  the  position 
at  Raros  in  the  night  between  the  18th  and  19th  of  July,  had 
already  succeeded  in  rendering  not  only  himself  suspected  of  a 
disinclination  for  fighting,  but  likewise  the  first  corps  intrusted  to 
his  command  ;  and  this  to  such  a  degree,  that  there  was  felt  to 
be  no  improbability  in  the  assumption,  that  the  first  corps  would 
be  inclined  to  lay  down  its  arms  immediately,  in  spite  of  the 
MTetched  nature  of  the  Russian  counter-engagements. 


502  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  danger — in  view  of  this  assumption — of  risking  the  exist- 
ence of  the  army  by  laying  before  it  this  open  question  neverthe- 
less did  not  exist ;  as  a  negative  answer  to  the  requirements  of 
the  K-ussian  trumpets  might  be  expected  with  certainty  from  the 
third  and  seventh  army  corps  (Count  Leiningen  and  Poltenberg) ; 
and  consequently  the  presupposed  assent  of  the  first  corps  alone 
must  remain  in  a  minority ;  and  the  only  consequence  it  could 
have  would  be  the  sad  but  at  the  moment  preservative  necessity, 
immediately  to  dissolve  this  corps,  which  had  shunned  engaging 
the  enemy,  and  incorporate  its  constituent  parts  in  the  other  two 
army  corps. 

However,  the  fear  to  which  the  consequence  of  Nagy-Sandor's 
untrustworthiness  had  given  rise  was  fortunately  not  justified  by 
the  answer  of  the  first  corps.  Like  those  of  the  third  and  seventh, 
it  was  in  the  negative. 

If  I  remember  rightly,  there  existed  between  the  declarations 
of  the  last  two  corps  and  that  of  the  first  merely  the  one  differ- 
ence, that  only  in  those  two,  and  not  in  this,  the  guarantee  for 
the  preservation  of  the  constitution  sanctioned  in  the  year  1848 
by  King  Ferdinand  Y.  was  pointed  out  as  the  postulate  of  a 
peaceable  arrangement.  But  as  the  documents  in  question  are 
not  in  my  possession,  I  can  not,  on  an  indistinct  recollection, 
vouch  for  the  actual  existence  of  this  difference  ; — although  it  is 
hardly  conceivable  that  an  official  declaration  of  the  first  corps, 
commanded  by  Nagy-Sandor  (Kossuth's  personal  partisan),  would 
contain  a  voluntary  appeal  to  the  state-law  set  aside  by  the  law 
of  independence  of  the  14th  of  April. 

In  the  answers  of  the  third  and  seventh  corps,  however — thus 
much  I  distinctly  remember — ^this  appeal  was  contained  in  ex- 
press terms,  as  it  was  also  in  my  declaration  to  Prince  Paszkie- 
wicz,  which — composed  in  the  spirit  of  these  answers,  and  reject- 
ing the  requirement,  made  to  us  by  the  Russian  trumpets,  to  lay 
down  our  arms — had  been  sent  on  the  2 2d  of  July  from  the 
head-quarters  at  Sajo-Szent-Peter  by  means  of  two  trumpets  to 
the  camp  of  the  next  hostile  column  closely  following  us,  to  be 
forwarded  to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Russian  army. 


h>4 


CHAPTER  LXX. 

On  the  21st  of  July  the  seventh  corps  reached  Dubicsany  and 
the  passage  across  the  Sajo,  the  third  corps  Putnok,  and  the  first 
Rimaszecs,  without  the  seventh  having  encountered,  or  the  first 
been  overtaken  by  the  foe. 

But  on  the  same  day  it  was  reported  by  scouts  at  the  head- 
quarters in  Putnok,  that  Miskolcz  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy. 

On  this  intelligence,  we  resolved  to  advance  to  the  attack  on 
Miskolcz  with  the  seventh  and  third  corps,  while  the  first  corps 
should  prevent  the  Russian  column  that  was  following  from  Los- 
soncz  from  crossing  the  Sajo  between  Dubicsany  and  Yadna,  and 
to  this  end  should  not  follow  the  third  and  seventh  corps  further 
than  the  last-named  point. 

In  the  event  of  the  attack  on  Miskolcz  proving  unsuccessful,  a 
concentric  flank-march  to  the  left,  by  Szikszo  and  Medgyaszo 
toward  Tokaj,  as  a  last  attempt  to  re-establish  the  communica- 
tion with  the  southern  forces  of  the  country,  was  determined  on ; 
although,  to  make  this  manoeuvre  possible,  with  an  enemy  victo- 
rious in  front  and  pursuing  in  the  rear,  it  was  prospectively 
necessary  to  expose,  on  the  one  hand,  a  part  of  the  first  corps  at 
Vadna,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  part  of  the  seventh  at  Miskolcz. 

(The  diversion  of  our  movements  toward  the  north,  perhaps  to 
destroy  the  enemy's  stores  in  Kaschau,  and  after  that  to  strike 
through  the  Marmaros  comitate  to  Transylvania — considering  my 
firm  resolution  to  execute,  at  whatever  cost,  if  at  all  practicable, 
the  decision  of  the  Komorn  military  council  of  the  6th  of  July — 
was  one  of  those  operations  which  ought  to  have  been  dictated  to 
me  solely  by  the  enemy  himself — and  this  by  the  timely  frustra- 
tion of  all  attempts  to  gain  the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss  by  Tokaj). 
-  Accordingly  on  the  22d  of  July  the  army  crossed  the  Sajo  be- 
^  tween  Dubicsany  and  Yadna,  and  advanced  on  the  right  bank  of 
.the  river — the  seventh  corps  by  Sajo-Szent-Peter  to  within  a 
mile  of  Miskolcz  ;  the  third  corps,  the  head-quarters,  and  the 
army  train  (followed  by  the  train  of  the  fugitive  civilians),  as  far 
as  Sajo-Szent-Peter ;  the  first  corps  to  Vadna.     The  march  was 


504  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

flanked  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Sajo  by  a  secondary  column  of 
the  seventh  corps,  disposing  its  most  advanced  troops  to  the  left 
as  far  as  Szikszo  (on  the  Kaschau  high  road),  to  the  right  as  far 
as  the  passage  across  the  eastern  branch  of  the  Sajo  at  Sajo- 
Vamos  ;  while  the  advanced  troops  of  the  main  column  reconnoi- 
tred the  passage  across  the  western  branch  of  the  river  at 
Szirma-Besenyo,  then  a  second  one  across  the  eastern  branch  at 
Arnot,  and  finally  Miskolcz  itself 

The  result  of  these  recomioiterings — namely,  the  unexpected 
certainty  that  Miskoloz  and  its  envirmis,  hud  been  vacated  by  the 
enemy  on  the  20th,  and  the  simultaneous  report  of  the  scouts  that 
Tokaj  was  held  by  Hungarian  troops — was,  that  Miskolcz, 
together  with  Mindszent  and  Csaba,  and  also  Dios-Gyor — the 
two  first  situated  to  the  south,  and  the  last  to  the  west,  of  the 
Gyongyos  high  road — were  occupied  in  the  course  of  the  22d  of 
July  by  the  main  column  of  the  seventh  corps  ;  and  that  the  day 
after  (the  23d)  the  following  movement  was  executed  by  the  army. 

The  seventh  corps  drew  up  its  secondary  column  from  the  left 
bank  of  the  Sajo,  and  advanced  from  Csaba  southward — the 
main  body  as  far  as  that  point  of  the  Gyongyos  high  road  where 
the  carriage-road  branches  off  from  it  to  the  left  through  Malyi  to 
Nyek ;  the  advanced  troops,  however,  part  as  far  as  Nyek,  part 
(on  the  said  high  road)  near  to  Harsany. 

The  third  corps,  with  the  head-quarters,  advanced  from  Sajo- 
Szent-Peter  by  Miskolcz  ;  then  striking  into  the  Kaschau  high 
road,  crossed  the  Sajo  at  F,-Zsolcza,  and  thence  down  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  river  as  far  as  A.-Zsolcza.  The  next  service  of  the 
third  corps  was  to  take  up  a  position  on  the  Sajo  from  where  it 
falls  into  the  Hernad  at  Onod  as  far  as  Arnot  (above  F.-Zsolcza). 

The  first  corps  vacated  Vadna,  and  followed  behind  as  far  as 
Sajo-Szent-Peter,  where  one-half  of  the  corps  remained  as  rear- 
guard, while  the  other  half,  forthwith  crossing  the  Sajo..  marched 
in  an  easterly  direction  to  Szikszo,  undertaking  the  observation 
of  the  Sajo  from  Arnot  upward. 

The  army  train,  with  the  train  of  the  fugitive  civilians,  was 
directed  from  the  camp  at  Sajo-Szent-Peter  to  Onga,  by  way  of 
Sajo-Keresztur,  Szirma-Besenyo,  and  Arnot,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  construction  of  a  bridge  over  the  Hernad  at  Gesztely  was 
undertaken.  As  soon  as  it  was  passable,  the  train  of  fugitive 
civilians,  and  also  that  part  of  the  army  train  which  could  just 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  505 

then  be  dispensed  with,  were  ordered  immediately  again  to  con- 
tinue their  march  to  Tokaj  from  Onga,  and  further  on  by  Gesztely 
as  far  as  Szerencs. 

The  object  of  these  movements  was,  consequently,  the  establish- 
ment of  the  army  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Sajo  in  the  line  of 
Szikszo  to  Onod,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  protection  of  the 
march  against  hostile  attacks  from  the  south  and  north. 

In  the  two  preceding  chapters  I  have  communicated  those  con- 
jectures respecting  the  enemy's  plan  of  operations  to  which  we 
were  led  by  the  supposition  that  he  intended  to  make  it  impossible 
for  us  to  get  across  the  Theiss  at  Tokaj.  These  conjectures  had, 
as  is  known,  led  us  to  apprehend  opposition  by  the  time  we  reach- 
ed the  Sajo  between  Dubicsany  and  Vadna,  but  at  all  events  at 
Miskolcz.  And  now  we  found  even  Miskolcz  undefended  ;  while 
we  learnt,  moreover,  that  the  enemy — i.  e.  a  column  of  from  4000 
to  5000  men,  with  some  artillery — by  the  20th  of  July  had  left 
the  said  point  for  the  south ;  on  which  day  our  van-guard  had 
reached  only  Rimaszombat.  At  the  first  glance  it  certainly 
appeared  from  all  this  that  our  conjectures  on  the  enemy's  plan 
of  operations  were  wrong. 

But  as  the  apprehended  counter-operation — namely,  that  from 
Waizen  by  Gyongyos  to  Miskolcz — was  indisputably  the  most 
ruinous  to  us,  so,  considering  the  accounts  received  relative  to  the 
strength  of  the  Russian  main  army,  we  thought  that  our  having 
escaped  the  effect  of  that  counter-operation  was  more  correctly 
explained  by  assuming  that  the  enemy  had  really  begun  it,  but 
in  consequence  of  various  delays  had  been  short  of  time,  than  by 
presuming  that  he  had  chosen  from  the  first  a  less  advantageous 
plan  of  operations. 

Any  other  plan  of  operations  for  the  Russians  than  that  of 
reaching  Miskolcz  from  Waizen  before  us,  seemed  to  be  question- 
able from  our  idea  of  the  number  of  the  hostile  troops  alone.  For 
the  united  strength  of  their  forces  which  had  entered  Hungary 
by  the  Carpathians  had  never  been  estimated  by  any  one — either 
by  the  government,  or  by  paid  or  unpaid  scouts — at  above  70,000 
men  ;  and  when  we  reached  Miskolcz,  it  was  even  said  that  one- 
third  of  these  had  already  been  carried  off  by  the  cholera.  Al- 
though the  latter  report  bore  the  stamp  of  exaggeration,  yet  from 
circumstantial  inquiries  into  the  divers  phases  of  the  number  of 
sick  in  the  enemy's  hospital,  which  had  been  removed  a  few 

Y 


506  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

days  before  from  Miskolcz  to  Kaschau,  it  was  at  least  proved 
that  the  Russian  main  army — according  to  our  reports  of  its 
whole  strength — could  now  number  scarcely  more  than  60,000 
men. 

But  with  this  force,  though  still  very  considerable,  and  cer- 
tainly twice  that  of  our  army,  the  Russian  commander,^  after  we 
had  deprived  him  of  the  basis  of  his  operation  by  gaining  the 
line  from  Szikszo  to  Onod,  found  himself  in  a  position  which  mast 
determine  him  (as  we  thought)  in  the  first  place  to  a  direct  attack 
with  his  whole  strength  on  our  position  on  the  Sajo. 

It  was  a  logical  consequence  of  this  view,  that  the  not  im- 
probable position  of  the  Russian  main  force  (possibly  not  far  from 
the  passage  of  the  Theiss  between  Poroszlo  and  Tiszafiired),  anew 
threatening  our  scarcely  gained  junction  with  the  southern  forces, 
gave  us  little  concern.  For  as  soon  as  the  Russian  commander 
saw  the  necessity  of  securing  to  himself,  against  all  contingencies, 
success  in  his  attack  on  our  position  on  the  Sajo,  it  was  impossi- 
ble that,  if  our  estimate  of  his  forces  was  correct,  he  could  wish 
at  the  same  time  also  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Theiss  between 
Poroszlo  and  Tiszafiired.  But  we  were  certain  that  this  passage 
could  be  won  only  by  force,  because  we  were  not  only  acquainted 
with  the  local  position,  which  was  very  favorable  for  preventing 
the  enemy  from  crossing  the  river  at  that  point,  but  also  because 
we  had  received  certain  intelligence  that  Tiszafiired  and  the  still 
more  southerly  points  for  crossing  the  Theiss,  as  well  as  Tokaj, 
were  occupied  by  Hungarian  columns. 

From  our  above-developed  suppositions  at  that  moment  it  must 
be  evident  to  the  reader  how  I  arrived  at  the  conclusion  of  per- 
manently interrupting  the  further  retreat  to  Tokaj  on  the  Sajo, 
in  case  a  resolute  offensive  movement  on  the  part  of  the  Russians 
against  Miskolcz  from  the  south  should  be  placed  out  of  doubt. 

If  this,  contrary  to  our  expectations,  were  not  to  happen,  then 
I  should  have  to  suppose  that  the  enemy  was  ignorant  of  our 
stopping  on  the  Sajo,  and  that  he  preferred  to  gain  the  left  bank 
of  the  Theiss  at  Tiszafiired  by  Poroszlo,  before  we  could  reach  it 
at  Rakamaz  by  Tokaj  ;  and  in  this  case  I  was  resolved  to  leave 
behind  the  first  corps  at  Miskolcz,  in  order  to  secure  this  stra- 
tegic point  against  that  part  of  the  enemy's  army  which  was 
advancing  upon  us  from  Rimaszombat ;  with  the  third  and  sev- 
enth corps,  however,  to  undertake  a  diversion  from  Miskolcz 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  507 

toward  the  south — thus  giving  the  Russians  the  choice,  either 
to  leave  open  to  us  a  passage  toward  Szegedin  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Theiss,  or  to  desist  from  their  operation  by  Poroszlo  against 
Tiszafured,  and  first  to  force  us  back  again  toward  Miskolcz,  then 
over  the  Sajo,  and  directly  toward  Tokaj,  on  our  original  line 
for  breaking  through. 

I  certainly  can  not  defend  myself  against  the  charge  of  having 
once  more  given  opportunity  for  a  dangerous  combination ;  but 
so  long  as  the  Russian  main  army  did  not  shrink  from  the  opera- 
tion against  Tiszafiired,  while  we  still  remained  on  the  Sajo,  I 
must,  after  all,  despair  of  regaining  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss 
a  junction  between  the  army  under  my  command  and  the  south- 
-  ern  forces  of  the  country  ;  because  the  Russians  from  Tiszafured 
— where  they  were  much  nearer  to  the  point  Debreczin  than  we 
who  were  on  the  Sajo — could  easily  have  forced  us  to  change 
the  direction  of  our  retreat  from  Miskolcz,  by  Tokaj,  Debreczin, 
and  Gross-Wardein,  to  the  Banat.  I  had,  in  fact,  no  choice  :  I 
skould  in  that  case  have  had  to  undertake  the  diversion  from 
Miskolcz  toward  the  south,  in  order  somehow  to  create  on  either 
bank  of  the  Theiss  new  chances  in  favor  of  the  intended  breaking 
through  toward  the  south. 

Meanwhile  the  next  events,  under  the  constant  influence  of 
the  illusion  that  the  Russian  main  army  was  scarcely  60,000 
strong,  grouped  themselves  in  such  a  manner  that  I  came  to  the 
erroneous  opinion  (es  I  should  think  must  be  apparent,  without 
any  explanation  of  mine,  from  the  subsequent  operations  of  the 
army  under  my  comniand),  that  the  Russian  commander  had 
either  never  intended  to  operate  beyond  the  Theiss,  so  long  as 
we  remained  there,  or  that  he  had  again  given  up  this  plan  in 
consequence  of  the  threatening  advance  of  our  seventh  corps  from 
Miskolcz  toward  the  south. 

It  is  now  almost  superfluous  particularly  to  mention,  that  this 
advance,  besides  the  covering  of  the  march  of  our  army  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Sajo  (on  the  line  of  Szikszo  to  Onod),  had  also 
the  object  of  a  forced  reconnoitring.  This  was  to  furnish  us 
with  information  whether  Miskolcz  or  Tiszafiired  was  the  next 
object  of  operation  of  the  Russian  main  army. 

By  the  20th  of  July,  as  is  known,  the  hostile  garrison  of  Mis- 
kolcz had  left  this  point,  while  our  van-guard  was  still  ten  miles 
from  it.     Patrols  of  the  seventh  corps,  however,  informed  us  on 


508  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  22d  of  July,  that  hostile  outposts  were  stationed  at  Harsany 
(two  miles  to  the  south  of  Miskolcz,  on  the  high  road  of  Gyon- 
gyos)  :  they  were  evidently  those  of  the  garrison  of  Miskolcz. 
Now  the  circumstance  that  this  weak  column  no  longer  felt  it 
necessary  to  make  way  for  us,  at  a  distance  of  ten  miles,  led  us 
to  suppose  that  it  had  found  a  support.  "Whether  this  support 
was  the  main  body  of  the  principal  Russian  army,  or  merely  a 
column  to  protect  in  flank  the  main  body  already  operating 
against  Tiszafiired — to  find  out  this  was  the  business  of  General 
Poltenberg,  he  having  been  ordered  to  commence  on  the  23d  of 
July  the  above-mentioned  southern  advance  toward  Nyek,  and 
Harsany. 

At  the  latter  place,  in  the  course  of  that  day,  his  advanced 
troops  were  briskly  attacked  from  Vatta,  and  pressed  back  along 
the  high  road  as  far  as  the  eminence  situated  in  the  southwest 
of  Goromboly.  Here,  however,  the  enemy  encountered  a  part  of 
the  main  troop  of  the  seventh  corps,  which  in  the  meantime  had 
hastened  forwaijd  from  the  camp  at  Goromboly,  and  now  avoid- 
ing any  further  contest,  he  again  retreated  forthwith  to  Vatta. 
He  seemed  to  have  intended  a  mere  reconnoitring.  For  the 
next  day  (the  24th  of  July),  however,  a  serious  attack  on  the 
position  of  the  seventh  corps  was  evidently  in  prospect. 

General  Poltenberg  received  orders  to  await  the  enemy  on  the 
spot,  unconditionally  to  accept  battle,  to  give  way  only  to  a 
superior  force,  and  in  this  case  to  draw  bacl^to  the,  position  of 
the  third  corps  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Sajo. 

For  the  protection  of  this  retreat,  should  it  happen,  against 
the  Russian  corps  approaching  from  Rimaszombat,  one-half  of 
the  first  corps  remained  in  Sajo-Szent-Peter.  Dios-Gyor  likewise 
continued  to  be  occupied  by  a  column  of  the  seventh  corps ;  as 
in  general  the  position  which  our  army  had  taken  up  on  the  23d 
of  July  was  left  unchanged  for  the  following  day. 


CHAPTEU  LXXI. 

In  the  night  from  the  23d  to  the  24th  of  July,  a  lady  travel- 
ling in  a  carriage  was  stopped  at  our  outposts,  and  on  her  assert- 
ing that  she  had  a  letter  for  me,  she  was  conducted  to  the 
head-quarters  at  A.-Zsolcza. 

The  contents  of  this  sealed  letter,  addressed  to  me  personally, 
were  as  follow : 

"  Balassa-Gyarmat,  le  19  Juillet,  1849. 

"  Monsieur — Les  troupes  places  sous  mes  ordres  se  sont  trouvees  en 
presence  de  celles  que  vous  comraandez  ;  la  fortune  des  armes  s'est  pro- 
noncee  en  ma  faveur.  En  vous  suivant.  j'appris  partout  sur  mon  pas- 
sage, que  vous  ne  vous  refusez  point  de  rendre,  avec  une  parfaite  loyaute, 
pleine  et  entiere  justice  a  la  valeur  de  mon  corps  d'armee.  Ce  precede  de 
franchise  de  votre  part  m' impose  le  devoir  de  vous  donner  une  preuve  de 
I'estime  que  m'inspire  votre  caractere  de  brave  militaire;  et  c'est  a  cette 
fin  que  je  me  suis  decide  a  vous  adresser  la  presente  communication. 
Vos  talens  ont  sans  doute  su  faire  surmonter  de  graves  difficultes  a  votre 
corps  d'armee ;  mais  vous  ne  vous  dissimulerez  point,  qu'en  ce  moment  un 
danger  imminent  le  menace.  Je  viens  done  vous  ofi'rir,  Monsieur,  en  toute 
conflance,  la  voie  des  negociations.  Veuillez  m'indiquer  les  conditions 
auxquelles  vous  jugeriez  possible  de  faire  cesser  une  lutte  desormais  inegal 
pour  vous,  et  je  m'empresserai  de  solliciter  a  cet  egard  les  ordres  de  S.  A. 
M.  le  Commandant  en  chef  de  I'armee  imperiale  russe.  Je  n'ai  pas  besoin 
d'ajouter,  qu'elles  seront  posees  avec  toute  la  justice  qui  distingue  mon 
illustre  chef,  et  que  votre  honneur  de  brave  guerrier  ne  subira  la  moindre 
atteinte. 

"  E-ecevez,  Monsieur,  I'assurance  de  ma  consideration  la  plus  distinguee. 
(Signed)  "  Le   Comte  Rudiger, 

Commandant  en  chef  d'un  corps  d'armee  de  troupes  russes." 

As  near  as  I  can  remember,  I  answered  Count  Riidiger  to  the 
following  effect : 

That  if  the  safety  of  my  troops  and  of  my  own  person  was 
alone  concerned,  I  should  by  no  means  be  disinclined,  on  honor- 
able conditions,  to  hold  out  the  hand  of  peace. 

That,  however,  the  salvation  of  Hungary  was  concerned,  the 
political  existence  of  which  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  those 
about  him  intended  to  destroy  ;  to  which  destruction  his  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Russia — apparently  misinformed  of  what  the 


510  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

better  and  greater  part  of  Hungary  wished  and  still  wishes — had 
also  of  late  unfortunately  given  his  powerful  support. 

That  therefore  we  must  fight  until  our  peaceful  feJ low-citizens 
were  saved  from  the  danger  of  subjugation,  or  we  ourselves  were 
destroyed  in  the  unequal  contest. 

That  this  was  my  answer  as  a  soldier  and  as  ^USe  commander 
of  the  troops  intrusted  to  me  by  the  state. 

That  I  hoped  every  leader  of  Hungarian  troops  thought  as  I 
did  in  this  respect ;  in  which  case  it  would  be  difficult  to  pacify 
Hungary  by  partial  treaties  with  individual  leaders  of  the  army. 

But  that  I  should  consider  it  to  be  my  duty  to  open  and 
smooth  the  way  for  the  commencement  of  secret  negotiations  be- 
tween the  provisional  government  of  Hungary  and  the  Russian 
Field-marshal  Prince  Paszkiewicz,  if  the  latter  would  be  pleased 
to  let  me  know  on  what  conditions  Hungary  could  make  peace 
with  his  majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia ;  and  that  in  this  case  I 
thought  I  could  show  a  result  more  desirable  for  Russia  than  even 
the  completely  successful  subjugation  of  Hungary  could  present. 

I  communicated  to  Count  Leiningen,  as  well  as  to  the  chief  of 
the  general  staff',  and  several  superior  officers  of  the  army  who 
were  accidentally  present  at  the  head-quarters,  this  reply  to 
Count  Riidiger,  the  whole  substance  of  which  has  been  related 
above  ;  and  afterwards  delivered  it,  sealed  and  addressed  to  the 
above-named  commander  of  the  Russian  corps,  to  the  same  lady 
through  whom  I  had  received  his  letter. 

She  thereupon  left  the  head-quarters  at  A.-Zsolcza  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  24th  of  July.  I  had  advised  her  to  return  to 
the  Russian  camp  by  way  of  Szikszo  and  the  position  of  our  first 
corps,  because  the  way  by  Miskolcz,  which  she  at  first  wished  to 
take,  was  occupied — as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter — by  the 
seventh  corps,  at  that  time  already  in  retreat  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Sajo.  She  followed  my  advice  ;  but  not  reaching  Szikszo  be- 
fore night  was  setting  in,  she  resolved  to  stay  there  till  daybreak, 
and  addressed  herself  directly  to  General  Nagy-Sandor,  with  the 
request  that  she  might  be  accommodated  with  suitable  quarters 
for  the  night,  at  the  same  time  informing  him  of  the  object  of 
her  journey. 

Nagy-Sandor  immediately  suspected  some  treachery  in  my 
correspondence  with  the  commander  of  the  Russian  corps  ;  com- 
municated this  suspicion  to  several  of  his  staff-officers,  and  was 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  511 

strengthened  by  them  in  his  intention  of  becoming  acquainted 
with  the  contents  of  my  letter  to  the  Russian  commander.  But 
he  had  not  the  courage  to  do  this  openly.  General  Nagy-Sandor 
thought  it  more  advisable  secretly  to  purloin  the  sealed  letter, 
and  after  it  had  been  opened,  read,  and  re-sealed,  to  restore  it  in 
the  same  way  to  the  possession  of  the  unsuspecting  lady.  But 
before  she  set  out  again  on  her  journey  from  Szikszo,  she  acci- 
dentally noticed  that  the  impression  of  the  seal  on  the  envelope 
was  no  longer  the  same  as  when  she  received  it  from  me,  and 
communicated  this  discovery  just  as  casually  to  a  stafF-officer  of 
the  first  army  corps,  who  not  being  of  the  same  political  opinions 
as  Nagy-Sandor,  and,  as  a  matter  of  course,  not  informed  of  what 
had  happened  to  the  letter,  learned  from  his  companions  how  the 
seal  had  been  changed,  and  brought  me  the  information  of  the 
affair,  with  the  well  meant  intention  of  putting  me  on  my  guard 
against  Nagy-Sandor.  But  I  ignored  the  whole  transaction  ;  for 
otherwise  I  should  have  had  to  punish  General  Nagy-Sandor  for 
an  act  by  which  he  had  undoubtedly  succeeded,  though  uninten- 
tionally, in  restoring  among  those  officers  whom  he  had  himself 
made  suspicious  of  me  their  original  confidence  in  my  purposes 
and  actions. 

On  the  24th  of  July,  the  trumpets  that  had  been  sent  from 
Sajo-Szent-Peter  to  the  camp  of  the  Russian  Colonel  Chrulovv 
with  my  answer  to  the  summons  to  lay  down  our  arms  returned 
from  their  mission.  They  had  found  his  column  already  joined 
by  a  second  under  General  Sass  ;  and  in  both  camps  met  with  a 
reception  suitable  to  their  ofifice.  For  the  Russian  leaders  ob- 
served toward  our  trumpets  those  usages  of  international  law 
which,  as  history  tells  us,  are  never  infringed  with  impunity, 
even  under  the  pretext  that  the  enemy  is  a  rebel. 

I  must  here  add,  that  Captain  Katlarow  and  Count  Riidiger, 
when  present  as  trumpets  in  our  camp,  had  no  hesitation  in  ex- 
changing arms  with  two  officers  of  my  suite.  General  Sass  and 
Colonel  Chrulow,  assuming  that  I  had  made  this  exchange  with 
Captain  Katlarow  and  Count  Riidiger,  took  the  opportunity  of 
dehvering  their  pistols  to  our  trumpets  as  a  counter-present  for 
me.  I,  however,  could  not  overlook  the  motive  of  this  chivalric 
attention,  and  therefore  repaid  it  by  sending,  on  one  of  the  follow- 
ing days,  into  the  nearest  Russian  camp,  two  pairs  of  my  own 
pistols  directed  respectively  to  General  Sass  and  Colonel  Chrulow. 


CHAPTER  LXXII 

General  Poltenberg  with  the  seventh  corps,  as  has  been 
mentioned  in  Chapter  LXX.,  had  immediately  repelled  the  Rus- 
sian corps  which,  on  the  23d  of  July,  had  advanced  aggressively 
from  Vatta  along  the  high  road  of  Gyongyos  as  far  as  the  emi- 
nence of  Goromboly,  and  had  hereupon  received  orders  to  main- 
tain his  position  during  the  following  day  likewise. 

In  the  forenoon  of  the  24th  of  July,  however,  such  trustworthy 
information  arrived  at  our  head-quarters  relative  to  the  strength 
of  the  Russian  forces  directly  opposed  to  our  seventh  corps,  that 
I  thought  I  might  now  consider  it  certain  that  the  next  object  of 
the  operation  of  the  Russian  main  army  was  Miskolcz  (not  Tis- 
zafiired).  I  therefore  deemed  it  superfluous  to  expose  our  seventh 
corps  any  longer  to  the  danger  of  an  attack  by  a  superior  force, 
and  ordered  it  without  delay  to  retreat  by  Miskolcz  to  the  left 
bank  of  the  Sajo. 

But  on  the  part  of  the  Russians,  and  from  the  same  direction 
as  on  the  23d  (namely  from  Vatta),  a  resolute  attack  on  the  posi- 
tion of  General  Poltenberg  at  Goromboly  had  already  been  made, 
before  this  order  to  retreat  could  reach  him. 

General  Poltenberg,  after  a  hot  contest  of  several  hours'  dura- 
tion, which  he  had  courageously  sustained  against  the  hostile 
superior  force,  on  the  eminence  to  the  southwest  of  Goromboly, 
was  forced  to  retreat  by  the  emerging  of  a  strong  hostile  turning- 
column  on  his  left  (at  Malyi).  He  effected  this,  still  fighting, 
along  the  high  road  as  far  as  Miskolcz,  and — after  he  had  here 
been  rejoined  by  the  column  detached  to  Dios-Gyor — on  the 
Kaschau  high  road  as  far  as  F.-Zsolcza  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Sajo. 

When  General  Poltenberg  arrived  here,  as  darkness  was  set- 
ting in,  he  received  instructions,  with  the  seventh  corps,  to  occupy 
the  line  of  the  Sajo  from  A.-Zsolcza  down  the  river  as  far  as 
Onod  in  the  course  of  the  night ;  while  Count  Leiningen  con- 
centrated the  third  corps  between  A.-Zsolcza* and  Arnot. 

That  half  of  the  first  corps  which  had  been  left  behind  in 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  513 

Sajo-Szent-Peter  on  the  23d  of  July  as  rear-guard  of  the  army, 
but  on  the  24th  to  protect  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  seventh  corps, 
was  now  likewise  disposed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Sajo  for  the 
purpose  of  rejoining  the  other  half  of  the  corps  posted  at  Szikszo  ; 
where  General  Nagy-Sandor  had  for  the  present  to  remain  with 
the  whole  first-corps,  to  ward  off  an  attack,  which  might  possibly 
be  directed  from  Putnok,  against  the  right  flank  of  the  army,  and 
to  secure,  as  before,  the  Sajo  line  above  Arnot  as  far  as  Sajo- 
Vamos. 

The  head-quarters  advanced  at  nightfall  of  the  24th  to  Onga, 
and  in  the  morning  of  the  25th  to  Gesztely. 

The  enemy  had  pursued  our  seventh  corps  in  the  evening  of 
the  24th  only  as  far  as  Miskolcz.  In  the  forenoon  of  the  25th, 
however,  he  advanced  from  Miskolcz  to  the  Sajo,  and  obstinately 
attacked  the  position  of  the  third  and  seventh  corps,  confining 
himself  almost  exclusively  to  the  active  employment  of  his  nu- 
merous artillery.  But  along  the  carriage-road  from  Sajo-Keresz- 
tur  to  Arnot  (on  the  right  wing  of  the  third  corps)  he  essayed  a 
brisk  attack  with  cavalry.  It  failed,  however ;  as  did  also  the 
efforts,  though  extraordinary,  made  by  the  artillery  to  dislodge 
the  batteries  of  our  centre.  One  of  the  hostile  batteries  especially 
distinguished  itself  by  the  rare  boldness  with  which,  rushing  for- 
ward close  to  the  river-bank  (opposite  A.-Zsolcza),  it  gained  a 
position  protected  against  the  fire  of  our  batteries,  and  moreover 
from  which  the  line  of  the  latter  was  taken  in  flank.  From  this 
point  the  enemy's  battery  was  very  destructive  to  our  left  centre, 
and  its  removal  appeared  ultimately  imperative  at  any  cost. 
Lieut. -Colonel  Gozon,  of  the  seventh  corps,  undertook  this  critical 
task.  With  about  fifty  volunteers  of  his  battalion  he  waded 
across  the  Sajo,  pushed  undetected  his  way  through  the  wood  at 
the  opposite  river-bank,  and  suddenly  fell  upon  the  two  battalions 
camping  on  the  western  edge  of  this  forest,  as  a  protection  to  the 
battery  posted  not  far  off.  The  stroke  succeeded  so  completely 
that  both  hostile  battalions  blindly  took  to  flight.  The  battery 
made  all  haste  to  overtake  its  guard ;  and  thus  the  balance  of 
the  combat  was  immediately  restored  in  the  range  of  our  left 
centre,  and  continued  so  during  the  remainder  of  the  engagement. 

This  balance  the  brave  General  Poltenberg  and  Count  Leinin- 
gen  knew  how  to  secure  for  themselves  on  all  points  of  their  dis- 
proportionately extended  position  by  a  circumspect  and  timel/ 


514  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

employment  of  their  forces ;  and  several  hours  before  nightfall 
the  attacks  of  the  enemy  were  completely  crippled. 

Both  army  corps,  the  seventh  and  third,  had  firmly  main- 
tained the  line  on  the  Sajo.  The  enemy  nevertheless  could  ar- 
rive unobstructed  in  the  rear  of  our  position  by  means  of  crossing 
the  Hernad  during  the  night,  below  the  point  of  its  junction  with 
the  Sajo. 

We  might  thereby  be  forced  to  enter  on  the  further  retreat 
behind  the  Theiss,  and  that  under  the  most  unfavorable  circum- 
stances. Nay,  supposing  the  enemy  intended  to  execute  this 
turning-manoeuvre  with  adequate  forces  and  speed,  we  had  cause 
to  apprehend  even  the  total  loss  of  our  line  of  retreat  toward  Tokaj, 
and  consequently  the  reward  of  all  those  inexpressible  efforts 
which  the  army  had  made  since  the  evacuation  of  Waizen. 

From  this  apprehension  originated  the  determination  to  draw 
back  the  army  from  the  Sajo  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Hernad 
before  daybreak  next  morning  (26th  of  July). 

The  order  of  succession  of  the  army  corps  remained  unchanged 
in  their  new  disposition  on  the  Hernad.  In  its  centre  the  third 
corps  was  disposed  at  Gesztely  and  Kak  ;  on  the  right  wing,  from 
Csanalos  to  Baksa,  the  first ;  and  on  the  left  wing,  from  Hernad- 
Nemeti  to  Korom,  the  seventh  corps.  Patrols  of  the  latter  ob- 
served the  further  course  of  the  Hernad  till  it  falls  into  the  Thiess. 
The  head-quarters  went  to  Szerencs.  The  unnecessary  army 
train  as  well  as  the  fugitive  civiHans  were  ordered  back  by  Tokaj 
to  the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss.  On  our  retreat  from  Waizen  to 
Miskolcz  several  officers  had  deserted  from  the  army.  Some  of 
these  gentry  had  meanwhile  been  apprehended  at  Szerencs.  I 
judged  it  needful  in  our  circumstances  to  sentence  those  unfortu- 
nates to  death. 

The  enemy  justified  only  in  part  our  supposition  that  he  had 
intended  to  turn  our  position  on  the  Sajo  from  Onod  by  Korom, 
and  to  force  us  out  of  the  line  of  retreat  toward  Tokaj.  He 
attempted  in  fact  to  pass  the  river  between  Onod  and  Korom, 
but  not  till  the  26th  of  July,  consequently  too  late  to  effect  this 
object,  and  moreover  with  so  little  energy  that  the  feeble  column 
of  the  seventh  corps,  forming  the  left  wing  at  Korom,  succeeded 
by  itself  in  maintaining  the  left  bank  of  the  Hernad  at  that  point. 

This  attempt  to  cross  the  river  was  the  only  undertaking  of 
the  enemy,  during  the  course  of  the  26th  of  July,  that  we  heard 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  515 

of.  All  the  reports  of  our  patrols,  as  well  as  the  information  of 
the  scouts,  agreed  that  the  hostile  army  was  neither  advancing 
nor  retrograding  from  Miskolcz,  Consequently  it  appeared  as  if 
the  arrival  of  General  Grabbe  from  the  mountain-towns  was 
waited  for,  before  the  energetic  continuation  of  the  offensive 
operations  against  us.  And  since  we  remained  so  much  the 
more  under  the  influence  of  the  erroneous  assumption,  that  on 
the  previous  day,  on  the  Sajo,  the  main  body  of  the  Russian 
principal  army  had  been  opposed  to  us — as  no  report  causing 
apprehension  had  arrived  from  Tiszafiired — I  resolved  to  stay  on 
the  Hernad  until  I  should  be  forced  to  continue  the  retreat  be- 
hind the  Theiss  either  by  a  superior  direct  attack  on  our  position, 
or  by  a  southerly  side-movement  of  the  supposed  main  body  of 
the  Russian  principal  army. 

To  this  conclusion  I  was  brought,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  in- 
tention of  facilitating  the  retreat  of  the  Kazinczy  division  to  the 
Banat,  which,  in  contradiction  to  Dembinski's  well-known  plan 
of  concentration,  still  continued  inactive  in  the  Marmaros  ;  on 
the  other  hand,  by  the  conviction  that — considering  the  present 
strategic  state  of  afiairs  in  the  south  of  the  country,  as  well  as 
the  impossibility  of  shaking  ofl'  the  Russian  main  army — I  should 
be  able  to  secure  the  existing  chances  for  a  favorable  turn  of 
affairs  on  the  lower  Theiss  and  in  Transylvania  only  by  means 
of  delaying  my  further  retreat  all  I  could,  not  by  hastening  it. 

The  strategic  state  of  affairs  in  the  southern  theatre  of  war, 
according  to  the  last  information  of  the  government  and  some 
private  communications,  was  as  follows  : 

The  Ban  Baron  Jellachich,  in  consequence  of  a  defeat  sustain- 
ed in  the  middle  of  July  at  Hegyes,  had  evacuated  the  Bacska 
with  his  army,  and  confined  himself,  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Danube  and  the  right  of  the  Theiss,  to  exclusively  maintaining 
the  plateau  of  Titel.  The  defile  of  Perlasz — by  taking  advantage 
of  which,  the  defeated  Ban,  in  order  to  redress  himself  in  some 
degree,  might  have  attempted  a  diversion  from  Titel  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Theiss — was  in  our  hands  ;  the  fortress  of  Peterwar- 
dein  in  part  relieved.  The  retreat  of  the  Ban  was  followed  by 
the  attempt,  on  our  part,  to  cont[uer  the  plateau  of  Titel,  and 
completely  relieve  Peterwardein.  These  undertakings,  however, 
had  to  be  abandoned  when  scarcely  begun  ;  for  the  southward 
advance  of  the  Austrian  main  army  from  Pesth  toward  Szeged  in 


516  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

induced  the  provincial  government  to  order  back  to  Szegedin  the 
greater  part  of  the  very  forces  which  had  been  destined  for  these 
enterprises,  where,  united  with  the  corps  of  reserve  and  that  of 
General  Vysocki  under  the  chief  command  of  Dembinski-Mes- 
zaros  (formerly  Meszaros-Derabinski),^  they  were  to  co-operate  in 
the  offensive  intended,  as  was  said,  against  the  Austrian  main 
army. 

With  regard  to  Transylvania — from  the  general  intimations, 
partly  official,  partly  private,  which  I  had  received  relative  to 
the  state  of  affairs  there — this  at  least  was  to  be  considered  as 
certain,  that"* Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bem  did  not  yet  despair  of 
maintaining  the  territory,  although  half  of  it  was  already  lost. 

Consequently,  on  the  one  hand  Transylvania,  on  the  other  the 
line  of  the  central  and  lower  Theiss,  were  certainly  not  yet 
given  up,  though  no  doubt  seriously  menaced ;  and  moreover 
the  fortress  of  Temesvar — in  the  centre  of  the  territory  to  be 
defended  simultaneously  both  east  and  west — was  still  in  the 
enemy's  possession  :  this  was,  synoptically,  the  strategic  position 
in  the  south  of  Hungary,  as  deducible  from  the  news  communi- 
cated to  me  up  to  the  26th  of  July. 

A  change  in  this  undeniably  precarious  condition,  favorable  in 
some  way  or  other,  must  now  begin,  in  my  opinion,  with  the  fall 
of  Temesvar,  so  as  to  render  possible  especially  the  reinforcement 
of  the  mobile  army  on  the  lower  Theiss.  For  from  the  circum- 
stance, that  though  the  Ban  Baron  Jellachich  had  been  defeated 
and  forced  to  evacuate  the  Bacska,  yet  that  it  had  nevertheless 
not  been  put  out  of  his  power  to  reappear  at  any  moment  in  an 
offensive  attitude  on  the  right  bank  of  the  lower  Theiss — a  con- 
siderable part  of  that  army,  being  indispensable  for  the  eventual 
protection  of  Szegedin  and  of  the  lower  Theiss  (against  the  Ban 
in  the  south))  must  be  withheld  from  the  northern  offensive  to  be 
opened  from  Szegedin  against  Baron  Haynau,  and  the  success  of 
this  offensive  must  consequently  beforehand  appear  doubtful  on 
account  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  forces  disposable  for  the  pur- 
pose. It  is  true  that  the  news  from  Szegedin  represented  the 
parts  of  the  mobile  army  on  the  lower  Theiss,  destined  for  this 
offensive,    as   a  total  force  of  50,000   men.     According  to  my 

*  When  this  change  in  the  chief  command  properly  took  place,  I  can 
not  indicate  with  certainty.  I  merely  infer,  from  other  vivid  recollections, 
that  it  must  have  belonged  to  the  last  days  of  July. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  517 

calculation,  however,  there  were  to  be  found  among  the  pretend- 
ed 50,000  men  scarcely  30,000  organized  troops,  including  the 
corps  of  reserve,  which  was  not  yet  in  all  its  parts  completely 
equipped  for  action.  The  remaining  20,000  men  might  perhaps 
have  been  "  militia"  (respecting  the  practical  value  of  which  in 
war-operations,  see  Chapter  III.)  ;  if  they  did  not  even  owe  their 
harmless  existence  to  an  official  error  calculi. 

From  an  offensive  undertaken  with  30,000  men  against  the 
A.ustrian  main  army  reinforced  by  a  Russian  corps,  not  much, 
indeed,  could  be  expected.  But  as  soon  as  Temesvarhad  fallen, 
this  army  of  about  30,000  men  could  certainly  be  raised  to  nearly 
60,000,  by  means  of  drawing  on  our  besieging  corps  (General 
Count  Vecsey)  and  the  recruits  lately  levied,  and  to  be  equipped 
with  the  arms  taken  at  Temesvar.  It  must  now,  I  should  think, 
be  sufficiently  plain  why  I  saw  in  the  fall  of  that  fortress  the 
nearest  postulate  for  assuming  that  a  favorable  turn  in  the  stra- 
tegic state  of  affairs  in  the  south  of  Hungary  was  to  be  antici- 


But  then  to  render  possible  the  taking  of  Temesvar,  the  further 
maintenance  of  the  central  and  lower  Theiss  and  of  Transylvania, 
at  least  of  its  southwestern  part,  was  indispensable  :  finally,  the 
accomplishment  of  this  task  demanded  that  the  Russian  main 
army  should  be  kept  as  far  distant  as  possible  from  the  line  of 
the  Maros  ;  for  in  the  same  degree  as  it  approached  the  Maros, 
Transylvania  and  the  line  of  the  Theiss  must  become  less  tenable, 
for  the  simple  reason,  that  the  Russian  main  army  would  gain 
with  the  Maros  simultaneously  the  possibility  of  attacking  our 
army  in  Transylvania,  as  well  as  that  at  Szegedin,  directly  in 
their  rear. 

My  determination  to  remain  at  the  Hernad  was  consequently 
justified  not  only  by  the  necessity  of  resting  the  army,  extremely 
exhausted  in  consequence  of  the  forced  retreat ;  not  only  by  the 
intention — far  from  being  of  little  importance  in  those  days  of 
general  scarcity  of  men — of  gaining  for  the  combat  the  Kazinczy 
division,  about  7000  strong,  which  was  stationed  inactive  in  the 
Marmaros.  This  determination  to  maintain  the  position  on  the 
Hernad  as  long  as  possible  had,  as  I  have  above  explained,  a 
strategic  motive ;  and  I  should  have  resolved  upon  it  under  the 
same  conjunctures,  even  if  the  retreat  from  Waizen  had  not  ex- 
hausted the  physical  powers  of  the  army,  and  if  the  opportunity 


* 


.^L.. 


518  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

had  not  offered  itself  to  augment  the  really  active  forces  of  the 
country  by  those  7000  men  of  the  Kazinczy  division. 

"Whether  the  motive  of  my  determination  to  interrupt  the  re- 
treat to  the  Banat,  in  the  position  on  the  Hernad,  vv^as  strategic- 
ally correct,  is  certainly  a  question  which  can  not  now  be  un- 
qualifiedly answered  in  the  affirmative.  This  motive  rested  on 
the  assumption  of  the  twofold  possibility  offered  by  our  position 
on  the  Hernad,  according  to  circumstances,  either  to  oppose 
during  a  certain  time  the  attack  made  with  all  its  force  by  the 
Russian  main  army  on  our  front,  or  to  frustrate  the  alteration  in 
our  retreat  (namely  by  continuing  it  betimes),  intended  perhaps 
by  means  of  a  critical  flanking  manoeuvre  from  Miskolcz  by 
Tiszafiired  toward  Debreczin.  The  assumption  of  this  twofold 
possibility,  however,  was  based  on  the  well-known  supposition 
that  the  Russian  main  army  numbered  scarcely  60,000  men, 
consequently  that  that  part  of  the  army  which  encamped  on  the 
26th  of  July  at  Miskolcz  was  its  main  body. 

Now  admitting  that  this  supposition  was  correct,  and  at  the 
same  time  bearing  in  mind  the  strategic  position  above  indicated 
— so  far  as  it  was  known  to  me  on  the  26th  of  July- — of  all  the 
armies  operating  in  Hungary,  there  can  be  objected  against  my 
determination  to  remain  on  the  Hernad  scarcely  any  thing  of  im- 
portance. 

This  very  supposition,  however  (how  it  originated  has  already 
been  explained),  was  totally  erroneous  :  for  the  whole  number  of 
the  forces  at  the  disposal  of  the  Russian  general  against  the  three 
army  corps  united  under  my  command  amounted  to  120,000 
men  ;  and  consequentlxon  the  26th  of  July  we  had  by  no  means 
the  main  body,  but  only  about  a  third  of  this  force  opposed  to  the 
front  of  our  position  on  the  Hernad,  while  the  main  body  with 
its  advanced  troops  had  reached  on  the  same  day  Tiszafiired  on 
our  left,  and  was  therefore  above  six  miles  nearer  to  Debreczin 
than  we  were.  The  distance  from  Tiszafiired  to  Debreczin  is 
nine  miles ;  while  our  army,  in  its  position  on  the  Hernad,  was 
somewhere  about  sixteen  miles  from  Debreczin. 

Under  these  circumstances  my  staying  on  the  Hernad  was  cer- 
tainly a  strategic  folly — but  an  unanticipated  one ;  an  aimless 
endangering  of  the  last  possibility  of  re-establishing  a  junction 
with  the  southern  forces  by  an  uninterrupted  speedy  continuation 
of  the  retreat — but  an  unconscious  one. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  519 

I  have  already  superficially  indicated  above  how  it  happened 
that  I  could  stay  on  the  Hernad  in  spite  of  the  occupation  of 
'  Tiszafiired  by  about  20,000  Russians,  vi^hich  had  taken  place  on 
the  26th  of  July  ;  on  that  day,  namely,  I  was  not  informed  of  the 
hostile  advance  against  Tiszafiired.  How  it  happened,  however, 
that  even  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  no  report  had  arrived  at 
the  head-quarters  in  Szerencs  about  the  forcing  of  the  left  bank 
of  the  Theiss  at  Tiszafiired,  though  it  had  been  begun  on  the 
25th — to  explain  this  I  must  leave  to  the  unhappy  commander 
of  that  column,  whose  mission  it  had  been  to  occupy  Poroszlo,  to 
observe  the  enemy  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Theiss,  and  to  defend 
the  passage  from  Poroszlo  to  Tiszafiired. 


CHAPTER  LXXIII. 

I  HAD  not  omitted  to  send  to  the  government  in  Szegedin  a 
circumstantial  report  relative  to  the  exchange  of  trumpets  which 
had  taken  place  between  the  Russian  army  and  that  under  my 
command. 

It  is  known  that  this  answer  to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Russian  army  of  intervention  contained  an  appeal  to  the  consti- 
tutional law  for  Hungary  sanctioned  in  the  spring  of  1848  by 
King  Ferdinand  Y. 

This  appeal — apart  from  its  accordance  with  the  leading 
reason  of  my  personal  participation  in  the  war  against  Austria — 
was  dictated  by  the  army. 

Nevertheless  Kossuth  blamed  this  appeal  as  a  demonstration, 
originating  from  me  alone,  against  himself  and  his  work,  the 
declaration  of  independence  of  the  14th  of  April. 

I  put  up  with  this  blame,  however,  without  answering  it,  be- 
cause I  did  not  wish  still  further  to  widen  the  breach  between 
me  and  Kossuth,  but,  on  the  contrary,  aimed  at  rendering  him 
as  much  as  possible  accessible  to  those  counsels  which  I  had 
partly  already  given,  partly  intended  to  give  him,  as  most  nearly 
affecting  the  interests  of  the  nation,  and  as  being  all  that,  under 
the  then  existing  circumstances,  could,  according  to  my  convic- 
tion, still  bo  realized. 


520  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

My  perception  of  what  was  still  jittainable  by  the  nation — its 
near  abolition  as  a  state  being  inevitable — and  which  moreover 
was  indispensable  to  the  nation  to  give  it  a  high  moral  bearing 
in  the  face  of  its  comfortless  future,  and  consequently  of  which  it 
had  need  above  all — this  perception  remained  the  same  as  it  had 
been  when  my  proposal  was  made  in  the  ministerial  council  of 
the  26th  of  June  (at  Pesth),  as  well  as  my  resolution  to  remain 
with  the  main  army  at  Komom  ;  that  Austria,  even  under  the 
wings  of  Russia,  should  once  more  feel  the  sharpness  of  Hunga- 
rian arms ! 

Under  what  conditions  the  probability  presented  itself  to  me 
of  seeing  this  moral  want  of  the  nation  still  satisfied  ;  how  I  had 
unfortunately  to  perceive  that  I  should  have  to  perform,  in  the 
most  favorable  case,  only  an  indirect  part  in  the  satisfaction  of 
this  national  want,  since,  being  directly  opposed  to  the  Russian 
and  not  to  the  Austrian  army,  to  take  a  direct  part  in  the  offen- 
sive operation  against  the  latter,  I  should  have  been  obliged  to 
expose  to  the  former  the  basis  of  the  operation  (the  Banat),  but 
that  then  the  intended  offensive  counter-stroke  against  the  Aus- 
trians  could  be  only  a  transient,  not  a  lasting  one  ;  all  these  cir- 
cumstances I  have  already  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter. 
It  remains  only  to  remark,  that  I  thought  an  indirect  support 
of  the  offensive  preparing  at  Szegedin  against  the  army  of  Baron 
Haynau  likewise  possible  from  the  garrison  of  Komorn,  and  that 
I  was  thereby  induced — after  my  determination  to  maintain  the 
position  on  the  Hern  ad  had  been  taken — to  send  a  letter  to  Gen- 
eral Klapka,  informing  him  of  the  breaking-through  of  my  army, 
presumptively  already  successful,  and  stimulating  him  to  activ- 
ity, But  as  this  letter  had  to  traverse  a  part  of  the  country  oc- 
cupied by  the  enemy,  it  seemed  to  me  necessary  to  take  the  pre- 
caution of  confining  it  in  its  weightiest  part  to  the  most  general 
indications  ;  the  more  so,  as  General  Klapka's  proved  sagacity 
led  me  to  anticipate  a  right  comprehension  of  my  hints,  however 
general  might  be  the  terms  in  which  they  were  expressed. 

Klapka's  energetic  demeanor  on  the  line  of  communication  be- 
tween the  Austrian  main  army  and  its  basis  of  operations ;  the 
fall  of  Temesvar ;  the  further  maintenance  of  the  southwestern 
part  of  Transylvania  by  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bern  ;  and  the  con- 
tinued hampering  of  the  Russian  main  army  on  the  upper  Theiss 
by  the  forces  united  under  my  command ; — these  were  circum- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAETfe^    .         521 


stances,  with  the  timely  coincidence  of  which  there  might  be  ex- 
pected— even  without  extravagance — from  an  offensive  against 
the  army  of  Baron  Haynau,  though  not  the  preservation  of  the 
existence  of  Hungary  as  a  state,  nevertheless  the  satisfying  of  the 
above-explained  moral  want  of  the  nation ; — if  Kossuth,  at  last 
discovering  Dembinski's  incapacity,  should  intrust  to  more  skill- 
ful hands  the  guidance  of  this  offensive,  and  at  the  same  time 
conquer  his  own  morbid  inclination  to  exert  a  direct  influence  on 
the  progress  of  the  war-operations. 

To  induce  Kossuth  to  do  the  first,  and  not  to  leave  undone  the 
second,  was  the  object  of  those  counsels  which  I  now  wished  to 
gain  him  to  reflect  upon.  My  hope  of  success,  however,  was  but 
faint ;  for  I  did  not  conceal  from  myself  that  Kossuth's  hostile 
feelings  toward  me,  in  consequence  of  the  well-known  events  at 
Komorn,  had  probably  become  sufficiently  strong  to  decide  him 
to  do  just  the  contrary  of  what  I  advised ;  without  taking  into 
account  the  peculiar  circumstance,  that  I  could  not  advise  for 
Dembinski's  removal  from  the  chief  command  without  exciting 
in  Kossuth  the  suspicion  that  I  did  so  probably  not  from  a  well- 
founded  conviction  of  Dembinski's  incapacity  as  a  general,  but 
merely  with  the  intention  of  rendering  possible  the  reacquisition 
of  the  staff  of  command  for  myself,  and  consequently  of  a  power 
in  the  state  by  means  of  which,  on  occasion,  even  the  authority 
of  the  civil  government  might  be  called  in  question. 

Nevertheless  I  advised  Kossuth  to  remove  Dembinski  from  the 
chief  command  ;  for  I  felt  an  inward  impulse  not  to  leave  un- 
tried any  means  for  the  promotion  of  what  I  conceived  to  be  the 
moral  welfare  of  the  nation.  The  injurious  effects  of  Kossuth's 
direct  encroachments  on  the  conduct  of  the  war-operations  I 
passed  over  for  the  present,  however,  in  cautious  silence,  partly 
that  I  might  not  hurt  his  personal  vanity,  and  thereby  lose  all ; 
partly  because  it  seemed  to  me  as  if  these  encroachments — so 
long  as  Dembinski  was  still  at  the  head  of  the  war-operations  on 
the  lower  Theiss — were  really  harmless,  or  at  least,  as  regarded 
the  success  of  our  arms  there,  scarcely  more  injurious  than  Dem- 
binski's own  strategic  dispositions. 

Hereupon  I  received  from  Kossuth  a  private  letter,  in  which 
he  declared,  among  other  things,  that  unfortunately  he  could  not 
deny  Dembinski's  incapacity  as  a  general ;  and  that  he  believed 
the  best  way  to  get  rid  of  him  would  be,  if  he  himself  joined  the 


522  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

army,  and  personally  conducted  the  operations  according  to  my 
counsels. 

I  received  besides  an  official  invitation  to  be  present,  on  the 
27th  or  28th  of  July,  at  a  personal  conference  with  Kossuth  and 
the  then  war-minister  General  Aulich — I  do  not  now  exactly  re- 
member whether  in  Kardszag  or  Kis-Ujszallas. 

Of  course  I  could  not  understand  whence  Kossuth  had  all  at 
once  acquired  the  unbounded  confidence  in  me  which  was  dis- 
played in  his  declaration  that  he  was  willing  to  conduct  the  op- 
erations according  to  my  counsels  ;  the  sincerity  of  this  declara- 
tion also,  in  view  of  the  Komorn  events,  as  well  as  the  genuine- 
ness of  the  feelings  with  the  outpouring  of  which  he  regaled  me 
in  the  private  letter,  was  highly  doubtful ;  and  I  resolved  not  to 
honor  it  with  any  reply. 

The  official  invitation  to  a  personal  meeting  with  Kossuth  and 
the  war-minister,  on  the  contrary,  was  the  more  wished  for  by 
me,  as  I  thought  that  Kossuth,  in  the  presence  of  a  witness  such 
as  General  Aulich,  would  probably  hesitate  to  promise  more  than 
he  intended  to  perform. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  July  I  accordingly  left  the 
head-quarters  at  Szerencs,  to  hasten,  by  Tokaj,  Nyiregyhaza, 
and  Debreczin,  to  the  place  of  meeting. 

In  Nyiregyhaza,  however,  I  found  a  written  report  from  the 
commander  of  the  Tiszafiired  column  on  its  way,  to  the  effect 
that  the  day  before,  a  Russian  corps  had  crossed  the  Theiss  be- 
tween Poroszlo  and  Tiszafiired ;  and  this  news  obliged  me  to 
forego  the  meeting  with  Kossuth,  and  return  immediately  to  my 
head-quarters  at  Szerencs. 


CHAPTER  LXXIV. 

When,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  July,  I  left  the  head- 
quarters at  Szerencs,  to  repair  to  the  place  of  the  proposed  meet- 
ing with  Kossuth,  no  change  whatever  had  been  remarked  by  our 
patrols  and  scouts  in  the  position  of  the  hostile  corps  (the  pre- 
sumed main  body  of  the  Russian  corps  d'armee),  which  had 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  523 

remained  inactive  during  the  preceding  day  at  Miskolcz.  At 
that  time  there  had  likewise  been  no  report  received  at  the 
head-quarters — as  I  have  distinctly  stated  in  Chapter  LXXII. — 
of  the  enemy  having  forced  the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss  at  Tisza- 
fiired. 

I  had  accordingly  indulged  the  hope  of  being  able  to  leave  the 
army  for  forty-eight  hours  (this  space  of  time  I  fixed  for  the 
meeting  with  Kossuth,  including  the  journey  there  and  back), 
without  being  particularly  apprehensive  that  any  hostile  under- 
taking could  essentially  prejudice  our  strategic  position  on  the 
Hernad  ;  for  it  is  known  that  we  explained  the  remaining  inac- 
tive at  Miskolcz  of  the  presumed  main  body  of  the  Russian  army 
by  the  apparently  not  improbable  intention  of  the  hostile  com- 
mander to  await,  before  the  next  significant  undertaking  against 
us,  the  arrival  of  his  army  corps  under  Grabbe,  which  was  has- 
tening thither  from  the  mountain-towns. 

This  repetition,  though  wearisome,  of  circumstances  sufficiently 
known  from  what  precedes  ;  as  well  as  once  more  mentioning  that 
we  estimated  the  whole  Russian  main  army  at  no  more  than 
60,000  men;  together  with  the  supplementary  remark,  that  we 
were  informed  of  its  real  force  (about  120,000  men)  only  post 
festa,  that  is  when  we  were  Russian  prisoners, — may  serve  here 
as  a  natural  explanation  of  the  fact,  that  though  the  news  I  had 
received  on  the  27th  of  July  in  Nyiregyhaza,  about  the  enemy 
having  effected  his  passage  across  the  Theiss  between  Poroszlo 
and  Tiszafured,  certainly  disagreeably  surprised  me,  it  by  no 
means  caused  me  to  despair  of  the  possibility  of  our  further  re- 
treat to  the  line  of  the  Berettyo  (the  point  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Theiss  where  we  next  intended  to  halt),  but  merely  showed 
me  the  necessity  of  instantly  beginning  the  retreat,.? and  so  fore- 
going the  reinforcement  of  the  army  by  the  Kazinczy  division. 
I  did  not  despair  of  the  possibility  of  executing  the  retreat,  be- 
cause I  erroneously  conceived  that  the  main  body  of  the  hostile 
army  was  posted  at  Miskolcz,  and  that  the  part  of  it  which  had 
crossed  the  Theiss  at  Tiszafiired  could  consequently  scarcely  be 
strong  enough  to  succeed  in  preventing  us  from  marching  through 
the  plain  of  the  Theiss  to  the  river  Berettyo ;  but  1  thought  it 
necessary  to  begin  the  retreat  immediately,  because  with  the 
left  bank  of  the  Theiss  at  Tiszafiired  we  should  have  lost  the 
possibility  of  hindering  or  even  controlling  the  accumulation  of 


524  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAEY. 

the  enemy's  troops  on  this  strategic  point ;  so  that  by  our  longer 
remaining  on  the  Hern  ad  an  opportunity  would  have  been  af- 
forded to  the  Russian  commander  to  establish  himself  suddenly 
with  superior  forces  on  our  ground  of  retreat,  and  to  press  us 
back  either  to  Transylvania  laterally,  or  even  into  the  Marmaros, 
thereby  to  all  appearance  for  ever  separating  us  from  the  southern 
armies  of  the  country. 

The  complete  evacuation  of  our  position  on  the  Hernad,  more- 
over, could  not  be  deferred,  as  in  the  course  of  the  28th  of  July 
several  mutually  confirmatory  reports  arrived  at  the  head-quar- 
ters at  Szerencs  from  the  valley  of  the  upper  Hernad,  placing  be- 
yond doubt  the  southern  advance,  rumored  the  day  before  (from 
Kaschau  toward  Tokaj),  of  a  fresh  Russian  corps  (Baron  Sacken), 
which  had  shortly  before  broken  into  Hungary.  By  this  corps, 
in  the  moment  of  its  arrival  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Hernad  at 
Hidas-Nemeti,  the  position  of  our  army  appeared  to  be  strategic- 
ally turned  in  its  right  flank;  Tokaj,  with  the  only  prepared 
passage  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss  available  to  us,  to  be  next 
menaced ;  and  already,  merely  to  secure  our  retreat  to  the  latter, 
we  were  obliged  to  draw  back  from  the  position  on  the  Hernad 
as  far  as  the  point  of  junction  of  the  roads  between  Zombor  and 
Bodrog-Keresztur,  Mad  and  Tarczal.  But  apart  from  the  tactic 
unfavorableness  of  the  local  circumstances,  remaining  longer  at 
this  point  could  not  have  been  strategically  justified,  if  the  left 
bank  of  the  Theiss  at  Tiszafiired  had  still  been  in  our  power, 
For  with  the  emerging  of  a  fresh  Russian  corps  between  Kas- 
chau and  our  army,  the  longer  keeping  back  of  the  latter  com- 
pletely lost  that  significance,  which — as  we,  under-estimating  the 
enemy's  strength,  might  hope — was  to  render  him  apprehensive 
of  the  basis  of  his  operations,  prevent  him  from  turning  our  left 
by  Tiszafiired,  and  cause  him  to  undertake  a  direct  attack  on 
our  positions  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Theiss  ;  in  which  case  I 
certainly  should  not  have  considered  it  impossible  to  prevent  the 
further  southern  advance  of  the  Russian  main  army  on  the  upper 
Theiss  for  some  time. 

On  the  27th  of  July,  during  my  absence  from  the  army,  an 
advance  of  hostile  cavalry  from  Miskolcz  by  Onga  took  place 
against  the  position  of  our  third  corps  at  Gesztely  and  Kak. 
This  undertaking,  however,  soon  proved  to  be  a  mere  reconnoi- 
tring ;  as  the  hostile  divisions,  however,  quickly  and  daringly  they 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  525 

attacked  our  outposts,  nevertheless  decidedly  avoided  any  serious 
conflict,  and  finally  evacuated  even  Onga. 

The  day  after,  the  third  corps  was  very  violently  attacked  in 
its  position  by  a  Russian  corps  of  strength  equal  to  itself,  w^hich 
had  approached  likewise  from  Miskolcz  by  Onga  against  Gesztely. 

Count  Leiningen  confined  himself,  indeed,  to  the  defensive ; 
but  it  was  a  defensive  which  obliged  the  enemy  to  evacuate  the 
field  of  battle  after  a  contest  of  several  hours,  leaving  behind  his 
wounded  men. 

This  time  it  seemed  as  if  the  enemy's  attack  on  our  position 
had  been  meant  in  real  earnest.  The  choice  of  the  point  of  at- 
tack also  seemed  to  indicate  this ;  for  it  can  not  be  denied  that, 
with  the  left  bank  of  the  Hernad  at  Gesztely  and  Kak,  a  great 
part  of  our  army,  namely  the  left  wing,  would  also  have  been 
lost,  as  soon  as  the  enemy  energetically  pursued  his  victory.  In 
evident  contradiction,  however,  to  the  earnestness  of  the  enemy's 
intention — which,  on  account  of  the  vehemence  of  the  attack, 
could  not  be  mistaken — to  break  through  the  centre  of  our  line 
on  the  Herndd,  stood  the  numerical  strength  of  the  assailant, 
which  was  altogether  insufficient  to  overcome  the  notorious  dif- 
ficulties of  such  undertakings. 

And  this  striking  disproportion  between  the  means  and  the  ap- 
parent object  of  this  attack  on  the  28th  of  July  was  a  circum- 
stance, the  only  possible  plausible  explanation  of  which  filled  us 
suddenly  with  a  lively  apprehension  that  we  had  perhaps  already 
let  slip  the  favorable  moment  for  the  continuation  of  our  retreat 
from  the  Hernad  across  the  Theiss  to  the  river  Berettyo,  and 
should  now  scarcely  be  able  to  reach  it,  or  at  all  events  only  with 
extreme  efforts. 

That  the  enemy  had  blindly  rushed  upon  us  on  the  28th  of 
July  at  Gesztely,  we  could  not  accept  as  an  explanation  of  his 
vehement  onset ;  because  he  had  already  reconnoitred  on  the 
previous  day  this  very  point,  had  found  it  strongly  occupied  by 
us,  and  our  troops  there  quite  the  reverse  of  disinclined  to  fight ; 
and  consequently,  the  energetic  opposition  which  he  had  met 
with  on  the  25th  of  July  on  the  Sajo  being  fresh  in  his  mind, 
he  could  by  no  means  be  authorized  to  expect  a  less  energetic 
resistance  on  the  Hernad. 

It  seemed  to  us  far  more  reasonable  to  explain  the  attack  of 
the  28th  of  July  on  the  centre  of  our  position  on  the  Hernad,  by 


526  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

assuming  that  the  Russian  commander — knowing  the  basis  of 
his  operations  to  be  secured  in  future  by  the  corps  of  Baron 
Sacken,  which  had  lately  broken  into  Hungary — had  begun  dur- 
ing the  27th  of  July  to  put  his  (presumed)  main  body  in  march 
from  Miskolcz  to  Tiszafured;  and  that  the  attacks  on  Gesztely 
on  the  27th  and  28th  had  merely  been  demonstrations,  in  order 
to  mask  this  flank  manoeuvre. 

According  to  this,  the  (presumed)  main  body  of  the  Russian 
army,  which  on  the  26th  was  still  encamped  at  Miskolcz,  on  the 
28th  could  certainly  have  crossed  the  Theiss  between  Poroszlo 
and  Tiszafiired,  and  have  executed  the  strategic  turning  of  tho 
left  flank  of  our  army,  which,  awaiting  the  direct  attack,  was 
still  on  the  Hernfid  from  Baksa  to  Korom.  There  was  conse- 
quently no  longer  any  hope  of  passing  Debreczin  without  danger. 
It  was  necessary  to  choose  a  line  of  retreat  to  the  river  Berettyo 
deviating  in  an  eastern  direction  from  the  route  by  Debreczin, 
and  moreover  to  strive  to  make  up  for  the  time  lost  on  the  Her- 
nad,  if  possible,  by  means  of  forced  marches.  In  consequence 
of  the  energetic  vigor  with  which  Count  Leiningen  had  repelled 
the  last  attack  on  Gesztely,  the  retreat  of  our  array  seemed  for- 
tunately to  be  secured  against  any  pursuit  at  least  from  the 
Hernad  by  Tokaj  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss. 

Accordingly,  at  nightfall  of  the  28th  of  July  the  army  left  its 
position  on  the  Hernad,  and  reached  Yaskapu  (on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Theiss,  on  the  road  from  Tokaj  to  Nyiregyhaza)  in  tho 
course  of  the  29th,  and  Nyiregyhaza  itself  on  the  30th. 

Meanwhile  we  were  informed  that  the  enemy  had  not  pro- 
ceeded from  Tiszafiired  toward  Debreczin,  but  up  the  Theiss ; 
intending,  as  it  seemed,  to  render  impossible  our  further  retreat, 
if  we  remained  any  longer  on  the  Hernad,  by  straightway  occu- 
pying the  left  bank  of  the  Theiss  opposite  Tokaj . 

We  could  learn  nothing  positive  about  an  advance  of  the 
enemy  tov/ard  Debreczin  till  our  arrival  at  Nyiregyhaza,  nor 
even  during  our  short  stay  there.  The  probability  of  this  move- 
ment was,  however,  too  great  for  us  to  assume  with  certainty 
that  it  would  be  possible  to  effect  without  danger  our  further 
retreat  on  the  route  by  Debreczin. 

The  main  body  of  our  army,  consisting  of  the  third  and  sev- 
enth corps,  was  consequently  at  Nyiregyhaza  turned  eastward 
from  the  way  to  Debreczin  on  the  road  by  Nagy-Kallo,  Nyir- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  527 

Adony,  Vamos-Percs,  Nagy-Leta  to  Kis-Marja  (on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Berettyo) ;  while  General  Nagy-Sandor  with  the  first 
corps,  which  had  not  once  been  engaged  with  the  enemy  since 
"Waizen  (15th  of  July),  had  to  form  the  flank-guard  of  the  army, 
and  for  this  purpose  continue  his  march  on  the  route  by  Debrec- 
zin,  and  further  by  Derecske  and  Berettyo-Ujfalu  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Berettyo ;  but  arrived  there,  immediately  to  undertake 
the  occupation  of  the  latter  a  cJieval  of  the  road  to  Gross- Wardein. 
;  In  order  to  render  the  combined  movements  of  the  main  body 
and  the  flank-guard  compatible  with  the  twofold  consideration 
of  gaining  betimes  the  river  Berettyo,  and  preserving  the  army 
from  heavy  losses,  the  following  dispositions  for  the  march  were 
issued : 

July  31st,  the  main  body  to  Nagy-Kall6,  the  flank-guard  to  Hadh^z. 
Aug.    1st,  "        "  Nyir-Adony,  "         "         Debreczin. 

2d,  "        "  Vamos-Percs,        "  remain  at  Debreczin. 

3d,  "        "  Nagy-Leta,  "  to  Derecske. 

4th,  "        "  Kis-Marja,  "         Berettyo-Ujfalu. 

The  leader  of  the  flank-guard  (General  Nagy-Sandor)  was 
expressly  ordered  to  avoid  any  serious  engagement  with  a  supe- 
rior hostile  force  :  in  case  he  should  encounter  such  force  before 
reaching  Debreczin,  by  a  lateral  retreat  to  the  main  body  of  the 
army ;  in  the  contrary  case — that  is,  if  his  corps  should  be 
attacked  by  a  superior  force  after  having  reached  Debreczin — 
by  speedily  continuing  the  route  of  march  indicated  to  him  as 
far  as  Berettyo-Ujfalu. 

According  to  this  disposition,  the  main  body  of  the  army  on 
the  31st  of  July  and  1st  of  August — so  long,  namely,  as  there 
was  still  a  possibility  of  a  hostile  movement  before  Debreczin — 
could  not  remain  at  an  equal  height  with  the  flank-guard ;  it 
must,  on  the  contrary  (compare  the  corresponding  stations  lor  the 
31st  of  July  and  1st  of  August)  give  to  the  flank-guard  so  much 
advance  as  was  absolutely  necessary  to  prevent  its  retreat  to  the 
main  body  of  the  army  from  degenerating  into  a  flank-march  ; 
because  otherwise  the  flank-guard — supposing  that  a  superior 
enemy  advanced  against  it  from  Debreczin  toward  Hadhaz,  or 
was  awaiting  it  before  Debreczin — would  have  had  to  choose 
between  either  allowing  itself  to-  be  destroyed  or  separated  from 
the  main  body. 

In  case  General  Nagy-Sandor  should  find  Debreczin  either 

# 


528  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

not  yet  occupied  at  all  by  the  enemy,  or  already  vacated  by  a 
feeble  column  which  had  perhaps  been  separately  advanced 
(both  cases  were  conceivable,  if  the  hostile  main  forces  had  really 
marched  from  Tiszafiired  up  the  Theiss)  ;  then  he  had  to  aim 
principally  at  procuring,  by  means  of  patrols  advancing  far  on 
all  communications  leading  from  Debreczin  toward  the  Theiss, 
the  most  exact  information  possible  relative  to  the  movements 
of  the  enemy.  Whether  the  flank-guard  should  remain  during 
the  1st  of  August  in  Debreczin,  or  might  rest  there — according 
to  the  dispositions  for  the  march  projected  in  advance — even  on 
the  2d  of  August — to  judge  of  this  I  must  leave  to  General 
Nagy-Sandor's  discernment.  The  express  order  to  avoid  any 
unequal  contest  with  the  superior  enemy  had  to  serve  him  therein 
as  a  rule.  If  he  was  menaced,  even  immediately  before  his 
arrival  at  Debreczin,  by  a  preponderating  force,  he  had  to  avoid 
it — as  already  pointed  out — on  the  road  to  Derecske,  and  at  once 
inform  the  main  body  of  the  army  of  it,  that  it  might  by  an  early 
forced  march  escape  the  danger  of  being  taken  in  flank  from 
Debreczin,  and  again  reach  an  equal  height  with  the  flank- 
guard. 

Thus  ran  the  instructions  given  to  General  Nagy-Sandor  in 
Nyiregyhaza,  before  he  left  with  the  fijst  corps  the  main  body 
of  the  army  for  the  purpose  of  forming  its  flank-guard  during  the 
march  to  the  Berettyo. 

On  the  1st  of  August  he  reached  Debreczin  without  danger, 
and  reported  that  he  had  learned  the  enemy  was  stationed  with 
about  15,000  men  at  Ujvaros — three  miles  to  the  west  of  De- 
breczin on  the  road  to  Csege. 

On  the  2d  of  August  the  main  body  of  the  army  arrived  at 
Vamos-Percs. 

I  was  prepared  to  learn  further  from  General  Nagy-Sandor 
that  the  enemy  threatened  an  attack  from  Ujvaros  with  superior 
forces,  and  that  the  first  corps  would  very  probably  be  obliged 
to  leave  Debreczin  in  the  course  of  the  day.  There  arrived, 
however,  at  the  head-quarters  neither  any  such  report  from  Gen- 
eral Nagy-Sandor,  nor  the  slightest  indication  of  the  situation  of 
the  first  corps  at  Debreczin,  which — as  was  evident  afterward — 
was  greatly  endangered  even  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  August 
by  the  enemy's  approach  from  Ujvaros  ;  and  I  was  consequently 
justified  in  supposing  that   no  hostile .  advance  from  Ujvaros 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  329 

against  Debrecziii  had  taken  place — that  the  enemy,  preparing 
for  a  decisive  blow  at  us,  was  probably  first  concentrating  the 
main  body  of  his  army  at  Ujvaros. 

But  in  contradiction  to  this  supposition  a  remarkably  brisk 
thunder  of  cannon  was  suddenly  heard  early  in  the  afternoon  from 
Debreczin.  To  discover  as  soon  as  possible  the  significance  of 
the  unexpected  conflict,  patrols  of  cavalry  were  immediately  sent 
toward  Debreczin. 

After  an  hour  or  two's  duration  the  cannonading  ceased ;  of 
the  patrols  dispatched,  however,  none  came  back.  Just  as  little 
did  I  receive  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon  from  General  Nagy- 
Sandor  any  explanation  of  the  enigmatical  occurrence. 

Under  these  circumstances  no  satisfactory  idea  of  the  state  of 
affairs  at  Debreczin  was  to  be  gained.  The  apprehension  that 
the  first  corps  had  suffered  a  defeat  was  contradicted  by  General 
]>ia.gySsindov'& previous  silence.  A  hostile  advance  from  Ujvaros 
against  Debreczin  could  not  have  remained  undiscovered  in  broad 
daylight ;  and  General  Nagy-Sandor  was  not  the  man  to  consider 
a  menacing  hostile  movement  as  unworthy  of  speaking  about :  he 
had  hitherto  always  seen  before  him  too  many  enemies,  never  too 
few,  and  at  no  time  omitted  in  cases  of  danger  threatening  to  ask 
very  assiduously  for  further  orders  how  to  act. 

The  hope  of  news  of  victory,  however,  was  contradicted  by 
Nagy-Sandor's  subsequent  silence.  It  was  not  like  him  to  be  so 
long  in  announcing  his  victory.  It  was  much  more  in  accordance 
with  his  personal  peculiarity  to  assume  that  in  consequence  of  a 
defeat,  he  had  become  bewildered,  and  had  forgotten  his  most 
urgent  duty  as  leader  of  the  flank-guard. 

The  non-return  of  the  patrols  of  hussars  sent  toward  Debreczin 
spoke  equally  for  defeat  and  for  victory.  In  the  first  ease  they 
might  have  perished ;  in  the  latter,  for  joy  at  the  unexpected 
success  of  our  arms,  they  might  have  located  themselves  in  the 
first,  best  csdrda,  in  a  state  of  unfitness  for  service. 

In  this  painful  situation  it  seemed  to  me  wisest  to  remain  with 
the  main  body  of  the  army  at  Vamos-Percs  till  daybreak  ;  for 
only  here  could  I  expect,  till  the  appointed  time,  Nagy-Sandor's 
report,  or  the  final  return  of  one  of  the  patrols  sent  toward  De- 
breczin ;  and  without  knowing  what  had  really  become  of  Gen- 
eral Nagy-Sandor  and  the  first  corps,  I  could  not  possibly  change 
the  dispositions  for  the  march,  projected  beforehand  and  com- 

Z 


530  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

municated  to  him — according  to  which  the  main  body  of  the 
army  was  not  to  leave  Vamos-Percs  till  the  3d  of  August — with- 
out apprehending  that  the  derangement,  which  perhaps  already 
existed  in  the  combined  movements  of  the  main  body  and  the 
flank-guard,  might  possibly  be  increased. 

The  advance  of  the  main  body  from  Vamos-Percs  toward  De- 
breczin  would  have  been  the  least  appropriate  measure  I  could 
have  taken  either  during  the  cannonading  or  after  it.  The  two- 
fold strategic  object  at  which  I  had  been  steadily  aiming  since 
our  departure  from  the  position  on  the  Henrad  (namely,  to  gain 
l)etimes  the  river  Berettyo,  and  to  preserve  the  army  from  heavy 
losses),  I  believed  was  attainable  only  by  avoiding  as  far  as  pos- 
sible any  encounter  with  the  Russians  on  the  territory  between 
the  Berettyo  and  the  Theiss — not  by  seeking  for  one.  Starting 
from  this  conviction,  I  had  distinctly  forbidden  General  Nagy- 
Sandor  to  accept  any  critical  combat  whatever. 

If  he  had  attended  to  this  prohibition,  then  it  was  a  victory  he 
had  just  gained — probably  over  a  weak  hostile  column  which 
had  approached  separately — and  the  whole  affair  was  quite  in 
order,  except  the  uncertainty  in  which  I  remained  respecting  it. 
But  if  he  had  not  attended  to  this  prohibition,  then,  considering 
his  well-known  want  of  decision  in  independent  situations  when 
before  the  enemy,  it  might  be  only  the  consequence  of  some  neg- 
lect of  which  he  had  been  guilty  as  leader  of  the  flank-guard, 
and  in  that  case  I  was  likewise  without  any  means  of  judging  to 
what  extent  he  had  infringed  my  express  prohibition ;  then  it 
might  as  well  have  been  50,000  as  15,000  Russians  by  which 
he  had  been  taken  by  surprise  ;  then  the  main  body,  although  it 
had  set  out  for  Debreczin  at  the  beginning  of  the  cannonading, 
might  not  only  have  arrived  too  late  to  prevent  the  first  corps 
from  being  defeated,  but  it  might  even  have  exposed  itself  to  the 
very  danger  from  which  it  intended  to  save  the  first  corps.  In 
order  to  undertake  this  movement  with  the  main  body,  under 
these  circumstances,  during  the  cannonading,  I  should  have  had 
to  give  up  first  of  all  the  nearest  strategic  objects,  which  I  had 
hitherto  aimed  at,  or  to  convince  myself  that  they  could  after- 
ward be  attained. 

But  after  the  sudden  cessation  of  the  cannonading  there  was 
no  motive  for  this  movement  of  the  main  body.  For  if  General 
Nagy-Sandor  had  conquered,  then  the  main  body  was  superfluous 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  531 

at  Debrecziii ;  if  he  had  taken  to  flight,  then  an  advance  of  the 
main  body  toward  Debreczin  would  only  cause  its  separation  from 
the  flank-guard,  and,  moreover,  the  loss  of  the  last  possibility  of 
reaching  the  Berettyo  before  the  Russians. 

I  consequently  resolved  to  maintain  the  point  Vamos-Percs  till 
daybreak  of  the  3d  of  August,  in  case  I  should  not  sooner  receive 
news  from  the  flank -guard. 

At  last,  shortly  before  the  time  fixed,  a  report  reached  the 
head-quarters  at  Vamos-Percs.  The  chief  of  the  general  stafl"  of 
the  first  corps  announced  from  Berettyo-Ujfalu,  that  General  Nagy- 
Sandor,  in  consequence  of  an  overpowering  attack,  had  been 
obliged  to  retreat  from  Debreczin  as  far  as  Berettyo-Ujfalu. 

The  main  body  consequently  started  without  delay  for  Nagy- 
Leta ;  halted  there  at  mid-day  ;  and  the  same  day,  3d  of  August, 
continued  its  march — which,  in  default  of  the  flank-guard,  was 
flanked  by  small  detachments  of  hussars — as  far  as  Kis-Marja. 

Now  if  General  Nagy-fSandor,  conformably  to  the  dispositions, 
remained  with  his  corps  behind  Berettyo-Ujfalu  on  the  Berettyo 
d  cJieval  of  the  road  to  Gross-Wardein,  and  had  not  suffered  any 
considerable  losses  at  Debreczin,  of  which  I  was  still  uninformed, 
then  the  untoward  occurrence  of  the  preceding  evening  was  really 
much  less  serious  in  its  consequences  than  I  had  at  first  feared. 

Soon  after  my  arrival  at  Kis-Marja,  however,  I  learned  that 
General  Nagy-Sandor  had  already  deemed  it  necessary  to  give 
up  even  the  line  of  the  Berettyo,  and  to  retreat  uninterruptedly 
further  on  toward  Gross-Wardein.  At  the  same  time  I  received 
some  authentic  indications  of  the  disordered  state  of  his  corps. 
He  had  quite  lost  a  great  part  of  his  artillery,  which,  wandering 
about  in  the  district  through  which  the  main  body  was  marching, 
had  unfortunately  been  discovered  by  its  patrols. 

I  now  saw  that,  under  these  circumstances,  I  must  abandon 
the  idea  of  interrupting  the  southern  advance  of  the  Russian 
main  army  on  the  Berettyo,  the  course  of  which,  moreover,  in 
the  dry  season — as  was  evident — hinders  the  communication 
only  on  some  points.  After  General  Nagy-Sandor  had  retreated 
in  the  course  of  the  day  from  Berettyo-Ujfalu  (if  I  remember 
rightly)  as  far  as  Mezo-Keresztes,  and  as  I  could  not  conceive 
but  that  this  had  been  done  in  consequence  of  the  Russians  vehe- 
mently pressing  after  him  ;  I  considered  it  dangerous  for  the  main 
body  to  stay  longer  at  Kis-Marja,  because  thereby  the  Russians 


532  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

would  be  enabled,  considering  Nagy-Sandor's  anticipated  unen- 
ergetic  resistance,  to  reach  Gross-Wardein  before  the  main  body 
of  our  army,  and  thus  cut  off  its  further  retreat  to  the  Banat. 

I  accordingly  moved  the  main  body,  during  the  night  between 
the  3d  and  4th  of  August,  from  Kis-Marja  toward  Bihar,  in  order 
to  be  able  to  reach  Gross-Wardein  with  it  in  the  course  of  the  4th 
should  it  prove  necessary. 

I  learned,  however,  in  Bihar,  that  the  first  Russian  patrols 
had  not  pressed  further  on  in  the  evening  of  the  3d  than  Berettyo- 
Ujfalu  ;  so  that  General  Nagy-Sandor  had  no  reason  whatever 
for  retreating  in  the  morning  of  that  day  from  Mezo-Keresztea. 
Just  as  little  reason  was  there  now  to  force  the  main  body — 
which,  in  consequence  of  Nagy-Sandor's  senseless  retreat,  had 
been  obliged  to  march  from  daybreak  till  late  in  the  morning  of 
the  4th  of  August,  a  distance  of  seven  miles — on  the  same  day 
two  miles  further  on  to  Gross-Wardein.  It  did  not,  therefore, 
arrive  at  that  place  till  the  day  after,  when  it  joined  the  flank- 
guard,  the  remnants  of  the  first  corps,  which  had  meanwhile 
been  reassembled. 

With  good  reason  I  may  be  asked,  how  I  came  to  tolerate 
General  Nagy-Sandor,  in  spite  of  his  negligent  conduct  before 
Waizen,  where,  in  the  night  between  the  16th  and  17th  of  July, 
when  departing  from  the  camp,  he  had  taken  with  him  the  out- 
posts, contrary  to  my  express  order,  and  had  thereby  rendered 
possible  the  hostile  surprise  which  ensued  ; — in  spite  of  the  serious 
violation  of  duty  of  which  he  was  guilty  as  commander  of  the 
rear-guard  on  the  18th  and  in  the  night  between  the  18th  and 
19th  of  July,  in  compelling  the  main  body  of  the  army  to  an  un- 
interrupted continuance  of  the  retreat,  commencing  from  Balassa- 
Gyarmat,  not  only  so  long  as  the  Russians  were  hotly  following 
but  even  after  this  had  ceased  to  be  the  case — instead  of  securing 
the  possibility  of  the  rest  absolutely  indispensable,  as  constantly 
as  Generals  Leiningen  and  Poltenberg  had  done  before  him — 
until  he  was  forced  at  last  by  his  comrades  to  halt  at  Raros,  and 
occupy  the  defile  there,  which  could  easily  be  defended,  but 
which  he  nevertheless  abandoned  in  wild  disorder  during  the 
night,  though  he  had  not  been  attacked,  and  thereby  placed  the 
whole  army  in  a  condition  in  which  its  further  existence  might 
have  been  jeopardized  even  by  a  single  patrol  of  Cossacks  ; — in 
spite  of  tVic  defeat  M^hich   he   had  brought  upon  his  corps  at 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUN(iAUV.  533 

Debreczin  by  disregarding  my  prohibition  against  engaging  in 
any  doubtful  contest  with  the  superior  enemy  ; — finally,  in  spite 
of  the  senseless  retreat  as  far  as  Mezo-Keresztes,  by  which  this 
defeat  was  followed  : — how  I  came,  in  spite  of  all  these  striking 
proofs  of  manifold  incapacity,  still  to  tolerate  General  Nagy-San- 
dor  in  the  army ;  this  question  may  certainly  with  good  reason 
be  put  to  me,  who  at  one  time  proceeded  with  such  an  iron 
severity  against  the  commanders  of  corps,  Colonel  Asboth  and 
General  Knezich  ;  to  me,  who  in  general,  during  my  official  life, 
had  not  known  how  to  gain  for  myself  the  honey-sweet  surname 
of  the  "  mild"  and  "  indulgent." 

This  question  may  find  an  answer  in  the  following : 

None  of  these  events,  except  one,  had  occurred  immediately 
under  my  own  eye.  The  explanations  of  them  which  I  subse- 
quently received — according  to  the  source  whence  they  came — 
were  not  unessentially  different  from  each  other ;  their  true 
nature  could  therefore  by  no  means  positively  be  placed  beyond 
all  doubt  in  a  summary  way.  Moreover  General  Nagy-Sandor 
knew  how  to  exculpate  himself  from  the  most  important  part  of 
the  blame  with  which  he  was  charged  in  these  cases,  by  always 
alleging  some  circumstances  the  credibility  of  which  could  not  be 
contested. 

In  this  manner  he  excused  his  retreat  to  Mezo-Keresztes  (on 
the  3d  of  August)  by  the  low  moral  condition  of  his  troops ; 
which  could  the  less  be  denied,  as  a  part  of  the  officers  of  the 
first  corps  fled  from  the  scene  at  Debreczin  in  an  uninterrupted 
course  as  far  as  Gross- Wardein,  one  other  part  still  further — as  I 
afterward  learned,  as  far  as  Arad. 

In  like  manner  he  excused  the  fact,  that  on  the  second  of 
August  at  Debreczin  he  had  not  avoided  the  superior  attack  of 
the  Russians,  by  enumerating  circumstances  which  iitiplicated 
exclusively  the  commander  of  his  troops  for  security  advanced 
from  the  camp  at  Debreczin  toward  Ujvaros.  He  was  certainly 
obliged  to  admit  that  he  had  been  surprised  by  the  Russians  in 
broad  mid-day ;  but  he  could  also  detail  the  measures  he  had 
taken  to  prevent  such  a  surprise,  and  could  prove  that  the  insuf- 
ficiency of  these  measures  was  not  to  be  ascribed  to  him.  He 
could,  it  is  true,  scarcely  deny  that  the  hostile  attack  had  not 
found  him  in  the  place  of  honor  in  front  of  his  corps,  but  in  the 
place  of  honor  at  a  patriotic  banquet,  which  had  been  given  to 


534  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

him  and  the  body  of  his  officers  by  the  gentry  of  the  city  of 
Debreczin ;  but  in  answer  to  this  he  could  very  aptly  remark, 
that  the  hostile  attack  would  most  certainly  not  have  found  him 
at  the  banquet,  but  in  front  of  his  corps,  if  the  commander  of  the 
troops  for  security  had  fulfilled  his  duty. 

In  the  same  way  he  excused  his  flight  from  Raros,  representing 
it  as  a  necessity  forced  upon  him  by  the  confusion,  which  most 
enigmatically  suddenly  prevailed  among  his  troops  and  through- 
out the  mass,  to  such  a  degree,  that,  among  others,  almost  all 
the  cavalry  and  draught-horses  had  run  away  at  one  time,  as  if 
they  were  mad  ;  in  consequence  of  which  he  was  obliged,  in 
order  to  pursue  with  his  whole  corps  the  runaway  horses,  to 
evacuate  without  delay  the  position  he  had  taken  up  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  defile  at  Raros.  In  these  circumstances  it 
was  no  small  merit  to  him,  that  he  had  not  had  the  draught- 
horses  unyoked.  Thus  at  least  the  horses  could  not  run  away 
without  removing  from  the  danger  threatening  from  the  enemy 
the  whole  artillery  of  the  first  corps.  From  the  danger  threaten- 
ing from  the  enemy?! — doubtless;  for  General  Nagy-Sandor 
originally  justified  his  flight  by  maintaining  that  he  had  already 
been  turned  in  his  position  at  Rtros  by  the  Russians ;  and  only 
when  the  untenableness  of  that  assertion  had  been  proved  by  the 
simultaneous  cessation  of  the  hostile  pursuit,  he  thought  that 
not  Cossacks  but  wolves  might  have  been  the  enemy  by  which 
he  imagined  he  had  been  turned  and  surprised  in  the  night. 

In  the  face  of  this  incertitude  on  the  part  of  Nagy-Sandor  in 
indicating  the  danger  which  had  impelled  him  to  that  most 
disastrous  nightly  flight,  the  necessity  for  it  was  indeed  not  suf- 
ficiently established,  and  it  had  undeniably  the  appearance  as  if 
in  the  night  between  the  18th  and  19th  of  July,  General  Nagy- 
Sandor's  heart  had  sunk  far  below  the  level  of  manliness;  the 
circumstance,  however,  that  during  that  night  more  than  a 
hundred  hussars'  horses,  belonging  to  the  first  corps,  had  been 
lost,  furnished  an  irrefragable  proof  of  the  boundless  confusion 
which  must  have  prevailed  among  the  troops  of  the  first  corps ; 
and  General  ISTagy-Sandor  asserted,  that  he  had  left  no  means 
untried  for  putting  a  stop  to  the  ever-widening  dispersion  of  his 
corps ;  that  he  had  at  last  been  forced  to  continue  the  retreat 
during  the  night,  in  order  to  keep  his  corps  in  some  measure 
together ;  the  former  assertion,  that  his  position  at  Raros  had 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  535 

been  turned  by  the  Russians,  as  well  as  the  latter  one,  that  his 
camp  had  been  alarmed  by  wolves,  he  had  not  brought  forward 
in  justification  of  the  flight,  but  as  an  excuse  for  his  troops — and 
so  forth. 

In  this  manner  he  excused  the  fact,  that  in  the  course  of  the 
18th  of  July,  after  he  had  succeeded  General-  Poltenberg  in  the 
rear-guard  service  at  Balassa-Gyarmat,  he  had  not  in  a  single 
instance  checked  the  hostile  pursuit  by  the  employment  of  all  his 
power — as  it  was  his  duty  to  do — this  fact  he  excused  from  the 
enormous  superiority  of  the  hostile  forces  pressing  on  closely  after 
him. 

Neither  here,  nor  at  Raros,  nor  at  Debreczin,  nor  finally  in  the 
flight  to  Mezo-Keresztes,  had  I  been  personally  present ;  a  direct 
knowledge  of  the  circumstances  of  the  moment  was  consequently 
wanting  to  me,  so  that  T  could  not  judge  of  the  responsibility  of 
Nagy-Sandor,  dependent  thereon,  for  those  acts  of  his,  the  con- 
sequences of  which  seemed  nevertheless  to  deny  that  he  was 
competent  for  the  important  post  of  a  commander  of  corps. 

Cluite  different  had  been  the  case  with  the  two  commanders 
of  corps  Knezich  and  Asboth  (before  Pered  on  the  20th  of  June). 
There  the  conditions  for  an  instant  penal  proceeding  certainly 
existed :  on  my  part,  a  direct  perception  of  the  matter  on  the 
spot ;  on  the  part  of  those  liable  to  penalty,  an  absolute  impossi- 
bility of  laying  the  blame  on  others. 

In  order  to  be  so  circumstantially  informed  of  the  amount  of 
Nagy-Sandor's  blame  in  the  disasters  enumerated,  as  was  needed 
for  pronouncing  a  sentence  with  full  conviction  of  its  justice,  I 
must  have  instituted  a  legal  inquiry.  For  this  there  was  evident- 
ly neitKer  time  nor  opportunity. 

I  could  have  put  in  force  the  summary  penal  proceediog  against 
Nagy-Sandor  only  in  the  one  instance  at  Waizen  :  here  there  was 
no  excuse.  I  had  made  him  personally  responsible  for  leaving 
behind  the  outposts  established  in  front  of  the  range  of  his  camp. 
The  outposts  nevertheless  departed.  He  could  not  possibly  throw 
the  responsibility  of  this  upon  any  other  person.  And  indeed  it 
may  appear  as  if  I  had  been  guilty  of  remarkable  weakness  in 
favor  of  General  Nagy-Sandor,  in  intrusting  him,  in  spite  of  this 
disobedience,  any  longer  with  the  guidance  of  an  army  corps 
under  such  uncommonly  critical  circumstances  as  ours  then  were. 
I  had,  however,  good  reasons  for  this  measure. 


536  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

That  General  Nagy-Sandor  was  the  least  competent  among 
the  commanders  of  corps  belonging  to  the  army  under  my  com- 
mand, was  certainly  no  secret  to  me  long  before  the  days  at 
Waizen.  But  just  as  little  was  it  unknown  to  me  that  the 
appointment  of  one  of  its  chiefs  of  division  to  the  post  of  com- 
mander of  the  first  corps  gave  still  less  ground  for  hope  than  did 
the  allowing  Nagy-Sandor  to  continue  in  the  post  already  con- 
fided to  him.  Consequently,  in  order  to  intrust  the  first  corps  to 
an  undoubtedly  more  skillful  guidance,  I  should  have  been  obliged 
to  appoint  one  of  the  chiefs  of  division  of  the  third  or  seventh  corps 
in  the  place  of  General  Nagy-Sandor :  from  this  experiment, 
however,  I  was  decidedly  dissuaded  by  my  sad  experience,  on  the 
21st  of  June,  at  Pered,  with  the  second  corps,  in  consequence  of 
a  similar  measure.  After  this  experience,  it  appeared  to  me,  in 
our  desperate  situation  before  Waizen,  to  be  more  advisable  to 
retain  to  the  first  corps  its  old  commander,  though  of  little 
capacity,  than  to  give  to  it  instantly  a  new,  even  if  undoubtedly 
a  more  skillful  one,  who,  equally  unacquainted  with  the  peculiar 
spirit  of  the  corps  in  general,  as  with  that  of  every  separate  sub- 
division in  particular,  might,  it  is  true,  guard  against  tactic, 
though  not  against  disciplinary  mistakes  :  but  in  critical  cases  (I 
speak  here  from  my  own  experience)  disciplinary  mistakes  in  a 
commander  are  mostly  far  more  dangerous  than  tactic  ones. 

Consequently  when,  notwithstanding  General  Nagy-Sandor's 
indifferent  trustworthiness  and  other  fitness  for  the  command 
committed  to  him,  I  did  not  remove  him  from  it  at  Waizen,  I 
yielded  merely  to  the  pressure  of  present  circumstances,  under  the 
feeling  that  this  measure,  proportionately  the  least  in  its  effects, 
would  be  the  less  disadvantageous,  as  I  was  at  the  same  time 
determined  in  future  personally  to  control  him  in  the  fulfillment 
of  important  missions.  The  physical  condition  in  which  the  con- 
sequences of  my  strenuous  personal  participation  in  the  events  at 
Waizen  placed  me,  unfortunately  rendered  the  carrying  out  of  this 
latter  determination  impossible. 

Great  were  the  material  losses  which  the  first  corps  sustained 
on  the  2d  of  August  at  Debreczin — far  greater  still  the  moral 
ones.  Taking  into  account  the  latter,  I  could  not  possibly  any 
longer  tranquilly  intrust  General  Nagy-Sandor  with  the  protective 
service  during  the  further  retreat. 

The  first  corps  had  accordingly  to  set  out  first  from  Gross- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  537 

Wardein  toward  Arad,  on  the  6th  of  August ;  with  the  third  and 
seventh  corps,  however,  I  intended  to  remain  during  the  day  at 
Gross- Wardein,  that  General  Nagj'^-Sandor,  with  the  first  corps, 
might  gain  an  advance  of  one  day's  march,  and  thereby,  being 
removed  out  of  danger  from  the  enemy,  get  a  few  days'  rest, 
which,  in  my  opinion,  both  himself  and  his  corps  needed,  that 
they  might  in  some  degree  recover  from  the  discouragement  under 
which  they  were  evidently  laboring  in  consequence  of  the  defeat 
at  Debreczin. 

However,  in  the  forenoon  of  the  5th  of  August,  in  Gross- 
Wardein,  I  received  a  decree  of  the  war-minister  General  Aulich, 
from  which  I  concluded  that  Lieut.-General  Dembinski  had  not 
assumed  the  offensive  against  the  army  under  Baron  Haynau — as 
I  had  been  led  to  suppose  by  the  earlier  news  from  Szegedin — 
but,  on  the  contrary,  had  already,  on  the  first  of  August,  given 
up  the  right  and  confined  himself  to  the  defense  of  the  left  bank 
of  the  Theiss  ;  further,  that  I  must  now  accelerate  my  retreat  all 
I  could,  without  heeding  the  Russian  main  army,  and  at  the 
same  time  inform  the  government  beforehand  on  what  day  the 
army  under  my  command  would  reach  Arad. 

This  decree  decided  me  to  have  the  first  corps  start  from  Gross- 
"Wardein  toward  Arad  in  the  course  of  the  5th,  the  third  and 
«eventh  on  the  6th  of  August.  Without  delay  I  sent  to  the  war- 
minister  the  information  that  one-third  of  the  army  would  arrive 
at  Arad  on  the  10th,  the  remainder  on  the  11th. 

On  the  retreat  from  Gross-Wardein  to  Arad,  I  received  a  second 
decree  of  the  war-ministry,  the  substance  of  which  was,  that 
Lieut.-General  Dembinski  had  already  given  up  likewise  the  left 
bank  of  the  Theiss,  and  had  been  ordered  to  retreat  toward  Arad, 
where  the  junction  was  to  take  place  between  his  army  and 
mine.  I  had  consequently  to  expedite  my  march  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  reach  Arad  at  least  with  one  part  of  it  by  the  9th. 

In  compliance  with  this  decree,  I  contracted  the  still  remaining 
stations  in  such  a  manner  that  General  Nagy-Sandor  with  the 
first  corps  arrived  at  Arad  on  the  9th,  the  third  and  seventh 
corps  on  the  10th  of  August. 


CHAPTER  LXXV. 

In  order  not  to  confuse  the  account  of  the  retreat  from  the 
Hernad  to  Arad,  it  was  necessary  to  pass  over  in  silence,  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  several  simultaneous  circumstances,  rumors, 
and  events,  vv^hich,  however,  had  exerted  no  influence  on  the 
progress  of  the  campaign. 

But  before  giving  a  supplementary  relation  of  these  circum- 
stances, rumors,  and  events,  I  must  point  out  my  personal  position 
to  the  army  under  my  command,  as  well  as  to  Kossuth  and  his 
political  partisans  and  adversaries  in  the  country. 

The  reader  knows  that  during  the  last  days  in  Komom  I  had 
found  by  experience  that  my  conviction  of  the  impossibility  of 
saving  Hungary,  and  my  consequent  perception  that  our  next 
patriotic  duty  was  to  terminate  alike  quickly  and  honorably  the 
hopeless  combat,  were  not  shared  by  the  majority  of  the  coryphei 
of  our  main  army  when  it  was  still  assembled  there.  Neverthe- 
less, by  means  of  a  decision  of  a  military  council,  I  had  attempted 
— as  has  been  stated  in  relating  the  last  occurrences  at  Komorn 
in  Chapter  LXVI. — to  oblige  the  main  army  to  fulfill  this  duty  : 
it  is  likewise  known  that  I  was  unsuccessful  therein — that  the 
decision  of  the  military  council  of  the  6th  of  July  limited  my 
proposal  (the  main  army  to  remain  at  Komom  and  attack  the 
Austrians),  by  accepting  Klapka's  amendment  (after  the  attempt 
at  breaking  through  the  position  of  the  Austrians — whether  suc- 
cessful or  not — the  junction  of  the  greater  part  of  our  main  army 
with  the  government  and  the  forces  about  concentrating  them- 
selves in  the  south  of  the  country,  to  be  fixed  on  as  the  next 
operation)  ;  further,  that  the  majority  of  the  military  council  had 
not  even  been  in  earnest  about  the  experimental  one  attack  on 
the  position  of  the  Austrians  ;  and  that  on  the  following  day, 
without  my  previous  knowledge,  the  departure  of  the  army  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  had  been  commenced  ;  that  in  con- 
sequence of  this  I  had  resigned  the  command,  but,  at  the  request 
of  the  deputies  of  the  army,  had  promised  to  resume  it,  on  con- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY.  o'39 

dition  that  the  attack  on  the  forces  of  Baron  Haynau,  resolved 
upon  in  the  military  council,  was  put  in  execution  ;  finally,  that 
notwithstanding  the  negative  result  of  this  attack,  made  on  the 
11th  of  July  under  General  Klapka's  chief  command,  I  was  by 
no  means  released  from  my  word  of  honor,  given  to  the  deputies 
of  the  army,  to  resume  the  command,  and  now  (in  the  sense  of 
the  same  decision  of  the  military  council,  the  carrying  out  of 
which  I  had  made  the  condition  of  my  resuming  the  command) 
to  lead  the  greater  part  of  the  army — in  spite  of  my  openly  ex- 
pressed conviction  of  the  forlorn  hope  of  this  measure — on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Danube  to  join  the  government  and  the  forces  to 
be  concentrated  in  the  south  of  the  country. 

My  position  as  commander-in-chief  was  consequently  guaran- 
teed not  by  the  authority  of  the  provisional  government,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  in  open  opposition  to  it,  solely  and  exclusively  by 
the  confidence  of  the  army  in  my  person — a  confidence,  however, 
which  could  not  be  founded  on  any  kind  of  hope  for  salvation 
directly  or  indirectly  excited  or  fostered  by  me. 

After  the  departure  from  Komorn  I  remained  passive  in  ray 
behavior  toward  Kossuth  and  his  partisans ;  and  when  the  pro- 
visional head  of  the  country  nevertheless  felt  moved  to  agitate 
against  me  even  in  his  public  speeches,  I  considered  this  to  be 
nothing  more  than  the  after-pains  of  the  terror  which  might  have 
seized  upon  him  in  consequence  of  the  well-known  invitation  to 
Komorn. 

With  Kossuth's  adversaries  external  to  the  army  under  my 
command  I  had  no  connection  whatever ;  his  opponents  present 
with  the  army  were  my  subordinates,  they  must  remain  passive, 
and  they  did  so.  That  declaration,  which  had  been  dictated  to 
me  by  the  army  as  the  answer  to  the  Russian  summons  to  lay 
down  our  arms,  had  indeed  the  serious  significance  of  an  aggres- 
sion against  Kossuth ;  but  was  of  no  avail  so  long  as  the  cham- 
pions of  the  constitutional-monarchical  principle,  as  well  as  the 
partisans  of  the  unexpressed  form  of  government  (of  the  14th  of 
April),  were  forced  by  the  dangerous  superiority  of  the  common 
external  enemy  to  a  reciprocal  toleration.  Besides,  Kossuth's 
astonishment  at  this  declaration  of  the  army  was  certainly  more 
than  naive  ;  since  he  could  not  possibly  have  forgotten  that  the 
main  army  had  never  thought  of  making  him  happy  by  an  ad- 
dress of  homage. 


fi40  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

More  thaii  what  precedes,  relative  to  my  position  as  respected 
the  army,  Kossuth,  his  opponents  and  partisans,  during  the  retreat 
from  Komorn  to  the  Hernad,  had  not  become  clear  to  me. 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  throw  some  light  upon  those  circum- 
stances, rumors,  and  events,  which,  as  belonging  to  the  period  of 
our  sojourn  on  the  Hernad  and  the  furthej;  retreat  to  Arad,  ex- 
erted no  influence  on  the  movements  of  the  army  I  commanded, 
and  were  passed  over  in  silence  in  the  last  chapter. 

Kossuth's  enigmatical  reconciliatory  private  letter,  already 
mentioned,  and  the  official  invitation  to  the  proposed  rendezvous 
in  Kardszag  or  Kis-Ujszallas,  did  not  long  remain  without  a  com- 
mentary :  rumors  from  Szegedin  spoke  of  a  general  discontent 
with  the  services  of  the  chief  command  Mezsaros-Dembinski,  and 
of  lively  sympathies,  which,  in  spite  of  Kossuth's  agitations 
against  me,  declared  themselves  now  suddenly  for  my  nomination 
as  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  forces.  Moreover  I  received 
almost  at  the  same  time  a  private  letter  from  the  first  minister, 
Bartholomaus  von  Szemere,  in  which  he  gave  me  to  understand 
that  now  was  the  favorable  moment  to  overthrow  Kossuth,  and 
that  if  I  liked  I  might  share  the  supreme  power  with  him  (Sze- 
mere.) 

The  origin  of  Kossuth's  enigmatical  reconciliatory  letter  to  me 
appeared  accordingly  to  have  been  as  follows  : 

Kossuth,  indirectly  accused  by  public  opinion  of  having  done 
something  injurious  to  the  national  cause  by  creating  the  chief 
command  Meszaros-Dembinski,  might  have  felt  the  necessity  of 
preventing  at  any  cost  the  indirect  public  accusation  from  being 
changed  into  a  direct  one,  perhaps  already  menacing  to  become 
so. 

The  appropriate  means  for  doing  this — if  the  rumors  about  the 
change  of  the  general  sympathy  in  my  favor  were  correct — could 
truly  be  no  other  than  a  comedy  of  reconciliation  with  the  new 
favorite  of  the  public,  arranged  by  Kossuth  himself  But  that 
there  must  be  something  in  the  rumored  change  of  the  public 
opinion,  of  this  Szemere's  above-mentioned  letter  furnished  me 
with  a  proof  which  was  scarcely  to  be  doubted.  Szemere's  per- 
sonal hostility  to  Kossuth  was  no  secret  to  me  ;  at  least,  from  the 
malevolent  manner  in  which  Szemere  always  spoke  of  Kossuth 
whenever  chance  had  brought  us  to  a  tete-a-tete,  I  could  not  do 
other  than  conclude  that  he  was  less  a  political  than  a  persmud 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  541 

adversary  of  the  provisional  head  of  the  country ; — and  the  cir- 
cumstance that  Szemere,  w^hom  my  always  equally  reserved 
behavior  toward  him  could  by  no  means  have  authorized  to  sup- 
pose that  he  had  succeeded  in  gaining  my  esteem,  much  less  my 
confidence — that  Szemere,  who  could  not  possibly  have  already 
forgotten  the  useless  efforts  made  by  him,  during  the  honeymoon 
of  his  nascent  republic,  to  gain  me  to  a  liaison  against  Kossuth 
— that  Szemere  thought  now  was  the  proper  time  to  venture 
again  on  an  attempt  at  this  liaison  ; — this  circumstance  certainly 
could  not  be  explained  otherwise  than  by  admitting  that  the 
rumors  about  the  lively  sympathy  of  the  public  opinion  for  me 
were  supported  by  facts. 

The  authentic  confirmation  of  these  rumors,  however,  I  re- 
ceived first  from  the  communications  of  a  representative,  who, 
coming  from  Szegedin,  arrived  at  Nagy-Kallo  on  the  very  same 
day  as  that  on  which  I  reached  it  with  the  main  body  of  the 
army.     This  was  on  the  31st  of  July. 

These  communications  were  to  the  effect,  that  the  majority  of 
the  Diet  had  proposed  to  the  provisional  government  to  transfer 
to  me  the  chief  command  over  all  the  troops  ;  and  an  affirmative 
answer  had  thereupon  been  given  to  the  Diet  by  Si^emere,  in  the 
name  of  the  provisional  government.  But  at  the  same  time  I 
learned  from  this  representative  that  on  the  28th  of  July  the 
Diet  had  determined  on  a  dissolution  for  an  indefinite  period,  and 
that  the  majority  of  the  representatives  had  in  fact  already  left 
Szegedin  to  join  my  head-quarters. 

I  thought  that  I  perceived  in  the  proposal  of  the  majority 
of  the  Diet  the  influence  of  the  peace-party.  But  as,  notwith- 
standing the  pressure  of  circumstances,  my  nomination  as  com- 
mander-in-chief had  not  yet  taken  place,  I  could  not  but  doubt 
the  sincerity  of  the  answer  which  Szemere  had  given  to  the  Diet 
in  the  name  of  the  provisional  government.  This  doubt  I  be- 
lieved I  ought  the  less  to  conceal  from  the  representative,  by 
whom  the  communications  in  question  had  orally  been  made  to 
me,  as  his  other  declarations  showed  me  that  he  and  the  majority 
of  his  colleagues  had  formed  no  small  expectations  from  my  nom- 
ination as  commander-in-chief  This  doubt,  however,  was  not 
felt  by  the  representative.  With  no  less  confidence  than  himself, 
his  colleagues  also  might  have  received  Szemere's  official  answer ; 
and  thus  the  rumor  that  the  provisional  government  had  already 


542  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY. 

transferred  to  me  the  chief  command  over  all  the  troops,  together 
with  all  the  expectations  connected  with  it,  were  soon  generally 
spread,  and  seemed,  moreover,  to  be  justified  by  the  simultaneous 
journey  of  two  members  of  the  provisional  government  to  the 
camp  of  the  army  under  my  command. 

These  members  of  the  government  were  Szemere  and  the  min- 
ister of  the  exterior.  Count  Kasimir  Batthyanyi.  They  arrived 
on  the  1st  of  August  at  my  head-quarters  in  Nyir-Adony.  The 
first  opportunity,  however,  I  gave  them  of  holding  a  conference 
with  me  was  at  Vamos-Percs  (the  next  station),  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  following  day.  For  I  thought  it  a  punishment  quite  ap- 
propriate to  Szemere's  above-mentioned  letter  to  overlook  him  in 
a  marked  manner  for  a  time,  and  thus  expose  him  to  the  sarcasms 
of  the  officers  present  at  the  head-quarters. 

Count  Batthyanyi,  as  Szemere's  companion,  had  accordingly 
to  sufier  with  him  ;  but  I  had  intended  the  punishment  for  the 
latter  alone.  For  in  order  intentionally  to  expose  the  minister 
of  the  exterior  to  the  treatment  which  his  colleague  Szemere  re- 
ceived in  the  head-quarters,  I  should  have  wanted  beforehand 
positive  reasons  (which  I  in  fact  had  not)  for  supposing  that  he 
was  privy  to  Szemere's  letter,  or  that  he  perhaps  even  agreed 
with  it. 

Of  the  official  significance  of  the  sudden  arrival  of  both  min- 
isters at  the  head-quarters  I  had  not  at  first  been  informed.  That 
the  object  of  this  mission  was  my  nomination  as  commander-in- 
chief,  as  had  been  generally  supposed,  appeared  to  me  highly  im- 
probable, considering  the  e^itente  peu  cordiale  between  myself 
and  the  provisional  government,  now  relieved  of  the  Diet.  But, 
on  the  contrary,  I  did  not  for  a  moment  doubt  that  Szemere  had 
not  come  without  the  positive  intention  of  sounding  the  effect  of 
his  private  letter,  and  accomplishing,  if  possible,  in  the  shortest 
way  the  league  Szemere-Gorgei  contra  Kossuth,  covertly  pro- 
jected in  this  letter  ;  and  Szemere  did  not  at  all  allow  himself  to 
be  deterred,  by  the  sarcasms  of  those  surrounding  me,  from  con- 
firming this  opinion  about  the  personal  object  of  his  arrival  at 
the  head-quarters  : — the  first  question  he  addressed  to  me  at 
Vamos-Percs,  on  the  occasion  of  an  accidental  tete-a-tete,  was  in 
fact,  whether  I  had  received  his  letter. 

This  tete-a-tete  between  myself  and  Szemere  was  brought  about 
contrary  to  my  intention,  when  I  conducted  both  ministers  to  my 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  543 

room — at  last  acceding,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  of  August,  to 
their  desire  for  a  conference  with  me — and  Count  Batthyanyi,  as 
if  by  chance,  stopped  behind  some  minutes,  leaving  me  alone 
Avith  Szemere. 

Shortly  before,  the  cannonading,  which  indicated  to  us  in 
Vamos-Percs  the  attack  of  the  Russians  on  our  flank-guard  at 
Debreczin,  had  ominously  suddenly  again  ceased,  and  I  was  in 
consequence  very  restless. 

In  a  more  favorable  disposition  of  mind  I  could  hardly  have 
resisted  the  temptation  to  ridicule  the  truly  rare  confidence  with 
which  Szemere  had  put  this  question  to  me,  in  spite  of  the  treat- 
ment, any  thing  but  inviting,  which  he  had  just  met  with  from 
me  and  those  about  me.  The  painful  incertitude,  however,  in 
which  I  was  as  to  the  issue  of  the  conflict  at  Debreczin,  saved 
Szemere  from  a  new  well-merited  chastisement. 

After  having  simply  answered  in  the  affirmative  his  question 
(whether  I  had  received  his  letter),  I  thwarted  Szemere's  probable 
intention  of  questioning  me  still  further  relative  to  its  contents 
and  tendency,  by  a  quick  counter-question  about  the  rumor  of  my 
nomination  as  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  troops.  For  this 
Szemere  might  not  have  been  quite  prepared  ;  since  he  at  first 
asserted,  that  the  cause  of  this  rumor  was  altogether  unknown  to 
him ;  and  after  I  had  told  him  what  I  had  learnt  about  it  on  the 
31st  of  July,  at  Nagy-Kallo,  he  admitted  that  the  choice  of  me 
as  commander-in-chief  had  in  fact  been  spoken  of  in  the  Diet, 
but  declared  as  wholly  without  foundation  the  rumor  that  a  mo- 
tion had  been  made  by  the  Diet  concerning  this  choice,  as  well 
as  that  an  affirmative  answer  had  been  given  by  him  in  the  gov- 
ernment's name. 

At  that  moment  Count  Batthyanyi  interrupted  the  tete-a-tete  ; 
and  now  I  learnt  the  real  object  of  the  official  mission  on  which 
the  two  ministers  had  been  sent  by  the  provisional  government. 

This  was  no  other  than  to  make  use  of  the  last  means  for  the 
salvation  of  the  formless  State  of  Hungary,  independent  of  Austria 
(dating  from  Debreczin  the  14th  of  April,  1849),  that  is,  to  offer 
the  crown  of  Hungary  to  the  dynasty  of  Romanow, 

The  reader — from  what  has  hitherto  been  communicated  of 
my  life  and  acts — might  perhaps  be  of  opinion  that  my  proposal 
in  the  ministerial  council  of  the  26th  of  June  (if  possible  only  to 
negotiate  with  the  Russians,  but  to  attack  the  Austrians  simul- 


544  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

taneously  with  all  the  forces  at  our  disposal)  was  the  origin  of 
this  last  idea  of  salvation. 

This  opinion,  however,  would  be  contradicted  by  a  circum- 
stance which  has  not  yet  been  mentioned,  namely,  that  Kossuth, 
long  before  the  14th  of  April,  1849,  consoled  those  who  even 
then  despaired  of  the  salvation  of  the  country  with  the  assurance 
that  he  had  already  entered  into  diplomatic  negotiations  abroad, 
having  for  their  object,  that  in  the  worst  case  the  Duke  of 
Leuchtenberg  should  ascend  the  throne  of  Hungary,  binding 
himself  to  govern  constitutionally,  under  the  protectorate  of 
Russia. 

It  might  indeed  be  answered  to  this,  that  the  Russian  interven- 
tion and  the  official  crusade-sermon  against  it  existed  msfaitsac- 
complis  between  the  time  in  which  the  honor  was  conferred  on 
the  Duke  of  Leuchtenberg  of  serving  Kossuth  as  a  last  resource, 
and  the  day  on  which  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  were 
charged  with  the  said  mission — that  consequently  Kossuth's  pa- 
rading of  his  foreign  diplomatic  connections  was  doubtless  nothing 
more  than  one  of  those  numerous  impostures  by  which  he  thought 
it  necessary  often  to  degrade  himself  so  remarkably  in  the  interest 
of  "  the  liberation  of  Europe."  Against  this  conclusion  I  cer- 
tainly could  not  make  any  weighty  objection. 

But  I  should  nevertheless  be  obliged  to  deny  the  correctness  of 
the  supposition  that  the  provisional  government  had  been  led  to 
that  idea,  which  was  now  about  being  realized  by  the  two  min- 
isters Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi,  by  my  proposal  in  the 
ministerial  council  of  the  26th  of  June ;  for  if  the  provisional 
government  had  hit  upon  this  idea  on  the  26th  of  June  in  con- 
sequence of  my  proposal — moreover  by  a  quite  illogical  and  ar- 
bitrary interpretation  of  it — then  this  circumstance  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  remained  a  whole  month  without  producing  the  least 
real  consequence  :  such  a  consequence,  however,  exists  nowhere 
in  the  acts  of  the  provisional  government  during  the  interval  of 
time  from  the  26th  of  June,  to  the  end  of  July,  1849. 

To  judge  by  the  experience  I  had  acquired  relative  to  the  man- 
ner of  thinking  and  acting  of  Kossuth  and  Szemere  (the  two 
members  of  the  provisional  government  most  eminent  by  position 
and  influence),  the  ministerial  decision,  dating  from  the  last  days 
of  July,  in  consequence  of  which  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi 
suddenly  emerged  in  ray  immediate  vicinity  with  the  well-known 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  545 

mission,  was  brought  about  by  the  co-operation  of  the  following 
circumstances : 

1.  At  the  end  of  July  even  Kossuth's  and  Szemere's  hopes  of 
a  favorable  result  from  Dembinski's  offensive  operations — intend- 
ed against  the  Austrians,  as  was  said — began  gradually  to  fail  : 
a  proof  of  this  was  the  undisguised  way  in  which  Kossuth  agreed, 
in  his  private  letter  to  me,  in  my  unfavorable  judgment  on  the 
chief  command  Dembinski-Meszaros. 

2.  The  provisional  government  received  about  the  same  time, 
in  quick  succession,  my  reports — 

a)  On  the  summons  to  lay  down  our  arms  made  by  the  Russians 
to  me,  and  my  reply  thereto  ; 

b)  On  the  breaking  through  the  line  of  operation  of  the  Russian 
main  army  by  the  three  army  corps  acting  under  my  orders, 
already  supposed  to  be  accomplished  with  the  gaining  of  the 
line  of  the  Sajo. 

c)  On  the  correspondence  between  the  Russian  Count  Riidiger 
and  myself.  This  report — if  I  recollect  rightly — was  ac- 
companied by  a  suggestion  that  two  men,  invested  by  the 
government  with  full  power,  should  be  sent  into  my  imme- 
diate vicinity ;  or  at  least  that  it  should  be  told  me  what  I 
was  to  do,  in  case  my  answer  to  the  letter  of  the  Count 

■  ,  y     should  be  followed  by  the  Russians  proposing  some   con- 
,   ditions  of  peace. 

3.  Simultaneously  the  well-known  exchange  of  arms  was  ru- 
mored abroad  in  Szegedin.  The  importance  of  this  act  was  ex- 
aggerated. I  was  said  to  be  already  on  the  best  terms  with  the 
Russians ;  their  negotiators  were  continually  moving  to  and  fro 
in  my  head-quarters ;  the  officers  of  the  army  under  my  com- 
mand were  fraternizing  with  those  of  the  Russian  army  ;  the 
war  was  continued  only  for  form's  sake,  as  it  were,  and  peace 
between  Hungary  and  Russia  would  have  been  made  long  ago 
if  the  government  had  allowed  me  to  act  as  I  liked  ;  with  the 
government,  however,  the  Russians  would  have  nothing  to  do  ; 
the  salvation  of  the  country  was  conceivable  only  in  a  peaceable 
way,  and  only  through  me ;  for  only  with  me — the  undisguised 
opponent  of  the  declaration  of  independence  of  the  14th  of  April, 
1849 — would  the  Austrians  as  well  as  the  Russians  treat ;  and 
so  on. 

Deceived  in  the  expectations  which  Lieut.-General  Dembinski, 


546  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

as  a  general,  had  been  appointed  to  justify ;  and  well  knowing 
the  depressed  condition  in  which  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bern  was 
in  Transylvania — consequently  without  the  hope  of  continuing 
to  maintain  himself  in  the  Banat  even  defensively,  much  less  of 
offensively  breaking  out  of  it ;  not  less  well  informed  of  the  nu- 
merical superiority  of  the  Russian  main  army  over  the  forces 
united  under  my  command,  and  although  inexhaustible  in  pro- 
jecting plans  of  war-operations  calculated  infallibly  to  destroy 
the  Austrians  as  well  as  the  Russians,  yet  doubtful  himself  of 
their  practicability ;  in  the  midst  of  this  comfortless  situation 
surprised  by  the  letter  of  the  commander  of  the  Russian  corps, 
Count  Riidiger,  to  me,  and  considering  it  to  be  nothing  less  than 
an  indubitable  proof  that  the  Russians  were  seriously  thinking 
about  concluding  a  profitable  peace  with  Hungary  separately ; 
fully  confirmed  in  this  supposition  by  the  rumors  enumerated 
under  point  3,  nay,  by  these  rumors  even  induced  to  suspect  that 
I  intended  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Russians  on  my 
own  account,  and  to  leave  the  provisional  government  shelter- 
less ;  finally,  not  quite  secure  also  against  the  twofold  illusion, 
that  Hungary  was  certainly  still  to  be  saved  by  negotiations,  but 
that  the  enemy  would  treat  only  with  me ;  and  thus,  on  the  one 
hand,  urged  by  the  public  opinion  to  the  way  of  pacification, 
supposed  to  be  open  ;  on  the  other,  fearing  to  become  shelterless, 
in  case  the  negotiations,  which  were  said  to  be  in  the  best  train, 
should  in  future  be  left  to  me  alone; — Kossuth,  supported  by 
Szemere,  was  determined  to  take  into  his  own  hands  the  negotia- 
tions with  the  Russians,  and  in  case  of  necessity  even  to  sacrifice 
the  crown  of  St.  Stephen  ;  for  only  by  offering  more  than  I  could 
do  (the  crown  not  being  in  my  possession),  could  Kossuth  and 
Szemere  hope  to  induce  the  Russians  to  make  peace  with  them 
(Kossuth  and  Szemere,  that  is,  the  provisional  government),  not 
with  me. 

This  determination,  consequently,  could  not  have  been  long 
and  maturely  considered  ;  we  can  conceive  and  judge  of  it  only 
as  come  to  in  despair ;  especially  as  Kossuth  must  thereby  in- 
volve himself  in  most  critical  situations  as  regarded  the  Poles — 
his  exclusive  fellow-champions  for  "  the  freedom  of  Europe." 
This  dangerous  consequence  also  had  by  no  means  been  over- 
looked by  Kossuth  ;  and  principally  to  avoid  disagreeable  col- 
lisions with  the  Poles,  the  real  object  of  the  official  mission  (Sze- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  547 

mere  and  Count  Batthyanyi's  into  my  immediate  vicinity)  was 
kept  secret.  But  as  the  mission  itself  could  not  possibly  remain 
unknown,  Kossuth  had  it  rumored  that  Szemere  and  Count 
Batthyanyi  conveyed  to  me  the  nomination  of  general-in-chief  of 
all  the  Hungarian  forces.  This  device  had  moreover  the  advant- 
age, that  it  thereby  seemed  as  if  the  growing  public  sympathies 
for  my  person,  as  well  as  the  rumored  pretensions  of  the  Szegedin 
population  (to  give  me  full  authority  in  the  "  saving"  negotiations 
with  the  Russians)  had  been  respected,  and  consequently  that 
the  suppressed  spirit  of  the  people  could  again  in  some  measure 
raise  itself;  an  advantage,  to  gain  which  Kossuth,  it  is  well 
known,  shunned  scarcely  any  means.  That  the  rumors  about 
my  nomination  as  generalissimo,  as  well  as  about  my  being  now 
free  to  treat  according  to  my  own  judgment  for  peace  with  the 
Russians,  must  unavoidably  expose  him  to  the  danger  of  coming 
into  conflict  with  the  Poles  (thanks  to  the  small  sympathy  I  had 
hitherto  shown  for  them) — this  Kossuth  had  not  to  fear  so  long 
as  Lieut. -General  Dembinski  and  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bem  re- 
ceived no  orders  from  me — so  long  as  he  (Kossuth)  kept  in  petto 
the  real  nomination  of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bem  as  commander- 
in-chief  of  all  the  troops  in  Hungary  and  Transylvania,  and  with 
it  the  infallible  means  for  convincing  the  Poles,  at  any  moment, 
of  his  faithfulness  toward  them — and  so  long  as  he  secured  to 
himself,  by  keeping  secret  the  real  object  of  Szemere  and  Count 
Batthyanyi's  mission,  the  possibility  of  inducing  those  Poles,  who 
might  be  rendered  suspicious  by  these  rumors,  to  believe  that 
Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  had  been  sent  to  me  only  to  pre- 
vent intended  treachery  on  my  part,  and  consequently  as  guard- 
ians, as  it  were,  of  "  the  freedom  of  Europe."  With  all  this, 
however,  it  is  not  yet  explained,  how  Kossuth  could  calculate  on 
reaping  advantage  from  the  negotiations  with  Russia,  without 
in  the  end  nevertheless  exposing  the  Poles,  and  with  them  "  the 
freedom  of  Europe."  And  for  this  very  reason  we  must  assume 
that  his  determination — to  offer  the  crown  of  Hungary  to  the 
dynasty  of  Romanow,  with  the  simultaneous  project  (afterward 
really  executed,  as  we  shall  see)  of  intrusting  to  a  Pole  the  chief 
command  over  all  the  Hungarian  armies — had  been  formed  in 
the  delirium  of  sudden  despair  and  absolutely  without  reflection. 
By  this  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  I  had  wholly  abandoned  the 
idea  of  treating  with  the  Russians  for  peace.     On  the  contrary,  I 


548  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

even  now  acknowledge  this  idea — if  it  could  have  been  realized 
— to  have  been  the  only  one  from  which,  under  the  then  existing 
circumstances,  none  of  the  parties  armed  in  the  country  against 
Austria  would  have  dissented. 

For  the  partisans  and  defenders  of  the  law  sanctioned  by  the 
King,  the  overthrow  of  which  was  the  real  object  of  Austria — 
for  the  sole  party  in  the  country  which  had  any  thing  positive  to 
lose — it  could  scarcely  be  difficult  to  make  choice  between  Rus- 
sian sovereignty  and  privileged  incorporation  with  Austria,  as 
soon  as  they  considered  that  Russia,  if  it  thought  seriously  of 
acquiring  Hungary,  must  necessarily  also  intend  to  retain  it  in 
her  possession. 

The  party  of  the  "  unexpressed  form  of  government"  had  nothing 
to  lose,  not  even  a  principle — as  their  title  indeed  betrays — unless 
it  were  that  of  being  independent  of  Austria  ;  and  this  principle, 
they  might  be  certain,  remained  intact  to  them  under  Russia's 
sovereignty. 

The  true  republicans,  finally,  could  only  gain  in  wide  and 
ample  Russia  what  they  had  in  Hungary — a  missionary  sphere 
of  action. 

For  the  Poles  indeed  it  must  have  been  difficult  to  choose  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia :  "  the  freedom  of  Europe"  here  as 
well  as  there  was  given  up  I  But  what  the  Poles  did,  after 
Russia  did  not  make  peace,  they  could  just  as  well  have  done  in  the 
contrary  case.  Besides,  I  was  speaking  above  only  of  those 
parties  who  inhabited  the  country.  And  so  long  as  the  facts — 
that  my  name  suddenly  began  again  to  become  popular  after  the 
appeal  to  the  constitution  of  the  country  of  the  year  1848  had 
been  dictated  to  me  by  the  army  under  my  command,  as  an 
answer  to  the  Russian  summons  to  lay  down  our  arms,  and  this 
document,  together  with  the  letter  of  Count  Riidiger,  and  the 
exchange  of  arms,  had  become  publicly  known ;  further,  that 
Kossuth  personally  had  come  to  the  determination,  not  perhaps 
to  accede  to  the  proposal  of  the  Russians,  but  himself  to  make 
proposals  to  them  ;  finally,  that  Szemere  personally  carried  out 
this  determination,  without  either  himself  or  Kossuth  having 
been  disavowed  for  this  act  by  the  parties  of  the  "  republic"  or  of 
the  "  unexpressed  form  of  government ;" — so  long  as  these  facts 
are  not  refuted,  I  must  adhere  to  the  declaration,  that  the  idea 
of  treating  for  peace  with  Russia — if  it  could  have  been  realized 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  549 

— was,  under  all  the  then  existing  conjunctures,  the  sole  saving 
one,  and  as  such  recognized  by  all  parties  in  the  country  which 
shared  in  the  combat  against  Austria. 

This  idea,  however,  could  Tiot  be  realized  so  long  as  the  Rus- 
sians only  desired  us  to  lay  down  our  arms,  but  made  no  pro- 
posals for  peace ;  and  I  certainly  can  not  compliment  Kossuth 
and  Szemere  for  overlooking  this  circumstance. 

The  first  conference  with  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  at 
Vamos-Percs,  which  betrayed  to  me  the  already  formed  resolution 
of  the  provisional  government  to  give  even  the  crown  of  Hungary 
for  peace  with  Russia,  was  in  substance  as  follows  :  '"  ; 

Szemere,  the  real  actor  in  the  mission  (Count  Batthyanyi' s  co-/ 
operation  seemed  to  be  confined  to  that  of  translator)  began  by 
asking  how  far  I  had  already  got  in  my  negotiations  with  the 
Russians. 

I  replied,  that  this  could  not  be  unknown  to  the  government, 
seeing  I  had  sent  it  a  copy  of  the  correspondence  between  Count 
Riidiger  and  myself 

But  since  then,  said  Szemere,  I  had,  as  the  government  had 
learnt,  repeatedly  exchanged  trumpets  with  the  Russians. 

As  I  thought  that  Szemere,  in  the  presence  of  his  colleague, 
stood  no  longer  before  me  as  Kossuth's  artful  rival,  but  as  the 
organ  of  the  government,  I  took  very  seriously  this  question  be- 
traying distrust,  and  indeed  considered  the  whole  conference  to 
be  strictly  official ;  and  endeavored  (as  I  certainly  should  not 
have  done  if  I  had  had  a  contrary  opinion  of  the  significance  of 
the  meeting)  circumstantially  to  explain  to  the  ministers  the 
estimate  to  be  formed  of  the  reports  of  my  * '  having  repeatedly 
exchanged  trumpets"  with  the  Russians,  if  the  government  did 
not  wish  to  give  way  to  silly  illusions.  I  assured  the  ministers 
that  I  had  come  in  contact  with  no  Russian  trumpet,  except  in 
the  known  instance  at  Rimaszombat ;  that  the  pistols  of  Lieut.- 
General  Sass  and  Colonel  Chrulow  had  been  brought  to  me  by 
our  own  trumpets — the  same  as  had  gone  from  Saj6-Szent-Peter 
to  the  next  Russian  camp  with  our  answer  to  the  proposal  to  lay 
down  our  arms  ;  that  my  second  sending  of  trumpets  to  the  com- 
manders of  the  Russian  advanced  troops  had  for  its  object  solely 
to  enable  me  to  make  the  return  demanded  by  their  chivalric 
courtesy  ;  that  consequently  those  reports  of  my  "  having  repeat- 
edly exchanged  trumpets"  with  the  Russians  could  only  refer  to 


650  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

the  fact — not  known  to  myself  till  afterward,  and  which  certain- 
ly redounded  to  his  honor — that  Count  Leiningen,  as  conqueror 
of  Gesztely  (on  the  28th  of  July),  had  permitted  the  trumpet, 
whom  the  Russians  had  sent  to  him  out  of  subsequent  anxiety 
about  the  fate  of  their  wounded  men  whom  they  had  left  behind 
on  the  field  of  battle,  to  convince  himself  personally  of  the  con- 
scientiousness with  which  these  unfortunates  had  already  received 
from  our  worthy  surgeons  such  attention  as  was  necessary, 

Szemere  now  further  inquired,  whether  it  did  not  seem  to  me, 
nevertheless,  that  the  Russians  were  not  disinclined  to  enter  in 
earnest  into  negotiations  with  us,  and  that  offers  of  peace  were 
to  be  expected  from  them. 

To  this  I  answered,  that  I  had  not  yet  formed  any  opinion  on 
the  diplomatic  speculations  of  the  Russians  ;  but  that  thus  much 
the  provisional  government  might  consider  certain,  that  if  the 
Russians  had  felt  a  desire  to  make  peace  with  us,  they  would 
hardly  have  left  my  answer  to  Count  Riidiger,  inviting  them 
thereto,  without  a  reply,  as  was  really  the  case  ;  that  consequent- 
ly the  provisional  government  would  wait  in  vain  for  a  proposal 
of  peace  from  the  Russians  ;  that  if  the  provisional  government 
\  wished  to  negotiate,  or  at  least  convince  itself  whether  the  Rus- 
sians had  any  inclination  thereto  or  not,  it  must  itself  take  the  in- 
itiative, with  a  proposal  of  conditions  of  peace  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly expressed. 

Szemere  in  consequence  resolved  immediately  to  draw  up  a 
letter  to  Prince  Paszkiewicz,  and  hand  it  to  me  to  be  forwarded 
to  the  Russian  camp. 

Late  in  the  evening  of  the  4th  of  August,  in  the  station  at 
Bihar,  a  single  Russian  officer  (Lieutenant  Miloradowicz)  arrived 
at  the  head-quarters,  as  trumpet,  sent  by  Prince  Paszkiewicz, 
with  the  double  commission  to  furnish  the  Russian  officers  who 
were  our  prisoners  with  the  money  necessary  for  their  more 
suitable  maintenance — and  to  return  to  me  those  arms  which  I 
had  sent  to  the  camp  of  the  Russian  corps  posted  at  Miskolez  on. 
the  26th  of  July,  as  counter-presents  for  Lieut. -General  Sass  and 
Colonel  Chrulow. 

Prince  Paszkiewicz — so  the  trumpet  declared — deemed  it  in- 
admissible to  permit  his  generals  and  officers,  in  the  face  of  the 
alliance  existing  between  Russia  and  Austria,  to  accept  presents 
from  the  enemies  of  the  latter. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  551 

To  this  I  replied,  that  in  my  present  position  I  deemed  it  not 
less  inadmissible  to  accept  presents  for  which  I  could  make  no 
return ;  that  consequently  Lieutenant  Miloradowicz  would  have 
the  goodness  forthwith  to  receive  the  arras  which  had  been  sent 
to  me  in  the  form  of  presents  by  Lieut. -General  Sass  and  Colonel 
Chrulow,  and  restore  them  to  their  former  owners. 

To  do  this — the  trumpet  said — was  opposed  to  his  notions  of 
honor ;  and  he  preferred,  on  his  own  responsibility,  to  go  back 
with  my  counter-presents  sent  for  Lieut. -General  Sass  and  Colonel 
Chrulow,  and  report  what  I  had  said — consequently  without 
accomplishing  his  mission. 

And  thus  this  matter  ended.  But  in  order  to  execute  his  first- 
mentioned  commission,  as  the  prisoners  were  escorted  with  the 
army-train,  and  it  was  stationed  on  the  4th  of  August  at  Gross- 
Wardein,  the  Russian  trumpet  had  to  go  there  :  this  was  not 
practicable,  however,  that  night,  it  being  very  dark  in  consequence 
of  the  rainy  weather  which  had  set  in  ;  he  therefore  remained  for 
the  night  in  Bihar,  and  was  conducted  to  Gross-Wardein  next 
morning. 

Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  hastened  thither,  in  advance,] 
on  the  4th  of  August,  and  had  already  completed  the  diplomatic  \ 
letter  to  Prince  Paszkiewicz  when  I  arrived  with  the  head- 
quarters and  the  Russian  trumpet.  Consequently  the  return  of 
the  latter  to  the  Russian  camp  furnished  an  opportunity  for 
sending  this  letter,  -^th  an  introduction  by  me,  to  its  destina- 
tion. 

Li  this  introductory  note  the  often-mentioned  letter  of  Count 
Riidiger  was  indicated  as  the  occasion  of  this  step  being  taken  by 
the  provisional  government. 

The  contents  of  the  letter  made  on  me  the  impression  of  an 
open  complaint  against  Austria,  and  a  disguised  invitation  to 
Russia  to  take  advantage  of  the  serious  rupture  between  Austria 
and  Hungary  by  making  peace  with  the  latter.  Being  asked  by 
Szemere  my  opinion  of  the  practical  value  of  this  letter,  I  re- 
marked that  it  would  hardly  repay  the  trouble  he  had  taken  with 
the  rough-draught.  The  Russians — thus  I  supported  my  un- 
favorable judgment — would  most  probably  answer  this  invitation 
as  they  did  that  contained  in  my  reply  to  Count  Riidiger — with  I 
silence  only  and  an  uninterrupted  prosecution  of  their  war-opera-  f 
lions ;  but  this  seemed  not  to  be  sufficiently  clear  to  the  provi-l 


•   552  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

sional  government :  it  had  consequently  to  expect  no  result  what- 
ever from  this  letter. 

Now  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  decide  whether  Szemere  had 

been  convinced  by  me ;   or  had  been  induced  to  strive  more 

energetically  for  the  object  of  his  mission,  perhaps  in  consequence 

'  of  General  Nagy-Sandor's  defeat  at  Debreczin,  and  of  the  news 

that  Lieut. -General  Dembinski  had  already  given  up  Szegedin, 

as  well  as  of  the  uninterrupted  continuance  of  the  retreat  to  Arad 

of  the  army  under  my  command.     The  fact  is,  that  he  invited 

^    me  again  to  a  secret  conference  with  him  and  his  colleague  on 

the  evening  of  the  next  day  (6th  of  August)  in  the  station  Gyapju. 

•         Szemere  opened  the  conference  by  declaring,  that,  as  I  was 

decidedly  of  opinion  that  the  Russians  should  be  forthwith  invited 

to  negotiate,  and  at  the  same  time  conditions  more  advantageous 

to  them  be  indicated — he  had  drawn  up  a  new  letter  to  Prince 

Paszkiewicz,  and  was  desirous  of  having  riiy  judgment  upon  it. 

By  this  introduction  Szemere  evidently  acted  as  if  he  had  been 
urged  by  me  to  repeat  the  attempt  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
Russia,  and  moreover  as  if  the  determination  of  the  government, 
in  virtue  of  which  Szemere  had  dispatched  the  Gross- Wardein 
letter,  and  was  about  to  follow  it  by  a  second,  was  in  some  man- 
ner a  concession  made  to  me  personally. 

The  perception  of  this  matured  in  me  the  resolution  to  make 
the  ministers  feel  that  I  did  not  mistake  the  tendency  of  their 
mission,  and  at  the  same  time  show  them  the  folly  of  their 
endeavors.  Beforehand,  however,  I  let  Szemere  read  without 
interruption  the  rough-draught  of  which  he  had  just  spoken.  It 
was  a  paraphrase  of  those  passages  of  the  Gross- Wardein  letter 
which  had  made  upon  me  the  impression  of  the  conscious  "  dis- 
guised invitation  to  Russia."  My  judgment  on  the  value  of  his 
paraphrase  was  similar  to  that  which  I  had  given  on  the  Gross- 
Wardein  letter. 

Szemere,  evidently  piqued,  now  asked  me  what  it  was,  then, 
that  I  wished  to  be  said  to  the  Russians. 

Hereupon  I  declared  to  him,  that  I  felt  no  need  whatever  to 
have  any  thing  of  the  kind  said  to  the  Russians,  because  I  was 
convinced  they  would  not  negotiate  with  us ;  and  that  even  if  I 
was  not  yet  convinced  of  it,  to  be  so  would  cost  me  only  the  slight 
trouble  of  fancying  myself  in  the  position  of  the  Russian  general. 
That  with  such  a  force  as  he  had  at  his  command,  /  at  least 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  653 

would  not  negotiate ;  and  that  I  had  no  reason  to  suppose  the 
Russian  under-estimated  his  superior  force.  It  therefore  lay  with 
the  government — not  with  me — to  obtain  a  still  more  distinct 
answer  than  Nagy-Sandor's  defeat  at  Debreczin  to  the  question, 
whether  there  were,  or  were  not,  any  terms  on  which  E-ussia 
would  make  peace  with  Hungary  ;  and  consequently  the  govern- 
ment had  so  to  put  its  question  to  the  Russians,  as  that  m)  answer 
would  finally  nevertheless  he  one.  Let  the  government  plainly 
offer  to  the  Czar  the  crown  of  Hungary  ;  and  even  if  no  answer 
at  all  were  given  thereto,  it  would  assuredly  not  he  able  any 
longer  to  doubt  of  what  it  wished  to  convince  itself 

Szemere  thought,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it  was  not  usual  to 
express  one's  self  so  explicitly  in  a  diplomatic  document.  Never- 
theless he  must  admit  that  the  rough-draught  lying  before  us  said 
too  little.  He  would  immediately  alter  it :  I  might  meanwhile 
appoint  the  trumpets ;  in  choosing  which,  care  should  be  taken 
that  both  of  them  by  their  personal  qualities  authorized  the  hope 
of  a  favorable  result  from  the  mission  intrusted  to  them.  At 
least  one  of  the  trumpets,  by  his  high  rank,  should  give  as  it 
we're  a  guarantee  to  the  enemy  that  we  were  in  earnest  in  the 
proposals  of  peace  and  the  advantageous  conditions  offered.  The 
other,  again,  should  possess  the  necessary  knowledge,  and  the 
corresponding  talent  as  a  speaker,  to  be  able  to  give  in  the  hostile 
camp  the  most  thorough  explanations  upon  the  historical  relation 
of  rights  between  Hungary  and  Austria,  and  by  contrasting  it 
with  recent  events  to  place  beyond  doubt  as  well  our  right  to  take 
any  step  against  Austria,  as  to  show  the  sincerity  of  our  proposals 
to  Russia. 

In  consequence  of  my  imdisguised  declaration,  which  openly 
exposed  the  provisional  government,  I  thought  I  must  be  prepared 
for  a  sudden  breaking-off  of  the  conference  on  the  part  of  the 
ministers,  as  well  as  for  a  final  abandonment  of  all  further 
attempts  at  pacification.  The  striking  proof  which  Szemere  had 
now  given  me,  contrary  to  all  expectation,  of  the  diametrically 
opposite  effect  of  the  utterance  of  my  sentiments,  surprised  me 
consequently  to  such  a  degree,  that  I  could  not  forbear  answering 
to  the  just-received  instructions  about  the  qualities  desirable  in 
the  trumpets,  by  proposing  that  Szemere  himself  should  start  as 
trumpet  with  the  new  letter  to  the  Russian  camp,  combining  as 
he  did  in  himself  the  advantages  of  high  rank,  talents  as  a 

Aa 


554  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

speaker,  and  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  historical  relation 
of  rights  between  Hungary  and  Austria. 

Szemere  did  not  approve  of  this  ;  he  objected,  that  his  personal 
safety  did  not  appear  to  be  sufficiently  guaranteed  in  the  camp 
of  the  Russians. 

If  this  was  his  opinion — I  answered — I  wished  he  would  not 
in  future  expect  me  to  order  any  person  of  high  rank  in  the  army 
to  perform  the  duty  of  trumpet ;  as  it  was  impossible  for  me  to 
conceive  how  the  safety  in  the  Russian  camp  of  any  other  person 
of  high  rank  was  more  guaranteed  than  that  of  the  minister  ;  he 
(Szemere)  must  therefore  bestir  himself  to  gain  one  of  the  com- 
manders of  corps — perhaps  General  Poltenberg,  as  he  spoke 
French — for  the  trumpet-service,  which  appeared  dangerous  to 
him  (Szemere).  If  General  Poltenberg  declared  himself  willing, 
I  should  have  no  objection  to  his  undertaking  this  service. 

The  ministers  hereupon  broke  off  the  conference,  and  went  to 
alter  the  rough-draught  of  the  new  letter,  and  seek  for  General 
Poltenberg  in  his  camp. 

The  latter  declared  himself  ready  to  go  as  trumpet  to  the 
Russian  camp  ;  and  left  the  army  with  his  suite  on  the  morning 
of  the  7th  of  August,  after  he  had  received  the  dispatch  for  Prince 
Paszkiewicz  directly  from  the  ministers.  How  the  new  letter 
turned  out,  tifter  the  alterations  resolved  upon  in  it,  I  did  not 
know.  The  ministers  dispatched  it  without  having  previously 
communicated  it  to  me.  Nor  did  they  again  honor  me  with  their 
confidence  during  the  whole  of  the  subsequent  march  to  Arad. 


CHAPTER  LXXVI. 

When  the  army  under  my  command  had  been  established  on 
the  Hernad,  and  I  had  been  informed  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  the 
south  of  the  country,  I  had  perceived — as  the  reader  will  recol- 
lect— that  to  obtain  possession  of  Temesvar  was  now  the  next 
object  of  the  strategic  activity  of  the  chief  command  Dembinski- 
Meszaros,  of  Field-marshal  Lieutenant  Bem,  and  of  myself. 

Dembinski-Meszaros  had  consequently  to  maintain  the  lower 
Theiss,  Bem  at  least  the  southwestern  part  of  Transylvania, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  555 

and  myself  to  keep  the  Russian  main  army  at  a  distance  from 
the  line  of  the  Maros. 

Should  it  happen,  however,  that  one  of  these  three  tasks  had 
to  be  abandoned,  in  order  that  one  energetic  stroke  against  Aus- 
tria, even  were  it  the  last,  might  precede  Hungary's  approaching 
fall,  the  further  protection  of  the  siege  of  Temesvar  must  give 
way  to  the  higher  object  of  rendering  possible  such  a  stroke. 

A  perception  of  this  seemed  likewise  to  be  expressed  in  those 
decrees  of  the  war-minister  which  determined  me  in  Gross-War- 
dein  not  to  interrupt  the  retreat  of  the  army,  accelerated  in  con- 
sequence of  General  Nagy-Sandor's  defeat,  but  to  continue  it  un- 
stopped further  toward  Arad,  nay  even  to  force  it  in  its  latter 
half  For  Arad  had  been  pointed  out  in  these  decrees  as  the 
common  point  of  retreat  for  Lieut. -General  Dembinski's  army, 
and  for  that  which  I  commanded.  Consequently  at  Arad — as  I 
understood  the  meaning  of  these  dispositions — in  the  worst  case, 
even  with  the  simultaneous  raising  of  the  siege  of  Temesvar,  the 
concentration  of  both  armies  should  take  place,  and  the  Aus- 
trians,  without  regard  to  the  Russian  main  army,  should  be  im- 
mediately after  attacked  with  superior  force. 

When,  on  the  9tli  of  August,  I  arrived  with  the  first  corps  at 
Arad,  I  learned,  however,  that  Lieut. -General  Dembinski — 
having  been  defeated  on  the  5th  at  Szorez  by  Baron  Haynau — 
had  directed  his  retreat,  contrary  to  the  instructions  of  the  war- 
minister,  not  toward  Arad,  but  toward  Temesvar  ;  and  that  con- 
sequently the  army  under  my  command  had  to  continue  its 
march  uninterruptedly  further  toward  Temesvar,  in  order  to  join 
that  of  Dembinski. 

As  to  the  reasons  which  might  have  determined  Lieut.-General 
Dembinski  to  retreat  to  Temesvar,  I  received  no  explanation 
either  from  Kossuth  or  from  the  war-minister  :  I  could  only  guess 
them  from  facts  which  I  learned  afterward.  Nevertheless,  with 
all  my  uncertainty  of  the  cause,  the  circumstance  that  Dembin- 
ski's army  on  the  9th  of  August  was  not  at  Arad,  and  tw  longer 
between  Arad  and  Szegedin,  of  itself  sufficed  completely  to  lower 
the  expectations  I  had  originally  associated  (when  in  Gross- War- 
dein)  with  the  proposed  concentration  of  both  armies — expecta- 
tions which  had  to  be  reduced  even  during  the  retreat  from 
Gross- Wardein  to  Arad  to  an  extremely  modest  limit ;  various 
unfavorable  rumors  from  the  camp  of  Dembinski  having  by  de- 


556  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

grees  reached  me.  According  to  these  rumors,  the  chief  com- 
mand Dembinski-Meszaros  seemed  to  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the 
army  just  as  little  as  the  former  (Meszaros-Deml;}inski)  ;  and  as 
I  knew  by  experience,  that  decisive  moments  decompose  even 
the  best  organized  army,  if  it  has  no  confidence  an  its  leader,  I 
could  not  possibly  suppose  that  Dembinski's  army,  after  the 
defeat  at  Szorez,  was  in  that  disciplinary  condition  in  which  it 
ought  to  be,  to  co-operate  adequately  in  the  offensive  intended 
by  me  against  the  Austrians,  when  the  junction  of  both  armies 
had  been  successfully  effected.  My  expectati'bns  from  this  offens- 
ive— which  therefore  were  by  no  means  extravagant — in  conse- 
quence of  Dembinski's  army  having  retreated  toward  Temesvar 
(instead  of  toward  Arad)  were  now  completely  abated ;  because 
this  arbitrary  change  of  the  point  of  retreat,  delaying  the  junction 
of  the  two  armies  at  least  two  days  (the  distance  from  Arad  to 
Temesvar  is  six  miles),  Dembinski's  army  remained  all  that  time 
the  longer  exposed  by  itself  to  the  attacks  of  the  Austrians,  and, 
should  they  be  aware  of  their  advantage,  it  might  be  pressed 
back  even  beyond  Temesvar,  before  it  could  be  possible  for  the 
three  army  corps  under  my  command  to  reach  this  point. 

Consequently,  by  Dembinski's  retreat  to  Temesvar  (instead  of 
to  Arad),  the  postulate  of  the  intended  offensive  against  the 
Austrians — the  junction  of  our  armies — was  already  rendered 
doubtful ;  and  by  the  afternoon  of  the  10th  of  August  I  was  to 
be  furnished  with  sufficient  reason  to  apprehend  that  the  Aus- 
trians knew  how  to  improve  energetically  the  advantage  offered 
them  by  Lieut. -General  Dembinski. 

For  on  the  morning  of  the  10th  of  August,  General  Nagy- 
Sandor,  with  the  first  corps,  had  already  broken  up  his  bivouac 
at  Arad,  in  order  to  advance  on  the  road  to  Temesvar  on  this 
day  as  far  as  Vinga,  and  on  the  following  day  to  join  Dembinski's 
army  concentrated  at  TemesvA.r.  Nagy-8andor  was  followed  by 
Generals  Leiningen  and  Poltenberg,  with  the  third  and  seventh 
army  corps,  on  the  10th  as  far  as  Arad,  which  were  to  reach 
Vinga  on  the  11th,  and  on  the  12th  to  effect  their  immediate 
junction  with  Dembinski's  army. 

The  head-quarters  of  the  army  had  to  remain  during  the  10th 
still  in  Alt- Arad. 

In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  of  this  day  the  following  reports 
from  General  Nagy-Sandor  arrived  at  head-quarters. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  557 

"  lOth  August,  12  o'' clock  noon. 
"  The  enemy,  composed  of  all  kinds  of  arms,  is  posted  behind  Dreispitz 
on  the  eminence.  During  our  forcible  reconnoitring  he  briskly  cannonaded 
us  with  two  batteries.  A  wounded  officer  had  previously  arrived  from  the 
direction  of  Temesv^r,  and  informs  us  that  a  battle  was  fought  yesterday, 
Jn  consequence  of  which  our  troops  must  retreat  toward  Lugos.  I  ask, 
how  far  my  mission  extends,  in  case  I  should  be  attacked  by  a  superior 
enemy.  My  present  position  is  on  this  side  Dreispitz  near  the  vineyards, 
and  I  observe  a  defensive  bearing  ;  I  «xpect  consequently  very  speedily  fur- 
ther orders.  Hostile  columns  are  at  this  moment  seen  on  the  eminence 
beyond  Dreispitz,  a  part  of  which,  consiisting  of  cavalry,  is  moving  toward 
the  Maros  in  my  right  flank.  ^ 

(Signed)      "  Nagy-Sandor." 

The  second  (later)  report  was  as  follows  : 

"The  enemy  is  advancing  with  superior  forces.  Further  orders  are  re- 
quired with  all  possible  speed ;  the  more  so,  as  he  threatens  to  turn  our 
right  flank. 

(Signed)      "  Nagy-Sandor. 

"Dispatched  at  one  o'clock  afternoon." 

On  the  first  of  these  reports  I  sent  orders  to  General  Nagy- 
Sandor  resolutely  to  accept  the  combat,  and  fight  manfully.  In 
case,  however,  he  should  be  repulsed,  he  had  to  draw  back  d 
cheval  of  the  road  to  Neu-Arad,  and  cover  this  point,  together 
with  the  passages  across  the  Maros. 

But  the  second  report  determined  me  to  hasten  in  person  to 
the  battle-field  ;  because,  from  JSTagy-Sandor's  statement  of  the 
superior  forces  of  the  enemy,  as  well  as  from  his  repeated  request 
for  further  orders — in  a  case  like  the  present,  in  which,  consid- 
ering the  simplicity  of  the  situation,  this  demand  was  quite 
superfluous — I  was  unfortunately  obliged  to  suspect  that,  as 
usual,  he  was  deficient  in  that  presence  of  mind  and  resolution, 
without  which  the  military  honor  of  his  corps  must  be  compro- 
mised. 

While  in  the  streets  of  Alt-Arad,  I  encountered  a  further  re- 
port that  (j^eneral  Nagy-Sandor  was  already  in  full  retreat.  A 
desire  to  obtain  beforehand  some  knowledge  of  the  ground,  which 
was  altogether  strange  to  me,  led  me  first  of  all  on  to  the  glacis 
of  the  fortress  :  here,  however,  I  incidentally  received  an  invita- 
tion from  Governor  Kossuth  to  be  present  at  a  ministerial  coun- 
cil just  about  to  take  place ;  and  consequently  I  could  not  in 
person  hinder  Nagy-Sandor  from  continuing  his  hasty  retreat, 
which  had  already  been  prosecuted  to  within  sight  of  Neu-Arad, 


558  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

but  had  to  confine  myself  merely  to  repeatedly  reminding  him, 
in  the  worst  case  to  maintain  at  least  Neu-Arad. 

The  circumstance,  that  a  hostile  corps  dared  to  advance  in  an 
ofTensive  manner  toward  Arad,  with  Temesv^r  in  its  rear,  seem- 
ed to  confirm  the  assertion  of  the  wounded  officer,  contained  in 
Nagy-Sandor's  first  report,  according  to  which  the  Austrians  had 
forced  Dembinski  on  the  previous  day  to  retreat  from  Temesvar 
toward  Lugos. 

Nevertheless  Kossuth  opened  the  ministerial  council,  in  which 
I  had  been  called  upon  to  take  part,  with  the  assurance  that  he 
had  received  from  a  trustworthy  source  news  that  Dembinski's 
army  had  gained  a  victory  at  Temesvar  on  the  previous  day  (the 
9th  of  August)  over  the  Austrians.  The  latter  had  been  the 
assailants ;  and  Dembinski,  at  the  commencement  of  the  com- 
bat, was  indeed  again  about  abandoning  the  field,  when  Field- 
marshal  Lieut.  Bem  had  suddenly  arrived  on  the  battle-field, 
immediately  taken  the  command,  and  from  the  already  ordered 
retreat  had  without  delay  assumed  the  offensive.  So  it  is  report- 
ed— continued  Kossuth  in  his  communications — by  two  officers 
of  Dembinski's  army,  who  were  wounded  just  at  the  time  of 
Bem's  arrival  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  who  continued  to  ob- 
serve for  some  hours,  from  the  spot  where  their  wounds  were 
dressed,  the  uninterrupted  advance  of  our  troops  afterward. 
When  these  two  officers — Kossuth  further  related — were  re- 
moved from  that  place  to  be  conveyed  to  Arad,  the  combat  was 
not  yet  ended  ;  nevertheless,  it  might  be  supposed  without  im- 
probability, that,  after  the  general  change  in  the  state  of  affairs 
in  our  favor  caused  by  Bem's  sudden  appearance,  the  day  had 
remained  ours. 

This  supposition,  I  remarked,  appeared  indeed  to  be  contra- 
dicted by  the  direction  from  which  that  hostile  corps  advanced 
against  Arad,  before  which  Nagy-Sandor  was  just  now  retreat- 
ing :  however,  it  was  quite  possible  that  the  governor  might  be 
better  informed  about  the  events  which  had  taken  place  on  the 
preceding  evening  at  Temesvar,  than  I,  who  had  received  directly 
contrary  news  respecting  them ;  and  it  was  the  more  desirable 
for  us  that  the  assumed  victory  of  Dembinski's  army  should  be 
confirmed,  as  in  that  case  the  Austrian  corps  which  was  now 
pursuing  Nagy-Sandor  would  probably  be  destroyed  within  twen- 
ty-four hours ;  since  I  intended  to  cross  the  Maros  with  our  third 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  559 

and  seventh  corps  during  the  night,  and  advance  even  offensively 
at  daybreak  in  the  direction  toward  Temesvar.  But  now — I 
further  remarked — I  must  ask  to  have  it  explained,  how  it  was 
to  be  understood,  that  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bem,  who  I  thought 
was  in  Transylvania,  suddenly  appeared  on  the  9th  of  August 
on  the  battle-field  of  Temesvar,  and  in  the  presence  of  Lieut.- 
General  Dembinski  took  upon  himself  the  command  of  the  lat- 
ter's  army.  From  an  earlier  communication  of  the  governor's — 
I  continued — it  was  known  to  me  that  Bem  on  the  31st  of  July 
had  sustained  a  severe  defeat  at  Marosvasarhely  ;*  of  later  vic- 
tories of  our  armies  in  Transylvania,  however,  I  had  heard  no- 
thing whatever  ;  the  state  of  affairs  there  could  consequently  not 
possibly  be  such  as  to  render  superfluous  the  personal  presence 
of  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bem  within  the  sphere  of  the  operations 
of  his  own  army :  how  then  could  he  quit  his  post  in  Transyl- 
vania ?  how  could  he  command  at  Temesvar  an  army,  the  guid- 
ance of  which  was  intrusted  to  Lieut.-General  Dembinski  ? 

Kossuth  replied  to  this,  that  at  the  time  when  he  invited  me 
to  the  well-known  rendezvous  (in  Kardszag  or  Kis-Ujszallas),  he 
had  already  perceived  the  necessity  of  intrusting  to  one  man  the 
chief  command  over  all  the  forces  of  the  country,  and  had  de- 
sired the  meeting  with  me  mainly  for  the  purpose  of  consulting 
me  about  the  choice  of  a  commander-in-chief;  but  as  this  meet- 
ing did  not  take  place,  and  his  confidence  in  Dembinski's  abili- 
ties had  day  after  day  been  more  shaken,  it  appeared  to  him 
necessary  for  the  salvation  of  the  country  to  place  the  conduct 
of  the  army  in  the  Banat  very  speedily  in  more  trustworthy 
hands ;  and  thus  Bem  was  called  for  in  person  to  the  Banat,  in 
order  to  make  good  again,  if  possible,  what  Dembinski  had  un- 
done. 

From  this  explanation  it  could  not  yet  be  inferred  who  com- 
manded the  army  in  Transylvania  in  the  stead  of  Bem,  or  what 
was  the  position  Dembinski  was  now  occupying  in  the  army  of 
the  Banat ;  generally,  in  what  form  Bem's  recall  from  Transyl- 

*  It  should  be,  "at  ScMsbnrg"  (in  Transylvania).  Bem's  report  to 
Kossuth  on  the  defeat  he  had  sustained  there  on  the  31st  of  July  might 
have  been  dated  from  Marosvasarhely  (because  Bem  immediately  after 
the  defeat  had  hastened  to  Marosvasarhely),  and  Kossuth  might  have 
erroneously  taken  the  place  where  the  report  was  written  to  be  that  at 
which  Bem  was  defeated.  My  news  of  this  event,  however,  were  derived 
only  from  Kossuth. 


560  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

vania  to  the  Banat  had  been  made  :  I  therefore  asked  again  for 
an  explanation  of  all  this. 

Kossuth's  earlier  statements  on  the  events  of  the  war  at  Temes- 
var  betrayed  clearly  enough  the  twofold  tendency — to  cheer  the 
spirits  of  the  assembly,  depressed  in  consequence  of  Nagy-San- 
dor's  retreat,  and  at  the  same  time  to  point  out  Bem  as  the  very 
man  who  had  been  appointed  by  Providence  for  the  glorious  sal- 
vation of  the  fatherland.  Now  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it 
was  difficult  for  the  governor  to  answer  my  question — who  com- 
manded the  army  in  Transylvania  in  Bem's  absence? — seeing 
there  was  now  no  army  in  Transylvania  I — consequently  he  pre- 
ferred no  longer  to  conceal  that  he  had  already  made  Bem  com- 
mander-in-chief 

From  the  circumstances  in  which  we  then  were,  it  had  not 
been  difficult  for  me  to  foresee  that  the  principal  matter  in  this 
ministerial  consultation  would  be  the  choice  of  a  commander-in- 
chief  Of  course  Kossuth's  communications  about  the  war-events 
at  Temesvar,  and  the  declaration  that  Bem  commanded  Dembin- 
ski's  army  while  he  was  present,  could  not  fail  to  strike  me  the 
more,  as  this  circumstance  was  incapable  of  explanation  other- 
wise than  by  the  previous  appointment  of  Bem  as  commander-in- 
chief  I  was  consequently  justified  in  suspecting  that  the  convo- 
cation of  this  ministerial  council  was  again  merely  a  mock-show 
of  Kossuth's ;  that,  ivithout  coiisulting  the  ministers,  he  had 
long  before  arbitrarily  filled  the  very  post,  on  the  appointment 
to  which,  pretended  only  now  about  to  be  made,  the  assembled 
council  of  ministers  had  to  decide.  At  the  moment,  however, 
when  Kossuth's  communications  about  the  war-events  at  Temes- 
var betrayed  to  me  the  fact  that  Bem  had  already  been  appointed 
to  the  chief  command,  I  was  still  without  any  certain  proof  that 
I  was  right  in  supposing  that  Bem  had  really  been  appointed 
without  the  previous  knowledge  of  the  ministers.  It  was  possi- 
ble also  that  the  only  object  of  the  present  consultation  might  be, 
on  an  understanding  with  the  ministers,  to  make  sport  of  me 
alone. 

The  sole  drift  of  my  repeated  request  for  an  explanation  of  the 
enigmatical  position  of  Bem  and  Dembinski,  as  related  to  the 
service,  was  that  I  might  be  certain  whether,  in  this  ministerial 
council,  I  alone  was  to  be  mystified  by  the  whole  government 
^ersorinel,  or  together  with  me  the  ministers  also  by  Kossuth  alone. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  561 

The  truth,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  lay  between  the  two  :  it  was  by- 
no  means  all  the  ministers ;  one  of  them,  the  minister  of  com- 
munication, Csanyi,  at  least  (perhaps  even  more),  was  elected 
with  me  to  be  present,  as  Kossuth's  dupe,  in  the  consultation 
about  the  choice  of  a  commander-in-chief 

Scarcely  had  Kossuth — compelled  thereto  by  my  repeated  ques- 
tions— avowed  that  he  had  already  appointed  Bem  commander- 
in-chief,  when  Csanyi  declared  this  nomination  to  be  contrary  to 
law,  because  it  had  not  the  counter-signature  of  a  minister. 

Kossuth  replied,  that  this  was  not  the  case,  as  it  had  been 
countersigned  by  a  minister,  namely,  by  the  war-minister  (Au- 
lich). 

Csanyi  retorted,  that  the  war-minister  was  not  justified  in 
doing  so,  as  it  could  not  be  unknown  to  him  (Aulich),  any  more 
than  to  tho,  governor  himself,  that  it  was  not  Bem,  but  myself, 
who  had  been  proposed  to  the  government  by  the  Diet  for  the 
post  of  commander-in-chief,  as  well  as  that  the  president  of  the 
ministers,  Szemere,  had,  in  the  name  of  the  government,  given 
their  consent  to  this  proposal  of  the  Diet. 

Csanyi's  latter  assertion  was  now  contested  by  Szemere,  who 
maintained  that  he  had  07ily  answered,  that  the  government 
acknowledged  the  proposal  to  have  been  made. 

Csanyi  again  remarked,  that  this  answer  could  only  be  consid- 
ered by  the  Diet  as  assenting  ;  that  the  government,  after  it  had 
given  this  answer,  had  merely  to  choose  the  time  for  nominating 
a  commander-in-chief;  and  that  he  (Csanyi)  must  consequently 
persist  in  his  declaration,  that  Bem's  nomination  to  the  chief 
command  was  contrary  to  law. 

The  other  ministers,  like  myself,  did  not  feel  it  necessary  to 
take  part  in  this  discussion. 

Csanyi's  opinion  being  no  longer  contested,  the  minister  of 
justice,  Sabbas  von  Vu-kovics,  rose  and  declared  that  the  question, 
who  should  be  intrusted  with  the  chief  command  of  all  the  troops, 
was  an  open  one  ;  the  speedy  settlement  of  which,  though  un- 
deniably urgently  demanded,  was  dependent,  in  his  opinion,  on 
the  previous  adjustmeift  of  certain  differences  between  the  pro- 
visional government  and  myself.  It  was,  for  instance — continued 
Vukovics,  in  his  declaration — not  unknown  to  the  government 
that  most  of  its  steps  underwent  a  caustic  criticism  in  the  camp 
of  the  army  commanded  by  me,  nay  mostly  in  my  immediate 


562  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

vicinity ;  that  in  general  all  the  opinions  and  observations  about 
the  provisional  government  which  were  made  among  the  officers 
of  the  said  army  seemed  to  be  calculated  to  degrade  the  highest 
civil  authority  existing  in  the  country  as  much  as  possible  in  the 
eyes  of  the  army,  and  to  render  it  by  degrees  accessible  to  the 
idea  of  a  **  military  despotism,"  and  such  like.  I  had,  therefore, 
first  of  all  to  clear  myself  from  the  suspicion,  that  these  phenomena 
hostile  to  the  government,  in  the  ranks  of  the  army  commanded 
by  me,  were  intentionally  brought  about  by  me,  and  that  they 
were  the  reflex  of  my  political  opinions,  the  signs  of  my  personal 
endeavors :  I  had  to  do  this  without  delay,  as  he  was  convinced 
that  the  ministerial  council  then  assembled  could  not  proceed  un- 
embarrassed to  the  choice  of  a  commander-in-chief  so  long  as  this 
suspicion  rested  on  me. 

I  had  long  ago  been  aware  of  the  suspicion  of  the  provisional 
government,  that  a  military  despotism  was  the  final  aim  of  my 
endeavors  and  those  of  the  army.  Kossuth  stood  at  the  head  of 
the  government,  and  had  himself  invented  the  fable  of  these  en- 
deavors, in  order  to  urge  the  Diet  to  the  declaration  of  independ- 
ence ;  and  it  had  happened  to  him  with  this  fable  as  it  usually 
does  to  children  with  the  bugbear  which  they  rig  up  to  frighten 
their  comrades,  and  at  which  at  last  they  begin  to  be  frightened 
themselves.  I  had  likewise  been  for  some  time  past  prepared  to 
see  start  anew  into  life  all  kinds  of  government  measures,  which, 
dictated  by  this  suspicion,  might  aim  even  at  my  removal  from 
the  army,  and  its  dissolution.  The  earnest  request  of  the  minister 
of  justice,  however,  that  I  would  clear  myself  by  a  simple  declara- 
tion from  the  suspicion  under  which  I  seemed  to  lie  in  the  eyes 
of  the  government,  came  on  me  indeed  very  unexpectedly ;  for  I 
could  not  see  how,  all  at  once,  a  simple  declaration  on  my  part 
could  suffice  to  accomplish  that  which,  with  all  my  former  decla- 
rations, so  often  repeated  to  Governor  Kossuth,  I  had  not  succeed- 
ed in  doing.  The  intimation  of  the  minister  of  justice,  that  the 
government  had  become  suspicious  of  me  only  through  those 
phenomena  hostile  to  it  which  had  been  remarked  in  the  army, 
in  the  form  of  caustic  criticisms  on  certain  government  measures, 
and  so  on — this  intimation  came  still  more  unexpectedly  on  me ; 
for  I  could  not  possibly  suppose  that  the  minister  of  justice  had 
lost  all  recollection  of  the  radical  disagreement,  dating  only  from 
the  beginning  of  July,  between  the  main  army  and  the  govern- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  563 

ment — a  disagreement  which  doubtless  must  have  caused  tho 

government  the  greater  apprehensions  for  its  continued  existence, 

as  its  two  members  most  eminent  by  their  position  and  influence 

(Kossuth  and  Szemere)  had  not  the  moral  capacity  to  convince  the 

/  army  that  they  had  been  induced  to  cause  this  disagreement,  if 

J  probed  to  the  bottom,  by  any  thing  else  than  by  the  want  of  res- 

I    olution  to  throw  down  the  bridge,  as  once  behind  the  nation,  so 

^  now  behind  their  own  worthy  persons  also. 

The  complaint  of  the  minister  of  justice  about  those  pheno- 
mena in  the  camp,  as  well  as  in  the  head-quarters  of  the  army 
under  my  command,  w^ere  certainly  not  unfounded. 

Government  measures,  such  as  the  fasting  and  crusade  ser- 
mons against  the  Russian  intervention — the  decree  to  burn  down 
all  places  which  had  to  be  evacuated  by  us  before  the  enemy — 
the  creation  of  the  chief  command  Meszaros-Dembinski,  and 
afterward  of  Dembinski-Meszaros — the  official  announcement 
that  France  had  declared  war  against  Austria — the  farce  (not 
even  original)  of  deciding  on  the  emancipation  of  the  Jews,  and 
on  the  equalization  of  rights  for  all  nationalities,  at  a  time  when 
there  remained  to  the  government  itself  but  one  single  place  of 
refuge  in  the  country,  and  even  that  one  only  for  a  few  days  ; — 
these  and  similar  government  measures  certainly  were  never 
favorablyjudged  of  by  those  nearest  me. 

Neitlier  by  Kossuth's  peculiar  predilection  for  a  camarilla, 
which  was  calculated  sensibly  to  injure  alike  his  personal  and 
his  official  authority  ;  nor  by  the  striking  contrast  between  what 
Kossuth  said  and  what  he  did ;  nor  by  his  accessibility  to  any 
prater,  however  extravagant,  especially  to  any  tale- telling ;  nor 
by  his  frequently  forgetting  that  though  at  liberty  to  be  ever 
under  petticoat-government  as  the  father  of  a  family,  yet  that  it 
was  never  allowable  as  the  Governor  of  Hungary ;  nor  by  his 
extraordinary  apprehension  of  any  personal  danger,  and  his  never- 
theless persevering  efforts  to  unite  in  himself  the  chief  command 
and  the  dignity  of  governor  ;  nor  by  his  insatiable  longing  for 
ovations  of  all  kinds  a^d  at  whatever  cost ;  nor  by  his  method  of 
raising  the  spirit  of  the  nation — among  other  means,  by  fabulous 
reports  about  the  doings  of  the  army,  compared  with  which  its  real 
deeds  appeared  quite  unworthy  of  mention ;  nor  (speaking  now  of 
Szemere)  by  his  programme  for  a  republican  government,  ridicu- 
lous by  the  side  of  ite  political  antecedents  ;  nor  by  his  endeavors 


c64  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAP.Y. 

to  organize  the  bands  of  guerrillas,  protected  and  fostered  by  him, 
into  a  kind  of  thorough-bred  republican  army,  the  command  over 
which  he  had  beforehand  destined  for  himself;  nor  by  the  artifices 
employed  by  the  minister  of  the  interior  for  augmenting  these  bands 
of  guerrillas  to  the  detriment  of  the  completion  of  the  already  ex- 
isting, though  ')iot  republican  army ;  nor,  finally,  by  his  efibrts  to 
gain  me  over  for  a  duumvirate  against  Kossuth ;  by  none  of 
these  or  similar  facts  (I  nmst  confess)  were  the  officers  in  the 
camp  and  at  the  head-quarters  of  the  army  which  I  commanded, 
transported  to  admire  either  Kossuth  or  Szemere.  On  the  con- 
trary, these  two  persons,  especially  Szemere,  were  very  often  the 
objects  of  such  remarks  as  were  by  no  means  compatible  with 
the  respect  due  to  the  bearers  of  the  highest  powers  of  govern- 
ment, and  before  whom  indeed  the  nimbus  of  authority  of  the 
whole  staff  of  the  provisional  government  had  by  degrees  to 
grow  pale ;  although  the  names  of  some  of  its  members  were 
never  mentioned  by  the  army,  while  others  of  them  were,  and 
not  without  respect. 

Nevertheless,  in  my  opinion,  the  minister  of  justice  was  by  no 
means  obliged  to  explain  these  disrespectful  remarks  about  the 
two  heads  of  the  provisional  government,  or  the  unfavorable 
judgments  about  such  and  similar  government  measures,  by  the 
arbitrary  supposition,  that  /  was  striving  for  the  military  dic- 
tatorship, and  that  I  had  originated  the  phenomena  hostile  to 
the  government  to  smooth  as  much  as  possible  my  way  to  abso- 
lute power.  The  minister  of  justice,  without  touching  upon  the 
moral  worth  of  my  endeavors,  might  have  deduced  the  origin  of 
these  phenomena  quite  simply  and  very  logically  from  the  differ- 
ences at  Komorn  between  the  main  army  and  the  government — 
even  if  he  were  not  willing  to  admit  that  these  unfavorable 
judgments  were  just,  and  the  disrespectful  remarks  about  Kos- 
suth and  Szemere  very  striki?tg.  And  the  minister  of  justice 
might  still  have  accused  me — if  it  must  be  so — directly  on  the 
basis  of  the  differences  at  Kommm,  of  striving  for  absolute  power ; 
whereby  he  would  moreover  have  had  the  advantage  of  being 
supported  by  a  proved  fact  (namely,  th^  of  my  disobedience), 
and  have  been  spared  any  tale-telling  in  sustaining  his  accusa- 
tion against  me. 

But  now  that  the  minister  of  justice  preferred  a  quite  imagin-. 
ary  mode  of  proof  to  that  which  was  at  least  apparently  a  real 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  565 

one,  he  led  me  to  suppose  that  he  was  much  more  concerned  al- 
together to  ignore  the  Komorn  differences  (hi  which  indeed  the 
provisional  government  had  not  played  an  advantageous  part) 
than  to  sustain  his  accusation  against  me.  The  latter  was  per- 
haps also  merely  a  consequence  of  the  irritation  of  the  minister 
of  justice  at  the  contemptuous  reception,  of  which  he  had  prob- 
ably already  been  informed,  his  colleague  Szemere  had  deservedly 
met  with  at  Nyir-Adony  in  the  head-quarters  of  the  army  under 
my  command ;  and  in  this  case  I  should  possibly  never  have 
been  called  upon  by  the  minister  of  justice,  if  he  had  known 
how  his  colleague  had  drawn  upon  himself  this  reception. 

But  be  this  as  it  may,  it  was  quite  impossible  for  me  to  dis- 
cover what  attainable  object  the  minister  of  justice  had  in  view, 
when  he  asked  me  so  decidedly  to  weaken  by  "  a  simple  explan- 
ation" the  suspicion  that  I  was  striving  for  absolute  power. 

Convinced  that  it  would  be  useless  to  comply  with  the  demand 
of  the  minister  of  justice  ;  convinced  that,  after  all  the  explana- 
tions I  had  formerly  given  to  the  same  effect  to  Kossuth  had  been 
unsuccessful,  a  more  favorable  fate  could  not  await  a  repetition 
of  them — I  replied,  that  the  government  might,  if  it  pleased, 
speedily  place  me  before  a  council  of  war,  if  there  were  valid 
reasons  for  the  suspicion  just  uttered  against  me ;  but  that  it 
need  not  expect  I  would  ever  answer  to  mere  calumnies  such  as 
those  now  cited  by  the  minister  of  justice,  and  to  suspicions  de- 
duced from  a  like  kind  of  rumors.  After  all,  I  added,  my  per- 
sonal presence  at  the  consultation  about  to  take  place  relative  to 
the  choice  of  a  commander-in-chief  seemed  to  me  to  be  quite  im- 
proper, since  I  myself  might  possibly  be  among  the  candidates 
for  this  post. 

After  I  had  made  this  declaration,  I  quitted  the  ministerial 
council  (the  last  at  which  I  was  present  in  Arad,  or  elsewhere); 
and  as  Nagy-Sandor  was  no  longer  harassed  by  the  Austrians  in 
his  position  before  Neu-Arad,  I  returned  forthwith  to  Alt- Arad  to 
the  head-quarters,  for  the  purpose  of  issuing  the  dispositions  for 
the  nightly  preparation  for  the  attack  which,  as  I  had  declared 
in  the  ministerial  council,  was  to  be  made  on  the  Austrian  corps 
posted  opposite  our  first  corps  before  Neu-Arad,  in  consequence 
of  Kossuth's  communication,  that  our  troops  were  victorious  at 
Temesvar  on  the  9th  of  August. 


t 


CHAPTER  LXXVII. 

When  Szemere  and  County  Batthyanyi  orally  reported  to  the 
government  in  Arad  the  way  in  which  they  had  been  endeavor- 
ing to  enter  into  negotiations  with  Russia  for  peace,  they  made 
the  remark,  that  their  proceedings  had  been  blamed  by  me  as  in- 
sufficient. 

I  was  present  when  they  made  this  report ;  and  as  Kossuth 
desired  to  know  the  reason  of  my  censure,  I  declared  before  him 
and  the  assembled  ministers — in  the  very  same  spirit  as  on  the 
occasion  of  the  last  conference  with  Szemere  and  Count  Batthy- 
anyi  (at  Gyapju,  on  the  evening  of  the  6th  of  August) — that 
the  government,  in  its  project  of  entering  into  negotiations  with 
Russia,  ought  not  to  overlook,  that  it,  not  Russia,  needed  a  peace- 
able arrangement,  and  that  consequently  it  had  to  make  distinct 
proposals  to  the  Russians,  but  had  not  to  expect  them  from  the 
Russians ;  that,  further,  it,  not  Russia,  desired  to  know  for  cer- 
tain whether  the  adversary  was  generally  disposed  for  pacifica- 
tion ;  that,  finally,  it,  not  Russia,  was  pressed  for  time,  and 
therefore  rrlust  make  such  tempting  proposals  to  Russia,  that 
even  if  the  Russians  should  continue  silent,  it  might  at  least  no 
longer  want  a  definitive  answer  to  the  prelimiTiary  question  in 
the  attempts  at  negotiation.  But  this  preliminary  question  was 
just  whether  Russia  had  any  such  intentions  as  the  idea  of  mak- 
ing peace  with  that  state  presupposed.  To  answer  this  question, 
the  G-ross-Wardein  letter  of  the  ministers  Szemere  and  Count 
Batthyanyi,  as  well  as  the  rough-draught,  on  the  practical  value 
of  which  these  ministers  had,  at  Gyapju,  desired  to  have  my 
judgment,  seemed  to  me  to  be  insufficient.  To  answer  this  ques- 
tion definitively  and  with  the  speed  demanded  by  present  circum- 
stances, I  believed  it  to  be  necessary  that  the  provisional  govern- 
ment should  offer  to  the  Czar  the  crown  of  Hungaiy,  not  dis- 
guisedly,  as  the  ministers  had  done  in  the  above  document,  but 
undisguisedly. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  567 

I  well  remember  that  Kossuth  assented  to  this  view  ;  that 
none  of  the  assembled  ministers  contested  it ;  and  that  while  I 
was  still  present,  a  government  decision  corresponding  with  it  was 
come  to.  I  also  distinctly  remember  a  later  oral  communication 
of  Kossuth's,  in  which  he  said  that  he  had  already  found  a  man 
(neither  a  member  of  the  army  nor  of  the  government,  however) 
who  was  ready  to  forward  the  letter,  drawn  up  in  accordance 
with  this  government  decision,  to  the  Russian  commander. 

What  I  at  that  time  thought,  and  do  still  think,  of  the  idea  of 
making  peace  with  Russia,  if  practicable,  I  have  sufficiently  ex- 
plained in  Chapter  LXXV.  There  also,  however,  I  blamed  the 
heads  of  the  provisional  government,  that  they  had  mistaken 
the  impossibility  of  realizing  this  idea  ;  nay,  that  to  the  last  they 
had  given  way  to  the  hope  that  Russia  would  not  be  able  to  re- 
sist the  temptation  of  acquiring  the  crown  of  St.  Stephen. 

I  blame  the  heads  of  the  provisional  government ;  and  yet  it 
was  /  who  plainly  called  upon  them  to  send  plenipotentiaries  to 
carry  on  the  negotiations  which  had  apparently  already  been  in- 
troduced by  the  letter  of  Count  Riidiger  to  me  at  the  head-quar- 
ters ;  and  yet  I  failed  to  prevent  the  ministers  Szemere  and  Count 
Batthyanyi  in  their  well-known  activity  as  the  provisional  govern- 
ment's negotiators  for  peace,  although  I  had  the  power  to  do  so  ; 
nay,  in  Arad,  according  to  all  appearance,  it  was  my  declaration 
which  brought  on  that  ministerial  decision,  in  consequence  of 
which  the  provisional  government  was  resolved  entirely  to  un- 
mask itself  to  Russia, 

True  I  called  upon  the  provisional  government  to  charge  itself 
with  the  management  of  negotiations  which  had  apparently  been 
already  opened.  The  m.otive  for  this  summons,  however,  was  less 
my  hope  of  any  favorable  result  from  these  negotiations,  than  my 
apprehension  of  raising  Kossuth's  distrust  in  me  to  the  highest 
degree  if  I  omitted  this  summons.  And  I  was  so  much  afraid 
of  heightening  this  distrust,  because  I  unfortunately  knew  of  no 
single  important  act  of  his,  called  forth  by  this  sentiment  against 
me  or  the  army  under  my  command,  which  in  its  results  had 
been  advantageous  to  the  national  cause. 

True  I  did  not  hinder  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  in  their 
efforts  to  induce  the  Russian  commander  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions ;  on  the  contrary,  I  actually  assisted  them,  and  afterward 
even  brought  about  a  government  decision,  the  carrying  out  of 


568  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

which  would  leave  nothing  more  to  be  desired  by  the  Russians 
in  Hungary.  It  was,  however,  not  the  delusive  belief  of  a  pacifi- 
cation with  Russia  which  had  determined  me  thereto. 

When  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi,  just  after  the  first  con- 
ference they  had  with  me  at  Vamos-Percs  on  the  2d  of  August, 
busied  themselves  with  the  composition  of  the  Gross-Wardein 
letter,  with  a  zeal  which — in  consequence  of  my  remark,  that  if 
the  provisional  government  desired  to  negotiate  with  the  Rus- 
sians, it  must  at  all  events  take  the  initiative — seemed  not  to  be 
justified,  only  because  I  had  sent  in  immediate  advance  of  this 
remark  a  circumstantial  report  about  the  exchange  of  trumpets 
which  had  taken  place  between  the  Russians  and  us,  and  because 
from  this  report  the  want  of  foundation  for  any  supposition  that 
the  Russians  felt  inclined  for  pacification  had  become  self-evident ; 
then  I  no  longer  doubted  for  a  moment  that  Kossuth  and  Szemere 
had  ceased  to  expect  the  salvation  of  the  fatherland  from  the  last 
efibrts  of  the  nation  ;  or  from  the  declaration  of  war  on  the  part 
of  France  against  Austria,  which  had  been  officially  published 
as  a  settled  point ;  or  from  the  alliance,  ready  for  completion,  as 
was  said,  with  Janku  and  Sztratimirovich — ^but  exclusively  from 
a  pacification  with  Russia  ;  and  just  as  little  did  I  doubt  that  if 
the  efforts  of  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  to  induce  Russia  to 
make  peace  should  be  hindered  by  me,  the  nation  would  forever 
cling  to  the  delusion  that  Hungary  could  assuredly  have  been 
saved  by  these  efforts.  And  this  foresight  it  was,  which  decided 
me  not  to  paralyze  the  activity  of  these  negotiators  for  peace,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  urgently  to  recommend  to  the  heads  of  the  pro- 
visional government,  after  I  plainly  perceived  their  tenacious  cling- 
ing to  their  "  last"  idea  of  salvation,  the  full  disclosure  of  their 
views  with  respect  to  Russia ;  for  I  was  convinced  it  then  mat- 
tered very  little  whether  Kossuth  and  Szemere  committed  in  pol- 
itics one  prank  more  or  less  ;  but  this  still  was  of  the  highest  im- 
portance, that  the  nation  should  once  for  all  get  rid  of  the  illusory 
belief  in  the  strength  of  the  Kossuth-Szemere  policy — that  Kossuth 
and  Szemere  might  themselves  furnish  to  it  a  ^moi per  absurdum, 
that  the  thought  of  Hungary  being  independent  of  Austria  is  one 
that  may  be  left  to  the  gossips,  until  the  realization  of  the  states- 
congress  at  Verona,  announced  to  the  Diet  by  Kossuth,  as  will  be 
remembered,  in  Debreczin  (on  the  13th  of  April,  1849),  in  which 
the  political  physiognomy  of  Europe  was  to  be  changed.     But 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  569 

the  idea  of  making  Hungary  a  republic  would  still  be  only  a 
topic  for  the  gossips,  even  if  this  congress  of  Verona  should  have 
accomplished  its  mission  to  the  fullest  contentment  of  Kossuth 
himself 


CHAPTER  LXXVni. 

In  the  evening  of  the  10th  of  August,  the  dispositions  for  the 
nocturnal  preparation  for  the  attack  on  the  Austrians  before  Neu- 
Arad,  intended  to  be  made  at  daybreak  on  the  1 1th,  were  already 
dispatched  to  the  divers  corps,  when  I  received  an  invitation  from 
^ossuth  to  repair  without  delay  to  a  personal  conference  with 
him  in  the  fortress, 

I  went  as  desired  ;  and  found  the  Governor  in  the  same  room 
which  I  had  left  several  hours  before,  that  I  might  not  embarrass 
him  and  the  ministers  by  my  presence  in  the  choice  of  a  com- 
mander-in-chief. Now  the  ministers  were  gone,  and  Kossuth 
was  alone.  He  felt  a  desire  for  a  tete-a-tete  with  me.  I  saw 
him  on  this  occasion  most  probably  for  the  last  time  in  my  life. 

My  supposition,  that  Kossuth  had  sent  for  me  to  communicate 
to  me  the  latest  decision  of  the  government  respecting  the  choice 
of  a  commander-in-c^ief,  and  then  perhaps  to  consult  with  me 
about  the  next  warlike  operations,  soon  proved  to  be  erroneous. 
That  I  had  been  chosen  commander-in-chief  in  the  ministerial 
council  which  had  just  taken  place,  I  did  not  learn  till  I  was  in 
Carinthia  ;  and  it  was  no  longer  the  future  about  which  Kossuth 
began  to  conjecture  during  this  conference — it  was  the  past. 

After  Kossuth  had  synoptically  recapitulated  the  really  splendid 
results  obtained  by  his  talents  and  unremitting  zeal,  without  which 
the  defense  of  the  country,  even  opposed  to  Austria  alone,  would 
have  been  paralyzed,  he  maintained  that,  to  drive  out  of  the 
country  at  once  both  the  Russians  and  the  Austrians,  only  one 
thing  had  been  wanting  to  him — my  confidence  I  He  made  men- 
tion of  the  time  (the  beginning  of  March,  at  Tiszafiired)  when  he 
had  asked  me  to  tell  him  openly  if  I  wished  to  possess  the  highest 
power  in  the  state ;  he  would  in  that  case  create  a  party  for  me 
— that  party  should  be  all  Hungary.     He  mentioned  at  the  same 


570  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  EITNGARY. 

time  also  the  answer  I  had  given  him  to  this  inquiry  (namely,  tha^t 
he  had  no  rival  to  fear  in  me) ;  but  said  that  I  had  not  then  been 
candid  with  him,  so  that  it  had  been  impossible  for  him  to  come 
to  an  understanding  or  to  unite  with  me ;  and  that  exclusively 
in  consequence  of  this,  Hungary,  instead  of  destroying  her  enemies, 
had  herself  come  to  the  brink  of  destruction. 

Many  and  multifarious  things  Kossuth  said  to  the  same  effect ; 
showing  me  how  much  easier  it  was  for  him  to  impute  to  me 
the  blame  of  the  ruin  of  the  fatherland,  than  repentantly  to 
confess  that  he  had  induced  the  nation  to  give  up  a  good  right 
for  an  idea,  to  realize  which  the  forces  of  the  nation  were  in- 
sufficient. 

The  perception  of  this  opened  to  me  the  unlucky  prospect  of 
having  probably  to  serve  in  future  as  the  governor's  scape-goat. 
However,  from  the  absurdity  of  his  assertion,  that  the  mere  doubt 
of  the  sincerity  of  my  assurance  that  I  was  not  striving  for  the 
highest  power,  had  prevented  him  (to  whom,  as  he  himself  pro- 
tested, the  crown  of  might  was  a  crown  of  thorns)  from  coming 
to  an  understanding  with  me,  from  uniting  with  me,  that  is,  7iot 
to  proclaim  the  forcible  separation  of  Hungary  from  Austria — I 
at  the  same  time  indulged  the  hope  that  Kossuth  (thanks  to  his 
peculiar  logic)  could  hardly  have  failed  by  this  time  to  take  again 
from  me  his  own  proper  sins. 

I  also  confined  my  reply  to  simply  assuring  Kossuth,  that  the 
negative  answer  I  had  given  him  in  the  beginning  of  March, 
at  Tiszafiired  to  his  question,  whether  I  should  like  to  reign  in 
his  stead,  was  certainly  sincere,  though  he  had  a  doubt  of  it ; 
and  that  I  was  of  opinion,  the  cause  of  Hungary  would  scarcely 
have  fallen  so  low,  if  in  the  consideration  of  my  counsels  for 
maintaining  the  just  rights  of  the  nation  he  had  not  allowed  him- 
self to  be  perplexed  by  his  unfounded  doubts  of  my  sincerity. 

When  Kossuth  began  to  speak  of  the  gigantic  results  of  his 
public  activity,  of  the  obstacles  that  had  prevented  us  from  con- 
quering the  allied  troops — in  a  word,  of  the  past,  I  suspected  that 
he  had  determined  to  speak  also  of  the  Komorn  differences  be- 
tween us.  However,  before  the  conference,  he  neither  seemed  to 
have  come  to  this,  nor  indeed  in  general  to  any  determination 
whatever  of  importance,  except,  at  most,  to  sound  me,  whether 
and  what  resolutions  I  had  already  formed  as  to  the  immediate 
future.     For  after  I  had  briefly  answered,  as  has  been  mentioned, 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  571 

his  retrospective  glance  into  the  past,  he  put  to  me  in  uninter- 
rupted succession  the  following  questions  : 

Above  all  things,  he  desired  to  know  how  I  should  take  it  if 
the  government  were  to  transfer  the  chief  command  to  Field- 
marshal  Lieut.  Bern. 

I  assured  him  that  I  should  consider  the  nomination  at  this 
moment  of  a  non-Hungarian  as  commander-in-chief  to  be  equiv- 
alent to  my  removal  from  the  command  of  the  army  under  me, 
and  would  immediately  retire  from  my  post ;  because,  in  order 
to  take  part  still  further  in  the  war,  I  needed  the  guarantee  that 
it  would  not  continue  to  be  carried  on,  when  any  moral  result 
was  no  longer  to  be  expected — only  for  personal,  not  national 
interests. 

Hereupon  Kossuth  wished  to  know  what  I  intended  to  do,  in 
case  the  news  he  had  received  of  the  victory  of  Dembinski's  army 
at  Temesvar  should  be  confirmed — the  junction  of  the  army 
under  my  orders  with  Dembinski's  effected — and  the  chief  com- 
mand over  both  armies  were  to  devolve  upon  me. 

In  that  case — I  replied — I  should  combine  the  whole  of  our 
forces,  and  direct  my  attack  against  the  Austrians  alone. 

But  if  the  Austrians  have  been  victorious  at  Temesvar  ?  Kos- 
suth finally  asked. 

Then  I  will  lay  down  my  arms — was  my  answer. 

And  I  shoot  myself  I — replied  Kossuth. 

I  took  this  in  earnest,  and  began  to  dissuade  him  from  the 
desperate  idea.  I  spoke  of  the  possibility  there  was  of  his  being 
still  useful  to  the  nation  even  abroad.  I  urgently  recommended 
him  to  prefer  flight  to  suicide.  Nay,  I  endeavored  to  show  him 
that  the  preservation  of  his  life  was  a  patriotic  duty.  And  this 
it  really  was ;  but  in  what  sense  it  was  so,  Kossuth  seemed  to 
have  no  perception. 

It  was  Kossuth's  patriotic  duty  to  recant  his  political  doctrine 
of  the  14th  of  April,  1849  ;  for  he  could  not  invalidate  the  prin- 
ciple derived  from  experience,  that  nations  as  well  as  individuals 
lose  themselves  when  the  object  after  which  they  strive  is  an 
unattainable  one.  Now  the  object  which  Kossuth  on  the  14th 
of  April  had  set  before  the  nation,  he  could  not  possibly  any 
longer  call  an  attainable  one,  after  he  had  himself  put  beyond 
doubt  that  Europe  was  in  fact  not  for,  but  against  the  revolt  of 
Hungary  from  Austria. 


572  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

But  that  Hungary  alone  would  be  able  to  maintain  itself 
against  Austria  and  Russia,  this  Kossuth  himself  had  never  be- 
lieved. 

A  proof  of  this  was  the  strenuous  efforts  he  began  immediately 
after  the  14th  of  April,  and  regularly  continued,  to  deceive  the 
nation  in  respect  of  the  danger  threatening  it  from  Russia  ;  efforts 
which  succeeded  so  well,  that,  among  others,  even  Field-marshal 
Lieut.  Bem  yielded  to  this  delusion,  and  lost  the  mountain  defiles 
of  Transylvania  before  he  had  even  an  idea  of  their  being  seri- 
ously menaced. 

A  proof  of  this  was  Kossuth's  parading — carried  so  far  as  offi- 
cially to  blind  the  nation — of  the  immense  influence  which  he 
pretended  he  could  exercise  upon  foreign  policy  against  Russia 
and  Austria  ;  the  result  of  which  influence  for  Hungary,  however, 
with  all  its  immenseness,  was  not  to  be  victory  over  Russia  and 
Austria,  but  (according  to  Kossuth's  own  assertion)  only  a  peace 
based  on  freedom — an  honorable  peace,  though  purchased  with 
sacrifices. 

Consequently,  even  with  the  assistance  of  the  expected  inter- 
vention of  the  "west"  of  Europe,  not  victory  over  Russia  and 
Austria,  but  merely  a  peace  bought  with  sacrifices,  which  could 
only  be  the  honor  and  freedom  of  the  nation  I  (or  what  else  could 
it  be  ?  perhaps  Kossuth  notes  ?) 

And  was  it  ever  really  believed  by  Kossuth  that  "  his  people" 
was  strong  enough  to  vanquish  the  Russians  as  well  as  the  Aus- 
trians  ? 

Kossuth,  in  fact,  had  not  even  to  deny  a  conviction  in  order- 
mindful  of  the  last  patriotic  duty  which  it  was  still  in  his  power 
to  perform — to  recant  his  doctrine  of  the  14th  of  April,  1849. 

That  he  would  nevertheless  fail  to  fulfill  this  duty  knowingly 
and  intentionally,  I  did  not  for  a  moment  doubt.  But  he  might 
fulfill  it  tvithout  knowing  it  and  without  intending  it,  by  sparing 
his  own  life,  by  early  taking  heed  to  its  safety. 

Hence  my  earnest  endeavors  to  dissuade  him  from  the  desperate 
idea  of  suicide,  and  to  induce  him  to  flee ;  for  I  feared  that  the 
nation  would  scarcely  resist  the  certain  temptation  forthwith  to 
consider  Kossuth's  death  (even  by  his  own  hand)  as  setting  the 
seal  to  that  doctrine,  from  which  the  nation  must  necessarily  turn 
away,  unless  it  had  a  mind  to  share  the  very  fate  of  those  whose 
efforts  were  directed  to  an  unattainable  object. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  673 

The  consolation  that  my  endeavors  were  successful — if  not 
superfluous — must,  however,  be  withheld  from  me  for  some  time 
yet.  Kossuth  seemed  not  to  be  willing  to  accede  to  any  of  my 
representations  respecting  the  preservation  of  his  life,  as  well  as 
its  safety  by  flight.  Soon  afterward  he  dismissed  me,  without 
communicating  to  me  the  desired  change  in  his  desperate  pro- 
ject.   

Before  midnight  I  had  returned  again  from  the  fortress  to  the 
head-quarters  in  Alt-Arad. 

A  few  hours  later,  Kossuth  sent  for  my  information  a  report  of 
General  Count  Guyon  relative  to  the  issue  of  the  battle  fought 
on  the  9th  of  August  at  Temesvar  by  Dembinski's  army  with  the 
Austrians. 

According  to  the  language  of  this  report,  written  by  Count 
Guyon  himself,  Dembinski's  army  no  longer  existed. 

By  this  final  result  of  Dembinski's  retrograde  operation  from 
Szoreg  to  Temesvar  (instead  of  to  Arad)  the  last  probability  of  a 
successful  ofiensive  against  the  Austrians  was  destroyed. 

The  further  continuance  of  our  active  resistance  to  the  armies 
of  the  allies  could  now  at  most  promote  personal,  no  longer  any 
national  interests. 

Therefore,  directly  after  the  receipt  of  Count  Guyon's  report  to 
Kossuth,  I  resolved,  with  the  army  under  my  command,  which 
had  been  strengthened  in  Arad  by  a  division  of  reserve,  to  lay 
down  our  arms,  that  an  unbloody  end  might  be  put  as  speedily  as 
possible  to  a  contest  henceforth  without  purpose,  and  that  the 
country,  which  I  could  no  longer  save,  might  at  least  be  freed 
from  the  horrible  misery  of  war. 

I  took  this  resolution  with  the  full  conviction  of  performing  no 
half  deed  in  executing  it :  for  the  army  under  my  command  was 
now  the  principal  army  of  Hungary,  and  its  conduct  must  pro- 
spectively the  more  certainly  become  the  guide  for  all  the  isolated 
lesser  bodies  of  active  forces  still  existing  elsewhere  in  the  coun- 
try, not  excepting  the  garrisons  of  the  fortresses ;  as  Kossuth 
himself  agreed  with  my  resolution  to  lay  down  our  arms,  and 
there  was  consequently  no  reason  to  apprehend  that  he  would 
agitate  against  a  general  imitation  of  the  example  I  was  determ- 
ined to  set. 

My  supposition  that  Kossuth  would  agree  to  the  laying  down 
of  our  arms  was  by  no  means  an  arbitrary  one. 


574  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

At  the  moment  when  I  explained  to  Kossuth  that  I  was  determ- 
ined to  lay  down  our  arms  as  soon  as  the  news  which  I  had  re- 
ceived about  the  defeat  of  Dembinski's  army  was  confirmed,  he 
was  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word  Tnaster  of  my  life.  The  in- 
terview at  which  I  made  this  declaration  took  place,  as  is  known, 
in  his  own  apartment  in  the  fortress  of  Arad.  The  commander 
of  the  fortress  was  Damjanics,  Since  the-Komorn  differences  he 
was  among  my  decided  adversaries.  The  garrison  of  the  fortress 
consisted  of  troops  that  scarcely  knew  me  by  name.  There  could 
not  exist  the  slightest  sympathy  on  the  part  of  these  troops  for  my 
person.  The  suite  with  which  I  had  hastened  on  Kossuth's  sum- 
mons into  the  fortress  consisted  of  one  adjutant.  Kossuth  never- 
theless allowed  me  unobstructed  to  return  from  the  fortress  to  the 
head-quarters  in  Alt- Arad.  He  had  not  even  attempted  to  dis- 
suade me  in  any  way  from  the  eventual  resolution  of  laying  down 
our  arms.  It  is  true  he  had  declared  he  was  resolved  to  shoot 
himself,  if  I  laid  down  our  arms.  This  declaration,  however,  con- 
sidering the  little  personal  sympathy  I  had  shown  him  since  the 
14th  of  April,  1849,  could  not  be  expected  to  shake  me  in  my 
resolution ;  I  considered  this  pathetic  declaration,  rather,  only  as 
a  natural  consequence  of  Kossuth's  repeated  asseverations,  that  he 
could  neither  live  out  of  Hungary  nor  in  it,  if  it  sunk  into  slavery. 

If  Kossuth  had  been  decidedly  opposed  to  the  laying  down  of 
our  arms,  he  could  not  possibly  have  allowed  me  to  quit  the  for- 
tress of  Arad. 

The  circumstance,  however,  that  Kossuth  did  not  combat 
my  resolution  to  lay  down  our  arms  either  by  adducing  reasons 
against  it,  or  otherwise,  proved  no  more  than  that  he  might  have 
been  already  convinced,  during  our  interview,  of  the  impossibility 
of  saving  the  fatherland.  And  the  fact  of  my  unendangered  re- 
turn from  the  fortress  of  Arad  to  the  head-quarters  in  Alt- Arad 
served  likewise,  strictly  considered,  merely  to  prove  that  Kossuth 
perhaps  foresaw  that  by  removing  my  person  he  would  at  most 
have  brought  on  something  even  worse  than  the  laying  down  of 
our  arms,  resolved  upon  by  me  in  the  event  of  the  defeat  of  Dem- 
binski's army. 

But  Kossuth  knew  of  my  intention,  at  daybreak  of  the  1 1th  of 
August  to  attack  the  Austrian  corps  before  Neu-Arad ;  I  had 
plainly  and  distinctly  declared  this  intention  in  the  ministerial 
council  assembled  in  the  forenoon  of  the  10th ;  during  our  interview 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  57.5 

(which  took  place  immediately  after  this  ministerial  council,  late 
in  the  evening  of  the  same  day)  I  had  already  informed  Kossuth 
of  the  dispositions  issued  for  the  intended  attack ;  further,  the 
governor— after  my  decided  declaration,  in  case  the  defeat  of 
Dembinski's  army  should  be  confirmed — could  not  possibly  be  in 
doubt  that  I  intended  to  undertake  the  attack  on  the  Austrians 
at  Neu-Arad  only  if  in  the  course  of  the  night  I  should  receive 
from  Dembinski's  army  either  an  authentic  favorable  report  or 
no  authentic  news  wJiatever.  And  nevertheless  Kossuth,  a  few 
hours  before  daybreak  of  the  11th,  sent  me,  for  my  information, 
Count  Gu yen's  report  unsealed,  consequently  evidently  after  he 
had  read  it. 

If  Kossuth  had  been  for  the  continuation  of  the  combat,  and 
not  for  the  laying  down  of  our  arms,  he  must  have  kept  secret 
the  contents  of  this  report.  Least  of  all  would  he  have  com- 
municated it  to  me. 

Having  nevertheless  done  the  latter,  and  moreover  without 
adding  to  the  report — the  original  of  which  he  sent  me — a  single 
word  with  his  own  hand  dissuading  me  from  the  surrender,  or 
even  charging  the  bearer  of  the  dispatch  to  do  so — I  should 
necessarily  have  been  obliged  to  get  from  the  clouds,  if  not  the 
assumption  that  Kossuth  was /or  the  surrender  of  arms,  yet  cer- 
tainly the  inference  that  he  was  against  it. 

Nevertheless  I  could  not  possibly  suppose  in  Kossuth  an  incli- 
nation to  take  a  personal  part  in  the  laying  down  of  our  arms,  in 
the  face  of  his  intended  suicide,  which  he  had  disclosed  to  me. 
And  as  it  was  of  course  important  for  me  to  avoid  even  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  resolution  to  surrender  being  one  of  treachery  to 
the  country,  an  act  of  rebellion  against  the  highest  authority  in 
the  state,  I  addressed  a  written  invitation  to  the  Governor  form- 
ally to  resign  and  transfer  to  me  the  supreme  power. 

I  took  this  step  in  the  expectation  that  Kossuth  would  not 
overlook,  that  though  as  far  as  he  personally  was  concerned,  it 
was  all  one  whether  he  committed  suicide  as  Governor  of  Hun- 
gary or  as  a  simple  private  individual,  yet  that  it  was  not  the 
same  as  regarded  the  tendency  of  the  laying  down  of  our  arms. 

But  instead  of  resigning,  Kossuth  acted  as  if  he  had  not  re- 
ceived my  invitation  at  all,  and  sent  me  an  official  letter  signed 
by  himself  as  Governor  and  with  a  ministerial  counter-signature, 
according  to  which  the  provisional  government  definitively  trans- 


SI'S  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

ferred  to  me  the  chief  command  over  all  the  troops  of  the  country, 
and  moreover  unlimited  power  to  conclude  a  peace — but  only 
with  the  Russians. 

Immediately  after  the  receipt  of  this  decree,  which  under  the 
then  existing  circumstances  was  utterly  worthless,  I  went  to  the 
minister  of  communications,  Csanyi.  I  had  already  previously 
informed  him  of  my  resolution  to  lay  down  our  arms,  and  call 
upon  Kossuth  to  resign,  and  transfer  the  supreme  power  to  me» 
Csanyi  approved  of  the  motives  of  these  resolutions.  I  now  re- 
quested him  to  show  to  the  Governor  how  absurd  it  was  to  ap- 
point me  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  troops  at  a  moment  when 
the  forces  which  had  hitherto  been  at  my  disposal  were  not  in- 
creased a  single  man  by  this  nomination ;  and  how  much  more 
absurd  it  was,  moreover,  to  empower  me  to  conclude  a  peace  with 
the  Russians,  when  we  were  in  a  situation  destitute  of  even  the 
fundamental  condition  for  entering  into  negotiations  about  peace 
— the  possibility  of  a  further  successfid  resistance.  I  also  re- 
quested him  to  represent  to  the  Governor,  that  it  would  be  much 
less  prejudicial  to  his  personal  dignity,  if,  convinced  of  the  im- 
.possibility  of  being  useful  to  the  nation  in  his  present  position, 
he  resigned  it  freely,  than  if  he  exposed  himself  to  the  danger  of 
a  public  humiliation  by  foolishly  wishing  to  retain  the  appear- 
ance of  a  power,  the  reality  of  which  had  already  been  destroyed 
in  consequence  of  the  enemy's  victories. 

Csanyi  promised  to  exert  all  his  influence  to  induce  Kossuth, 
together  vdth  the  ministers,  voluntarily  to  resign.  And  he  kept 
his  word ;  for  early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  1 1th  of  August  the 
deed  of  resignation,  signed  by  Kossuth  and  the  majority  of  the 
ministers,  was  in  my  possession. 

The  transmission  of  the  supreme  power  to  my  person  was 
clearly  and  distinctly  expressed  in  this  document :  I  was  not  to 
take  the  place  of  the  provisional  government,  however,  till  the 
evening  of  the  same  day.  This  precautionary  measure  of  Kos- 
suth's— by  the  way,  just  as  unworthy  as  superfluous — seemed  to 
indicate  either  that  he  had  not  at  all  needed  my  representations 
of  the  preceding  evening  during  the  well-known  interview  (to 
spare  his  own  life,  and,  above  all,  to  take  early  steps  for  his 
safety  from  the  enemy),  or  at  least  that  he  had  not  been  insensi- 
ble to  them. 

Kossuth  speedily  confirmed  this  indication :  an  oflicer,  whom 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUiNGARY.  677 

I  had  dispatched  to  him,  soon  after  receiving  the  deed  of  resigna- 
tion, to  take  possession  of  the  insignia  of  the  state,  returned  with- 
out accomplishing  his  mission,  and  reported  that  the  Governor 
had  already  taken  his  departure. 

I  know  nothing  of  the  fate  of  the  insignia  of  the  state  after- 
ward. 

Before  evening  of  the  11th  of  August,  the  resignation  t)f  the 
provisional  government,  and  the  union  of  the  supreme  civil  and 
military  power  in  my  person,  was  made  known  to  the  public  by 
the  two  following  proclamations,  which  I  give  in  a  German 
translation. 

"To  THE  Nation. 

"  After  the  defeats  that  have  lately  befallen  the  nation,  all  hope  is  at 
an  end  of  our  being  able  any  longer  to  continue  with  success  the  combat 
in  self-defense  against  the  allied  powers  of  Russia  and  Austria. 

"  In  such  circumstances,  the  preservation  of  the  national  existence  and 
the  guarantee  for  its  future  is  now  solely  to  be  expected  from  the  leader 
at  the  head  of  the  army ;  and,  as  I  am  thoroughly  convinced,  the  further 
continuance  of  tn^  present  government  is  not  only  useless,  but  even  pre- 
judicial to  the  nation.  I  accordingly  inform  the  nation,  that,  moved  by 
that  pure  patriotic  feeling  which  has  led  me  to  consecrate  all  my  eflbrts, 
my  whole  life,  exclusively  to  the  fatherland — in  my  own  name,  as  well  as 
that  of  the  ministry,  I  hereby  resign;  and  transfer  the  supreme  civil  and 
military  power  to  General  Arthur  Gorgei,  until  the  nation,  in  virtue  of  its 
right,  shall  enact  otherwise. 

"  I  expect  from  him — and  I  hold  him  responsible  for  it  before  God,  the 
nation,  and  history — that  he  will  use  this  power,  according  to  his  best 
ability,  for  the  salvation  of  the  national  existence  of  our  fatherland,  for  its 
welfare,  and  for  guaranteeing  its  future. 

"May  he  love  his  fatherland  as  disinterestedly  as  I  have  loved  it;  and 
may  he  be  more  fortunate  than  I  have  been  in  securing  the  prosperity  of 
the  nation ! 

"  By  actions  I  can  no  longer  be  useful  to  my  fatherland.  Could  my 
death  avail  for  its  well-being,  joyfully  would  I  sacrifice  my  life. 

"May  the  God  of  clemency  and  justice  be  with  the  nation  ! 
"  Louis  Kossuth,  Governor. 
Sabbas  VuKOvics,  Minister  of  Justice. 
Ladislaus  Csanyi,  Minister  pf  Communications  and 

Public  Works. 
Michael  Horvath,  Minister  of  Public  Instruction. 

"  Fortress  of  Arad,  August  ilth,  1849." 

"Citizens  ! 
"The  provisional  government  of  Hungary  no  longer  exists. 
"  The  Governor  and  the  ministers  have  to-day  voluntarily  resigned  their 
offices. 

Bb 


578  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

"Forced  by  this  circumstance,  besides  the  military  chief  command,  I 
have  to-day  provisionally  assumed  the  civil  power  also. 

"  Citizens  !  All  that  can  be  done  for  the  fatherland  in  our  difficult  posi- 
tion, I  shall  do,  whether  it  be  by  arms  or  peaceably,  as  necessity  shall 
dictate ;  at  all  events,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  diminish  the  sacrifices  which 
have  already  been  so  great,  and  put  an  end  to  persecution,  cruelty,  and 
murder. 

"  Citizens !  The  events  are  extraordinary,  and  the  blows  of  misfortune 
have  fallen  heavy  upon  us.  In  such  a  position  it  is  impossible  to  calcu- 
late beforehand.  My  advice  and  wish  is,  that  you  return  peaceably  to 
your  dwellings ;  and  even  if  the  enemy  takes  possession  of  your  town, 
offer  no  resistance,  nor  otherwise  take  part  in  the  combat :  for  the  security 
of  your  persons  as  well  as  of  your  property  is  most  probably  dependent 
upon  your  remaining  quietly  in  your  own  homes,  engaged  in  peaceful  occu- 
pations. 

"  Citizens  !  That  which  God's  inscrutable  decrees  have  destined  for  us, 
we  shall  bear  with  manly  resolution,  and  in  the  hope,  founded  on  our  own 
conviction,  that  a  just  cause  can  not  always  be  lost ! 

"  Citizens  !   God  be  with  us  ! 

{My  signature  follows.) 
"Arad,  the  nth  of  August,  1849." 

-« 

In  the  first  sentence  of  his  farewell  proclamation  Kossuth 
declares  that  every  hope  of  continuing  any  longer  with  success 
the  struggle  in  self-defense  against  the  allied  powers  is  at  an  end. 
Nevertheless  he  declares  immediately  afterward,  in  the  next 
sentence,  that  under  such  circumstances  it  was  still  possible  to 
save  the  existence  of  the  nation,  nay  even  to  secure  its  future. 
The  "  hoiv''  Kossuth  conceals  from  the  nation.  He  informs  it 
only  "  by  whom,"  namely,  by  the  leader  who  stands  at  the  head 
of  the  army. 

The  army,  however,  which  Kossuth  in  all  reason  must  have 
meant,  was  in  fact  no  other  than  that  which  had  hitherto  been 
commanded  by  me.  The  Transyivanian  army,  according  to 
Kossuth's  own  assertion,  and  the  Dembinski  or  Banat  army, 
according  to  Count  Gruyon's  report,  recognized  as  authentic  by 
Kossuth  himself,  had  both  already  ceased  to  exist. 

By  this  army  alone — greatly  exhausted  as  it  was  by  the  forced 
retreat  from  Komorn  to  Arad  (about  80  German  miles),  and  by 
the  battles  and  encounters  which  had  taken  place  during  it — the 
fatherland  was  now  speedily  to  be  reconquered,  after  three  armies 
had  not  been  able  to  maintain  it. 

But  no — not  from  the  army,  only  from  the  leader  at  its  head,' 
Kossuth  expects,  and  even  from  him  not  the  reconquest  of  the 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  579 

fatherland,  but  only  the  preservation  of  its  existence  as  a  state ; 
but  for  this  he  is  made  responsible  by  Kossuth  before  God,  the 
nation,  and  history,  the  more  certainly  as  Kossuth  transfers  to 
this  leader  at  the  same  time  the  power  in  the  state  intrusted  to 
himself  and  to  the  ministers — after  every  hope  of  continuing  any 
longer  the  contest  in  national  self  defense  against  the  allied  powers 
had  already  been  destroyed. 

Kossuth  may  have  had  his  particular  reasons  for  leaving  the 
nation  in  the  dark  about  the  "  how"  of  its  salvation  to  be  expected 
from  me  (the  leader  at  the  head  of  the  army).  We  can  not,  how- 
ever, suppose  that  he  himself  was  in  the  dark  about  this  "how," 
without  rendering  him  suspected  of  having  wished  to  mask  by  the 
proclamation  in  question  merely  the  real  motive  (were  it  so  ?)  of 
his  resignation  and  flight — namely,  his  inmost  conviction  that  the 
nation  in  fact  was  no  longer  to  be  saved  by  any  means,  not  even 
by  his  death. 

But  however  probable  this  supposition,  and  however  strikingly 
the  tendency  of  Kossuth's  proclamation,  derived  from  it  in  like 
manner,  harmonizes  with  the  necessity  felt  by  him,  and  which 
had  before  then  been  repeatedly  evident,  always  to  find  excuses 
for  himself^ — we  should  nevertheless  expose  ourselves  to  the  de- 
served reproach  of  hostility  to  Kossuth,  if  we  gave  way  to  this 
supposition — that  he  was  himself  in  the  dark  about  the  "  how" 
it  was  possible  still  to  save  Hungary — without  having  previously 
made  use  of  all  the  facts  known  to  us,  by  means  of  which  this 
supposition  might  possibly  be  shown  to  be  erroneous. 

And  some  such  facts  are  certainly  known  to  us.  Kossuth  had 
formed  and  carried  out  the  resolution  of  entering  into  negotia- 
tions for  peace  with  the  Russians.  Further,  he  had  resolved,  on 
the  9th  or  10th  of  August,  to  offer  quite  undisguisedly  the  crown 
of  Hungary  to  the  dynasty  of  Romano w.  He  had  done  for  the 
execution  of  this  resolution  as  much  as  time  and  circumstances 
permitted  him.  For  this  purpose  a  letter  to  the  Russian  com- 
mander had  been  drawn  up  by  himself,  if  I  mistake  not,  or  he 
had  caused  it  to  be  drawn  up  (probably  by  the  president  of  the 
ministers  Szemere,  already  practiced  in  this  department).  He 
had  personally  endeavored — and,  as  he  assured  me,  not  without  suc- 
cess— to  find  some  one  to  forward  the  letter  to  the  Russian  camp. 

With  a  matter,  on  the  success  of  which  no  hopes  are  depend- 
ent, it  is  not  usual  to  occupy  oneself  so  zealously. 


580  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Kossuth  believed,  consequently,  at  the  moment  in  which  he 
wrote  his  farewell  proclamation,  in  the  possibility  of  saving  th© 
fatherland  by  negotiations  for  peace  with  Russia. 

Herein,  at  the  same  time,  lies  the  key  for  understanding  this 
proclamation,  which  without  it  would  have  no  meaning  at  all. 
For  only  in  the  firm  belief  of  the  possibility  of  concluding  peace 
with  Russia,  could  Kossuth  speak  in  one  and  the  same  proclama- 
tion of  the  unsuccessful  further  combat  and  the  possible  salvation 
of  the  fatherland. 

That  Kossuth,  even  after  I  had  called  upon  him  to  resign,  still 
entertained  this  belief,  is  shown  by  the  full  powers  to  conclude  a 
peace  which  he  gave  me,  as  an  evasive  answer,  as  it  were,  to  my 
invitation  to  him  to  resign.  The  resignation  which  nevertheless 
afterward  took  place,  does  by  no  means  prove  that  Kossuth  had 
seen  the  absurdity  of  his  belief  in  consequence  of  the  representa- 
tions which  I  had  requested  Csanyi  to  make  to  him.  Csanyi  had 
not  promised  me  to  communicate  to  the  governor  my  views  about 
the  value  of  the  said  full  powers  :  his  promise  was  merely,  that 
he  would  do  all  he  could  to  induce  Kossuth  and  the  ministers  to 
resign  voluntarily.  How  he  accomplished  it,  we  do  not  know. 
In  view  of  the  tendency  of  the  surrender  of  arms,  on  which  I  had 
resolved,  and  in  view  of  Kossuth's  most  probable  disinclination 
to  sanction  this  tendency  by  his  personal  participation  in  the  act 
of  surrendering,  Csanyi — perceiving  from  the  national  point  of 
view  the  moral  necessity  for  the  resignation  of  Kossuth  and  the 
ministers — might  possibly  not  have  hesitated  to  make  use  of  such 
means  to  induce  Kossuth  to  resign,  as  were  quite  contrary  to  those 
I  had  proposed.  However  little  he  may  himself  have  been 
deceived  as  to  the  futility  of  the  idea  of  saving  the  political  exist- 
ence of  Hungary  by  means  of  concluding  peace  with  Russia, 
Csanyi,  aware  of  Kossuth's  spasmodic  clinging  to  this  idea, 
might,  in  this  case,  have  urged  on  him  (to  induce  him  to  resign) 
just  the  said  idea,  and  represented  to  him  that  the  Russian  com- 
mander would  hardly  be  inclined  to  negotiate  with  him  (Kossuth), 
though  probably  he  might  with  me — (in  favor  of  which  was  the 
fact,  that  the  diplomatic  dispatches  of  Szemere  and  Count  Bat- 
thyanyi  had  been  forwarded  to  the  Russian  camp  exclusively 
under  my  name).  Consequently  the  process  of  Kossuth's  volun- 
tary resignation  might  perhaps  have  been  as  follows : 

Kossuth  believed  in  the  possibility  of  concluding  a  peace  with 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  681 

the  Russians  at  the  expense  of  the  Anstrians,  and  thereby  of 
saving  the  political  existence  of  Hungary,  nay,  of  securing  its 
future.  In  like  manner  he  believed  that  the  Russians  would 
negotiate  only  with  me — not  with  him.  But  Kossuth  might 
have  suspected  that,  in  the  treaty  to  be  concluded,  I  intended  to 
take  care  of  the  interests  of  the  army  only,  not  of  those  also  of 
the  whole  nation,  of  the  state.  (My  declaration,  that  I  was  de- 
termined to  lay  down  our  arms,  Kossuth,  from  the  moment  when 
I  called  upon  him  to  resign,  might  have  taken  merely  for  what  I 
should  have  taken  his  declaration,  that  in  that  case  he  would 
shoot  himself,  if  I  had  known  then  what  I  know  now,  namely, 
that  his  repeated  asseverations — that  he  could  neither  live  in  nor 
out  of  Hungary  if  it  was  reduced  to  slavery — were  never  seriously 
meant.)  Kossuth  consequently  considered  it  to  be  his  patriotic 
duty  to  ignore  my  invitation  (to  him  to  resign),  and  to  dismiss 
me  merely  with  the  dignity  of  commander-in-chief,  and  full 
powers  to  conclude  a  peace.  So  long  as  he  still  stood  at  the 
head  of  the  government,  I  should  scarcely  dare  (so  he  might  htive 
hoped)  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  the  Russians,  which  would  ex- 
pose the  nation.  After  some  hours'  reflection,  however,  he  might 
have  perceived,  that  his  continuing  to  retain  the  dignity  of  gov- 
ernor was  the  very  thing  that  would  render  it  impossible  for  me 
to  come  to  any  other  treaty  with  the  Russians  than  one  which 
had  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  army  alone ;  because  so  long 
as  he  "held  the  state-rudder,  I  could  act  in  the  negotiations  for 
peace  neither  as  dictator  of  Hungary,  nor  as  representative  of  the 
provisional  government  (with  which  the  Russians  w^Tiid  have 
nothing  to  do),  but  solely  as  general-in-chief  But  the  percep- 
tion of  this  must  assuredly  have  the  rather  determined  him 
formally  to  resign,  as  by  this  act  he  incidentally  acquired  the 
right  to  render  me  responsible  for  the  salvation  of  the  fatherland 
— before  Grod,  the  nation,  and  history. 

Now  if  we  compare  this  process  of  the  development  of  Kossuth's 
voluntary  resignation  with  the  contents  of  his  farewell  proclama- 
tion, we  cannot  without  injustice  withhold  from  him  (viewed 
from  Kossuth's  position)  the  acknowledgment  that  it  appears  by 
no  means  to  be,  what  it  might  be  taken  for  at  a  first  glance — 
namely,  an  intentional  mystification  of  the  public. 

But  when,  in  order  to  save  the  honor  of  this  proclamation, 
we  cast  a  second  glance,  beyond  its  limits,  upon  the  facts  which 


582  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

had  preceded  it,  and  from  which  it  as  it  were  originated,  we 
simultaneously  conceded  to  our  opponents  the  right  to  cast  yet  a 
third  (controlling)  glance  upon  the  facts  which  followed,  and 
which  contradict  the  consequences  developed  from  the  facts  that 
preceded,  thus  endangering  anew  the  scarcely  saved  honor  of  this 
proclamation. 

Our  opponents,  namely,  can  maintain — and,  alas,  consistently 
— that  Kossuth,  in  case  he  had  resigned  only  in  order  to  render 
possible  the  salvation  of  the  country  through  me,  that  is,  to  en- 
able me  to  conclude  a  peace  with  Russia  at  the  expense  of  Aus- 
tria— a  peace  which  was  not  only  momentarily  to  save  the  polit- 
ical existence  of  Hungary,  but  also  to  guarantee  it  for  the  future 
— that  Kossuth  in  this  case  ought  to  have  likewise  enabled  me 
to  buy  this  peace,  there  being  no  longer  any  hope  (as  Kossuth 
himself  avows  in  the  first  sentence  of  his  proclamation)  of  gain- 
i7ig  it  by  fighting  ;  consequently  that  Kossuth,  well  aware  that 
I  had  to  offer  to  the  Russians  for  the  saving  peace,  besides  the 
army  and  my  own  person  and  some  Kossuth  notes,  absolutely 
nothing  as  purchase-money,  not  a  foot-breadth  of  ground  which 
the  Russians  or  Austrians  either  did  not  already  possess,  or  could 
not  take  possession  of  within  a  very  short  time,  in  the  face  of  the 
uselessness  of  our  further  resistance,  confirmed  by  Kossuth  him- 
self (in  his  proclamation) ;  that  Kossuth,  knowing  all  this  quite 
well,  ought  to  have  placed  at  my  disposal  at  least  that  by  means 
of  which  he  himself  intended  to  buy  the  peace  (in  case  the  Rus- 
sians had  negotiated  with  him) — namely,  the  insignia  of  the  state ; 
that  he  ought  the  less  to  have  withheld  these  from  me,  as  he 
himself  labored  under  the  general  illusion,  that  the  enemies  of 
the  fatherland  would  negotiate  only  with  me,  because  the  army 
under  my  command  had  exclusively  recognized  only  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  year  1848,  sanctioned  by  King  Ferdinand  V.,  never 
the  coup  d'etat  of  the  14th  of  April,  1849 — consequently  that 
Kossuth,  from  the  point  of  view  of  this  illusion,  could  not  possibly 
deny  that  the  delivery  of  the  insignia  of  the  constitutional  king- 
dom of  Hungary  w^ould  very  probably  be  the  object  of  the  princi- 
pal reciprocal  condition  to  be  made  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 

Now  from  the  single  fact,  that  Kossuth  had  not  delivered  the 
insignia  of  the  state,  our  opponents  might  certainly  deduce  the 
fatal  conclusion,  that  the  object  of  his  voluntary  resignation  was 
quite  other  than  to  render  possible  the  effecting  of  a  saving  peace 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  583 

with  Russia ;  consequently  that  Kossuth's  farewell  proclamation, 
was  no  more  than  a  mask  for  the  real  motive  of  the  voluntary 
resignation,  a  last  official  blinding  of  the  nation. 

This  conclusion,  in  spite  of  its  undeniable  consecutiveness,  may 
nevertheless  be  weakened  by  simply  referring  to  those  dangers 
by  which  Kossuth  might  have  seen  himself  threatened,  to  the 
endangering  of  his  Hfe,  on  the  11th  of  August.  If  we  recall 
first  of  all  Kossuth  and  his  partisans'  notorious  apprehensions 
that  1  was  mischievously  plotting  against  his  hfe — apprehensions 
which  must  have  excited  the  more  terror,  as  they  were  connected 
with  the  fact  that  I  had  once  studied  chemistry ;  if  we  further 
recall  the  proximity  of  an  Austrian  corps  to  the  fortress  of  Arad, 
where  Kossuth  then  sojourned  ;  and  finally,  Kossuth's  very  prob- 
able apprehension,  after  Count  Guyon's  report,  of  next  day,  per- 
haps, seeing  the  way  to  Turkey  (from  Arad  by  Lippa  and  Lugos) 
blocked  up  by  Austrian  expeditionary  columns  ; — we  shall  accuse 
our  opponents,  if  not  of  positive  wrong,  at  least  of  the  highest  in- 
justice toward  Kossuth,  if  they  do  not  admit  that  though  these 
threatening  dangers  did  not  shake  his  patriotic  resolution  to 
deliver  up  to  me,  with  the  highest  power,  the  insignia  of  the 
state  also,  yet  that  they  might  nevertheless  have  prevented  him 
in  some  measure  from  executing  it ;  according  to  which,  the  re- 
tention of  the  insignia  of  the  state  would  be  to  be  considered  by 
no  means  as  premeditated,  but  only  as  accidental — merely  an 
oversight,  as  it  were,  and  explicable  from  the  haste  with  which 
Kossuth  had  effected  his  departure  from  Arad.  And  we  can 
maintain  this  with  the  greater  positivene^,  as  we  calculate  con- 
fidently on  finding  in  Kossuth  himself  our  surety  for  the  correct- 
ness of  this  assertion.  But  we  must  be  very  cautious  (and  advise 
Kossuth  to  be  the  same) — perhaps  from  too  anxious  solicitude  for 
the  honor  of  the  farewell  proclamation — not  to  render  more 
sharply  prominent  the  bewildering  influence  of  these  threatening 
dangers  (no  matter  whether  imaginary  or  real)  on  Kossuth's 
actions  of  the  11th  of  August  than  is  just  necessary  to  excuse  the 
non-delivery  of  the  insignia  of  the  state.  For  in  that  case  we 
ourselves  should  furnish  to  our  opponents  the  most  dangerous 
weapons  against  us ;  we  should  enable  them,  namely,  fully  to 
establish  the  assertion,  that  Kossuth,  after  all,  had  intended  to 
save  by  the  voluntary  resignation  only  his  life,  and  by  the  fare- 
well proclamation  only  his  popularity  : — by  the  voluntary  resig- 


58  i  My  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

nation,  his  life — for  he  feared  I  should  hinder  his  flight  so  long  as 
he  was  still  governor ;  by  the  farewell  proclamation,  his  popular- 
ity, which  seemed  to  him  to  be  endangered  by  the  vohmtary  re- 
signation :  the  nation  might  suspect  him  of  having  voluntarily 
resigned  from  cowardice ;  he  must  prevent  the  suspicion  of  the 
nation,  by  assuring  it  that  he  did  it  from  patriotism. 

And  our  opponents  would  then,  alas,  be  supported  by  the  ac- 
cordance of  this  assertion  with  the  character  of  the  farewell  pro- 
clamation. For  the  latter  was,  in  any  case,  a  blind ;  although, 
according  to  our  opinion  above  expressed  of  its  origin,  possibly  an 
unintentional  one. 

This  proclamation  was  a  blind  ;  not,  perhaps,  because  Kossuth 
therein  made  a  parade  of  his  patriotic  sentiments,  but  because  he 
held  out  to  the  nation  a  prospect  of  deliverance  still — of  something 
impossible  under  the  then  existing  circumstances. 

W«  have  already  mentioned  from  what  idea  Kossuth  must 
have  set  out  in  order  to  venture  this.  It  only  remains  to  investi- 
gate tvhy  this  idea  (that  /  should  conclude  a  saving  peace  with 
Russia)  was  an  untenable  one. 

Kossuth,  as  is  known,  believed  that  it  was  not  possible  for  him, 
but  only  for  me  to  succeed  in  making  a  treaty  for  peace  with  the 
Russians,  because  they  negotiated  only  with  me,  not  with  him. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  Kossuth  had  not  a  single  fact  at  his 
command,  from  which  he  could  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
Russians  would  negotiate  with  me. 

Such  a  fact  could  evidently  only  have  been  some  negotiation 
already  entered  into  with  me  on  the  part  of  the  Russians. 

But  the  Russians  had  only  summoned  me  to  lay  down  our 
arms  ;  and  this  is  just  the  opposite  of  what  can  reasonably  be 
called  negotiating.  Even  the  letter  of  Count  Riidiger,  contained 
in  Chapter  LXXL,  attentively  considered,  is  nothing  more  than  a 
polite  invitation  to  lay  down  our  arms ;  not  to  speak  of  the  cir- 
cumstance that  Count  Riidiger  was  only  a  sub-commander  of  the 
Russian  main  army,  and  that  negotiations  of  any  importance 
must  necessarily  have  come  from  the  commander-in-chief  (Prince 
Paszkiewicz).  The  exchange  of  arms,  too,  was  merely  a  warlike 
courtesy,  followed  by  no  results  whatever. 

But  assuming  that  Kossuth  did  nevertheless  attribute  to"  these 
events  an  importance,  from  which  he  believed  he  was  authorizeo 
to  conclude  that  the  Russians  would  not  hesitate  to  enter  into 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  585 

negotiations  with  me,  he  could  not  possibly  predict,  without  an 
optimist  ignoring  of  certain  circumstances  well  known  to  him, 
that  the  benefits  of  the  negotiations,  supposed  to  be  opened  in 
earnest  between  the  Russians  and  myself,  would  ever  be  able  to 
extend  beyond  the  limits  of  the  personal  interests  of  the  army, 
and  become  political,  answering  to  Kossuth's  idea  of  salvation. 

Yet  the  Russian  commander  had  even  hesitated  to  allow  Lieut.- 
General  Sass  and  Colonel  Chrulow  to  accept  my  presents,  merely 
because  he  suspected  in  them  a  political  demonstration  against 
Austria.  Yet  the  letter  of  Count  Riidiger  (the  sole  source  of 
those  chimeras,  which,  propagating  themselves  in  Kossuth's  fancy, 
finally  gave  birth  to  the  fixed  idea  of  saving  the  state  of  Hungary 
under  Russian  protection)  did  not  contain  the  least  allusion  to 
the  political  relation  of  Hungary  to  Austria ;  and  my  answer, 
which  certainly  very  distinctly  treated  of  this  relation,  as  well  as 
the  diplomatic  letter  of  the  ministers  Szemere  and  Count  Batthy- 
anyi,  had  hitherto  remained  unanswered, 

Kossuth  might,  however,  either  have  been  so  in  love  with  his 
own  political  doctrine,  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  ever  to  per- 
ceive its  impracticability  ; — or  after  Bem's  defeats  in  Transylvania, 
Nagy-Sandor's  at  Debreczin,  and  Dembinski's  at  Temesvar  ;  after 
the  constant  want  of  sympathy  on  the  part  of  Europe  ;  and  after 
the  fruitless  endeavors  of  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  to 
negotiate  for  peace — he  might  perhaps  at  last  have  perceived  it. 
But  he  had  not  the  necessary  strength  of  mind  openly  and  frankly  to 
announce  to  the  nation  (instead  of  deluding  it  with  newly  invent- 
ed possibilities  of  salvation)  in  his  farewell  proclamation — "  It 
can  never  be !" 

On  the  other  hand,  Kossuth,  in  the  face  of  the  above  described 
and  to  him  well  known  indifference  of  the  Russians  to  our  diplomatic 
importunities,  would  scarcely  have  dared  to  maintain  that  the 
Russians  were  ready  to  conclude — not  with  him  indeed,  but  with 
me — a  peace  guaranteeing  the  political  existence  and  the  future 
of  Hungary.  Kossuth  would  rather  have  sought  for  an  explana- 
tion of  the  circumstance  that  the  Russians  exchanged  trumpets 
with  me,  but  not  with  himself  or  Szemere,  neither  in  an  especial 
sympathy  of  the  Russians  for  my  person,  or  for  the  constitutional- 
monarchical  confession  of  faith  of  the  army  I  commanded,  nor  in 
an  antipathy  (perhaps  instinctive)  to  his  or  Szemere's  personality, 
or  to  the  idea  of  independence  or  of  a  republic  ;  but  exclusively 


586  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  JN  HUNGARY. 

in  the  circumstance  that  I  was  only  the  commander  of  the  army; 
consequently  that  an  exchange  of  trumpets  with  me  could  have 
only  a  purely  military,  and  by  no  means  that  political  signifi- 
cance, without  which  an  exchange  of  trumpets  between  the  Rus- 
sian army  of  intervention,  hurried  hither  to  save  Austria,  and 
the  heads  of  the  provisional  government  of  Hungary,  bent  on  the 
destruction  of  Austria,  would  have  been  wholly  inconceivable. 
This  being  evident  to  him,  Kossuth,  further,  could  not  possibly 
have  overlooked,  that  the  Russians,  from  the  moment  in  which  I 
took  the  power  of  the  provisional  government,  could  no  longer 
negotiate  with  me,  any  more  than  with  himself  or  Szemere  ;  and 
that  if  they  nevertheless  should  do  so,  it  would  most  probably  be 
not  with  the  dictator  of  Hungary,  but  again  only  with  the  com- 
mander of  the  troops,  and  that  therefore  the  benefits  of  any  nego- 
tiation {in  spe)  would  not  extend  beyond  the  camp  of  the  army. 

Consequently,  the  idea  that  I  had  now  to  conclude  a  peace 
with  Russia,  saving  the  political  existence  of  Hungary  and  guar- 
anteeing its  future — although  Kossuth  did  not  hesitate  to  render 
me  responsible  for  the  realization  of  this  idea  before  God,  the 
nation,  and  history — had  really  no  higher  practical  value  than 
perhaps  the  state-creating  idea  expressed  by  Kossuth  in  the  first 
intoxication  of  independence  (I  hope  not  in  full  earnest?),  com- 
pletely to  clear  the  Banat  of  the  Serbians  and  Raizens,  to  colonize 
the  depopulated  tracts  of  land  with  Honved  battalions,  and  to 
make  the  success  of  this  liberal  enterprise  more  speedily  possi- 
ble by  simultaneously  introducing  bigamy. 

So  that  from  negotiations  between  the  Russian  commander 
and  myself,  even  if  such  had  already  been  in  progress,  Kossuth 
could  not  expect  any  thing  for  the  state  of  Hungary ;  nor,  as  in 
fact  no  such  negotiations  had  been  commenced,  for  the  troops 
united  under  my  personal  command. 

Kossuth  might  take  my  assertion,  that  hitherto  no  such  negotia- 
tions had  been  commenced  with  the  Russian  commander,  as  a 
pretext  for  reproaching  me  that  I  distorted  the  facts ;  and  he 
might  at  the  same  time  establish  the  counter-assertion,  that  send- 
ing General  Poltenberg  to  the  Russian  camp  (with  the  Gyapju 
letter  of  the  minister  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  to  the  Rus- 
sian commander)  was  in  itself  the  commencement  of  a  negotia- 
tion. But  Kossuth,  in  order  to  venture  this  assertion,  must  openly 
ignore  the  fact  that,  for  the  opening  of  negotiations  of  any  kind 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  687 

whatever,  an  inclination  on  one  side  is  by  no  means  sufficient. 
And  if  Kossuth  had  delayed  his  departure  from  the  fortress  of 
Arad  only  half  an  hour  longer,  he  might  have  modified  his  much- 
promising  farewell  proclamation  before  it  went  to  the  printer, 
without  coming  into  the  least  conflict  with  his  conviction  ;  for 
scarcely  had  he  left  the  fortress  when  General  Poltenberg,  return- 
ing from  the  Russian  camp,  arrived  at  the  head-quarters  in  Alt- 
Arad,  and  handed  me  the  following  letter  addressed  to  me  : 

"Monsieur  le  General — J'ai  fait  parvenir  a  la  connaissance  de  Mon- 
sieur le  Marechal  Prince  de  Varsovie  I'arrivee  du  Baron  Poltenberg  comrne 
parlementaire  a  mon  corps  d'armee.  Son  Altesse  me  charge  de  vous  in- 
former, Monsieur,  que  la  destination  de  son  armee  est  uniquement  de  com- 
battre  ;  et  que  si  vous  desirez  traiter  de  votre  soumission  a  votre  souverain 
legitime,  il  faut  que  vous  vous  adressiez  au  commandant-en-chef  de  1' armee 
autrichienne,  qui  probablement  a  les  pleins-pouvoirs  necessaires  a  cet  eiFet. 

"B/ecevez,  Monsieur  le  General,  I'assurance  de  ma  parfaite  considera- 
tion. 

(Signed)     "  Le  Comte  Theodore  Rudiger. 

VAout 

When,  in  spite  of  this,  many  besides  Kossuth  indulged  the  sus- 
picion that  I  was  thinking  only  of  the  salvation  of  the  army,  not 
of  the  country's,  and  openly  showed  by  this  suspicion  their  belief 
in  the  possibility  of  saving  only  the  troops  under  my  command ; 
they  thereby  proved  merely  their  incapacity  to  judge  correctly  of 
the  situation  in  which  those  forces  were  placed  after  the  fatal  de- 
feat of  Dembinski's  army,  according  to  the  report  of  Count  Guyon. 

The  error  of  those  who  still  thought  the  salvation  of  the  army 
possible  by  negotiating,  might  have  originated  in  the  idea,  that, 
supported  by  the  fortress  of  Arad,  I  should  have  been  able  to 
make  such  an  impression  on  both  hostile  armies  as  to  force  from 
them  humane  and  honorable  terms  of  capitulation. 

The  army  under  my  command  might  certainly  be  supported  by 
the  fortress  of  Arad,  in  its  rear.  The  protection  of  the  latter 
would  also  first  of  all  have  been  indispensable ;  for  the  Russian 
main  army  threatened  from  the  north,  the  Austrian  from  the  south. 

The  consequent  pressing  necessity  of  protecting  the  rear  of  the 
army  might  indeed  be  quite  simply  met  by  stationing  it  around 
the  fortress.  By  disposing  it  in  this  way,  the  army  would  at  all 
events  have  been  unassailable  in  its  rear.  A  commanding  posi- 
tion, by  which  the  enemy  should  be  forced  to  offer  honorable 


588  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

terms  of  capitulation,  happens,  however,  to  demand  besides  the 
state  of  being  unassailable  in  the  rear,  the  securing  likewise  of 
the  front  by  the  natural  or  artificial  impediments  of  the  ground, 
and  this  to  such  a  degree  that  a  hostile  attack  would  be  possible 
only  under  very  disadvantageous  circumstances.  But  even  this 
condition  was  still  attainable  :  the  army  had  merely  to  draw 
back  within  the  outworks  of  the  fortress  (if  there  was  space 
enough),  and  here — safe  from  attack  in  the  rear,  covered  in  front 
by  the  ramparts  of  the  outworks — the  army,  forthwith  unmolest- 
ed, might  sing  miserere  after  miserere,  that  one  or  other  of  the 
hostile  commanders  would  take  pity  on  it,  and  (though  he  should 
not  exactly  be  pressed  to  concede  honorable  terms  of  capitulation) 
at  least  attack  it  speedily,  that  it  might  not  finally  be  driven  to 
the  fatal  necessity  of  completely  abandoning  its  commanding 
position,  although  supported  by  the  fortress  of  Arad,  without 
striking  a  blow  ;  of  course  only — to  deliver  up  its  arms  for  the 
most  necessary  sustenance  during  its  captivity,  and  thereby  escape 
certain  starvation. 

After  the  report  relative  to  the  fate  of  Dembinski's  army  ar- 
rived, I  was  convinced  that  the  army  under  my  command  had 
only  to  choose  betAveen  the  forcible  or  voluntary  surrender  of  its 
arms  (in  either  case  unconditionally),  and  the  breaking  through 
into  the  Turkish  territory,  which  was  certainly  still  possible. 

In  the  latter  (and  out  of  Hungary  generally),  neither  I,  nor 
the  army,  so  long  as  I  commanded  it,  had  any  thing  to  seek : 
for  this  was  a  national  army ;  and  I— myself  a  Hungarian — 
felt,  as  its  commander,  the  obligation  to  prevent  it  from  taking  a 
step  by  which  it  would  have  denied  the  Hungarian  national 
character. 

Or  was  it  self-delusion,  w^hen  I  believed  that  the  true,  inalien- 
able greatness  of  the  nation  rested — 

On  the  inmost  aversion  of  the  Hungarian  to  leave  his  father- 
land, even  when  death  from  the  hand  of  the  executioner  awaited 
him  for  it  at  home : 

On  the  sublime  courage  displayed  by  the  Hungarian  in  bat- 
tling with  his  adverse  fate,  and — if  this  avails  not — in  knowing 
how  to  endure  unsubdued : 

On  the  manly  resignation  with  which  the  Hungarian,  volun- 
tarily, and  with  a  calm,  steadfast  gaze,  advances  to  meet  what 
is  unavoidable,  when  perceived  to  be  such. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  589 

Was  this  belief  a  vain  delusion  ? 

By  it  I  was  resolved  not  even  to  think  of  the  still  possible 
breaking  through  into  the  Turkish  territory,  much  less  to  prefer 
a  vohintary  to  a  forcible  surrender  of  arms. 

But  the  honor  of  receiving  our  arms  immediately  from  our 
hands,  I  could  not  possibly,  after  the  intervention  of  Russia,  now 
adjudge  to  the  Austrians. 

The  Austrians,  in  my  opinion,  had  forfeited  all  claim  to  this 
honor  long  ago — at  the  moment  when  they  were  no  longer  able 
to  sustain  their  courage — broken  by  the  April  campaign — through 
their  own  self-reliance,  but  only  through  the  hope  of  Russia's 
near  and  saving  aid. 

Moreover,  a  resolution  on  my  part  to  lay  down  our  arms  before 
the  Austrians  (so  long  as  I  had  a  free  choice  in  the  matter) 
would  have  been  a  denial  of  that  principle,  to  which  the  army 
and  myself  personally  were  pledged.  Not  as  if  I  had  perceived 
in  Russia  a  guarantee  of  the  constitutional-monarchical  form  of 
government  of  Hungary  :  but  because  I  reckoned  that  the  Aus- 
trian government  was  much  less  such  a  guarantee  ;  because  I, 
^besides,  knew  of  no  fact  from  which  I  could  have  concluded  that 
the  violent  overthrow  of  the  constitution  of  Hungary  sanctioned 
by  King  Ferdinand  V.  had  originated  with  Russia,  and  not  with 
Austria. 

And  in  fact  the  voluntary  laying  down  of  our  arms,  resolved 
upon  by  me  (certainly  on  my  own  responsibility  before  God,  the 
nation,  and  history),  could — so  long  as  I  commanded  the  army 
have  taken  place  before  the  Austrians  only  in  one  of  two  cases  ; 
either  if  they  had  conquered  us  without  the  aid  of  the  Russians, 
or  if  the  army  under  my  command  had  expressly  wished  that 
this  act  of  surrender  should  be  performed  before  the  Austrians — 
not  before  the  Russians. 

After  I  had  received  the  document  of  resignation  of  the  pro- 
visional government,  and  moreover  the  official  report  that  Kossuth 
had  already  decamped,  I  drew  up  a  letter  to  Count  Riidiger, 
which  in  substance  contained  the  following  points  : 

The  announcement  that  the  provisional  government  of  Hun- 
gary had  resigned,  and  transferred  to  me  the  supreme  power ; 

The  declaration,  containing  my  reasons,  that  I  was  ready  un- 
conditionally to  lay  down  our  arms  ; 

An  appeal  to  the  magnanimity  and  love  of  justice  of  the  Czar, 


590  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

in  behalf  of  the  general  interests  of  the  nation,  and  in  particular 
of  those  officers  of  the  army  who  had  formerly  heen  in  the  Aus- 
trian service — with  the  exception  of  my  own  person  ; 

The  express  condition,  that  the  act  of  surrender  should  take 
place  only  before  Russian  troops ; 

The  line  of  march  of  the  army  for  the  12th,  13th,  and  14th  of 
August  (Vilagos,  Boros-Jeno,  and  Beel),  communicated  in  order 
that  Count  Riidiger  might  move  with  his  troops  between  us  and 
the  Austrians,  so  as  to  separate  us  from  the  latter ; 

Finally,  the  remark,  that  in  case  this  manoeuvre  should  be 
frustrated  by  the  Austrians,  I  should  retire,  repelling  the  attacks 
of  the  latter,  on  the  specified  route  toward  Gross- Wardein,  for 
the  purpose  of  arriving  within  reach  of  the  Russian  army. 

The  draught  of  this  letter  I  communicated  forthwith,  in  all  its 
contents,  to  those  generals  and  superior  staff-officers  of  the  army, 
who,  being  at  that  moment  off  duty,  had  jn  the  meantime  been 
summoned  to  the  head-quarters  to  hold  a  military  council ;  and 
called  upon  the  assembly  plainly  to  declare,  after  having  delib- 
erated, whether  they,  in  the  name  of  the  army,  agreed  or  not 
with  the  forwarding  of  this  letter,  and  with  the  consequences  of 
this  step.  In  the  latter  case,  the  assembly  had  immediately  to 
come  to  a  positive  decision,  to  the  execution  of  which  I  pledged 
myself  beforehand.  I  did  not  support  my  proposal  by  a  single 
word.  I  even  avoided  availing  myself  of  the  influence  of  my 
personal  presence  upon  the  consultation.  Immediately  after  I 
had  communicated  to  the  assembly  the  contents  of  the  letter, 
and  had  addressed  to  it  the  above-mentioned  invitation,  I  left 
the  council-chamber. 

My  proposal  was  nevertheless  determined  on,  and  I  was  in- 
formed of  the  fact  by  two  delegates  of  the  assembly. 

After  the  expiration  of  the  time  up  to  which  Kossuth  had  re- 
served to  himself  the  dignity  of  governor  (as  already  said,  this 
was  an  hour  of  the  evening — if  I  mistake  not,  8  o'clock  of  the 
11th  of  August),  three  trumpets  left  the  head-quarters  of  Alt- 
Arad  for  the  purpose  of  forwarding  my  letter  to  Count  Riidiger. 

From  the  simple  description  of  the  manner  in  which  my  pro- 
posal for  an  unconditional  surrender  to  the  Russians  was  resolved 
upon  by  the  military  council ,  the  reader  might  be  inclined  to  con- 
clude that  I  had  not,  after  all,  been  originally  in  good  earnest 
about  the  laying  down  of  our  anjis  in  general,  as  well  as  in  par- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  5flH 

ticular  about  the  performance  of  this  act  before  Russian  troops  ; 
since  I  pledged  myself  beforehand  to  the  military  council,  un- 
asked and  without  any  reservation,  to  execute  any  of  its  pos- 
sible resolutions,  even  if  by  them  my  proposal  should  be  partially 
or  even  wholly  set  aside,  without  previously  being  sure  of  my 
object,  without  having  done  the  least  to  assure  myself  of  it, 
without  having  made  use  of  so  many  means  lying  near  at  hand 
— as,  preliminary  agitations,  a  precautionary  sifting  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  military  council,  presiding  myself  in  the  council — 
without  employing  one  of  these  and  similar  means,  which  surely 
would  have  been  calculated  to  guarantee  the  reception  of  my 
proposal. 

Certainly  in  the  camp  of  the  army  under  my  command  no 
kind  of  agitation  for  the  laying  down  of  our  arms  took  place,  at 
least  I  knew  nothing  of  it,  unless  it  was  that  perhaps  Kossuth, 
Szemere,  and  Count  Batthyanyi's  evident  prepossession  in  favor 
of  the  groundless  idea  of  concluding  a  peace  with  Russia,  or  the 
efforts  made  by  these  men  for  the  realization  of  this  idea,  or,  after 
all,  even  Kossuth's  farewell  proclamation,  might  have  operated 
as  an  indirect  agitation  for  the  surrender  of  arms,  although  the 
effect  of  this  could  hardly  have  been  considerable,  because  the 
credit  of  these  men  with  the  army  was  not  great ;  certainly  the 
military  council  was  composed  of,  or,  more  correctly,  by  chance 
contained  not  a  few  select  persons,  but,  without  choice,  the 
generals  and  higher  staff-officers  of  the  army  who  happened  to 
be  off  duty  just  then  ;  and  even  individuals  who  no  longer  be- 
longed to  the  army  under  my  command,  or  had  never  belonged 
to  it,  were  allowed  to  take  part  in  the  consultation,  if  only  they 
seemed  to  be  entitled  to  it  by  their  rank ;  certainly  I  renounced 
the  presidency,  nay  even  my  personal  presence  at  the  consulta- 
tion about  the  proposal  made  by  me.  But  the  non-employment 
of  all  these  and  similar  means,  ought,  if  well  considered,  to  fur- 
nish an  irrefragable  proof  how  much  I  was  in  earnest  about  the 
laying  down  of  our  arms  in  general,  and  in  particular  about  the 
performance  of  this  act  before  Russian  troops  exclusively,  before 
the  decision  of  the  military  council.  For,  in  my  opinion,  agita- 
tions for  the  laying  down  of  our  arms  would  have  served  only  to 
demoralize  the  troops,  to  render  them  unfit  for  repelling,  if  eventu- 
ally necessary,  Austrian  attacks,  and,  on  the  contrary,  fitter  to 
disperse  themselves  ;  further,  in  my  opinion,  with  the  decision  of 


592  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HITNGARY. 

a  military  council  composed  of  a  few  chosen  persons,  as  well  as 
in  general  with  such  a  decision  taken  under  the  predominating 
influence  of  my  personal  participation  in  the  council,  only  a  de- 
cision would  have  heen  obtained,  but  its  carrying  mit  would, 
with  all  that,  have  been  doubtful. 

That  the  laying  down  of  our  arms  should  not  only  be  decided 
on,  but  that  it  should  also  be  executed,  the  military  council  must 
be  numerous,  and  formed  at  hap-hazard,  without  choice,  not  a 
picked  one  ;  I  must  give  full  liberty  of  debate  on  my  proposal ;  I 
ought  even  not  to  embarrass  it  by  my  personal  presence ;  least 
of  all  ought  I  to  lower  myself  by  delusive  agitations,  even  if  I  had 
possessed  the  moral  capacity,  which  was  not  the  case. 

Only  thus  could  I  succeed  in  keeping  together  the  army  until 
the  last  moment ;  only  thus  could  I  render  the  military  council 
almost  as  inaccessible  to  the  suspicion  that  I  wished  the  laying 
down  of  arms  in  general,  or  at  least  the  performance  of  this  act 
before  the  Russians,  for  my  'personal  interest,  as  I  myself  had  re- 
mained inaccessible  to  every  thought  of  saving  my  person  from 
the  consequences  of  my  acts.  Only  thus  could  the  receiving  of 
my  motion  by  the  military  council  be  at  the  same  time  a  guaran- 
tee for  its  execution ;  for  only  in  bringing  it  forward  neither  by 
means  of  agitations,  nor  under  the  predominating  influence  of  my 
personal  participation  in  the  deliberation,  could  I  rely,  in  the 
execution  of  this  determination,  upon  the  voluntary  co-operation 
of  all  those  who  had  taken  part  in  the  decisive  debate ;  but 
among  them  were  the  bravest  generals  and  staff'-officers  of  the 
army — men  without  whose  heroic  renunciation  of  any  attempt 
to  save  their  lives,  the  surrender  of  arms  would  never  have  been 
possible. 

My  assertion,  that  these  men  had  completely  renounced  the 
preservation  of  their  lives,  when  they  resolved  upon  the  act  of 
surrendering  before  the  Russians,  might  certainly  be  vigorously 
attacked  from  diflerent  sides  and  with  different  views. 

This  assertion,  however,  is  founded  on  the  facts,  that  I  not 
only  did  not  conceal  from  the  military  council — ^before  I  left  it 
to  decide  upon  my  motion — the  contents  of  the  above-commu- 
nicated indirect  answer  of  the  Russian  commander  to  the  diplo- 
matic efforts  of  the  ministers  Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  plainly  warned  it  not  to  expect  any  results 
whatever  from  my  appeal  to  the  magnanimity  and  love  of  justice 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAHY.  593 

of  the  Czar,  as  well  a^  generally,  in  forming  their  resolution,  not 
to  set  out  from  the  illusion,  that  there  was  still  a  prospect  for  us 
of  the  possibility  of  preservation  from  Austrian  courts-martial 
under  Russian  protection.  And  in  consequence  of  this  warning, 
as  well  as  of  the  answer  of  the  Russian  commander,  which  left 
not  even  the  hope  that  Russia  could  reserve  to  itself  the  part  of 
mediator  between  Austria  and  Hungary,  my  proposal  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  rejected,  and  at  the  same  time  the  breaking 
through  into  the  Turkish  territory  would  have  been  resolved  upon, 
if  the  members  of  the  military  council  had  not  set  less  value  on 
their  own  lives  than  on  the  speedy  deliverance  of  their  fellow- 
citizens  from  the  miseries  of  a  hopeless  war.  The  supposition 
that  the  military  council  had  declared  its  accordance  with  my 
letter  to  Count  Riidiger  only  because  it  had  indulged  the  hope 
that  the  Russians  would  save  us  from  the  Austrian  courts-martial, 
would  consequently  be  quite  untenable  ;  would  be  in  fact  no- 
thing else  than  intentionally  to  create  a  suspicion. 

The  military  council  approved  of  my  letter  being  sent  to  the 
Russian  commander,  because  every  single  member  of  the  council 
strongly  felt  that  the  decision  of  the  moment  was,  whether,  in 
the  last  issue,  the  highest  honor  which  one  enemy  can  give  to 
another  enemy  should  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  Russian  or  the  Aus- 
trian general ;  and  because  not  a  single  member  of  the  council 
overlooked  the  circumstance  that  the  Austrian  general.  Baron 
Haynau,  had  rendered  himself  unworthy  of  this  highest  honor  by 
the  first  of  his  doings  in  Hungary — the  well-known  executions  at 
Presburg. 

Of  the  prevalence  of  any  other  motive  m  the  decision  of  the 
military  council  in  favor  of  my  proposal  (to  lay  down  our  arms 
before  Russian  troops  exclusively),  I  have  heard  nothing.  The 
motives  of  a  political  nature,  clearly  and  distinctly  expressed  in 
what  precedes,  which  had  determined  me  to  make  this  proposal, 
could  not  possibly  have  led  to  its  being  received,  because  I  had 
•  not  communicated  these  motives  either  to  a  member  of  the 
council  or  to  any  one  else,  and  because  I  have  never  subsequently 
heard  any  expression,  from  which  I  could  suppose  that  one  of 
these  motives  had  been  referred  to  during  the  deliberation  by  any 
body. 

On  the  contrary,  it  is  my  settled  conviction  that  I  should  cer- 
tainly have  failed  in  my  proposal  to  perform  the  laying  down  of 


594  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

our  anns  before  Russian  troops  only,  if  Baron  Haynau  had  known 
how — like  many  a  one  of  his  sub-commanders — to  gain  for  him- 
self the  fame  of  a  humane  personal  character,  which  does  not 
sound  dishonorably  even  in  the  mouth  of  an  enemy. 


CHAPTER  LXXIX. 

Immediately  after  I  had  learned  from  Count  Guyon's  report  to 
Governor  Kossuth  the  issue  of  the  battle  at  Temesvar  (conse- 
quently before  daybreak  of  the  11  th  of  August),  orders  to  retreat 
without  delay  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river  were  issued  to  the 
first  and  seventh  corps,  which  in  consequence  of  the  last  disposi- 
tions were  deployed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Maros.  The  first 
corps  was  charged  with  the  eventual  defense  of  the  latter  against 
the  Austrian  corps  which,  as  is  known,  had  pressed  forward,  on 
the  preceding  day,  on  the  road  to  Temesvar  nearly  to  Neu-Arad ; 
while  the  third  and  seventh  corps,  together  with  the  division  of 
reserve,  encamped  in  battle-array  to  the  north  and  northwest  of 
Alt-Arad,  on  the  roads  leading  to  Simand  and  Pecska.  This 
disposition  originated  from  the  news,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the 
van-guard  of  the  Russian  main  army  was  already  posted  near 
Simand,  and  on  the  other,  that  a  strong  Austrian  corps  was  ap- 
proaching from  Pecska. 

This  position  of  the  army  remained  unchanged  during  the 
whole  day,  and  without  being  attacked  by  the  Austrians.  The 
Russians,  as  it  became  afterwards  evident,  were  not  near  enough 
to  be  able  to  attack  us  at  Alt-Arad  during  the  couirse  of  the  11  th. 

In  the  night  between  the  11th  and  12th  (after  our  trumpets 
had  left  the  head-quarters  with  my  letter,  spoken  of  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter,  to  Count  Riidiger  ;  and  General  Damjanics  more-* 
over,  having  previously  been  informed  of  the  impending  uncon- 
ditional surrender  of  the  army,  had  declared  of  his  own  accord, 
that  as  commander  of  the  fortress  of  Arad  he  would  follow  the 
example  of  the  army),  the  whole  army  commanded  by  me 
moved  from  the  above-indicated  position  in  and  around  Arad, 
on  the  road  to  Villages,  reached  this  point  early  in  the  morning 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  595 

of  the  12th  of  August,  and  encamped  near  and  before  this  place 
in  battle-array,  its  front  and  outposts  facing  Arad. 

Here  the  whole  army  remained  stationary  till  late  in  the 
morning  of  the  next  day 

According  to  the  last  news,  which  I  had  received  on  the  pre- 
vious day  when  still  in  Arad,  relative  to  the  movements  of  the 
Russian  main  army,  I  necessarily  supposed  it  possible,  as  inti- 
mated in  my  letter  to  Count  Riidiger,  that  I  should  be  pursued 
by  Austrian  troops  on  the  retreat  from  Arad  toward  Beel. 

This  news  was,  that  not  the  corps  of  the  van-guard,  but  only 
Cossacks  (the  foremost  advanced  troops)  had  approached  Simand 
during  the  day  (the  1 1th  of  August).  And  I  knew  already,  from 
my  experience  of  the  use  made  of  the  Cossacks,  obtained  during 
the  retreat  from  Komorn  to  Arad,  that  the  nearest  considerable 
force  of  the  Russians  may  with  much  probability  be  assumed  to 
be  still  two,  not  seldom  even  three  ordinary  days'  march  from 
the  point  where  the  first  divisions  of  Cossacks  emerge  alone. 

Consequently,  from  the  news,  that  in  the  course  of  the  11th 
the  first  divisions  of  Cossacks  had  been  seen  only  at  Simand 
(four  miles  to  the  north  of  Arad),  I  conjectured  that  the  main 
body  of  the  Russian  corps  of  the  van-guard  (the  commander  of 
this  corps  was  Count  Riidiger,  as  General  Poltenberg  had  re- 
ported) could  scarcely  have  crossed  the  river  Koros  at  Nagy- 
Zerend  (from  three  to  four  miles  north  of  Simand).  This  con-* 
jecture  seemed  moreover  to  be  confirmed  by  the  circumstance, 
that  Count  Riidiger — as  his  letter,  which  reached  me  through 
General  Poltenberg,  showed — on  the  9th  of  August  was  still  in 
Artand ;  the  distance  from  Artand  to  Nagy-Zerend  being  ten 
miles. 

According  to  this  conjecture,  which,  as  I  have  just  shown, 
was  not  unfounded,  I  could  not  possibly  expect  that  Count 
Riidiger  would  arrive  by  daylight  of  the  12th  with  his  corps 
between  Vilagos  and  Arad,  in  order  to  separate  me — as  invited 
to  do  by  my  letter — from  the  Austrians,  and  thereby  prevent 
any  further  conflict  between  the  Austrian  troops  and  those  com- 
manded by  me.  I  could  not  expect  this,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
the  distance  from  Nagy-Zerend  to  the  road  which  leads  from 
Arad  to  Vilagos  is  six  miles,  and  that  it  was  an  absolute  impos- 
sibility for  Count  Riidiger  to  pass  over  this  distance  with  his 
corps  before  late  in  the  evening  of  the  12th,  even  if  he  set  out 


596  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

immediately  after  the  receipt  of  my  letter.  On  the  contrary, 
the  advance  of  an  Austrian  column  from  Arad  toward  Vilagos 
in  the  course  of  the  same  day  seemed  certainly  not  impossible. 

Count  Riidiger,  however — what  I  could  not  foresee — thought 
it  sufficient  for  separating  us  from  the  Austrians,  to  send  only 
his  foremost  advanced  troops  from  Simand  on  the  road  from 
Vilagos  to  Arad.  This  was  done  hefore  noon  of  the  12th  of 
August ;  and  immediately  afterward  appeared  the  commander 
of  these  advanced  Russian  troops,  accompanied  by  our  trumpets, 
who  were  just  returning  to  the  head-quarters  in  Vilagos  to  inform 
me  of  this  movement. 

So  long  as  I  must  still  be  prepared  for  an  attack  on  the  part 
of  the  Austrians,  it  was  absolutely  necessary — considering  my 
very  serious  intention  to  oppose  them  with  the  greatest  energy 
— to  keep  the  decision  of  the  Arad  military  council  secret  from 
the  troops.  This  necessity  had  also  been  perceived  by  the  coun- 
cil, which  had  pledged  itself  for  this  very  reason  to  leave  to  me 
personally  to  fix  the  time  when  the  real  object  of  our  retreat 
from  Arad  toward  Beel  should  be  communicated  to  the  troops, 
as  well  as  the  act  of  the  communication  itself 

The  time  for  informing  the  troops  of  the  mournful  fate  which 
awaited  them  would  certainly  have  been  the  moment  when  the 
report  arrived  from  our  outposts,  that  a  hostile  column,  descend- 
ing from  tljip  direction  of  Simand,  was  approaching  laterally  the 
road  from  Vilagos  to  Arad.  The  commander  of  the  Russian 
advanced  troops,  however,  preceding  his  column,  had  arrived  at 
the  head-quarters  at  Vilagos  before  this  report;  and,  prevented 
partly  by  his  presence,  partly  by  attending  to  some  pressing  mili- 
tary affairs  which  could  not  be  deferred,  I  failed  to  repair  to  the 
camp  immediately  after  the  receipt  of  this  report  from  the  outposts, 
and  explain  in  person  to  the  troops  the  real  meaning  of  the  flank- 
manoeuvre  of  the  Russian  column.  All  the  corps  of  the  army, 
alarmed  by  the  approach  of  this  column,  had  got  ready  for  battle. 
And  now  they  received  without  any  comment  my  simple  order 
to  abstain  in  future  from  all  kinds  of  hostihties.  The  thought, 
that  treason  was  going  on,  was'  obvious  enough  to  be  improved 
for  agitations  against  my  person,  or  perhaps  only  against  further 
remaining  together,  by  some  declaimers,  who  would  have  pre- 
ferred an  aimless  flight  on  their  own  account,  to  the  fate'  ol 
being  made  prisoners  of  war  and  its  consequences.     The  result 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  597 

of  this  was,  that  I  was  surprised,  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
12th,  by  a  report,  that  mutiny  threatened  to  break  out  in  the 
camp. 

Determined  to  prevent  this,  I  immediately  repaired  to  the  camp : 
and  the  event  showed  that  this  report  was  founded  either  on  ex- 
aggeration, or  that  my  personal  appearance  among  the  revolted 
troops  must  have  been  sufficient  of  itself  to  keep  the  army  obe- 
dient to  my  orders  till  the  laying  down  of  arms  was  accomplished. 
For  during  my  presence  in  the  camp  I  confined  myself  merely  to 
announcing  to  the  separate  army  corps,  that,  perceiving  the  im- 
possibility of  conquering  both  hostile  armies,  I  had  resolved  on 
our  voluntary  disarming  before  Russian  troops  ;  that  I  expected 
obedience,  and  engaged  my  life  that  it  would  be  paid  to  me  in 
future  as  it  had  hitherto  ;  that  the  surrender  was  at  discretion ; 
that  this  step  nevertheless,  in  the  face  of  the  sad  position  in 
which  Hungary  found  itself  for  the  moment,  was  a  patriotic,  not 
a  disgraceful  one — one  endangering  our  lives  certainly  ;  but  that 
I,  on  whose  head  the  vengeance  of  the  enemy  must  chiefly  alight, 
did  not  shrink  from  this  step ;  and  that  I  was  convinced,  those 
who  had  hitherto  followed  me  with  manly  courage  into  the  bat- 
tle, would  not  now  desert  me ;  the  others,  if  dismayed,  I  should 
know  how,  with  the  assistance  of  their  brave  comrades,  as  form- 
erly to  drive  into  the  battle,  so  now  into  becoming  prisoners ;  to 
them — ^the  discouraged — it  was  further  declared,^ that — exclu- 
sively for  the  purpose  of  rendering  impossible  a  disgraceful  flight 
— on  an  understanding  with  me,  the  army  had  been  completely 
surrounded  by  Russian  troops ;  that  this  measure  had  no  reference 
to  the  brave ;  they — the  brave — I  knew  beforehand  could  never 
be  regardless  of  the  honorable  duty  of  voluntarily  maintaining 
military  order  in  the  army  up  to  the  last  moment. 

After  I  had  spoken  to  this  effect  to  the  troops,  I  returned  again 
to  the  head-quarters ;  for  from  their  behavior  toward  me,  I  was 
already  convinced  that  the  danger  of  mutiny,  even  if  it  had  been 
really  on  the  point  of  breaking  out  before  my  ride  into  the  camp, 
was  now  over. 

In  striking  contradiction  to  the  mutinous  intrigues  which,  in 
consequence  of  the  sudden  cessation  of  hostilities  against  the  Rus- 
sians, had  shown  themselves,  though  only  for  a  little  while,  in 
the  ranks  of  the  army  under  my  command,  whole  swarms  of 
fugitives  arrived  toward  evening  of  the  12th  of  August  at  Vilagos 


598  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

among  others  also  a  detachment  of  several  hundred  men  (mostly 
still  unarmed  recruits),  of  the  presence  of  which  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Maros  I  had  not  been  at  all  informed.  The  leader  of  this 
detachment  reported  to  me,  that,  having  been  alarmed  by  the 
rumor  that  the  Austrians  had  already  occupied  Alt-Arad,  he  had 
intended  about  noon  to  start  from  Radna  by  Lippa  for  Lugos, 
"when  an  Austrian  column  suddenly  approached  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Maros  toward  Lippa  ;  whereupon  he  not  only  gave  up  the 
intended  march  to  Lugos,  but  immediately  burnt  down  the  bridge 
over  the  Maros  between  Radna  and  Lippa,  and  again  drew  back 
some  distance  toward  Arad.  He  now  really  knew  not  whither 
he  should  turn.  But  among  the  fugitives,  to  whom,  as  to  him 
and  to  his  detachment,  the  road  to  Lugos,  was  now  interrupted 
by  the  Austrian  column,  the  rumor  of  my  march  toward  Vilagos 
soon  spread,  and  that  I  had  already  concluded  an  advantageous 
peace  with  the  Russians.  This  rumor  determined  him  and  the 
whole  mass  of  the  fugitives  to  save  themselves  at  Vilagos. 

What  a  blind  belief  the  rumor  that  I  had  obtained  an  advan- 
tageous peace  with  the  Russians  must  have  found  beyond  the 
camp  and  the  head-quarters  of  the  army  which  I  commanded,  is 
evident,  above  all,  from  the  remarkable  circumstance,  that  among 
the  fugitives  who  arrived  at  Vilagos  in  the  course  of  the  12th  of 
August  were  a  great  number  of  those  officers  (mostly  from  Dem- 
binski's  army)  who  had  deserted  in  the  beginning  of  August. 

They  were  people  of  an  avowedly  prudent  character.  They 
would  certainly  have  avoided,  at  any  cost,  the  proximity  of  the 
army  under  my  command,  if  they  had  entertained  the  sHghtest 
suspicion  that  the  said  advantageous  peace  concluded  with  the 
Russian  commander  was  mere  fudge.  But  how  could  they,  as 
well  as  many  thousands  besides,  have  any  presentiment  that  the 
solution  of  all  those  oracles  contained  in  Kossuth's  farewell  pro- 
clamation, equally  enigmatical  and  much-promising,  would  be  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  arms  ?  It  must  not  be  said,  that  they 
might  have  deduced  it  from  the  proclamation  in  which  I  informed 
the  citizens  of  Alt-Arad  of  the  resignation  of  the  provisional  gov- 
ernment, as  well  as  of  the  junction  of  the  highest  civil  and  mil- 
itary power  in  my  person.  My  proclamation  was  prose ;  Kos- 
suth's, poetry.  The  public,  to  whom  we  both  spoke,  had  no 
comprehension  for  the  prose  of  the  strict  warrior  ;  for  the  poetry 
of  the  great  agitator,  on  the  contrary,  a  high  degree  of  suscepti- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  599 

bility.  The  public,  must  not,  therefore,  be  blamed ;  it  may  at 
most  be  pitied,  that  the  agitator  was  not  a  warrior,  the  warrior 
not  an  agitator ;  that  consequently  their  routes  must  diverge. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  mention,  that  of  all  who  subsequently 
arrived  at  Vilagos  merely  with  the  intention  of  saving  their  own 
worthy  persons  under  Russian  protection — when  they  had  learnt 
the  "  advantageous  conditions  for  peace" — those  only  remained 
with  the  army,  who,  being  subordinate  soldiers,  belonged  to  the 
ranks,  and  were  obliged  to  give  up  all  further  attempts  at  flight. 

In  the  category  of  those  whom  the  absurd  rumors  had  enticed 
to  Yilagos  must,  however,  Twt  be  included  tJiose  meji  who,  determ- 
ined to  share  the  fate  of  the  army,  had  never  left  it  since  it  was 
in  Alt-Arad.  These  were,  the  ministers  Csanyi  and  General 
Aulich  ;  the  generals  not  belonging  to  the  active  contingent  of  the 
army.  Kiss,  Lahner,  Knezich,  Schweidel,  Gaspar,  Torok,  and 
Lenkey  ;  and  besides  many  members  of  the  Diet.  Of  the  latter, 
almost  all — so  far  as  I  know — ^belonged  to  the  peace-party. 

On  the  previous  day  (the  11th  of  August) — as  has  been  men- 
tioned— and  this  before  the  resignation  of  the  provisional  govern- 
ment, I  had  communicated  to  the  minister  Csanyi  my  determina- 
tion to  surrender  at  discretion.  Immediately  after  the  retirement 
of  the  provisional  government,  however,  and  before  the  convoca- 
tion of  the  decisive  military  council,  a  lengthened  consultation 
took  place  between  Csanyi  and  myself  upon  the  questions  of  an 
unconditional  surrender,  or  a  still  further  prosecution  of  the  con- 
test. Csanyi  endeavored  to  maintain  divers  possibilities  of  new 
success  on  the  battle-field,  in  order  to  gain  me  to  a  continuance 
of  the  struggle ;  and  he  did  not  give  up  his  endeavors  until  after 
I  had  undisguisedly  expressed  my  conviction  that,  in  our  present 
situation,  without  war  supplies,  without  money,  with  the  sup- 
port of  the  troops  dependent  exclusively  on  contributions — even  if 
the  possibility  of  new  successful  war-operations  were  admitted — on 
the  one  hand,  the  permanence  of  them  must  at  all  events  be 
denied  ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  objection  to  a  combat,  to  be 
maintained,  against  the  well-known  "Wallenstein  maxim,  in  our 
oivn  country,  must  be  plainly  seen.  It  was  on  this  occasion  also 
that  Csanyi  declared,  without  being  asked,  that  he  was  deter- 
mined to  remain  with  the  army  ;  for  he  felt  there  was  no  neces- 
sity to  save  his  life,  if  he  could  no  longer  devote  it  to  the  service 
of  the  fatherland. 


600  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

General  Aulich,  like  the  other  generals,  had  been  summoned  to 
take  part  in  the  council  of  war  in  which  the  sending  of  my  letter 
to  Count  Riidiger  was  approved. 

The  above-mentioned  members  of  the  Diet,  finally,  had  joined, 
as  it  appeared,  properly  the  minister  Csanyi  direct.  Disquieted 
by  the  thought  that  they  had  taken  this  step  perhaps  in  the 
vain  expectation  of  finding  in  the  Russian  camp  protection  from 
the  persecutions  of  Austria,  I  applied  to  Csanyi,  for  the  purpose 
of  learning  something  certain  on  this  point.  This  I  did  at  Yilagos 
on  the  12th  of  August.  And  Csanyi  assured  me,  he  had  commu- 
nicated to  his  companions,  while  still  in  Alt-Arad,  that  our  sur- 
render would  be  at  discretion.  Several  of  them  thereupon  were 
undecided  whether  they  should  remain  or  flee  ;  the  greater  num- 
ber, however,  without  hesitation  declared  that  they  were  determ- 
ined not  to  avoid  the  fate  which  awaited  them  in  the  fatherland  ; 
they  only  wished  for  the  present  to  remain  with  the  army,  until 
the  enemy  should  have  disposed  of  their  persons.  The  undecided, 
however,  he  had  himself  advised  to  flee ;  but  he  was  sorry  he 
had  done  so — for  they,  very  probably  hurt  thereby,  now  declared 
that  they  also  would  persevere,  like  himself  and  the  others ; 
though  he  feared  that  this  victor}^  of  their  sense  of  national  honor 
over  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  was  not  a  lasting  one,  that 
their  courage  to  die  would  not  remain  unshaken ;  and  in  his 
opinion  all  to  whom  there  seemed  at  this  moment  to  be  a  moral 
necessity  voluntarily  to  face  death  for  their  belief  in  the  justice 
of  the  cause  of  the  fatherland — before  they  took  the  decisive  step, 
ought  to  examine  themselves  conscientiously,  lest  their  strength 
should  desert  them,  when  it  might  be  necessary  not  to  deny 
their  belief  in  the  face  of  sneering  enemies,  nay  even  at  the  place 
of  execution.  And  those  who  felt  themselves  not  fully  adequate 
to  this  trial  ought  to  recognize  flight  as  their  nearest  patriotic 
duty ;  that  the  nation  might  not  endure  the  disgrace  of  having 
to  blush  for  the  pusillaniirdty  of  those  men  on  whom  it  once 
relied  as  on  a  rock. 

Let  the  reader  take  into  consideration  with  due  earnestness  the 
facts  of  the  two  conferences  held  at  Arad  between  Csanyi  and 
myself,  upon  the  necessity  of  an  unconditional  surrender,  undeni- 
able in  a  purely  patriotic  point  of  view — the  summoning  of  Aulich 
and  other  generals  to  the  decisive  military  council — Csanyi's 
frank  behavior  toward  his  companions  ;  and  he  will  be  obliged 


Mr  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  601 

unreservedly  to  assent  to  my  assertion,  that  those  ministers,  those 
generals,  and  those  members  of  the  Diet,  who  of  their  own  accord 
joined  the  army  in  Alt-Arad,  can  by  no  means  be  included  in  the 
category  of  those,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  enticed  by  the  absurd 
rumor  that  I  had  concluded  an  advantageous  peace  with  the 
Russians,  suddenly  emerged,  late  in  the  course  of  the  12th  of 
August,  at  Vilagos,  and  speedily  undeceived,  just  as  suddenly 
disappeared  again. 

The  minister  of  finance,  Duschek,  whose  participation  in  the 
contest  of  Hungary  against  Austria — as  Kossuth  himself  assured 
me-^was  not  a  voluntary  one,  was  at  Lugos  at  the  time  of  my 
arrival  at  Arad  (on  the  9th  of  August),  for  the  purpose  of  setting 
the  bank-note  presses  again  to  work.  This,  however,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  defeat  of  Dembinski's  army  at  Temesvar,  had  be- 
come impracticable.  The  presses  were  therefore  brought  from 
Lugos  to  Arad.  The  order  to  do  this  was  issued  by  Kossuth. 
The  minister  of  finance  consequently  arrived  in  person  at  Arad 
on  the  11  th  of  August,  but  not  till  the  provisional  government 
had  resigned.  At  least  I  do  not  remember  to  have  spoken  with 
him  there  before  this  time.  I  gave  him  an  order,  in  the  course 
of  the  following  day  (12th  of  August),  immediately  to  convey  to 
Vilagos  the  whole  store  of  the  public  treasur}'-  in  gold  and  silver, 
as  well  in  bars  as  in  coin,  together  with  the  still  existing  state- 
notes  ;  and — not  convinced  of  his  willingness  to  obey  my  orders 
— I  appointed  two  officers  by  his  side,  with  authority  to  oblige 
him  to  the  punctual  execution  of  my  order,  by  employing  even 
coercive  measures,  according  to  circumstances.  Thus  the  money 
in  the  public  treasury  was  at  my  disposal.  I  had  it  distrib- 
uted among  the  army,  that  it  might  receive  at  least  in  part 
the  pay  which  had  been  due  to  it  for  several  weeks.  The  coin 
found  remaining  in  the  public  treasury  was  unfortunately  not 
sufficient  to  pay  them  in  full.  The  bars  of  precious  metals  in 
store,  however,  I  gave  in  charge  to  the  minister  of  finance,  and 
left  him  to  choose  between  conveying  them  to  the  Russians  or  to 
the  Austrians.     He  resolved  upon  the  latter. 

Besides  the  minister  of  finance,  the  staff-officers  of  hussars, 
Colonel  Zambelli  and  Lieut.-Colonel  Markovich  also,  as  I  know, 
declared  themselves  in  favor  of  surrender  to  the  Austrians. 
This,  however,  I  only  learned  accidentally,  in  consequence  of  a 
violent  discussion,  which  took  place  at  Vilagos  on  the  12th  of 

Cc 


602  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

August,  between  these  two  staff-officers  and  seme  of  their  com- 
rades. I  saw  myself,  however,  obliged  thereby  to  inform  them, 
in  the  presence  of  the  generals  and  staff-officers  of  the  army,  that 
I  expected  the  resolution  of  the  military  council  of  Arad  to  be  re- 
spected as  the  last  unchangeable  decision  upon  the  fate  of  the 
army  ;  that  since  the  moment  when  my  letter  to  Count  Riidiger 
left  the  head-quarters  at  Alt-Arad,  I  considered  the  execution  of 
this  determination  to  be  the  army's  honorable  duty ;  I  had  conse- 
quently to  prevent  the  subsequent  discussion  of  the  question, 
whether  with  the  Russians  or  with  the  Austrians  there  was 
more  prospect  of  escaping  with  a  whole  skin,  as  incompatible 
with  the  honor  of  the  army ;  that  to  this  end  I  proposed  to 
them  to  leave  the  army  instantly,  and  surrender  themselves  to 
the  nearest  Austrian  outposts ;  that  I  called  upon  them  the 
more  decidedly  to  do  this,  as  it  was  quite  impossible  for  me  to 
hold  out  to  them  the  least  prospect,  except  of  a  not  brutal  treat- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  Russians,  whereby  those  expectations 
could  be  compensated  which  they  seemed  to  attach  to  the  per- 
formance of  the  act  of  surrendering  before  the  Austrians.  They 
preferred,  however,  to  remain  with  the  army,  and  not  again  to  dis- 
cuss the  questionable  expediency  of  executing  the  laying  down  of 
our  arms  before  the  Austrians. 

In  the  just-mentioned  last  assembly  of  the  generals  and  staff- 
officers  of  the  army  I  had  purposely  undisguisedly  repeated  my 
conviction,  that  the  most  we  might  expect  from  the  Russians  was 
a  less  brutal  treatment  than  from  the  Austrians,  but  nothing  else, 
namely,  no  kind  of  protection  from  the  vengeance  of  Austria — for 
the  purpose  of  preventing  the  optimist  self-delusions,  in  which  a 
part  of  the  officers  in  the  army — it  is  true,  in  consequence  of  a 
quite  peculiar  inducement  thereto — began  to  indulge  already  on 
the  12th  of  August  at  Vilagos. 

This  inducement  was  furnished  by  an  invitation  of  Count 
Riidiger,  which  reached  me  on  the  same  day,  to  inform  him  of 
the  most  urgent  requests  of  the  army,  as  he  was  ready  to  inter- 
cede with  his  chief  to  gain  attention  for  them  ;  and  the  con- 
jectures of  some  of  the  officers  relative  to  the  bearing  of  this  in- 
vitation mounted  so  high  as  to  assume  that  there  was  now  a  pos- 
sibility of  forthwith  passing  over  into  the  Russian  service. 

Several  subaltern  officers  even  requested  to  be  advanced  to  a 
higher  rank  b<»fore  the  laying  down  of  arms,  because,  as  they 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  603 

thought,  this  higher  rank  in  our  army  would  secure  to  them  a 
proportionately  higher  one  in  the  Russian  army.  I  represented 
to  them,  how  unworthy  it  was  to  think  of  entering  into  the  Rus- 
sian army,  in  the  face  of  the  loss  of  the  cause  of  the  fatherland 
being  just  the  direct  consequence  of  the  Russian  intervention. 
They  seemed,  however,  not  so  much  affected  by  my  representa- 
tions relative  to  the  unworthiness  of  their  request,  as,  on  the  con- 
trary, to  be  inconsolable  that  I  so  decidedly  refused  them  the 
latter.  And,  in  fact,  they  and  their  sympathizers  did  not  allow 
themselves  to  be  at  all  disturbed  by  the  severe  censure,  which, 
agreeing  with  me,  the  bravest  generals  and  staff'-officers  of  the 
army  expressed  at  every  opportunity  about  their  thinking  on  Rus- 
sian service.  Based  on  the  thesis,  certainly  indisputable,  that 
"one  may  ask  any  thing,"  and  without  caring  about  thereby 
losing  the  esteem  of  his  companions  in  arms,  many  a  one  persisted, 
that  the  request  to  permit  those  who  wished  to  enter  Russian 
service  should  be  comprehended  in  the  specification  of  the  army's 
requests  which  was  to  be  delivered  to  Count  Riidiger. 

I  did  not  consider  that  the  philanthropic  ofi^er  of  Count  Riidiger 
to  obtain  attention  from  his  chief  to  the  most  urgent  requests  of 
our  army  was  insincere  :  any  hope  of  a  favorable  result  from  his 
efforts,  I  must,  however,  unfortunately  renounce  ;  for  the  Russian 
commander-in-chief,  in  his  answer  to  the  diplomatic  letter  of 
Szemere  and  Count  Batthyanyi  (see  Chapter  LXXVIIL),  had 
not  at  all  left  me  in  the  dark  as  to  the  extent  of  his  task  respect- 
ing us  ;  and  to  attend  to  even  the  most  natural  wishes  of  the 
army  under  my  command  would  not  be  a  warlike  but  a  political 
act — lay  therefore  beyond  the  limits  which,  according  to  the  as- 
sertion of  the  Russian  General  himself,  were  prescribed  to  him. 

Consequently,  on  the  12th  of  August  at  Vilagos,  our  future,  in 
spite  of  this  philanthropic  offer  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  officer, 
appeared  to  me  not  less  comfortless  than  on  the  previous  day  at 
Arad  ;  and  in  fact  I  had  continually  to  remind  myself  of  the  duty, 
unmistakable  if  viewed  from  the  point  of  national  honor,  of  main- 
taining the  discipline  of  the  army  till  the  last  moment  of  its  ex- 
istence ;  that  I  might  not  be  overcome  by  the  anxious  apprehen- 
sion, that  the  delivery  of  my  own  person  to  save  the  lives  of  my 
subordinates  might  nevertheless  hardly  suffice,  and  be  induced 
forthwith  to  admonish  all  the  generals  and  superior  staffs-officers 
of  Ihe  army  to  take  to  flight.     In  the  case  of  some  of  them — those, 


604  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

namely,  who  in  the  fall  of  Hungary  happened  not  to  have  to 
lament  that  of  their  country — I  thought,  however,  that  I  ought 
not  to  abstain  from  this  invitation  :  I  ventured  it — ^but  in  vain  I 
To  the  thought  of  forestalling  the  forcible  separation  from  his 
friends  and  companions  in  arms,  for  the  sake  of  his  own  safety, 
no  one  of  them  all  was  accessible. 

The  forcible  separation,  however,  was  near  at  hand,  and  urged 
us — my  friends  and  comrades  as  well  as  myself — on  the  evening 
preceding  the  accomplishment  of  the  fate  we  had  chosen  for  our- 
selves, to  the  solemn  exchange  of  a  last  encouraging  **God  be 
with  thee !" 

In  the  night  between  the  12th  and  13th  of  August  the  chief 
of  the  general  staff  of  Count  E-iidiger  appeared  in  the  head-quar- 
ters at  Vilagos,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  with  me,  where  the 
act  of  surrender  was  to  take  place  on  the  following  day.  The 
result  of  this  conference  was  as  follows  : 

The  voluntary  disarming  of  the  army  under  my  command 
should  be  made  at  Szollos — at  the  point  of  junction  of  the  roads 
from  Kis-Jeno  by  Zarand  and  from  Vilagos  by  Uj-Pankota  to 
Boros-Jeno — on  the  ground  between  the  southern  outskirts  of 
Szollos  and  the  Miihlen  canal,  crossing  the  road  from  Vilagos. 

The  corps  of  Count  Riidiger,  very  early  on  the  13th  of  August, 
approaching  from  Kis-Jeno,  should  inclose  the  above-designated 
ground  on  the  east,  north,  and  west,  occupying  with  a  part  of  its 
troops  the  brook  Csiger,  between  Moroda  and  Szollos,  as  well  as 
the  latter  place,  and  establishing  its  main  body  between  Zarand 
and  Szollos,  with  its  front  toward  the  east. 

The  army  under  my  command,  on  the  contrary,  in  order  to 
afford  the  Russian  corps  the  time  necessary  for  taking  up  the  in- 
dicated positions,  should  not  start  from  Vilagos  for  Szollos  till 
late  in  the  forenoon  of  the  13th  of  August,  followed  by  the  col- 
umn of  the  Russian  cavalry  corps  standing  between  Vilagos  and 
Arad.  This  column  would  finally  have  to  occupy  the  Miihlen 
canal  also,  as  soon  as  the  last  Hungarian  troops  had  crossed  it. 


CHAPTER  LXXX. 

On  the  13th  of  August,  1849,  between  ten  and  eleven  o'clock 
in  the  forenoon,  their  last  encampment  was  left  by  the  shattered 
remains  of  those  troops  whose  victories  had  certainly  preserved 
Hungary  from  the  disgrace  of  having  failed  in  a  proper  answer 
to  the  "  Olmiitz  octroyed,"  but  at  the  same  time  had  enabled 
Louis  Kossuth  to  give  a  turn  to  the  just  contest  for  the  law  by 
which  he — depriving  the  nation  of  its  just  right — could  only  gain 
for  himself  the  thanks  of  the  Austrian  government,  never  those 
of  his  fatherland. 

In  company  with  some  officers  of  the  army,  whom  their  duty 
did  not  confine  close  to  the  troops,  I  pushed  forward  toward 
SzoUos. 

Not  far  from  Uj-Pankota  we  met  a  Russian  trumpet,  who  was 
charged,  in  the  name  of  his  chief.  Count  Riidiger,  to  ask  from 
me  a  definite  verbal  declaration,  that  it  was  my  sincere  determ- 
ination unconditionally  to  lay  down  our  arms  at  the  place  ap- 
pointed. 

I  unhesitatingly  made  the  desired  declaration ;  and  in  order 
fully  to  convince  the  trumpet  of  my  sincerity,  I  requested  him 
immediately  to  conduct  me  to  his  chief 

This  the  trumpet  agreed  to,  and  remained  close  by  me  while 
we  (my  companions  and  myself)  pursued  our  ride  to  the  Miihlen 
canal  before  Szollos.  Here  the  trumpet  left  us,  in  order,  first  of 
all,  to  carry  my  answer  to  his  chief;  while  we  awaited  his  return 
on  the  bridge  over  the  canal,  and  meanwhile  could  convince 
ourselves  that  the  disposition  of  the  hostile  troops  had  really 
been  carried  out  as  agreed  upon.  The  open  ground  enabled  us 
to  perceive,  in  the  east,  a  hostile  column  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  brook  Csiger  between  Moroda  and  SzoUos.  The  latter  place 
lies  to  the  north  of  the  canal  bridge ;  from  the  outskirts  glittered 
the  Russian  helmets,  and  in  the  west,  leaning  to  the  left  on 
Zarand,  to  the  right  on  the  Miihlen  canal,  was  deployed  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy's  force.     In  this  direction  the  trumpet  turned 


fins  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAUY. 

from  the  high  road,  after  he  had  left  us  by  the  canal  bridge.  He 
soon  returned,  and  told  me  that  Count  Riidiger  was  waiting  for 
me  in  front  of  his  troops. 

Followed  by  my  companions,  I  immediately  proceeded  to  the 
place  which  had  been  pointed  out.  As  we  drew  near  to  the 
hostile  position,  we  perceived  in  front  of  it  an  isolated  group  of 
horsemen  ;  and  the  next  moment,  one  of  them  detaching  himself 
from  the  party  singly  approached  us. 

My  companions  now  stopped ;  I  advanced  alone  up  to  the 
rider,  saluted  him,  and  gave  my  name  ;  for  I  supposed  that  I 
now  stood  before  the  commander  of  the  Russian  corps,  General 
Count  Rildiger.  And  such  was  indeed  the  case.  Count  Riidiger 
seemed  filled  with  the  noble  desire  of  alleviating  as  much  as 
possible  the  depression  of  my  present  situation  ;  for  his  first  words 
to  me  contained  the  frank  assurance  that  he  fully  appreciated 
the  motive  which  had  induced  us  voluntarily  to  abandon  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  ;  and  in  confirmation  of  this  he  offered  me 
his  right  hand.  An  audible,  involuntary  exclamation  of  my 
companions  betrayed  how  agreeably  they  were  surprised  at  this 
proof  of  esteem  from  the  victor  to  the  now  unfortunate  leader  of 
the  vanquished.  This  exclamation  also  betrayed,  perhaps,  the 
sudden  revival  of  hope  in  the  heart  of  many  a  one  of  my  com- 
panions— a  hope  which  it  seemed,  however,  impossible  for  the 
man  to  fulfill  by  whom  it  had — with  the  purest  intention,  I  am 
convinced — been  for  a  moment  revived,  and  afterward  nour- 
ished. 

Taking  the  respectful  demeanor  of  the  hostile  leader  toward 
me  for  the  emanation  of  a  certain  reverence,  not  perhaps  for  my 
person,  but  for  the  greatness  of  our  misfortune,  I  delivered  to 
Count  Riidiger,  together  with  a  list  of  our  requests,  the  names 
also  of  those  members  of  the  provisional  Government  and  of  the 
Diet  who  had  voluntarily  attached  themselves  to  the  army,  and 
who  had  requested  me  to  obtain,  if  possible,  for  them  at  least 
permission  to  remain  with  the  army  during  its  captivity,  until 
the  fate  of  each  of  them  had  been  decided. 

The  very  modest  request  of  these  resigned  men  could  now 
scarcely  be  disregarded  ;  but  Count  Riidiger  not  only  guaranteed 
to  them,  as  to  all  who  surrendered,  the  undisturbed  possession  of 
the  property  they  had  with  them,  but  consented  that  all  generals 
and  officers  should  retain  their  arms.     For  the  remaining  re- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  607 

quests,  which  he  had  not  the  power  to  grant,  he  promised  to  use 
all  his  influence  with  his  chief. 

In  anticipation,  I  felt  myself  called  upon  to  assure  Count 
Riidiger  of  the  most  hearty  thanks  of  my  companions  in  misfor- 
tune. 

The  inquiry  on  my  part,  whether  I  had  to  await  special  orders 
to  march  up  the  army  under  my  command,  and  the  answer,  by 
which  the  arranging  of  the  plan  for  our  self-disarming  was  left 
to  my  own  discretion,  formed  the  remainder  of  the  only  conver- 
sation which  took  place,  2^'^6'vious  to  the  completion  of  the  sur- 
render, between  Count  Riidiger  and  myself 

Meanwhile  the  tete  of  the  Hungarian  army  was  leisurely  ap- 
proaching the  Miihlen  canal.  The  narrow  carriage-road  of  the 
bridge  easily  caused  stoppages  in  defiling  over  it ;  and  to  prevent 
this,  I  immediately  returned  with  my  companions  to  the  bridge, 
and  ordered  the  army  to  form  en  masse  in  two  lines  on  the 
ground  between  the  Miihlen  canal  and  the  village  of  Szollos — 
the  front  toward  the  Russian  main  army  at  Zarand.  The  first 
line  was  formed  by  the  third  and  seventh  corps  ;  the  second  line 
by  the  Arad  division  of  reserve  and  the  first  corps  ;  in  the  space 
between  the  lines  were  collected  all  the  batteries ;  the  train  of 
the  army  was  behind  the  second  line. 

The  oppressive  sultriness  of  the  atmosphere — the  sky  un- 
clouded and  not  a  breath  of  air  stirring — unusually  retarded  the 
march  of  the  troops.     Besides,  they  had  nothing  more  to  lose. 

As  the  last  division  of  the  army  crossed  the  bridge,  the  sun 
was  just  setting. 

And  in  the  twilight  of  the  13th  of  August,  1849,  General 
Count  Riidiger,  the  commander  of  a  Russian  army  corps,  in- 
spected the  Hungarian  troops  under  my  command.  But  the 
cavalry  was  dismounted,  and  had  their  swords  hung  on  the 
pommels  of  their  saddles  ;  the  muskets  of  the  infantry  were  piled 
in  pyramids ;  the  artillery  was  drawn  close  together  and  un- 
manned ;  the  flags  and  standards  lay  there  unprotected  before 
the  disarmed  ranks. 


CHAPTER  LXXXI. 

In  the  night  between  the  13th  and  14th  of  August  1849,  I 
was  escorted  from  the  Russian  camp  at  Zarand  to  Kis-Jeno,  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  14th  likewise  all  the  other  participators  in 
the  laying  down  of  arms. 

At  nightfall  of  the  14th  I  had  to  leave  Kis-Jeno  under  the 
charge  of  a  Russian  staff-officer,  to  be  conveyed  in  a  carriage  to 
Gross- Wardein,  the  head-quarters  of  the  Russian  army.  The 
doctor,  whose  assistance  I  still  needed,  and  three  or  four  of  my 
most-closely  attached  officers,  were  allowed  to  accompany  me. 
The  other  generals,  officers,  and  civil  notabilities  who  were 
prisoners,  received  notice,  in  the  course  of  the  14th  of  August,  by 
means  of  a  placard,  to  be  prepared  next  morning  likewise  to  set 
out  for  Gross-Wardein.  As  I  subsequently  learned,  on  the  1 5th 
they  began  the  march  from  Kis-Jeno  toward  Gross-Wardein,  but 
were  led  back  from  the  station  of  Nagy-Szalonta  to  Sarkad  (eight 
miles  to  the  southwest  of  Gross-Wardein),  and  I  accordingly  in 
vain  expected  a  re-union  with  them  in  Gross-Wardein. 

The  resolution,  however,  which  I  had  definitively  formed  at 
Arad  in  the  night  between  the  10th  and  11th  of  August,  to  give 
the  impulse  to  a  speedy  unbloody  termination  of  the  hopeless 
war,  I  had  executed  to  its  last  consequences.  Letters  written 
by  myself  were  already  on  their  way  to  the  commanders  of  the 
fortresses  which  were  still  occupied  by  Hungarian  troops,  as  well 
as  to  the  leaders  of  divers  Hungarian  corps  and  detachments 
isolated  in  the  district  of  operations  of  the  Russian  army.  The 
latter,  in  my  letters,  I  distinctly  called  upon  to  follow  my  ex- 
ample :  with  regard  to  the  former,  I  confined  myself,  as  far  as  I 
recollect,  to  the  simple  communication  of  facts ;  and  this  from 
the  twofold  reason,  that  I  could  not  overlook  either  the  absolute 
situation  of  the  commander  of  a  fortress  threatened  by  the  enemy, 
nor  the  possibility  of  a  not  unconditional  surrender  being  eventu- 
ally offered  to  him. 

The  confidence  of  the  troops  once  commanded  by  me  had 
mostly  been  concentrated  in  those  men,  who,  thoroughly  under- 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  IIUNGAEY.  609 

standing  my  mode  of  thought  and  action,  had  remained  inac- 
cessible to  the  suspicion,  that  in  the  unconditional  laying  down 
of  our  arms  generally,  or  at  least  in  the  performance  of  this  act 
before  the  Russians,  I  had  had  regard  to  the  safety  of  my  own 
person.  Those,  on  the  contrary,  who  had  felt  themselves  per- 
haps moved  to  render  me  suspected  of  this  intention  had  probably 
so  little  renown  with  the  troops,  or  one  so  extremely  unfavorable, 
that  an  attempt  by  them  at  rendering  me  suspected  must  have 
been  unsuccessful. 

Therein  lies  the  solution  of  the  enigma,  how — in  spite  of  my 
scrupulously  avoiding  any  delusive  pretensions  to  prospects  of 
safety,  nay,  even  simultaneously  disavowing  all  such  illusions — I 
could  succeed  in  performing  the  act  of  surrender,  without  discipline 
being  in  any  way  considerably  disturbed  in  the  ranks  of  the  army. 

And  had  it  pleased  the  victorious  alliance,  in  consideration  of 
the  circumstances  : 

That  I — although  not  agreeing  with  the  "  Debreczin  act  of 
independjnce" — had  nevertheless  fought  under  its  aegis  against 
the  "  Olmiitz  octroyed,"  for  the  carrying  out  of  which  such  im- 
mense efforts  had  been  made  ; 

That  I  further — although  perceiving  from  the  first  that  the 
protraction  of  the  combat  against  the  allied  armies  was  hopeless 
— nevertheless,  by  summoning  up  all  the  moral  and  physical 
forces  I  could  command,  assisted  to  continue  the  war  until  at 
last  Kossuth  himself  officially  declared  that  all  hope  of  Hungary's 
carrying  on  the  defense  of  the  country  any  longer  with  a  prospect 
of  success  was  at  an  end  ; 

That  1  finally — although  in  consequence  of  the  laying  down 
of  our  arms  some  Russians  and  Austrians  had  their  lives  pro- 
longed— had  really  determined  upon  and  performed  this  act 
neither  from  love  of  those  Russians  and  Austrians,  nor  from  re- 
penting of  my  acts ; 

If,  I  say,  in  consideration  of  these  obvious  circumstances,  it  had 
pleased  the  victorious  alliance  not  to  overlook,  that  J,  of  all  the 
actors  in  the  laying  down  of  our  arms,  was  certainly  the  most 
unworthy  of  its  clemency,  and  if  it  consequently  had  allowed  me 
to  fall,  it  would  most  probably  the  more  certainly  have  spared 
me  the  posthumous  fame  of  having  betrayed  my  fatherland,  or 
at  least  my  companions,  and  itself  the  slander  of  having  sue  ceed- 
ed  in  subduing  Hungary  only  by  the  aid  of  my  treachery  ;  since, 

c  c''^ 


610  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

so  far  as  1  know,  neither  it  nor  /  have  to  fear  the  disclosure  ol 
any  fact  from  which  it  could  be  proved  that  it  had  bartered  its 
pardon  for  the  surrender,  or  I  the  surrender  for  my  pardon. 

However,  on  the  first  day  of  my  involuntary  arrival  at  Gross- 
Wardein  (the  15th  of  August),  the  Russian  commander-in-chief 
ordered  me  to  be  brought  before  him ;  and  although  he  received 
me  with  vehement  reproaches  about  the  obstinacy  of  my  resist- 
ance, and  plainly  declared  to  me  at  first  that  besides  my  own 
life  I  had  forfeited  that  also  of  my  comrades — he  nevertheless 
suddenly  went  on  to  a  consideration  of  the  voluntariness  of  our 
act  of  surrender ;  and  concluded  finally  by  a  promise  of  inter- 
ceding for  pardon  for  me  alone,  though  unsought  for  by  me  either 
directly  or  indirectly. 

And  hardly  had  eight  days  elapsed  when  an  ofiicer  in  the  suite 
of  the  Russian  commander-in-chief  announced  to  me,  in  the  name 
of  the  latter,  that  I  had  been  pardoned  by  his  majesty  the  Czar  ; 
further,  that  his  majesty  the  Czar  had  intrusted  his  eldest  son, 
the  Grand  Duke,  heir  to  the  throne,  with  the  mission  to  obtain 
for  me  likewise  the  pardon  of  his  majesty  the  Emperor  of  Aus- 
tria ;  and  that  should  this  be  refused  me,  I  was  to  be  taken  to 
Russia,  in  virtue  of  the  order  of  his  majesty  the  Czar.  At  the 
same  time  this  oflScer  demanded  my  sword  from  me,  and  inti- 
mated that  it  was  the  wish  of  his  serene  highness  Prince  Pasz- 
kiewicz  that  I  should  immediately  lay  aside  the  Honved  uniform, 
and  dress  as  a  civilian. 

A  few  days  after  this  occurrence  the  following  documents  were 
handed  to  me  by  the  Austrian  major,  Norbert  von  Andrassy, 
adjutant  to  the  person  of  Baron  Haynau. 

"  Chief  Command  of  the  Royal  Imperial  Army  in  Hungary. 
No.  186. 

Secret. 

"  His  Majesty,  my  most  gracious  emperor  and  sovereign,  with  the  hered- 
itary clemency  of  liis  most  high  person,  has  deigned  to  pardon  you. 

"You  are,  however,  not  allowed  to  reside  in  Hungary,  but  in  another 
crown-land,  and  in  the  first  instance  Carinthia  is  assigned  for  your  abode, 
whither  you  have  to  repair  without  delay  under  the  conduct  of  the  royal 
imperial  Major  von  Andrassy. 

"  There  is  no  objection  to  your  taking  with  you  your  family  and  effects. 

(Signed)      "  Haynau,  Master  of  the  Ordnance. 
"  Head-quarters,  Arad,  Aug.  26, 1849. 
"  M.  Arthur  VON  GoRGEi." 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  611 

"  M.  Arthur  von  Gcirgei  and  his  lady  are  obliged  to  travel  in  company 
with  the  adjutant  of  the  person  of  his  Excellency  the  commanding  Master 
of  the  Ordnance  Baron  Haynau,  the  right  honorable  Major  Norbert  von 
Andr^ssy,  as  far  as  the  place  which  he  shall  fix  for  both. 

(Signed)         "  Count  Stephen  Szirmay, 

Royal  Imperial  Lieut.-Colonel,  and  substitute 
of  his  Excellency  the  Royal  Imperial  Com- 
missary-in-chief Francis  Count  von  Zichy. 
"  Gboss-Wardein,  Aug.  27th,  1849." 

The  latter  document  was  issued  by  the  commissariat  repre- 
senting the  Austrian  government  in  the  head-quarters  of  the 
Russian  army. 

And  Major  von  Andrassy  conducted  me  without  more  ado  from 
Gross-Wardein  by  Crakow  and  Vienna  to  Klagenfurt.* 

While  still  in  Gross-Wardein  I  had  a  foretaste  of  the  injurious 
effect  of  all  these  things  on  my  reputation.  Already,  in  con- 
sequence of  my  separation  from  the  rest  of  the  prisoners,  the 
rumor  was  spread,  that  I  was  about  to  be  received  into  the 
Russian  army  as  a  general ;  and  the  circumstance  that  such  a 
rumor  found  behef  sufficiently  proved  of  itself  in  what  haste  the 
public  opinion  has  been  to  impress  on  the  act  of  surrender  the 
stamp  of  treason. 

The  facts  which  soon  afterward,  nay  almost  simultaneously, 
became  publicly  known,  namely,  that  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
retained  to  himself  the  decision  about  my  fate  exclusively,  and 
ordered,  on  the  contrary,  all  the  other  prisoners  to  be  unreservedly 
delivered  up  to  Austria,  sufficed  to  complete  the  justification 
of  the  condemnatory  judgment  which  had  been  passed  upon  me. 

In  addition  to  this,  the  Russians,  on  the  occasion  of  our  sur- 
render, it  was  said,  had  again  got  into  their  hands  a  subordinate 
individual  who  had  deserted  to  us.  This  man  (while  the  army 
under  my  command  was  stationed  between  Miskolcz  and  Tokaj), 
as  leader  of  a  Russian  patrol  of  cavalry,  being  sent  from  the 
Gyongyos  high  road  toward  the  passage  of  the  Theiss  between 

*  Major  von  Andrdssy  during  the  whole  time  of  his  escort  service — 
which,  as  I  can  very  well  conceive,  was  any  thing  but  agreeable — behaved 
toward  me  in  a  most  chivalrous  manner.  After  our  arrival  at  Klagen- 
furt,  he  had  moreover  the  kindness  to  commend  me  to  the  protection  of 
Captain  von  Kurzendorfer,  at  that  time  commander  of  the  place ;  a  man 
— I  speak  from  my  own  experienc6 — -distinguished  by  the  most  humane 
disposition,  and  at  the  same  time  having  the  rare  courage  boldly  to  prove 
this  by  his  conduct  to  the  unfortunate,  without  respect  of  persons,  even  in 
opposition  to  public  opinion. 


I 


bliS  ^    MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGAP.Y. 

Poroszlo  and  Tiszafiired,  at  that  time  in  our  possession,  had  exe- 
cuted his  determination  of  passing  over  to  the  enemy  (into  our 
ranks),  abandoning  his  men.  The  detached  commander  of  our 
column  at  Tiszafiired  hereupon,  on  his  own  authority,  had  the 
deserter  immediately  escorted  from  Tiszafiired  to  Arad,  as  he 
wished  to  serve  under  Field-marshal  Lieut.  Bern.  Nevertheless, 
instead  of  arriving  at  the  Bern  army,  he  happened  to  come  into 
the  camp  of  that  which  I  commanded,  and,  through  our  surren- 
der, before  a  Russian  council  of  war. 

Although  the  first  knowledge  I  had  of  the  existence  of  this 
individual  was  during  my  captivity,  from  a  Russian  stafF-ofhcer, 
who  communicated  to  me  the  doings  and  destiny  of  the  delin- 
quent, as  a  topic  of  the  day  ;  nevertheless  public  opinion  accused 
me  of  the  intentional  delivery  of  this  Pole  (in  the  "  Pole"  lies 
the  point)  to  Russia,  and  welcomed  therein  an  evident  proof  that 
I  had  shunned  the  use  of  no  means  to  obtain  pardon  from  the 
Czar. 

Consequently  it  was  to  be  foreseen,  that  the  sum  of  eleven 
hundred  gold  half-imperials,*  which  I  had  received  from  Prince 

*  At  the  surrender,  all  the  ready-money  I  possessed  amounted  to 
about  fifty  ducats  in  gold,  and  perhaps  2000  florms  in  Kossuth  notes.t 
After  the  latter  had  been  taken  from  me  in  the  Russian  head-qua.rters  by 
order  of  the  Austrian  commissariat  of  the  country,  I  was  forced  to  sell  my 
horses  at  any  price,  and  immediately  dismiss  my  servants.  Prince 
Paszkiewicz,  accidentally  informed  of  this  in  the  first  days  of  my  cap- 
tivity, had  the  sum  of  300  gold  half-imperials  placed  at  my  disposal;  and 
on  the  evening  preceding  my  involuntary  departure  from  Gross-Wardein  the 
Prince  in  person  handed  to  me  a  sum  of  500  pieces  of  the  same  coin, 
when  he  had  learned  that  my  removal  to  Klagenfurt  was  not  to  take 
place  at  the  expense  of  the  state,  and  that  the  possibility  of  prolonging 
my  existence  was  in  no  way  secured  to  me,  even  for  the  inmaediate 
future. 

Both  sums,  it  is  true,  were  offered  to  me  as  loans  for  an  indefinite 
period,  with  the  unmistakable  intention'  of  not  wounding  my  feelings. 
My  expectation,  however,  that  the  reaction  of  my  revolutionary  activity 
on  my  person  would  free  me  for  ever  from  further  care  about  support, 
having  been  disappointed  by  my  unforeseen  pardon,  I  was  now  unfortu- 
nately in  th  econdition  of  being  forced  to  accept  with  thanks  what  was 
called  a  loan,  in  spite  of  my  apprehension  of  not  being  able  again  to 
repay  it. 

I  have  above  stated  the  total  sum  received  from  Prince  Paszkiewicz  to 
amount  to  1100  gold  half-imperials,  because,  besides  the  800  pieces,  I 
had  also  received  300  to  be  distributed  among  the  Hungarian  officers  who 


t  The  ducat  =  about  9s.  M.;  the  florins  =  2s.— TVans. 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  613 

Paszkiewicz,  would  figure  in  the  general  judgment  about  me 
wholly  as  the  reward  for  delivering  up  this  Pole,  if  not  even  as 
the  price  of  blood  for  the  treason  committed  against  the  father- 
land, or  at  least  against  my  comrades. 

However,  although  originally  by  no  means  a  despiser  of  the 
public  opinion  in  Hungary,  I  had  nevertheless,  before  the  13th 
of  August,  1849,  ceased  to  respect  it  unreservedly — thanks  to  its 
numerous  aberrations  during  the  time,  though  but  short,  of  our 
acquaintance. 

And  in  fact  it  was  the  sorrowful  future  of  Hungary  and  of  my 
companions,  not  that  of  my  public  honor,  which  grieved  me. 

The  future  of  Hungary  was  considered  as  lost  after  the  sur- 
render, even  by  tlwse  patriots  who  during  the  combat  between 
Hungary  and  Austria  had  sided  with  the  latter — but  not  in  the 
field.*' 

The  future  of  a  great  part  of  my  companions  evidently  fluc- 
tuated between  prison  and  death. 

Csanyi  was  brought  a  day  or  two  later  than  myself  to  Gross- 
Wardein  in  the  strictest  custody.  He  had  with  him  in  coin  a 
part  of  the  fortune  of  his  ward,  and  earnestly  requested  a  meet- 
ing with  me,  intending  to  forward  this  money  through  me  to  its 
owner.  It  was  too  late.  A  meeting  was  refused  us.  On  the 
14th  of  August,  1849,  at  Kis-Jeno,  I  had  taken  leave  for  ever 
(without  having  a  presentiment  of  it)  of  Csanyi,  as  well  as  of  all 
my  companions,  with  the  exception  of  a  few. 

The  other  civilian  notabilities,  who  had  joined  in  the  act  of 
surrender,  were  treated,  as  I  heard,  at  first  less  severely.  I  even 
spoke  to  some  of  them  in  Gross- Wardein.  They  were  for  the 
Dresent  sent  to  their  homes  by  means  of  compulsory  passports. 

The  hussars  and  Honveds,  from  sergeant-major  downwards 
(those  also  who  had  formerly  been  in  the  Austrian  service),  re- 
ceived an  amnesty  soon  after  the  surrender  of  arms. 

had  been  transported  to  Gross-Wardein,  in  part  together  with  me,  in  part 
in  the  course  of  the  next  following  days.  These  officers  were  thereby  to 
be  enabled  to  procure  for  themselves  civilian  attire,  as  they  were  to  lay 
aside  the  Honved  uniform  immediately  after  their  arrival  at  Gross- 
Wardein. 

*  Whether  these  patriots  had  formerly  entertained  hopes,  and  of  what 
kind,  relative  to  the  salvation  of  the  fatherland,  I  know  not.  It  may  easily 
be  conceived,  that  before  the  surrender  I  had  no  opportunity  of  coming  in 
contact  with  any  of  them. 


i 


614  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

The  generals  and  officers,  however,  were  kept  in  custody. 
Baron  Haynau  had  reserved  to  himself  for  a  more  suitable  time 
the  decision  of  their  fate.  I  could  not  possibly  be  deceived  as  to 
the  horrid  meaning  of  this  reservatibn. 

So  long  as  the  unfortunate  men,  like  myself,  were  detained 
prisoners  by  the  Russians,  I  still  hoped  indeed  to  induce  Prince 
Paszkiewicz  to  use  his  influence,  of  which  he  seemed  too  prodi- 
gal toward  me,  rather  in  favor  of  my  companions.  I  proceeded 
on  the  supposition  that  the  Russian  commander-in-chief  had  come 
to  the  determination  to  interfere  only  for  my  safety,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  erroneous  opinion  that  our  surrender  was  to  be  con- 
sidered as  the  necessary  consequence  of  my  absolute  will.  To 
convince  Prince  Paszkiewicz  of  the  contrary  was,  therefore,  the 
nearest  object  of  my  endeavors.  I  duly  rendered  prominent  the 
spontaneousness  of  the  assent  of  my  comrades  to  the  laying  down 
of  our  arms,  their  co-operation  in  the  accomplishment  of  this  act, 
as  well  as  the  impossibility  of  executing  it  without  their  assent 
and  co-operation ;  and  moreover  declared  to  the  Russian  com- 
mander-in-chief, that  I  did  not  in  general  value  the  pardon 
which  he  designed  for  me,  and  least  of  all  if  it  should  be  the  un- 
changeable fate  of  my  companions  to  be  delivered  up  to  Baron 
Haynau. 

However  plainly  Prince  Paszkiewicz's  decided  inclination  to- 
ward generosity  was  proved  by  the  humane  treatment  which  my 
comrades  and  myself  enjoyed  in  the  Russian  camp,  his  answer 
nevertheless  was  always  confined  to  the  comfortless  assurance 
that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  attend  to  my  representations 
and  prayers.  And  when  the  delivery  of  the  prisoners  to  an  Aus- 
trian escort  had  taken  place — although  I  knew  perfectly  well  in 
how  noble  a  manner  Prince  Paszkiewicz  had  directly  solicited  the 
pardon  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria  for  my  companions — I  could 
not  but  the  more  certainly  despair  of  their  preservation,  as  in  the 
mean  time  the  influence  of  some  things  which  had  happened 
«eemed  in  itself  to  be  sufiicient  to  endanger  in  the  highest  degree 
the  life  of  these  unfortunate  men. 

General  Damjanics,  commander  of  the  fortress  of  Ar ad,  imme- 
diately after  the  laying  down  of  our  arms,  had  informed  Count 
Riidiger  of  his  determination  to  surrender  this  fortress  only  to 
Russian  troops.  The  Russian  General,  Buturlin,  charged  to  open 
negotiations  with  the  fortress,  and  provided  for  this  purpose  with 


MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY.  615 

a  letter  from  me  to  General  Damjanics,  went  consequently  on  the 
15th  of  August  to  Alt-Arad,  and  obtained  a  capitulation,  in 
which  the  garrison  of  Alt-Arad  engaged  to  evacuate  the  place 
on  the  17th  of  August  in  the  afternoon,  at  discretion,  but  only  be- 
fore Russian  troops ;  and  General  Buturlin,  on  his  part,  guaran- 
teed the  non-presence  of  Austrian  troops  at  the  act  of  surrender. 
The  fortress  had,  however,  been  blockaded  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Maros  by  an  Austrian  corps,  under  Field-marshal  Lieut. 
Schlick,  who,  before  it  commenced  negotiating  with  the  Russians, 
had  summoned  it  to  surrender,  but  had  received  a  decided  nega- 
tive answer.     When  Baron  Haynau,  therefore,  was  informed  of 
the  treaty  for  capitulation,  which  had  been  concluded  immedi- 
ately after  between  the  garrison  and  General  Buturlin,  he  issued 
an  order  to  Count  Schlick,  the  execution  of  which  must  place 
the  Russian  general  in  the  fatal  alternative  of  either  not  keeping 
his  word  to  the  garrison  of  Arad  (for  the  non-presence  of  Aus- 
trian troops  at  the  act  of  surrender),  or  of  opposing  in  a  hostile 
manner  his  troops  to  those  under  Count  Schlick.     Count  Riidiger 
— early  informed  of  Haynau's  order,  and  perceiving  that  General 
Buturlin  would  be  obliged,  in  virtue  of  his  treaty,  to  prevent  the 
execution  of  this  order  even  by  armed  force,  and  that  consequently 
a  conflict  between  the  Austrian  and  Russian  troops  would  be  un- 
avoidable— dispatched  without  delay  an  officer  to  the  Austrian 
head-quarters  at  Temesvar,  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  Baron 
Haynau  to  revoke  his  order  to  Schlick.     The  deputy  of  Count 
Riidiger  found  Baron  Haynau  obstinate  in  a  high  degree  ;  and 
only  the  impressive  representation  of  the  Russian  officer,  that 
through  this  order  the  existence  of  Austria,  scarcely  saved,  would 
again  be  called  in  question,  at  the  last  moment  succeeded  in  ob- 
taining its  revocation.     Count  Riidiger  had  beforehand  charged  his 
deputy  at  once  to  convey  Baron  Haynau's  counter-order  to  Count 
Schlick.     The  latter — on  the  one  hand,  firmly  resolved,  from 
well  understanding  the  interests  of  his  Monarch,  not  to  obey 
Haynau's  order  ;  on  the  other  hand,  believing  the  Baron  capable 
of  punishing  his  inevitable  disobedience  in  the  most  inconsiderate 
manner — in  the  Russian  officer  hastening  back  from  Temesvar 
to  Arad  with  Haynau's  counter-order,  hailed  the  saviour  of  his 
life. 

The  news  of  these  occurrences,  rapidly  spread  through  the 
camp  of  the  Russian  army,  gave  rise  to  remarks  upon  Baron 


I 


I 


616  MY  LIFE  AND  ACTS  IN  HUNGARY. 

Haynau's  personal  character  which  appeared  by  no  means 
to  spring  from  feelings  of  esteem.  Haynau's  proclamation  at 
Temesvar  on  the  18th  of  August,  1849,  by  which  the  Russian 
army  felt  itself  sorely  wounded,  had  the  effect  of  exposing  not 
only  the  person  of  the  Austrian  commander-in-chief,  but  likewise 
his  army,  to  these  remarks. 

The  Russian  officers,  who,  following  the  noble  example  of 
their  generals,  from  the  day  of  the  surrender  had  endeavored  to 
alleviate  as  much  as  possible  the  captivity  of  my  companions  in 
war,  in  their  excitement  against  the  Austrians  now  went  so  far 
as  remarkably  to  distinguish  the  Hungarian  prisoners,  sometimes 
in  the  presence  of  Austrian  officers,  nay  even  to  treat  the  latter 
with  undisguised  disrespect  before  the  former.  It  soon  came  to 
encounters  between  separate  individuals  of  the  allied  armies ;  and 
rumor,  which  reports  every  thing  in  a  fabulous  manner,  developed 
from  this  by  degrees  the  certainty  of  a  war  being  already  about 
to  break  out  between  Austria  and  Russia,  in  which  Hungary  was 
of  course  not  to  espouse  the  side  of  Austria.  However,  the  cir- 
cumstance that  the  prisoners  were  delivered  up  at  Sarkat  to  an 
Austrian  detachment  deprived  the  nascent  rumors  of  more  than 
a  merely  ephemeral  existence ;  and  only  the  facts,  on  which 
these  rumors  were  based,  endured  and  operated  afterward^ 
and  this  presumptively  to  the  unavoidable  destruction  of  these 
unfortunate  men ;  for  all  that  I  had  hitherto  learnt  relative  to 
the  character  of  Baron  Haynau  increased  my  apprehension  that 
he  would  scarcely  fail,  in  deciding  upon  the  fate  of  my  compan- 
ions, to  make  these  defenseless  Hungarians  pay  for  all  the  morti- 
fication caused,  especially  to  his  self-love,  by  armed  Russians. 

And  so  long  as  my  pardon  was  valid  only  in  Russia,  not  in 
Austria  also,  he  could  indulge  his  impulse  to  do  so  the  more 
heedlessly,  as  even  the  most  copious  use  of  the  jus  gladii  com- 
mitted to  him  could  more  naturally  be  represented  as  a  state  ne- 
cessity to  free  united  Austria. 

But  from  the  moment  when  the  Emperor  of  Austria  was  also 
pleased  to  pardon  me,  the  rule  of  the  jus  gladii  over  those  who 
had  been  under  my  command  against  Austria  must,  according 
to  my  conviction,  have  ceased  to  be  necessary  to  the  state  of 
Austria. 

THE    END 

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